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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000500600001-1
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret-
Intelligence
Morocco-Algeria:
Living Near the Brink
NESA 87-10014
March 1987
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Morocco-Algeria:
Living Near the Brink
Israeli Division, NESA,
This paper was prepared b Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions from Nate Tuchrello, Office of
Imagery Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-
Secret
NESA 87-10014
March 1987
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Morocco-Algeria:
Living Near the Brinkl 25X1
development, and each generally accepts the regime of the other.
Key Judgments Algeria and Morocco are competitors for regional hegemony that prefer to
Information available keep their competition in the diplomatic arena. Even their opposition over
as of 13 February 1987 Western Sahara-where for 11 years Moroccan troops have fought
was used in this report.
Polisario Front guerrillas trained, supplied, and advised by Algeria-is not
an issue that either Algiers or Rabat believes should be settled by a direct
war. The two rivals are interested in cooperation for the sake of economic
The Western Sahara war, however, prevents a normalization of relations
between the two countries, aggravates their mutual distrust, and keeps
their forces dangerously close to one another. Both sides pay lipservice to
the concept of third-party negotiations under UN auspices to end the war,
but neither has been willing to make substantial concessions. Algiers
almost certainly will continue its longstanding diplomatic campaign to
isolate Morocco until Rabat accepts earnest negotiations with Polisario
Front leaders. Consequently, we see little prospect of a diplomatic solution.
We believe that the prolongation of the Western Sahara war will occasion-
ally prompt Algeria and Morocco to move closer to hostilities. Having
nothing to show for their diplomatic efforts, the increasingly frustrated
Algerians may try to use just enough force to jolt Rabat out of its
intractability. Algerian officials would try to limit this force because they
do not believe that the Western Sahara war can be finally resolved by
military means alone:
? It is likely that, between now and 1990, Algeria will at least engage in
brinkmanship on behalf of the Polisario Front. Algiers did this in 1984-
maneuvering its forces and ambushing a Moroccan border patrol-when
Rabat was energetically driving the Polisario guerrillas from their
Western Sahara strongholds.
? Once the choice is made to engage in brinkmanship, the risk of an armed
clash would be high, with a significant potential that Morocco and
Algeria would embark on a series of raids and skirmishes. This occurred
in 1963, when they fought a series of engagements along their central
border, and again in 1976, when they fought two battles in Western
Sahara.
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NESA 87-10014
March 1987
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? The potential for all-out fighting between Algeria and Morocco is much
more remote. Neither sees the surrender of the other as a goal attainable
at reasonable cost. Both have displayed a realistic perception of the
danger of an all-out war and have been careful to avoid such an
eventuality. Indeed, this dynamic is so strong that just the fear that any
clash could escalate to full war tends to reduce their willingness to take
military risks.
In the atmosphere of extreme mutual distrust created by the Western
Sahara war, other developments not directly related to the war could
produce occasional flareups in Algerian-Moroccan tension, any of which
would raise the risk of armed raids and skirmishes. Instability in Maurita-
nia, for example, could increase Algerian-Moroccan competition for
dominance there. Hostilities could also arise accidentally, with either side
misreading the military intent of the other.
The potential for miscalculation would increase substantially if either King
Hassan or President Bendjedid were replaced. Although both leaders
appear secure in power for the next few years, each country has radicals
and malcontents from whose ranks an assassin could arise. A successor
might be more inclined toward unrestrained brinkmanship or exaggerating
the foreign threat to consolidate his power base.
If Algerian-Moroccan tension were to escalate to, or near, the point of
hostilities, Washington's efforts to be friendly to both would be
jeopardized:
? Rabat would ask for expanded US military support-at least arms
delivery and intelligence support-in return for continued US military
access to Moroccan ports and airfields.
? Algiers would want strict US neutrality. Should Washington provide
significant military support to Rabat after hostilities began-for
example, airlifting Moroccan troops-Algiers probably would break off
relations with Washington.
Even without a clear escalation in tension, Rabat's perception of an
increasing Algerian threat-largely driven by Algeria's growing military
inventory-is likely to cause Morocco to intensify its efforts to obtain US
arms at concessional terms. Rabat's willingness to increase US military
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training opportunities in Morocco and to enhance access for rapid deploy-
ment contingencies almost certainly will depend on the extent to which
Washington finds ways to increase support for Moroccan security.
Libya's allegiances have a subtle but real influence on the balance of forces
and state of tension between Algeria and Morocco. When the Libyan-
Moroccan union was active, Algiers feared a two-front war should tension
on either border enter the military arena. In addition, troops that Algeria
moved to the Libyan border in 1985 had to be drawn from the Moroccan
border. Now that the union is terminated, Morocco is watching Libya
closely, fearing that Algiers and Tripoli will cooperate to isolate Rabat in
the region.
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War by Misperception 4
Bendjedid or Hassan Removed 5
Implications for the United States 11
Algiers Will Seek Strict US Neutrality 12
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Morocco-Algeria:
Living Near the Brink
Algeria and Morocco are competitors for regional
hegemony that prefer to keep their competition in the
diplomatic arena. Even their opposition over Western
Sahara-where for 11 years Moroccan troops have
fought guerrillas trained, supplied, and advised by
Algeria-is not an issue that either Algiers or Rabat
believes should be settled by a direct war. The regimes
trade propaganda jibes but generally accept each
other.
The Western Sahara war, however, prevents a nor-
malization of relations between the two countries and
keeps their forces dangerously close to one another.
The dispute also creates an atmosphere of extreme
mutual distrust, raising the risk that competition over
Western Sahara in particular and regional preemi-
nence in general could move from the diplomatic to
the military realm with little warning. As long as the
Western Sahara war drags on-and we see little
prospect for a resolution soon-leaders in both capi-
tals will continue to believe that they are living under
the threat of war in the medium term. Algerian and
Moroccan leaders appear eager to avoid war and are
likely to prevent a drawn-out conflict, but we view a
move to the brink of hostilities as likely between now
and 1990. Moving a step closer to the brink would
bring a high risk of a clash, perhaps culminating in a
series of raids and skirmishes.
Algeria and Morocco have been to the brink of war
several times, most recently in the spring of 1984. In
that year, Moroccan forces expelled the Polisario
from nearly all of their base camps in Western
Sahara. Algiers signaled its displeasure by:
? Ambushing a Moroccan supply column that had
crossed Algerian territory on a regularly used short-
cut to a Moroccan border post
which left four Moroccan soldiers
dead and 31 captured.
? Flying fighter aircraft over Western Sahara and
deep into Moroccan airspace,
? Deploying its newest and best interceptors, MIG-23
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? Conducting the largest and most sophisticated exer-
cise ever attempted by the Algerian Army and
staging it near the undefended northern Moroccan
border.
? Upgrading the Polisario arsenal by providing more
advanced tanks and antiaircraft artillery.
Before this 1984 activity, Moroccan and Algerian
forces had clashed twice, leaving dozens of casualties
and nearly 2,000 prisoners who have yet to be repatri-
ated, In 1963 a
series of battles was fought along the undemarcated
central border. In 1976, Algerian forces were expelled
from the Amgala area of Western Sahara after two
battles with Moroccan forces.
Current relations between Algiers and Rabat remain
as cold as they were in the period leading up to the
1984 clash. They have no diplomatic relations, al-
though unofficial contacts occasionally are made. We
believe both are genuinely interested in better rela-
tions that would allow for broad economic coopera-
tion; an abortive effort toward this end was made in
1983. Such a breakthrough is not likely, however, as
long as no progress is made toward a settlement of the
Western Sahara war.
Neither side desires an Algerian-Moroccan war, in
our view, and it is significant that the conflicts in
1963, 1976, and 1984 passed without escalation.
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Figure 1
Clashes Between Algerian and Moroccan Forces
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Canary Islands
(SP-)
4
Western
Sahara
ibraltar Alborrin
(U.K.) Sea
STAT
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Indeed, the desire to avoid war, in our view, is so
strong that it generally serves to restrain Rabat's and
Algiers's willingness to take military risks. Neverthe-
less, their differences over Western Sahara, Maurita-
nia, and regional preeminence are so intense that
periodic returns to the brink of military conflict are
likely.
The risk of limited war between these neighbors could
be sharply increased by any of several situations. In
none of these does armed conflict become inevitable,
but each raises the potential that one of the sides
will-probably reluctantly-initiate hostilities.
An Extension of the Western Sahara War
The Western Sahara war, in our view, is the greatest
potential flashpoint between the two neighbors. We
estimate that over 100,000 Moroccan troops are
engaged in defending Western Sahara against 3,000
to 5,000 Algerian-supplied guerrillas of the Polisario
Front. We believe both the 1976 and 1984 crises
stemmed from Algiers's efforts to influence the war
with its own forces. In the earlier case Algerian forces
actually fought in Western Sahara. In a press inter-
view in 1984, the commander of Morocco's Western
Sahara campaign claimed that Algeria is fighting the
Western Sahara war by proxy.
Algiers clearly is frustrated with King Hassan's in-
transigence about a settlement of the conflict. The
Moroccan strategy of walling in most of Western
Sahara with an earth berm has given Rabat firm
military control over most of the contested territory,
stymied the Polisario forces, and reduced pressure on
Hassan to negotiate, in our view. A senior Algerian
Government official told the US Ambassador last
June that Algiers was eager to achieve a face-saving
settlement, but "Hassan only played games." He said
that Algiers cannot afford to have the Polisario lose
the war outright
Algiers has several options available to bring more
pressure on Hassan to enter serious negotiations on
Western Sahara:
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? Algiers could allow the guerrillas to cross directly
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this did happen on a small scale in July 1986.
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this approach, and Rabat would have to rethink its 25X1
ground tactics if the Polisario infiltrated more than 25X1
a few hundred guerrillas at once or a few dozen in
frequent operations.
? President Bendjedid could repeat the saber rattling
of 1984 as an expression of frustration over lack of
progress toward a negotiated settlement.
? A few Algerian armored battalions or aircraft could 25X1
enter the fighting in Western Sahara to help the
Polisario punch large holes in the berm.
Algiers probably is deterred from taking any of these
steps for the present because of the high risk that they
could lead to a direct Algerian-Moroccan war.
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Several factors could increase the likelihood of a
Moroccan-Algerian war under one or more of the
scenarios discussed in this study. Some of these
political wild cards may already be a source of
pressure on either Moroccan King Hassan or Algeri-
an President Bendjedid to adopt a more aggressive
policy. Information, however, is not available to
assess reliably the degree to which such pressure
could influence a decision by either leader to engage
in a military conflict.
Economic Deterioration. Both Algeria and Morocco
are plagued by increasing economic problems. Both
have experienced rioting attributed to declining living
standards-Morocco in 1984 and Algeria in 1986.
Neither has much hope of reversing its fortunes in the
next few years. Should economically inspired unrest
become more widespread and put the survival of
either regime at risk, officials may be prompted to try
to rally local support by beating war drums.
Radicals in Algiers. If elements opposed to Bendje-
did's moderate policies gain greater influence in the
Algerian military or ruling party, Bendjedid could be
forced to take a harder line with Rabat, particularly
that the expense of the Western Sahara
war eventually will force Morocco to negotiate a
settlement reduces the appeal of such precipitate
initiatives. We believe, however, that Rabat can sus-
tain the war for several more years and that Algiers
eventually may have to choose between accepting
failure of its pro-Polisario policy or engaging in new
Diplomatic Gambit. Algiers and Rabat tend to view
diplomatic initiatives in the region as a zero-sum
game: a gain for one is a loss for the other. At the
same time, both believe that the image of a strong
military can buy influence in the region. This pro-
duces an equation wherein making the enemy's mili-
tary appear impotent can translate into diplomatic
gains. We cannot envision a scenario in which this
dynamic is strong enough by itself to lead to war, but
it will be added to the arguments for war in any
scenario described in this paper. The influence of the
military image on decisionmaking will be greater if
the tension comes in a period when one player
believes the other is making diplomatic break-
throughs. This particularly could be the case if
Rabat, which already has firm military control of
Western Sahara, suddenly secured major diplomatic
support as well, such as the ouster of the Saharan
representative from the Organization of African
Unity.
War by Misperception
General hostilities could result from either capital
misreading the military intentions of the other. Any
large Moroccan maneuvers behind the northernmost
part of the berm, for example, would resurrect long-
held fears in Algiers of an assault on Tindouf. In a
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similar vein, when Algerian armored maneuvers hap-
pen to coincide with Polisario advances toward the
berm, the Moroccan command must consider whether
the Algerian forces intend to assault the part of the
wall that is less than 10 kilometers from the Algerian
border.
Under usual circumstances, both Algiers and Rabat
would work to prevent such crises from escalating.
coincided with increased mutual tension, constructive
communications could be disregarded and the risk of
a clash would be high.
Bendjedid or Hassan Removed
We believe both President Bendjedid and King Has-
san are eager to avoid a war and can curb aggressive
impulses among their subordinates.
Algiers regards Hassan as a
stabilizing influence in Morocco and, despite the
King's intransigence over Western Sahara, worries
that his successor will be much more belligerent.
Similarly, we regard Bendjedid as a moderating force
Hassan and Bendjedid each generally are sensitive to
and usually avoid the kinds of military activity that
would alarm the other.
We view both leaders as having a firm grip on power
that probably will not be relinquished through 1990.
Each country, however, has a generous and increasing
portion of radicals and discontents from which an
assassin could arise. Should either Hassan or Bendje-
did be removed from power, relations between Moroc-
co and Algeria could become much more volatile.
Successor regimes may be more inclined toward bold
brinkmanship while having a less refined sense of
what the other side will tolerate, significantly raising
the potential for border clashes and raids. We antici-
pate that a less experienced military successor to
either Hassan or Bendjedid would be more likely to
take risks in pressing for an end to the Western
Sahara war. Depending on the circumstances of suc-
cession, a new leader might be attracted to the well-
worn strategy of enhancing his popularity by exagger-
ating the threat on the border. Similarly, a new
regime could find a small clash convenient as an
excuse to implement special war powers to consolidate
its position. Algerian President Ben Bella, for exam-
ple, used fighting with Morocco in 1963 as an excuse
to dismiss the parliament.
Conflict Over Mauritania
Mauritania could become the venue for a clash
between its northern neighbors. In our view, Algiers
and Rabat each see this weak state as a potential
vassal. Each has tried both to intimidate and to woo
the shaky regime in Nouakchott.
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ommitted itself to intervene
if Moroccan troops violated Mauritania's border. The
next year, Rabat encouraged-and perhaps engi-
neered-the coup that ousted Mauritanian President
Haidalla, in our and probably Algiers's views. F_~
The current regime in Nouakchott has been more
careful than its predecessor in maintaining Mauritan-
ia's neutrality toward both Morocco and Algeria.
Should it begin to serve the interests of one at the
expense of the other, however, the scenario for a clash
could develop. If, for example, Nouakchott offered
general sanctuary to Polisario guerrillas, Rabat could
order hot pursuit into Mauritania. Algiers, in turn,
could augment Mauritania's northern defenses with
its own troops. Alternatively, if the current Maurita-
nian regime is toppled and a succession struggle
develops between pro-Moroccan and pro-Algerian
factions, both neighboring states would be tempted to
try to force an outcome with their own troops.
We believe that a war between Algeria and Morocco
would involve a series of raids and skirmishes rather
than a protracted, broad-front war. This would be
especially true if both King Hassan and President
Bendjedid were in power. Their behavior in previous
crises suggests that they appreciate the costs of a war
that is not quickly resolved. Both leaders almost
certainly would seek quick victories to gain advantage
at the negotiating table but would seek to avoid
prolonged combat.
In our view, both Rabat and Algiers would face
serious hurdles in trying to achieve a major strategic
victory. Rabat almost certainly believes that its forces
have insufficient aircraft, armor, and transport to
push beyond Algeria's western defenses. Rabat un-
doubtedly realizes that acquiring the requisite equip-
ment is well beyond Morocco's means, given its
current struggle to pay for the upkeep of its forces. In
the case of an Algerian offensive, it is likely that
Algeria accepts that attrition would be high among its
forces in any thrust through the Atlas Mountains. In
addition, the drive probably would be slow enough to
allow major elements of Morocco's 100,000 southern
troops to reinforce the north.
We believe that the economic burden of an all-out war
also serves to deter Rabat and Algiers. Algiers is
having to rein in its economic development programs
and is encountering growing domestic criticism over
its handling of the reduction in hydrocarbon revenues.
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Rabat has even less breathing space. It has already
refinanced its foreign debt twice and suffered urban
riots in 1984 when it tried to reduce government
subsidies on bread and other staples. Neither side can
count on significant outside financial support in the
event of a war, since their primary potential donors
are Arab states that would be reluctant to take sides
in inter-Arab fighting. Both nations almost certainly
would disregard their economic concerns once war
had spread, but these concerns would be a significant
factor weighing against escalation in the early stages
of fighting.
Finally, we find no issue so critical as to lead either
capital to consider all-out war at this time. The
principal source of friction between them-Western
Sahara-may spark Algerian-Moroccan clashes, but
Algerian officials have often repeated that they do not
believe the war in Western Sahara can be resolved by
military means alone. The Polisario's aspirations for
statehood are not a vital Algerian interest, in our
view. The more basic source of division-competition
for regional dominance-lacks the focus required to
catalyze a massive military offensive. Neither side has
a near-term prospect of dominating the region at the
expense of the other.
Raids and skirmishes, on the other hand, could be
used to exert pressure on either side while avoiding
the commitment of men and resources for sustained
warfare. Military action would be intended to gain
limited political victories relatively cheaply. In this
context, raids could be ordered with any of several
goals in mind:
? To prompt negotiations.
? To uphold national honor.
? To placate hawks in one's own government.
? To demonstrate military power.
? To test the resolve of the enemy.
Several options would be available to Rabat or Algiers
if either decided to press the other with limited
military action. Actions would be quick and probably
self-contained to reduce the risk of escalation and to
allow the capital to exercise tight control of the
campaign. There are several types of tactics that we
believe would be employed in Algerian-Moroccan
There is a remote chance that an Algerian-Moroccan
clash could develop into a.full-blown war, despite the
fact that both capitals dread such an outcome:
? The cycle of strike and retaliation between these
neighbors could build a momentum that weighs
against a quick negotiated settlement.
? Military leaders of either side could miscalculate
the likely level of retaliation for any strike.
? A scenario could develop in which sustaining an
unwinnable war wouldforestall the collapse of one
of the regimes.
For the present, the risk of uncontrolled escalation
appears to be acknowledged by both Rabat and
Algiers and deters even limited military action.
Algiers's brinkmanship in 1984, however, which in-
cluded a clash with Moroccanforces, illustrates that
the deterrent is not always overwhelming.
hostilities.' Each of the measures probably would
prompt an immediate defensive response as well as a
retaliatory strike of similar magnitude. Raids back
and forth could drag on for days or even weeks,
probably without decisive results. We believe that fear
by both sides that the violence could get out of control
would provide impetus for a resolution, although the
longer the clashes dragged on, the greater would be
the pressure for escalation to full war.
If Rabat wanted to press Algiers to reduce its support
for the Polisario, it could:
? Stage air raids against Polisario base camps near
Tindouf. Surprise would be essential to avoid Alge-
rian interceptors and surface-to-air missiles in the
area, and so we would not anticipate large or
frequent strikes.
' Each of these measures could be successfully staged within present
capabilities. Some would be achieved only with concurrent employ-
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? Pursue Polisario units across the border into Alge-
ria, particularly if the guerrillas began attacking
Morocco north of the berm.
If Rabat wanted to demonstrate Algeria's vulnerabili-
ty, it could:
? Fly fighter-bombers over the economically impor-
tant Oran-Arzew region (but not bomb; this would
maximize Algeria's sense of vulnerability without
the necessary escalation that would be prompted if
bombs were actually dropped).
? Bomb an isolated airfield such as Hamaguir or
Tinfouchy.
If Algiers wanted to press Rabat to be more flexible in
negotiations on the Western Sahara war, it could:
? Send two or three battalions against the northern
section of the Moroccan berm to overwhelm the
frontline defenders but withdraw before Moroccan
reinforcements arrived.
? Assist a Polisario offensive against the berm with
Algerian air support. (By restricting its actions to
Western Sahara, Algiers would be signaling its
desire not to widen the war.)
We anticipate that Algeria would have an edge in a
"war of raids." Algeria's forces are much better
equipped and arrayed for shallow probes across the
border. In addition, Algeria's defenses are good
should Rabat try to strike Algerian territory. Finally,
Algeria has dozens of battalions that are free for
action. In contrast, Moroccan units would be tied
down by the Western Sahara war in most scenarios. If
Moroccan units were drawn from Western Sahara to
meet the Algerian threat elsewhere, Algiers almost
certainly would push the Polisario to attack the berm
to take advantage of the shift. This imbalance assures
that Algiers would have the advantage in any cycle of
attacks and counterattacks.
We anticipate that, as long as the Western Sahara
war goes on, Algeria and Morocco will occasionally
move toward hostilities. The fundamental Algerian
belief that the defeat of the Polisario is unacceptable
combines with Rabat's intransigence in a potentially
volatile equation. The risk of a clash-accidental or
calculated-will be high each time Morocco invigo-
rates its military campaign to secure Western Sahara
and each time Algiers sees progress toward a diplo-
matic resolution set back.
Other areas of dispute-such as the unsettled bound-
ary between the countries and the holding of prisoners
of war-are not in themselves likely to spark a clash
in the next several years. These issues, however, will
continue to be available as pretexts should leaders in
either country be attracted to military action for
political reasons.
Algeria's ability to outstrip Morocco in a war of raids
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In an effort to intimidate Rabat, Algerian forces
could:
? Overrun the Moroccan garrisons at Bou Arfa and
tracts with Western arms producers and is likely to
conclude the high-priority ones-for enhanced elec-
tronics and air transport-in the next year, despite
Figuig.
? Bomb airfields at Meknes or Goulimine.
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The Western Sahara war has prompted both Algeria
and Morocco to station several thousand troops in
the south. The proximity of these large forces raises
the potential for significant fighting, although each
side normally keeps its units in a defensive posture.
The following are two scenarios in which Rabat or
Algiers presses its maximum offensive option in this
region. These worst case scenarios are not likely in
the next few years, but they illustrate the limit of
what we believe could be achieved by force of arms in
the south.
We believe that, with maximum effort, Morocco
could seriously damage the largest Polisario base
camps near Tindouf, Algeria. By loading 20 of Mor-
occo's Mirage, F-5, and Alpha Jet fighters with
bombs (including cluster munitions) and using anoth-
er dozen or so for air intercept, the strike wing could
reach and cripple the Polisario's two primary mainte-
nance and storage bases. The strike would require a
low-level approach (a tactic usually shunned by the
Moroccan Air Force) and maximum surprise to
minimize the threat from Algeria's nearby surface-to-
air missiles. A raid of this magnitude could destroy
most of the Polisario's tank transporters, some armor
and SA-6 launchers, and many support buildings. A
simultaneous raid by airborne commandos against
the Polisario armored brigade arrayed near the
the belt-tightening caused by declining oil revenues.
We see no prospect that Morocco will be able to keep
pace with the development of the Algerian military in
the next few years. Rabat will be hard pressed even to
maintain its existing inventory unless it soon wins a
substantial increase in outside financial backing. The
prospect of such backing from Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates has prompted a resurgence in
Rabat's approaches to Paris and Washington for
Mirage 2000 and F-16 fighters, but contracts remain
unsigned. Even if the fighter purchases go through,
we judge that they would not be enough to tip the air
Algerian-Mauritanian border could increase the Poli-
sario's disarray and inflict further personnel casual-
ties, although materiel damage probably would be
modest. The combined Moroccan effort could signifi-
cantly reduce the Polisario's attack capabilities for at
least a year, while risking heavy Moroccan casualties
and the entry of Algeria into the Western Sahara
war.
In a scenario in which the initiative is on the other
side, we believe Algerian forces could dramatically
increase the cost of Morocco's Western Sahara cam-
paign by sending an armored brigade against the
berm. The objective would be to signal the depth of
Algiers's commitment to the Polisario and punish
Rabat for its intransigence rather than to win the
Western Sahara war. The difficulty of moving armor
over long stretches of desert would restrict this tactic
to the northern third of the berm, which is also the
best defended section. We believe the balance between
the attackers and defenders would be relatively even,
generating heavy casualties on both sides. It is likely
that such a move by Algeria would force Rabat to
abandon most of the berm and concentrate its forces
to defend southern Morocco and the "useful
triangle --the northwestern corner of Western Saha-
ra that has been the target of over $1 billion of
Moroccan investment.
balance with Algeria if, as we anticipate, Algeria also
receives new-generation Soviet fighters in the next
few years.
Meanwhile, using budget
adjustments and creative financing, Rabat has lined
up delivery of over 1,400 Spanish trucks and 58
French armored vehicles. These items will probably
help Morocco maintain its stranglehold on Western
Sahara against the Polisario but will not redress the
equipment imbalance with Algeria. Moreover, addi-
tional cash purchases probably would have to be
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Libya's allegiances have a subtle but real influence on
the balance of forces and state of tension between
Algeria and Morocco. Libya's potential impact on the
Moroccan-Algerian balance was highlighted during
the two-year existence of the Libyan-Moroccan
union, signed in the summer of 1984. We believe the
union prompted fears of a two-front war among
Algerian military planners. The relaxation of the
Western Sahara war during this period-Polisario
offensives decreased and Algerian saber rattling dis-
appeared-probably was due in part to these fears.
Moreover, in 1985
three Algerian brigades had been shifted from the
Moroccan border to the Libyan border.
Now that the Libyan-Moroccan union is terminated,
Tripoli's influence is less direct but still a matter of
keen interest in Rabat and Algiers:
? Libya may renew military or financial aid to the
Polisario, relieving Algiers of at least a small part
of this economic burden (but not appreciably in-
creasing the Polisario threat to Moroccan borders).
? Tripoli could work toward rapprochement with
Algeria and Tunisia. If achieved, the rapproche-
ment would increase Rabat's feelings of isolation
and vulnerability in the Maghreb, in our view, and
probably prompt increased urgency in Rabat's ap-
pealsfor US and French military aid.
? Finally, should Libya directly threaten Tunisia, we
believe Algeria would shift forces to that front to
protect its small neighbor. For a time, Algiers's
attention would necessarily be shifted from Rabat.
covered by shifting funds from more politically sensi-
tive parts of the government budget such as social
services and consumer subsidies.
The widening gap between Algerian and Moroccan
military inventories is likely to make Algeria bolder
and Morocco more cautious in making military initia-
tives. As Algiers perceives its growing advantage, it
will be tempted to try to intimidate Rabat. This factor
increases the likelihood of a clash, in our view,
although the current constraints against a major war
are likely to continue to weigh against escalation of
the clash. We do not anticipate that Algeria's strength
will grow to the point where an all-out invasion of
Morocco would be an attractive option.
Implications for the United States
We believe that a Moroccan-Algerian war-or even a
series of skirmishes-would be a serious setback for
US efforts to maintain close cooperation with Moroc-
co while developing an increasingly friendly relation-
ship with Algeria. Indeed, there is a significant risk
that both belligerents would be dissatisfied with the
US stand.
Rabat Will Want Too Much
We anticipate that, in a war situation, Morocco would
ask for urgent US military support. Key requests
probably would include rapid delivery of equipment
under liberal financing terms,
and perhaps air transport for its
troops. At a minimum, Rabat would demand urgent
resupply of ammunition and maintenance of US-built
aircraft. To try to secure Washington's help, Rabat
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almost certainly would back its requests with threats
to curtail US military access to Morocco for training,
port calls, and rapid deployment force contingencies.
Even without a war, Rabat's perception of the Algeri-
an threat has prompted repeated pleas to the United
States for such items as F-16 fighters, M-48 and M-
60 tanks, and a general increase in military grants
and credits. Beyond enhancing Morocco's defenses
against its neighbor, these big-ticket items would help
Hassan to maintain the allegiance of the military. We
judge his forces' loyalty would be at risk if they
believed the King was neglecting Morocco's defense
needs. Moroccan military officials in contact with the
may be at risk
if Washington does not extend more military support
soon. For now, this implied threat probably is just a
negotiating tactic to secure increased US aid cheaply.
We believe Rabat would be willing to take a different
tack and
Algiers Will Seek Strict US Neutrality
We believe that, in an environment of increased
Algerian-Moroccan tension, any gesture toward Ra-
bat by Washington would greatly complicate US
efforts to maintain cordial relations with Algiers.
Algerian officials already have complained that cur-
rent levels of US support to Morocco's military make
cooperation with Washington difficult. In periods of
peak tension, we expect that the Algerians would
press Washington to deny all of Rabat's military
requests, considering even resupply of ammunition
unacceptable. Should Washington step up support
from current levels on Rabat's behalf after hostilities
begin-if, for example, the United States provided
aircraft to lift Moroccan troops-we anticipate that
Algiers would break relations with the United States.
Algiers's perception of US support to Morocco would
at the same time be a factor weighing against escala-
tion of any clash. The Algerians already appear to
have an inflated view of US-Moroccan cooperation
and probably fear that secret defense commitments
have been signed. If fighting broke out, Algiers
probably would try to calculate the level of pressure
that could be exerted against Morocco without caus-
ing direct US intervention.
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Appendix
The overall military balance between Algeria and
Morocco is even enough to prevent either from taking
the prospect of war lightly. Morocco has a slight edge
in men under arms. Its combined services total some
220,000 men, compared with about 165,000 for Alge-
ria. At the same time, equipment inventories favor
Algeria. It has roughly a 2:1 advantage in heavy field
equipment (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery) and a
3:1 advantage in combat aircraft. The balance in
ground forces approaches 10:1 in Algeria's favor
along the northern half of their common border. F_
border area, ensuring Algeria's defense but contribut-
ing little to an effort to overrun Morocco's heartland
rapidly.
Evening the Ground Balance
Algeria's overwhelming advantage in equipment
along its border with Morocco does not, in our view,
translate into a capability to win an easy strategic
victory against Morocco. The factors listed below
would work to increase the cost to Algeria of trying to
press an unconditional surrender on Rabat. These
factors would not necessarily preclude an Algerian
victory, but they would ensure that the Algerians, like
their opponents, would suffer heavy casualties in the
contest.
Target Accessibility. There are no strategic targets in
easy reach of the Algerian Army. We believe that
Oujda, the largest city in arid eastern Morocco, would
be expendable in the fighting-to be regained in
eventual negotiations-from Rabat's point of view.
Morocco's political and economic heartland lies west
of the Atlas Mountains.
Inadequate Transport. Algeria's investment in heavy
armored equipment has not been matched by an
investment in transporters to move it quickly into
hostile territory
Algeria could muster only about 100 tank transport-
ers for an invasion, enough to lift a brigade of tanks or
armored personnel carriers deep into northern Moroc-
co. This would leave at least seven brigades in the
Difficult Terrain. We believe that pushing through
the Atlas Mountains would be costly for Algerian
forces. Few routes are passable to armor units, and
the most direct route-between Taza and Fez-is
where Moroccan forces almost certainly would con-
centrate their defenses.
[have long regar e t e
Taza Gap as the most likely invasion route. One
Algerian armor brigade funneling through this gap
and assisted by an airmobile brigade probably could
be held back for a week by Moroccan units immedi-
ately available. That would be long enough for addi-
tional Moroccan artillery and antitank units to be
brought north from Western Sahara to defend the
western end of the gap against new Algerian rein-
forcements.
the border.
Beyond the difficulty the Algerians would face in
breaking through dug-in Moroccan Army positions in
the mountain choke points, we believe they would face
significant harassment from Moroccan tribesmen en
route. In 1979 the Moroccan Foreign Minister an-
nounced that arms had been issued to civilians near
the border to enable them to face possible Algerian
aggression. We believe this tactic would be repeated
among the tribesmen in the mountains-many of
whom already have guns-if Algerian units crossed
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Morocco's Combat Experience. The Western Sahara
war has provided Morocco's Army and Air Force with
experience that would serve them well in a major 25X1
contest with Algeria. The 11-year-old war has given
Moroccan commanders and field grade officers train-
ing in movement and logistics that we anticipate
would eliminate many of the mistakes from which
their opponents would be likely to suffer in the early
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Figure 12. Moroccan antitank vehicles would slow any Algerian
stages of the war. Algeria's only significant combat
experience has been its clashes with Morocco in 1963,
1976, and 1984.
Air Balance
Algeria almost certainly would dominate an air war
with Morocco. Algeria enjoys decisive advantages:
? Better than a 3-to-1 advantage in manned and
operational interceptors.
? Nearly a 4-to-1 advantage in air defense missiles,
including surface-to-air missile coverage of all key
areas in westernmost Algeria.
? Overlapping and deep coverage (out to 50 kilome-
ters, in some instances) of high-priority targets by
several types of surface-to-air missiles, as compared
with Morocco's only surface-to-air missile, the
Chaparral, with its 6-kilometer range.
? An Air Force much less vulnerable to preemptive
strikes at the opening of hostilities because its
fighters are spread over several bases around the
country. In contrast, Morocco's primary fighters
normally are stationed at only two bases.
? MIG-25 aircraft capable of flying reconnaissance
missions at altitudes and speeds Moroccan forces
are incapable of opposing.
Morocco has much more experience in ground attack
missions-frequently conducted against the Polisario
in Western Sahara-but may have little chance to
gain from this edge. Attrition of Moroccan strike
aircraft is likely to be high if they repeatedly try to
approach targets protected by Algerian interceptors-
as all significant Algerian troop concentrations and
support areas are likely to be.
We have insufficient information to gauge the two
sides' relative skills in air interception. Neither has
had air-to-air combat experience. Even if Moroccan
flyers are somewhat better trained than their Algerian
counterparts-which they may be, thanks to joint
exercises with French, Spanish, and US intercep-
tors-we anticipate that Algeria's numerical superior-
ity would overcome this.
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Eventual Algerian command of the skies, which is
likely, would not necessarily provide decisive air sup-
port to a ground campaign to break through the Atlas
Mountains. Dislodging dug-in Moroccan defenses
from mountain passes would be difficult for even well-
trained ground attack pilots. If, as we expect, the
Algerian ground attack training is no better than that
demonstrated by other Soviet clients such as Libya, 25X1
Iraq, and Syria, we would not anticipate decimation
of Moroccan ground forces from the air.
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