POWER AND SUPERPOWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100070018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 26, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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71
If THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
29 Nov 1984
NOTE FOR: Fred C. Ikle
Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer, Vice Chairman
National Intelligence Council
This editorial
is a knockout.
/0*
Herbert E. Meyer
Attachment
lony Dolan,
Bob Tuttle, WH
Jay Keyworth, WH
Richard Perle, OUSD/ISP
DCI
STAT
STAT
STAT
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 - Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100070018-6
P.O. Box 7, 200 Gray's Inn Road, London WCIX 8EZ. Telephone: [phone]
,POWER AND SUPERPOWER I
"The elementarc means by which all
foreign policy must be conducted are
the armed forces of the nation, the
arrangements of its strategic position
and the choice of its alliances. In the
American ideology of our time these
things have come to be regarded as
militaristic, imperialistic, reaction.
arv and archaic. The proper concern
of right-minded men was peace,
disarmament and the choice between
non-intervention and collective secur-
ity. "
These words were written by
Walter Lippman 40 years ago
but they accurately describe the
trend of American foreign policy
in the wake of the Vietnam
defeat in the early seventies.
That defeat was accompanied by
a period of western appeasement
which resulted in a dramatic
expansion of Soviet influence
into Laos, Cambodia, Afghan-
istan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozam-
bique, South Yemen, Libya,
Syria, Zaire, Madagascar, Sey-
chelles, Nicaragua and Grenada.
To that must be added a
continuous decline in the self-
confidence of the Atlantic
Alliance and a faltering in the
purposiveness of United States
policy in the Middle East and
Central America.
Mr Ronald Reagan was
elected president in 1980 on a
clear platform to restore
America's strategic confidence
by increasing its defence strength
and discontinuing these policies
of appeasement. Throughout his
first term every effort was made
by the Soviet Union to prevent
that occurring. The Soviet ex-
pansion continued, as did the
intimidation of America's for-
mal and informal allies.
Fortunately the American
electorate held its nerve, as did
the Alliance - just. The cruise
missiles were installed. The allies
refused to be bullied into making
any concessions simply to re-
sume negotiations broken off
unilaterally in a fit of pique by
visited Washington in nxogm- The deepest significance of
ton of Soviet assumptions that Reagan '3 second term is that it
President Reagan would indeed , has indeed liberated the United
be leading the Alliance for the
next four years. States. It has liberated it from
After his re-election there i the incubus of a period of
s detente and appeasement which
now a recurring and world-wide was thought by most commen-
attempt to induce President tators to be the new, and settled
Reagan to change the policies orthodoxy, as Lippman ? had
and attitudes on which he has perceived it'to be in a previous
twice been elected to"pre nt
his country. That is not phase. It has liberated the United
prising given the persistence of States by providing it with the
Soviet diplomacy. Soviet leaders opportunity to consolidate the
work to long rhythms which 1 witho t beings unof the first mn
derminede by
outpace the historic breathless- persistent attempts to prove the
ness of western electoral time- ephemerality of those policies,
tables. Soviet leaders exploit their lack of substance and
their advan a and th
ta
e
are
g
y
helped in this, not always
unconsciously, by the -pervasive
cultural refusal in the western
liberal establishments to recog-
nize and accept the hard simple
principles of Mr Reagan's leader-
ship for which he received such
decisive confirmation in the
election, against all liberal hopes
and predictions.
durability. In other words there
should be no change. There
should be no "reassessment"
suggesting any revision of Mr
Reagan's basic principles. His
opportunity is now to show the
world that be is consistent and
that his policies, when he leaves
the stage, will have had an eight
year disadvantage of unfold
some solethe
d
mid-term "reassessment" under-
mining those principles to which
A liberation for
the United States
This principle is the reasser-
tion of American power and self-
confidence and an end to
appeasement. So why is it that
now, after a second endorse-
ment, there is so much pressure
for change? One can see it even
in Dr Kissinger's recent article in
The Sunday Times where be
starts by deploring the fact that,
"for too long presidential elec-
tions have led to reassessments
of American foreign policy" and
then contradicts himself a few
paragraphs later by suggesting
that, "the deepest significance of
Reagan's second term'is that it
has liberated the US' to under-
take in a climate of conciliation a
the other side. By September it long overdue reassessment of the
was clear that the Soviet Union (basic assumptions of its foreign
ndeed.
had begun to adjust to the failure policy", Double-speak indeed.
of its diplomacy. Mr Gromyko
of
g term and for which he rece
second.
Shultz/Gromyko meeting in
the
new year what should this mean?
Mr Reagan has always, quite
rightly, indicated a willingness to
talk but from a position of
strength. That combination must
be maintained. The Soviet
Union respects strength as much
as it exploits weakness. It will try
every trick in its book to use
such discussions to undermine
American strength and repair i
some of its own strategic weak-
nesses. We should thus examine
the Soviet position with care to
be continuously aware of those
weaknesses and determined opt
the need to perpetuate them.
Too often, in the detente
Period, the response to so-called
Soviet insecurity was an ex-
pression of western guilt leading
to some reduction in our
strength as though it would be
possible, in the words of Am-
bassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "to
control anybody's aggressive
behaviour by taking care not to
frustrate them unduly in the first
place". Appeasement is based
inevitably on wishful thinking
about the people whom one is
trying to appease.
Reagan's chance
for manoeuvre
Soviet society is mobilized for
war, both a shooting war and a
class war. Since the Geneva
Conference of 1922 Soviet
officials have been currying
western economic assistance to
make up for their strategic
.weaknesses while their leaders
have used double-talk to conceal
their aggressive intentions
against the free world.
However, the Soviet Union
desires the fruits of war without
the risks. That is the basis of Mr
Reagan's main opportunity'now.
There is a common interest in
avoidance of nuclear war and
therefore in avoiding any rituals
which might lead to one. That
gives ample room for tactical
manoeuvre. First, there is much
to discuss to remind the Soviet
Union that its relationship with
the other major nuclear power
cannot be pushed too far in
peripheral non-nuclear settings
without eventually jeopardising
the mutual concern they both
have for the prevention of
nuclear tensions. It has to be
made clear to the Soviet Union
that their persistent struggle in
these peripheral areas makes it
necessary for the United States
to maintain and improve its
strategic nuclear superiority over
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Soviet capabilities.
Seeondly, this common desire
to avoid nuclear war must affect
negotiations about such . new
rluclear systems. It is thus
important for Mr Reagan to
persist with the Strategic De-
fence .Initiative. That is the
underlying source of pressure on
the Soviet leadership. It has
brought it back to the negotiating
table and it should not be eased
up unless and until a decisive
arms control arrangement is
identified. Such an arrangement
must include significant re-
ductions in arsenals but only
achieved on the basis of clear
principles of equality and cast-
iron guarantees about verifi-
cation. Nothing else would be
satisfactory. There is no strategic
security in a succession of
diplomatic nods and winks.
Thus the refusal of Washington's
bureaucracies to come clean now
about the record of Soviet arms
control violations does not augur
well for the conclusion of any
agreement which will command
real, as.against rhetorical confi-
dence.
However, persistence with the
SDI and President. Reagan's
other major defence programme
has even more profound impli-
cations for the Soviet-American
relationship. As Zbigniew Brze-
-zinski, former head of Carter's
National Security Council, has
;.observed, the Soviet system is a
world power of a new type, in
that its might is one-dimen-
sional. It is a global power only
in the military dimension but in
no other. It is neither a genuine
economic rival to the US nor -
as once was the case - even a
source of -a globally interesting
ideological experiment". The
Soviet economy is in the throes
of a' long historic decline.
Professor Cyril Black of Prince-
ton has noted that the Soviet
Union, in spite of all the
suffering, killing and social
disruption of the last 65 years,
occupies no higher rank in the
table of world social and econ-
omic indices than it did 20 years
before the revolution.
. The full implications of this
decline are not likely yet to be
apparent to Soviet leaders - and
with such a mendacious and self-
serving bureaucracy . beneath
them, why should they expect to
be told these uncomfortable
trutl}s! However, the Brzezinski
conclusion is that Soviet military
power, while progressively un-
able to challenge American
power on the basis of equality,
(let alone to impose its one-
dimensional character on the
world as a kind of Pax Sovietica)
will nevertheless continue to
disrupt existing international
arrangements. The Soviet
interest will be to undo the
stability of the free world system.
It will operate at the sub-nuclear
level by continuing to foster
greater international anarchy
where it suits Soviet purposes in
stimulating terrorism, insurrec-
tion and uncertainty in those
areas which are regarded as
politically valuable or sensitive
to the west.
The challenge facing Mr
Reagan, therefore, is to see that
such disruptive behaviour goes
unrewarded. He must not be
seduced either by Soviet diplo-
macy, or by his own officials,
into thinking that the prize of an
arms control agreement justifies
overlooking these disruptively
offensive tactics elsewhere.
Consequently the west under his
leadership should exercise the
most rigorous constraint on any
economic benefits to the Soviet
Union which encourage or
facilitate its military ad-
venturism. There should be no
exchange of strategic technology,
or know-how, or concealed and
unnecessary assistance to the
Soviet military economy by, for
instance, the grain deal which in
Above all, an the light of
the presidential election, the
west should now approach the
Soviet Union with increased self-
confidence. From that should
flow a refusal to be bullied.
Indeed there is a case for a
change of attitude which suggests
some element of counter-offen-
sive against the long assault on
our values by the Marxist-Lenin
ists,._This is already apparent at
the detaiiea ievei of rvato-s
tactical military planning but
there are subtler avenues to
pursue.
We must organize and co-
ordinate our policy to achieve
greater differentiation within the
Soviet system. There should be
differentiation between the Rus-
sian peoples and their Soviet
masters; between the East Euro-
pean peoples and their Soviets
occupiers; between the Soviet
signature at Helsinki and their
abject failures to honour that
signature (from the barbarity of
the Berlin wall, the constant
jamming of western broadcasts
to the refpsal of elementary civil
rights to their citizens); between
their professed desire to take part
in international security struc-
tures and a chronic refusal to
share knowledge about how their
own decisions are made. Unless
the west can monitor their
political processes with the same
freedom as the Soviets do ours,
there can be no question of
mutual security. We .cannot yet
do so and the Soviets show no
sign of recognizing. that fact.
There can thus be no genuine
security between us and the
relationship must remain based
on this inherent danger.
1972 not only involved a 300
million dollar subsidy but con-
tributed to a substantial western
inflation of grain prices.
For such a policy of economic
discipline to be applied, Mr
Reagan has to enlist the active
support of his major industrial
allies in Europe and Japan. The
leaders of those countries share a
general assessment of Soviet
policy. They could be ready for a
concerted approach given clear
leadership from President Rea-
gan and greater evidence of
teamwork and coherence in
those parts of his administration
concerned with developing
grand strategy.
West can be more
self-confident
Differentiation, ~erifcation
and vigilance. Those must be Mr
Reagan's watchwords. He must
rely on firmness of purpose and
clear principles. It would be fatal
to. change course now in re-
sponse to pressures to restore the
dangerous illusions of the period
of detente in the 1970s. The
Soviet Union is showing a
positive reaction to. President
Reagan's policy of increasing
American military strength. He
should not now , allow his
dealings with Moscow to de-
velop into a weblike system such
as Dr Kissinger tried to weave,
to the point where the system
became an end in itself so that
the United States was deprived
of the freedom to apply strict
conditionality to each and every
individual act of mischief.per-
petrated by Soviet hostility. That
freedom must be preserved if the
United States and its allies are to
be able to rope with a system
which operates on an inherently
outmoded, malevolent, dis-
credited and dishonourable
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