THE KEY ROLE OF U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00528R000100010046-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: January 10, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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0
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
iI ?0,K 9 y
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Asian Studies Center.
Backgrounder
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. ? Washington, D.C. 20002 ? [phone] ? Telex: 440235Z
January 10, 1984
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of the Philippines always has occupied a special
place in the foreign policy considerations of the United States.
This is a product not only of the long historic association and
substantial economic involvement in trade and investment between
the two nations, but also of the importance of the military bases
at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the strategic policy of the United
States in the West Pacific.
U.S. access to those bases is critically important for at
least five reasons. Such access (1) assures the security of the
Philippines against external attack, (2) allows the Philippines
and other friendly nations in Southeast Asia to pursue economic
growth without disabling military expenditures, (3) offsets Soviet
military initiatives in Southeast Asia, (4) adds stability to the
South China Sea region, and (5) affords the U.S. the ability to
project its military power quickly into both the Pacific and
Indian Ocean areas.
Though there have been modifications in the original 1947
Military Bases Agreement that gives the U.S. the right to use
Subic Bay and Clark Field, these have not essentially restricted
American use of those major facilities. The trouble is that
future access to these bases is less certain.
The Philippines today is experiencing one of the most acute
crises in its modern history. There is serious opposition to the
government of President Ferdinand Marcos because of his domestic
policies as well as the special relationship between the Philip-
pines and the U.S. This crisis threatens to bring a change in
leadership that might seek to abrogate the bases agreement. The
loss of these bases would be an incalculable setback for the U.S.
from a regional and a global perspective.
THE KEY ROLE OF U. S. BASES
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the
passage of any bill before Congress.
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The 1947 agreement granted the United States "the right to
retain the use" of 16 bases (including Clark Field and Subic Bay)
in the Philippines and to use 7 other bases if Washington decided
that "military necessity" required such action. Access to these
23 specifically named bases was provided rent-free for a period
of 99 years (until the year 2045). The Philippine government
also agreed to enter into negotiations with the United States, if
the latter so requested, to expand or reduce such bases, to ex-
change those bases for others, or to acquire additional base areas.
The agreement allowed the U.S. full discretionary use of the bases'
facilities. Criminal. jurisdiction over U.S. base personnel and
their dependents was given to U.S. authorities irrespective of
whether the alleged offenses were committed on or off the base
areas.
In effect, some of the rights and privileges accorded the
U.S. under the agreement evoked serious questions concerning
violations of Philippine sovereignty. As early as 1951, Filipino
Nationalist Senator Claro M. Recto assailed the U.S.-Philippines
military .and security arrangements charging that they made a
mockery of Philippine independence. By the mid-1950s, it had
become clear that the agreements would have to be amended to
reduce the irritants to Filipino nationalist sentiments.
In 1956, Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay and U.S. Vice
President Richard Nixon sought to dampen some of the most serious
Filipino objections. They issued a joint statement in Manila
affirming inter alia full Philippine sovereignty over the base
territories. Three years later, a "memorandum of agreement" was
signed by U.S. Ambassador Charles A. Bohlen and Philippine Foreign
Minister Felixberto Serrano which stipulated that operational use
of the bases by the U.S. would require prior consultation with
the Philippine government--except on those occasions when the.
bases might be employed in accordance with the U.S.-Philippines
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the 1954 Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty (The Manila Pact). The Bohlen-Serrano
Agreement also stated that the U.S. could not establish long-range
missile capabilities on the bases without consulting the Philippine
government. The terms of the lease governing the American bases
were reduced from 99 years to 25 years, and U.S. operations were
to be consolidated into four "active bases."
By the mid-1960s, the U.S. had become so sensitive to Philip-
pine nationalist sentiments that during the Vietnam War the bases
were used exclusively for logistical support purposes. Although
the Manila Pact allowed the U.S. to launch'combat operations from
the Philippine bases, facilities elsewhere, notably in Guam, were
employed for combat missions against enemy targets in Vietnam.
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In 1965, the U.S. revised the criminal jurisdiction provisions
of the bases agreement to conform to the NATO status-of-forces
formula--an agreement that had fully satisfied the sovereignty
concerns of American allies in Europe. The following year, U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Philippine Foreign Minister
Narciso Ramos initialed an accord that formally ratified the
Bohlen-Serrano understanding of 1959, thereby setting the termi-
nation date of the bases agreement for 1991.
Full Philippine sovereignty over the American bases was
reaffirmed on two other occasions during the 1970s: the first,
in a joint communique between Presidents Gerald Ford and Ferdinand
Marcos dated December 7, 1975; the second in a joint communique
between President Marcos and Vice President Walter Mondale issued
on May 4, 1.978. The latter communique also signalled forthcoming
major revisions in the U.S.-Philippines Bases Agreement. What
those revisions involved was revealed in the amendments that were
made public on January 7, 1979.
One of the most enduring disagreements involved the issue of
compensation to the Philippines for the bases. While the original
agreement gave the U.S. use of the bases "rent-free," it was clear
that the Philippine government expected to receive and, in fact,
did receive some kind of "compensation." The U.S.-Philippine
Military Assistance Agreement of'1947, signed just one week after
the bases accord, was considered by Washington and Manila, at
least in part, compensation for U.S. use of the bases.
Philippine officials nonetheless felt such arrangements were
inadequate and unreliable. During the early 1970s, Thailand
received over $400 million in military assistance and South Korea
received over $600 million. The Philippines received only $50
million in grant aid--at a time when the Filipino Communist New
People's Army had recommenced its armed insurrection against the
government.' At this time, moreover, the U.S. signed agreements
with three Mediterranean nations on American basing facilities.
These included: a 5-year agreement with Spain that contained a
$1.2 billion compensation clause; a 4-year agreement with Turkey
that netted Ankara $1 billion in compensation; and a similar
agreement with Greece involving payments of $700 million.
By the end of the 1970s it was clear that Manila would
request far more substantial compensation. In fact, the January
1979 agreement involved a commitment on the part of President
Jimmy Carter to make his "best effort" to obtain $500 million in
military and economic grants and aid to the Philippines over a
5-year period.
Serapio P. Taccad, "Philippine-American Relations and the U.S. Bases: A
Filipino Perspective," Naval War College Review, Spring 1978, p. 71,
and United States-Philippine Base Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 1977), p. 10.
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Beyond the compensatory changes, Filipino commanders were
installed at the bases and security on the bases became a Philip-
pine responsibility. The U.S. also returned large land and water
tracts to Filipino administration. In fact, about 90 percent of
the land area of Clark Field and 45 percent at Subic, in addition
to most of the waters of the immediate Bay, reverted to Philippine
control.2 Finally, the U.S. agreed to review the 1947 U.S.-
Philippines Bases Agreement every 5 years.3
On June 1, 1983, following nearly two months of talks, new
amendments to the 1947 agreement were signed. The U.S. retained
its "unhampered military operations" on the bases, qualified by
the requirement that Manila be informed of the level of U.S.
forces permanently stationed in the Philippines at any given
time, and that the Philippine authorities be given prior notifica-
. tion of any "major changes in [U.S.] equipment and weapon systems."
The U.S. affirmed that it would "take all measures within its
authority to ensure" that all members of its armed forces, their
dependents, and civilian employees, would respect domestic Philip-
pine law.
The U.S. also agreed: (1) to promote suitable projects in
the areas surrounding the base facilities;.(2) to improve the
social and economic conditions in regions adjacent to the bases;
(3) to procure goods and services in the Philippines necessary
for base operations.to "the maximum extent feasible"; (4) to
establish procedures for ensuring the equality of treatment of,
and the extension of the right of collective bargaining to, the
Philippine work force on the bases; and (5) to withhold Philippine
income tax from the salaries of Philippine nationals employed by
U.S. armed forces.
In substance, these amendments to the military bases agree-
ment would seem to satisfy the most pressing Filipino concerns
regarding their national sovereignty. The current arrangement
between Washington and Manila is essentially the same as those
between the U.S. and Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Germany,
Italy, Greece, Turkey, South Korea and Japan--on whose soil the
U.S. maintains military facilities. The Philippine military bases
are now under the command of Philippine military commanders who
have access to all information concerning military activities on
the facilities (except the most sensitive classified materials).
American personnel are subject to Philippine law except in cases
involving only Americans on the bases themselves. Prior consul-
tation with the appropriate Philippine officials is required in all
Alvin J. Cottrell and Robert J. Hanks, The Military Utility of the U.S.
Facilities in the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University,
1980), p. 27.
Larry A. Niksch, Philippine Bases: How Important to U.S. Interests in
Asia? (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 1,
1980).
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instances involving military operations launched from the bases.
And Philippine labor practices are extended to all Philippine
nationals employed within the confines of the facilities.
THE BASE FACILITIES
The facilities at Clark Field include an 8,000-ft. runway,
long enough to accommodate any aircraft in the U.S. inventory,
and 3 million sq. ft. of storage area (one-half million under
cover) containing stores valued at about $100 million, including
about 101,000 items ranging from portable control towers to tran-
sistors. Clark Field is also a major communications link, one of
three such centers in the West Pacific (along with Yokota in
Japan and South Korea). Wallace Air Station, north of Clark,
provides a major radar facility that serves the entire region.
In any general conflict, the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark would
assume major responsibilities in the West Pacific and Indian
Ocean, supporting the activities of the Fifth Air Force operating
out of Japan, providing escorts for long-range bombers based at
Guam, and resupplying'the austere facilities on Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean.
Subic Bay, 50 miles west of Manila, includes the Port Olongapo
Naval Station, the Cubi Point Naval Air Station, and.the Camayan
Point Naval Magazine. The four-floating drydocks at Subic Bay
Naval Base can service all U.S. naval vessels other than carriers.
The base also has a storage capacity for petroleum, oil, and
lubricants of about 110 million gallons. The Naval Air Station
at Cubi Point provides a further storage capacit,, of 1.68 million
gallons and can service the entire aircraft complements of two
aircraft carriers. The Naval Magazine provides space for almost
4 million cubic feet of ammunition storage. About 60 percent of
all servicing and repair for the U.S. Seventh Fleet is done at
the pier and harbor support facilities at Subic.
Without access to these naval facilities, the Seventh Fleet
would have to be removed a minimum of four days "steaming time"
from Southeast Asia. Such a distance could be critical in times
of crisis and would require massive expansion in the seatrain
and logistics capabilities of the U.S. Navy in the West Pacific
if U.S. forces were to remain on station in Southeast Asia or the
Indian Ocean for extended periods of time.
THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION OF THE PHILIPPINE BASES
Base functions have remained unchanged for nearly four
decades: (1) to protect a friendly Philippines, (2) to provide
a forward defense perimeter for the U.S.,.and (3) to establish
support installations for supply, repair, and staging services for
American forces in East and South Asia.4
4 See the statement of Paul McNutt, Congressional Record, July 3, 1946,
p. A3922.
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The strategic importance of the U.S. military bases in the
Philippines has increased dramatically since the debacle in
Vietnam. While the U.S. partially withdrew its forces from the
Pacific region, the Soviet Union launched a massive military
buildup.
Particularly noteworthy has been the growth of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet. Once a modest coastal defense force, the Soviet.
Pacific Fleet today is the largest of its four fleets, deploying
about 30 percent of Soviet naval assets.. The Soviet Pacific Fleet
now operates over 200 combat vessels in East Asia--including about
135 submarines, of which some 65 are nuclear-powered. This force
is supplemented by approximately 2,200 combat aircraft. Among
the 285 bombers in the region are some 70 Tupolev Backfires with
an operational radius estimated at 3,400 miles (without refueling).
Finally, Soviet theater nuclear capability has improved dramatical-
ly with the deployment of at least 100 SS-20 mobile intermediate-
range ballistic missiles.
In countering the Soviet threat, a major U.S. advantage in
the West Pacific is the Philippine bases. In any general conflict,
U.S. forces in Japan and Korea would attempt to confine Soviet
naval forces to the inland seas along the Asian mainland north
and west of Japan and Korea. The U.S. and Japanese forces in
Northeast Asia would be fully involved against any attempt by the
Soviet Union to break out of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of
Okhotsk.
A major weakness for the Soviet Pacific Fleet in such a
situation would be its thin logistical infrastructure in Southeast
Asia. Soviet basing facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong, and Da
Nang in Vietnam cannot now and will not be able for some time to
maintain Soviet naval units at sea for extended tours, nor provide
the service necessary to repair major battle damage. By contrast,
as long as U.S. naval forces have use of the extensive repair,
replenishment, and resupply facilities at Subic Bay, they will
enjoy a significant combat advantage.
Soviet forces also lack adequate air cover in Southeast Asia.
Thus, U.S. forces, having access to Clark Field and the Cubi Point
Naval Air Station, could deploy air support that would provide
them maximum battle advantage. The carrier-borne interceptor,
strike and anti-submarine aircraft made available by the naval
forces stationed at Subic Bay could influence decisively any
conflict in the West and Southwest Pacific.
THE REGIONAL ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE BASES
Even without a general conflict, U.S. bases in the Philippines
constrain Soviet initiatives in Southeast Asia. All noncommunist
nations of Southeast Asia, acutely aware of the Soviet threat,
have indicated clearly that they want U.S. forces to deter further
Soviet moves. The unstated premise of the collective defense
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policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of
which the Philippines is a founding member, is the continued
presence of American armed forces at Subic Bay and Clark Field.5
Those forces provide the military shield that allows ASEAN nations
to grow economically without disabling military expenditures.
The Philippine military budget, for example, is among the lowest
in Asia. Manila commits only about 1.7 percent of its gross
national product (GNP) to defense. For the rest of ASEAN, this
ranges from 3.5 percent (Thailand) to 5.8 percent (Singapore) of
GNP
Over the past decade the situation in Southeast Asia,.parti-
cularly in the South China Sea, has become increasingly tense.
The Sea affords passage for the shipping that sustains the major
trading nations of Northeast Asia as well as vessels that provide
military resupply to Soviet bases in the USSR's Far Eastern
provinces. The routes traversed by these ships pass through
critical chokepoints, which could be sealed by mines and shore
defenses in wartime. The control of those chokepoints and the
waterways depends largely on who has possession of the islands,
cays, banks, shoals, and reefs of the South China Sea.
This is particularly true of the Spratly Islands. -Vietnam
claims some of the Spratlys, while the Philippines claims six of
the islands, having renamed them the Kalayaan Island Group and
incorporated them as a municipality of Palawan Province.6 For
its part, the Republic of China on Taiwan maintains a garrison.on
several of the Spratly-Islands.
The Spratly Islands lie astride the principal-trade routes
through the South China Sea and any power that controls the
islands can influence safe passage to the Indian Ocean and North-
east Asia. For the Soviet Union, free passage through the region
is essential for the maintenance and resupply of its Far Eastern
forces. For'the People's Republic of China, Soviet control of
the waterways of the South China Sea would-help to complete its
encirclement" by a power Beijing has every reason to fear.
Yet as long as the current circumstances apply, with the
Republic of China on Taiwan occupying Itu Aba in the Tizard Bank,
and the Philippines occupying the Reed Bank and Nanshan and Thitu
See Jusuf Wanandi, "Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Indonesian
Observation," Asian Survey, December 1978, p. 1214, and "Conflict and
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Indonesian Perspective,"
Asian Survey, June 1982, p. 513; Lee Boon Hiok, "Constraints on Singa-
pore's Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, June 1982, p. 528.
Estrella D. Solidum, "Philippine Perceptions of Crucial Issues Affecting
Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, June 1982, pp. 542-543.
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islands in the Central Spratlys, the situation is defused. Con-
tinuation of present circumstances requires a dominant U.S. mili-
tary presence in the region, without which the situation would
become unpredictable. As such, the U.S. military forces in
the Philippines help stabilize all Southeast Asia. The presence
of major U.S. naval and air units in the immediate vicinity
deters military adventure by any of the claimants of the islands.
Any major withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines could
tempt Moscow or Beijing to "settle" the dispute over the islands
and thereby involve the entire region in conflict. The ability
of the United States to project its forces into the region, there-
fore, is a critical variable in the configuration of factors that
shape events in Southeast Asia.
As the Soviet Union consolidates its position in Indochina,
routinizing its use of military bases in Vietnam and Cambodia,
the U.S. military presence in the Philippines becomes much more
critical. The defense of Thailand, for instance, requires a
credible U.S. response capability. The continued U.S. commitment
to Bangkok necessitates base facilities close enough to make the
commitment credible. The only realistic U.S. response to the
inevitable Soviet military build-up in Indochina is a correspond-
ing replenishment of its own forces in secure bases in the region--
as much in the interests of the nations of the region (including
the PRC) as its own. Although at one time it could have been
argued that either ASEAN or the United States could put together
a realistic security policy for Southeast Asia without basing
U.S. forces in the Philippines, such a position no longer is
tenable.?
PHILIPPINE BENEFITS FROM THE BASES ARRANGEMENT
For the Philippines, the presence of the U.S. armed forces
not only is a security asset of significance, but it also consti-
tutes an economic factor of major importance. President Reagan
has pledged to make his best efforts to procure about $900 million
in security and economic aid for the Philippines as compensation
for the use of the bases. Maintenance of the bases, meanwhile,
pumps over $300 million annually into the Philippine economy and
provides full-time employment for over 40,000 Philippine nationals.
U.S. compensatory aid and capital transfers for base maintenance
make up about 7 or 8 percent of-the Philippine GNP.
President Marcos has openly acknowledged the strategic global
and regional importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. The
negotiations over the new amendments to the agreement were con-
cluded in June 1983 after only 17 sessions. It is clear that
as long as the Marcos administration remains in office in Manila
the United States will be assured access to the Philippine bases.
Lucien Pye, Redefining American Policy in Southeast Asia (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 32.
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The immediate threat to a continued U.S. military presence in the
Philippines emanates from the anti-Marcos opposition--whether the
opposition characterizes itself as "moderate" or "radical."
THREATS TO THE MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT
The leftist opposition in the Philippines has long since
clarified its position concerning the military bases agreement.
It opposes U.S. equity investments in the islands as "exploitative,"
and the presence of the U.S. miltary there as "oppressive" and
"neocolonial." The National Democratic Front--the united front
organization of the Philippine Marxist left--calls the Marcos
government a "full-blown fascist dictatorship" established at the
"instigation of U.S. imperialism." The express policy of the
radical left in the Philippines is to "nullify" all "unequal
treaties and arrangements" with the United States.8 The "abroga-
tion of all treaties, executive agreements and statutes" clearly
involves the basing agreement with the U.S. armed forces. The
Marxist anti-Marcos opposition is committed to a "campaign against
the U.S. military bases" and all security relations between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States.9
The "moderate" opposition also takes this line. Not only
have the current leaders of the United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO), the moderates' umbrella organization, taken
a stand very much like that of the radical left against U.S.
equity holdings in the Philippines, but UNIDO leadership ex-
plicitly has objected to the Military Bases Agreement. Salvador
Laurel, the UNIDO leader has announced that the noncommunist
"moderate" opposition to Marcos demands an abrogation of the
bases agreement before its scheduled termination in 1991.' The
official platform of UNIDO now calls for an immediate removal of
U.S. forces from the Philippines. In terms of U.S. security and
economic interests, it is difficult to distinguish "moderates"
from an anti-Marcos opposition that is "radical."
The entire anti-Marcos opposition has chosen to identify
itself with an anti-American program that includes a redirection
of the Philippine economy designed to diminish its trade and
investment relations with the United States. Their goal is an
inward directed economy based on the domestic market, closed to
foreign capital flows and export outlets. UNIDO advocates a
protectionist'policy predicated on the shopworn theses of leftist
"anti-imperialism."lo
Manifesto of the National Democratic Front-Philippines (Mansfield Depot,
Conn.: Philippines Research Center, n.d.), pp. 1, 3.
Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution in the Philippines (Boston:
Philippines Liberation Press, 1975), pp. 14, 17.
"UNIDO Suggests 'Alternative,'" Bulletin Today (Manila), May 22, 1983.
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In the past, U.S. officials have sought to maintain contact
with the Philippine anti-Marcos opposition in case the Marcos
government falls. At present, however, not even the "moderate"
anti-Marcos opposition has anything to offer the United States,
the anti-Soviet West, or the nations of the region. The "moderates"
advocate a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines that
would impose an onerous burden of self-defense expenditures on
the noncommunist nations of the region. And the anti-Marcos
opposition, even in its most "moderate" form, proposes a return
to a policy of autarkic economic development that has proved
disastrous wherever attempted.
Raul Manglapus, a leader of the "moderate" opposition, has
referred to the U.S. as a nation that "no longer speaks the
language of freedom but of profits .... "11 As early as 1964
former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, another "moderate" leader, spoke
against continued "foreign" [i.e. U.S.] investments in the
Philippines as "oppressive.i12 Former Senator Jose Diokno,
another "moderate," has denounced the U.S.'for maintaining a
system of "colonialism" in which it exploits the Philippines for
its own purposes. He advocated a withdrawal of U.S. "military
supports" so that the Philippines could become "self-reliant."13
In sum, the present "moderate" opposition to the Marcos
government is manifestly anti-American by conviction, and however
much their overt behavior might be modified by the realities of
power, their commitment to the security of Southeast Asia and to-
a realistic policy of economic development for the region is, at
best, questionable. The leadership of the anti-Marcos opposition
has been so long inured.to the "anti-imperialist" notions-of the
neo-Marxist left that it is unlikely that the U.S. can ever have
confidence in its behavior.
The crisis in the Philippines today threatens to bring a
change in leadership that could very well seek to abrogate the
bases agreement that has secured the stability of Southeast Asia
since the trauma of Vietnam. The anti-Marcos opposition has so
long opposed the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines that
it might find itself compelled to attempt their eviction. The
consequences of any such attempt would be incalculably dangerous.
The crisis in the Philippines leaves the United States with
few options. The accession to power of even a "moderate" anti-
Marcos opposition could very well threaten U.S. security, economic,
Raul Manglapus, Philippines: The Silenced Democracy (Maryknoll: Orbis,
1976), pp. 10, 60.
See Jose Maria Sison, National Democracy and Socialism (Mansfield Depot,
Conn.: Philippines Research Center, a.d.), p. 3.
Jose W. Diokno, Justice Under Siege: Five Talks (Manila: Nationalist
Resource Center, October 1981), pp.'47, 50, 52, 60, 85-88.
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and political interests. The "moderate" anti-Marcos opposition
is sufficiently anti-American to make its advent to power in
Manila a cause for considerable alarm--but it seems evident that
the "moderates," attempting.to secure and consolidate power,
would have to tolerate the presence of some more radical elements
in their midst. The history of such revolutions in Nicaragua,
Iran, and Cambodia is too recent to allow Americans to be deluded
about the probable outcome of a similar eventuality in the
Philippines. The overthrow of Somoza, the Shah, and Lon Nol only
succeeded in bringing the Sandinistas, Khomeini, and Pol Pot to
power, who have proved not only more objectionable in terms of
their human rights records and political policies, but assiduously
anti-American as well.
In pursuit of its national interests--and in the service of
its ultimate concern with the most fundamental human rights--the
United States has few options other than to attempt to stabilize
the economic and political circumstances in the Philippines to
prevent any radical change. Such a change in the governance of
the Philippines would trigger widespread disorder, protracted
violence, and a critical instability throughout Southeast Asia.
The only forces that would profit from such an outcome would be
those committed to the destruction of political and economic
democracy. At the very center of the unfolding drama are the
U.S. bases in the Philippines. The future security and well-
being of one of the most promising regions in the developing
world depends on them.
Prepared for The Heritage Foundation
by A. James Gregor
Professor of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
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