EVOLVING PARTY POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000700920001-4
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
in Pakistan
Evolving Party Politics
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
NESA 87-10047
October 1987
Copy 3 5 8
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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Pakistan
Evolving Party Politics
Operations.
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of
Leadership Analysis, and NESA. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 87-10047
October 1987
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Evolving Party Politics
in Pakistan
Key Judgments Pakistan's myriad political parties have sprung back to life following the
Information available lifting of martial law in late 1985 by President Zia. So far, the ruling Paki-
as of 5 October 1987 stan Muslim League (PML) has the upper hand, but it is experiencing
was used in this report.
organizational difficulties that are impeding its political agenda. Antigov-
ernment parties, including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Pakistan's
largest opposition party, also are experiencing organizational problems and
chronic infighting that make it difficult for them to mount serious
challenges to the government. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition
parties have been able to build a nationwide constituency. This stalemate
has created an opportunity for smaller parties with narrow ethnic and
religious agendas to agitate and appeal for greater public support.
The PML, headed by Prime Minister Junejo, holds commanding majorities
in both the national and provincial assemblies and is popular in Punjab. It
shows little evidence, however, of creating the grassroots support outside
Punjab that can help return it to power-without vote fraud-in the
general election. Muslim League legislators in the national and provincial
parliaments have done little to pass legislation that addresses pressing
social and economic problems. The party organization has also been hurt
by factionalism, provincial resentment, and corruption.
The return of Benazir Bhutto, coleader of the PPP, in April 1986 after al-
most two years in exile gave a major boost to Pakistan's opposition
movement. She, however, has run into serious organizational problems
within her party and the opposition movement. She is also accused by
smaller opposition parties of trying to dominate the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a loose coalition of antigovernment
parties. Finally, Bhutto is still repairing the damage from the failure of the
opposition-led agitation in August 1986 to move the MRD closer to its
goals of Zia's removal and new elections.
Bhutto's inability to unite the opposition has led to further splintering. One
party-the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal-left the MRD in protest against Bhutto's
autocratic leadership. Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a former PPP rival of
Bhutto, formed the National People's Party in August 1986, made up of
anti-Bhutto opposition politicians. Jatoi may consider building a new
coalition of moderate antigovernment parties opposed to Bhutto's efforts to
control the opposition.
Secret
NESA 87-10047
October 1987
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Several parties that appeal to narrow ethnic or religious audiences have
emerged to fill the vacuum created by the major parties' failure to build a
national base. One of these parties, the Muhajir Quami Movement,
depends on the Muhajir population of Sind Province for its support.
Another party, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria, appeals to Pakistan's
Shia minority. These parties agitate-often violently-for the rights of
their respective constituencies and may pose serious local challenges to the
more established parties that have traditionally sought to appeal to as
broad a national audience as possible.
The local district and municipal elections tentatively scheduled for late this
year or early next year will provide the next major challenge for both the
Muslim League and the opposition. Although the elections will probably be
held on a nonparty basis, the opposition will capitalize on the government's
poor handling of domestic problems and make an impressive showing at the
polls-probably winning a majority of the votes cast-if the voting is fairly
tabulated. A good showing in the local elections would provide the PPP and
the rest of the antigovernment movement a springboard for the general
election, scheduled for 1990.
The weaknesses and factionalism of Pakistan's political parties will
frustrate US efforts to encourage the growth of democratic institutions
there. Officials of the PML will continue to support US policy initiatives,
but concerns about domestic opinion and preoccupation with party infight-
ing will slow their responses to US policy approaches. Most of the
opposition will continue to suspect US motives in Pakistan and resent
Washington's support for the current government. The most anti-US
parties are receiving political and material support from the Soviet Union
and Afghanistan. A PPP-dominated government would probably create
problems in the US-Pakistani relationship because such a government
would be less responsive to US concerns on issues like nuclear weapons
development, Afghanistan, and narcotics.
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Key Judgments
Emerging From Zia's Shadow
The PML: Old Goods in New Wrappings?
2
5
Election Strategy
5
Ideological Differences
6
Implications for the United States
B. Major Political Party Profiles
12
12
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Scope Note This Intelligence Assessment focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of
Pakistan's major political parties. It presents an in-depth analysis of
Pakistan's current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League, and updates
an earlier paper on Pakistan's opposition groups.
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Evolving Party Politics
in Pakistan
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has seen a series
of weak civilian governments overthrown by strong
military regimes. The ineffectual civilian governments
of the 1950s came to an end with Gen. Ayub Khan's
coup d'etat of 1958. Ayub Khan drew up a new
constitution and tried to transform his military regime
into a democracy, but Pakistan's unsuccessful war
with India in 1965 and unrest in East Pakistan led to
Gen. Yahya Khan's coup four years later. After losing
the 1971 war in which East Pakistan became the
independent state of Bangladesh, Yahya Khan hand-
ed over power to Zulfikar Bhutto, whose Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) had won the 1970 election in
West Pakistan. Bhutto held power until 1977 when he
was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq.
In this unstable political atmosphere, political parties
in Pakistan have had difficulty establishing grassroots
support, with once-powerful parties being replaced
and suppressed by military rulers. Moreover, provin-
cial and ethnic divisions have ruptured political orga-
nizations and split them into competing factions. To
this day, many parties in Pakistan are often mere
groupings of self-seeking politicians who have co-
alesced around a single popular political leader.
The basis for the current political scene lies in the
unrest of 1977 that culminated in a military coup led
by General Zia. In disputed elections that year, Prime
Minister Zulfikar Bhutto's PPP won a lopsided vic-
tory that was immediately challenged by a coalition of
conservative and Islamic parties. Street fighting be-
tween opponents and supporters of the PPP prompted
Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq to declare
martial law and remove Bhutto from office. Bhutto
was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and
hung in 1979.
Figure 1
Pakistan: Voting Results,
1970 and 1977a
Muslim League 38.9
(Convention)-3.9
Jamaat-i-lslami 6
Jamiat-ul-Ulema- i-
Islam-7.3
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Pakistan-8.2
Muslim League
(Qayyum)-8.2
Muslim League
(Council)-10.7
Pakistan National
Alliance-36`
Pakistan People's
Party-59
, Elections were held in 1985 but were on a
nonparty basis.
n Results are for West Pakistan only. East Pakistan
became the independent country of Bangladesh
in 1971.
The Pakistan National Alliance was an alliance of
nine opposition parties formed to run against the
Pakistan People's Party.
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Zia, who became President in 1978, severely restrict-
ed political parties and activities. He often reaffirmed
his distrust of civilian politicians, saying they prac-
ticed the "politics of destruction." He further ratio-
nalized his ban on political parties by claiming they
were "un-Islamic" because they fostered divisions
among Muslims. Consequently, Zia has refused to
join a political party.
Zia kept restrictions on political activity in place
through the national and provincial elections of Feb-
ruary 1985. The opposition Movement for the Resto-
ration of Democracy (MRD)-a loose coalition of
antigovernment parties formed in 1981 to work for
Zia's ouster and dominated by the PPP-boycotted
the elections. Despite the boycott, the elections were
heavily contested by candidates running as individuals
who, for the most part, had well-known party affili-
ations. As a result of the boycott, the national and
provincial assemblies that convened in March 1985
consisted mostly of moderate-to-conservative rural
landlords, urban businessmen, and members of funda-
mentalist religious parties.
Zia-at the urging of Prime Minister Junejo and
other civilian politicians-gradually lifted restrictions
on political activity following the elections. In Decem-
ber 1985 the National Assembly formally lifted the
ban on parties and allowed political activity. The
Political Parties Act stipulated that parties had to
register with the government-run election commis-
sion, list party officials, and open their financial books
to official inspection. Members of Parliament were
prohibited from changing party affiliation. The Paki-
stan Muslim League (PML), which Junejo formed in
January 1986, registered with the government, but
most of the opposition refused, saying registration
would imply recognition of the present government's
legitimacy
With the lifting of martial law on 30 December 1985
came greater political activity and press freedom.
Opposition parties regularly hold rallies and demon-
strations, and newspapers and magazines give much
more coverage to political activities, including those of
nonregistered parties such as the PPP. The press is
also much more critical of government policies than
before the lifting of martial law, according to US
Opposition activity also increased after PPP leader
Benazir Bhutto-daughter of the late Prime Minis-
ter-returned to Pakistan from West European exile
in April 1986. Although she was greeted with large
crowds on her arrival, she failed to attract the sus-
tained mass support necessary to overthrow Zia dur-
ing a series of demonstrations in August 1986. Bhut-
to's failure and the arrest of many MRD activists led
to infighting within the opposition over the wisdom of
using violence to challenge Zia's rule, according to the
US Embassy in Islamabad. By the summer of 1987
the political climate had calmed, with both the PML
and MRD trying to build their organizations and map
out future strategy.
The PML: Old Goods in New Wrappings?
Despite the status and patronage powers it enjoys as
the ruling party, the PML cannot match Benazir
Bhutto's PPP supporters in terms of numbers and
enthusiasm. Although it enjoys government patron-
age, the PML is seen largely by ethnic minorities,
liberals, and Islamic fundamentalists as a rehash of
the old Muslim League, which was Pakistan's first
ruling party, according to US diplomatic reporting.
We believe, on the basis of US diplomatic reporting
over the past several years, that the PML is largely
made up of opportunistic politicians from many dif-
ferent parties who have abandoned their original
parties in return for the governmental favor and funds
they can obtain through the PML.
Prime Minister Junejo has been working to invigorate
the PML, spurred by the return of opposition leader
Benazir Bhutto last year. We believe his aim is to
promote the PML as a populist party to rival the PPP
as the party of have-nots. The Prime Minister has
been pushing a program of granting property rights
and provision of municipal services to slumdwellers in
Punjab and land grants to rural tenants in that
province. His government also has announced with
much fanfare a "Five-Point Program" to promote the
welfare and prosperity of Pakistanis through a variety
of government development programs.
Embassy reporting.
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The original Muslim League was formed in British
India in 1906 and soon became a vehicle for those
advocating an independent Muslim state. The Mus-
lim League became the ruling party when Pakistan
was created in 1947 but gradually lost public support
during the 1950s through mismanagement and cor-
ruption. It was formally dissolved when martial law
was declared by the Army in 1958. The League
gradually fell into disarray, splitting into threefac-
tions. It was resurrected by Prime Minister Junejo in
January 1986 as the Pakistan Muslim League
Prime Minister Junejo announced the PML's Five-
Point Program for political, economic, and social
development in a national address on 31 December
1985. The five points are:
? To set up a durable Islamic democratic political
system.
? To eradicate unemployment.
? To eradicate illiteracy.
? To eliminate corruption.
? To promote a strong national defense and pursue a
nonaligned and balanced foreign policy.
(PML).
The nucleus of the new PML was the Muslim League
of Pir Pagaro-a religious leader in Sind-that had
supported the martial law regime of President Zia.
Prime Minister Junejo, a longtime follower of
Pagaro, became head of the League, and the party
formally registered with the government in February
1986. At present, 50 of 87 Senators and 170 of 237
National Assembly members belong to the PML.
Junejo is assured a parliamentary majority until the
general election scheduled for 1990 because, by law,
any legislator who changes party affiliation during
his term is disqualified. This assurance does not
protect Junejo from parliamentary votes of no confi-
dence, since Zia retains the right to call such a vote.
Zia does not hold a formal position in the PML in
conformity with his personal opposition to political
parties. A party official told US diplomats in 1986
that 5 million voters had joined the PML.
Despite these efforts, the PML has had difficulty
competing with the popularity of Benazir Bhutto's
PPP. Bhutto's rally in Lahore in April 1986, for
example, attracted about 500,000 people compared
with a PML rally held there several days before that
drew only 50,000, according to the US Consulate. US
diplomatic reporting indicates that Junejo's lackluster
speaking style has failed to arouse much enthusiasm
The PML has taken or is considering measures-
some legal, some not-to circumvent the PPP's appeal
at the polls. Last May the National Assembly raised
the voting age from 18 to 21, a move that was
castigated by many opposition leaders as a tactic to
exclude younger people-a major source of Bhutto's
support, in our view-from the polls.
Even without the threat from the PPP, we believe that
the PML faces problems resulting from provincial
rivalries, party factionalism, and corruption. The im-
age of the PML as a party meant to further only the
interests of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous prov-
ince, severely limits the party's appeal in the other
provinces. The PML has established an adequate
grassroots organization only in Punjab, according to
the US Embassy. Although the government has spent
heavily on development projects for Punjab, politi-
cians from Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West
at PML rallies.
25X1
25X1
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Mohammad Khan Junejo
Prime Minister,
Head of the Pakistan Muslim
League
First Prime Minister since imposition of martial law
in 1977... strong-willed, independent, ambitious pol-
itician ... has worked hard to project himself as
legitimate spokesman and chief policymaker of a
popularly elected democracy ... high moral charac-
ter ... holds cautious, conservative political views ...
well disposed toward the United States ... wealthy
son of prominent landowner from Sind ... 54.
Frontier Province complain that Islamabad neglects
the need for economic and social investment for these
areas. The PML, in our view, runs a distant second or
third in popularity in these provinces to the PPP and
other, more local parties.
The PML organization in Punjab was distracted
during late 1986 and early 1987 by a challenge to
Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif's authority by a group
of League dissidents in the provincial assembly. The
dissidents were critical of Sharif's alleged arrogance
and indifference to local PML concerns. The infight-
ing stopped only when President Zia and Prime
Minister Junejo intervened on Sharif's behalf, accord-
ing to the US Consulate in Lahore.
The PML has also been tarnished with several cases
of corruption involving federal cabinet ministers who
are League members. In November 1986, for exam-
ple, Commerce Minister Mohyuddin Baluch was
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
The goals of the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD), as established in 1981, are the
removal of President Zia from office, the immediate
holding of a free and fair national election, and the
complete restoration of the 1973 Constitution. As of
August 1987, the component parties of the MRD
were:
? Pakistan People's Party.
? Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam.
? Pakistan Democratic Party.
? Pakistan Muslim League-Qasim Faction.
? Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi.
? Mazdoor Kissan Party.
? Pushtun-Khawa National Awami Party.
? Pakistan National Party.
? Awami National Party.
ousted for his involvement in a scheme to sell export
quotas to a Pakistani business. Minister of Local
Government Anwar Aziz Chaudry resigned his post
in June 1987 after an official probe into the misuse of
development funds in his electoral constituency. To
deflect negative publicity generated by government
corruption, Prime Minister Junejo has launched sev-
eral well-publicized "anticorruption" drives.
The MRD: In Search of a Strategy
We believe that the MRD has been an unwieldy
vehicle for anti-Zia forces and has been unable to take
full advantage of the PML's weaknesses. Since its
inception, it has been a kaleidoscope of parties with
different constituencies and views of what a post-Zia
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Secretary General
Jamiat-u l-Ul ema-i-!slam
Heads only religious party in MRD ... holds blend
of radical, political, and religious fundamentalist
views ... calls for nationalization and land distribu-
tion ... decries Zia'sfailure to implement Islamiza-
tion but regards Shariat Bill as a sham ... demands
destruction of US and Soviet power in the Muslim
world ... unable to attract sizable following, espe-
cially among secular MRD members ... attempts to
broaden appeal through populist Islamic slogans.
government should look like. The leftist parties, for
example, tend to favor increased provincial autonomy,
while the more moderate groups want a continuation
of strong central government. In our view, the nine
component parties of the MRD have spent more time
fighting among themselves than in working on a
comprehensive strategy to force Zia's removal and
new elections. In most cases of infighting, the moder-
ate parties are often pitted against the more radical
ones, while the smaller parties are usually opposed to
the much larger PPP. The return of Benazir Bhutto
has only widened the cleavages within the MRD by
reinforcing the PPP's dominance. Nevertheless, the
MRD will probably survive at least until the next
general election is held because the smaller parties
realize that, by themselves, they cannot gain power.
PPP Preeminence
The most persistent problem within the MRD is the
smaller parties' complaint that the PPP-the largest
party in the MRD-ignores their opinions and only
wants to gain power for itself. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-
i-Islam, the MRD's only religious party, has criticized
the PPP for trying to dominate the movement and has
often threatened to leave the coalition, according to
US diplomatic reporting. A moderate MRD party,
the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, withdrew from the movement in
October 1986 after the PPP criticized its decision to
register with the election commission.
Provincial Autonomy
A second major division in the MRD is the question of
provincial autonomy. Two MRD parties-the Awami
National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan National
Party (PNP) -advocate greater autonomy for the
North-West Frontier, Sind, and Baluchistan and cas-
tigate what they allege is increasing Punjabi domina-
tion of these provinces. These parties came out earlier
this year in favor of limiting the federal government's
jurisdiction to defense, foreign affairs, finance, and
communications, according to US Embassy reports.
Other MRD parties-including the PPP-oppose re-
ducing the central government's authority so radical-
ly. These parties realize that, to gain power, they will
need the support of the Punjabis who have traditional-
ly favored a strong central government in Pakistan.
Election Strategy
Strategy over holding new elections is also a source of
discord in the MRD. The PPP is demanding that a
new general election be held immediately. The other
MRD parties are less enthusiastic about an early poll,
according to US diplomatic reporting. The smaller
parties fear they will be overwhelmed by the PPP in
an open election and have argued for a prearranged
apportionment of parliamentary seats between the
PPP and the other MRD parties. The PPP has
refrained, so far, from making any preelection deal.
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Head of the Awami National
Party
Inveterate opposition leader ... strong advocate of
provincial autonomy ... longtime symbol of Push tun
nationalism ... sharply critical of US and Pakistani
policy toward Afghanistan and resents influx of
Afghan refugees into North-West Frontier Prov-
ince ... makes frequent visits to Kabul and Mos-
cow ... member of father's independence movement
against British in 1947... served numerous prison
terms for illegal political activities ... about 70.
Ghaus Buz Bizenjo
Head of Pakistan National
Party
Formidable Baluch politician ... strong proponent of
Baluchistan's autonomy ... backs Soviet presence in
Afghanistan ... willingness to negotiate with succes-
sive regimes has cost him support among dissident
students ... imprisoned by every Pakistani re-
gime ... Governor of Baluchistan in early 1970s until
dismissed and arrested by Bhutto government ... 84.
Ideological Differences
MRD unity is hindered by ideological differences over
foreign policy. The main leftist parties-the ANP and
PNP-are critical of the PPP's efforts to seek US
support. The US Consulate in Peshawar reported that
a rally in May 1986 jointly held by the PPP and the
ANP turned unruly when the leftists accused the PPP
of "tilting" toward the United States. US Embassy
reporting indicates that, at an MRD meeting in June
1986, six parties proposed a resolution over the PPP's
objections that condemned the United States for
"prolonging the Afghan war and endangering Pakis-
tan's security."
The PPP itself is divided in its views of the United
States. Party leader Bhutto presents herself publicly
and privately as a moderate political leader who is
favorably disposed toward Washington. She has pri-
vately said that she supports continuing US economic
aid to Pakistan, according to US diplomatic reporting.
Sources of the US Consulate in Lahore reported in
May 1986, however, that PPP leftists criticized
Bhutto for her relatively moderate stance toward the
United States.
We believe that the failure of the MRD's violent
antigovernment campaign in August 1986 was a
major setback in its efforts to unite and force Zia's
ouster. About 30 people died in political protests over
a two-week period, mainly in Sind, after the opposi-
tion defied a government ban on political rallies. In
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our view, ideological and regional disagreements with-
in the coalition were further exposed by the aborted
campaign. The US Embassy reports that many MRD
moderates resented being dragged by Bhutto and the
PPP into a premature and counterproductive confron-
tation with the government which only resulted in
mass arrests of opposition activists. Benazir Bhutto
publicly acknowledged that the opposition movement
was unprepared for the August confrontation.
One result of the abortive campaign, in our view, was
an effort by Bhutto to build up the Punjab wing of the
PPP to match the strength of the party in Sind and to
develop the party's credentials as a national party. In
the aftermath of the August clashes, PPP members in
Sind, where most of the violence was confined, ac-
cused their Punjab counterparts of failing to provide
support, according to US Embassy accounts. To
resolve this friction, Bhutto dismissed the head of the
Sind PPP in October because of his criticism of the
Punjabis. In June 1987 the PPP held internal party
elections in Punjab to reinvigorate the provincial
party apparatus. According to the US Consulate in
Lahore, the elections resulted in a stronger, more
unified PPP in Punjab.
We expect the PPP will continue to depend on Bhutto
for leadership. There is a lack of respected second-tier
leaders in the party, and, if Bhutto were to die or be
incapacitated, we believe it would split into provincial
Cochairman,
Pakistan People's Party
Eldest child and political heir of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto ... triumphantly returned to Pakistan in
April 1986 after nearly three years of self-imposed
exile. . . her authoritarian
style has alienated many party members ... has
moderated her political tone after failure of 1986
agitation campaign ... intense, sharp intellect, ac-
complished orator ... educated at Radcliffe and Ox-
ford ... recently engaged to be married ... 34.
factions. Although Bhutto realizes the need for great-
er party cohesion and long-term planning, she has
been unwilling to dismiss or discipline several party
officers-because of their loyalty to her-even though
they are poor organizers.
By the spring of 1987 the parties of the MRD were
discussing the possibility of a conference of opposition
parties to approve a coordinated program to force a
new national election. After months of interparty
wrangling over whether parties outside the MRD
could participate in the meeting, the conference was
held in mid-August in Lahore. According to press
reports, the conference ended in disarray with the
PPP refusing to sign the final declaration and walking
out.
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MRD Breakaways
One result of the MRD disarray has been the with-
drawal of one party from the coalition and formation
of another moderate non-MRD opposition party made
up of anti-Bhutto politicians.
The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), led by former Air Force
Chief Asghar Khan, quit the MRD in October 1986
after the other parties criticized his decision to regis-
ter the TI with the government. Asghar Khan helped
lead the political movement against Prime Minister
Bhutto in 1977, and he has been critical of Benazir
Bhutto's efforts to lead the opposition. He had earlier
publicly demanded that the MRD renounce dictatori-
al aspirations-what he called "Bhuttoism"-and af-
firm its belief in Pakistan's territorial integrity, an
implicit criticism of the provincial autonomist parties
in the MRD.
The MRD suffered another setback in August 1986
when Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a former PPP leader,
established the National People's Party (NPP). Jatoi,
who was a close ally of Prime Minister Bhutto,
headed the PPP in Sind until his removal by Benazir
in May 1986. The NPP is made up largely of
moderate, older ex-PPP members who, like Jatoi,
oppose Bhutto's "impetuousness," according to the
US Consulate in Lahore. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a
former governor of Punjab under Zulfikar Bhutto, is
associated with Jatoi in building the NPP. Jatoi sees
Khar, a Punjabi, as a means to expand the NPP's
appeal beyond its Sindhi base, according to the US
Consulate in Karachi. For the time being, however,
Khar's assistance is limited by his current incarcera-
tion while awaiting trial on a variety of charges,
including murder.
Jatoi is trying to build a moderate image for the NPP.
The party has not issued a formal manifesto and has
kept its policy pronouncements limited to general calls
for adherence to Islam, democracy, and Pakistan's
territorial unity. Jatoi told US diplomats that he seeks
a new general election but is against agitating for an
immediate new poll. He has registered the NPP-
which has one representative in Parliament-with the
government and has said his party may run in the
local elections when they are held.
Jatoi and the NPP are often rumored in the Pakistani
press to be potential replacements for Prime Minister
Junejo and the PML
Although we believe
Jatoi would be acceptable to Zia and the Army, the
President is probably not seriously planning to remove
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Junejo. The NPP has so far not demonstrated an
impressive ability to attract many disaffected opposi-
tionists to its flag, thus limiting its usefulness to Zia.
from MRD ... about 66.
Moderate, secular, human rights activist ... retired
Air Marshal ... respected for integrity but lacks
charisma ... sentenced to five years' house arrest by
Zia for antigovernment activities during martial law
period ... disdains Bhutto family ... withdrew party
While the two major political parties-the PML and
the PPP-strive to attract national constituencies, a
recurring phenomenon of Pakistani politics has been
the emergence of political parties that cater to specific
ethnic and provincial audiences. We believe that these
organizations reflect the inability of the larger, more
established parties to address the more parochial
concerns of Pakistan's many minority groups. One of
these parties, the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM),
was formed in 1984 to better represent the interests of
the Muhajirs, Muslim immigrants from India. The
Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front, formed in 1985, has been
pressing for greater autonomy for Sind, Baluchistan,
and the North-West Frontier than the central govern-
ment is willing to allow.
Religious parties have long been a part of Pakistani
politics. The Jamaat-i-lslami, a fundamentalist Sunni
party, has occasionally cooperated with President
Zia and gained 10 seats in the National Assembly
in the 1985 general election. It is sponsoring
legislation-the Shariat Bill-that would replace Pa-
kistan's civil law with Islamic law. Another Sunni
party is the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), a
moderate opposition party. A relatively new religious
party, representing Pakistan's Shia minority, is the
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria (TNFJ), which is pro-
Iranian and antigovernment.
The Parliamentary Opposition Group (POG) is not an
organized political party but a grouping of about 20
opposition members of Parliament in the National
Assembly who have flirted with resigning their seats
in the National Assembly to join the PPP, according
to the US Embassy. Led by former Assembly Speaker
Fakhr Imam, the POG met with Benazir Bhutto and
the PPP to discuss ways to coordinate strategy in June
1987. The POG endorses Bhutto's stand on a new
election, Zia's resignation from the Army, and full
revival of the 1973 Constitution, but by August 1987
it had not agreed to unite with the PPP.
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Secret
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi
Head of National People's
Party
Savvy veteran politician and wealthy Sindhi land-
owner ... conservative, urges moderation rather than
confrontation with Zia government ... popular with
rural elite and business community ... sees himself
as viable alternative to Prime Minister Junejo ...
Chief Minister of Sind (1974-77) ... a longtime PPP
stalwart, was ousted from party post in 1986 by
Benazir Bhutto ... well disposed toward United
States ... about 57.
Local Elections
Even if the elections for district and municipal coun-
cils that oversee the disbursement of government
development funds are held on a nonparty basis, as is
quite likely, we believe the larger opposition parties
will indirectly participate to keep themselves before
the public eye and to prepare for the 1990 general
election. In October the PPP announced that, al-
though it would not officially participate, it would
support "democratic-minded" candidates. Most
officeseekers will have clear party affiliations. In free
and fair elections, we believe the MRD parties would
almost certainly win a majority in Sind, Baluchistan,
and the North-West Frontier, where resentment
against Punjabis is high. We believe, however, that
the prospect of vote fraud by the PML governments in
these provinces will give the PML victories in impor-
tant districts and lead to violent confrontations with
Head of the Parliamentary Opposition Group ...
National Assembly member ... Assembly Speaker
until ousted by Junejo in 1986 for "antigovernment"
maneuvering ... often critical of government and has
held talks with Benazir Bhutto ... Shia Muslim
from wealthy Punjabi family but has Western, secu-
lar outlook ... wife Abida also a member of Parlia-
ment and her husband's opposition group ... about
45.
the opposition. In Punjab the result will probably be a
narrow PML victory due to the effectiveness of
government-supported development projects.
The risk of well-known Muslim League politicians
being defeated in the polls by members of the opposi-
tion will be a potential danger for the PML in the
local elections. The victory of antigovernment politi-
cians over established PML members would be a
major boost to the opposition and an embarrassment
to the government.
National Election
If a national election is held in 1990, we believe the
ruling PML will be hard pressed to present an
attractive record of legislative accomplishment to the
public. Economic and social problems probably pose
the biggest long-term challenge to the PML. It proba-
bly cannot fulfill promises of the Five-Point Program
to increase employment, wage rates, and rural electri-
fication because of budgetary constraints. We expect
that difficulties in dealing with deep-rooted social
problems, such as illiteracy, corruption, and crime,
will also hurt the PML's credibility with the public.
We believe that the PML will be hurt in the general
election by its inability to put down roots in Sind,
Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier. PML
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Local elections which are held every four years, elect
officials to district (subprovincial), township (subdis-
trict), and municipal governments. These local gov-
ernment bodies have significant influence because
they disburse federal and provincial development
funds. No definite schedules have been set, but US
diplomatic reporting suggests the ballot will be con-
ducted this winter.
The logistics of the local elections are still largely
undecided. The government has not announced, for
example, whether the elections will be held on a party
or nonparty basis. Parties were banned in the last two
local elections-1979 and 1983-and Pakistani press
reports indicate that the government will decide that
the elections will also be nonparty. Islamabad could
also allow only registered parties, such as the PML,
to participate in the polls. Such a maneuver could be
used to exclude the PPP from the polling. Another
issue that is still unclear is whether dual officehold-
ing will be permitted. Many local officeholders are
members of the provincial and national assemblies. If
dual officeholding is not allowed, assembly members
will have to decide whether to give up their seats to
run in the local elections.
efforts to increase its popularity in these areas will be
hindered by the government's unwillingness to grant
more provincial autonomy as well as a likely reduction
in government funds for development projects outside
Punjab.
The PPP would probably be the main beneficiary of
PML lethargy in the general election. We believe
that, by highlighting the PML's shortcomings, reorga-
nizing the party, and disavowing violence, the PPP's
public image would be enhanced and Benazir Bhutto
would become a stronger challenger to the PML in
1990. To be successful, however, Bhutto must first
improve unity and discipline within her party, in our
judgment. We believe that she will regard the other
MRD parties as increasingly irrelevant, although she
will find it useful to keep the alliance alive to prevent
the smaller parties' co-optation by the government
and to present at least the appearance of opposition
unity.
The non-PPP members of the MRD will also probably
keep their alliance with the PPP alive, if only in name,
out of concern that they are not strong enough
individually to challenge the government. Nonethe-
less, we believe the political and provincial fissures
within the MRD will deepen and reduce its public
credibility.
We believe that the non-MRD opposition parties
could be the wild card in future Pakistani politics. The
emergence of a strong NPP and its possible alliance
with the TI and JUP would provide a new political
alternative to Pakistani voters who are tired of the
continuing PML-PPP confrontation, in our judgment.
NPP leader Jatoi is a respected political leader, and
any party he leads in a future election would steal at
least some votes from both the PML and the PPP. A
strong showing by the NPP in the 1987 local elections
would greatly strengthen the party's viability.
Between now and 1990 regional and ethnic political
parties will probably grow in popularity as more
Pakistanis become disillusioned with the established
political parties. We believe the MQM, in particular,
will attract increasing numbers of Muhajirs in Sind
who consider themselves discriminated against by
other ethnic groups. The growth of the MQM, howev-
er, will be limited to Sind, given the comparatively
few Muhajirs outside the province. Although some
tactical cooperation between the MQM and the PPP
is likely in this year's local elections, a long-term
alliance between the parties is improbable, given the
MQM's distrust of the established political parties.
We believe that the religious parties-Shia as well as
Sunni-will play only a minor role in the political
process. The Sunni parties have never received more
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than 10 percent of the vote in past national elections
and we believe they are far from their goal of
imposing a theocratic Islamic state in Pakistan. Shia
organizations such as the TNFJ are also too small to
determine political events, but they appear to be well
financed, have a committed following, and will proba-
bly cause trouble for the government on issues such as
religious rights for Shias and relations with Iran and
the United States. The TNFJ will also serve as a front
for Iranian-sponsored subversion in Pakistan.
Effect on Pakistani Stability
We believe that the fractious nature of Pakistan's
political parties will hinder Prime Minister Junejo's
efforts to create a stable political order. Although
disorganization within the MRD takes some of the
pressure off him, the likelihood of future dissension
within Junejo's Muslim League will weaken his stand-
ing, and he may be replaced if party infighting
increases in the runup to the 1990 general election.
Junejo's handling of the fall local elections will largely
determine his political future and perhaps that of the
PML.
President Zia is not immediately threatened by Pakis-
tan's chaotic party structure. He has put distance
between himself and the MRD-PML confrontation as
well as the PML's own infighting. Nonetheless, we
believe future government-opposition confronta-
tions-over PML vote fraud in this fall's local elec-
tions, for example-and the weak structure of the
PML could prompt criticism from Zia's Army col-
leagues on his lack of success in creating a stable
political system in Pakistan
Although another military takeover is not likely in the
near term, a new martial law regime, dominated by
the Army, would probably mean another ban on
political parties and the imprisonment of many party
leaders. the Army is
becoming increasingly irritated with what it observes
as a deterioration in law and order under Pakistan's
civilian government. New military rulers might even-
tually allow a new national election, but it would
probably be closely supervised by the Army and
restricted to "acceptable" political parties.
In the long run, the prospect of continuing party
factionalism and disorganization, along with increas-
ing law-and-order problems, works against the estab-
lishment of civilian democracy in Pakistan and makes
another military regime more likely. The Army has a
tradition of restoring political and economic stability
and preserving national integrity. The civilian politi-
cal parties, on the other hand, have failed to establish
themselves as credible vehicles for long-term national
development-civilian administrations in Pakistan
have already been replaced three times by military
governments-and there is not much likelihood that
the current parties will improve on this record.
The disorganized and fragmented nature of Pakistan's
political parties will make it harder, in our judgment,
for the United States to encourage the establishment
of democratic institutions in the country. We believe
the corruption and lethargy of the PML and its
inability to address growing social and economic
problems will lead to public disillusionment with the
civilian government. The tendency of opposition par-
ties, such as the PPP, to merely criticize the govern-
ment instead of offering constructive policy proposals
for these problems will also increase popular cynicism
about political parties.
Although the PML is basically friendly toward the
United States, we believe its preoccupation with party
infighting and gaining popular support may cause
some League members in the government to hesitate
in backing US-supported initiatives. Some PML
members of the National Assembly, for example,
protested the government's efforts to enforce poppy
eradication in the North-West Frontier Province in
March 1986 after violence broke out between police
and local farmers. US Embassy reporting indicates
that caucus meetings between Prime Minister Junejo
and PML members of Parliament to discuss pending
legislation are often poorly organized and rarely
accomplish much.
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Foreign Support for Pakistan's Opposition?
Charges that the PPP and the rest of Pakistan's
opposition are receiving financial and political sup-
port from foreign countries have often been raised by
government spokesmen in an effort to tarnish the
opposition's image. President Zia publicly insinuated
in June 1986 that PPP leader Benazir Bhutto was
receiving money from the Government of India. A
Bhutto has publicly denied any foreign
financial support for the PPP. She has told US
diplomats, however, that Libyan leader Colonel Qa-
dhctfi financed her brother Mumtaz-leader of the
terrorist organization Al-Zulfikar-and had
"helped" her family in the late 1970s while Zulfikar
Bhutto was in jail.
Soviet and Afghan support was evident in the creation
of the leftist Awami National Party in July 1986.
The Pakistani press reported that several Afghan
diplomats were present at the ANP's formation in
Karachi. Party leader Abdul Wali Khan made a
highly publicized visit in late summer 1986 to Af-
ghanistan and the Soviet Union where he publicly
praised Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and criti-
cized Islamabad's support for the Afghan insurgents.
We believe that the continuing influence of leftist
forces will give the opposition MRD alliance an anti-
US tinge for the foreseeable future. Issues of concern
to the United States, such as Pakistan's nuclear
program and opium production, will provide more
opportunities for leftist parties to criticize US "inter-
ference" in Pakistani internal affairs, in our view.
Even PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, who has largely
refrained from publicly criticizing the United States,
will probably be driven to adopt more anti-US posi-
tions to whip up greater popular enthusiasm and
placate her leftist supporters.
In our view, a PPP government headed by Benazir
Bhutto would create strains between Islamabad and
Washington, especially if she perceived that US sup-
port was lacking during her drive to power. Although
she would probably want continued access to US
economic assistance, she would also try to placate the
powerful left wing of the PPP. We believe Bhutto
would be more agreeable to leftist demands for direct
talks with the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan,
be more accommodating to Soviet terms for a military
withdrawal, and might also curtail support to the
Afghan insurgents. A PPP government would proba-
bly continue Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons
program and be more resistant to US urgings to
control narcotics in order to win support among
farmers in poppy-growing areas.
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Secret
Appendix A
Pakistan's Ethnic and
Religious Parties
In the past several years, new ethnic political forces
have emerged to compete with both the government
and the established political opposition for voter popu-
larity. One of these, the Muhajir Quami Movement
(MQM) is a growing political vehicle for the Muhajirs,
or Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from India
after the 1947 partition, according to US diplomatic
reporting. Muhajirs comprise about 5 to 10 percent of
the Pakistani population and are found mainly in
urban areas of Sind. The MQM emerged from obscu-
rity in Sind after violent ethnic riots between Muha-
jirs and Pushtuns in Karachi and Hyderabad in late
1986. The leader of the MQM, Altaf Hussain, has
become the leading Muhajir spokesman and has
organized many Muhajirs who have long felt perse-
cuted by Pushtuns and other Pakistani ethnic groups,
according to the US Consulate in Karachi.
The MQM has already disrupted the political balance
in Sind. According to US diplomatic reporting, the
MQM has succeeded in drawing many Muhajir mem-
bers from established religious parties by charging
that these parties are not doing enough to protect and
defend Muhajir rights
The Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front (SBPF) is another
maverick political organization that opposes both the
government and the established political parties.
Formed in April 1985, the SBPF is led by Mumtaz
Bhutto, a cousin of Benazir and a former Chief
Minister of Sind under Zulfikar Bhutto. The aim of
the front is to press for greater autonomy for Sind,
Leader, Muhajir Quami Movement ... political op-
portunist and firebrand spokesman for Muhajirs ...
imprisoned for inciting riots in Sind in October
1986... rhetoric has cooled since release in January
1987... espouses equality in education and public
sector ... has capitalized on disaffection of Muhajir
youth ... Muslim immigrant from India ... 34.
rural youth in Sind.
Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier than the
government is willing to allow, according to the US
Consulate in Karachi. Mumtaz Bhutto also considers
Benazir and the PPP to have "sold out" to the
majority Punjabi population. In November 1986,
Mumtaz Bhutto and several followers were arrested in
Karachi on charges of treason and sedition but were
released on bail in September 1987, according to US
diplomatic reporting. Even though the government
felt compelled to detain him, the Consulate in Kara-
chi reports that Bhutto has never had a major follow-
ing in Pakistan outside of a small segment of alienated
Pakistan's religious parties are divided along sectarian
and political lines that impede unity and enable the
government to play them against each other. The
Sunni and Shia parties disagree over the imposition of
Islamic law in Pakistan, with each sect promoting its
own version. Most of the Sunni parties oppose Benazir
Bhutto for being a secular female politician. The Shia
parties, however, may come to see her as a bulwark
against Sunni-imposed religious legislation and as a
possible sympathizer, given that her mother is a Shia
from Iran.
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Conservative religious leader for past 36 years ...
rigid, reserved Muslim ... sees party as moral move-
ment first, political party second ... tacitly supports
Zia but criticizes failure to implement Islamization
policy ... strong supporter of Shariat Bill ... 73.
The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) is a small, influential funda-
mentalist Sunni party that seeks to turn Pakistan into
an Islamic state. It has occasionally cooperated with
President Zia, participating in the 1985 national and
provincial elections and holding 10 seats in the Na-
tional Assembly, but it generally seeks to adopt an
equidistant position between the government and the
opposition. It has, for example, urged Zia to retire
from the Army and criticized him for using Islam for
US diplomatic reporting indicates that the JI is
becoming increasingly frustrated with Prime Minister
Junejo and the PML. The Jamaat and the PML
openly disagree on the Shariat Bill, which seeks to
replace Pakistan's civil law with Islamic law. Accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting, the JI strongly supports
the Shariat Bill, while the PML is proposing an
alternative that preserves some responsibilities for the
civil courts and Parliament. A JI official told the
Embassy that party members will resign their parlia-
mentary seats if an acceptable compromise cannot be
worked out with the government. The Jamaat was
also upset with the PML-dominated Sind provincial
government's dismissal of the JI-dominated Karachi
city government in February 1987 after an allegedly
illegal JI demonstration in the city. In response, the J I
opened a dialogue last spring with the MRD, includ-
ing the PPP, on the possibility of joint action to press
for an early national election.
Despite these contacts with the opposition, we see
little likelihood of the JI resigning from Parliament
and joining the PPP in opposing the government. If it
gave up its parliamentary seats, the JI would lose
status and access to government development funds.
A clean break between the JI and Zia-who both
support the Shariat Bill-is also unlikely, although we
expect disagreements between the JI and the PML to
continue.
Moreover, fundamental disagreements remain be-
tween the JI and the MRD, particularly the PPP.
Mian Tufail Mohammad declared in April 1987 that
a female could never become leader of a Muslim
country. This sparked anti-JI demonstrations by the
PPP, which interpreted his remark as a slur against
PPP leader Benazir Bhutto.
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), a moderate
Sunni party, also tries to remain nonaligned in rela-
tion to both the PML and the MRD. Most party
members boycotted the 1985 election, but they also
refuse to join the MRD because of the harsh treat-
ment JUP leaders received during Prime Minister
Bhutto's rule, according to US diplomatic reporting.
A party leader told US diplomats in September 1986
that the JUP sees itself as a potential go-between for
the government and the opposition and stressed the
need for negotiations to solve political disputes. The
leader also said the party supports a new general
election but not until political passions have cooled in
Pakistan.
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Leader, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Pakistan
Pious Muslim fundamentalist ... commands consid-
erable authority among 2 million Brelvi Sunni
sect ... proud of religious position but politically
naive ... distrusts US intentions in Pakistan and
espouses anti-US sentiment ... imprisoned several
times under Bhutto and Zia governments ... 61.
There has been speculation that the three moderate
non-MRD parties-the JUP, NPP, and TI-will join
forces to present a political alternative to the PML
and PPP. US diplomatic reporting indicates that JUP
party leader Maulana Noorani has close personal ties
to NPP leader Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi. There were
preliminary discussions between Noorani, Jatoi, and
TI leader Asghar Khan in 1986 on the possibility of
forming a non-MRD opposition coalition.
The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Figh-e-Jqffria (TNFJ) is the
major Shia party. Pakistan's Shia minority-about 10
to 15 percent of the total population-has been
relatively slow to organize politically. We believe,
however, that this politization has accelerated in
response to the government's Sunni-oriented Islamiza-
tion program, the Shariat Bill, and the influence of
neighboring Iran. Party leader Arif ul-Husseini, a
pro-Iranian Shia, declared the TNFJ's objectives at a
large rally in Lahore in July 1987, demanding that
the Shias' rights be safeguarded and that the Paki-
stani Government reduce its relations with the United 25X1
States. He also expressed his interest in joining the
MRD.
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Secret
Appendix B
Major Political Party Profiles
Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
Leaders:
Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Jun-
Leader:
ejo, President
Founded:
Iqbal Ahmad Khan, General Secretary
Status:
Founded:
1986 (from several existing parties)
Status:
Ruling party; holds majorities in na-
tional and provincial assemblies
Ideology.
Centrist party, pro-private enterprise,
Ideology:
secular, friendly to the West
Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)
Leaders: Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Secretary Gen-
eral; Mian Tufail Mohammad, leader
of Punjab wing
Founded: 1941
Status: Independent party; holds seats in na-
tional and provincial assemblies but of-
ten opposes government policy
Ideology: Sunni fundamentalist party, critical of
United States, supportive of Afghan
resistance, opposed to Pakistan People's
Party
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)
Leader: Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani
Founded: 1970 (splinter group of older religious
party)
Status: Independent party; does not hold any
seats in national and provincial assem-
blies and is not a member of the MRD
opposition alliance
Ideology: Moderate Sunni religious party; repre-
sents Brelvi sect of Sunni Muslims; is
often critical of both government and
opposition but has ties to both camps;
supports call for a new national election
Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM)
Altaf Hussain
1984
Independent party; does not hold any
seats in national and provincial assem-
blies and is not a member of the MRD
opposition alliance
Ethnically based party; predominant in
urban areas of Sind; promotes the cause
of Muhajirs, Muslims of Indian origin
National People's Party (NPP)
Leader: Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi
Founded: 1986
Status: Independent opposition party; holds one
seat in Parliament; not affiliated with
MRD
Ideology: Moderate in political views; supports
call for a new election, but is anti-
Bhutto; party made up largely of ex-
PPP members
Tehrik-i-Istiglal (TI)
Leader: Asghar Khan
Founded: 1970
Status: Independent opposition party; no par-
liamentary representation; not affiliat-
ed with MRD
Ideology: Moderate in political views; resigned
from MRD in 1986 to protest PPP's
"domination" of opposition alliance;
supports call for new election
National Democratic Party (NDP)
Leader: Sherbaz Mazeri, founder
Founded: 1975
Status: Independent opposition party; no par-
liamentary representation; not affiliat-
ed with MRD
Ideology: Small, left-of-center party, strong in
Baluchistan; supports call for new elec-
tion, but Mazeri has been critical of
Bhutto
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Secret
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaffria (TNFJ)
Leader: Arif Hussain ul-Husseini
Founded: 1987
Status: Independent religious party; no parlia-
mentary representation; may seek affil-
iation with MRD
Ideology: Main political party for Pakistan's Shia
minority; seeks to preserve religious
rights for Shias; pro-Iranian and anti-
US
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)
Leaders: Fazlur Rahman, First Secretary; Abd-
ullah Darkhasti, leader of rival JUI
group
Founded: 1945
Status: Divided into two factions; Rahman fac-
tion is member of MRD, but splinter
Darkhasti group opposes the MRD and
holds a seat in the Senate
Ideology: Fundamentalist Sunni religious party;
represents Deobandi school of Sunni
Islam; Rahman faction often at odds
with rest of MRD alliance
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)
Leader: Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan
Founded: 1969
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, left-of-center party based in
Punjab; calls for new election; Nasrul-
lah Khan often plays conciliator role in
Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
Leaders: Benazir Bhutto, Nusrat Bhutto
Founded: 1967
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Large, left-of-center party; is organized
nationally, but is strongest in Sind and
Punjab; demands immediate ouster of
Zia and holding of new election; is often
accused of trying to dominate rest of
MRD parties
Pakistan Muslim League-
Qasim Faction (PML-Q)
Leaders: Malik Mohammad Qasim
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, left-of-center party; remnant of
original Muslim League
Pushtun-Khawa National Awami Party (PK-NAP)
Leader: Mahmood Khan Achakzai
Founded: Date unknown
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Small, leftist party; popular mainly in
ethnic Pushtun areas of Baluchistan;
advocates creation of new province for
Pushtuns in Baluchistan
Pakistan National Party (PNP)
Leader: Ghaus Bux Bizenjo
Founded: 1979
Status: Associate member of MRD
Ideology: Leftist party, has its strongest following
in Baluchistan; calls for new election
and unconditional autonomy for
Pakistan's four provinces; opposes
Islamabad's Afghanistan policy; full
entry into MRD blocked by disagree-
ments over provincial autonomy; fac-
tion of PNP joined ANP in 1986
Awami National Party (ANP)
Leader: Abdul Wali Khan
Founded: 1986
Status: Member of MRD
Ideology: Leftist party; formed from four smaller
leftist parties; strongest in North-West
Frontier Province; often opposes Bena-
zir Bhutto for being too moderate;
strongly opposes Islamabad's Afghani-
stan policy; calls for new election and
more autonomy for provinces
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Mazdoor Kissan Party
Sind-Baluch-Pushtun Front (SBPF)
(Workers-Farmers Party; MKP)
Leaders:
Mumtaz Bhutto, Ataullah Mengal
Leader:
Fatehyab Ali Khan
Founded:
1985
Founded:
Date unknown
Status:
Independent party; no parliamentary
Status:
Member of MRD
representation; not affiliated with
Ideology:
Small, leftist party based in North-
MRD
West Frontier Province; large faction of
Ideology:
Advocates confederation for Pakistan
party joined ANP in 1986
and unconditional provincial autonomy;
Bhutto and other party leaders were
Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi (QMA)
arrested in late 1986 on sedition
Leader:
Mairaj Mohammad Khan
charges
Founded:
Date unknown
Status:
Member of MRD
Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP)
Ideology:
Small, leftist party; has base of support
Leader:
Imam Ali Nazish, Secretary General;
in Karachi labor unions; faction of par-
Jam Saqi
ty joined ANP in 1986
Founded:
1948
Status:
Banned since 1954
Ideology:
Pro-Soviet in orientation; has gone
largely underground since 1954
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secret
Secret
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