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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000400560002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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~tELUGE~, Derectorate of
Intelligence
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The Afghan Army:
Marginal Improvements
E A 7-10008C
March 1987
ropy 4 2 4
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Directorate of ,Top Secret
Intelligence
? The Afghan Army:
Marginal Improvements
This paper was prepared by Office
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of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions b
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Office of Leadership Analysis, and
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NESA. It was co
ordinated with the
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Directorate of Operations.0
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 87-10008C
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The Afghan Army:
Marginal Improvements 25X1
Key Judgments Afghan ground forces have increased their combat capability slightly in the
Ir{/ormation available past year. Nevertheless, the army and paramilitary units remain plagued
as of/5 January 1987 by manpower shortages, factionalism in the senior ranks, and poor morale.
was used in this report.
These shortcomings are likely to persist despite vigorous regime and Soviet
efforts to alleviate them. It is highly unlikely that the Afghan forces will be
able to take over from the Soviets in the counterinsurgency in the
foreseeable future.
The Afghan army is experiencing the same problems that have plagued it
since the Soviet invasion:
? Ineffective recruitment, desertions, and high casualty rates in recent
operations have contributed to manpower shortages. Some operations
apparently had to be postponed last year because of manpower problems.
Experienced leadership-especially in the noncommissioned offiicer
ranks-is lacking. Morale is low.
? Factionalism in the senior ranks was heightened when Najib replaced
? Lack of equipment-especially self-propelled artillery, automatic mor-
tars, and modern armored personnel carriers-hinders performance.
Despite a protocol signed with the USSR in October 1985 to speed the
introduction of more modern Soviet equipment to Afghan units, there is
little evidence that the Afghan forces are receiving much new equipment.
On the positive side, the Afghan ground forces have increased their combat
activity in the past year. More Afghan units, including local forces, are
participating in ground operations alongside Soviet forces, and the number
of independent operations has increased. Moreover, the Afghan army is
demonstrating more unit cohesion. Disintegration of entire units under
fire-something that has occurred often in recent years-has become less
frequent.
The current Afghan army troop strength is about 50,000 to 55,000, a
decrease of about 10,000 from mid-1983 and about 25,000 from before the
Soviet invasion in 1979. One infantry division and approximately 30 border
guard battalions have been formed since January 1985.
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NESA 87-10008C
0
March 1987
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Given continuing shortcomings, however, Soviet units will continue to bear
the brunt of combat, and Afghan army and militia units will continue to
depend on Soviet ground, air, and artillery support. Moscow will be unable
to withdraw anything in the foreseeable future beyond token forces if it
wants to contain the insurgency
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Key Judgments
Slight Performance Improvements
Military Manpower Problems
Military and Political Training 9
Military Intelligence 9
A. Key Afghan Military Figures
B. Assessing Success or Failure in the Afghan Army
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Figure 1
Afghanistan
Fay::hea
~Nah~lnrr ~~e'I
L... ~.t.! .fie
{ t.owgar ? N9zi9d
A i KheyP dejt Meydin
~yPaktia~ g , ~
ardeyz~\Khnnowaf
zna arrTani
(camp)
Kamel `-~
Khan
Boundar~representaeon ~s
not necessarily authoritative
0 150 Kilometers
Tr-1
0 150 Miles
STAT
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The Afghan Army:
Marginal Improvements0
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the in
dependent operations undertaken by regime forces 25X1
Soviets launched a major effort in late 1985 to b
eginning in November 1985:
increase the size of the Afghan army and to have it
shoulder a heavier load of the fighting.
?
The Afghan Ministry of Defense planned and im- 25X1
plemented five major operations-an unusually high
number-between late December 1985 and mid-
February 1986. Each operation lasted about two
weeks and utilized regular army, sarandoy (police),
and KHAD forces,
? Regime efforts to shoulder more of the combat 25X1
burden continued through early-to-middle 1986.
Several small independent Afghan operations took
place in eastern Afghanistan,
Another largely Afghan operation was
Slight Performance Improvements
Afghan military forces have achieved a modest im-
provement in performance, in our view. We have
raised our assessment of the army's capabilities some-
what from January 1985, when we judged the Afghan
military to be almost totally ineffective.' A major
reason for this reappraisal is the increased number of
aimed at cutting off insurgent supplies destined for
Parvan Province and the Panjsher Valley. Sporadic
shortages of supplies among Panjsher Valley insur-
gents during the summer may have been in part a
result of regime operations in the area.
and advisory support.
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? Several other primarily Afghan regime operations
took place throughout the country in March~25X1
round force oper- 25X1
a ions east-nort east o ar eyz, the Herat area, 25X1
and in the Nazian Valley were conducted primarily
by Afghan army forces with Soviet air, artillery,
~ The Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) was renamed the Minis-
try of State Security in January 1986. In this Assessment KHAD
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The army managed its most impressive success since
the war began during athree-week operation in
Paktia Province during April 1986. As many as 5,000
regime troops with minimal Soviet Ground Forces'
participation captured and destroyed an important
insurgent base camp at Zhawar Killi. Regime forces,
supported by an average of 125 Soviet and Afghan
aircraft sorties a da inflicted heav losses on the
insurgents insurgent
groups in Peshawar estimated that some 150 guerril-
las had been killed or were missing and another 250
had been wounded. Their camps were overrun, and
large caches of small arms, antitank and antiperson-
nel mines, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies,
and food were captured
The fighting in Paktia resulted in heavy casualties
among regime troops. Although no reliable figures are
available for overall casualties,
there were 200 deaths in the initial assault alone.
Those casualties appear to have seriously damaged
army capabilities for further operations. A planned
major offensive into the Nazian Valley in Nangarhar
Province involving approximately three times more
Large-scale Afghan operations did not actually re-
sume until November 1986 when several regime units
fought together in Nangarhar and Qandahar
Provinces.
One of the primary reasons for the army's inability to
sustain a steady pace of offensive operations, in our
view, is a continuing shortage of troops. Recruitment
efforts have been insufficient to replace desertions and
casualties despite a large pool of manpower from
which to draw and a great emphasis on recruitment
by regime officials. According to US Census Bureau
projections, there are approximately 3.2 million male
Afghans-not including refugees in Pakistan and
Iran-between the ages of 15 and 44.
Recruitment
The regime has failed to achieve ambitious goals of
increasing the size of its chronically undermanned
Afghan regime units than Soviet
was postponed until the fall of 1986 to
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Figure 3. Afghan soldiers re-
laxing after Zhawar Killi vic-
increased to 140,000, almost three times our estimate
of its size at that time. Regime and some Soviet guard
? Afghan prisoners were coerced to serve their prison
terms as soldiers,
and road security duties were also to be transferred to ? The regime decreed pardons for draft dodgers and
the police to free more soldiers for offensive opera- deserters in late May 1986 to lure back to service
lions. those who may have become disillusioned with the
insurgents.
To meet these goals, the regime put major emphasis
on recruiting, including conscription. Regime state-
ments clearly show that the process is closely moni-
tored by the political and military leadership.
The adoption of increasingly desperate measures dur-
ing the year reflected the regime's determination to
inject new manpower into the military:
Afghan army
forces and members of KHAD surrounded all of the
high schools in Kabul in mid-June 1986 to round up
males eligible for conscription
18-year-old males were inducted on the spot.
The new conscripts apparently were not allowed to
contact their families and were not told where they
were being sent.
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civilian mem- 25X1
hers of the PDPA holding nonmilitary government 25X1
positions were to be transferred to combat areas to 25X1
serve with army units for three-month periods be-
ginning in July 1986. 25X1
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These efforts have not had a significant effect on
The Afghan military continues to suffer from a lack
of skilled professionals. Army units typically have a
disproportionately high ratio of newly trained officers
to enlisted men and small numbers of experienced
Desertions
The inability of the government to secure the loyalty
of its troops and to lower the desertion rate is an
important impediment to increasing force levels.
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Casualties
Combat casualties also seriously drain army manpow-
er, and poor medical procedures magnify this prob-
lem.
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Afghan military medical capability has shown no
significant improvement over the past couple of years.
There were severe shortages of medi-
cines, blood plasma, basic medical supplies and ban-
dages, medical personnel, and facilities. Shortages of
trained medical personnel, medications, and other
medical material allow the army to provide only
haphazard support to its units.
Leadership Factionalism
Intensified factionalism within the PDPA since Najib
replaced Babrak Karmal as party chief in May 1986
has stymied efforts to build an efficient and reliable
Conflicts between officers loyal to Babrak and those
loyal to Najib, in our view, have brought the morale
and effectiveness of even party loyalists to a new low.
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Constructing a Military Infrastructure
The Soviets and the regime, while attempting to keep
adequate numbers of troops in the army and control
factionalism, are at the same time emphasizing longer
term measures such as retraining officers, construct-
ing areliable security component in the military, and
providing more modern equipment. We believe these
efforts will have little impact unless the Soviets can
find away-perhaps through training young people in
the USSR-to expand the small number of officers
committed to the regime.
Military and Political Training
The regime is undertaking new efforts to develop a
more competent and loyal military through increased
and improved training. Senior army officers are re-
ceiving afull range of instruction on weaponry and
tactics as well as political education courses in the
also were sent to a Soviet military academy in late
1985 for refresher courses on strategy, tactics, and
operations. The PDPA Central Committee is directly
involved in the administration of a new educational
and trainin academ for the militar
Manpower shortages continue to have a serious im-
pact on training, in our judgment. Because of the
urgent need for officers, the Afghan regime has
reduced one academic year at the military academy to
seven months and compressed athree-year course into
21 months without vacation,
Conscripts receive on y one mon o
basic training at best before being sent to fight,
Military Intelligence
The military intelligence role and capability of the
Afghan regime have significantly increased in effec-
tiveness in the last 18 months, in our judgment.
KHAD Nezami (military intelligence) is focusing
primarily on identifying insurgent leaders and infil-
trators into the army, and locating insurgent caches
and supply routes. In January 1986 some KHAD
units began receiving a few tanks and transport
helicopters to enable them to react to time-sensitive
information on insurgent movements and supply ac-
tivity, KHAD is not
responsible for tactical intelligence-a mission per-
formed by divisional reconnaissance battalions
KHAD agents are specially picked for their ability to
mingle with the insurgents, especially those involved
in the movement of supplies.
Despite improvements in KHAD's ability to react to
timely intelligence and to penetrate some insurgent
groups, we believe the army, as a whole, still lacks
tactical intelligence-especially on insurgent battle
plans~n which to make sound combat decisions.
Conventionally structured Afghan reconnaissance
battalions are not well suited for collecting combat
intelligence in a counterinsurgency environment, in
our view. Inability to anticipate insurgent attacks and
failure to plan adequately for operations against
insurgents remain serious problems.
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Enhanced Equipment
In the first years of the war the Soviets were slow to
provide deliveries and basically replaced damaged and
wornout equipment. Moscow over the past three years
has increased Afghan army stocks but with older and
relatively inexpensive models and types of equipment.
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Senior-level regime officials regularly seek to demon-
strate publicly their commitment to the army. The
Minister of Defense, Minister of Nationalities and
Tribal Fairs, and Minister of Interior were all
present at a military exercise and weapons display at
Kabul last April, according to press accounts. They
toured the air force helicopters, radar units, signal
and engineering units, and logistics, light artillery,
and air-defense weapons displays before observing the
Regime forces continue
to be equipped with only small numbers of the more
modern BMP and BTR-60 armored personnel carri-
ers. There is no evidence of newer or upgraded
equipment such as the Vasilek 120-mm mortar, BMP-
2, or self-propelled artillery. The regime armored
force at Herat has T-62 tanks, however, and an army-
level multiple rocket launcher battalion at Kabul is
equipped with the newer BM-21 rocket launcher.
set piece exercise.
Regime troops returning to Kabul from the Zhawar
Killi campaign in April were warmly greeted by high-
ranking members of the government and were praised
by regime media for their military skill and courage.
The PDPA Politburo and Presidium of the Revolu-
tionary Council instructed the Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of State Security
to grant mass promotions in late April, according to
press accounts.
In a further attempt at raising the armed forces'
morale, several decrees were approved in August by
the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, the
regime legislature:
? A new title of "Hero of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan" was created.
? The army received a new national symbol or badge.
? Certain units were designated heroic units and
awarded distinct banners.
We believe these moves have done little to improve
the low state of morale. The mostly symbolic rewards
offered by the government have not been able to
overcome the effects of poor pay, separation from
families, inadequate medical support, and shortages
of food and other supplies.
There has not been a corresponding increase in equip-
ment within Afghan units. This suggests that most of
this equipment replaced combat losses.
The Soviet reluctance to deliver more modern equip-
ment, in our view, reflects concern about the army's
ability to use or maintain sophisticated military hard-
Regime soldiers during 1985 were issued new Kalash-
nikov assault rifles but depend on trucks and World
War II-type tanks and personnel carriers for trans-
portation and support
country.
The regime has emphasized over the past year devel-
oping the military capabilities of local forces to
include border troops, sarandoy (police), and militias
to supplement regular forces. These paramilitary or-
ganizations include a broad range of forces drawn
from various villages and tribes in all parts of the
these armed citizenries are becoming increasingly
widespread in the southeastern border provinces
where they harass and interdict-even if they cannot
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DRA Army:
1: hlaJor, service dress
2: Infantryman, summer dress
8, 4: Junior Lt. Bc radioman, Commandos
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U1tA Ar~+;
l; F'rtvaEn, 9eourity'i'mope 9; Gaptnln end Cinr& infantry
~; Inl~ntrym~, wintQr dree?
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Soviet and regime aircraft and artillery
defeat or control-the resistance. The presence of
these local forces provides a semblance of government
control, freeing Soviet and Afghan regime troops
from static defensive positions. The local troops are
also inexpensive to equip and get around traditional
Afghan suspicions of regular forces.
different lines of command to Kabul.
Border Troops
Located in provinces that border Pakistan and Iran,
they operate under the Ministry of Defense through
the Border Security Command. In general they are
lightly armed, but their knowledge of the local terrain
and conditions gives them a useful intelligence capa-
bility.
Border troops fighting without Soviet or regular army
assistance have sustained significant losses from in-
surgent attacks in the past year,
In early April 1986 at least five
or er atta ions m t e provinces of Nanearhar.
Paktia, and andahar were severel mauled by insur-
gents, Most of the
troops were killed or wounded or had defected.
The Soviets and Afghan regime appear determined to
enhance the performance of the border troops.
border brigades
control of KHAD. KHAD's improved organizational
effectiveness, coupled with an already established,
though weak, military structure, should bring im-
regime remain weak.
This is an area in which the Soviets and the Afghan
are slow to respond to beleaguered border forces,
although Soviet and regime regular forces rescue
border troops in dire straits. Analysis of past insur-
gencies reveals that quick reaction is essential to
motivate local forces to resist strongly when attacked.
Sarandoy
Some police-type units under the control of the Minis-
try of Interior have been transformed over the past
year into a light infantry force,
organized almost like 25X1
army battalions. At least one Sarandoy battalion is
located in each provincial capital,
Some units have T-34 tanks and 12.7-mm 25X1
heavy machineguns, enabling them to engage small,
lightly equipped insurgent groups,
Since early January 1985 five battalion-size Sarandoy
operational forces have been stationed in various parts
of Kabol Province,
One, responsible for Kabul city, consists of 11
units of 100 men each. Their mission is the neutraliza-
tion of the insurgents, and they have contributed to
the improved security position in and around Kabul.
In our view, the regime hopes sarandoy operational
forces will play a key role in the consolidation and 25X1
improvement of its control over urban areas, especial- 25X1
ly Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul. Sarandoy capabili-
Tribal Militias ,
The Soviets and the regime, especially since Najib's
rise to power, have reemphasized efforts to form
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and battalions were to be placed directly under the
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militias, mostly among Pashtun tribes. Traditional
leaders are provided arms and other bribes in return
for opposing local resistance groups who are often
longstanding enemies as well as groups seeking to
move supplies through tribal areas to other parts of
the country. Originally responsible for providing secu-
rity along main highways, some tribal militia units
participate with regular army units, sarandoy units,
and border troops in the larger operations.
More tribes and chiefs appear to be making deals with
has been the most active and successful recruiter of
militias by giving insurgent groups large cash pay-
ments, salaries, and weapons,
Militiamen are generally paid 3,000 to 7,000
Afghanis per month ($60-140), and families of militia
personnel in Nangarhar Province are provided with
free rations
The capabilities of the various tribal militias vary
substantially.
e ra i Iona ea er
has not ma a goo on promises to impede ows o
vital insurgent supplies through his area. Despite the
fact that they collect a monthly salary and accept
weapons from the government, they identify more
with the insurgents than the regime,
greatly hindered local insurgents
in the Qandahar area Ismatullah Achakzai, the leader
of the transborder Achakzais-a tribe that has long
cooperated with Kabul to obtain local advantages and
autonomy-has established numerous posts and
Although we believe the Soviets will continue to
exploit old divisions among the Pashtuns and seek
ways to take advantage of Pashtun pragmatism, we
doubt that the tribal groups will make a substantial
difference. As in the past, local leaders hedge their
bets by occasionally cooperating with both sides.
even the Achakzais
occasiona y attac oca po ice posts in one area while
maintaining a facade of loyalty to the regime.
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Soviet Advisers-Key to Survival
Over 3,000 Soviet military advisers throughout the
~4fghan military down to many battalion-size units
provide an immediate link to Soviet military sup-
port-logistic, intelligence, and combat.
ithout the direct access to Soviet
The capability of the regime military to fight the
insurgents probably will improve marginally, but, in
our view, the improvements will not be substantial
enough to allow the army to deal effectively
with the insurgents in the foreseeable future unless
the insurgent threat is reduced significantly.
Manpower shortages will continue to present the most
serious obstacle to the improvement of regime mili-
tary effectiveness. We believe that many conscripts
will continue to desert at the first opportunity. Recent
conscription efforts, in our opinion, will do little to
improve the situation, and many civilians will proba-
bly flee the country or join the insurgents rather than
insurgent military pressures.
firepower provided by Soviet military advisers, we
believe most regime units could not long withstand
Soviet advisers' interference in regime military
fairs produces serious resentment and stifles cor~fr-
dence and initiative of thefew competent and reliable
~Qfghan commanders.
be forced into service. Desertions, casualties, and
problems in developing and keeping trained noncom-
missioned officers will force the army to limit inde-
pendent operations, in our view. Distrust and jockey-
ing for advantage among the senior military members
of the Parcham and Khalq factions will also remain a
serious problem for the senior military leadership.
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In our view, in the near term the Soviets and the
Afghan regime will focus on solving several pressing
issues:
? The Afghan army may curtail major independent
offensive operations over the next several months
and concentrate on assimilating and training the
new recruits resulting from the recent major con-
scription efforts.
? The Kabul regime probably will seek to further
increase the numbers of border battalions, national
brigades (militias), and police (sarandoyJ units par-
ticularly in eastern Afghanistan in order to reduce
insurgent resupply activities, deny civilian support,
and expand government control over the
countryside.
? Attempts will be made to significantly improve the
effectiveness of Soviet military advisers in regime
units.
Prospects for significant improvement in the Afghan
military over the longer term do not seem much
brighter. The only scenarios that we see that would
bring improvement would be significant Soviet/
regime military successes or insurgent inactivity
resulting from the loss of external sanctuary and
support. We view these scenarios as unlikely, however,
even over the longer term
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Appendix A
Key Afghan Military Figures
Lt. Gen. Sayed
Mohammad Gulabzoi
Minister o1'Interior
(since December 1979)
Undisputed Khalqi leader in the Kabul regime who
has increased his power and influence in the midst of
continued Parcham factional feuding ...aligned him-
self with Najib at May 1986 plenum where Najib
became general secretary ...was instrumental in en-
gineering resignation of Babrak Karmal from top
party and government posts in November 1986,
~as played
increasingly active role in defense matters ...has
primary responsibility for security of Kabul area and
personally led his police forces in fighting against
resistance around city ...recently promoted to rank
of three-star general ...elected candidate member of
Politburo in November 1986 ... confidant of Foreign
Minister Abdul Wakil, a Parchami ...champion of
Pashtun interests ...may have greater claim to loyal-
ty of Pashtuns brought into government and party
under fellow Pashtun Najib than the general secre-
tary himself ...about 46.
Gen. Mohammad Rafi
Minister of National Delense
(since 4 December 1986)
Career military officer who brings experience to his
ministerial post, having once before (1979-82) served
as Defense Minister ... an opportunistic Parchami
with close ties to Khalqi leader and Interior Minister
Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi ...midway through ex-
tensive training in USSR in early 1980s, was removed
as Defense Minister by Babrak Karmal and given
largely powerless post of Deputy Prime Minister for
Pashtun, about 42.
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Maj. Gen. Shahnawaz Tanai
ChieJ'oI the Armed Forces
General Stgf~'
(since March 1985)
A young (36), two-star general who probably appeals
to the Kabul regime because of his staunch belief in
party unity .. .
Solayman Laeq
Minister of Nationalities
and Tribal ~gfJairs
(since June 1981)
a Pasa Pas n
was a captain
serving as company commander of an airborne
brigade in 1978 when Taraki regime came to power
...was rewarded for his party activism by his subse-
quent rapid rise in the military hierarchy ...under
Babrak Karmal served as commander of the 8th
Division based outside Kabul and later as commander
of the strategically important I Corps (or Central
Forces) guarding the capital ...has been a member of
the PDPA Central Committee since August 1983.
A longtime friend and confidant of Najib who was
promoted to full membership in the Politburo after
Najib became PDPA general secretary ... a Pashtun,
active in regime's still unsuccessful attempts to win
over tribesmen on both sides of Afghanistan-Pakistan
border ...good connections with the resistance
through family ties-sister once married to Sibgha-
tullah Mojadedi of the resistance alliance ...former
devout Muslim who joined Communist Party at
founding in 1965 ... well-known intellectual and
award-winning poet in Pashtu and Dari who, although
diehard Communist, still respected by many Afghans,
. was neighbor of
regime's national anthem ...about 60.
Stan and as newspaper editor ...early Babrak Kar-
mal supporter and Minister of Radio and Television
under Nur Mohammad Taraki regime ...author of
a~i wen atter in me ica sc ool and swayed him
toward Communism ...worked for Radio Afghani-
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Appendix B
Assessing Success or Failure
in the Afghan Army
Our judgments about the effectiveness of the Afghan Intelligence. Improvement in collection and use of
army are based on analysis of several key factors that
we believe provide a good measure of progress or
failure in the counterinsurgency effort.
Morale and Factionalism. We believe attitudinal
factors are especially vital to the performance of the
intelligence is vital to any counterinsurgency effort.
Afghan military.
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Combat Cohesion. We believe Afghan performance in
battle is an important measure of progress in such
areas as command and control, leadership capabili-
ties, and tactical sophistication.
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