SUDAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000700850001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan's
Political Parties
A Research Paper
Secret
NESA 87-1000
LDA 87-13206
August 1987
Copy 345
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Sudan's
Political Parties
NESA
LDA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
Analysis, with a contribution by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
and Office of Leadership
This paper was prepared by
Secret
NESA 87-10040
LDA 87-13206
August 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of6 July 1987
was used in this report.
Sudan's
Political Parties
takeovers by strong military leaders.
Sudan's return to parliamentary government in 1986 after nearly two
decades of military-dominated rule marks the country's third attempt at
pluralistic democracy since independence in 1956. Multiparty governments
in the 1950s and 1960s failed to effectively address Sudan's national
problems. They worsened the country's sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and
regional divisions, and in periods of crisis the Sudanese willingly accepted
government's ability to address Sudan's massive problems.
Long out of power, Sudan's party leaders have again created a domestic
political scene marked less by accomplishment than by party rivalries and
haggling over political spoils. The political system remains fragmented.
Returns from the election in April 1986 gave no party a decisive victory
and showed that no party can claim a national constituency. A Cabinet
shuffle in June 1987 removed several troublesome or ineffective ministers
from the government but did not end party rivalries or improve the
The centrist coalition under Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi is an uneasy
patchwork of contending parties and political rivals:
? Sadiq's Umma Party, dominant in rural central and western Sudan, has
roots in the country's largest Muslim sect, the Ansar. The Prime Minister
is both the head of the party and the leading figure in the sect. Sadiq and
a small group of personal advisers maintain tight control over the party.
The Umma favors compromise legislation on the status of non-Muslims
under Islamic law but opposes a secular state. The party supports
populist economic measures such as subsidies and opposes dismantling
the statist measures enacted by former President Nimeiri. In foreign
policy the Umma advocates a nonaligned position that includes trying to
get along with Libyan leader Qadhafi.
? The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sadiq's principal coalition part-
ner, has roots in the Khatmiyyah Muslim sect, which is almost as large as
its historic Ansar rival. The Khatmiyyah sect draws support from urban
businessmen, intellectuals, and wealthy farmers in northern and eastern
Sudan and has a significant number of adherents in Sudan's officer
corps. Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani is both the sect leader and party
patron. The DUP does not radically differ from the Umma on domestic
issues, although its friendlier attitude toward its Egyptian patron and the
iii Secret
NESA 87-10040
LDA 87-13206
August 1987
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Secret
United States creates tension. The DUP's determination to check Prime
Minister Sadiq's efforts to centralize power and its internal divisions and
antagonistic factions tend to make the party a disruptive, unreliable
coalition partner.
? The third element in the ruling coalition is a bloc of Assembly members
from five southern parties and the Sudan National Party (SNP), which
represents the Nuban tribesmen of southern Kurdufan. Initially number-
ing 38 legislators, the bloc's size has diminished as several of the southern
parties have split internally over the Prime Minister's policies for
administering the south. With the exception of the SNP, none of these
parties have a significant popular base. Participation in the coalition by
some members of the southern parties allows Sadiq to project the image
of a truly national government and provides him with the guise of
imposing decisions such as the recent reorganization of the south's
political administration. The parties also could help him retain a majority
in the Assembly if the DUP bolts from the coalition, but they are
unreliable partners-suspicious of the northern Muslims and distrustful
of Sadiq. They want a secular state, a federal system that would enhance
regional autonomy, and a stronger African identity for Sudan.
The parliamentary opposition includes the National Islamic Front-a
significant political force representing the extreme religious right-and the
Communists-whose fortunes have declined steadily since the 1960s when
the Sudan Communist Party was the largest and best organized Commu-
nist party in Africa:
? The National Islamic Front's (NIF) strong third-place showing in the
1986 election reflects its superior leadership, organization, and funding.
The party is the political arm of the largest Sudanese Muslim Brother-
hood faction. Both the faction and the party are under the leadership of
Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF, which has long opposed the domination
of Sudanese politics by the leaders of the traditional Muslim sects, has
shown it can stir up trouble in the streets. The party platform calls for an
Islamic state that respects the rights of non-Muslims; favors a private
sector within an Islamic economy; and backs strong ties to the West,
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
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? The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) won only three seats in the Assembly
in 1986. It has no significant popular base and draws support mainly
from trade unionists and intellectuals in the major northern cities.
Divided between pragmatic party leader Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud
and the more militant party newspaper editor Ali al-Tijani al-Tayyib, the
SCP generally cooperates with the Sadiq government. The party poses no
threat in the Assembly and only a moderate covert threat in the near
term. The SCP espouses a secular state, supports subsidies, opposes
privatization, condemns austerity measures mandated by the Internation-
al Monetary Fund, is critical of the United States, and is wary of both
Egypt and Libya.
Several other important groups on the Sudanese political scene exist
outside the parliamentary system:
? The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-the political arm
of the major southern insurgent group, the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army-prevented voting in more than half of the constituencies in the
south in 1986. The SPLM does not recognize the legitimacy of the Sadiq
government and has continued its insurgent attacks in the hope of
maintaining pressure on the government by straining both financial
resources and military loyalty. Led by former Sudanese military officer
Dr. John Garang and supported by Ethiopia, the SPLM claims to seek a
secular, unified, federal, democratic, and socialist Sudan. Historical
distrust between north and south along with issues such as the status of
Islam and revenue and power sharing make prospects for negotiations
and resolution of the southern insurgency dim.
? Sudan's Ba'thists, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, won no seats in
the Assembly in 1986 and have virtually no popular following, although
their pan-Arab ideology is attractive to some young military officers.
They are split between Iraqi-supported and Syrian-backed factions and
depend on their respective country patrons for funding. The Ba'thists,
like the Communists, view the Sadiq government and the current
political system as conducive to their growth. Their domestic policies are
similar to those of the Communists, but their foreign policy positions are
colored by the policies favored by their patrons.
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? The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, which are viewed by most
Sudanese as Libyan surrogates, did not take part in the 1986 election and
have refused to participate in the democratic process. They have little
popular following and are factionalized, but they represent a pool of
potential terrorists and subversives susceptible to Libyan direction.
The outlook for stable, multiparty democratic government in Sudan is
bleak. Despite Prime Minister Sadiq's evident good intentions, Sudanese
increasingly question the government's legitimacy because its decisionmak-
ing capability is consistently undermined by interparty and intraparty
infighting. Opposition activity by northern groups, tempered in the recent
past by the fear of triggering a military takeover, is likely to increase in the
next year as the government's paralysis becomes more obvious. If the
coalition government fails to develop effective leadership, civil unrest in
Khartoum-including the prospect of clashes involving party militias-or a
further major deterioration in the security situation in the south would set
the stage for an Army takeover and the return of military-dominated rule.
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Secret
Election Results and Coalition Building
The National Umma Party 5
Base of Support 11
Opposition Parties in the Assembly 12
12
13
13
The Communist Party
14
Base of Support
14
Other Opposition Groups
15
The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
15
17
The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees
17
Outlook for the New Multiparty Government
17
A.
Comparative Analysis of the 1953 and 1986 Election Returns in
Northern Sudan
19
D.
Selected Data on Parties Represented in the Constituent Assembly,
Cabinet, and State Council
31
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Figure 1
Selected Sudanese Tribal Groupsa
a Authoritative sources acknowledge 56
groups comprising 597 tribes in Sudan.
Libya
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Despite the reinstatement of the
Addis Ababa accords in April 1985,
J
7-
VV%
Saudi
Arabia
Red
Sea
ADDIS ABABA
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
.q
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Sudan's
Political Parties
The centrist government formed in May 1986 under
Umma Party and Ansar sect leader Prime Minister
Sadiq al-Mahdi marks the third Sudanese effort to
build a parliamentary democracy since independence
in 1956. The overthrow of the 16-year authoritarian
regime of President Nimeiri in 1985 paved the way
for the return of political parties and the pluralistic
democracy that has remained the ideal for Sudan's
elite since the end of British rule.
Party and personal rivalries have undermined the
decisionmaking capability and political stability of
Sudan's democratic regimes, which have ruled the
country for only eight of the past 31 years. The
multiparty governments have failed to foster national
unity in the face of Sudan's sectarian, tribal, ethnic,
and regional divisions. During periods of crisis under
these earlier parliamentary governments, most Suda-
nese have willingly accepted takeovers by strong
military leaders. In 1958 civilian leaders invited the
Army to take control, and in 1969 Gaafar Nimeiri,
then an Army colonel, met little popular resistance
when he took power following five years of govern-
ment paralysis caused by successive weak coalition
governments.
President Nimeiri used the ineffectiveness of the
multiparty regimes to justify outlawing parties and
establishing a one-party state on the Arab socialist
model. He first moved against the Muslim sectarian
parties and the Muslim Brotherhood and later turned
against the left after an abortive Communist-backed
coup in 1971. A few party leaders joined Nimeiri's
Sudan Socialist Union, but many others joined oppo-
sition fronts abroad or were imprisoned at home.
increases. The interim military regime inherited a
grim legacy. Sudan's economy was in a shambles, and
an insurgency continued to grow in the south.
Nimeiri's controversial decisions in 1983 to divide the
south into three separate regions and to impose
Islamic civil, criminal, and economic laws throughout
Sudan not only fueled the insurgency in the animist
and Christian south but further weakened the
economy.'
Overwhelmed by the domestic situation, the military
acquiesced to popular demands for a freer political
atmosphere following the coup. The Transitional Mil-
itary Council agreed to allow the return of political
parties and a free press, to abolish Nimeiri's State
Security Organization, to hold free elections, and to
turn over power to a democratically elected civilian
government within a year.
Returns from the election in April 1986 indicate that
no Sudanese party won a landslide and that no party
can claim to have a national constituency. The Suda-
nese media reported that 73 percent of the eligible
population registered to vote and that 11 of the 31
parties that ran in the election won seats in the
Constituent Assembly.
' Nimeiri's division of the south into three regions in 1983 violated
provisions for a semiautonomous and united south in the Addis
Ababa accords of 1972, which ended the first southern rebellion
after 17 years. Southerners, moreover, believed that his imposition
of Islamic law throughout the country violated the spirit of the 1973
Constitution. Northern Muslims, meanwhile, were upset by Islamic
law provisions that meted out harsh punishments such as mutila-
tions for theft and forbade drinking of alcoholic beverages. They
also believed that poorly crafted laws that eliminated interest and
replaced income taxes with the Muslim zakat (tithe) heightened
By the late 1970s, Nimeiri's domestic support had
eroded as he became more autocratic and erratic. In
April 1985 senior military officers ousted him in the
midst of massive demonstrations triggered by price
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Sudanese Politicians on Democracy
"The democracy we are callingfor ... is guided
democracy. That is guidance that we are not impos-
ing out of dominance or arbitrariness but rather
through channels of mutual understanding among the
various political forces. The only alternative to fail-
ure in the democratic system is descent into the abyss
of dictatorship and national fragmentation. "
Sadiq al-Mahdi
Prime Minister and president of Umma Party
"Democracy will always and forever be in danger,
and it will always be threatened as long as [Sudan is]
at this level of economic, social, and political
backwardness. "
proceed with strong legislation, and call for Islamic
law, because, if it were not for the Islamic religion,
there would be no morals."
Ahmad Muhammad Ata al-Manan
Assembly member, DUP
"It should be pointed out that military coups repre-
sent a constant threat to democratic life, but the
experience of the past 16 years and the destruction
and ruin they brought have made it difficult for
military rule to continue. "
Sid Ahmad al-Husayn
Minister of Interior, DUP
Bakri Ahmad Adil
Minister of Education, Umma Party
"The weak performance of parliamentary life threat-
ens democracy. "
Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud
Secretary General, Sudan Communist Party
"There will not be anything threatening democracy if
all the people stand up for the good of the nation,
Sudan's two northern Muslim sectarian parties gained
the largest number of votes. The Umma Party of
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi won a plurality with
100 of 264 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Its
historic rival, the Democratic Unionist Party, placed a
distant second with 63 seats. The radical Muslim
Brotherhood, which ran as the National Islamic
Front, finished a strong third with 51 seats. (See
appendix A for a more detailed analysis of the
election returns.)
"It is not enough to pursue democracy by means of
weak patterns, but it requires us to work to deepen
these patterns and democratic institutions and link
them to the Sudanese citizen's emotions so as to
become part of his being, compelling him to consider
these institutions as working to safeguard his
interests. "
Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha
National Islamic Front
Southern rebel activity prevented voting in over half
of the southern constituencies, and the more moderate
southern parties filled only 31 of the 68 seats allocat-
ed to their region in the Assembly. The Sudan
National Party of the Nuban tribe was the only ethnic
party to place well, coming in fifth with eight seats.
The Beja People's Congress-an ethnic party from
the Red Sea Hills in the northeast-took one seat.
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Figure 2. Former Military
Council leader Suwar al-Da-
Minister and Foreign Minister. The major parties
shared the most sensitive posts. In addition to defense,
the Umma took the post of attorney general and the
portfolios of finance and planning, energy and mining,
agriculture, animal wealth, industry, education, and
Cabinet affairs. In addition to foreign affairs, the
Democratic Unionists took the portfolios of interior,
health, public works and housing, trade, and informa-
tion. Representatives of four separate southern parties
each took one of the less prestigious domestic minis-
tries, and a representative of the National Alliance-
a group of unions and parties formed after the coup in
1985-was appointed Minister of Peace and National
Constitutional Conference.
Prime Minister Sadiq had to make additional compro-
mises in the disposition of key government posts.
Earlier in May 1986 the Assembly elected Democrat-
ic Unionist leader Ahmad al-Mirghani as Chairman
of the State Council and de facto head of state. Four
other Council posts were split among the major
parties and one southern representative. The Umma
Party won the coveted post of parliamentary speaker,
while one of two positions as deputy speaker was
reserved for but not accepted by leaders of the Sudan
National Party, according to the US Embassy.
hab voting in April 1986.
The left made a poor showing, with the Communists
winning only three seats and the Bath Party failing to
win any.
Party infighting delayed the formation of a coalition
government for almost a month. US Embassy report-
ing suggests interparty and intraparty haggling over
the distribution of key positions proved more disrup-
tive to coalition building than any major political
difference. Following an intense period of negotiations
into mid-May, the southern and Nuban bloc joined
the Umma and Democratic Unionist parties in form-
ing a centrist coalition that represented about three-
quarters of the 264 seats in the Assembly. Excluded
from the coalition, both the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Communists entered the parliamentary opposi-
tion. Southern rebel leaders refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the new government.
The Cabinet that emerged in mid-May 1986 reflected
the uneasy compromises struck among the coalition
partners. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi assumed the
defense portfolio, and Democratic Unionist leader Al-
Sharif Zayn al-Hindi became both Deputy Prime
In May 1987, just two days short of the Cabinet's first
anniversary, Sadiq dissolved his government. This
move followed criticism by the top military leadership
over the government's failure to act decisively in
addressing severe economic problems and the south-
ern insurgency, and public accusations by Trade
Minister Muhammad Abu Hurayrah (a Democratic
Unionist) that some fellow ministers were corrupt.
Sadiq's action was supported by the Mirghanis, who
wanted Abu Hurayrah removed from office for at- 25X1
tempting to undermine the Mirghanis' leadership of
the Democratic Unionist Party.
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The interim constitution adopted by the caretaker
military government in late 1985 provides the guide-
lines for civilian government until Khartoum adopts a
permanent constitution. a In the interim constitution,
as under the Nimeiri regime, Islam retains its privi-
leged position as the source of law.
The Constituent Assembly elected in April 1986 is
unicameral and has 301 seats, of which 28 are set
aside for university graduates and the remainder are
allotted to geographic districts. The Assembly exer-
cised its power to elect key government officials on 6
May 1986 when it voted for a five-man State Council,
the Prime Minister, and the Assembly Speaker. In
the event of impeachment, retirement, or the death of
these officials, the Assembly has the authority to
elect their successors.
In addition, the Assembly passes legislation or can
amend the constitution with a two-thirds vote of its
membership. Its major responsibility, however, is
drafting a permanent constitution, after which it will
a Prime Minister Sadiq this year tabled more than 100 amend-
ments to the interim constitution to enhance his legislative and
Judicial powers. His coalition partners and the NIF opposition-
both fearing the return of Nimeiri-style authoritarianism-have
opposed several of these amendments, claiming that they undercut
the checks and balances of the interim constitution. A number of
the amendments, however, were passed by the Constituent Assem-
bly in early April. Nevertheless, the NIF pressed Sadiq to make
extensive compromises that weakened the powers given to the
transform itself into a parliament within four years.
Rebel activity prevented voting in 37 of 68 constituen-
cies in the south during the April 1986 election, and,
until elections can be held in these areas, work on a
permanent constitution cannot be completed.
The State Council serves as a collective head of state.
It is the chief constitutional authority and supreme
commander of the armed forces. In the absence of a
permanent constitution, the Council shares responsi-
bility with the Assembly for defining legislative pro-
cedures. The judiciary is directly responsible to the
Council, which appoints judges to staff the country's
courts. The Council also has the authority to pardon
or commute the sentence of any individual convicted
of any offense.
The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are
responsible to the Constituent Assembly for conduct-
ing the executive and administrative duties of the
government. The Prime Minister has the responsibil-
ity to make individual appointments to the Council of
Ministers who must receive the approval of the State
Council. In the event the Prime Minister is traveling
abroad or is temporarily incapacitated, he has the
authority to designate a minister of his choice as
acting Prime Minister.
Following three weeks of negotiations among the
political parties-both coalition members and opposi-
tionists-a new Cabinet was formed in early June.
The new Cabinet differs little from its predecessor-
11 of the original 20 ministers retained their positions,
two other ministers assumed new portfolios, and the
allocation of portfolios among the parties remained
basically unchanged. Notable differences between the
two governments were the removal of Abu Hurayrah
as Trade Minister, the withdrawal-for personal rea-
sons-of Democratic Unionist Party Secretary Gener-
al Hindi from the post of Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, and the expansion of the Cabinet
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Division of Political Posts Among Parties
Assembly
Seats a
State
Council
Seats
Cabinet
Members b
260
5
20
100
2
10
Democratic Unionist
Party
63
2
7
People's Progressive
Party
Southern Sudan Politi-
cal Association
7
0
Sudan African People's
Congress
7
1
Independent
6
0
Sudan Communist Party
3
0
Sudan African Congress
2
0
Beja People's Congress
1
0
Sudan People's Federal
Party
1
0
a Official results of Constituent Assembly elections as reported by
the Sudan News Agency on 25 May 1986. Four additional deputies
have been seated and several independent deputies have joined
political parties since the 25 May tally was released, but these
changes have not altered the overall balance within the Assembly.
b As of 19 June 1987 four Cabinet seats were unfilled.
from 20 to 24 seats. Sadiq left four Cabinet positions
unfilled in an attempt to entice opposition parties,
most notably the National Islamic Front, to join the
coalition.
The National Umma Party
The Umma Party's plurality in last year's election
reflects its status as the largest Muslim party to
reemerge after Nimeiri's overthrow. In contrast to the
Democratic Unionists, the Umma Party effectively
used the grassroots organization of its affiliated reli-
gious sect, the Ansars, to encourage voting and ensure
that its strength was not diluted by multiple candi-
dates running for the same position. Prime Minister
Sadiq stifled opposition from significant factions with-
in the party.
Base of Support. The Umma has historical roots in
the Ansars-Sudan's largest Muslim sect-who are
followers of the charismatic religious leader, the
Mahdi. In the late 19th century the Mahdi led a
successful religious-political movement that united
Sudan and temporarily won independence from Egyp-
tian and British rule. Election returns indicate that
the Umma's electoral strength came from its tradi-
tional areas of support in central and western Sudan.'
'The Umma Party had no significant electoral strength outside
traditional areas of support in western Sudan, except in Khartoum,
according to an academic paper presented at a US Government-
sponsored seminar on Sudan in October 1986. When comparing the
pattern of Umma support with the most comparable election results
in 1953, the paper indicates the party has shifted its base of support
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Sadiq al-Mahdi combines political and religious
leadership as Prime Minister, head of the Umma
Party, and the most prominent leader of the Ansar
sect. Western observers have noted that he exhibits
three distinct political characteristics:
? A northern Sudanese politician representing the
interests of Sudan's Muslim governing elite, he is
opportunistic, adept at building short-term coali-
tions, and contemptuous of Christian/animist
southern Sudanese.
? The leading candidate for the position of Imam of
the Ansars and scion of Sudan's most notable
family, he acts as guardian of Sudan's Islamic
identity and takes an authoritarian approach to
decisionmaking.
The Ansars still have a strong rural identity in these
areas, although over the past 20 years increasing
numbers have moved into northern urban areas, ac-
cording to academic sources. Ansars also have tradi-
tionally looked to the Army as a means of upward
mobility and represent an estimated 40 percent of the
enlisted men in the Sudanese armed forces,F_
? Western educated, Sadiq emphasizes to Westerners
the secular, democratic, and moderate aspects of
his political views. Presenting his positions on
issues in well-constructed, rationally based argu-
ments, he has demonstrated an ability to deal
comfortably with and impress Westerners.
These three characteristics served Sadiq well during
his 20 years in Sudan's political wilderness by en-
abling him to tailor his message to different audi-
ences. In our judgment, however, they have not
contributed to his developing a core of principles or
policy objectives needed to address Sudan's massive
problems, especially the issues of Islamic law and the
southern rebellion. Moreover, he has shown a tenden-
cy to overestimate his political skills and underesti-
mate the strength of his opposition and the complex-
ity of problems he faces. As a result, he often makes
promises he cannot fulfill.
Sadiq, who is 52, received a degree in economics with
honors from Oxford University in the late 1950s. He
served as Prime Minister from July 1966 until the
following May. During most of 1970-78 he was in
exile or imprisoned. With Libyan support, he orches-
trated a nearly successful coup against President
Nimeiri in 1976. Sadiq reconciled with Nimeiri in
1978 but was jailed during September 1983-Decem-
ber 1984 for criticizing the President's Islamic laws.
Party Leadership. Sadiq al-Mahdi has strong personal
control over the Umma party in his capacity as both
head of the party and leading contender for the
position of Imam of the Ansar. Embassy
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about 10 loyal advisers, composed mainly of asso-
ciates and relatives who serve in the Cabinet or
perform sensitive party and quasi-governmental du-
ties. Prominent members of this circle include party
secretary and Agricultural Minister Umar Nur al-
Da`im and Sadiq's cousin Mubarak al-Mahdi, head of
the party's foreign affairs committee and Minister of
Industry.
The US Embassy reports that Umma leaders outside
of Sadiq's inner circle have criticized his dependence
on a narrow set of advisers. Traditionalists in the
party have expressed resentment over the influential
role played by his wife, Sarah, who was elected to the
Umma's General Secretariat in early 1986.
Mahdi family squabbles have threatened party unity
in the past and could prove to be a factor in weaken-
ing the current regime. Sadiq's uncle, Ahmad, and his
first cousin, Wali al-Din, each head an Umma fac-
tion. Neither man, in our judgment, poses an immi-
nent threat to party unity, but each has the potential
to make trouble. Ahmad-more politically conserva-
tive than the Prime Minister-according to US Em-
bassy reporting, claims 20 Umma delegates in the
Assembly would be prepared to join him in a new
coalition in the event of a major disagreement with
Sadiq.
Wali al-Din-considered militant and pro-Libyan by
US Embassy sources-has no popular following but
could instigate internal clashes between his and
Sadiq's followers in the 5,000-man Ansar militia.
Party Platform. Sadiq and his inner circle take prima-
ry responsibility for Umma Party policy but remain
sensitive to the views of Umma constituents on key
issues like Islamic law. Academic specialists stress
there is wide support for the abolition of Nimeiri's
version of Islamic law among the Umma and other
northern Muslim parties but that no Muslim party
supports a return to a secular state. The Western-
educated Sadiq probably is more liberal than his
followers regarding Islamic law, but we believe his
status as great-grandson of the Mahdi and the most
prominent contender for the long-vacant post of Imam
of the Ansars, the support for a new set of Islamic
laws by a majority of northern Muslims, and the
threat of assassination by religious fanatics will pre-
vent him from advocating a secular constitution.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Sadiq and other
Umma leaders probably are willing to implement
more liberal Islamic laws to mollify southern Suda-
nese and other non-Muslims. Nevertheless, Sadiq's
efforts to alter the interim constitution's commitment
to Islamic law with a compromise amendment proved
so controversial that discussion of the issue was
postponed.
Sadiq's government has sent conflicting signals on the
southern insurgency. Umma leaders have sought dia-
logue with the southern rebels and have openly stated
their commitment to hold a constitutional conference
that would air national problems and southern griev-
ances. Meanwhile, Sadiq has actively pursued a policy
of acquiring arms and training for the armed forces in
the hope of maintaining Army morale, decreasing
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Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in late July 1986
made a major policy address to the Constituent
Assembly that, given the lack of an official Umma
Party platform, remains the broadest expression of
both the Umma Party's and the new government's
domestic and foreign policy positions. In the domestic
area Sadiq called for:
? Removal of all vestiges of the former Nimeiri
regime; support for democracy and building more
democratic regional and local government, but
maintaining a state of emergency for security
reasons.
? A peaceful resolution to the southern insurgency,
offering to revise foreign treaties in response to
rebel demands but emphasizing plans to rearm the
armed forces to prevent military defeat; southern
demands for a secular state were sidestepped, how-
ever, with a statement that Nimeiri's Islamic laws
would be replaced by new ones.
? Guidelines to cut government spending and increase
revenues while proposing price controls on basic
commodities and a temporary freeze on all debt
repayment; foreign aid would be sought for a new
policy of rural development.
? Improvements in social welfare-health, education,
and labor-and greater controls on refugees and on
the activities of foreign voluntary agencies.
In the foreign policy area, Sadiq underscored Khar-
toum's commitment to nonalignment and regional
cooperation, stressing Sudan's Islamic, Arab, and
African heritage and reaffirming and elaborating on
the direction taken by the interim regime. These
include:
? Adopting Arab unity as a strategic goal in pursuit
of Arab economic and military strength but refrain-
ing from forming alliances; support for Palestinian
self-determination.
? Reformulating the special relationship with Egypt
to serve the interests of both countries and estab-
lishing a Brotherhood Charter with Saudi Arabia;
continuing to develop relations with Libya in the
direction of overall Arab unity.
? Using the context of the Nile Valley Charter to
develop and maintain good ties to Ethiopia, Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire; developing West
African ties with regard to Chad and Nigeria.
? Strengthening relations with both superpowers in
the service of national and common interests, while
preserving the principle of nonalignment; deepening
relations with Western Europe, China, Japan, and
the Third World.
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coup plotting, and gaining military superiority to
press the rebels to enter into a dialogue.
Nevertheless, we believe Sadiq's relationship with
Qadhafi is opportunistic and lacks a shared ideology
or foreign policy goals.
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In economic policy, US Embassy reporting indicates
the Umma leadership has adopted populist positions,
including favoring consumer subsidies and opposing
major economic austerity measures mandated by the
International Monetary Fund that would cause wide-
spread hardship. Sadiq has also called for a freeze on
domestic and foreign debt repayment. Umma leaders
are moderately supportive of private enterprise, espe-
cially of adopting policies that favor their large
farmer constituency, but they do not support actions
that would significantly alter statist policies adopted
under Nimeiri, fearing the consequences could desta-
bilize the government in the short term.
The Umma Party supports a return to the pre-Nimeiri
policy of nonalignment and good relations with neigh-
boring states. The US Embassy reports that Umma
leaders and almost all other party leaders view this
policy as the most pragmatic way for Khartoum to
maintain its sovereignty, undercut external support to
the southern rebels, and cultivate sources of economic
aid.
Umma leaders continue to value the benefits of good
ties to the United States and the West, but they
oppose a return to the close strategic cooperation with
Washington that existed under the Nimeiri regime.
Sadiq's request in January 1987 that the United
States remove its pre-positioned equipment from Port
Sudan highlights concern for maintaining Khartoum's
nonalignment. Symbolic of this commitment, Sadiq
visited Moscow in August 1986. US Embassy report-
ing indicates Umma leaders believe Moscow has
leverage over Ethiopia-a key supporter of the south-
ern rebels-and view the Soviets as a potential source
of aid.
Party leaders favor maintaining the rapprochement
with Libya started in April 1985 to prevent Tripoli
from renewing its support to the southern rebels and
to maintain it as a source of economic and military
aid. Libyan leader Qadhafi supported Sadiq when he
was in opposition to Nimeiri in the 1970s, and US
Embassy reporting indicates Qadhafi contributed sub-
stantial funds to Sadiq's 1986 election campaign.
Umma leaders view a rapprochement with Ethiopia as
crucial to solving the southern insurgency. During
Sadiq's meeting with Ethiopian Chairman Haile-
Miriam Mengistu in July 1986, however, he failed to
reach an agreement to end support to each other's
insurgents. The US Embassy indicates Umma leaders
are prepared to increase aid to Ethiopian dissidents as
a method to press Addis Ababa to come to an
agreement. Party leaders favor improving relations
with Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire to discourage an
escalation in their political and humanitarian support
to the southern rebels.
Sadiq and other party leaders favor redefining the
special relationship with Egypt developed under the
Nimeiri regime, including the integration charter of
1982. Umma leaders recognize Egypt's strategic im-
portance as a counter to Libyan and other external
threats. We believe that Sadiq's visit to Cairo last
February and the signing of a Brotherhood Charter
reflected pressure from the Army to improve ties to
Egypt. Nonetheless, Umma leaders remain suspicious
of Cairo's support for their Democratic Unionist
coalition partners and continued provision of asylum
for Nimeiri. The Umma Party leadership wants to
enhance its ties to Saudi Arabia, Sudan's key regional
donor. Sadiq visited Riyadh October 1986 and again
this July, each time seeking extensive economic and
military aid.
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Party leaders want to bring Sudan into the Arab
mainstream, including putting distance between
Khartoum and the Camp David accords. Sadiq favors
maintaining good ties to both moderate and radical
Arab and Muslim states so that Sudan can benefit 25X1
from their aid and, in return, offer its good offices to
mediate regional disputes such as the Iran-Iraq war
and the Libya-Chad conflict. The Prime Minister
used this rationale to justify his visit to Tehran last
December to formalize improved ties to Iran while
trying to maintain good relations with Iraq.
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Democratic Unionist Party
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) placed a dis-
tant second in the April 1986 election because, in our
judgment, it lacked the unity, organization, and lead-
ership to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from mak-
ing inroads into the party's traditional areas of sup-
port in northern and eastern Sudan.
Base of Support. The DUP has roots in the Khat-
miyyah Muslim sect, which is almost as large as its
Ansar rivals. The party's Unionist designation origi-
nated in the 1950s when the Ansars supported inde-
pendence and the Khatmiyyah supported union with
Egypt. The DUP draws most of its support from
urban intellectuals, wealthy businessmen, and farm-
ers. Academic sources note that a significant number
of senior officers in the Sudanese armed forces have a
Khatmiyyah background.
Party Leadership. Khatmiyyah sect leader Muham-
mad Uthman al-Mirghani is the party patron, and Al-
Sharif Zayn al-Hindi technically heads the DUP. In
contrast to previous sect leaders, Mirghani involves
himself directly in party affairs, maintaining a tight
hold over the party's policies and financial resources.
The US Embassy reports the younger and more
liberal members of the party oppose Mirghani's direct
role, arguing for a real separation of the sect and
party leadership.
Jthe June Cabinet shuffle and the resignation
in July of one of two DUP members of the State
Council were partly the result of increasing challenges
to the Mirghanis' hold over the party
Since the late 1950s when the party first called itself
the National Unionist Party (NUP), it has splintered,
changed names, reorganized, and reunited several
times. Personal squabbles and frictions over sectarian
versus nonsectarian leadership have generally caused
divisions. The US Embassy reports that the current
DUP is a reincarnation of the pre-1969 party. Two
major factions united just before the election as a
result of pressure from their Egyptian backers. These
include Khatmiyyah sect leaders and NUP secular
leaders who formed the opposition abroad in the
1970s. Two other small Unionist factions that reject
the domination of sect leaders over the party have
formed a new NUP under the leadership of Ali
Muhammad Hasanayn.
Party Platform. The DUP is an unreliable partner in
the coalition government not only because historic
rivalries make its commitment to cooperation with the
Umma questionable but also because of its weak
leadership and tendency to splinter. A US Embassy
source has described the DUP as a base without a
leadership and the new NUP as a leadership without a
base. US Embassy reporting indicates the DUP works
to check many of Prime Minister Sadiq's efforts to
centralize power. State Council Chairman Ahmad al-
Mirghani attempts to use his constitutional powers to
limit Sadiq's control over the Army and the bureau-
cracy. Embassy reporting indicates that the DUP, like
the Umma, is building an armed militia and intelli-
gence network to protect its interests.
The DUP leadership's domestic policies as expressed
in speeches and in its newspaper Al-Itihadi generally
do not differ radically from those of the Umma Party.
DUP sectarian leaders, however, seem closer to the
Muslim Brotherhood about the status of Islamic law
than the Umma Party leaders and are more support-
ive of a free enterprise economy, according to US
Embassy reporting.
On foreign policy questions, disagreements with the
Umma Party are pronounced. The DUP, especially
the Khatmiyyah faction, has historically favored close
ties to Cairo and, according to the US Embassy, has
received substantial funding from the Egyptians, who
are trying to rebuild the DUP. Nevertheless, DUP
leaders are often irritated with what they perceive as
indifference from President Mubarak and other Egyp-
tian leaders. According to the US Embassy, the DUP
opposes close ties to Libya, works to limit the Libyan
presence in Sudan, is wary of increased ties to radical
Arab and Muslim states, and wants to establish closer
ties to the United States than does the Umma Party.
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Ethnic and Southern Parties
Only seven of some 14 ethnic and regional parties that
ran in the 1986 election won seats in the Assembly.
The ethnic parties include the Sudan National Party
(SNP), led by Father Philip Abbas Ghabboush, whose
support comes from the Nuban tribesmen of southern
Kurdufan. Another ethnic party-the Beja People's
Congress-won a seat in a constituency populated by
its tribesmen in the Red Sea Hills of northeastern
Sudan. Together with five southern parties, these
parties' 38 delegates in the Constituent Assembly are
united in the African bloc under the leadership of
Father Ghabboush. The US Embassy reports that
these parties-except for the Beja party, which is not
in the government coalition-are important to Sadiq,
who needs their support to project the image of a
national government and to help retain a simple
majority in the Assembly if the DUP should bolt from
the coalition.
Base of Support. The SNP-which includes Chris-
tians and Muslims-has, in our judgment, the re-
sources to create significant problems for the govern-
ment if it went into open opposition. US Embassy
reporting indicates Father Ghabboush-who is under
arrest on corruption charges-is an inveterate coup
plotter and troublemaker. He has refused to accept
the position of Second Deputy Speaker in the Assem-
bly and may decide to join the opposition. Nubans
have in the past instigated civil unrest in Khartoum,
according to the US Embassy.
The Nubans also maintain contact with the southern
rebels. They identify with their southern neighbors,
and, together, Nubans and southerners form the
majority of the enlisted men in the Sudanese armed
forces. The Beja nomads in the Red Sea Hills have
traditionally resisted central government authority,
but we believe they are not numerous in Khartoum
and are less able than the Nubans to cause direct
problems for the Sadiq government.
Academic sources indicate that the moderate south-
ern parties in the coalition government have little real
support in the south, and southerners view most of the
party leaders in the government as corrupt and oppor-
tunistic.' The Sudan African People's Congress
(SAPCO) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP)--
both from Al Istiwa'i (Equatoria)--are the only par-
ties based in the south. The other parties are head-
quartered in Khartoum, including the Nuer-backed
Sudan People's Federal Party (SPFP), the Sudan
African Congress (SAC)-Dinka-backed, with direct
links to the rebels-and the Southern Sudan Political
Association (SSPA). The US Embassy reports the
SSPA is the only party that won in all three regions in
the south and claims to represent only the south in
contrast to the other southern parties, which espouse
national goals.
Platforms. The African bloc parties are disruptive
and unreliable junior members of the coalition. In
July 1986 they walked out of the Assembly for three
months to show their opposition to Sadiq's stand on
Islamic law. Members of the African parties are
suspicious of their northern Muslim coalition partners
and especially distrust Prime Minister Sadiq's efforts
to centralize power. The moderate southern parties
are not large enough or sufficiently active to have an
armed militia that could pose security problems for
Sadiq, but US Embassy reporting suggests the Nu-
bans probably have arms and a small militia.
The common policy link among these parties is that
they want Sudan to have a stronger African identity.
The Sudanese press reports they vehemently oppose
Islamic law and want a secular state but eschew
violence in solving the country's problems. They favor
a federal system of government that would enhance
regional autonomy, want more political power and
revenue sharing, and favor a national conference-to
include the southern insurgents-that would discuss
solutions to the country's problems, especially those
relating to the south.
' The southern insurgency prevented voting in large areas of A'ali
an Nil (Upper Nile) and Bahr al Ghazal as well as some parts of
Equatoria. Only 31 of the 68 southern constituencies had elections
for seats in the Assembly. US Embassy reporting indicates that the
number of registered voters in the south was very small, and the
only violence during the election took place in the south, where
insurgents shot a candidate. Until elections can be held in the 37
uncontested southern constituencies, the Assembly will be unable to
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The two southern parties based in Equatoria oppose
the concept of one southern region revived when the
Transitional Military Council in April 1985 restored
the Addis Ababa accords of 1972.1 The Equatorians
view the return to one southern region as favoring the
large Dinka tribes of A'ali an Nil (Upper Nile) and
Bahr al Ghazal. Last February, after nine months of
haggling among southerners had brought no agree-
ment, Prime Minister Sadiq unilaterally imposed a
southern governmental structure and appointed a six-
man high executive council and three civilian gover-
nors and deputy governors. The southern parties
refused to accept Sadiq's decision. The SAC Minister
of Labor resigned in protest, and the SSPA and
SAPCO have split between those members who hold
government positions and wish to remain in office and
those who hold no post and wish their party represen-
tatives to withdraw from the coalition.
The African parties tend to favor closer ties to the
West and other African countries than does the
Umma Party, according to the US Embassy. Embassy
reporting indicates these parties especially distrust the
Umma Party's apparent close ties to Libya.
The National Islamic Front
The US Embassy reports the National Islamic Front's
(NIF) strong third place in the 1986 election reflects
the growth of the Islamic movement since the 1960s
and its superior leadership, organization, and funding.
In addition to 28 geographic constituencies, the NIF
won 23 of the 28 Assembly seats set aside for
university graduates. A special analysis of election
returns presented by an academic specialist at a US
' The Military Council never actually returned to the provisions of
the Addis Ababa accords that gave southerners their own regional
assembly, which in turn selected a president, a higher executive
council, and governors. The accords also gave southerners the right
to impose their own taxes and created a southern military command
of 12,000 troops, half of whom were to be southerners.
administratively and was not in compliance with the accords when
it appointed three separate military governors and a higher execu-
tive council. Prime Minister Sadiq's appointment of civilian gover-
nors and a new executive council in February 1987 also technically
Government-sponsored conference last October indi-
cated that the NIF gained geographic constituencies
at the expense of the disorganized DUP.
The US Embassy reports that many NIF members of
the Assembly are well educated and hold advanced
degrees from universities in the West, including the
United States. The NIF was the only northern party
to win seats in the south-running well-educated
graduates in constituencies where few southerners
could qualify-and the only party to have women
candidates win seats-two-in the Assembly. West-
ern observers note that the NIF attracted large
numbers of women and youth in the campaign,
reflecting the appeal of the Muslim "progressive"
platform of the party. US Embassy sources stress that
the NIF continues to gain adherents through its social
welfare programs, including provision of favorable
loans by Islamic banks to young military officers and
free housing to young couples for their first year of
marriage.
Base of Support. The NIF is the political arm of the
largest Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood faction, which
has been under the leadership of Dr. Hassan al-
Turabi since 1969. The Brotherhood draws its follow-
ing largely from urban professionals, intellectuals,
students, and small merchants. Academic sources
indicate that it has successfully recruited from youn-
ger members of the Umma and Democratic Unionist
Parties since it emerged from its underground status
in the 1960s.
During the post-1977 reconciliation with the Nimeiri
regime, the Brotherhood used its position in the
government to penetrate universities, labor groups,
the government bureaucracy, and the Army. Nimeiri
arrested Turabi and key members of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the spring of 1985 in the hope of
deflecting criticism of the more negative aspects of his
Islamization program that many Sudanese believed
were instigated by the Brotherhood. After Nimeiri's
overthrow, the interim regime released the Brother-
hood members from prison, and they soon organized
themselves as the National Islamic Front.
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Party Leadership. Turabi failed to win a seat in the
Assembly in April 1986 because the other major
parties joined forces to support the Democratic
Unionist candidate, according to US Embassy report-
ing. But, as head of the NIF, Turabi still has strong
personal influence over the direction of party policy.
Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha leads the NIF delega-
tion in the Assembly. The US Embassy reports that
the NIF has a 25-man politburo that makes important
decisions on a collegial basis, consciously avoiding the
autocratic style of the dynastic leadership of the
Umma and Democratic Unionist Parties
Divisions within the NIF leadership are not well
defined, but there is a small faction of the Muslim
Brotherhood under the leadership of Sadiq Abdallah
Abd al-Majid. This faction broke away in protest
against Turabi's reconciliation with Nimeiri after
1977. It continues to call itself the Muslim Brother-
hood, but we believe its inability to win any seats in
the Assembly indicates that it poses no major threat
to Turabi and the NIF.
The NIF claims to be a "loyal opposition," but we
believe it poses a serious threat to the stability of the
coalition government. It has the strength to split the
coalition vote in the Assembly or to entice conserva-
tive factions of the DUP or the Umma from the
coalition if the Sadiq government makes compromises
on such controversial issues as Islamic law. In addi-
tion, the NIF has the capabilities within professional
and student groups to organize mass demonstrations
and instigate civil unrest. The two weeks of sporadic
antiregime demonstrations led by NIF students in
Khartoum in the fall of 1986 resulted in violence and,
in our opinion, are a harbinger of unrest. The students
protested against the government's economic policy,
constitutional amendments, delay in convening the
constitutional conference, and the "freeze" on Islamic
laws. Even more important, we believe the NIF's
influence in the military could be used to inspire a
coup in the event of serious domestic deterioration.
Embassy sources report that, like the Umma and the
DUP, the NIF is building an armed militia.
The US Embassy reports that initially the NIF
wanted to enter the coalition, but the Umma and the
DUP believed its presence would endanger foreign aid
and resolution of the southern problem. Embassy
reporting indicates that since the beginning of 1987
the NIF has rejected several offers from Sadiq to
enter the coalition and has used the party's newspa-
per, A1-Riyah, to stress the indecisiveness of the Sadiq
government. Rivalry and antagonism between Turabi
and his brother-in-law Prime Minister Sadiq add a
personal dimension to the NIF's role in the opposition.
Party Platform. The NIF represents the extreme
religious right in Sudan, and its adherents strongly
oppose the domination of civilian politics by the
leaders of the traditional sects-the Ansar (Umma)
and Khatmiyyah (DUP). In Al-Riyah the party calls
for an Islamic state that respects the rights of non-
Muslims as protected minorities within the traditional
context of Islamic law. Academic sources note that
the NIF views Islam as the key to rehabilitating
Sudan politically, economically, and socially. The
party officially rejects violence as a means to imple-
ment an Islamic state, although it probably would be
willing to come to power through a military coup. The
NIF is antagonistic toward the Communist Party, and
outbreaks of violence between the NIF and leftist
students have been fairly common on university cam-
puses.
The NIF's stance on resolution of the southern prob-
lem differs little from that of the Umma Party, but it
takes a hard line to win support in the Army. For
example, press reports indicate that Turabi has been
in contact with rebel leaders in London, and he says
that he accepts the idea of regional autonomy in
which each region would define its own legal code.
Last January the NIF published a charter stressing
the party's commitment to Islamic law but reiterating
its traditional stand on the rights of non-Muslims and
stressing the need for regional autonomy and power
sharing. The charter demands a cease-fire as a pre-
condition for the attendance of the southern rebels at
a future constitutional conference. Southern politi-
cians are suspicious of the NIF charter, and the
southern rebels have not responded.
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The NIF is highly supportive of the private sector.
The party favors an Islamic economy, of which
interest-free banking represents a major facet. Schol-
ars note the NIF views itself as progressive and
supports women in the workplace, stating that wear-
ing traditional garb, including the veil, allows women
to compete more effectively in the labor force by
protecting them from unwanted male sexual
advances.
In foreign policy, US Embassy reporting indicates
that Turabi and NIF leaders maintain positions that
closely resemble those of the DUP. Despite their
support for nonalignment, party leaders want good
ties to the West as a means to limit leftist influence in
Sudan. Turabi favors strong ties to both Saudi Arabia
and Egypt.
Turabi backs the Libyan rap-
prochement but wants to limit Libyan influence in
Sudan. NIF members have denied rumors of Turabi's
close ties to the Iranian leadership, but the US
Embassy notes the NIF admires the Iranian model of
a nonaligned Islamic state,
The Communist Party
The poor showing of the Sudan Communist Party
(SCP) in the 1986 election reflects its continuing
decline since the 1960s, when it was the largest and
best organized Communist party in Africa. Academic
sources note that the party has never recovered from a
1970 split, when the more moderate wing allied itself
with Nimeiri, or from purges after the abortive
Party Leadership. The organization of the SCP is
similar to that of other Communist parties, consisting
of a politburo, a secretariat, and a central committee,
according to academic sources. Since 1977 Muham-
mad Ibrahim Nuqud has headed the Communist
Party, and the more militant Ali Tijani al-Tayyib-
spokesman and chief editor of the party newspaper-
is regarded as a potential rival. US Embassy sources
report that the SCP is divided between the pragma-
tists led by Nuqud and the ideologues who identify
with Tijani.
the SCP leadership has postponed its national confer-
ence for fear that differences over policy and Nuqud's
opportunistic and nonideological style of leadership
would heighten already serious splits.
Party Platform. We believe that the SCP poses no
immediate threat to the Sadiq government in the
Constituent Assembly and only a moderate covert
threat over the next two years. Nuqud's open criticism
of Prime Minister Sadiq has been mild
indicate the Communists probably have a
parallel covert strategy to enhance their underground
Reporting by the US Embassy
Communist-led coup in 1971.
Base of Support. US Embassy and academic sources
report that the Communists have no significant popu-
lar base and draw support mainly from trade unionists
and intellectuals in the major northern cities. The
same sources suggest that the Communists were
surprised by Nimeiri's overthrow and unprepared to
function in a free environment after years of operating
Despite the Marxist rhetoric, the SCP leadership
occasionally takes an independent line in its newspa-
per, Al-Maydan, and is strongly nationalistic
underground.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2 Al
25X1
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One scholar notes that many Sudanese consider the
SCP to be almost a traditional party, despite its
espousal of a secular state, because it does not oppose
working with the sectarian parties. US Embassy
sources report the SCP recognizes the cultural and
historical importance of Islam in Sudan and is willing
to coexist with it. The SCP's public stand on the
southern rebels is similar to the Umma Party's official
line, but the party opposes a military solution. In
economic policy, the US Embassy reports the party
agrees with the Umma's definition of the problems
but is much more supportive of subsidies, opposes
privatization, and condemns austerity programs man-
dated by the International Monetary Fund.
Al-Maydan frequently criticizes the US presence in
Sudan, maintaining that steps should be taken to
prevent US interference in Sudan's internal affairs.
The party's stand toward Egypt is similar to the
Umma Party's wariness, and it favors rapprochement
with Marxist Ethiopia as part of the solution to the
southern insurgency. Even though the SCP nominally
supports the Libyan rapprochement, the US Embassy
reports it has openly criticized the Libyan presence as
posing security problems and opposes Qadhafi's ef-
forts to establish a union between the two countries.
The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
The SPLM is the political arm of the major southern
insurgent group, the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA). The SPLM opposed the April 1986
election, and its insurgent activities prevented voting
in more than half the constituencies in the south. It
radiobroadcasts.
does not recognize the legitimacy of the Sadiq govern-
ment, calling it the "government of the day" in its
Since Nimeiri's overthrow, dialogue has taken place
between the rebels and Sudanese politicians and
officials, but no progress toward negotiations has
resulted. In July 1986, Prime Minister Sadiq's talks in
Addis Ababa with the movement's political and mili-
tary leader John Garang proved inconclusive. The US
Embassy reported that Garang agreed to talks with
Sadiq only in the latter's capacity as head of the
Umma Party, not as Prime Minister.
Backed by Ethiopia and, until Nimeiri's overthrow,
Libya, Garang formed the SPLA in 1983 in opposi-
tion to Nimeiri's policies toward the south. The
southern rebellion-a resumption of the north-south
civil war that raged from 1955 to 1972-has its roots
in the fundamental divisions between the northern
Arab Muslim majority who dominate the central
government and the mostly animist and Christian
south. Garang and most other rebel leaders are
mainly from the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal
regions, although in the recent past Equatorian tribes-
men have also joined. One scholar describes the rebel
leaders as mainly Dinka tribesmen who are young,
idealistic, Christian, and well educated by Sudanese
standards.
victory on the battlefield.
The rebel movement suffers from the personal rival-
ries and tribal and ideological differences that have
reduced the cohesion of earlier southern dissident
movements. A well-placed source of the US Embassy
says that the movement has several factions and is
divided between those who seek a peaceful solution
and an uncompromising military wing that seeks
The insurgency poses a major challenge to the surviv-
al of the coalition government. Garang's refusal to
negotiate, in our opinion, reflects his deep personal
distrust of Sadiq, a belief that the SPLA can instigate
a military takeover, and probable preference for
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SPLA leader Col. John Garang is a charismatic and
effective leader. Since his defection from the Suda-
nese Army in mid-1983, he has molded mutinous
southern military troops and additional recruits into
an effective insurgent force. In his speeches and
writings he has consistently stressed national goals
and advocated the creation of a federal system with
extensive regional autonomy as the solution to rule
by a "minority Arab clique" that he claims is largely
responsible for Sudan's massive economic and politi-
toum to address his demands.
Garang is extremely suspicious of Khartoum's Arab
Muslim political establishment in general and of
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in particular. His
envoys have repeatedly told US officials that the
worst fighting in the 1955-72 civil war and the
assassination of a southern rebel negotiator in Khar-
toum occurred during Sadiq'sfirst term as Prime
Minister (1966-67). Garang s suspicions may be so
great that he would reject genuine efforts by Khar-
Garang, 41, has received both military and academic
training in the United States. He attended the Infan-
try Officers' Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Geor-
gia (1974) and earned a Ph.D. in economics from
Iowa State University (1981). These studies provided
him with important knowledge for leading his insur-
gent movement. In the military course he learned
about guerrilla warfare tactics, and he gained exten-
sive knowledge about the south while conducting field
research for his dissertation on southern Sudanese
development strategies.
cal problems.
negotiating with Army officers who now are less
identified with former President Nimeiri. Since 1983
the rebels, in our judgment, have become an effective
fighting force, controlling most of the southern coun-
tryside and cutting off transportation links to key
Army garrisons in the area. We believe that fighting
the insurgents strains the Army's unity and loyalty to
the Sadiq government, increasing the prospect of a
coup. The rebels set back economic recovery by
preventing Khartoum from resuming work on vital oil
and water projects in the south and forcing it to
assume, an added
financial burden of about $500,000 a day to support
military operations.
Garang and other leaders hope to make the SPLM
the basis for a national party. SPLM leaders want
greater political and economic power sharing between
Khartoum and the south as well as other regions.
They have consistently demanded that Khartoum
meet several conditions before they attend a constitu-
tional conference that might facilitate negotiations.
The Kokka Dam agreement signed by the SPLA and
representatives of the National Alliance in March
1986 set forth preconditions for talks, including the
repeal of Nimeiri's Islamic laws and all other laws
restricting freedom, abrogation of military pacts with
other countries that impinge on Sudanese sovereignty,
and public commitment by the Sadiq government that
The SPLM claims to seek a secular, unified, federal,
democratic, and socialist Sudan. We believe that
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im government that will hold new elections.
1986 when they attempted to rally anti-US sentiment
over US actions against Libya, according to the
Embassy. Tripoli trained the SRCs as a subversive
force against the Nimeiri regime, and they returned
The Bath Party
The Bath-the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party-is
a Pan-Arab revolutionary movement that has little or
no popular following in Sudan and won no seats to the
Assembly during the April 1986 election. Neverthe-
less, scholars note that the Ba'th's Pan-Arab socialism
appeals to some young Sudanese military officers.
The Ba'thists are split between a larger Iraqi-backed
wing headed by Badr al-Din Mudathir and a Syrian-
backed wing. Each wing depends on its respective
country patron for funding, and each has its own
newspaper.
Like the SCP, the Bath Party views the Sadiq
government and the current democracy as conducive
to the party's growth. The Iraqi-backed Ba'thists
worked with the traditional Muslim parties in exile in
the 1970s, especially with the more secular, radical
factions of the DUP. US Embassy reporting indicates
that Ba'thist officers planned more than one coup
attempt during the transitional government that fol-
lowed Nimeiri's overthrow and present a disruptive
element should they decide to oppose the Sadiq
government. US Embassy reporting suggests that the
Ba'thists may have a small armed militia.
Ba'thists hold many of the same domestic policy
positions as the SCP. They favor a secular state and
oppose privatization and austerity measures mandated
by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. Their foreign policy stance is strongly influ-
enced by their affiliation to their country patrons. The
Syrian wing tends to be more critical of US and
Western influence in Sudan, and the Iraqi wing has
opposed Libyan influence in Sudan.
The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees
The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees (SRC),
which most Sudanese view as Libyan surrogates, did
not run in the April 1986 election and have publicly
stated they will not participate in the political process,
according to the US Embassy. The SRCs have little
popular following in Sudan despite extensive Libyan
economic and organizational support. For example,
the committees were only marginally successful in
to Sudan only after Nimeiri's ouster.
US Embassy reporting indicates the SRCs pose no
immediate threat to the Sadiq government, but they
could undermine political stability by providing an
armed pool of terrorists and subversives for Libya.
Abdallah Zakariyyah, who spent some 10 years in
exile in Tripoli, heads one of several SRC factions.
The four or so factions disagree on leadership and
whether they should be a revolutionary movement.
Zakariyyah tries to project a positive image by claim-
ing he rejects violence and that the committees are
not an extension of the Libyan system of government.
Nevertheless, the SRCs want to adapt Libyan leader
Qadhafi's system of government to the Sudanese
situation and strongly favor unity with Libya.
Out of power for 17 years, Sudan's party leaders have
created a domestic political scene reminiscent of the
mid-1960s when interparty and intraparty rivalries
and haggling over political spoils took precedence over
national concerns. The performance of the Constitu-
ent Assembly has further discredited civilian leaders.
The Assembly has passed no key legislation, it had
four major adjournments in the first year, and it has
failed to convene at least five times for lack of a
quorum because of walkouts by different parties or
absenteeism of Assembly members.
Prime Minister Sadiq's legitimacy as the key figure in
the government is generally accepted, but, in our
opinion, he cannot take decisive action on major issues
for fear of alienating one group or another. He told
the Arab press in an interview two years ago that
Sudan needed a "guided democracy" for the country
to be governable. His ability to make bold decisions is
hampered by the fact that the Umma Party did not-
and probably could never-win a majority in elections
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and clearly does not have a national constituency.
Sadiq's dependence on the Democratic Unionists and
southern coalition partners-both suffering from in-
ternal divisions-has prevented quick action on issues
such as the creation of a new state security service or
the new governmental structure for the south. F_
Formal opposition activities by most northern parties
and other groups against the Sadiq government have
been tempered by the fear of triggering a military
takeover. For example, both the Communist and
Bath Parties continue to cooperate with the civilian
government, hoping to gain time to build strength
among labor groups, students, and the Army. Prime
Minister Sadiq's apparent willingness to tolerate their
political activities probably makes his government the
best option available to the left. The leftist parties, in
our view, seem unwilling to precipitate unrest, believ-
ing that they are not sufficiently strong in the military
to prevent a coup led by conservative or Islamic
fundamentalist officers who would be hostile to the
left.
In contrast, the National Islamic Front on the reli-
gious right has been an unrelenting critic of Prime
Minister Sadiq and his government. NIF leader Tur-
abi has refused Sadiq's offers to enter the govern-
ment, instead using his opposition status to attack the
government's indecision. US Embassy reporting sug-
gests that Turabi is increasingly successful in offering
his party as an alternative to the sectarian-based
Umma and Democratic Unionists. The Sadiq govern-
ment contained the NIF-inspired demonstration over
economic grievances last fall, but this protest served
to intimidate Sadiq by underscoring the NIF's ability
to mobilize students and other groups. US Embassy
reporting indicates that Turabi openly admits that he
has good support in the Army.
The weak performance of the Umma-DUP coalition
suggests that the prospects for stable multiparty
democratic government in Sudan are poor. Academic
sources note that Prime Minister Sadiq and other
party leaders genuinely view democratic government
as the country's salvation but seem not to have
learned from the failure of earlier civilian coalition
governments. Problems with the economy and the
insurgency are awesome in scope. The government's
lack of cohesion and discipline, often the result of
party factionalism and petty personal squabbles, com-
pound efforts to find solutions. Even the passage of
constitutional amendments that would increase Prime
Minister Sadiq's powers is unlikely to alter signifi-
cantly the governmental paralysis in Khartoum
If, as we expect, the coalition government fails to
develop effective leadership, civil unrest in Khartoum
or a further deterioration in the security situation in
the south would set the stage for the coalition govern-
ment's fall over the next year or so. Prolonged civil
unrest over food and energy shortages or price in-
creases-as well as clashes between the large number
of southern refugees and northern Muslim party
militias-are real possibilities in the capital. A major
rebel offensive that took a key southern city or that
killed a considerable number of military personnel
probably would erode even the institutional support
the Army now has for the coalition government.
We believe more senior military officers-mainly
Khatmiyyah, conservative, pro-Egyptian, and pro-
Western-will not long tolerate a discredited coalition
government or a successor if it falters in the next two
years, fearing that their inaction would erode central
authority to a dangerous point, further divide the
Army, and risk a coup by younger, more radical
officers. In response to a military takeover, the politi-
cal parties could mount a strong, possibly bloody
resistance with their armed militias, and Army lead-
ers probably would be forced to suppress at least some
of the parties and detain some civilian political lead-
ers. Military leaders, hoping to defuse hostilities, may
also decide to form a coalition government with one or
more of the parties, most likely the NIF or the
sectarian faction of the DUP, both of which have
adherents and sympathizers in the officer corps.
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Appendix A
Comparative Analysis of the
1953 and 1986 Election Returns
in Northern Sudan S
The relative strengths of the political groupings in
northern Sudan have changed significantly in recent
years. A comparison between the results of the 1953
and 1986 elections helps to illustrate this point. These
two elections offer the most valid comparison because
of significant similarities in the structure of the
available results and in the organization of the com-
peting parties.
In both the 1953 and 1986 elections, factions of the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) were joined in a
single party (in contrast to the elections of 1958 and
1965). The provincial-regional units for the available
statistics are also similar. In each case there are six
regional units with roughly the same boundaries
(Khartoum, Ash Shamali [Northern], Kurdufan, and
Darfur regions are roughly the same in both), while in
1953 Kassala is similar to the Ash Sharqi (Eastern)
region of 1986 and Blue Nile in 1953 is comparable to
the Al Awsat (Central) region of 1986. Specific details
may vary, but general comparisons can be made.
The first and most obvious observation is that the
position of the mainline parties has changed signifi-
cantly. In 1953 the National Unionist Party (NUP)-
predecessor of the DUP-and the Umma Party clear-
ly dominated the field. All other parties were minor in
their impact, with the largest "third party" reflecting
the strength of a few particular tribal leaders and not
a major national sentiment. Ideological parties, either
Islamic or leftist, attracted some support among
educated Sudanese but made no impact in the territo-
rial constituencies. The strongest of the ideological
parties was the Communist Party, which looked like it
might, in the long run, be the only effective challenge
to the political dominance of the sectarian, mainline
parties.
Figure 4
Vote by Party as a Proportion of Total
Votes in North, 1953 and 1986-
National
Unionist
Party (NUP)
Democratic
Unionist
Party (DUP)
30.7
Umma
Party
43.8
Umma
Party
39.2
a The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics
provided in Sudan News and Features, I September 1954. The
figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results
provided by the Sudan News Agency, 25 May 1986.
b For 1953, the others are primarily independents, tribal leaders,
and the Socialist Republican Party which gained about 8 percent
of the total vote in the northern provinces, especially in Eastern
(Kassala), Central (Blue Nile), and Darfur. For 1986, the other par-
ties are primarily independents and small regionally important
parties. The major ones are the Sudan Communist Party in Khar-
toum and the Sudan National Party in Khartoum and Kordofan.
' This analysis was prepared as part of a contract study presented at
a US Government-sponsored seminar on Sudan held in October
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Figure 5
Vote by Party for Regions in North, 1953 and 19868
National Unionist Party/Democratic Unionist Party (NUP/DUP)
National Islamic Front (NIF)
_ Otherb
Percent
1953
1986
1953
1986
1953
1986
1953
1986
a The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics
provided in Sudan News and Features, 1 September 1954. The
figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results
provided by the Sudan News Agency, 25 May 1986.
b For 1953, the others are primarily independents, tribal leaders,
and the Socialist Republican Party which gained about 8 percent
of the total vote in the northern provinces, especially in Eastern
(Kassala), Central (Blue Nile), and Darfur. For 1986, the other par-
ties are primarily independents and small regionally important
parties. The major ones are the Sudan Communist Party in Khar-
toum and the Sudan National Party in Khartoum and Kurdufan.
1953
1986
1953
1986
The picture painted by the results of the 1986 election to 1953, the challenge was not coming from the left,
is dramatically different. Although the mainline sec- which received little support outside Khartoum, but
tarian parties together received almost 90 percent of from the NIF on the extreme Islamic right.
the vote in 1953, they received only 70 percent of the
vote in 1986. In 1986 there was a clear third-party The general position of the two parties in terms of the
option, the Muslim Brotherhood-led National Islamic proportion of the votes shows a dramatic decline. The
Front (NIF), which gained almost 20 percent of the two parties divided the northern provinces in 1953,
vote, with support throughout the north. Although the
mainline parties were still clearly dominant, they
seem to be facing a significant challenge. In contrast
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Figure 6
Vote as a Percentage of Total Votes for Parties by Region, 1953 and 1986-
National Unionist Party/ Democratic Unionist Party (NUP/DUP)
Umma Party
National Islamic Front (NIF)
1953
1986
Ash Shamali
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
OV~
Ash Sharqi Al Awsat
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
1953
1986
1953
1986
`Li
1953
1986
1953
1986
Darfur
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
go"
a The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics
provided in Sudan News and Features, 1 September 1954. The
figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results
provided by the Sudan News Agency, 25 May 1986.
1953
1986
with one party clearly dominant in each province. The
NUP received 68 percent of the votes in Khartoum,
65 percent in Northern Province, and 53 percent in
Kassala Province, while the Umma dominated in
Kurdufan (53 percent) and Darfur (55 percent). Blue
Nile was more evenly divided because of a strong
showing by the Socialist Republican Party and by
independent candidates. In 1986 there was only one
region that was clearly dominated by a single party.
The Umma Party received 62 percent of the votes in
Darfur. Meanwhile, the NIF received more votes than
the Umma Party in the Khartoum and Northern
regions.
A comparison of party performance in the two elec-
tions shows remarkably little change in the Unionists'
position. Khartoum, for example, provided 14 percent
of the total national vote for the NUP in 1953 and 17
percent of the total vote for the DUP in 1986. In both
years about 60 percent of the votes for the party came
from the Northern, Eastern/Kassala, and Central/
Blue Nile regions. Thus, one might say that the
general profile of the Unionist alliance remains basi-
cally the same, although the party received a smaller
share of the overall vote in 1986 than in 1953.
Nevertheless, the Unionist profile shows a gradually
declining party.
The picture for the Umma Party is similar. The three
major regions for the Umma Party-Central/Blue
Nile, Kurdufan, and Darfur-provided roughly 80
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percent of the total party vote in both elections. There
was a significant shift in 1986, however, in that the
regions of Kurdufan and Darfur account for a larger
part of the vote, and Darfur emerges as the location of
a quarter of the total Umma Party vote. This might
suggest a growing ruralization and "westernization"
of the party. One long-run implication of this shift for
the Umma Party leadership may be increasing diffi-
culties in appearing secularist or in modernizing the
party.
A comparison of the two elections also provides some
indications about the nature of the support for the
NIF. In 1953 only small electoral support for the
Brotherhood-supported group came from the graduate
constituencies. This became overwhelming support for
the NIF in 1986, with the Brotherhood sweeping the
graduate constituencies. In the territorial constituen-
cies the NIF gained slightly more than half of its total
vote in Khartoum and the Northern and Eastern
regions, the old areas of Unionist dominance. It
appears to have advanced directly at the expense of
the Unionists in those areas. In Kurdufan and Darfur,
areas of Umma dominance, the NIF received a
significant portion of the votes, but it was the Union-
ists and not the Umma position that was affected. The
NIF, therefore, appears to be the rising successor to
the old NUP alliance as the second major political
party in Sudan.
If this is the case, it has significant implications for
the Unionist leadership. Clearly, the old mainline
parties cannot appear to be slack in their support for
Islam. Umma and Unionist competition with the NIF
for popular support is likely to become more evident
and probably will lead these mainline parties to
become more strident in the advocacy of Islamic
fundamentalist positions.
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One of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's closest associates for 20 years, Umar Nur
al-Da'im has been secretary general of the Umma Party since 1985 and Minister
of Agriculture since May 1986. For many years Nur al-Da'im has served as
Sadiq's trusted emissary, spokesman, and troubleshooter.
An Embassy source
has described Nur al-Da'im as an implementor rather than a formulator of Sadiq's
ideas and policies
for many years organizing Sadiq's opposition to the regime. He is about 57.
Nur al-Da'im holds a Ph.D. in agricultural engineering from Goettingen Universi-
ty in West Germany. After several years as chief agricultural engineer at a
government-run agricultural project, he was elected to the Constituent Assembly
in 1965. During Sadiq's first term as Prime Minister, Nur al-Da'im served as
Agriculture Minister in late 1966. When the Umma split into two factions in 1967,
Nur al-Da'im remained loyal to Sadiq and became deputy leader of Sadiq's
backers in the Assembly. After the military seized power in 1969, he was in exile
Muhammad al-Mirghani has been the leader of the Khatmiyyah sect (Sudan's
second-largest Muslim sect) and "patron" (head) of the Democratic Unionist Party
for nearly 20 years. He is the older brother of Ahmad al-Mirghani, chairman of
the State Council, through whom he has direct imput into the government. Many
Sudanese, both in and out of the party, have criticized Mirghani's leadership and
blame him for the DUP's poor showing in the April 1986 election. He maintains
firm control over the party's financial resources and policymaking, but he failed to
develop effective ties to the party's rank and file. Secular elements within the party
have expressed a desire to see the traditionalist Mirghani withdraw from active
involvement in the party and to serve only as spiritual leader of the Khatmiyyah.
about 51.
Mirghani holds a degree in economics from the University of Khartoum. Unlike
many other political leaders from the 1964-69 parliamentary period, he neither
participated in nor openly opposed the regime of Gaafar Nimeiri. Mirghani is
Appendix B
Key Party Leaders
19 Umar Nur al-Da'im
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brother, who does not wish to hold a government position.
A prominent figure in the Democratic Unionist Party and the younger brother of
DUP "patron" Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, Ahmad al-Mirghani has been
chairman of the five-member State Council, Sudan's collective head of state, since
May 1986. He is widely regarded as a weak political figure and exerts little
influence within the government. On several occasions Prime Minister Sadiq
al-Mahdi has failed to inform Mirghani of important policy decisions. Sudanese
political observers regard him as a frontman in the government for his elder
business and served as chairman of the Sudanese Islamic Bank. He is 46.
Mirghani studied economics at the London School of Economics and Political
Science. During the late 1960s he held several high-level positions in the DUP. In
the late 1970s he accepted then President Gaafar Nimeiri's reconciliation offer to
political opponents and served on the politburo of Nimeiri's political party for two
years. Before assuming his current position, Mirghani was engaged in private
succeed Hindi as Foreign Minister.
Secretary general of the Democratic Unionist Party since 1985, Al-Sharif al-Hindi
served as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Sadiq's first Cabinet.
Widely criticized for his performance and wishing to devote more.
time to personal affairs, Hindi rejected offers to retain his government positions in
Sadiq's second Cabinet. Although he has expressed support for some Unionist
politicians opposed to the Mirghanis' leadership of the DUP, the Mirghanis have
worked to have Hindi continue as DUP secretary general to reduce the prospect
that he will join the NUP. Hindi's continued influence over government matters
was evidenced when he prevented Sadiq from appointing an official he favored to
55.
A member of the Constituent Assembly during 1967-69, Hindi was jailed for
opposition activity after the military seized power in 1969. Freed in the early
1970s, he went into exile and joined the foreign-based opposition. In 1982 he
succeeded his deceased elder brother, Husayn Sharif al-Hindi, as leader of the
opposition National Unionist Party. (One of the two parties that joined in the mid-
1960s to form the DUP, the NUP resumed its activities in the 1970s as an
opposition party.) After the April 1985 coup that ousted President Gaafar Nimeiri,
Hindi returned to Sudan and became secretary general of the DUP. He is about
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Hassan al-Turabi has served as head of the main faction of Sudan's Muslim
Brotherhood-renamed the National Islamic Front in 1985-since 1969. He
promotes Islam as the key to uniting Sudan's diverse groups. Regarding the issue
of the non-Islamic south, Turabi says he supports political federalism that would
protect the interests of southerners. Turabi's personality and political views elicit
extremely passionate feelings from both supporters and opponents. A charismatic
figure and effective advocate of his views, he commands enthusiastic responses
from supporters while instilling fear and hostility in his opponents. In the April
1986 election he was defeated in his bid for a seat after six parties withdrew their
candidates for the seat and backed a single candidate. Nevertheless, he has a voice
in the Assembly through his tight control over the NIF's 51 parliamentarians.
Turabi, 54, holds a master of laws degree from the University of London and a
doctorate of laws from the University of Paris. He has served in government as At-
torney General (1979-83) and adviser to the President for foreign affairs (1983-85).
Although Turabi is a brother-in-law of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, personal
and political differences have severely strained relations between the two men.
Ali Taha is a member of National Islamic Front politburo and a longtime
associate of NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi. With Turabi's failure to win a seat in
the Constituent Assembly, Taha was selected to head the NIF's parliamentary
delegation. In this position he serves as leader of the largest opposition bloc in the
government.
served as head of the Assembly during 1984-85.
Taha began his political career as president of the Muslim Brotherhood-dominat-
ed Khartoum Students' Union during 1969-70. He later served as a judge and rose
to the Brotherhood's leadership. In 1977, when the Brotherhood reconciled with
then President Gaafar Nimeiri, he became a member of the People's Assembly.
With the Brotherhood's increased prominence in Nimeiri's government, Taha
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July he was released without a trial.
Father Philip Ghabboush, a perennial figure in Sudanese politics with a history of
involvement in coup plotting, is the leader and founder (1985) of the Sudan
National Party (SNP). An ordained Anglican priest who draws most of his support
from his fellow Nuba tribesmen, Ghabboush is a spokesman for Sudan's "have
nots." A charismatic leader and articulate advocate of his views, Ghabboush
favors a socialist economic system, a secular constitution, and a decentralized
political system. In addition to his base of eight SNP deputies in the Constituent
Assembly, he has won the support of 30 southern deputies from various parties to
form the fourth-largest bloc (African Group) of delegates in the Assembly.
Ghabboush has twice led a walkout of this bloc, including a July-October 1986
boycott of Assembly sessions, to protest the division of political spoils and demand
the repeal of Islamic laws. In April 1987 he was jailed on corruption charges. In
implicated in at least three coup plots since 1969. He is 63.
A hereditary leader of his tribe, Ghabboush devoted his early life to service in the
Anglican Church. In 1965 he was elected to the Constituent Assembly on a
platform advocating regional autonomy for non-Arabs. Ghabboush has been
Muhammad Nuqud has served as secretary general of the Sudan Communist
Party (SCP) since 1971. He was one of three SCP members to win Constituent As-
sembl seats in the A ril 1986 election.
Nuqud has said that the SCP is a minor party that must
sic alliances with stronger political parties to survive and influence Sudanese
society. Since the current government was formed, Nuqud has supported many of
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's policies as a way of opposing the SCP's
archenemy, the NIF. He, however, has been unable to unite the party behind him.
The party's newspaper has contradicted Nuqud's views on several occasions.
exile in Eastern Europe during most of 1971-85. He is about 57.
Nuqud, a lawyer by training, has worked full-time in the SCP since its founding in
1956. He served in the Constituent Assembly during 1965-68. One of the few
leaders of the SCP to escape the roundup and execution of Communists following
their failed coup in 1971, Nuqud became secretary general by default. He was in
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Appendix C
Selected Data on Members of the
Cabinet and State Council
Party
Position(s)
Sadiq Siddiq
al-Mahdi
Umma
Prime Minister; Minister of
Defense; President, Umma
Party
Umar Nur al-
Da'im
Umma
Minister of Agriculture;
Secretary General, Umma
Party
Bakri Ahmad
Adil
Umma
Minister of Education
Adam Musa
Madibu
Umma
Minister of Energy and
Mining
Mubarak
Abdallah
al-Mahdi
Umma
Minister of Industry; Head,
Umma Party Foreign Affairs
Committee
Salah al-Din Abd
al-Salam al-Khalifa
Umma
Minister of Cabinet Affairs
Comments Date and
Place of Birth
1935
Omdurman
See Appendix B. 1930
Kurdufan
Longtime associate of Sadiq and high- 1934
ranking party official ... tasked with Kurdufan
reducing NIF influence in educational
system ... formerly a business execu-
tive, governor of Kurdufan (1980-81),
and head of drought relief committee
(1985).
Closely associated with Sadiq since 1937
1960s ... works well with US oil Darfur
company officials ... Ph.D. in civil
engineering from Northwestern Uni-
versity ... son of prominent tribal
leader ... former Defense Minister
(1967-68).
Cousin and protege of Sadiq ... 1950
involved in Sadiq's 1976 coup attempt, Khartoum
but new to national politics ... former
businessman who appears committed
to revitalizing private sector ... holds a
degree in business administration.
A trusted, longtime lieutenant of Sadiq 1930
... serves as the Prime Minister's Central
"gatekeeper" ... moderate and pro-
Western ... grandson of Khalifa Ab-
dallahi, top general and later political
successor of the Mahdi (Sadiq's great-
grandfather).
Bashir Umar Umma Minister of Finance and Former academic with little political 1951
Muhammad Planning experience ... intelligent and well Kurdufan
versed in economic theory, but not
fully familiar with the details of the
economy and bureaucracy ... active in
formulating and implementing Um-
ma's southern policy ... Ph.D. in
economics from Manchester Universi-
ty.
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Selected Data on Members of the
Cabinet and State Council (continued)
Party
Position(s)
Abd al-Mahmud
al-Haj Salih
Umma
Attorney General
Muhammad Bashir
Gamma
Umma
Minister of Irrigation
Rashida Ibrahim
Abd al-Karim
Umma
Minister of Social Welfare
Comments Date and Place of
Birth
Umma Party chairman Kusti ... ex- 1942
Communist ... worked in government Central
judiciary (1967-74) and private prac-
tice (1974-86).
Has an engineering background ... NA
deputy governor, then acting governor
of Darfur during early 1980s.
Only woman in Cabinet ... niece of NA
Prime Minster Sadiq's influential wife,
Sarah ... once Sadiq's personal secre-
tary ... headed Cabinet's training
office during Nimeiri regime ... grad-
uated from Khartoum University's
Faculty of Arts.
Hussein Abu Salih DUP Minister of Health Neurosurgeon ... served as Health 1930
Minister in transitional Cabinet (1985- NA
86) ... as head of Khartoum doctors'
trade union, instigated strike that led
to 1985 coup ... studied in Cairo and
at Royal College of Surgeons in Lon-
don.
Muhammad Tawfiq DUP Minister of Foreign Affairs Experienced and respected politi- 1918
Ahmad cian ... Minister of Culture and Infor- Northern
mation during 1986-87 ... secretary of
NUP in mid-1960s ... highly regarded
for experience and honesty ... long-
time contact of US Embassy ...
diploma in administration from Oxford
University.
Muhammad Tahir DUP Minister of Public Works, Member of Beja tribe ... former civil 1940
al-Jaylani Housing, and Public Utilities servant in Ministry of Local Govern- Eastern
ment and district commissioner in
Eastern Province (1979-85).
Sid Ahmad
al-Husayn
DUP Deputy Prime Minister; Minis- A lawyer and politician ... poor 1934
ter of Interior; Deputy Secre- manager and ineffective as Interior Northern
tary General, DUP Minister ... anti-Libyan, but has told
Western diplomat that he fears person-
al harm from Libyans if he curbs their
activities in Sudan ... received higher
education in Egypt.
Mamun Sanada
DUP
Minister of Culture and Infor-
mation
Hassan Muhammad
DUP
Minister of Youth and Sports
Mustafa
Lawyer and DUP politburo member 1932
... Attorney General in 1967 and Northern
later legal adviser to Kuwaiti aid
fund ... Ph.D. in comparative politics
from Oxford University.
Trade union leader and antiregime ac- 1940
tivist during 1970s ... imprisoned four Northern
years in mid-1970s for political activi-
ties ... unsuccessful candidate for
Assembly seat in 1986.
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Selected Data on Members of the
Cabinet and State Council (continued)
Party Position(s) Comments Date and Place of
Birth
Ibrahim Hassan DUP Minister of Trade and Supply Sound understanding of economics and NA
Abd al-Galil favorably inclined toward private
sector ... not assertive ... former dean
of the Faculty of Economics at Khar-
toum University ... Ph.D. in econom-
ics from UCLA.
Aldo Ago Deng SSPA Minister of Transportation and Experienced southern politician ... 1942
Communications former deputy governor of Bahr al Bahr al Ghazal
Ghazal (1983-85) ...0 initially
opposed to division of south, changed
opinion when offered post in new re-
gional government ... Dinka tribes-
man.
Lawrence
Modi Tombe
NA
Equatoria
NA
Upper Nile
1941
Khartoum
All Hasan Taj al-Din Umma Member, State Council Son of former Umma leader in Darfur NA
... given Darfur seat on Council to Darfur
signify party's gratitude for Darfurian
support ... former civil servant and for
last decade employed by Islamic De-
velopment Bank ... Ph.D. in adminis-
trative science from University of Par-
is.
Umma's spokesman and chief repre- Omdurman
sentative on the NASC during transi-
tion period ... involved in Umma
negotiations with SPLA ... director of
radio and televison during 1967-68 ...
during 1970s worked in broadcasting
in Saudi Arabia ... studied journalism
at Boston University.
tary General, SAPCO Regional Assembly (1978-83) ... sup- Equatoria
ported southern division, rewarded
with presidency of Equatoria People's
Council (1983-85) ... advocates a
federal system with local governments
to determine legal system ... poorly
informed on key issues.
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Appendix D
Selected Data on Parties Represented in the
Constituent Assembly, Cabinet, and State Council
Sadiq al-Mahdi, President; 5-6-million-member Ansar sect. Sawt al-Umma (Biweekly)
Umar Nur al-Da'im, Secretary
General
Democratic Unionist Party Muhammad Uthman al-Mirgh- 5-million-member Khatmiyyah Al-Itihadi (Weekly)
(DUP) ani, party patron; Al-Sharif sect.
Zayn al-Abidin al-Hindi, Sec-
retary General
National Islamic Front (NIF) Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, Urban professionals, intellectu- Al-Riyah (Daily)
Secretary General; Ali Uthman als, students, and small Alwan (Biweekly)
Muhammad Taha, head of NIF merchants.
parliamentary delegation
People's Progressive Party Eliaba James Surur, Chairman Equatoria Region.
(PPP)
Sudan National Party (SNP) Philip Abbas Ghabboush, Presi- Nuban tribe based in southern None
dent Kurdufan Region.
Southern Sudan Political Asso- Samuel Aru Bol, President; Only southern party to field None
ciation (SSPA) Peter Gatkouth, Vice President; candidates for the Assembly in
Lawrence Lual Lual, Secretary all three southern regions.
General.
Sudan African People's Con- Morris Lawya Ezekiel, Chair- Equatoria Region.
gress (SAPCO) man; George Longokwa, Depu-
ty Chairman; Pacifico Lado
Loleik, Secretary General
Sudan Communist Party (SCP) Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, Trade unionists and intellectu- Al-Maydan (Daily)
Secretary General; Ali Tijani als in Khartoum and other
al-Tayyib, politburo member northern urban areas.
Sudan African Congress (SAC) Walter Kunijok, President; Upper Nile Region (Dinka None
Mabior Leek Deng, Secretary tribe).
General
Beja People's Congress Taha Ahmad Taha, sole Beja Beja tribe located in Eastern None
deputy in Assembly Region.
Sudan People's Federal Party Joshua Dewal, head Nuer tribe based in Upper Nile None
(SPFP) Region.
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Secret
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