WESTERN SAHARA: SCENARIOS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000600720010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~' ~"?+
Intelligence
Western Sahara: Scenarios
for a Diplomatic Solution
NESA 87-10027
April 1987
Copy 3 4 9
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Intelligence
Western Sahara: Scenarios
for a Diplomatic Solution
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-
Israeli Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 87-10027
April /987
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Western Sahara: Scenarios
for a Diplomatic Solution
Key Judgments The 11-year war in Western Sahara between Morocco and the Algerian-
Inlormation available backed Polisario Front guerrillas shows no sign of ending. Even though
as at 18 nsarch 1987 Morocco has the upper hand militarily, Algeria and the Polisario hold sway
was used in this report.
in the diplomatic arena. The chances of a negotiated political solution
during the next several years are poor. Neither side is willing to make the
necessary compromises. 25X1
Although Morocco and Algeria want to avoid wider conflict, their
competition for preeminence in the Maghreb poses potential dangers for
the United States. The jockeying could lead to instability in Morocco and a
weakening of US ties to Algeria.) 25X1
Only a political solution will bring lasting peace. Rabat and Algiers
recognize that military means will not resolve the dispute, and their views
on a negotiated settlement are slowly converging. Algeria's President
Bendjedid is the key to progress. He eventually will be forced to make
diplomatic concessions because his government will not risk all-out war to
stop King Hassan's successful efforts to consolidate his hold on Western
Sahara. Algiers, however, will require aface-saving formula.
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The most likely diplomatic solution would be based on the concept of
federation, involving Hassan's sovereignty over Western Sahara in return
for a degree of Polisario autonomy. This type of compromise would amount
to a Moroccan trusteeship of Western Sahara, probably under UN
auspices, and would give Algeria a way out of the conflict without
conceding defeat.
Political solutions less likely to bring peace include Moroccan incorporation
of Western Sahara, a territorial partition, or the formation of an indepen-
dent state in the region. 25X1
A settlement of the Western Sahara dispute would only temporarily
stabilize the politics of North Africa. Both Algeria and Morocco will
continue to compete for influence with other regional states. Hassan would
benefit the most from a settlement, but he might be emboldened to renew
Irredentist claims to the Spanish enclaves and possibly even to Mauritania.
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Secret
NESA 87-/0017
April 1987
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Soviet interests in the Western Sahara conflict probably are limited, and a
resolution is unlikely to change Moscow's relations with either Morocco or
Algeria. The Soviets believe they have little hope of weakening Morocco's
strong ties to the United States. Moscow has sanctioned Algiers's transfer
of arms to the Polisario, but it does not want to jeopardize relations with
Rabat by openly supporting the Polisario.
A settlement could enhance the US position in the Maghreb, mainly
because it would strengthen Morocco, Washington's closest friend in the
region. Nevertheless, it could also encourage King Hassan to take steps-
such as unilateral initiatives in the Arab-Israeli peace process-that could
complicate other US interests in the region. The King may press the
United States to provide increased financial and military aid in return for
his willingness to support US strategic interests, but he probably would not
weaken his ties to the United States.
Algeria is likely to view Washington as partly responsible for a Moroccan
success in Western Sahara. Algiers probably would cool relations with
Washington, at least temporarily, in response to perceived greater US-
Moroccan cooperation and possibly develop closer ties to Moscow. Algeria
would also seek to compensate by strengthening ties to Libya, Tunisia, and
Mauritania, the most vulnerable state in the region.
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Moroccan, Algerian, and Polisario Attitudes
1
Past Attempts at a Solution
4
Bilateral Initiatives
4
Third-Party Efforts
5
International Attempts
5
Prospects for a Diplomatic Settlement
6
Morocco
6
Algeria
6
Alternative Political Solutions
8
A Compromise Formula
8
Moroccan Incorporation of Western Sahara
9
Territorial Partition
9
An Independent Western Sahara
9
Wider Implications of a Settlement
11
The Regional Perspective
11
The Enclaves
11
Mauritania
11
Libya
12
Appendix
Chronology of the Western Sahara Dispute 15
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Figure 1
Western Sahara
Canary Islands
(Spain)
Morocco
Norfh
Aflanfic ?cean
Mauritania
Mauri#ania
50 100 Kilometers
F-~,i-4 t ,
50 100 Mile
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Western Sahara: Scenarios
for a Diplomatic Solution
The contest for control of Western Sahara, pitting
Morocco against guerrillas of the Algerian-backed
Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el Hamra and Rio de Oro) is in its second decade.
Neither side appears capable of winning aclear-cut
military victory. Moreover, the combatants have
shown little willingness to end the fighting at the
peace table~~
interests.
The struggle continues to be the main point of friction
between Morocco and Algeria, who both seek Ma-
ghreb leadership. If the existing stalemate drags on
indefinitely, it will contribute to political and econom-
ic instability in both countries as well as risk wider
conflict in North Africa. This assessment will focus on
the political options of the key players, possible
diplomatic solutions, the ramifications for regional
politics, and the implications for US and Soviet
Fighting in Western Sahara has its origins in the
decolonization process. In 1975 Spain began a phased
withdrawal from Spanish Sahara, and in early 1976
Madrid relinquished control over the territory to
Morocco and Mauritania, who divided it between
them. This prompted Algeria and the Polisario-the
only indigenous political movement among the native
population of about 75,000 in the colony-to launch
armed attacks against Morocco and Mauritania.
The conflict has evolved from a dynamic contest-
during which territory changed hands several
times-to a static one involving limited Polisario
military operations against Moroccan forces en-
trenched behind a lengthy earthen wall or berm. The
Polisario and its Algerian patrons held the upper hand
until 1981, when Morocco built its first berm. Since
then, Morocco has seized the initiative and now
controls more than two-thirds of Western Sahara.
Diplomatically, Rabat has not achieved the same
success. Algiers has used its strong position in the 25X1
Nonaligned Movement and generous aid disburse-
ments in Africa to rally international support for the
Polisario. Sixty-five countries, including India, Yugo-
slavia, and Nigeria, recognize the Polisario govern-
ment, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
(SDAR). Algeria's diplomatic muscle has produced
strong endorsements for its position in the United
Nations and led to the withdrawal of Morocco from
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), following
OAU recognition of the SDAR in 1984.
Moroccan, Algerian, and Polisario Attitudes 25X1
The driving force behind Morocco's pursuit of the war
is a national consensus that Western Sahara is an
integral part of the country. Morocco claims Western
Sahara on the grounds that it possessed the territory
before Spanish colonization. In our view, Moroccan
King Hassan has little room to maneuver because
even the opposition parties have taken a strong sup-
portive stand on the issue. He has generally pursued a
hard line and would lose face at home if he were to
make concessions that would threaten Moroccan con-
trol over the territory. According to the US Embassy
in Rabat, most Moroccans believe that Algiers-
despite its espousal of self-determination for the Poli-
sario-covets the territory and that the Polisario is a
creature of the Algerians.0 25X1
We believe Morocco can continue to fight indefinite-
ly, given the low cost of maintaining the berms and its
ample reserves of manpower. According to the US
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Area:
People:
Population:
Religion:
Language:
Capital:
Natural
Major
industries:
Geography:
266,770 square kilometers, comparable in size to Colorado or Great Britain.
Arab and Berber
Estimated at 92,000 (July 1986), including refugees living in Algeria.
Muslim
Hassaniya Arabic and Moroccan Arabic
El Aaiun (also La'younJ
Phosphates, iron ore, .fish
Phosphate mining, fishing, and handicrafts
The Atlantic coastlinefeatures rugged cliffs with sand dunes that extend up to 30
kilometers inland. Most of the interior consists of a rocky plain, and the sand
dunes of neighboring Mauritania and Algeria barely extend into Western Sahara.
RairEfall averages from S to 20 centimeters each year-a total that allows for
seasonal vegetation and abundant game. The country contains only one intermit-
tent river.
The legal status of the territory and the question of sovereignty are unresolved.
'ter Spain abandoned Western Sahara in 1976, Morocco and Mauritania
partitioned it, with Morocco acquiring the northern two-thirds, including the rich
phosphate reserves at Bu Craa. Mauritania, under pressure from the Polisario
guerrillas, abandoned all claims to its part in August 1979. Morocco moved to oc-
cupy the Mauritanian sector shortly thereafter and has since asserted administra-
tive control over most of the territory. The Polisario Front and its Algerian-
backed government-in-exile continue to contest Morocco for control of the
territory.
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he economic burden proba-
bly ranges from $500,000 to $1 million per day. The
number of those killed in combat is about a dozen per
month.
viewed as defensive.
(morale problems among the
troops are increasing, we do not believe that these
problems are serious. The US Embassy in Rabat says
that the war is sustainable for Morocco because it is
dum.
In our view, the issue evokes less emotions for most
Algerians than it does for Moroccans because Algeria
has no claims to Western Sahara. Nevertheless, it is
involved in the conflict for ideological reasons. Algiers
has always insisted on the principle of self-determina-
tion for the inhabitants and views the Polisario quest
for self-determination as a legitimate struggle against
colonialism. The government has declared itself ready
to accept the results of a properly conducted referen-
In addition, national interests have a bearing on25X1
Algeria's position. Because of its common border with
Western Sahara, Algeria sees itself as a party to the
dispute. The government supports the Polisario as
part of its efforts to deny Morocco access to the region
and to drain Moroccan resources.~~ 25X1
The costs of the war so far have been tolerable for
Algeria because of its oil resources and the Polisario's
role as a proxy in the fighting. Although Algerian
troops participated in combat during the early phases
of the war, their current involvement generally is one
of providing logistic and tactical support behind the
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The Polisario is committed to its goal of independence
for Western Sahara despite its setbacks on the battle-
field. Officials of the SDAR have publicly expressed
satisfaction that Polisario access to international fo-
rums, safehaven in southwestern Algeria, and eco-
nomic support from Algiers give them the means to
carry on the struggle indefinitely.
Past Attempts at a Solution
Bilateral Initiatives. Since the beginning of the con-
flict, Algeria and Morocco have had numerous con-
tacts to resolve the fighting in Western Sahara. Many
of these attempts were secret and apparently pro-
duced no written proposals for a settlement. For the
most part, during the early phases of the war Morocco
and Algeria tended to focus on fighting rather than
diplomacy because both believed they could win.
The tide of the war changed when Morocco began
constructing its berms and winning the war militarily
in the early 1980s. Algeria, for its part, began to use
Structure. The Polisario, or the Popular Front,for the
Liberation o.1'Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, was
created by Sahrawi nationalists in 1973. The move-
mentlormed the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
(SDAR) in 1976. Mohammed Abdelaziz is President
o.1'the SDAR and its Council ojMinisters, as well as
Secretary General of the nine-man Executive Com-
mittee o./'the Polisario, which is the primary govern-
ing body of the organization.
Ideology. Polisario leaders espouse non-Marxist
Arab socialism and Sahrawi nationalism.
Numbers. The Polisario claims that as many as
165,000 supporters live in its,Jour rerugee camps in
the vicinity of Tindoul. Algeria. Morocco, however,
contends that the number is as low as 15,000.
the number is between 17,000 and 35,000-a
and 500 trucks.
range we endorse.
Polisario troops number about 3,500 and have an
arsenal including 100 tanks, 150 armored vehicles,
40 howitzers and mortars, SA-6 air defense missiles,
Foreign Support. Algeria provides the bulk of the
Polisario's economic and military support. Cuba
provides a small number of medical doctors and
military advisers,
diplomacy more aggressively in response to Morocco's
military moves, particularly pushing its position in the
OAU. These two developments, in our view, encour-
aged Hassan and Bendjedid to hold their first summit
meeting in early 1983. Hassan, for his part, probably
believed at the time that he would be negotiating from
a position of strength. Bendjedid probably believed he
had little to gain in continuing the war but would face
severe criticism at home and among foreign support-
ers if he abandoned the fight. Bendjedid may also
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meeting Hassan.
have believed that the Polisario's success in gaining
international recognition strengthened his hand in
Even though the summit meeting helped ease bilateral
tensions-a resumption of air links and reduction of
restrictions on cross-border traffic-it did not settle
the Western Sahara issue. The inability of both
governments to move forward has encouraged them to
seek help from third parties and international organi-
zations to settle the dispute.
about the intent of the mediating states.
part, because of Algerian and Moroccan suspicions
Third-Party F~`orts. Since the war began, several
countries-the most prominent of which are France,
Spain, and Saudi Arabia-have attempted to mediate
between Morocco and Algeria. These efforts primari-
ly have been to ease tensions and foster dialogue
rather than to present explicit plans. In our view,
third-party reconciliation attempts have foundered, in
Saudi Arabia, long a proponent of Arab unity, has at
various times sought to reconcile Algeria and Moroc-
co. King Fahd tried in 1981 to bring Hassan and
Bendjedid together, and, according to the US Embas-
sy in Riyadh, the Saudis take credit for the successful
meeting between the two leaders in 1983. King Fahd
in March visited both countries to lay the groundwork
for another Bendjedid-Hassan summit meeting.
resolving the dispute.
French efforts have stumbled because of Algiers's
belief that Paris favors Morocco in the struggle. This
belief stems from French fighting on the side of
Mauritania against the Polisario during the 1970s, as
well as lingering animosities toward France as a result
of the Algerian independence struggle. In 1978 Paris
offered a plan for territorial partition, and in 1981,
1983, and 1985 it offered to playa "friendly role" in
Although Madrid wanted to wash its hands of West-
ern Sahara after abandoning the colony in 1976, it
has occasionally made itself available as a mediator,
particularly with regard to assisting a referendum.
Spain has population records that would be useful in
preparing a vote among the inhabitants of Western
Sahara on self-determination, which both sides agree
is essential for a political resolution. Even though
Madrid is officially neutral, its support for the Poli-
sario in the United Nations has made Spain suspect in
the eyes of Hassan.0 25X1
International Attempts. International initiatives in-
creasingly have taken the place of bilateral and third-
party mediation as the venue for negotiations. The
OAU was the original international forum for discus-
sion of the Western Sahara dispute. Much of this
effort is attributable to Algeria, which used its good
credentials with African states to press its position.
Algiers has been a stronger supporter than Rabat of
liberation movements on the continent and has given
more financial aid to the emerging nations. Hassan's
call at an OAU summit meeting in 1981 for a
supervised referendum in Western Sahara was, in our
view, largely an effort to preempt Algerian proposals
that would damage Morocco's diplomatic position. At
the OAU foreign ministers' meeting in February 25X1
1982, however, Algeria succeeded in having the
SDAR delegation seated-a development that sig-
naled the SDAR's heightened status internationally.
In 1984 the OAU recognized the SDAR.
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We believe that Morocco's subsequent withdrawal
from the OAU in 1984 destroyed any hope that this
organization could broker an accord and shifted inter-
national peace efforts to the United Nations. The
most concerted UN initiative to date was undertaken
last year, when Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
attempted unsuccessfully to solicit terms fora cease-
fire and referendum during talks with Moroccan and
SDAR diplomats. According to the US Embassy in
Algiers, the current UN strategy is to extract a
commitment from the Polisario to cease hostilities in
return for a Moroccan pledge to withdraw a signifi-
cant portion of its military forces from Western
Sahara. Comments by UN officials to Embassy offi-
cers in Algiers indicate that the Secretary General
may try to encourage bilateral contacts to improve the
atmosphere for negotiations.0 25X1
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Conditions for a Diplomatic Settlement
Issue
Cease-fire
Negotiations
Morocco
Yes
Morocco and Algeria only
Yes, with Moroccan civilian admin-
istrators remaining, with military
confined to barracks
Referendum supervisor UN
1974 Spanish census, but only
Sahrawis presently in Western Saha-
ra, not including 11,000 refugees in
Algeriaa
a The most recent census on the population of Western Sahara is
the 1974 Spanish census, which listed 73,497 Sahrawis in the
territory. We believe that current Moroccan and Algerian claims as
to the number of refugees in Algeria are skewed for propaganda
purposes.
Algeria/Polisario
Yes
Morocco and the Polisario, with
Algeria an observer
Yes, with removal of all Moroccan
civilians and military
1974 Spanish census, but including
the 165,000 Polisario refugees in
Algeria
Prospects for a Diplomatic Settlement
7'he chances for a negotiated political solution during
the next several years are slim. Even though the views
of both sides have converged in recent years-they
accept the idea of UN mediation and a referendum of
the Sahrawi inhabitants over the territory's status-
neither side is willing to compromise on the specific
conditions necessary for a settlement.
Rabat will not com-
promise on territory or sovereignty, and Algiers re-
mains committed to obtaining concessions on these
points.
Morocco. Rabat is prepared to pursue the war indefi-
nitely. The government is building a new berm that
will allow it to control about 90 percent of the
territory. We believe that this move reflects Rabat's
pessimism about the chances of reaching a favorable
political settlement in the near term.
We believe that King Hassan's diplomatic strategy
has been to stall for time and to hold firm to his
positions for a settlement. Despite his refusal to
compromise and his firm military commitment, we
believe he realizes that a military victory is not
achievable or will not resolve the dispute and that only
a political solution can end the conflict. He believes,
however, that his strong military position enables him
to push for a settlement on his own terms.
Algeria. Although the Algerians also maintain a
tough public stance,
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they are convtnce t at t e war cannot be
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won and
are becoming more flexible. In our
view, Algiers is playing a waiting game, believing that
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Countries Recognizing the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
Kiribati
Nauru
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
1976
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Burundi
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique
Rwanda
Togo
North Korea
10
1977
Seychelles
1
1978
Congo
Sao Tome and Principe
Tanzania
South Yemen
Panama
5
1979
Cape Verde
Ethiopia
Ghana
Lesotho
Zambia
Afghanistan
Cambodia
Laos
Vietnam
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
St. Lucia
16
1980
Botswana
Libya
Mali
Sierra Leone
Swaziland
Chad
Zimbabwe
Iran
Vanuatu
Syria
Costa Rica
Cuba
12
1982 Mauritius Bolivia
Suriname
Venezuela
1984 Burkina Peru Yugoslavia 5
Mauritania
Nigeria
Guatemala
Dominican Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
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Morocco cannot bear the economic burden of main-
taining its 100,000 troops in Western Sahara indefi-
nitely.
? King Hassan has less reason to deal because Moroc-
co already controls most of the territory.
? Bendjedid faces the unpleasant choice of upping the
ante militarily, of making distasteful diplomatic
concessions to redress the situation, or of even
President Bendjedid's position has evolved from sup-
port for the independence of Western Sahara to some
sort of federation involving autonomy for the region
under nominal Moroccan control. Behind his chang-
ing attitude are Algeria's economic problems due to
falling oil revenues and the rising costs of economic
support for the Polisario population. We believe Bend-
jedid realizes that military options are limited unless
he is willing to risk war with Morocco.
:Most of Algeria's key leaders want a political settle-
ment, but they need aface-saving compromise.
The economic and military
dependence of the Polisario on Algeria, however, gives
it little leeway to challenge Algiers's wishes.
We believe neither side can force an end to the war,
and only a negotiated political solution will bring
lasting peace. The pace of negotiations largely de-
pends on several factors. Increasing economic and
social problems in Algeria, for example, might make
Bendjedid more amenable to a deal. On the other
hand, the same trends in Morocco might require
Hassan to focus domestic attention on the war and
avoid concessions. In addition, the removal of Bendje-
did or Hassan from power or widespread political
changes in either regime would increase instability in
the region and distract the governments from the
problem.
A Compromise Formula
We see signs that both sides are slowly edging toward
a negotiated settlement. Not much headway has been
made, but they continue to hold periodic, low-level
talks searching for common ground. Algeria's Presi-
dent Bendjedid is the key to progress:
throwing in his hand.
We believe that Bendjedid will stall for time but will
eventually choose to make diplomatic concessions. He
has offered Hassan a federation plan in his "postage
stamp and flag" proposal that would give the King
titular authority over Western Sahara in return for
limited Polisario self-government. Senior Algerian
officials recently told the US Embassy in Algiers that
their government still supports this plan. Hassan,
however, refuses to accept it because it would give the
Polisario too much autonomy, including diplomatic
representation abroad. Algeria apparently has in mind
a federation mirroring Canada's loose ties to Great
Britain. Hassan would accept an arrangement similar
to Quebec's position within federal Canada. We be-
lieve any federal solution would have to bridge these
differences.
In our view, progress on divisive bilateral problems
could help resolve the Western Saharan dispute. For
example, most of the 1,300-kilometer border separat-
ing Morocco and Algeria is not demarcated, and there
have been periodic clashes along the frontier. In 1972
Rabat and Algiers agreed to delimit the border, and
Morocco disavowed its claims to small portions of
Algerian territory. Hassan, however, has yet to ratify
the 1972 accord. Although the two regimes have not
made a direct link between border problems and the
Western Sahara conflict, a resolution of the frontier
could provide Algiers with a "victory" that would help
Bendjedid extract himself from the Western Sahara
conflict. Algiers may even require Moroccan ratifica-
tion of the accord, since any settlement of the West-
ern Sahara problem will tend to favor Rabat.
Another issue that could spur progress is repatriation
of prisoners held by each side, some of whom were
taken in the Western Sahara fighting.
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to follow Algeria's lead.
Given the problems with the federation idea, a possi-
ble compromise would involve Moroccan trusteeship
under UN auspices. Morocco would gain sovereignty,
but only after a specified period of time. This solution
would represent an Algerian concession to recognize
Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, while
Rabat would have to guarantee certain rights for the
Polisario. These could include a regional parliament, a
separate budget, and possibly the right to form their
own police force. The arrangement could be modeled
after a UN trusteeship, such as the US administration
of Micronesia. The transition period might resemble
Great Britain's agreement with China to turn over
control of Hong Kong by the end of the century.
Morocco would achieve its objectives, and Algeria
would have a solution to the problem without conced-
ing defeat. The Polisario would be allowed to exercise
limited self-government within the Moroccan polity
but would have no representation abroad. Even
though the Polisario leadership would not be pleased
with this arrangement, they would have no choice but
not bring Rabat to the negotiating table.
Moroccan Incorporation of Western Sahara
If King Hassan continues to rely principally on mili-
tary force to absorb Western Sahara, he will continue
to face harassment from Polisario guerrillas based in
Algeria. We believe the current level of harassment is
not a serious military challenge for Morocco and will
achieving a political settlement.
We believe Bendjedid's frustration over this stalemate
and the nearly complete enclosure of the region by
berms could eventually impel Algeria to raise the
military stakes. Algiers, for example, could allow the
insurgents to engage in terrorism inside Morocco.
Algeria might also decide to become directly involved
in the fighting. In either case, Algiers would hope to
force Hassan to the bargaining table without provok-
ing an unwanted war between the two countries. We
believe such actions would generate dangerous tension
with little hope of forcing an end to the fighting or
Territorial Partition 25X1
Although it is probably too late for this option,
Morocco and Algeria could decide to partition West-
ern Sahara. We do not believe the earlier territorial
proposals, such as the French plan of 1978 that called
for Mauritanian control of the southern portion of
Western Sahara, Moroccan control of the northern
portion, and Algerian acquisition of parts of northern
Mauritania, would be acceptable to all parties. Any
future partition would need to be heavily weighted in
favor of Morocco, since Rabat will soon hold about 90
percent of the region. Rabat would retain the most
useful areas of Western Sahara, while Algiers would
gain territory in that part of Western Sahara current-
ly outside the berm. This plan could also lead Moroc-
co and Algeria to compel Mauritania to yield a small
amount of its northern frontier area to round out
Algeria's boundaries-a move we believe Nouakchott
would gladly take to ensure a peaceful settlement.
Algiers's acquisition of this terrain would ease its
concerns about Moroccan encirclement. Bendjedid
would have to compel the Polisario to accept resettle-
ment either in Algeria or in the areas ceded by
Morocco or by Mauritania.
An Independent Western Sahara 25X1
The least likely outcome of the conflict would be a
new state in the region governed by the SDAR. Not
only is such a prospect implausible, given the military
situation in Western Sahara, it is unacceptable to
King Hassan, who has staked his prestige on the issue.
We believe that Hassan would not even countenance
an SDAR entity whose independence was heavily
circumscribed by Rabat's having a veto over the 25X1
domestic and foreign policies of the new state. An
independent state would not be viable economically,
given its small population and lack of resources. It
would be highly dependent on foreign support and
vulnerable to subversion, and, in our judgment, Mo-
rocco and Algeria would eventually resume the con-
test for control of the territory. ~~ 25X1
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Figure.2
Possible Territorial Compromise
Territorial transfer under
possible compromise
North
Atlantic Ocean
Canary Islands L~
csv.) !1
'Tan-Tan
~Bir Moghrein
;.Morocco
;-
Mauritania
Algeria
Mali
0 150 Kilometers
I r' 'i -~
0 150 Miles
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The Regional Perspective
We believe that a compromise solution of the Western
Sahara conflict would remove one of the destabilizing
elements of North African politics, but it would not
end the adversarial relationship that exists between
Morocco and Algeria. We would expect both coun-
tries to continue to view their bilateral relations and
their diplomacy with other regional states as competi-
25X1 tive.
The Enclaves. We cannot exclude the possibility that
Hassan would be emboldened to take up other Irre-
dentist issues, in particular, efforts to win sovereignty
over the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
northern Morocco. Rabat claims the enclaves as its
own and asserts that Spain should have surrendered
them when it relinquished the rest of its colonial
territories in Morocco in 1955. Madrid, on the other
hand, has occupied and administered the enclaves as a
part of mainland Spain since the 15th century. The
question of sovereignty over these territories is a
sensitive issue in Spain and a highly charged rallying
cry for nationalism and anticolonialism in Morocco.
25X1
Mauritania. In our view, Mauritania will continue to
be a vulnerable target for both Algeria and Morocco.
The Western Sahara war has had a negative effect on
ritania at the expense of Morocco.
Morocco's prestige would go up a notch because of the
enlargement of its territory, and King Hassan's imme-
diate task would be to consolidate Moroccan control.
Algeria, for its part, would suffer a loss of face despite
any benefits it would derive from a settlement. Algeri-
an leaders probably would want to compensate by
reinforcing political ties to Tunisia, Libya, and Mau-
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Mauritania as the country's more powerful neighbors
have attempted to pull Nouakchott into its camp.
Mauritania's two coups in 1978 and 1984 were pri-
marily attributable to meddling by Algeria and Mo-
rocco. Mauritania also is susceptible to foreign inter-
ference because of its economic and social problems
due to drought, famine, and ethnic tensions. ~~
King Hassan probably hopes to maintain his good ties
to Mauritania, which in recent years has moved closer
to Morocco.
A geria probably will be concerned about
Moroccan designs on Mauritania, and it will use
economic blandishments or subversion to influence
the Mauritanians.
Libya. We believe that Algiers would be interested in
strengthening ties to Libya before and after a settle-
ment of the Western Sahara conflict. Since the
breakup of the Moroccan-Libyan union last August,
Algeria has increased its contacts with Libya. Algeri-
an leaders almost certainly view such a policy as a
hedge against Moroccan expansionism as well as a
way to restrain Qadhafi's adventurism, and they
would want to secure their eastern flank to exclude
the possibility of a two-front military confrontation.
Morocco alleges that Libya has resumed aid to the
Polisario, but we have no evidence to support this
claim. We believe Algeria would accept such aid but
would insist upon maintaining its political and
military control over the Polisario.
For his part, King Hassan probably will continue to
be concerned about growing Libyan-Algerian ties as
well as Libyan meddling in Morocco and will thus
seek to maintain normal relations with Tripoli. Libya,
too, would want to maintain ties to Morocco because
of Rabat's importance as a target of subversion.
The Chances for Soviet Inroads
Regardless of the outcome of any settlement, the
prospects are dim for increased Soviet involvement in
Western Sahara. Moscow has close ties to Algeria,
sympathizes with the Polisario cause, and has sanc-
tioned the transfer of arms to the insurgents. The
Soviets, however, refrain from direct contact with the
Polisario; they have not accorded it the status of a
national liberation movement; nor have they recog-
nized the SDAR. The Algerians, too, have kept the
Soviets at arm's length on this issue. They have
neither pressed them to become involved nor sought
Soviet military or financial aid for the insurgents
because of their own adequate resources and desire to
retain control over the Polisario.
The outcome of the conflict is not likely to change
Soviet perceptions or influence Moroccan or Algerian
relations toward Moscow. The Soviets support OAU
and UN resolutions on Western Sahara and probably
would accept any settlement agreed to by all parties.
They undoubtedly will maintain current advantages
in Algiers, including access for military overflights
and naval port calls and a preferential position for
military sales contracts. Even though the Bendjedid
government is gradually expanding ties to the West,
Moscow probably realizes that it has little chance of
seriously weakening US-Moroccan ties, given the
strong pro-Western position of King Hassan. Never-
theless, Hassan has shown a willingness in the past
year to permit the Soviets to make occasional naval
port calls and give Moscow lucrative fishing rights
along Morocco's coast.
The Outlook for US Interests
A compromise involving either aMoroccan-Algerian
treaty, a trusteeship, or territorial partition could
strengthen the US position in the region and enhance
Washington's interests. It would foster:
? Stability along NATO's southern flank, in which
Soviet influence is kept to a minimum.
? Opposition to Qadhafi's troublemaking.
? Improvement of US relations with Algeria.
A compromise settlement would constitute a victory
for the US position. Washington has remained neutral
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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sides.
toward the combatants and has called fora nonmili-
tary solution, direct negotiations by the parties in-
volved, and a settlement that reflects the views of all
Washington's indirect assistance to Morocco in the
conflict-provision of military equipment, economic
assistance, ould even
improve US relations with Rabat. King Hassan's
incorporation of Western Sahara would boost his
image at home, which we believe would reinforce
cooperation with the United States. Nevertheless, we
believe Hassan's success may make him feisty enough
to adopt policies that co~ild complicate other US
interests in the region. He might, for example, take
unilateral initiatives in the Arab-Israeli peace process
or decide to press Moroccan Irredentist claims in the
Spanish enclaves, and possibly even Mauritania. The
King may also press Washington to provide increased
financial and political aid in return for his willingness
to support US strategic interests. We do not believe,
however, that he would choose to weaken his ties to
the United States. In our judgment, Hassan views his
strategic links to Washington as contributing to
Morocco's national security.
We believe that Algiers will view Washington as a 25X1
contributor to Morocco's success in Western Sahara,
regardless of how active Washington is perceived to
be in helping to resolve the dispute. Consequently,
Algiers could decide to reduce its ties to Washington
at least temporarily. The government might also
decide to develop closer ties to the Soviets as a counter
to greater US-Moroccan cooperation. To the extent,
however, that Algeria perceives that the United States
extracted concessions from Morocco, US ties to
Algeria would stabilize or improve.
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1975
23 May
4 July
Appendix
Chronology of the Western Sahara Dispute
Spain announces intent to relinquish the territory.
Algerian-Moroccan communique lists Algiers's approval of Moroccan-Maurita-
nian partition of the territory.
UN Mission to Western Sahara reports indigenous population categorically favors
independence and opposes Moroccan-Mauritanian partition. Report calls for
plebiscite.
16 October International Court of Justice (ICJ) concludes that Morocco's well-founded
historical ties to the region do not constitute sovereignty.
About 350,000 Moroccans undertake peaceful invasion into portion of the colony
following ICJ decision and King Hassan's call fora "Green March" of Moroccans
on the territory to demonstrate resolve.
14 November Madrid Agreement of Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania establishing interim
administration of region and Spanish departure in February 1976. Algeria calls
accord null and void.
1976
12 January Spain withdraws its military from Western Sahara.
26 February Spain withdraws completely.
27 February Polisario announces creation of the SDAR.
March Morocco and Mauritania break relations with Algeria following latter's recogni-
tion of the SDAR.
14 April Morocco and Mauritania formally partition territory.
April Polisario undertakes first military operation against Mauritania's one rail line.
June Polisario leader killed in major attack on Nouakchott.
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First substantial units of Moroccan Army stationed in Bir Moghrein, Mauritania,
as well as first joint sweep operations by Moroccan and Mauritanian units.
Polisario begins naval operations.
Morocco and Mauritania sign mutual defense treaty.
Second Polisario attack on Nouakchott.
King Hassan threatens right of hot pursuit into Algeria following heavy military
losses at Sebkhet Oumm ed Drous Guebli.
Polisario releases French captives taken in fighting in Mauritania during year
following French airstrikes on Polisario units.
Military coup in Mauritania brings new government committed to peace settle-
ment. Polisario announces cease-fire with Mauritania two days later.
OAU summit meeting in Khartoum creates ad hoc "Committee of Wise Men" to
deal with dispute.
Algerian and Moroccan emissaries meet under French auspices.
September Algerian President Boumediene's illness prevents summit meeting with King
Hassan in Belgium.
1979
13 January
Polisario announces new military offensive, attacking Tan-Tan, Morocco, and
Cabo Bojador in Western Sahara. Actions mark first instance that guerrillas strike
within Morocco and overrun sizable Moroccan town.
Bendjedid inaugurated new President of Algeria.
OAU "Wise Men" call for immediate cease-fire and self-determination through a
free referendum for the Western Sahara population. Morocco refuses to accept
narrow OAU vote to accept report.
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Mauritania signs peace treaty with Polisario, renounces territorial claims, and
recognizes SDAR as the sole legitimate representative of the region. Shortly after,
Nouakchott restores relations with Algeria.
14 August Morocco annexes Mauritania's portion of the region.
October Morocco begins major military sweep in Western Sahara that results in capture of
much Polisario equipment but little combat.
Fall Morocco begins construction of the berm.
1980
25 January
3 March
Polisario attacks Akka, Morocco in deepest penetration of Morocco in over a year.
Hassan declares all of Western Sahara as an integral part of Morocco and makes
his first visit to the territory the following day.
April Libya recognizes SDAR, and Morocco breaks relations with Tripoli.
June Hassan declares at OAU summit meeting in Nairobi that Morocco agrees to a
supervised referendum in Western Sahara.
October Polisario victory at Guelta Zemmur results in largest Moroccan military losses
since the start of the war.
22 February OAU foreign ministers agree to seat SDAR, and 19 delegations walk out of
session.
1983
26 February Hassan-Bendjedid summit meeting in Oujda, Morocco.
30 May Morocco and Algeria agree to reestablish airlinks, reduce border restrictions, and
develop cooperation at local level.
June OAU summit meeting in Addis Ababa passes pro-Algeria resolution calling on
Morocco and SDAR to engage in direct negotiations.
July Qadhafi travels to Morocco and Algeria for meetings with Hassan and Bendjedid.
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8 September Morocco abolishes visa requirements for Algerians.
October Moroccan troops overrun three Polisario camps in first ground offensive since
construction of the berm.
1984
27 February Mauritania recognizes the SDAR.
April Algerians begin periodic overflights of southern Morocco and Western Sahara.
15 June Algerian troops ambush Moroccan supply column that strayed across border.
Fall OAU recognizes the SDAR, and Morocco withdraws its membership.
January Algeria and Morocco complete two months of highly intensive diplomatic contacts
on Western Sahara.
UN Secretary General begins several months of talks with diplomats of Morocco
and the Polisario in New York to bridge differences between the two sides. UN
initiative continues to the present day.
Mid-February Morocco begins latest extension of the berm to include southern portions of
Western Sahara along frontier with Mauritania.
25 February Polisario responds to Moroccan berm construction with the largest military
operations since 1983.
Saudi Arabia's King Fahd visits Morocco and Algeria in initiative. by Riyadh to
resolve dispute.
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secret
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