CONVERSATION WITH D/ACDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100070002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100070002-3
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CONFIDENTIAL
28 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with D/ACDA
1. D/ACDA Kenneth Adelman telephoned last week to invite me to
lunch; he said he wanted advice on how to solve his "intelligence
problem."
2. We met for lunch on 26 December, and Adelman elaborated on his
point. He said he had a "people" problem; that he knew a lot of US
intelligence officials "couldn't get along with " He added
that he felt he was being cut out of certain intelligence, and had no
influence over the choice arms-control related products the intelligence
community produces. Adelman said he plans to remain in office and is
prepared to make whatever personnel or organizational changes might be
needed "so I can play with a full deck." He asked for my advice on what
to do.
3. I replied that I would not discuss personnel or personality
issues, and we put those aside. I pointed out that only a very few
senior officials received all the "tidbits" that Adelman seemed to
believe were due him, and I added that in the great scheme of things the
lack of such "tidbits" probably was not his big problem. As for having
an influence on the choice of arms-control related products to be
undertaken by the Intelligence Community, I explained that we all have
projects we would like to do but cannot do because of too few resources.
I talked about how the estimates process works, and how subjects for
estimates are chosen. I explained that the DCI makes the final decisions
based on his judgment of the potential value to policymakers of a
particular subject. Suggestions from policymakers are always considered
carefully, and the decision rests on a combination of factors including
the policymaker and the value of the suggestion itself.
4. Adelman asked whether more regular contact between himself and
the DCI would lead to greater influence over the choice of intelligence
products. I replied that I could not answer the question adequately. To
my question of how he saw his own role in the arms control process,
Adelman replied that he was the Administration's "top expert" and the one
to whom other officials ultimately turn when the level of detail exceeds
their technical grasp simply because he and ACDA spend full time on arms
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control while others do not. He portrayed ACDA as a think tank with
himself as its chief. He did not talk about an operational role for
himself or ACDA.
5. I asked whether he thought the DCI shared his perception of
ACDA's and his own role, and he said yes. I said I had no idea what the
correct answer was, but that I was confident the DCI would provide him
and ACDA with the intelligence he felt they needed to do their jobs.
6. Adelman said he would try to spend a bit more time with the DCI
in coming months, perhaps by arranging regular meetings on a bi-monthly
basis.
091
Herbert E. Meyer
VC/NIC
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP88T00528R000100070002-3