NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00659R000100300001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vii V74i~
uiru Or OF I %F"
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
-s ,
'6 February 1981
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Contents
USSR-Middle East: Reaction to US Naval Activity .................... 1
Kuwait-Iran: Terrorists Hiding in Iranian Embassy ...................... 2
India-Pakistan: Options Against Sikh Extremists ........................ 3
Jordan-PLO: Renewal of Limited Cooperation ............................ 4
Chad-Libya-France: Chadian Offensive Preparations ................ 5
West Germany: Extradition Uncertain ........................................ 6
USSR: Cosmonauts To Resume Space Station Operations........ 6
Kuwait-USSR: Talks on Economic Cooperation Scheduled ......
Nicaragua: Heavy Fighting in the Northwest ..............................
Pakistan-USSR: Foreign Minister Visits Moscow ........................
Israel-PLO: Heightened Unrest in Gaza Strip ..............................
Syria-Egypt: Assad and Mubarak Meet ......................................
Greece: Cabinet Changes ............................................................
Spain: Leadership Struggle Among Conservatives ....................
South Korea: Government's Hard Line on Rally ........................
China-GATT: Long Accession Negotiations Ahead ....................
Special Analyses
Top Secret
Colombia: Rise in Insurgent Violence .......................................... 13
France: Chirac Charts Cautious Course ...................................... 15
Too Secret
6 February 1987
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USSR- Reaction to US Naval Activity
MIDDLE EAST:
Moscow shows no sign of concern that US military intervention in
the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf might be imminent, and the
Soviet military response to increased US naval activity in the
region-if any-is likely to be low key.
Soviet media have widely reported the heightened US military
presence in the Middle East but have not issued an official
condemnation of or warning to the US. In a Moscow press conference
on Tuesday, a senior Soviet spokesman expressed concern over US
naval activities and accused Washington of increasing tensions in
Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. A Soviet diplomat in Damascus met
recently with a US official to cony Syrian fears of pendinz-US
strike and to probe US intentions
Meanwhile, the Soviets' Mediterranean Fleet-including a Kiev-class
VTOL aircraft carrier-is slightly below normal strength; it continues
routine intelligence collection operations against US forces.
Moscow's Indian Ocean squadron is also at less-than-normal
strength- although a Soviet destroyer is en route to the Indian Ocean.
Comment: Moscow probably is concerned that the new round of
hostage taking might be used to justify US strikes in Lebanon or Syria
and appears to be attempting to defuse the situation. Its official
statements have been mild in comparison to the strong Soviet
condemnation of US exercises in the Gulf of Sidra in January 1986
and direct warnings to the US against striking Syria during
US-Turkish exercises late last year.
The USSR probably is also concerned that the US might seize on the
instability in the Persian Gulf to increase its military presence in the
region. As the US naval presence in the Gulf increases, the USSR will
augment its Indian Ocean squadron but probably only to show the
flag and to collect intelligence. There is no indication that the USSR
will increase its Mediterranean Fleet substantially over the near term.
Tnn Spr_rpt
1 6 February 1987
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Top Secret
KUWAIT-IRAN: Terrorists Hiding in Iranian Embassy
Kuwaiti officials reportedly have evidence that Tehran has
provided direct support to terrorists in Kuwait; they believe that
five suspects sought for the bombings of oil facilities there last
month and in June are hiding inside the Iranian Embassy in
Kuwait.
Kuwait late last week announced the arrests of 11 suspects and the
discovery of several arms caches. Kuwaiti officials claim that some of
the weapons-which included Soviet, Israeli, and US assault rifles,
submachineguns, silencers, grenades, and devices for time bombs-
are traceable to Iran. They also say that some of those arrested had
traveled frequently to Iran and had received instructions in code via
daily radiobroadcasts from southern Iran.
Official statements and press accounts of the arrests avoid mention
of the Iranian angle and play down tensions between Sunni and Shia
Muslims within Kuwait, even though all the suspects are Kuwaiti
Shias, some from prominent families with ethnic links to Iran. Families
of those arrested reportedly demonstrated briefly outside the Interior
Ministry. A source told the US Embassy that a crowd estimated at 50
to 100 men threatened the police while they were searching a
suspect's home.
Comment: This is the first evidence that Iran was directly involved in
the Kuwait bombings. Tehran's support to the group and its apparent
willingness to allow the terrorists to take refuge in the Iranian
Embassy indicate high-level approval of the operation. The assistance
also demonstrates Iran's continued willingness to use selected acts of
terrorism to support its foreign policy objectives-in this case to
undermine the Islamic summit held in Kuwait late last month. Other
Iranian assets in Kuwait probably would also be available if Tehran
were to decide to use terrorism as part of a broader program to
P-Ynnrt it-, Islamffir rpy 7 n or to destabilize the Sunni Gulf regimes.
Kuwait is unlikely to break relations with Iran over the incident but
could withdraw its representative from Tehran to protest Iran's
blatant support for terrorism. The arrests are likely to heighten
sectarian tensions in Kuwait. where i constitute one-third of the
native population.
Tnn Secret
2 February 1987
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Options Against Sikh Extremists
74
India's unwillingness at this time to negotiate troop withdrawals
from the Punjab border suggests that Prime Minister Gandhi
hopes to use the Indian Army to strengthen the moderate Sikh
state gove ut Sikh extremists on the
defensive.
India's agreement with Pakistan this week on troop withdrawals does
not address deployments on either side of the Punjab border, and no
date for the discussion of additional withdrawals has been se
has moved
0,000 troops into positions near the Puniab border. India also sealed
the border during the latest crisis.
chief minister of the state.
Press reports indicate that two breakaway, hardline factions of the
ruling Sikh party in Punjab have united in a bid to oust the moderate
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without dismissing the state government.
powers-including the sending of additional paramilitary troops-
Gandhi is unlikely to risk a renewed deterioration in relations with
Islamabad, however, just to keep troops near the Punjab border
indefinitely. Even if Sikh extremists increase their attacks after a
pullback of troops, Gandhi could still exercise his extensive security
Top Secret
3 6 February 1987
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JORDAN-PLO: Renewal of Limited Cooperation
Cooperation between Jordan and the PLO in administering a new
$9.5 million Saudi contribution for the West Bank probably will
not lead to an early resumption of ng
Hussein and PLO Chairman Arafat.
Jordan's Minister for Occupied Territories' Affairs recently
announced that he will host a meeting of the PLO-Jordanian Joint
Committee and that Arafat's deputy Khalil al-Wazir will attend. The
committee, a largely ineffective body, was created in 1978 under the
auspices of the Baghdad Pact to channel Arab aid to the West Bank
and, according to the US Embassv in Amman. had received no
contributions since mid-1985.
Wazir is optimistic that 25X1
Hussein will soon resume close coordination with Arafat on Arab-
Israeli peace negotiation issues. The meeting will mark Wazir's first
visit to Amman since he was expelled and his PLO offices were closed
by Jordanian officials last Jul 25X1
The Jordanians do not share Wazir's optimism. One senior Jordanian
official has said the meeting will not interfere with Jordan's West Bank
development plan-which calls for spending $1.3 billion on municipal
projects by 1990-and does not signal a resumption of political
coordination on the peace proces
The committee will merely allocate monev to ro'ects in municipalities
led by pro-Jordanian mayors, Meanwhile, US 25X1
Embassy sources say that Italy has agreed to donate $16 million
directly to Hussein's development program. 25X1
Comment: Hussein probably realizes that he risks losing broad Arab
support for his West Bank initiatives if he discards Baghdad Pact
agreements; no Arab country has agreed to contribute funds outside
the joint committee framework. Hussein is likely to point to the
coming meeting as proof that he can work with the PLO to improve
the Palestinians' quality of life. But he remains committed to his West
Bank development project-designed to undermine the PLO's
credibility-and undoubtedly has been buoyed by Italy's donation,
the largest so far by any country.
Top Secret
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CHAD-LIBYA- Chadian Offensive Preparations
FRANCE:
French and Chadian aerial resupply missions suggest the Habre
government is preparing to attack F 25X1
probably within two or three weeks. 25X1
The missions to the Chadian logistic base at Bir Kalait have doubled
since 29 January The armored cars, 25X1
other vehicles, fuel, weapons, and ammunition delivered have been
forwarded daily to government forces at Fada. Early this week, France
delivered to N'Djamena most of its promised $82 million worth of
military equipment. however, that 25X1
the French refused a Chadian request to move their Crotale surface-
to-air missile system from N'Djamena to Fada 25X1
Comment: Chadian Government and allied guerrilla forces in the
Tibesti area apparently have regrouped and, when new supplies and
reinforcements arrive, probably will again attack Zouar. Their assault
on the town two weeks ago was unsuccessful
The French refusal to move the Crotale system is consistent with
Paris's reluctance to increase its military presence north of the 16th
parallel. The Libyans continue to conduct airstrikes against positions
in Tibesti and to reinforce units at Ouadi Doum and Faya-Largeau.
Top Secret
5 6 February 1987
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Top Secret
West Germany may now be leaning toward placing arrested terrorist
Muhammad Hammadi on trial rather than extraditing him. The West
Germans reportedly believe that the hostages in Lebanon are no
longer held by the Hammadi family and are now in the custody of
Hizballah. Bonn's investigators surmise that Hizballah's real concern
is to prevent Hammadi's extradition to the US, and they cite a recent
message from the kidnapers demonstrating indifference to whether or
not the Hammadi brothers are tried for violating West German law.
Comment: Bonn probably has not yet reached its decision on the US
extradition request. The Kohl government will continue to draw out
the legal proceedings and investigations as long as possible as it tries
to reconcile the conflicting objectives of not alienating the US, not
sacrificing the hostages, and not giving in to blackmail. The current
course of the investigations, however, suggests that the longer the
process takes and the more evidence the West Germans collect, the
more likely it is that Bonn will see a West German trial-perhaps with
additional charges-as the best alternative.
USSR: Cosmonauts To Resume Space Station Operations
Two Soviet cosmonauts were launched toward the Mir space station
on the Soyuz TM-2 transport spacecraft . Docking is
scheduled for tomerr w. This was the first mann launch of a
Soyuz TM spacecraf , a modernized version f h 9 7 uz T that has
been used for 14 m nPi frnhts ince 1979.
Comment: The crew will probably try to surpass the record of
237 days on Mir, taking the first step toward the Soviets' stated goal
e-viii-carry-equiprnentt-designed
and=manafectar-e"y the-U G 4he-let ierlands., e, ,-West-
G-ermany-, and4be-E --apean-Space - -n y. ,
Top Secret
6 e ruary
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Top Secret
KUWAIT-USSR: Talks on Economic Cooperation Scheduled
Kuwaiti and Soviet officials will meet in Moscow early next week to
discuss joint energy projects but will probably not reach agreement
on specific proposals. The US Embassy in Kuwait says the talks will
center on oil swap arrangements, technical cooperation on oil
production, and the development of joint energy projects in Iraq, the
USSR, Greece, and Morocco. Kuwait also may be negotiating a new
agreement with Moscow for the protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf, according to the US Embassy in Oman
Comment: Most of the projects under consideration are in the
planning stage, but each side has incentives for cooperation. For
Kuwait, economic collaboration with the USSR would provide
opportunities for idle Kuwaiti oil exploration and development
capacity and would promote a more balanced foreign policy. Moscow
probably views economic cooperation as an effective way to build
closer bilateral relations, to obtain access to Western oil technology
and Kuwaiti financing for projects in the USSR, and to improve its
image in the Arab world. Kuwait is unlikely to request Soviet naval
escort of its commercial tankers but may consider using Soviet
tankers to shin Kuwaiti oil. possibly as part of an oil swap
arrangement.
Top Secret
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Too Secret
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PAKISTAN-USSR: Foreign Minister Visi A- am
government in Kabul.
r._{ 7Yaqub also is likely to discuss the idea of a neutral
the one issue remaining to be settled at Geneva.
a u will try to gauge Soviet flexibility on a withdrawal timetable-
government in Afghanistan, as Islamabad prepares for the next round
of Geneva talks opening 25 February
During his meetingssjn Moscow beginning ^a7 Pakistani Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan' will explore Soviet ideas on a postsettlement
postsettlement government in Afghanistan
without the participation of the Afghan resistance. Moscow will
probably be willing to discuss the issue but is unlikely to view
neutrality as an alternative to ensuring Communist dominance of a
Comment: The Pakistanis are intrigued by recent signs of Soviet and
Afghan Government flexibility on a negotiated settlement, although
they have doubts about the sincerity of the overtures. They believe
they must reach an understanding with Moscow on a postsettlement
government before the USSR will agree on a withdrawal timetable,
and they think the idea of neutrality will make the Soviets amenable to
a shorter timetable. Islamabad appears willing to negotiate this issue
Top Secret
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Ton Secret
Tensions in the Gaza Strip
Mediterranean
Sea
~ i.
GAZA ST IPA (Israeli oc pied- l'/./
s to a etermined) K
Khan At
Hoene of expelle anus I
P16 activist azan\student l
Recent1 killed
isturbances
Egypt \\
"Rafah
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6 February 1987
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ISRAEL-PLO: Heightened Unrest in Gaza Strip
Several days of disturbances in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip have
been sparked by Israel's deportation of a local PLO activist last week
and the shooting of a Palestinian student by Israeli troops. Israeli
security officials charge that the deported Palestinian was the head of
the Fatah youth organization in Gaza and that he had incited armed
resistance. The shooting resulted from an apparent overreaction by
Israeli troops during a protest against the deportation at a school in
Khan Yunus. Israeli media have reported numerous demonstrations
and disturbances throughout Gaza since the student's death.
Comment: Violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip
tends to be cyclical, and the current wave will probably decrease in
intensity soon. Given the extremely volatile mood in Gaza, however,
even a small incident could spark another round. Fatah probably sees
the demonstrations in Gaza as a test of its strength and wants to
prove that it retains a base there despite the expulsion of one of its
top organizers. Israeli troops may overreact again under pressure, as
they have done in several other incidents in the occupied territories
during recent months.
In a secret meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak during the
recent Islamic summit in Kuwait, Syrian President Assad promised to
ease his opposition to Egypt rejoining the Arab League if Mubarak
would disengage himself from the Camp David accords
Mubarak rejected the proposal, but Assad
asked to continue a discreet dialogue and urged Egypt to refrain from
developing closer relations with Israel
Comment: Assad probably perceives that Mubarak is gaining
momentum in improving his position within the Arab community, and
he may be trying to gain concessions on the Camp David issue before
Egypt's reintegration becomes a fait accompli. The Syrian leader is
unlikely to drop his opposition to the Camp David accords and
probably hopes that, by putting pressure on Mubarak during bilateral
talks, he will-at a minimum-discourage him from expanding
Egypt's ties to Israel. Assad seems to believe Egypt's peace treaty
with Israel will ultimately fail and wants to be poised to take
advantage of that eventuality
Top Secret
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9 6 February 1987
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GREECE: Cabinet Changes
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou shuffled his Cabinet yesterday for
the second time in three months. According to the press, three of the
seven ministers being replaced will move to senior jobs in the ruling
Socialist Party. The most significant changes are in the Interior,
Health, and Commerce Ministries. The Ministers of Defense, Foreign
Affairs, and Economy will remain in place.
Comment: Papandreou is evidently trying to reaffirm his control of
the party following its poor showing in the municipal elections last fall
and subsequent financial scandals involving party members. Most of
the ministers being moved are staunch supporters of Papandreou
and popular with the left. By shifting them into the upper echelons of
the party, he could be preparing for an early election. The left has put
considerable pressure on Papandreou to back down from his
economic austerity program and efforts to improve relations with the
US, but this shuffle indicates he is not going to bring about major
changes in either area
SPAIN: Leadership Struggle Among Conservatives
Spain's main conservative opposition party, the Popular Alliance,
could be weakened further if it is unable to agree amicably on a new
leader during its party congress tomorrow. The party has suffered a 25X1
series of setbacks since its poor showing in the national election last
year and is now locked in a bitter leadership struggle. Miguel Herrero,
the party's parliamentary spokesman and temporary, de facto leader,
and Antonio Hernandez Mancha, party boss in the Andalucia region,
are battling to replace Manuel Fraga, who resigned in December.
According to diplomatic and press reporting, attempts by party
officials to reach a compromise that would allow both men to share
power have been unsuccessful 25X1
Comment: Hernandez, who favors alignments with other center-right
parties, probably has a slight edge over Herrero, who espouses a
more conservative approach. Neither wants to play the role of spoiler,
but neither is willing to step aside gracefully for the sake of party
unity. An open airing of the leadership struggle at the congress may
provoke further defections from the party. Over time, this might lead
to a fragmentation of the right that would leave Prime Minister
Gonzalez's Socialist Party without a credible opposition and
conservative Spaniards a legitimate outlet for their views.
Top Secret
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SOUTH KOREA: Government's Hard Line on Rally
Comment: Word of the government's planned tactics is likely to
diminish the turnout for the rally. Organizers, however, are calling for
other displays of public protest, including the ringing of church bells
and a honking of horns, that could embarrass Chun. The use of police
force will undercut Chun's efforts to appear responsive in dealing with
the torture incident. In both camps, the human rights issue is likely to
continue to aggravate tensions between moderates and hardliners
over the choice of political tactic
CHINA-GATT: Long Accession Negotiations Ahead
China s submitted a draft trade policy memorandum to GATT and
plans to request the establishment of a working party next month to
consider its membership, aeeoTdMgtp oma i r_ces: GATT's
initial response to Beijing's membership bid has been favorable.
China vacated its seat in 1948 and has had observer status since
1984.
Comment: Negotiations for making China's trade practices
compatible with GATT will prove long and difficult. In addition to key
issues, such as the lack of consistency in China's trading system and
the existence of nontariff barriers, Beijing's lack of substantial
progress on price reform probably will be a source of contention in
accession talks. Following tentative movement toward price reform in
mid-1986, Chinese officials now indicate that price reforms are on
hold for this year. China's standdown on price reform was probably
based on the need to control inflation in the wake of a surge in
demand late last year, but recent political moves toward
conservatism will reinforce the slow pace of price reform
Ton Secret
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Tee Secret
China has announced trade deficit last year.was $5.8 billion ...
24-percent improvement over record deficit in 1985... US
statistics show China's surplus with US increased nearly fivefold to
$2.2 billion.
China issued regulations merging research institutes with
manufacturing ... creating more financial incentives for scientists
... suggests commitment to S&T modernization continues despite
current focus on ideological concerns
early December, underscoring conciliatory line under Gorbachev 25X1
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- USSR apparently ended clandestine radiobroadcasts to China in
... may be part of broader reassessment of such broadcasts ...
Soviets' "National Voice of Iran" went silent earlier.
Djibouti seized shipment of Polish-made arms bound for South
Yemeni exiles, according to US Embassy ... involvement of high-
ranking Djiboutian official in deal will undercut Djibouti's efforts to
develop role as regional mediator
overreaction likely to spur wider protests.
- Student demonstrations against government in Madagascar
gaining support from opposition parties, striking civil servants,
says US Embassy ... security forces avoiding confrontation ...
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Rural Fronts of Principal Insurgent Groups and Petroleum Facilities
Caribbean Sea
Panama
r~PANAMA.
aP
Ocean
North
Santa
Marta
Barranquilla
\\
*QUITO
Ecuador
qtr
CARACAS
Venezuela
to
''llc
10`
s/\
Principal insurgent groups
FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia)
M-1 9 (19th of April Movement)
EPL (People's Liberation Army)
ELN (National Liberation Army)
Crude oil pipeline
Refinery
Top Secret
Peru (Ama?'
Note: America Battalion's activity coincides
with M-19's southwestern territory. All
principal groups also have guerrillas
in Bogota and other major cities.
Peninsula
do la Guayra
JAyaclu!W,%
*BGOTA \\ s
Aruba Netherlands Antilles
(Neth.) (Neth.)-,
Golfo de
Venezuela
"I.01 Maacbo
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Special Analysis
Rise in Insurgent Violence
counterinsurgency capabilities.
maintain his truce with FARC Iona enough to build his
Top Secret
A series of challenges by the country's largest leftist insurgent
group-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-coupled
with a Cuban-sponsored campaign by the guerrillas to unify their
efforts, is making it increasingly difficult for President Barco to
truce, according to the US Embassy 125X1
recently killed seven unarmed soldiers in an attack on a military
roadbuilding crew-an action that outraged Bogota and aroused
widespread concern over the status of the group's three-year-old
FARC has initiated a series of challenges to demonstrate its power to
Bogota. It organized a demonstration in December by about 23,000
farmers in rural southeastern Colombia-where the rebels are
involved in drug production and trafficking-and succeeded in
disrupting government antidrug operations there, according to the US
Embass . The group has ordered some of its units to attack military
patrols and has begun 25X1
to target military personnel in the northeastern oil region, where
security forces are defending the nation's largest pipeline. FARC also
Embassy officials, particularly the Ambassador
reports that traffickers are working with the alliance to kill
Colombians who support drug-control programs and to target US
President Barco also faces a threat from the National Guerrilla
Coordinator, an alliance of the other major insurgent groups formed
in late 1985 by the M-19 organization. A rural contingent led by M-19
continues to harass government forces in southwestern Colombia.
The National Liberation Army, another member of the alliance, has
slowed its attacks on the oil pipeline-probably because of increased
security measures there-but recently joined M-19 in a series of
bombings in northern cities. Meanwhile, the US Embassy has new
Increasing Guerrilla Unity
past year suggests a trend toward greater political and o erational
unity Cuban 25X1
President Castro tried to resolve conflicts within the a lance at a
summit last month in Havana. With Havana's tutelage, members of
the alliance will almost certainly continue to work together 25X1
Although the guerrilla groups continue to squabble, reporting over the
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Major Colombian Guerrilla Groups
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- Armed wing of Colombian Communist Party; created in 1966.
- Conservatively estimated at 3,500 to 4,000 armed combatants; at least 3,000
noncombatant supporters.
- Involved in drug production, trafficking; dominant in southeastern Colombia, where
major cocaine laboratories are located.
- Signed truce with government in 1984; participated last year in national election
through its political front, the Patriotic Union, formed in 1985.
19th of April Movement (M-19)
- Nationalist, anti-US leftist group; emerged in 1974.
- Number of armed combatants 850 to 1,000; extensive support in rural southwestern
Colombia.
- Leads National Guerrilla Coordinator alliance.
- Sporadic reports of drug involvement, arms trafficking.
- Withdrew from government peace talks in 1985.
National Liberation Army (ELN)
- Pro-Cuban, anti-US Marxist-Leninist movement; founded in 1963.
- Probably has 1,000 armed combatants; has grown rapidly during past two years; most
active threat to oil pipeline.
- Member of National Guerrilla Coordinator alliance.
- Sporadic reports of drug involvement, arms trafficking, particularly on Venezuelan
border.
- Never signed cease-fire with government; dissident factions joined FARC in truce.
People's Liberation Army (EPL)
- Armed wing of pro-Beijing Colombian Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist; founded in
1967.
- Number of armed combatants 450 to 600.
- Member of National Guerrilla Coordinator alliance.
- Sporadic reports of drug involvement.
- Signed truce in 1984, rejected it in 1985.
Too Secret
6 February 1987
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Ton Secret
Leaders of FARC and the alliance appear to be making gradual
progress toward some kind of united front, with talks between the two
likely to result in a loose political alliance within the year
the groups are already cooperating to support a
recently formed leftist labor organization. There is evidence to
suggest that FARC and the alliance occasionally cooperate in minor
military operations, and
the insurgents were p anning a nationwide joint offensive
beginning this month. Both FARC and the alliance have expanded
their Pffnrts to nhtnin arms,
Prospects for the Truce
President Barco is responding carefully to the increased violence,
trying to demonstrate the government's resolve while still preserving
the truce. He rejected demands by the group's political front to halt
antidrug operations in southeastern Colombia, but he has refrained
from authorizing wholesale military reprisals. If attacks on unarmed
military personnel continue, he is likely to permit selective retaliatory
action. In talks with the rebels early this week, the government again
ratified the truce and agreed to appoint a verification commission.
FARC will continue to test the government's strength, but a formal
break in the truce is unlikely in the next few months. Bogota's security
forces are already fully occupied in combating the alliance guerrillas,
and Barco will probably tolerate some truce violations by FARC while
he accelerates his efforts to improve Colombia's limited
counterinsurgency and antidrug capabilities. The President will not
halt drug eradication efforts or interdiction operations in the cities. He
sees the trafficker-guerrilla link as one of the most serious threats to
his government, but he may delay raids in insurgent-controlled
territory to avoid a major clash with FARC. If fighting between the
government and the insurgents escalates sharply, Barco will probably
try to forestall a nationwide conflict by limiting military actions to one
area at a time
Top Secret
14 February
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Special Analysis
Ton Secret
French Prime Minister Chirac has modified the tone of his
government's basic policies by emphasizing sensitivity to social
problems. He almost certainly will further slow his economic
reform program, disappointing some supporters in order to
maintain a firm hold on his office. The decline in Chirac's
personal p amaged his hopes for the
presidency.
of dialogue with workers and students
When he assumed office in March, Chirac hoped a record of quick
legislative achievements would carry him to the presidency next year.
Problems with Socialist President Mitterrand, student protests, and
labor unrest have plagued his government, however, and prompted
opposition charges that his policies lack a social dimension. Cracks
have also appeared in the governing coalition between rightwingers
demanding speed on reforms and centrists concerned about the lack
In a major speech last week, Chirac struck a note of conciliation. His
three priorities-modernizing the economy, improving the standard
of living, and relaunching the social dialogue with labor-are
designed to show his commitment to social concerns. The specific
legislative measures he announced, moreover, dealt mostly with
social issues. Chirac probably hopes that such a limited,
noncontroversial legislative program will calm the public, heal
divisions in the mainrity- and Min im to regain some of his
popularlt~ W~
Mitterrand until the presidential election next year
April and of continuing his power-sharing arrangement with
Chirac's caution will disappoint supporters who want to push ahead
with conservative measures, but it is likely to appease centrists in his
coalition and reduce the left's opportunities to profit politically.
Chirac's revised approach further improves his chances of winning
the confidence vote he intends to call for when parliament reopens in
improve competitiveness, and reduce unemployment.
modestly, reduce the budget deficit, hold the line on inflation to
The speech reflects a change in tone and tactics rather than basic
direction. Major portions of his economic program-especially
denationalization and financial deregulation-will proceed at a
cautious pace. The government will continue efforts to cut taxes
Top Secret
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^ vv vIWvI us
Top Secret
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