THE THREAT OF THE NEO-LUDDITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100060006-0
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 19, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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October 19, 1984
Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Director
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545
Dear Don:
Thanks very much for your letter of
September 17, and for sending a copy of my
book to in Paris. I enjoyed your
article on a reat of the Neo-Luddites."
Let's make it a point to get together the next
time we're in the same city.
All best,
STAT
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Arms Control and
International Security
edited by Roman Kolkowicz
and-. Neil: Joeck
Copyright 1984 by The Regents of the University
of California
Westview Press / Boulder and London
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Westview Special Studies in International Relations
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Published in 1984 in the United States of America by Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central
Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301; Frederick A. Praeger, President and Publisher
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Arms control and international security.
(Westview special studies in international relations)
(Studies in international and strategic affairs series)
Bibliography: p
Includes index.
1. Arms control-Addresses, essays, lectures.
2. Atomic weapons and disarmament-Addresses, essays,
lectures. 3. Security, International-Addresses,
essays, lectures. 4. Nuclear nonproliferation-Addresses,
essays, lectures. I. Kolkowicz, Roman. II. Joeck,
Neil. Ill. Series. IV. Series: Studies in interna-
tional and strategic affairs series.
JX1974.A768855 1984 327.1'74 83-16801
ISBN 0-86531-662-7
ISBN 0-86531-663-5 (pbk.)
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6
The Threat of the Neo-Luddites
Donald M. Kerr
Reliance on technological superiority has been a keystone of U.S.
defense posture. Today, however, several threats to science and technology
in the United States may adversely affect the nation's security and
prosperity.
Technological "Quick Fixes"
One of these threats comes from the friends and proponents of
research and development (R&D) who have exaggerated confidence that
crash programs in science and technology can rapidly solve national
problems. This is the often suggested Manhattan Project or Apollo
Program approach to technical problems. Not too many national problems
are in fact amenable to the crash program approach. Following the first
oil shock, in 1973, we attempted to solve the "energy problem" with
rapid, massive federal spending. While this had some beneficial results
in improvements in conventional technologies, it did little to advance
the start-up date for complex, long-term energy supplies such as fusion
reactors. We found that many programs in scientific research and
development are responsive only to consistent efforts made over a long
time.
We now are faced with a similar problem in national defense, the
increasingly aggressive Soviet military buildup, which we may be trying
to spend our-way out of. This approach may be useful in making up
deficiencies in readiness and supplies and buying off-the-shelf weaponry;
it is not likely to be of much help in accelerating development of new,
exotic, and very promising military technologies such as directed energy
weapons and "brilliant" conventional weapons.
Scientific "breakthroughs" are in fact usually the result of steady
progress in basic scientific understanding and gradual improvements in
technological know-how. Technological advancement is usually evolu-
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The Threat of the Neo-Luddites 69
tionary, not revolutionary. But certain features in our society incline us
not to appreciate the steady, consistent effort that must be given to
ensure a productive research and development program. For one thing,
most Americans maintain a-fundamental belief in the natural technological
superiority of the United States. Further, some of us believe that it
stems from a native U.S. genius occasionally watered by federal funding.
Few of us understand the nature and demands of the research and
development process itself.
Another impediment to stable R&D support-is the difference between
the time horizon of the political decision makers who provide funding
and the twenty-year time scale that characterizes many major devel-
opment projects. When the payoff is so many years in the future; it is
sometimes difficult to maintain the interest of the, political community
against more transient but more publicized budget priorities.
The consequence of these problems and' misunderstandings is a
dangerous overdependence on technological "quick fixes" to national
problems, particularly in. the defense area. Reliance on the-crash program'
approach can. be used as an' excuse not to invest adequately in day-to-
day scientific and technological research: Our inadequacies in R&D
investment: are most troubling in the defense' area: Every year" since
1971, the Soviet Union has outspent us in dedicated military research
and development, and in 1981 their spending was- about twice ours.
Even the Reagan defense program increases will merely prevent the
United States from falling. further behind. Besides direct investment' in
R&D, we need a continuing' high level of production of graduates in.
science and technology fields and investment in research equipment
and facilities:
Neo-Luddism
Other threats- to technological development come from modern de-
scendants of the Luddites: The original Luddites- were primarily dis-
gruntled and threatened' laborers' who broke the new machines of the
Industrial Revolution, which they believed threatened their jobs. They
were supported by some upper-class romantics who objected to the
changes that industrialization was bringing to traditional society-in
the form of large, smoky cities, the disappearance of the rural peasantry;
and the like.
One type of modern neo-Luddite wants to return to simpler, supposedly.
happier times by rejecting the (usually exaggerated) consequences of
technological' progress. More prevalent in the 1970s than today, this'
attitude was reflected in such works as Robert Heilbroner's Inquiry into
the Human Prospect (1974), which argued that
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70 Donald M. Kerr
in the last few years we have become apprised of these side effects of
economic growth in a visible decline in the quality of the air and water,
in a series of man-made disasters of ecological imbalance, in a mounting
general alarm as to the environmental collapse that unrestricted growth
could inflict.
The civilizational malaise, in a word, reflects the inability of a civilization
directed to material improvement-higher incomes, better diets, miracles
of medicine, triumphs of applied physics and chemistry-to satisfy the
human spirit.'
This philosophy has led some people to advocate limits to growth
and constraints on technology. Whatever its maligned side effects,
however, technological advancement is the force behind the increasing
ease and affluence of the industrialized world, and few people seem
inclined to give them up. The vigorous efforts of the Third World to
industrialize, in order to approach our affluence, show that most of the
world will continue to aspire to technological development, whatever
we do in the West. This group of neo-Luddites also fails to indicate
how we would meet our national security needs without the technological
superiority on which that security has long rested.
Although the rather romantic antitechnology arguments of these neo-
Luddites can perhaps be set aside, another group of neo-Luddites presents
a very different objection to technological advancement, one that we
must take seriously. They claim that technological progress may in
principle be a good thing and contributes meaningfully to socioeconomic
improvement, but it also inevitably contributes to military technology.
The advancement of military technology has led to deployment of more
lethal and indiscriminate weaponry (especially chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons); political and military strategies appear to promise to
use that weaponry in a massive and indiscriminate fashion. Although
current weapons do not, as is sometimes stated, threaten to destroy life
on earth, they do pose a threat to all organized societies and to Western
civilization itself. In this sense, we must ask seriously if technological
development may come to pose a threat that outweighs the benefits it
can contribute.
Although we have tried to devise means to prevent or constrain the
use of mass-destruction weapons, in fact the political, social, or intellectual
capacity to prevent their use has not kept pace with technological
advances. The tensions and rivalries between states have not been
reduced; no world organization capable of preventing or containing war
has arisen; the motives or inclinations of men have not improved enough
to ensure that war will be eliminated.
We must address several questions: How can the catastrophe of a
war that uses indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction be averted
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The Threat of the Neo-Luddites 71
without sacrificing the essential freedom and security of the West? More
specifically, what part does technology play in creating the problem;
and what should be done about technology in possible solutions to it?
Solutions to the Threat of Modern, Technological War
There are two generic solutions to the threat posed by war in the
technological age: (1) to control or eliminate the causes of war and (2)
to limit the effects of war should it occur. Thus far, combinations of
these two approaches, which are the staple of modern arms control
efforts, have not succeeded.
The threat posed by the application of science to the art of war was
recognized by the founders of modern experimental science, but they
believed that the scientific enterprise also contained the solution to the
problem it created. The purpose of modern natural science was to make
man the master of nature so that he could escape nature's capriciousness
and force it to work for mans benefit. The prosperity provided by science
would give man the material means to develop his faculties to the full.
Sir Francis Bacon stated that
the true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this: that
human life be endowed with new discoveries and power. The introduction
of famous discoveries appears to hold by far the first place among human
actions ... for the benefits of discoveries carry blessings with them, and
confer benefits without causing harm or sorrow to any.'
The universal prosperity made possible by scientific discoveries would
allow man to escape the commands of scarcity and deprivation; insofar
as these are the causes of evils among men, their demise would allow
for injustice and enmity to cease. The resulting spread of democratic,
just, free regimes would be coextensive with the advance of the benefits
of science, leading the world toward a universal and peaceful state.
Because science made this future possible, the potential military
applications of technology would not come to pose a threat to civilization.
To quote Bacon again:
If the debasement of arts and sciences to purposes of wickedness, luxury,
and the like, be made a ground of objection to the inventions of modem
science, let no one be moved thereby. For the same may be said of all
earthly goods: of wit, courage, strength, beauty, wealth, light itself, and
the rest. Only let the human race recover that right over nature which
belongs to it by divine bequest, and let power be given it; the exercise
thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion.3
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72 Donald M. Kerr
Another parallel effort to control the threat of unhampered military
technology and eliminate war altogether appeared in the form of socialist
and communist ideology. They both proposed to use science and new
political institutions to eradicate the causes of hostility between men
and states and to advance the world toward a universal and prosperous
state. The socialists thought that they could develop a world common-
wealth of socialist governments, which would be made peaceful by the
elimination of capitalist and imperialist competition. On the other hand,
the communists. (the early Marxists) wanted a universal society from
which governments themselves would fade away, in which all individuals
would live together in affluent harmony. In the world envisioned by
Bacon and in that dreamed of by the socialists and communists, technology
would be only a boon to mankind, and in fact would be his prime
benefactor.
Instead, the advancement of technology and the growing prosperity
it brought about did nothing to ameliorate the hostilities between men
and states. Communism, instead of fulfilling the promise of Marx, evolved
into a permanent tyranny under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors.
Soon it became evident that nations were destined to remain at daggers-
drawn indefinitely and that progress toward democracy and universal
peace was not preordained.
Today, because military technology has apparently outrun the main
schemes to place it under rational or institutional control, the future
and character of military technology are serious and conscious public
concerns. It is from this failure and this concern that the arms control
efforts of the post-World War II era have emerged.
Efforts to get military technology under control and prevent or reduce
the consequences of war have followed several paths in recent years.
One approach, advocated by the neo-Luddites, is to limit or control
scientific and technological progress, either in directly military areas, or
across the board. This was the approach taken in a series of articles in
Science magazine on "Technology Creep and the Arms Race" in 1978.
Efforts to constrain technology ignore several important facts, however.
For developed nations, technology is bound up with the entire structure
of their societies. Their economies and social and political institutions
have developed in the context of technological progress. Their continued
prosperity, world standing, and general national security depend on
advancing technology. (Our reliance on military technology is obvious:
The requirement of very advanced sensor and discrimination technology
for early warning of attack and for remote verification of arms control
agreements are two examples.) We depend on technology in more subtle
ways for our security as well. The energy crisis, for example, showed
that dependence on external supplies of some critical components of
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The Threat of the Neo-Luddites 73
our economy can pose serious threats to our prosperity. If not remedied
by development of domestic energy resources, we could be forced into
military confrontation to guarantee external supplies.
For the developing nations, technological progress is even more
important, for they see it as the key to movement toward industrialization
and its benefits. We may admonish them about the undesirable con-
sequences of development on some aspects of their way of life, but they
remain persuaded that the goods of development are worth the con-
sequences. They would probably be even more reluctant than we to
forego the benefits of technological progress.
It can be argued that although technological progress is demanded
and beneficial in the civilian sector, we should place constraints on
military technology. Unfortunately, military and civilian technologies
are symbiotic and inseparable. Military technology has long contributed
to civilian uses. For example, microprocessors and cryptology, developed
in military programs, have found wide applications in civilian equipment.
Recently, civilian technology has come to play a larger role in military
capabilities. Developments in computer technology and materials re-
search, conducted in the private sector for commercial applications, have
made major contributions to improving military systems.
So again, limits on overall technological advance are perhaps possible,
but they would severely affect our prosperity, our world standing and
economic competitiveness, and our overall national security. They would
also affect our social structure, probably requiring a major (and undesired)
alteration in our way of life. In addition, limiting technological progress
would eliminate one of the key functions that scientific R&D traditionally
plays, that of providing insurance against technological surprise and
obsolescence.
If limits on technological progress or on military technology are
undesirable, must we be burdened with whatever unhappy military
applications they make possible? There is scope for prudence and political
guidance in choosing the direction of military technology and in the
weapon applications we choose to develop. It is in these areas of directing
and applying technology, not in attempting to control the growth of
knowledge, that some mitigation of military effects may be hoped for.
Other efforts to avert a disastrous war have tried to reduce the threat
from weapons of mass destruction, preeminently nuclear weapons. The
prime focus of post-World War II arms control, these efforts have a
long history-beginning with the (perhaps apocryphal) effort of Pope
Innocent to ban the use of the crossbow (but only against other Christians)
in 1139. The technology of the longbow and the military application
the English made of it at Crecy may be an example of the danger
involved in falling behind in military technology. Perhaps the fourteenth
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century elite of France-knights in armor-saw the longbow as socially
destabilizing. Whatever the reason, they failed-until more than sixty
years later after their crushing defeat at Agincourt-to develop the
technology that made knights in armor militarily extinct.
After World War I, treaties were designed to prohibit some of the
causes and excesses of that war. Bans on chemical weapons (the Geneva
Protocol) and an abortive ban on submarine attacks on noncombatant
ships were examples of attempts to control excesses. Various efforts to
control or eliminate armaments (the Versailles Treaty and the World
Disarmament Conference), or to create a war-preventing League of
Nations or "international police force" were examples of attempts to
prevent war from happening again.
Since World War II, the control of nuclear weapons themselves, with
both quantitative and qualitative restrictions, has been emphasized. If
the arms race is itself a cause or contributor to war, as some people
argue, successful agreements might reduce the risk of war. Some agree-
ments also aim to establish stability, a balance that gives neither side
an incentive or need to strike first in times of tension. And finally,
nuclear arms limits or reductions have aimed (in U.S. eyes) at getting
both sides to accept the MAD doctrine and to renounce strategic nuclear
war as an instrument of policy.
Somewhat different approaches to arms control have been the 1946
Baruch Plan, which aimed to place nuclear weapons under international
control, and the idea of nuclear weapon test bans, which might ultimately
lead to the withering away of dependence on nuclear weapons.
At present, these negotiated approaches to arms control have not
eliminated the threat or potential damage levels of war, although several
arms control negotiations are now under way or in preparation. These
include the START talks (where a new approach or on-site verification
seems to be needed), the INF talks (to fill the gap left by strategic
nuclear weapon negotiations), test ban negotiations, chemical and bi-
ological weapons control and conventional arms control negotiations
(needed to cover the asymmetries between the military needs and
capabilities of the nuclear powers).
What We Can Do
These main lines of arms control of recent years seem to offer little
hope. While some reductions may be possible from START and INF
talks, even those will be difficult because of the characteristics of the
weapon systems involved. And even reduced arsenals would possess
enormous destructive power. In addition to attempting to obtain whatever
improvements we can through negotiated arms control agreements, there
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The Threat of the Neo-Luddites 75
are two things we must do. In the short run, we have no recourse but
to maintain the pace of technological advancement. The United States
desires peace and the retention of the international status quo; conse-
quently, maintaining our lead in weapons technology gives the best
chance for continued peace. (Technical superiority is especially important
in light of our inferiority in numbers of weapons and manpower.)
Technological progress is also vital in other security-related areas (e.g.,
a secure energy supply and increased industrial productivity) if we are
to avoid falling victim to outside circumstances and are to maintain our
ability to stay out of conflicts as long as we wish to do so.
In the longer run, we must consciously exploit those promising
developments in military technology that offer some hope for reducing
the possible damage of war, should it start, while maintaining or even
increasing our security. One trend in military technology is toward the
ability to create more discriminating, less massive, more secure weapons.
This development, made possible by progress in detection, discrimination,
and guidance technologies, improvements in warhead lethality, and
greater capability for complex battle management, may in time allow
for the deployment of a credible military defense with less risk of
resorting to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
For example, multiple nonnuclear warheads might be deployed on our
weapon systems in Europe, effectively taking over the antiarmor role
that now can only be accomplished by battlefield nuclear weapons.
Developments like this offer the prospect of a future battlefield where
the destruction is limited in large part to combatants.
Technological advances may also permit development of viable strategic
(and even tactical) defenses, perhaps for a time shifting the military
advantage from the offense to the defense. We might then move from
a strategy of mutual assured destruction to mutual assured survival.
One significant military option would be the ability to ward off an
incoming attack without the loss of territory or the destruction of
population. To have the ability to choose appropriate responses to
military challenges, without the fear of immediate impending destruction,
would be satisfying both politically and militarily. To achieve that position,
however, will take more than reaching some rough technological parity
with the Soviets; it will take a courageous long-term investment-with
high risk-to lay the scientific and then technological groundwork for
a significant strategic defense not linked to instant escalation.
Besides being desirable as a way to move technology away from
massive and indiscriminate destruction, such developments are necessary
for U.S. defense policy. In an age of strategic parity and theater and
conventional inferiority, we need to develop military forces that we are
not self-deterred from using, as may be the case with our current
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battlefield nuclear weapons. Our military deterrent would thus become
more credible and those nuclear weapons for which there is no-alternative
at present' would" be protected- from criticism.
The- choice of weapon systems characteristics can drastically alter the
perception of their intent. For example, theater nuclear forces heavily
weighted' toward ballistic missiles might be perceived as' a first-strike
capability and thus destabilizing; while greater emphasis on cruise missiles
would indicate a retaliatory posture.
Over the, long run; emphasizing such developments, might lead us
out of the dangerous situation we now ' face, reducing the threat that
military technology poses to' our nation and our civilization. Such,
prospects need to be examined' soberly in ~ terms of our national' needs
and purposes, and a national strategy must be developed- for investment
in scientific' and= technological research and development that ensures
vigorous support of the trends most suited to those national purposes.
Given the harsh realities of. our world, the attempts to control' military
technology -development proposed by the neo-Luddites- hold not. promise
but. danger; We must consider the opposite'' course-enhancing those
technologies that allow us' to reduce tensions, improve international
stability, and reduce the threat to, national survival. We: can, take this
course unilaterally, without having, to wait' for the' results of desultory
arms control negotiations, without having, to wait for the development
of goodwill -or other desirable but unlikely improvements in the political
climate or organization of the world;
Notesy
1. Robert L. Heilbroner, Inquiry into the Huinan'Prospeet-(New York: W. W.
Norton, 1974), pp: 19 and 21.
2. SirFrancis Bacon; The New Organon'and.Related Writing; Fulton H. Anderson
editions (Indianapolis: Bobbs and; Merrill, 1960); p 71.
3. Ibid; p. 117.
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