NORTH-SOUTH KOREA: THE ARTILLERY RACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00539R000600800002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The. Artillery Race
North-South Korea:
s~
EA 87-10032
July 1987
Copy 4 8 7
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Directorate of Secret
North-South Korea:
The Artillery Race
An Intelligence Assessment
This a r prepared b
Office of East Asian Analysis.
omments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
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EA 87-10032
July 1987
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Scope Note
North-South Korea:
The Artillery Race 25X1
t e paper addresses the
Improvement Program.
area where South Korea is just beginning to make gains. We also assess the
South's growing capability to manufacture modern artillery in terms of the
potential for friction with the United States over arms sales. Other papers
in the series will look at armor and at progress in Seoul's Force
important estimate that North Korean long-range artillery and multiple-
rocket fire could have a devastating effect on South Korean defenders.
Range, one of the most critical aspects of the firepower equation, is a key
North Korea is an extremely difficult target, but we
of artillery in the reserve forces. Proiecting eauinment levels hevnnrl rhP
(maintain a fairly
accura a pic ure o orce an equipment levels, particularly with regard to
major weapons. We have a much higher degree of confidence in the
accuracy of similar data for the South, although some gaps remain-
largely concerning weapons developed without US assistance and the status
next several years is problematic.
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EA 87-10032
July 1987
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North-South Kore
The Artillery Race
Key Judgments South Korea is cutting into the North's longstanding lead in artillery
I,dormation available firepower. As Seoul fields its indigenously designed howitzer-the KH-
as c~1'15 July 1987 179, with a maximum range of 30 kilometers-most of P'yongyang's long-
was used in this report.
range guns will lose one of their key advantages: the capability to fire on
South Korea's artillery positions while remaining out of range of nearly all
of Seoul's guns. The South has deployed over 300 KH-179s and plans a
total force of 640 by 1989.
Over the next few years, Seoul plans to acquire artillery-locating radars
that should provide astep-up in technology over the North. These US-
designed radar systems can track incoming rounds and immediately
provide locations of enemy firing sites so that counterfire can occur
quickly.
Nevertheless, we expect North Korea will retain its substantial advantage
in artillery throughout this decade:
? Current trends in acquisitions indicate that the South will not cut into the
North's 2 to 1 lead in numbers of artillery weapons. Neither side is
expanding the number of weapons in the regular forces to any significant
degree.
? The North Koreans also are adding long-range artillery. They recently
fielded three battalions of the M-1978, a large, self-propelled cannon
with an estimated maximum range of over 40 kilometers, raising the total
to 72 guns. The North is also developing a heavy multiple rocket
launcher that probably has a similar range.
? P'yongyang's program to convert most artillery to self-propelled will
enable it to maintain a sizable edge in mobility, which also increases
survivability. The South is coproducing some self-propelled howitzers,
but will not mimic the North's efforts because its use of fixed defensive
lines does not require a similar degree of mechanization.
? The North will keep its substantial edge in explosives delivery capability
by artillery, because the South is not attempting to field large numbers of
rocket launchers. as North Korea does and will remain dependent on
tactical air to compensate for any shortfalls.
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number known to be fielded or exported
tion capacity for towed versions of these guns apparently exceeds the
? Pyongyang could counter Seoul's gains in long-range, artillery by
producing and deploying considerably more 130-mm guns. The produc-
massive US reinforcement during the first few days of the war
enough by the mid-1990s to withstand a North Korean attack wig
We believe, however, that Seoul's economic and technological advantages
and its investment in a relatively modern production base for military
hardware are paying dividends. Combined with production of modern
tanks, the manufacture of infantry fighting vehicles, and acquisition of
modern fighter aircraft that the North cannot match, improvements in
artillery are another step in what we see as the South's inexorable march
toward parity. If current trends continue, the South's forces may be strong
significantly increasing their firepower.
The reserve forces of both sides are increasingly capable of contributing in
combat, as a result of the artillery modernization in the regular forces. As
older weapons are replaced in the regulars, they are passed to the reserves,
incorporating US parts and technology.
designed M 109, aself-propelled howitzer, both for the South Korean Army
and for export after the coproduction agreement with a US firm expires in
1988. Such a move could add to bilateral friction over requirements for
prior approval from Washington for third-country sales of equipment
the South might continue manu actunng some version o e -
underused defense industry
Although the improvements in South Korea's artillery are a response to US
pressure on Seoul to increase its independent defense capability, we see a
potential downside for US interests. In addition to producing more and
better artillery for domestic use, South Korea's manufacturers will proba-
bly attempt to sell guns abroad as part of a continuing effort to boost an
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Contents
Scope Note
Key Judgments
Range-A Critical Factor
Mobility
Pyongyang Answers
Future Developments
Implications for the United States '7
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North-South Korea:
The Artillery Race
a major goal.
Both Koreas have been expanding and improving
their arsenals of artillery at a substantial rate since
the early 1970s. North Korea had a headstart,
however, with a larger force and a capability to
produce armaments. The United States helped the
South Koreans build their own artillery production
base in the early 1970s, but gun manufacture began
slowly. To cut into P'yongyang's edge in combat
capability, the South launched its first Force Im-
provement Plan in 1975. With US and South Korean
estimates indicating that the North had about twice
as many artillery weapons as the South and a substan-
tial edge in firing range, artillery improvements were
that of the South.
During the late 1970s the South was able to increase
its inventory of artillery by a third, but the numbers
gap widened as the North expanded its own artillery
force at an even greater rate. Numbers were only part
of the story. The North increased its advantage in
range by deploying additional long-range guns and
multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). Moreover, P'yon-
gyang's edge in the mobility of artillery rose marked-
ly-through domestic production the North built up
its inventory of tracked artillery nieces to 12 times
Aware that it was losing ground, Seoul again empha-
sized artillery improvement as part of its second-phase
Force Improvement Plan (FIP II) introduced in 1982.
Key programs included the production of long-range
howitzers and the acquisition of self-propelled guns.
Range-A Critical Factor
In our view, Seoul has correctly identified its disad- .
vantage in firing range as the major area for improve-
ment to reduce the North's edge in artillery,
Current Artillery Forces
North
South
Total weapons a
7,600
3,720
Towed guns and howitzers
2,980
3,430
Self-propelled guns
2,750
250
Multiple rocket launchers
1,870
40
e Figures are derived from the Ground Orders q/'Battle, published
by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1986 and 1987, and
include artillery assigned to reserve forces. South Korean totals
include artillery assigned to the Marines. Surface-to-surface mis-
siles and large rockets like Honest John and FROG were not
included; these weapons are not employed in one of the key roles for
field artillery-providing fire support for the infantry. In recent
years, differences in the roles and capabilities of howitzers and field
guns have blurred; the terms are used interchangeably in this paper.
Koreans had almost 1,700 weapons that could fire at
ranges of over 18 kilometers-more than 40 times the
number the South had
? Pyongyang had 350 -mm guns with a maximum
range of 27 kilometers; Seoul had only 12 175-mm
guns that could meet or exceed that range.
? The South had only 30 other artillery weapons that
could match the ranges of over 20 kilometers of the
North's 900 BM-11 MRLs and 280 122-mm field
guns.
? The standard medium howitzers (152 mm) of the
North outranged the South's 155-mm howitzers by
almost 3 kilometers.
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Seoul's artillery.2
At that time, the range advantage would allow many
gun batteries in the North to fire on those in the
South, while remaining out of range of almost all of
South Korea has focused domestic production on
long-ran a howitzers to remedy these range deficien-
cies.
duced, 155-mm howitzer that can shoot to
with the KH-179, a domestically designed and pro-
is
replacing many of its shorter range medium howitzers
with rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPS) (see figure
1). Without RAPs, the KH-179 can fire to a 0
The South introduced this
weapon in 1984 and had deployed 300 by late 1986.
Seoul appears to have chosen well in assigning the
first KH-179s off the production line. All have been
deployed where we believe they are most needed-
with the corps-level artillery battalions near the
has begun, and
within the
figure 2).
Allocation to the infantry divisions
In our view, the development and deployment of the
KH-179 represents a significant milestone for the
South and corrects one of its most critical weaknesses
in firepower. Although Pyongyang retains a substan-
tial lead in numbers of weapons that can fire to
ver 1,800 versus nearly
400-almost all of the orth's artillery sites in the
forward area are well within the maximum firing
range of the South's new howitzers, and most fall
(see
2 North Korea's divisional weapons that are deployed in forward
positions consist of short-range, direct support artillery, as well as
suvnort_ficd .,;P~ `~
~~ Both regularly fire to the ranges-15 and 20 kilometers,
P~ongyangAnswers. While the South has been play-
ing catchup, North Korea has been deploying addi-
tional long-range weapons for its artillery forces.
Since the late 1970s, the North has had three battal-
ions (36 guns) of M-1978 long-range guns
'n late 1985 and early 1986
Pyongyang added three more 12-gun battalions of
the indigenously designed self-propelled guns, bring-
ing the total deployed to 72. Analysis of photography
taken during a rare military parade in Pyongyang in
1985 indicates that the caliber of the extremely long-
barreled M-1978 is 170 to 180 mm, and
(see figure 3).' Although all of the M-1978s are in the
forward area, none is based close enough to the DMZ
to take advantage of its extreme range and fire deeply
into the South. All probably would move forward
before a North Korean attack, however, as would a
substantial number of 130-mm guns-most of which
are in sites away from the DMZ.
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the parade in Pyongyang,
North Korea also is developing an MRL with extend-
ed range. The North displayed a new, large MkL in
it was in production later in 1985 (see figure
4). Although we have not detected the new MRL
deployed with units in the field
extreme ran es
We believe that the large MRL is a companion piece
of the M-1978 long-range gun, and that it also will be
used to provide assault and counterbattery fire at
the 121aunch tubes appear
large enough to house rockets with a caliber in excess
of 200 mm.
the new MRL has a maximum range of over 40
Although South Korea has developed its own truck-
mounted MRL, Seoul apparently has no intention of
fielding large numbers of these weapons as the North
has done. Since 1984 the South has deployed only
three dozen of its 36-round, 130-mm MRLs-with a
and may add 36 more
launchers by 1988, a far cry from the nearly 1,000
truck-mounted launchers now in the North.? Rocket
launchers are relatively inaccurate, but they can
provide devastating rapid file against fixed defenses.
We believe Seoul prefers the more accurate fire that
cannon provide, and that it will depend primarily on
tactical air to saturate large areas with explosives in a
manner similar to that of MRLs.
Mobility
Neither has the South chosen to mimic the North's
emphasis on force mobility
Pyongyang has arme most o its orces
m t e orward area with self-propelled artillery and is
converting almost all of the artillery in its maneuver
and fire-support units. The mechanization effort in
infantry, artillery, and armor gives Pyongyang a
powerful, mobile, and flexible force for both offense
and defense.
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priority
South Korea has chosen a less flexible course, posi-
tioning the bulk of its Army in a series of fortified
defensive lines between Seoul and the DMZ. The
mobility of artillery is not as critical in this deploy-
ment scheme, and towed artillery is much cheaper to
produce, simpler to operate, and easier to maintain.
Large-scale deployment of the towed KH-179 indi-
cates that Seoul is not making mobility its highest
moving tanks and tracked personnel carriers.
Even so, the South has not ignored mobility altogeth-
er. According to the US Embassy in Seoul, current
plans call for fielding 270 of the US-designed
M109A2 self-propelled howitzers by 1989. We believe
the South will deploy the M 109s with its few mecha-
nized divisions and armor brigades, where the mobil-
ity is most necessary to provide fire support for fast-
The ability to provide mobile fire support is not the
only advantage of self-propelled artillery-survivabil-
ity is another. Although like towed artillery, P'yon-
gyang's self-propelled guns lack crew protection be-
cause the vehicles are not turreted, they can shoot and
move quickly to another position before being located
and fired on-a valuable safety factor.
as self-propelled guns replace older models in the
North Korean Army, the quantity of towed artillery
where reserve units are organized
tion in the regulars.
Reserves
Neither side appears to be adding significant numbers
of artillery weapons to the regular forces, but the
reserve units on both sides are considerably increasing
their firepower as a result of the weapons moderniza-
transfers M 114
m~e iu~itzers tot a reserves as the M114s are
replaced by the long-range KH-179s.
We believe the added weaponry will improve the
reserves' combat performance. The North's reserve
units should now be more capable of providing home-
land defense, thus freeing more regular forces for an
offensive role. In addition, we believe that some of the
North's reserves have the firepower to serve as regular
forces to augment the attack echelons. The South's
Mobilization Reserve Divisions will be much more
capable of supporting the regular forces at the front
now that they are being armed with medium howit-
zers. In fact, a few 25X1
reserve artillery a a ions equippe w1 -mm
howitzers have been activated and are reinforcing the
forward area as part of the regular Army.
Future Developments
For the near term, we expect major trends to contin-
ue, with the North maintaining its program to mecha-
nize its artillery. In addition, we expect North Korea
to field its long-range MRL as a corps-level weapon.
Initial deployment probably will be in small numbers,
with perhaps two regiments (72 multiple launchers)
fielded by the end of 1989.
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Figure 5. North Korean-
produced /30-mm gun
We are not sure how the North Koreans will react to
the South's gains in artillery firing range, but we can
see a few possibilities:
? Pyongyang could take a more expensive route that
would be in line with its mechanization effort and
increase the rate of manufacture of self-propelled
130-mm guns. These could replace the shorter
range, less effective 122-mm field guns now in the
infantry divisions.
nance costs must be high
North Korea probably would not attempt to produce
and deploy large numbers of the M-1978 gun, which
almost certainly outranges any on the peninsula. In
our view, this weapon is cumbersome, and, because of
its size and likely complexity, production and mainte-
deliver accurate counterfire against the North
Even if Pyongyang maintained or slightly increased
the size of its lead in numbers of long-range artillery
weapons by expanding production of either model of
the 130-mm gun, it still would have lost a key
advantage-the ability to lay heavy fire on the
South's gun positions from sites that Seoul's artillery
could not reach. Moreover, the South's acquisition of
artillery-locating radars will enhance its ability to
w
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substantial investment in production facilities. Al-
though it will not match the North's emphasis on
mobility, the South probably sees an increasing need
for further mechanization of artillery to match its
growing force of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks.
As new tank and mechanized infantry units are
formed, more self-propelled artillery will be required
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Trends in Seoul's artillery mirror other advances in
the South, such as production of modern medium
tanks and the acquisition of infantry fighting vehicles,
testifying to the payoffs of Seoul's investment in a
relatively modern production capability for military
hardware. Additionally, South Korea is purchasing
F-16 fighters, Harpoon antiship missiles, and other
technically advanced weapons. In our judgment, if
trends continue, South Korea may be able to with-
stand aNorth Korean attack without massive US
reinforcement during the first, few days of combat by
the middle of the next decade
Implications for the United States
Improvements in the South's artillery force are a plus
for the United States from a military perspective.
Washington has long encouraged Seoul to become
more self-sufficient in defense, as a way of cutting the
costs of US assistance and the presence of US forces.
If South Korea continues to gain in artillery vis-a-vis
the North, we believe the need for immediate tactical
air support-in the event of conflict on the peninsu-
la-from the US forces based outside Korea might be
reduced.
On the downside, Seoul's plans for artillery develop-
ment could increase friction between South Korea and
the United States over third-country sales (see inset).
Both Koreas have engaged in arms sales, the North
having started much earlier and having achieved a far
greater volume. P yongyang s newest artillery weap-
ons-the long-range, se1/=propelled gun and the heavy
MRL probably will not be big sellers. Both are
likely to be expensive, and the market for large-
caliber weapons is small. To our knowledge, North
Korea has not attempted to sell any of its wide
variety of tracked artillery. We believe that sporadic
sales of the more standard items, such as towed
130-mm duns and the 122-mm BM-11 MRL, will
continue.
The South Koreans might view the KH-179 towed
howitzer as a bright prospect for third-country sales,
but it is entering an extremely crowdedfield-many
Western nations are promoting 1 SS-mm artillery with
long-range capabilities. The South's gun may be
competitive if the selling price is kept low. We believe
that the M109 self-propelled gun also has a potential
market overseas,
Seoul has placed a priority on boosting military sales
to aid an underused defense industry,
Embassy Seoul reports that South Korean
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Figure 6. US M109A2 se
propelled howitzer
last year a South Korean trading firm listed a wide
variety of military items for export-many of which
Bilateral differences could arise if the South Koreans
try to market the M 109 self-pro elled howitzer see
figure 6). the
South may continue to manufacture and eventually
export the M109 after the coproduction agreement
with a US firm runs out in 1988. Given the obvious
US design and content of even a modified M 109, the
issue of US approval for third-country sales is certain
to arise. Moreover, manufacture and export of a
Korean-produced M 109 could create com etition for
the US producer. has com-
mented that an attempt to export the M 109 would be
consistent with South Korea's efforts, once technology
The South Korean producer of the KH-179 howitzer
hopes to market it overseas after current manufacture
for the Arm is com let
Such sales would be less
troublesome, however, because the gun is almost
entirely of South Korean design,
The KH-179 uses a
carriage copied from the US M 114, which was pro-
duced in the South under license, but key parts are of
South Korean origin.
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and production skills are acquired, to localize produc-
tion and become free of US constraints on sales
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