AFGHANISTAN: THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Directorate of
Intelligence
of National Reconciliation
Secret
Afghanistan: The Domestic
and International Implications
Secret
NESA 87-10048
October /987
482
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
of National Reconciliation ~
Afghanistan: The Domestic
and International Implications
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with contributions by
This paper was prepared by
f ffice of Leadership Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA~
Secret
NESA x~-rnoa~~
Or?lober 1987
STAT
25X1
STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Aghanistan: The Domestic
and International Implications
of National Reconciliation
Key Judgments The peace initiative launched by the USSR anal the Afghan regime on 15
~~~~.~~~~r~~,n al~Quae~e January 1987, which features a unilateral cease-fire and a national
~,.~ ~~t ~~ s~pren~he. i9s~ reconciliation plan, has failed to attract the interest of Afghan insurgent
erns useA in this report.
groups and has weakened the Kabul government domestically. At the same
time, Moscow and Kabul probably are succeeding through their peace
initiative in slowly enhancing the Afghan regime's diplomatic legitimacy,
dividing the resistance alliance, and undermining international political
support for the insurgents, thereby threatening to win politically what they
have not been able to win on the battlefield.
Because of disagreements about the reconciliation proposals, the Moscow-
dominated People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) almost
certainly has become more faction ridden and less effective as an
instrument of government. The chronic factionalism that has characterized
the PDPA since its inception in 1965 has intensified since January and has
led to the emergence of several small splinter groups in the PI)PA's
traditional Parchami and Khalqi factions.
The decline of the regime's armed forces' combat proficiency has
matched-and perhaps exceeded the deterioration of the government
since the peace offensive began. The threat of Soviet withdrawal implicit in
the peace offensive has undermined the already poor morale of party and
regime cadre, as well as that of the officer corps. So far in 1987 the Afghan
army has performed poorly on the battlefield and-after atwo-year
respite-is again experiencing small, whole-unit desertions. Growing insur-
gent use of surface-to-air missiles is causing a rapid decline in the morale
and aggressiveness of the Afghan air force. The combination of the specter
of near-term Soviet withdrawal and the insurgents' improving combat
effectiveness is almost certainly having a detrimental impact on the morale
and aggressiveness of the regime's armed forces as a whole.
Moscow and Kabul have scored some international successes, however, and
are methodically building on the peace proposals to create a diplomatic
environment in which the Afghan regime's legitimacy is growing. Moscow
appears to have concluded that the campaign is softening international
political support for the insurgents and increasing the possibility of many
states viewing the war as an East-West issue rather than as a clear-cut case
Secret
NESA 87-10048
Or~ober 1987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
of Soviet aggression. The international impact of the national reconcilia-
tion effort almost certainly will reduce the number of nations voting for
Pakistan's Afghanistan resolution at the UN General Assembly this fall.
The Soviet-Afghan regime peace initiative has had considerable success in
sowing confusion and dissension both in the seven-party resistance alliance
and between the insurgent party chiefs and the Pakistanis. Moscow's and
Kabul's acceptance of an as yet undefined leadership role in a national
reconciliation regime for former King Zahir Shah has sharply increased
tensions between the fundamentalist political party chiefs and the tradi-
tionalist leaders, and among the party leaders, the field commanders, and
the refugees. The Zahir Shah issue
has also divided most of the alliance and the Pakistanis.
The Soviets and Afghans undoubtedly realize they have struck the alliance
and its external backers at their weakest point-the alliance's lack of
internal cohesion and a single political agenda and will probably continue
to pursue the policy. After the UN General Assembly session, Moscow and
Kabul probably will continue presenting their "reasonable" peace propos-
als to the Islamic Conference Organization and the Nonaligned Movement
and contrast them with the resistance's lack of a flexible negotiating policy.
Despite the increasingly severe rifts in the PDPA growing out of the peace
initiative, we see no imminent prospect for a collapse of the Kabul regime.
Moscow could not permit the dissolution of the PDPA or the breakdown of
the regime's armed forces because there are no other instruments through
which Soviet goals in Afghanistan could be pursued. The intensity of the
current intraparty struggle for power also suggests that most senior PDPA
members still regard the party leadership as a prize worth winning, an
attitude implying that senior party members do not foresee an imminent
withdrawal of Soviet protection.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Pn ~e
Key Judgments
What Is "National Reconciliation"?
iii
1
National Reconciliation: Destabilizing the PDPA
2
Impact on the Cadre
2
Parchami Splintering Continues
3
The Khalgis: Climbing Back to Power`?
4
The Afghan Armed Forces: Steady Deterioration
S
Declining Morale
H
Casualties and Desertions
8
Manpower Problems
__ -_
Growing Success: The International Impact of National Reconciliation
H
Courting the United Nations
10
Kabul, the Islamic Conference, and the Nonaligned Movement
12
Making the War an East-West Issue
l 2
Driving Wedges: The Resistance, Pakistan, and National Reconciliation
13
_---_
The Insurgent Alliance and Kabul's Peace Plan
13
_. __---
The Alliance and Pakistan: Fighting Over Peace
16
-___
Outlook
16
Implications for the United States
18
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Afghanistan
8ountlary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Aghanistan: The Domestic
and International Implications
of National Reconciliation
The peace initiative begun by the USSR and the
Afghan regime in January 1987 has, in our judgment,
failed at home and had limited but important success
abroad. No important insurgent commander has ob-
served the regime's cease-fire-most have increased
their combat activity-and no prominent resistance
political figure or significant number of refugees has
returned home to participate in the national reconcili-
ation process. The peace campaign nonetheless has
succeeded in securing increased international recogni-
tion for Kabul, and Soviet and Afghan regime media
are having some success in portraying the war as an
East-West issue, blurring the reality of Soviet aggres-
sion. The "peace proposals" have also sown dissension
within the resistance alliance and between the insur-
gent leaders and the Pakistanis.
What Is "National Reconciliation"?
The Soviet-Afghan regime peace initiative has thus
far gone through two distinct phases. Kabul and
Moscow launched the first stage of the peace offensive
in early January 1987 with the declaration of a six-
month unilateral cease-fire, a call for national recon-
ciliation, and the release of some political prisoners.
initially, Kabul's plan was short on specifics, offering
only a vague scheme for sharing power with its
opponents and pledging the establishment of an Is-
lamic state. Kabul also promised to provide land,
food, money, and resettlement arrangements for those
refugees choosing to accept its invitation to return
home. The Soviets and Afghans complemented the
domestic aspects of the initiative with a media and
diplomatic offensive aimed at increasing Kabul's in-
ternational legitimacy, blaming the United States for
prolonging the war, and accusing Pakistan and Iran of
preventing the return of refugees.
The second and more specific phase of the peace
initiative was proclaimed in June and July. People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) General
Secretary Najib began this stage by announcing the
Economic Aspects of Kabul's National
Reconciliation Plan
Kabul has unveiled several economic programs to
garner support for national reconciliation in the
Afghan business and refugee communities. In May,
the regime
announced that it would soon return some expropri-
ated industries to their.former owners. The regime
apparently has been unable to operate many of them
profitably because of shortages of labor, energy, and
raw materials. According to regime media, Kabul is
also trying to prompt a mass return of refugees
through gifts of cash, land, seed, and fanning equip-
ment, as well as an exemption from back taxes and
interest on debt.
Land reform is a major economic component of
national reconciliation. Acknowledging that serious
mistakes had been made in implementing the
regime's original land reforms, a top official stated
last spring that Kabul would raise the limit on
individual landholdings from 6 to 20 hectares. The
regime's land distribution program has been univer-
sally unpopular since its introduction in 1978 and
was instrumental in triggering the initial outbreak of
armed resistance to the new regime. In our opinion,
the new land policy will fail because opposition to
Kabul's land reform policy is directed not so much at
the size of individual landholdings-which have tra-
ditionally been small-but at government interfer-
ence in a matter that has historically been governed
by lslamie laws oJ~inheritance. The regime s program
will also be constrained by the shortage of land in a
country where only about 20 percent of total acreage
is arable.
STAT
25X1
25X1
25X1
L~X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
possibility of renaming the country the Republic of
Afghanistan, presumably hoping that dropping the
term "Democratic" from the country's current name
would blur the regime's Marxist underpinnings. Ka-
bul next offered its opponents 23 Cabinet, sub-Cabi-
net, and ambassadorial posts; promulgated a law
legalizing a multiparty political system; declared for-
mer King Zahir Shah eligible for a post in a reconcili-
ation regime; and issued a draft constitution for
"national" debate. The regime also extended its uni-
lateral cease-fire through 15 January 1988 and issued
a decree allowing insurgent commanders-after
agreeing to join the national reconciliation process-
to establish autonomous "political and military struc-
tures" within their areas of control. Kabul also sweet-
ened its offer to the refugees by promising restitution
for property and land confiscated or destroyed by the
reg4me~
At the same time, Kabul continued its diplomatic
offensive by sending senior officials to more than 60
states-mostly Islamic nations and in the Third
World-to explain the "successes" of the national
reconciliation campaign and assert US "responsibili-
ty" for prolonging the war by providing sophisticated
arms to the insurgents. The diplomatic campaign was
capped in early September by a session of the UN-
sponsored Afghanistan negotiations in Geneva called
at Kabul's insistence during which the Afghan For-
eign Minister reduced the proposed timetable for
Soviet troop withdrawal from 18 to 16 months
National Reconciliation: Destabilizing the PDPA
We believe the Soviet-Afghan peace initiative has had
a negative internal impact on the PDPA, sharply
increasing the party's chronic factionalism and steadi-
ly lowering morale. In our view, PDPA General
Secretary Najib, former General Secretary Babrak
Karmal, and many party members of both the Par-
chami and Khalqi factions expected such a result and
have never had much enthusiasm for the peace pro-
posals.
~ We believe
that Kabul's six-month extension of the regime's
unilateral cease-fire, announced in mid-July, was
imposed by Moscow against Najib's wishes.
Impact on the Cadre. The national reconciliation plan
has, in our view, weakened party cohesion and sapped
the confidence of party and government cadre in the
reliability of Soviet protection. The widespread uncer-
tainty created by the initiative appears to have en-
couraged many PDPA members-who had been ner-
vous about
the durability of Soviet protection since Babrak Kar-
mal was removed as party leader in May 1986-to
organize themselves into groups that are loosely asso-
ciated with but distinct from the two traditional party
factions. at
least six separate factions are vying for power in the
PDPA: pro-Najib Parchamis, pro-Babrak Karmal
Parchamis, anti-Soviet Khalqis, pro-Soviet Khalqis,
Khalqis recently released from prison by Najib, and
the various non-Pashtun ethnic groups who are gath-
ering around Prime Minister Keshtmand.
In the 10 months since the cease-fire-national recon-
ciliation plan began, the PDPA regime, according to
US diplomatic reports, has experienced a steady rise
in nervousness among its middle- and lower-level
cadre. The usually well-informed Indian Ambassador
in Kabul summarized the impact of the peace plan on
the cadre when he told US officials that they, unlike
Najib and his Cabinet-level colleagues, "could not
hop the last plane to Tashkent" in the event of a
Soviet withdrawal. Nervousness about a potential
Soviet pullout began to grow almost immediately
after the cease-fire commenced, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Ratebzad, forced to resign from the Politburo, and
Babrak Karmal's half brother Mahmud Baryalai,
demoted to a less important party post.
As a result of the unnerving effect of the peace
initiative on government and party officials, we be-
lieve that Kabul has lost most of the already limited
effectiveness it possessed last January.
Moreover, in our opinion, rumors of Mos-
cow's displeasure with the domestic failure of national
reconciliation, its reported interest in replacing the
PDPA regime with a "nonparty" government, and the
hints of an imminent Soviet withdrawal that accom-
panied Najib's extended July-August visit to the
USSR almost certainly will add to the disquiet.
Parchami Splintering Continues. Dissension within
the Parchami faction-to which both Najib and
Babrak Karmal belong-has increased markedly
since the cease-fire was announced, largely because
Babrak Karmal and his followers opposed the peace
plan from the start.
Adding to tension in the faction has been
Najib's continuing purge of Babrak Karmal loyalists
from senior posts in the bureaucracy and party appa-
ratus. The most recent prominent victims of the
purge, according to US diplomatic reporting, have
been longtime Babrak Karmal loyalist Anahita
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Kabul built several elaborate reception centers last
spring to facilitate the repatriation of large numbers
of the nearly S million Afghan refugees resident in
Pakistan and Iran. To date these centers remain
virtually deserted, and we have no evidence to vali-
date the regime's claims that more than 80,000
refugees have returned home. Indeed, Kabul's repeat-
ed claims that the Pakistani and Iranian Govern-
ments are physically preventing Afghan refugees from
returning almost certainly are meant to disguise the
regime's failure to lure a significant number home.
There is no evidence suggesting that Islamabad or
Tehran are blocking the return of refugees. Both
governments have offered to receive UN inspection
teams to ver4fy that no such obstacles exist. To foster
the impression that their program is working, we
believe that Kabul and Moscow are reporting normal
cross-border trade and commercial trc~ic as return-
ing refugees, staging fake return ceremonies, and
exaggerating the number of refugees who periodically
return to Afghanistan to check on their property,
businesses, and family interests.
On the basis of conversations with refugees and
representatives of the leading humanitarian relief
agencies, the US Embassy in Islamabad contends
The Khalgis: Climbing Back to Power? We believe
the Khalqi faction's opposition to the peace initiative
and recognition of Najib's tenuous hold on both his
that probably no more than a few thousand refugees
have returned to Afghanistan under the national
reconciliation program. In our opinion, the number of
refugees flowing into Pakistan from Afghanistan ex-
ceeds the number traveling in the opposite direction.
Kabul appears to have had somewhat more success in
its effort to entice the Marri tribesmen-who live on
both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border-to
return to Afghanistan.
nearly 5,000 tribesmen recently migrated
from Pakistan's Baluchistan Province in response to
a summons by tribal chieftain Nawab Khair Bux
Marri, whose headquarters is in Kabul. The tribal
leader and nearly 3,000 of his followers have been
recipients of Afghan subsidies and military training
since they moved to Afghanistan in 1979. Kabul
probably hopes that the new migration will embar-
rass Islamabad and serve as a stimulus to other
border tribes.
own faction and the party's general secretaryship have
greatly intensified the conflict between it and the rival
Parchami grouping in recent months.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Underlying Weaknesses in the People's Democratic
Party of A/ghanistan
The split in the PDPA dates back almost to the
party's founding in 1965. By 1967, Khalq and Par-
cham had become separate factions. Each took its
name from its newspaper. Differences over political
tactics were an important factor in the original
schism, with
the early Khalgis favoring revolutionary extremism
and the Parchamis favoring more moderate tactics.
The differences also have social and ethnic roots.
Parchamis tend to come from urban and middle- or
upper-class backgrounds and Khalgis from the rural
lower class. Nearly all Khalgis are Pashtun, while
nearly all Parchamis are from other ethnic groups.
(Najib, a Pashtun Parchami, is an exception.) Subfac-
tions based on personal following, family ties, tribal-
of the security forces. Abandoning the Parchamis
would mean losing an educated class of administra-
tors.
Despite repeated recruitment drives, building party
membership is a peremiial problem. The party rou-
tinely inflates its membership figures. It claimed
50,000 members in 1979; 120,000 in 1984; 134,000 in
1985; and 150,000 in 1986. The party apparently
recruits heavily from the national youth group, the
Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan. Ac-
cording to official statistics, haU'of the new party
members in 1985 came from this group. Of the
!20,000 members the party claimed in 1984, more
than 70 percent were under 30, suggesting that the
party may be having considerable difficulty recruiting
ism, or ethnicity also exist.
/n 1977 the two factions united under Soviet pressure
but only papered over their differences, which re-
appeared in mid-1978 after the party came to power.
The dominant Khalgis exiled or jailed most impor-
tant Parchamis and took control of the PDPA. Since
December 1979, when Soviet troops overthrew the
Khalgis and installed a government in which both
factions were represented, the Parchamis have gained
slowly at Khalgi expense. Nevertheless, the Khalgis
still wield considerable influence through their large
numbers in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
Moscow has been unable to heal the party's serious
rifts and will have to pay a price for choosing one
faction over the other. Eliminating Khalgis, for ex-
ample, would weaken considerably the effectiveness
older members.
Most Western observers estimated party size in the
early 1980s at less than haUof the regime claim.
Moreover, many citizens, particularly in urban areas,
undoubtedly have a party card only because it is
necessary to obtain or hold jobs or to have access to
government-supplied goods. Even if the party had
grown at the pace suggested by official government
figures, members would hardly have had time to fie
s~ficiently indoctrinated in, much less committed to,
Marxist theory.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
The internal disarray of the Parchami faction has, in
our view, emboldened the Khalqis, moving them to
demand a greater share of power from the General
Secretary. In April, according to US Embassy report-
ing the Khalqis demand-
ed an equal share of ministerial portfolios, the return
of several prominent Khalqis from exile in diplomatic
posts abroad, and the release of some prominent
Khalqis who had been imprisoned since the Soviet
invasion in 1979. Najib initially rejected these de-
mands He
eventually yielded to Soviet pressure, however, and
released a dozen Khalqis from Pol-e Charkhi prison-
Najib's troubles may be encouraging Khalqi leader
Gulabzoi to see himself as a potential candidate to
head the PDPA. Since Babrak Karmal's ouster, Gu-
labzoi has been a strong supporter of Najib
Gulab-
zoi commands the support of most Khalgis, and, as
Minister of Interior, he also commands the loyalty of
the Ministry's well-armed and reasonably well-disci-
plined paramilitary organization-the Sarandoi.
Leading Parchamis apparently are worried about the
use Gulabzoi could make of the Sarandoi.
Gulabzoi may believe that the Soviets are looking at
him as a potential successor to Najib. We believe
there is some basis for such a perception.
The
US Embassy in Kabul, for example, reports that the
Soviets may have recently brought the Interior Minis-
ter to Moscow for private and unannounced discus-
sions. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that
Gulabzoi was upbraided for ignoring the wishes of
Najib and the Soviets by trying to arrest the trouble-
some leader of a proregime tribal militia. He was
promoted to full Politburo membership shortly after
the event. Finally, press accounts claim that Gulab-
zoi-with the assistance of Soviet advisers-has re-
placed most Parchami district secretaries in the prov-
inces bordering Pakistan with Khalqis loyal to him.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
By making himself an early and key collaborator in
Moscow's decision to replace Babrak Karmal with
Najib, Minister of Interior Sayed Mohammad Gu-
labzoi has increased his power (he was named a full
Politburo member in June 1987) and improved his
future prospects. He has emerged as the undisputed
head of a strengthened and relatively united Khalgi
faction, which he ho es
to lead back to power. His close
identification with factional and Pashtun ethnic inter-
ests would probably ensure continued hostility from
Parchamis and non-Pashtuns if he were to replace
Najib.
He has
ado tried to develop an ethnic base of support by
posing as a champion of Pashtun causes in the regime
and cultivating ties to his home province of Paktia.
Gulabzoi has been careful not to anger the Soviets by
his empire building. As Minister of Communications
in the regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki, he partici-
pated in an apparently ,Soviet-supported coup atter~rpt
in September 1979 against Prime Minister Amin and
took refuge in the Soviet Embassy when the attempt
failed. Since 1979 he has made himself valuable to
the Soviets by running an e.~cient (by regime stan-
dards) Ministry of Interior.
Gulabzoi, a memher of"the Zadran tribe, war born in
the Khowst region of Paktia. He has had little formal
education but received some military training in the
Soviet Union. As a young air force officer he took
part in the 1973 overthrow of King Zahir Shnh and
was rewarded with the position of aide-de-camp to
the air force commander.
Gulabzoi is intelligent, decisive, and quick to defend
his interests. An ardent Khalgi ever since Hgf~zullah
Amin recruited him in the 1970s, he gained a reputa-
tion for standing up to the Parchamis in the years
after the Soviet invasion. Gulabzoi fought successful-
ly to preserve his position and independence as Minis-
ter of Interior from the growing power of Najib's
secret police. ~
Fol /owing
t7ie coupZulabzoi was named an aide to Taraki and
a Central Committee member. He became Minister of
Communications later that year. The regime's o(]i-
cial biography claims that he is about 3b, but he may
be several years older.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Although we have no conclusive evidence that the
Soviets are considering dumping Najib, we believe
that Moscow is keeping open the option of throwing
its support behind Gulabzoi and the Khalqis.
The Afghan Armed Forces: Steady Deterioration
We believe that the Soviet-Afghan peace initiative
and unilateral cease-fire were designed, in part, to
provide the Afghan army with time to recuperate,
reequip, and train after suffering heavy losses in
fighting during November and December 1986.
In our opinion, the combination of disappointment
over the failure of the cease-fire, an increase in overall
insurgent military capabilities, tensions with their
Soviet allies, increasing casualties and desertions, and
the lack of significant battlefield successes this year
all but ensure that there will be little improvement in
the performance of the regime's armed forces for the
in operations this year around the capital, in eastern
Afghanistan, and in Qandahar Province.
The defection of small units en masse
and a continued high level of desertions are also
limiting the military's effectiveness.
Manpower Problems. The regime's decision in Janu-
ary to temporarily end forced conscription as a means
of adding to the popular appeal of its national recon-
ciliation program adversely affected the army's man-
power situation,
BAs a result of this political maneuver, Kabul
had to find other methods of meetin the arm 's
personnel requirements.
foreseeable future.
Declining Morale. The morale of the regime's armed
forces has plummeted
since the start of Kabul's peace offensive, in part due
to the failure of the national reconciliation process.
Increasing insurgent firepower, battlefield coopera-
tion, and logistic capabilities probably are demoraliz-
in the re ime military.
Casualties and Desertions. Although information on
casualties is fragmentary, we believe that regime
military and paramilitary forces have sustained heavy
combat losses since last January. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, the army has suffered heavy losses
~In our
view, the regime's renewed conscription campaign is
only marginally improving the military's manpower
problems. As recently as June and July, Kabul was
forced to send virtually untrained party and govern-
ment cadre to reinforce regime units fighting near
Qandahar.
Growing Success: The International Impact of
National Reconciliation
Although the peace offensive has been a disaster
internally, it has, in our view, scored notable diplo-
matic successes that have enhanced the regime's
international stature. In a series of well-publicized
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Regime Military Operations in 1987
Since January, the regime's military operations have
focused on curbing guerrilla resupply capabilities and
preventing the insurgents from operating in and
around urban areas. Regime forces, initially support-
ed only by Soviet air and artillery strikes, have been
deployed with little success against insurgent strong-
holds and supply routes in Qandahar, Kapisa, Pak-
tia, Lowgar, and Nangarhar Provinces. In each case,
Kabul's forces encountered stubborn insurgent resis-
tance, requiring the deployment of Soviet ground
units in their support. From late May through mid-
June, for example, the regime's forces and Soviet
Special Purpose Forces attempted without lasting
success to close guerrilla resupply routes from Gar-
deyz to Kabul. The US Embassy in Kabul reports
that regime forces could not dislodge guerrilla forces
from the Paghman area west of the capital in June
and were forced to seek Soviet support to extricate
themselves. In this series of engagements, well en-
trenched resistance forces repulsed several large re-
gime attacks with all sides s~J"ering heavy casualties
in these battles.
Regime forces also played aleading-and similarly
ineffective-role in a series of operations in Qanda-
har in May, June, and July.
high-level visits, Foreign Minister Wakil visited New
Delhi in February, Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari
visited Kabul in April, and Afghan Prime Minister
Keshtmand visited Baghdad in early June. In addi-
tion, Zimbabwe-whose prime minister is chairman
of the Nonaligned Movement-and Cyprus have rec-
ognized Kabul, although neither has set a date on
which relations will formally begin. Austria agreed in
early September to permit Kabul to open an embassy
in Vienna. Afghan representation in Vienna almost
certainly will result in Kabul's envoy gaining accredi-
tation to the UN components headquartered in the
The subsequent assaults had little impact
on the insurgents but destroyed much of the area's
agricultural resources.
In late June, regirrae and Soviet troops resumed
operations near Qandahar, this time in the Malajat
area south of the city. 13ecause the regime's forces
had been inefjeetive in the first Qandahar operation,
Soviet forces took the lead in the Malajat fighting
and the regime's forces provided second-echelon sup-
port. This operation
also failed to remove the guerrillas and their bases
from the Qandahar region.
The Soviets almost certainly are frustrated with the
deterioration of regime military ef.~ectiveness so far in
1987. Soviet-regime tensions have grown this year as
a result of Soviet efforts to block attempts by regime
units to surrender or defect to the resi.rtanc~
~In our view,
military ineffectiveness has prevented regime forces
from even remotely approaching the accomplishment
of their
major goal for 1987-the closing down of insurgent
supply routes from Pakistan.
city. Moscow and Kabul, according to L'S diplomatic
reporting, are also focusing on improving the Afghan
regime's standing with such international organiza-
tions as the United Nations, the Islamic Conference
Organization, and the Nonaligned Movement.
Moscow's actual and potential diplomatic successes
on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly, the
Islamic Conference Organization, and the Non-
aligned Movement are not solely due to Kabul's peace
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
plan. Moscow has long used various forms of lever-
age-weapons, economic aid, and diplomatic sup-
port on nonaligned states. The peace proposals, how-
ever, give those countries that have been resisting
Soviet pressure a plausible pretext for putting dis-
tance between themselves and the insurgents on the
basis of Moscow's purported readiness fora "compro-
mise" peace. Moscow's efforts underline the Soviets'
continuing commitment to the current Afghan regime
and willingness to expend diplomatic and economic
capital on Kabul's behalf.
Courting the United Nations. The Soviets and Af-
ghan regime-using the national reconciliation pro-
gram as proof of their good intentions-are concen-
trating on reducing the number of nations voting for
Pakistan's annual Afghanistan resolution at this fall's
session of the UN General Assembly. Moscow began
this effort in February when it took an unusually
conciliatory tack on Afghanistan at the meeting of the
UN Commission on Human Rights. In previous Com-
mission sessions Moscow had always loudly objected
to any inquiry into human rights in Afghanistan. In
the February meeting, according to US diplomatic
reporting, the Soviets took aloes-key approach, re-
fused to respond to sharp US criticism of Moscow's
Afghan policy, and arranged for Najib's delegation to
invite the Commission's special rapporteur on Af-
ghanistan-Austrian Professor Felix Ermacora-to
visit Kabul in late July. Soviet and Afghan regime
forebearance paid dividends as Ermacora's report
described the "full cooperation of the Government of
Afghanistan" and praised Kabul's national reconcilia-
tion plan "as a positive step in the restoration of the
human rights situation in the country." Ermacora also
publicly supported Moscow's contention that a quick
withdrawal of Soviet troops would result in a "blood-
bath" inside Afghanistan.
The Soviets and Afghan regime, according to US
diplomatic reporting, have also had some success in
using national reconciliation to soften the attitude of
the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)
toward the Kabul regime. The Soviets persuaded
High Commissioner John Hocke to visit Moscow in
June, the first such visit by a head of the UNHCR.
During the visit, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
Vorontsov attempted to convince Hocke that the
United Nations and other humanitarian organizations
should begin planning for the "orderly and humane"
return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran
and that an organization should be established on the
scene in Kabul to coordinate arrangements. With the
blessing of UN Secretary General de Cuellar and UN
Special Negotiator for Afghanistan Cordovez, Hocke
agreed to send a committee of UNHCR technical
experts to Kabul in late August or early September
but later postponed the visit under US pressure.
Hocke, according to US officials, may have agreed to
arrange the visit in part to refute Cordovez's conten-
tion that he is "in the American pocket." Hocke's
agreement to a visit almost certainly will stand Mos-
cow and Kabul in good stead when they try to soften
the UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan
Moscow and Kabul followed up this push in the
United Nations' constituent forums with a broad
diplomatic initiative aimed at acquainting many
Third World, Islamic, and Western governments with
their "desire" for a peaceful settlement of the war.
Moscow
and Kabul believe that, if they can persuade several
countries in Africa and Latin America to change their
votes, a snowball effect might be produced because
these two geographical regions tend to vote as blocs in
the UN General Assembly. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, the Afghan regime dispatched five
teams of senior officials in July and August to central
and southern Africa, Asia, Latin America, and West-
ern Europe to explain the national reconciliation
process and contrast it with the intransigence of the
resistance and its external backers. Soviet diplomats
abroad have also pressed their host governments-on
Kabul's behalf-to change their votes at this fall's
'The activities in Afghanistan of two other international organiri-
tions are also likely to improve the international standing of'~ajib's
regime. UNICEF has recently initiated a child immuniruiun
program in Afghanistan in which it is cooperating directly with the
Kabul authorities, and the International Committee of the Red
Cross is in the midst of significantly expanding its presence and
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
UN General Assembly session. In Malaysia, Guinea
Bissau, Uganda, and Ecuador, for example, Soviet
diplomats, according to media
reporting, have pressed high-level foreign ministry
officials with claims that the "conciliatory" Soviet-
Afghan approach has been answered by Islamabad
and Washington only with intransigence and an in-
creased flow of sophisticated weapons to the insur-
gents.
The recent Soviet- and Afghan regime-instigated
session of the UN-sponsored negotiations on Afghani-
stan in Geneva almost certainly was intended to
convince Third World audiences of Moscow's sincer-
ity in seeking a political settlement of the Afghan war.
In the preliminaries [o the UN General Assembly
session, Moscow and Kabul have stressed that, al-
though they reduced the proposed timetable for Soviet
troop withdrawal from 18 to 16 months, Pakistan's
"insigniticant" counteroffer of eight months rather
than seven prevented the successful conclusion of the
negotiations. Soviet and Afghan regime media pr~ba-
bly will seek to sharpen this point by emphasizing that
Kabul has cut the withdrawal timetable from 48 to 16
months since the UN-sponsored talks began in 1982.
In our view, however, Moscow and Kabul will derive
little propaganda value from the September negotiat-
ing session primarily because the Soviets had widely
hinted beforehand that Kabul would offer a 12-month
timetable. Nonetheless, the two-month reduction may
give several of the nations being pressed by Moscow to
change their votes on the UN General Assembly's
Afghan resolution sufficient justification to do so.
We believe that Moscow sees these efforts as a useful
prelude to the UN General Assembly session, where it
probably will seek textual changes in Pakistan's Af-
ghanistan resolution and may even oft~er a counter-
resolution of its own acknowledging Kabul's nation-
al reconciliation effort and calling for an end to all
foreign interference. [t probably believes these
changes are increasingly acceptable to some Third
World states.
Pakistan's UN resolution un ,=~l~rha~iistan ~~~hirh hu.~~
been debated evert tear since 1980 calls.%ur the
immediate withdr~iwai ~~~fJoreign trnops.lrom the
country and the restoration oJ~,-(/~,~hunistcm's indepen-
dence and nonaligned status. 7~he resolution also
rec~ffirrrts the right uJ~ the Afghan people to sell=
determination and appeais_(or the creation ~~/~ruiuli-
tio~ls that would perirtit the return ref rc:%ngees to
Afghanistan with "peace and honor. " Moscow and
Kabul art'
likely to attempt to untencl Pakistan's resolution to
have it call for an end to 'J~~reign intcrJcrenre" in
A/'ghani.rtan. They are also iikely to seek the addi-
tion of language praising the .-~/ghan regime's ar-
tempts to promote "national recunciliutiun. "
In our view, the Soviets -who believe the loss of even
a few votes will embarrass Washington and Islam-
abad-will have some success in reducing the number
of states supporting Palkistan's UN resolution. US
diplomatic reporting indicates that Islamabad is un-
certain of its ability to match the numberr of votes cast
for the UN General Assembly resolution in 1986.
According to US officials, the countries most suscep-
tible to Soviet and Afghan regime blandishments arc
limbabwe, Cyprus, Congo, Iraq, Mozambique, I.csu-
tho, Mauritania, Togo, Cameroon, and Uganda. ~hu
Washington's list of potential vote switchcrs, Paki-
stani Foreign Ministry officials odd Peru, Sao Tumc
and Principe, Ghana, Benin, Mali, Burkina,Suriname,
Guyana, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Kuwait, L.unbia,
Vanuatu, and Kenya. Pakistani officials recently sug-
gested that Wash~ngtun and Islamabad may have to
resort to swapping; foreign aid fur UN General As-
sembly votes to shore ~~ip support for the Afghani-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Stan resolution. The Pakistanis-who claimed to have
no funds available for such an effort-identified
Benin, Mali, Uganda, Burkina, Guinea Bissau, Sao
Tome and Principe, and Suriname as possibly open to
such an offer.
Kabul, the Islamic Co~lerenee, and the Nonaligned
Movement. We believe Kabul and Moscow are seek-
ing to weaken the Islamic world's publicly hardline
anti-Soviet stance on the war by stressing the success
of national reconciliation and petitioning Islamic
states to support Afghanistan's readmission to the
Islamic Conference.
Soviet officials are urging Islamic Confer-
ence members to show flexibility in their next resolu-
tion on Afghanistan to help the USSR withdraw with
honor. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, accord-
ing to US officials, stressed this point to Islamic
Conference Organization Secretary General Pirzada
during the Tatter's visit to Moscow in February-the
first such trip by an Organization head. Officials of
Kuwait, Conference chairman until 1989, have told
US diplomats they will ask Islamabad to be more
responsive to Soviet proposals for ending the war. US
diplomatic reporting also indicates that Iran, Paki-
stan, and Saudi Arabia are worried that the recently
concluded Iraq-Afghanistan cooperation agreement
will have an adverse effect on the Islamic Conference
Organization's attitude toward the war. Although the
Conference's official stance probably will not change,
we believe that the Soviets may succeed in persuading
some members to upgrade their ties to Kabul. Iraq
and Kuwait, for example, are seeking additional
Soviet support in their confrontation with Iran and
may be willing to concede more to Moscow on the
Afghan issue.
Kabul's delegations to two Nonaligned Movement
conferences in June apparently also made some inter-
national headway. According to US officials, the
Afghans met under Soviet auspices with the Algerian
Foreign Minister at the Nonaligned Movement's
"south-south" cooperation conference in North Korea
and elicited from him praise for Kabul's national
reconciliation campaign and a hint of expanded bilat-
eral ties. The Afghan envoy to the Nonaligned Move-
ment information ministers' meeting in Zimbabwe
succeeded in preventing any mention of Afghanistan
in the meeting's final communique. At both confer-
ences, Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry officials were
acting as chairman. In our view, Soviet blandishments
may have convinced Zimbabwean Prime Minister
Mugabe to help soften anti-Kabul sentiment in the
Nonaligned Movement. Moscow, according to US
diplomatic reporting, recently offered Zimbabwe so-
phisticated fighter aircraft and contributed $100 mil-
lion in training and equipment to the Nonaligned
Movement's "Africa Fund," which is designed to
protect the Frontline States from South African
military and economic pressure.
Making the War an East-West Issue. As an essential
part of their peace campaign, Moscow and Kabul
have redoubled their efforts to identify Washington as
the main obstacle to a political settlement of the war.
In official media, in talks with foreign governments,
and in public statements by high-ranking officials,
Moscow and Kabul have repeatedly asserted that the
United States is escalating and prolonging the war by
ignoring Najib's peace overtures and providing in-
creasingly sophisticated arms to the insurgents. The
Soviets and Afghans are also making effective propa-
ganda use of public statements by US officials and
politicians spotlighting the flow of sophisticated US
arms to the guerrillas, according to media reporting.
We believe Soviet claims of US interference and
intransigence in Afghanistan are attracting attention
in Western Europe-the US Embassy in Stockholm,
for example, recently reported that Swedes increas-
ingly tend to juxtapose Afghanistan and Nicaragua-
and are having some impact in the Third World and
Middle East. In our view, any increase in the tenden-
cy of Third World and Islamic capitals to view the
Afghan war as another insoluble East-West issue will
reduce their willingness to attribute sole responsibility
for continuing the war to the USSR, as well as
weaken their resistance to recognizing Najib's regime.
Moscow and Kabul almost certainly are encouraged
by the international success of their peace initiative
and are expecting more gains through its extension to
mid-January 1988. They may soon make aproposal-
now rumored in the media and some diplomatic
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
circles-for the first direct talks among Moscow,
Kabul, the resistance, Pakistan, and the United
States. Even if these maneuvers are only negotiating
tactics, Moscow probably believes-with good cause,
in our view-that they will win valuable public rela-
tions points because the resistance and its backers will
not call the Soviet-Afghan bluff.
We believe the Soviets are incrementally creating an
international environment in which Kabul's legitima-
cy is growing-despite the peace plan's domestic
failure-and world opinion is increasingly focused on
US aid to the insurgents. Moscow undoubtedly ex-
pects to reduce the level of international criticism of a
continuing or increased Soviet presence in Afghani-
stan if the Geneva process fails to produce a political
settlement of the war. Moreover, Moscow and Kabul
almost certainly believe that the considerable success
they have had in expanding the diplomatic acceptabil-
ity of the Afghan regime will help them in the
preliminaries to the UN General Assembly session in
1988.
Driving Wedges: The Resistance, Pakistan, and
National Reconciliation
The InsurgentAllianee and Kabul's Peace Plan. The
Soviet-Afghan peace initiative has struck at the weak-
est point of the seven-party resistance alliance-its
lack of internal unity and a coherent political agenda.
In our view, the alliance was caught offguard by the
peace initiative and has not fully recovered. It has
been trying without success to craft a united political
approach to settling the war since the peace initiative
was launched. The seven leaders rejected the peace
proposals on 17 January and announced-without
giving details-that they had agreed that an interim
government should oversee athree- to four-month
Soviet withdrawal and devise Afghanistan's future
political system. Their subsequent deliberations, how-
ever, have failed to describe how this transition would
be managed or who would participate in it. Discus-
sions about the various facets of a political settlement
of the war appear to be weakening alliance cohesion
by widening the gap dividing the traditionalist party
leaders-Nabi, Mojadedi, and Gailani-from the
fundamentalists-Khalis, Rabbani, Sayyaf, and Gul-
buddin.
We believe that there are three major policy disagree-
ments between these two groupings, all of which are
coming to a head because of the pressures exerted by
the Soviet-Afghan peace campaign:
? Zahir Shah: The traditionalist leaders support a
figurehead leadership role for former Krng Zahir
Shah in an interim government largely because
their parties and their families prospered during the
royalist era. They also see alliance acceptance of a
Zahir-led interim regime as a useful ploy for induc-
ing the Soviets to withdraw. The fundamentalists,
on the other hand, believe that Zahir is corrupt and
argue that his lax and ineffective leadership spurred
the growth of the PDPA and permitted Soviet
influence to take root in Afghanistan. They also
resent Zahir's decision to live comfortably in Rome
during the war. Jamiat leader Rabbani-generally
the promoter of compromise in the alliance-proba-
bly quashed any chance of the resistance supporting
Zahir when he recently said that the former King
was "not the solution'" to forming an interim
government.
? Insurgent-sponsored elections: Despite Hizbi Islami
faction leader Gulbuddin's announcement in early
May that the alliance had decided to hold an
election for a representative assembly- with Af-
ghan refugees electing 20 percent of the members
and Afghans residing inside Afghanistan electing
the remainder-the seven leaders have shelved the
plan because they could not agree on electoral
modalities. According to press accounts and diplo-
matic reporting, only Gailani and Gulbuddin, prob-
ably the most opportunistic of the alliance leaders,
fully support such an election. The other five leaders
apparently oppose an election and favor choosing a
permanent leader for the alliance-who would also
head an interim government-from among the sev-
en party leaders.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
~~ t111 alliance factions arc predominantly Pashtun, except the
Jamiat-i-Islami, which is ethnically Tajik.
~, There arc an estimated 150,000 insurgent fighters.
? The PDPA's future: The traditionalist leaders ap-
parently would acquiesce in a limited PDPA role-
if the party shed itself of Najib and his closest
colleagues-in an interim government and in a post-
Soviet election. The traditionalists believe such a
concession would be a useful tool for persuading the
Soviets to withdraw and that the PDPA would
inevitably be overwhelmed once deprived of Mos-
cow's protection. The fundamentalists view any role
for the PDPA as a betrayal of the holy war and
those who have died in the fighting.
Besides causing problems among the alliance leaders,
we believe these policy issues have also sharpened
tensions between the party chiefs, their military com-
manders inside Afghanistan, and leaders in the refu-
gee camps. The Zahir Shah issue alone
has caused problems
between the fundamentalist party leaders and a large
segment of the refugees, as well as between the
traditionalist party leaders and their commanders.
There also appears to be some disagreement between
the military commanders of the moderate parties and
their political leaders over the idea of joining an
interim regime with the Afghan Communists and
permitting the PDPA to participate in apost-Soviet
election.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
We believe that widespread name recognition and a
lingering aura of legitimacy make Mohammad Zahir
Shah, the former King of Afghanistan, attractive to
Moscow, Kabul, and Islamabad as a potential figure-
head for a PDPA-controlled "national reconcilia-
tion "government.
OZahir enjoys considerable popularity with
many ordinary Afghans, who remember him as a
benign and passive ruler and look back on his long
reign (1933-73J as the "good old days" compared to
the repressive and tumultuous regimes that followed.
Support for Zahir is strongest among his fellow
Durrani Pashtun.c (the royal family is from the
Mohammadzai branch of the Barakzai tribe, part of
the Durrani confederation), who predominate in
southern Afghanistan and the refugee camps in Paki-
stani Baluchistan. The Soviets must also remember
Zahir's reign as a period of calm and friendly
relations between Moscow and Kabul.
Theformer monarch, however, is a cautious reran who
is deeply suspicious of .Soviet intentions
and will not involve himself
war if he is called upon by all sides to do so
the monarchy but will probably feel dutvbound to
play a role in achieving a political settlement to the
in any peace plan without the support oj~the bulk of
the resistance alliance. Zahir will not seek to restore
Were he to return to Kabul as head of government,
Zahir would not be a strong or dynamic ruler. He
suffers from a reputation for being weak and indeci-
sive, and during his reign he failed to provide ~hective
leadership on key issues. He is, however, intelligent
and tactful and probably could guide an interim
government during the critical period oJ~a Soviet
withdrawal if he had the cooperation of all the major
players. Once the initial task of such a regime was 25X1
completed, we expect he would seek to retire from
public life as quickly as possible.
Zahir, now 72, has lived quietly in exile in /tale ,cince
he was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daud.
He enjoys good relations with the leaders of the three
traditionalist resistance parties but is opposed by the
leaders of the fundamentalist groups, particularly
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Ra.cul Sat~vdl; who
accuse him of opening the door to Communism
during his reign.
Many insurgent field commanders, in our view, prob-
ably approve the alliance's election scheme as it now
stands. Several of the major commanders Ahmad
Shah Masood in northern Afghanistan, Ismail Khan
in western Afghanistan, and Mullah Malang in Qan-
dahar Province-have devoted considerable time, ef-
fort, and resources to developing political as well as
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
military organizations and could expect to fare well in
an election conducted according to the proposed for-
mat.
The Alliance and Pakistan: Fighting Over Peace. The
pressures generated by the Soviet-Afghan peace ini-
tiative are causing strains between the Pakistanis and
the insurgents. Islam-
abad continues to believe that Moscow wants to
withdraw from Afghanistan but needs a "face-saving"
way out. Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan and
his subordinates, in particular, apparently believe,
according to US diplomatic
reporting, that, if Moscow can be convinced that a
postwithdrawal Afghan regime will be stable and will
refrain from slaughtering PDPA members, the likeli-
hood of Soviet withdrawal will increase. Armed with
these conclusions, the Pakistanis, in our judgment,
believe it is incumbent on them-because of the
alliance's disunity and to protect their own diplomatic
position-to press the resistance leaders to accommo-
date some Soviet demands. We believe Islamabad
interprets Kabul's recent two-month reduction in the
withdrawal timetable as a signal of further cuts to
come and will therefore again press the alliance to
formulate coherent negotiating positions regarding an
interim regime, 7_ahir Shah, and the future of the
PDPA.
The Pakistanis have attempted to force the pace and
direction of alliance deliberations on all three of the
major issues that divide the fundamentalist leaders
and their moderate colleagues. Pakistani pressure on
these issues probably is causing growing tension be-
tween the alliance and Islamabad. The tension began
to grow, in our judgment, early in 1987 when high-
level Pakistani officials demanded that the alliance
pledge to allow PDPA participation in apost-Soviet
election. The Pakistanis soon thereafter
urged the alliance to
accept PDPA participation in an interim government
and Zahir Shah as an interim leader.
Outlook
We believe that Moscow and Kabul will continue to
push their national reconciliation initiative for the
foreseeable future. Although we believe the peace
campaign will continue to unnerve the PDPA cadre,
Soviet and Afghan regime officials apparently believe
they can prevent the deteriorating domestic situation
from getting out of hand. Moscow and Kabul are
willing to accept the negative domestic impact of the
initiative as long as they believe the effort is even
marginally improving the international legitimacy of
the Afghan regime, reducing international political
support for the resistance, or producing pressure on
Islamabad to accommodate Soviet demands in
Afghanistan.
We see no prospect for a stabilization of the Kabul
regime so long as the Soviets continue to hold out the
possibility they may withdraw. In our view, the
cadres' preoccupation with efforts to ensure their own
survival cannot help but erode the regime's effective-
ness, especially in the already loosely controlled urban
areas outside Kabul. We believe that only a decision
by the Soviets to announce their long-term resolve to
remain in Afghanistan until the PDPA's position is
consolidated-perhaps matched with a sizable in-
crease in Soviet forces-would halt the corrosive
impact of the peace initiative.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Najib's continuing effort to rid the senior levels of the
PDPA and government of pro-Babrak Karmal Par-
chamis probably will not secure his hold on either the
Parchami faction or the party as a whole. As recently
as late June, for example, the US Embassy in Kabul
reported that opposition to both Najib and the nation-
al reconciliation campaign was widespread among
senior PDPA officials of both factions. Even the
party's plenum on 10 June-during which Najib
admitted that substantial opposition to his policies
existed in the party's ranks-seems to have failed to
significantly strengthen the General Secretary's hold
on power. Although the plenum reduced the power of
the leading pro-Babrak Karmal Parchamis, they are
likely to serve as rallying points for those opposed to
Najib as long as they remain in Kabul. Moscow's
failure to remove them from the scene and recurrent
rumors that Babrak Karmal will eventually return to
Kabul suggest that the Soviets may be toying with the
idea of replacing Najib either with Babrak Karmal or
some combination of pro-Babrak Karmal Parchamis
and the Gulabzoi-led Khalgis.
There is no indication that the Soviets have any firm
idea about how to curb PDPA factionalism. An
official Soviet spokesman told a Leningrad audience
in May that the PDPA lacked strong leadership and
was in a "crisis situation" with factions fighting and
"even murdering" each other. In addition to Najib's
visit to Moscow in July, the Soviets,
have had several senior party mem-
bers visit Moscow since late January-including Gu-
labzoi, Yaqubi, Baryalai, Deputy Prime Minister Nur
Ahmad Nur, and Prime Minister Soltan Ali Kesht-
mand-to discuss ways of uniting the party's factions.
The Soviets' recent appeasement of the Khalgis, their
acquiescence in the rise of Gulabzoi's personal power,
and his promotion to full Politburo membership sug-
gest that the Soviets have not ruled out the possibility
of dumping the Parchami faction altogether and
giving the Khalgis another shot at power.
Despite the uncertainty, we see little or no chance of a
collapse of the regime. Because the PDPA is the only
Afghan political tool available to the Soviets, Moscow
almost certainly will not allow the regime to disinte-
grate. We also have no evidence indicating that the
Soviets are worried that PDPA factionalism may
spiral out of control. We are struck by the large
number of PDPA Politburo and Central Committee
members who still believe that the party leadership is
a prize worth winning. Despite eight years of war,
military setbacks, and intense party infighting, there
apparently is no shortage of senior PDPA members
eager to contest the leadership rather than formulate
escape plans or curry favor with Moscow to ensure
they are allowed to accompany withdrawing Soviet
troops into exile. We believe their quest for power will
continue with a ferocity limited only by the degree of
self-discipline necessary to prevent the Soviets from
decisively intervening to stop the factionalism.
Afghan diplomatic initiative.
Although we believe that Moscow and Kabul arc
deriving tangible and important benefits from the
international dimension of their national reconcilia-
tion campaign, we do not believe that this is a tactic
that can be pursued indefinitely. In the near term,
Moscow is likely to reduce the number of anti-Kabul
votes at this fall's UN General Assembly session, a
success that almost certainly will give the diplomatic
campaign additional momentum. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve that its vitality can be parlayed into more
successes only so long as the military situation in
Afghanistan does not deteriorate to the point where
escalation is required. Given the continuing decline in
the quality of the regime's armed forces and the
increasing combat effectiveness of the insurgents, we
believe that time may not be on the side of the Soviet-
We believe that Moscow and Kabul will continue to
benefit from forcing the pace of the alliance's political
discussions. We believe that, even after nearly eight
years of war, the thinking of the resistance leaders
about a political settlement of the war is rudimentary
25X1
25X1
25X1
L ~J~"I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
at best. There are sharp-probably insoluble-differ-
ences among the insurgents over who would be al-
lowed to serve in an interim regime and how the post-
Soviet political system would be shaped.
In our view, Soviet and Afghan regime gains are
already visible in the strains produced within the
alliance, and between it and the Pakistanis, over a role
for Zahir Shah, PDPA survival, and the recently
aborted plan to hold an election for a representative
assembly. The failure to hold the election probably
will lend at least superficial credence to Soviet claims
that the resistance is disorganized and incapable of
behaving in a politically responsible manner. The
alliance's failure to hold an election probably will also
complicate a settlement of the war by convincing the
Soviets that Islamabad cannot control the resistance
and therefore cannot be counted on to help form a
stable Afghan Government or create a political envi-
ronment in which Moscow's Afghan clients can
survive.
Implications for the United States
Kabul's continuing bombing campaign in Pakistan
and the success of the Soviet-Afghan peace initiative
have convinced Islamabad that an early political
settlement of the war is necessary. Although we do
not believe that Pakistan will rush into an agreement
accommodating Soviet demands, Islamabad almost
certainly will agree to a Geneva arrangement-proba-
bly one that includes a 10- to 12-month withdrawal
timetable and some role for the PDPA in an interim
regime-that is less than optimal from the US view-
point.
The sense of urgency in Islamabad to reach an
accommodation with Moscow and Kabul limits US
ability to influence Pakistani relations with the resis-
tance alliance, in our view. If Kabul proposes a 12-
month withdrawal, the Pakistanis probably would act
quickly to try to persuade and~or coerce a doubtful
insurgent alliance into accepting arrangements for an
interim regime that are acceptable to Moscow but
that do not meet the minimum requirements estab-
lished by the resistance. Islamabad's major point of
pressure on the alliance is its control of the insurgents'
supply pipeline, and we believe the Pakistanis would,
as a last resort, manipulate the flow of supplies to
remove resistance roadblocks to a settlement. The
United States-in such ascenario-would have limit-
ed scope for influencing Islamabad's actions toward
the resistance. The alliance undoubtedly would appeal
to US officials to urge Pakistan to back off, raising
the possibility of a public squabble between the
United States, Pakistan, and the guerrillas.
The increasingly successful Soviet effort to portray
the Afghan war as an East-West issue could ham-
string US ability to influence the course of diplomatic
events in Afghanistan. Soviet-Afghan highlighting of
the essential role the United States plays in supplying
arms to the insurgents is having an impact in the
Third World,
~To the extent that Soviet-Afghan propaganda
rings true there, US public diplomacy on behalf of the
insurgents in the United Nations and elsewhere, in
our opinion, tends to confirm for Third World and
nonaligned audiences Moscow's contention that
Washington is only interested in prolonging the war
as a means of keeping the USSR bogged down.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29 :CIA-RDP88T00096R000700930001-3