NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00659R000100310001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100310001-2
IJIMOGIUF UI I %Or Wr?rr-ii..
-111- IA Central
Intelligence
Seitt,s-rid)
14ational Intelligence Daily
Sat9rday
7 FObruary 1987
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CPAS NID 87-031JX
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7 February 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100310001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100310001-2
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Contents
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Philippines: End of Cease-Fire Imminent
1
Persian Gulf States-Egypt: Closing Ranks
2
USSR-China: Boundary Talks
3
Eastern Europe: Reaction to Soviet Party Plenum
4
EC-Central America: Meeting in Guatemala
5
Suriname: Increasing Disarray
6
Notes
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Egypt: Election Likely
7
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North Yemen-South Yemen: Border Tensions Over Oil
9
India: Military Pushing Resumption of Exercises
9
Israel-Lebanon: Fresh Attacks by Hizballah
10
China: New Restrictions on Overseas Study
10
In Brief
11
Special Analyses
Middle East: Response to US Naval Moves
12
Haiti: One Year After Duvalier
14
Ten Spereat
7 February 1987
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PHILIPPINES: End of Cease-Fire Imminent
The 60-day truce with the Communist insurgents expires at 2300
EST tonight, but hostilities may not resume immediately.
President Aquino has called publicly for an extension of the truce. The
Communist negotiators, who walked out of the peace talks two weeks
ago after a clash between leftist demonstrators and the military near
the presidential palace, have not responded. Despite the breakdown
of the negotiations, both sides have continued to honor the truce.
Comment: Aquino probably is disappointed with the Communists'
failure to resume discussions, she
and her advisers believe there is popular support for the cease-fire.
They favor an extension that would give the government's recently
launched program to get Communists to defect time to take effect. If
the Communists refuse to extend the truce, the government may try
to negotiate cease-fire agreements in various regions with local
insurgent commanders. There have been signs that rebel
commanders in the Visavas and on Mindanao are interested in
continuing the truce
The initial Philippine military response to expiration of the truce is
likely to be low-key. The armed forces, whose leaders are convinced
that the cease-fire has primarily benefited the insurgents, are anxious
to regain the initiative, but they do not want to be blamed for starting
hostilities. The military will probably resume fighting in those parts of
the country where the rebels refuse to negotiate. Such a strategy
would be compatible with the armed forces' limited capability to
sustain a nationwide counterinsurgency offensive.
The Communists' plans following expiration of the cease-fire are not
clear. They may be reluctant to initiate attacks that would give the
government a big propaganda advantage. The Communists must be
troubled by the demonstration of popular support for Aquino in the
constitutional plebiscite last Monday.
insurgent leaders suspect an imminent military crackdown and
are considering preemptive attacks, they may decide to wait for the
government to make the first move
Top Secret
1 7 February 1987
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To Secret
PERSIAN GULF Closing Ranks
STATES-EGYPT:
Fears that Iran is winning the war with Iraq and that instability in
Egypt is mounting are prompting Saudi Arabia and the other
Arab states on the Persian Gulf to seek closer ties to Cairo.
Gulf leaders have been responsive to Cairo's efforts to improve its
contacts with other Arab states and, in fact, facilitated EavDt's
attendance at the Islamic summit late last month.
it was Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that brokered the talks
between Syrian President Assad and Egyptian President Mubarak at
the meeting. According to the US Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi King
Fahd's two meetings with Mubarak were designed to signal that
Saudi-Egyptian relations are improving steadily.
UAE President Zayid, in a rare initiative, received Mubarak
immediately after the Islamic summit. The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi
speculated that the highly publicized meeting centered on the war and
possible financial assistance to Egypt. Oman, which never broke
diplomatic relations with Cairo, also hosted Mubarak in an attempt to
demonstrate its support for closer Gulf ties to Egypt.
Comment: Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states probably believe
that closer ties to Egypt are essential to counter the Iranian threat in
the region. In exchange for financial assistance, they probably expect
Egyptian guarantees of security assistance in the event of future
Iranian aggression
Despite these initiatives, the Gulf states are unlikely to restore
diplomatic relations with Egypt soon, for fear of provoking Arab
radicals. However, they see the importance of a moderate regime in
Cairo and will try to build a consensus within the Arab League for
Egypt's reintegration into the Arab fold.
Top Secret
2 7 February 1987
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Disputed Areas
on the
Sino-Soviet Border
1=1 Principal areas in dispute between China and the
SOviet Union. Chinese claim the Soviets hold islands in
the Amur and Ussuri and areas in the Pamirs which
were not given to Tsarist Russia even by the "unequal
treaties" of the 19th century.
Bektr.th
Pamir tract
Paklatan
o?s
t
iKhinese LineN,
of Control
India....Indian Claim
Soviet Union
Chimnaya Island (Hei,i'lazi)
Soviet Union
Boundary shown on
Chinese maps
Khabarovsk
N
,..r..0*efric;?\
Boundary shown ton ?
Russian maps
China
SI
a741.
Soviet\Union
? 1.0Kilometers
0
"????.,
Chimnaya
Island
(Heixiazi)
Khabarovsk
Are ot, to f
o 300 Kllome,ters
0 300Miles
China
BEIJING*
,
North
Korea;
South
Korea
Yellow Sc?-:
Japan
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Top Secret
7 February 1987
7095242.B/
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Top Secret
USSR-CHINA: Boundary Talks
The Sino-Soviet boundary a s reopen n Moscow o
after a nine-year hiatus are unlikely to produce quick solutions to
the many deep-seated territorial disputes, but their resumption
marks a significant broadening of the dialogue.
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The talks were agreed to by the Foreign Ministers in September.
Chinese officials have acknowledged 4.e4sleErelefolemete?Wriet their
decision to resume was a direct result of-General Secretary
Gorbachev's statement at Vladivostok last July that the Amur River
boundary could pass along the main channel or thalweg of the river. If
this approach were also used for the Ussuri River boundary, it would
rprmirp thp 11SSR to rAttirn ost of the 600 to 700 islands in dispute.
7
The negotiations will be chaired by Deputy Foreign Ministers
Rogachev and Qian, who also head delegations to the semiannual
talks on political normalization. Grower stoietwailiagamilimpaitieirantetabta
liElmEmlsossor siiisosiettg the talks till last two weeks and that Moscow
hopes to secure a firm s'cItedule f gs
The Soviet negotiator added that the mast difficult issues are likely to
be: defining main channels for the two rivers, in particular where they
have shifted over the years; resolving which state owns the islands at
the confluence of the rivers opposite the Soviet city of Khabarovsk;
and?along the western sector?deciding which ridge in the Pamir
Mountains was agreed to as the border in a 19th-century treatyalier?
Comment: Moscow evidently is trying to improve the atmosphere for
the talks by having Rogachev head its delegation rather than Deputy
Foreign Minister llichev who was uncompromising when he led the
Soviet side in the 1970s, and by announcing the planned withdrawal
of about 20 percent of the Soviet troops in Mongolia this spring. The
Kremlin probably hopes that a modicum of progress on border issues
would persuade China to accept Gorbachev's offer to open another
forum to discuss mutual troop reductions along the border.
The Soviets' keen interest in improving relations with China suggests
they will make some concessions in an effort to be accommodating.
Their stated intention to keep the islands opposite Khabarovsk,
however, might scuttle an overall settlement
The Chinese probably agreed to resume these talks to encourage
Moscow's courtship. They are likely to interpret Gorbachev's
eagerness as a softening of his resolve on border issues and will
probably press for further concessions without offering much in
return on boundary matters or in_possible future talks on troop
reductions
Top Secret
3 7 February 1987
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EASTERN EUROPE: Reaction to Soviet Party Plenum
The East Europeans probably are relieved that Soviet party
leader Gorbachev did not win full endbrsemen,t for his reform
package at the recent plenum of the Soviet Central
Committee.
Comment: Soviet party secretary Medvedev who is responsible for
relations with ruling Communist parties, t.iweek briefed the East
European ambassadors in Moscow on the plenum. Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze took advantage of a previously arranged trip
to East Germany and Czechoslovakia to stress the plenum's
significance. The Czechoslovaks seem the most concerned to appear
in step with Gorbachev, while the East Germans remain studiously
cool
The plenum probably has convinced the East Europeans of
Gorbachev's determination to pursue his domestic program. !hey will
see the lukewarm endorsement of his ideas in the plenum resolution
and rumors about opposition to his leadership, however, as
preserving maneuvering room for them,
Few East European leaders are seriously interested in adopting
Gorbachev's more aggressive proposals, such as on personnel policy
or intraparty democratization. They will continue to wait to see how
the Soviets define these ideas in practice. If Gorbachev is successful
at home, potential successors to the aging East European leaders
might follow his lead in order to further their careers
The multilateral ambassadorial session, while consistent with
Gorbachev's efforts to forge closer unity by keeping his allies better
informed, was also the first such meeting since he became party boss.
It may also have been designed to remind the East Europeans that
they too should take steps, especially in the economic sector, to
overcome their deficiencies.
Ton Secret
4 7 February 1987
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EC- Meeting in Guatemala
CENTRAL AMERICA:
European Community officials will meet on Monday with
representatives of the Central American and Contadora
countries and probably will oppose any Nicaraguan attempts to
include strong anti-US statements in the conference
communique.
Comment: The West Europeans see the meeting in Guatemala?the
third in a series that began in 1984?as a means of demonstrating the
EC's continued interest in the region and support for the Contadora
peace process. The Central American states hope for increased
European economic assistance. Nicaragua probably wants to
persuade the West Europeans to voice openly their criticism of US
support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents.
The meeting is unlikely to produce major initiatives. Budgetary
constraints probably will prevent the EC and most individual West
European countries from providing much more than their currently
modest levels of economic assistance. They have been reducing aid
to the Sandinistas?largely because of growing disenchantment with
Managua's human rights record?and probably will redirect some
assistance to the Central American democracies.
The West Europeans' hopes that these meetings might contribute to
regional peace, democratic reform, and economic development have
largely faded. Most West European governments are increasingly
pessimistic about the prospects for Contadora but want to maintain
their role in the area
The conference almost certainly will issue a statement reiterating
support for Contadora. It is also likely to condemn human rights
abuses in the region without singling out any regimes, urge the
adoption of democratic reforms, and call for an end to outside
intervention in Central America. The West Europeans probably will
oppose any Nicaraguan effort to add strong anti-US statements that
would antagonize Central American moderates and the US?although
West European leaders remain opposed to US military support to the
anti-Sandinista insurgents.
TOD Secret
5 7 February 1987
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SURINAME:
Increasing Disarray
As economic and military
disagreements are growing
policymaking is becoming
Government Bouterse may
pressures mount in Suriname,
within leadership circles,
more confused, and Head of
be considering asking the US for help.
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officials blame
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numerous
Foreign Minister Herrenberg
for encouraging
Bouterse to expel the
Dutch Ambassador last month.
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a key labor leader blasted
Bouterse for expelling the Ambassador at a
time when renewed Dutch development aid is
vital to the economy.
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Bouterse may regret the expulsion. Various press
reports say that
Paramaribo has asked The Hague to name a new ambassador and
has offered to
upgrade Suriname's diplomatic
presence in the
Netherlands.
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Bouterse expects Herrenberg
and Prime
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Minister Raclhaloshun?
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Ito resign by the end of next month, which is the deadline for
presenting a constitution. Finance Minister Mungra reportedly is
calling for an austerity program designed to obtain IMF assistance,
but the labor leader and the Central Bank director are opposed to
such a plan.
According to a US diplomatic report, Bouterse recently raised the
"hypothetical possibility" of US military forces protecting the US-
owned Suralco facilities and asked about help in restoring electricity
to the capital. Since late December, official press statements have
suggested that Paramaribo wants to improve relations with the US.
Meanwhile officials of the
Libyan People's Bureau are trying to meet with rebel leader Brunswijk
to discuss possible support for the insurgents.
Comment: The economic crisis seems to be bringing to the surface
ideological and personal rivalries among government officials.
Bouterse's past erratic behavior and his growing desperation over the
regime's mishandling of the insurgency and the economy portend
increasingly confused domestic and foreign policies
Tripoli probably sees a deal with Brunswijk as its best option for
maintaining a presence in Suriname should Bouterse fall from power.
The rebels might accept Libyan military aid but, if they came to
power, would probably expel the Libyans, particularly if Libyan ties
precluded Western help
6
Tnn qtartnat
I reoruary luot
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NtiEGYPT: Election Likely
ect week's referendum called by President Mubara dissolve the
Pedpte's Assembly is likely to have little trouble pa g. If it passes, a
new election must be held by 17 April. Althoug opposition leaders
have prai d the move because it could exp d their representation, 25X1
they are calllfl for additional steps towa 41 a more open system
before they parbc,ate, according to)h US Embassy. 25X1
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Comment: Mubarak heeds a vl People's Assembly to ensure that
his reelection next fall isle ate, and the referendum in part may
be an effort to preempt a au,ct decision invalidating the election law
under which the curre Assert) ly was elected. The initiative gives
opposition groups g ater leverae and Mubarak may have to make
further concession' if he is to ensur their participation and escape a
court challenge/the election campaig N#Iso will provide him with
excuses to,eAporize on badly needed, NI potentially divisive,
economiyeforms.
Top Secret
7 7 February 1987
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Ton Secret
Yemeni Border Tensions
Saudi Arabia
Jazieir
Faresank
(Saudi Arabia)
Red Sea
Q
? a?
Ethiopia
Kemaran
Island
(P.D.R.Y.)
0
HUNT-EXXON
concession area
Jaziral
Jabal Zugern
(Y.A.R.) ?1.1
Jazirat at
/*mist,
at Kabir
(YAP.)
SANAA
Area of oil,,-
resources ,
Alif field "--
Ma'rib\\., 0//
refine
Yemen Arab
Republic
(North Yemen)
Djibouti
0
'e de ?
t""'" DJIBOUTI
Perim Island
Gulf of Aden
Soviet oil discovery
ew South Yemeni
border claim
(--
Boundary representation is
jalia
not necessarily authoritative.
Top Secret
7 February 1987
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen)
709514 (A05111) 2-87
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NORTH YEMEN-SOUTH YEMEN: Border Tensions Over Oil
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The possibility of a border clash between the two Yemens has been
heightened by South Yemen's formal claim to territory near a recent
oil discovery he claim was made 25X1
after North Yemen protested the buildup ot south Yemeni military
forces in the disputed area near Ma'rib followina a major oil discovery
south of there by the USSR. Sanaa believes the 25X1
Soviet discovery is in North Yemen 25X1
Comment: Geologic studies known to the North Yemenis suggest
that the disputed area includes several large oilfields containing at
least several hundred million barrels of oil. The Soviet discovery
probably confirmed South Yemeni suspicions that the oil-bearing
area in North Yemen extends into South Yemen, and Aden will push
the border issue. North Yemen has permanent military facilities at
Ma'rib, however, and maintains a decisive numerical advantage over
South Yemeni forces in the border area. Even so, the oilfields are
vulnerable to sabotage
INDIA: Military Pushing Resumption of Exercises
Indian officials have reacted to the Indo-Pakistani border withdrawal
agreement with relief, but the military appears determined to continue
with the Brass Tacks exercises.
the Army Chief of Staff seems to have persuaded Prime Minister
Gandhi to continue the Brass Tacks IV exercise at full strength
despite misgivings in the Cabinet and Foreign Ministry. The US
Embassy and Indian press commentators speculate that Gandhi's
aggressive stance will enhance his party's political standing in the key
spring elections in two northwestern states. Critics, however, are
accusing Gandhi of vacillating between appeasement and
confrontation during the crisis and of making India appear a bully.
Comment: Some Indian troops at the border are likely to move to the
Brass Tacks exercise area over the next few days rather than return
to garrison?probably sparking renewed Pakistani protests. Gandhi
and his Congress Party almost certainly will translate the Army
deployments into votes from Hindus in the northwest, who will
welcome additional troops in Punjab as evidence of New Delhi's
commitment to combat Sikh extremists. Gandhi should easily weather
press criticism that his recent actions were ill considered and
inconsistent
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Top Secret
7 February 1987
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Mediterranean
Sea
BEIRUT Lebanon
,
Hiiballah Isr",e1r--
attacks