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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000400500002-2
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of See, t
Intelligence
USSR-Iran: Prospects for
a Troubled Relationship
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 87-1000IX
SOVA 87-10002X
January 1987
Copy 4 51
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Directorate of
Intelligence
a Troubled Relationship
USSR-Iran: Prospects for
This paper was prepared by
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Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
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Analysis, and Office of
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Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Persian Gulf Division, NES
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25X1
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 87-10001X
SOYA 87-10002X
January 1987
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USSR-Iran: Prospects for
a Troubled Relationship 25X1
Key Judgments Relations between the USSR and Iran are troubled by longstanding
Information available differences that are likely to prevent a significant improvement in ties at
as of 19 December 1986 least as long as Khomeini is alive. The clerics' abhorrence of atheistic
was used in this report.
Communism has reinforced the Iranians' historical hostility toward Russia
and fostered deep-seated suspicions about Soviet intentions toward the
Islamic republic. Moscow is angry over the clerics' continuing anti-Soviet
behavior but believes its major objective is achieved as long as the United
States remains excluded from Iran
Iran would like to improve relations to obtain major Soviet arms, economic
benefits from increased trade, and diminished Soviet support to Iraq, but
the Soviets are likely to hold fast to demands for Iranian concessions on key
issues as a precondition for closer ties. The demands include a reduction in
anti-Soviet rhetoric and support for the Afghan resistance as well as
moderation in its conditions for ending the war with Iraq. Iran is unlikely
to meet those demands in the near term unless military or economic
setbacks threaten the regime's survival and a turn toward Moscow is
viewed as essential to stave off disaster.
The USSR's capability to influence events in Iran is limited, and its
willingness to intervene militarily is constrained by the possibility of
confrontation with the West. Moscow has a variety of assets it might use to
exert pressure on Iran, but any such effort could be counterproductive and
push Iran closer to the West.
Moscow's opportunities for gaining influence in a post-Khomeini Iran will
increase if factional strife leads to major shifts in the political balance. A
government controlled by left-leaning technocrats or Revolutionary Guard
leaders might be more inclined to look to the Soviets for military and
economic aid and less hostile to Soviet foreign policy goals in the region. In
a less likely scenario, even a government dominated by radical clerics
might decide that closer ties to Moscow would best serve its domestic and
foreign policy goals, at least temporarily.
If Iran experienced a prolonged upheaval after Khomeini, the Soviets
would enjoy expanded opportunities for exploitation, particularly among
Iran's minorities near the lengthy border with the USSR. Moscow,
however, probably does not possess the assets inside Iran to exert signifi-
cant influence on events or policies in Tehran. Furthermore, a Soviet
military invasion of Iran is unlikely in the next several years.
Secret
NESA 87-10001X
SOVA 87-10002X
January 1987
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Even after Khomeini's death, Moscow is unlikely to make major moves to
improve relations until Tehran reduces its anti-Soviet rhetoric and posture.
In the unlikely event that a successor government in Tehran avoided major
factional infighting, it might take the initiative to meet some Soviet
demands, but it probably would balance such steps with overtures toward
the West, eventually including the United States.
Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq and its support for the resistance in
Afghanistan have been and are likely to continue to be major impediments
to closer relations with the USSR, even after Khomeini dies. His successors
might have less personal commitment to these policies, but they will
hesitate to change them for fear of being accused of betraying Khomeini's
legacy. Although the Soviets have tilted toward Iraq since 1982, they do
not want either Iran or Iraq to emerge a clear victor. The Soviets oppose
the war because it has led many Persian Gulf states to increase their
security cooperation with the United States, allowed the United States to
improve its ties to Baghdad, and, in Moscow's eyes, diverted Arab
attention from opposing Western imperialism and Israeli expansionism.
Moscow is unlikely to risk souring relations with Baghdad without the
prospect of significant gains in Tehran.
Iran is unlikely to approve a political settlement in Afghanistan that does
not provide for a Soviet withdrawal. Tehran's material support for the
Afghan resistance probably will remain limited and directed mainly to
Shia insurgents.
Any significant improvement of Tehran's relations with Washington
probably will be more a factor of the outcome of the post-Khomeini power
struggle than of Moscow's policies.
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Secret
{ Key Judgments
Soviet Objectives in Iran
Keeping the United States Out
1
Changing Iran's Anti-Soviet Policies
1
Stopping Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance
2
Ending the Iran-Iraq War
Soviet Leverage
Espionage and Covert Activity
Opportunities in the Post-Khomeini Era
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
North
Caucasus
Military
District
Caspian
Sea
Cyp us 'r
Mediterranean
Sea BEIRUT
Leban
Isr
Tel Aviv-Yafo,
Syria
nannsetts
Aral
Sea
-E;fahan
Iran
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Strait of
Hormuz
United Arab\ Arabian
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Secret
USSR-Iran: Prospects for
a Troubled Relationship
Revolutionary Iran's policy toward the USSR has
displayed deep-seated antagonism tempered by an
awareness of the potential benefits of staying on good
terms with Moscow. The clerics' antagonism toward
the Soviets is based on the Islamic concept of a
constant state of war between the Muslim and non-
Muslim worlds. Khomeini has described the two
superpowers as forming an antagonistic front against
Islam and being guided by worthless "human ideolo-
gies." His call for "neither East nor West" sums up
his view of Iran as a country guided by universal,
divinely revealed truth standing up to the more
powerful but ideologically bankrupt superpowers.
Despite Moscow's atheism, Khomeini has labeled the
USSR as the "lesser Satan" and the United States as
the "great Satan." US support for the Shah, whom
Khomeini charged with undermining traditional Is-
lamic values and repressing the Islamic movement,
made the United States a more prominent target for
the Ayatollah's wrath. In addition, the United States
and the West, because of their greater influence
worldwide, are seen as larger threats to Islam than the
USSR.
In shaping their policy toward the USSR, the clerics
have been guided by traditional Iranian geopolitical
considerations and concern about Soviet meddling in
Iran's domestic affairs. The Iranians are suspicious of
Moscow because of:
? Historical hostility toward Russia.
? Soviet support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war.
? The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
? Soviet covert activities and links to the banned
Tudeh (Communist) Party.
Keeping the United States Out
Moscow had long sought to undermine Washington's
influence and presence in Iran, and, with the fall of
the Shah, this objective was achieved. Keeping the
United States out remains the primary goal but
requires little effort as long as Khomeini is ardently
opposed to the United States.
Changing Iran's Anti-Soviet Policies
With the United States on the sidelines, Moscow has
felt free to take a hard line toward Iran's anti-Soviet
actions. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet in June
1983, then Foreign Minister Gromyko said "the
USSR will act with regard to whether Iran wishes to
reciprocate its actions and maintain normal relations
with us or whether it has different intentions." In
March 1985, Pravda stated that Soviet-Iranian rela-
tions would not improve unless Tehran took
"concrete" steps to correct "intolerable" activities.
These include:
? A sustained reduction in Iran's anti-Soviet propa-
ganda. Iran's public line equating the USSR with
the United States is galling to the Soviets, and
frequent criticism at Friday prayer meetings in
Tehran annoys Moscow.
? Permission to replace the 18 Soviet diplomats ex-
pelled in 1983 and to reopen the Soviet Consulate in
the northern Iranian town of Rasht.
? An improvement in economic cooperation, such as
reopening the natural gas pipeline to the USSR. 25X1
? An end to the repression of the Tudeh Party.
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The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the late 1970s
posed a vexing problem for the Soviets. The move-
ment's fervent rejection of Western values presented
opportunities for Moscow's efforts to undermine US
influence in the Muslim world, but it also threatened
Soviet interests closer to home, namely in Afghani-
stan. Initially, Soviet theoreticians and academics
were cautiously optimistic, but they have grown
progressively more pessimistic in their evaluation of
the extent that Islamic fundamentalism serves Soviet
interests.
In one of the first Soviet reactions to the Iranian
revolution, Kommunist published an article by Tudeh
Party First Secretary Kianuri, who praised it as a
peoples, anti-imperialist, and socially progressive
revolution. Others noted its negative attitude toward
atheistic ideologies. In 1980, Moscow's senior Third
World theoretician Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy wrote that
the Shia clergy offered the only real chance for
revolution in Iran because the Shah's regime had
terrorized all other resistance groups, including the
Communists. He noted, however, that the clergy was
critical of the "left democratic movement, especially
toward the party of scientific socialism," the Tudeh.
Still, in 1981 at the 26th Soviet Communist Party
congress, Brezhnev stated that "we Communists treat
with respect the religious convictions of people pro-
fessing Islam. "
Soviet views gradually became more critical. In 1982,
Ul'yanovskiy called the Iranian revolution an expres-
sion of class struggle but charged the clergy with
monopolizing power and pursuing bourgeois policies.
He argued that an Islamic society was an "illusory
quest for a third path between capitalism and social-
ism and cannot have any real long-term historical
prospects"but said the revolution was continuing and
`;lull of contradictory potentialities. " By 1985 he
claimed the revolution was 'fettered from the very
beginning by the chains of Muslim fanaticism. " He
also had little sympathy for the outlawed left, blam-
ing many of its problems and its weakness on its
failure to unite.
Still, Soviet interpretations of the Iranian revolution
vary. Elena Doroshenko of the Soviet Oriental Insti-
tute and a specialist on religion in Iran wrote in 1985
that the Shia clergy not only played a leading role in
the overthrow of the Shah, but, in a Muslim country,
were in the best position to voice opposition to the
Shah's government. Semyon Agayev, who is associat-
ed with Ul'yanovskiy, portrays the clergy as joining
the revolution only after it was well under way and
then exploiting the popular victory to seize power.
Common to both authors' views is the notion that the
Islamic revolution in Iran was a promising opportuni-
ty that went wrong.
Soviet authors spend little time directly addressing
the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on the Muslim
peoples of the Soviet Union, although they, and
Soviet policymakers, almost certainly view the phe-
nomenon as a threat to stability in Central Asia.
Soviet propaganda since 1917 has portrayed religion
as an antipopular, repressive, and retrograde influ-
ence that will be eradicated under socialism. In
recent years, however, the regime has shown height-
ened concern over pockets of resurgence in religious
belief among Soviet citizens.
Stopping Iranian Support to the Afghan Resistance
The Soviet position on withdrawal from Afghanistan,
first stated in 1980, holds that support for the insur-
gents must cease first and be guaranteed by Iran as
well as Pakistan. Prospects for a Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan remain dim, but, as the UN-
sponsored talks have intensified over the last year, the
Soviets have begun to emphasize the need to include
Iran in the settlement process. Should Pakistan and
the Afghan Government reach a settlement, the Sovi-
ets could stall their withdrawal by insisting that Iran
sign a comprehensive agreement. Thus far, Iran has
refused to participate in the negotiations
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Moscow welcomed the overthrow of the Shah and the
collapse of US-Iranian relations in 1979, initially
believing that the Iranian revolution promised a
socialist-oriented future. Moscow signaled its interest
in improving relations with Tehran by praising the
progressive aspects of the revolution and the historic
ties between the two countries. Soviet media, howev-
er, stopped short of fully supporting the new regime
and noted the distinction between the `progressive
masses" and the radical clerics. After Iraq invaded
Iran in September 1980, Moscow imposed an arms
embargo on Soviet weapons going to both countries-
a move that affected Iran far less than Iraq. Khomei-
ni left relations essentially unchanged despite his
inherent distrust of the atheistic Soviets.
By 1982 relations were becoming more hostile. Iran
drove Iraqi forces out of all but small pockets of
Iranian territory. Moscow, concerned that Iran was
gaining the upper hand, resumed its arms supplies to
Baghdad. The clerics began imposing restrictions on
their nominal allies in the Tudeh Party. Iran closed
its natural gas pipeline to the USSR, reduced the
Soviet diplomatic presence, terminated cultural rela-
tions, and allowed Afghan rebels to operate from
Iranian territory. In early 1983 the Iranians arrested
Tudeh members, including the general secretary, on
charges of spying for the Soviet KGB. In May, Iran
expelled 18 Soviet diplomats for interfering in Irani-
an internal affairs.
In response to these developments, Kommunist pub-
lished a landmark article by Rostislav U!'yanovskiy.
He presented an authoritative Marxist-Leninist con-
demnation of the Khomeini regime and its Islamic
revolution and stated that clerical rule of Iran would
lead to "Islamic despotism."
Iran has been uncompromising in its support for the
political aims of the Afghan resistance, including an
unconditional Soviet withdrawal, but it has provided
only limited material support. Iran is restrained by its
commitment of resources to the war with Iraq and by
its concern not to provoke a serious Soviet reaction.
Iran's support is far below that of Pakistan and
directed almost exclusively to Afghan Shias. The
Iranians have grudgingly approved the Pakistan-
Afghanistan talks but are suspicious that the talks
will lead to a sellout of the resistance. Iran has warned
Pakistan that it would oppose any such outcome.
Statements by Iranian leaders in 1986 indicate Iran
may have dropped its insistence on the creation of an
Islamic state as an ultimate solution in Afghanistan
and would accept a broad-based government in Ka-
bul. Iran probably hopes its modified stance will
encourage a Soviet withdrawal and help Tehran's
efforts to improve relations with Moscow.
support to a resolution of the conflict.
Ending the Iran-Iraq War
Moscow has consistently called for an end to the Iran-
Iraq war. When Iran crossed into Iraqi territory in
1982, Moscow urged Iran to be more willing to
negotiate an end to the war. This became an explicit
Soviet demand for improved relations during the visit
of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani to Mos-
cow in August 1986. The Soviets in their public
comments tied broader Soviet political and economic
We believe that one of Moscow's longstanding policies
in the region has been to attempt to maintain strong
relations with both Iraq and Iran, recognizing that
Iran is the greater strategic prize but that, over the
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years, Iraq has been more pro-Soviet. Moscow's rela-
tions with Iraq's President Saddam Husayn are not
trouble free. They have been strained over the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet arms embargo in
1980-81, Iraq's repression of Communists, and Bagh-
dad's improving ties to the West. The two countries
nonetheless maintain a fair degree of cooperation. The
Soviets almost certainly would not risk endangering
those ties, as they did in the early 1980s, without the
promise of at least commensurate gains in Iran.
We do not believe that the Iran-Iraq war has served
Moscow's overall interests in the region. It has led
many of the Persian Gulf states to increase their
security cooperation with the United States; given the
United States an opportunity to improve its ties to
Baghdad; and diverted Arab attention from the more
important issues, in Moscow's eyes, of opposing West-
ern imperialism and Israeli expansionism. Despite
their support for Baghdad, we do not believe that the
Soviets want either Iran or Iraq to emerge a clear
victor. If the Soviets believed that a major Iraqi
defeat was imminent, they would be under pressure to
increase their aid to maintain their credibility. Al-
though the Soviets are not unlikely to provide direct
combat support to Iraq, they probably would extend
emergency military assistance.
Over the past two years, Iran has sought improved
relations with the USSR, although it has been unwill-
ing to make more than minor concessions to mollify
Moscow. this effort has been
pushed by those we consider pragmatists who have
been concerned over:
? Iran's declining fortunes in the war.
? The deteriorating economic situation.
? The US-Iraqi rapprochement in 1984.
? The belief that Iran is increasingly threatened by
the United States.
Iran's initiatives have led to a series of reciprocal
visits. Although discussions to date have emphasized
economic matters, we believe Iran has sought closer
military and political cooperation as well. The Irani-
ans have asked Syria and Libya to convince the
Soviets of Tehran's desire for cooperation in these
areas.
Tehran took several other steps in 1985 toward meet-
ing Soviet conditions for improving relations:
? It toned down anti-Soviet rhetoric in the Iranian
media and Friday prayer sermons.
? It whitewashed anti-Soviet graffiti at the Soviet
Embassy in Tehran.
? It postponed indefinitely the trial of Tudeh members
arrested in 1983 on espionage charges.
Tehran might make additional minor adjustments.
For example, the level of anti-Soviet rhetoric could be
further reduced, Tehran might allow the Soviet diplo-
matic presence to grow, and some of the Tudeh
members could be discreetly released or tried but
given reduced or suspended sentences.
We believe these concessions are close to the maxi-
mum the Iranian regime will make until there is a
decisive shift in the regime's internal political balance.
We do not expect the regime to grant the Tudeh legal
status or to end Tehran's support for the Afghan
resistance. Conservatives in the leadership have suffi-
cient leverage to prevent major concessions to Mos-
cow, even in the unlikely event pragmatists and
radicals wanted to pursue such a course.
For its part, Moscow shut down in September 1986
the National Voice of Iran, a radio station located in
Baku and affiliated with exiles of the banned Tudeh
Party. It had repeatedly called for the overthrow of
the Khomeini regime. Besides attempting to appease
the Iranians, the Soviets may be courting more lenient
treatment of Tudeh members in Iran.
compel a change in policy.
We believe that the USSR has little leverage to force
Iran to be more accommodating. Moscow could raise
the cost for Iranian intransigence but apparently
believes pressure tactics would only increase Iranian
antagonism without hurting the Iranians enough to
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Table 1
USSR-Iran Diplomatic Visits, 1984-86
Spring 1984
Moscow
Iranian Foreign Ministry
officials
April 1985
Moscow
Deputy Foreign Minister
Kazempur-Ardabili
February 1986
Tehran
First Deputy Foreign
Minister Korniyenko
June 1986
Tehran
Middle-level Soviet
eonomic delegation
August 1986
Moscow
Deputy Foreign Minister
Larijani
August 1986
Moscow
Iranian Oil Minister
Aqazadeh
December 1986 Tehran
Chairman of Soviet State
Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations
Katushev
Resume Joint Economic Committee (JEC); allow more frequent use of
Soviet airspace by Iranian commercial aircraft; in principle, reopen
Iranian-Soviet gas pipeline.
Soviets announce technicians to return, but no date specified; improved
relations conditional on end of Iran-Iraq war.
First JEC meeting in six years; agreed to continuing efforts to expand
economic ties; open dissension over issues of Iran-Iraq war and
Afghanistan.
Economic
We would not expect improved trade relations to
strengthen substantially Iran's economy. Nonetheless,
Iran during the past two years has focused on expand-
ing economic ties, both because of its limited options
for improving the dire state of its economy and
because it hopes economic links will pave the way for
Soviet military aid. The USSR has allowed the
economic dialogue to move ahead slowly, apparently
using the prospect of expanded economic ties as an
inducement for Iran to soften its political animosity.
There are several potential areas for economic cooper-
ation.
Iranian Natural Gas Exports. Before 1980, Iran's
primary export to the USSR was natural gas, but
sales ended that year in a dispute over price and the
portion of payment made in hard currency. Economic
problems have made Tehran increasingly eager to
resume gas exports to the Soviet Union and more
willing to accept barter terms. Moscow, for its part,
could then free more domestic gas for export or
internal needs.
Nevertheless, Moscow has fewer economic incentives
than Iran to renew gas purchases and would probably
do so only in return for political concessions and
guarantees that supplies would not be interrupted as
they were in 1980. Since the collapse of the last gas
agreement, the USSR has built new pipelines to
transport Siberian gas to the Baku and Transcaucasus
areas, greatly reducing the need for Iranian gas.F_
Although Tehran and Moscow agreed in August 1986
to study the resumption of gas sales, we believe that
depressed energy prices will make it difficult for them
to agree on a price that would justify Iranian invest-
ment in gas production and pipelines. The existing gas
pipelines to the USSR would require substantial time
and money to repair. Moreover, in the coming years
we expect that Iran will require substantial quantities
of gas for domestic use and for injection into oil wells
to maintain oil production.
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Table 2
Iran: Trade With the USSR,
1979-85
Soviet Imports
(million US $)
Share of Iranian
Exports (percent)
Soviet Exports
(million US $)
Share of Iranian
Imports (percent)
1979
209
1.0
416
5.3
1980
116
0.9
399
3.7
1981
653
5.6
568
5.3
1982
260
1.4
797
8.2
1983
509
2.6
755
4.9
1984
298
1.7
297
1.9
1985
173
1.1
244
2.2
Technical Assistance. Tehran's steel and power indus-
tries have long relied on Soviet technical assistance
and were hurt when Moscow withdrew the last of its
technicians in 1985 because of the threat to their
safety posed by the war. The Soviet Union announced
in August 1986 that Moscow would return the techni-
cians when their safety could be guaranteed. Their
return is probably on hold until either the war ends or
the political atmosphere improves substantially. Al-
though the Soviets probably were genuinely con-
cerned about the safety of Soviet citizens in cities that
were being bombed by Iraq, they might also hope to
use the technicians' return to press Iran to enter peace
negotiations with Iraq. Tehran may have made the
return of the technicians a precondition for a meeting
of the Iran-Soviet Joint Economic Committee.F_
The long-run potential for Soviet technical assistance
is not good. Iranian officials, particularly technocrats,
have indicated that they prefer Japanese and West
European technology and view Soviet expertise as
inferior. The Iranians also consider Soviet equipment
as substandard and constantly in need of repair. The
government encourages Iranian students to study in
the United States or Europe. Those requesting studies
in the USSR are viewed with suspicion. Nevertheless,
the USSR's willingness to offer barter arrangements
during financially difficult times and Tehran's desire
to diversify trade will encourage at least limited use of
Soviet technology.
Oil Cooperation. The plunge in oil prices in 1986 has
added a new issue to Soviet-Iranian economic rela-
tions. The USSR's dependence on oil revenues for a
large part of its foreign exchange presents a coinci-
dence of vital economic interests with Iran not present
in other areas. Iran's role in OPEC decisions poten-
tially gives it more influence with Moscow than is
provided by any bilateral trade agreement. According
to press reports, Iran has sought Soviet cooperation in
its drive to have oil-exporting countries reduce output
and shore up prices. Moscow gave rhetorical support
to Tehran's accusations that a plot by Western na-
tions against the Third World was behind the fall in
oil prices. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union declined an
invitation by Iran to meet with other oil-producing
countries before an OPEC meeting last June.
Press reports indicate Iran and the Soviet Union are
interested in joint development of oil and gas in the
southern Caspian Sea. A border dispute has hindered
this activity,
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reached a postrevolution peak in 1982 of 2,500 to
3,000 working on some 55 projects. This compares
with approximately 4,500 advisers who were present
in Iran before the overthrow of the Shah. Moscow
Radio claims that as of March 1986 the USSR had
trained more than 85,000 workers and set up 20
training centers in Iran. By far the largest Soviet
presence has been at power plant construction sites
near Esfahan and Ahvaz and steel complexes near
Esfahan. In addition, specialists have helped with
numerous smaller development projects and industri-
al operations.
According to press reports, several hundred techni-
cians were withdrawn from the Ahvaz power project
in March 1984 because of the war. Remaining techni-
cians throughout the country were withdrawn by June
1985 following increased fighting in the spring of that
year.
Press reports indicate that Iranian and Soviet experts
agreed in principle last summer that future discus-
sions of technical cooperation would focus on several
power and steel projects: draft agreements for the
Soviets to build two hydroelectric installations along
the border at Khoda Afarin and Bist Qal'eh on the
Aras River; arrangements for the return of workers to
the partly completed thermal power stations in Esfa-
han and Ahvaz; and completion of the first phase
expansion of the Esfahan steel mill to 900,000 metric
tons per year
Iran has made Caspian Sea projects a priority in its
oil development plans and is pressing ahead with a
$300 million first-phase exploration well to be com-
pleted within two years.
Transit Trade. The amount of Iranian goods imported
through the USSR has declined considerably over the
past four years, reducing the leverage this trade
c o e
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according to Iranian trade data.
afforded Moscow. In the early 1980s Iran's depen-
dence on the USSR for the transshipment of goods
had increased sharply because the war reduced Iran's
use of its two major ports on the Persian Gulf.
Tehran's expansion of ports in the southern Gulf since
1982 and lower import levels since 1983, however,
reversed the trend. In 1984 Iran imported only about
13 percent of its goods through the Soviet Union,
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Military
We believe that the 26 motorized rifle divisions and
one tank division in three Soviet military districts
north of Iran and the equivalent of six divisions in
Afghanistan give Moscow a potent lever over Iran.
The divisions in the Turkestan, Transcaucasus, and
North Caucasus military districts are among the least
well equipped of Soviet forces in the USSR's border
regions and are in a low state of readiness in peace-
time. Nevertheless, we believe that these forces are
sufficient, when mobilized, to mount either a limited
or full-scale invasion of Iran on relatively short notice
without reinforcement from Soviet forces opposite
NATO or China
We consider a Soviet invasion of Iran unlikely during
the 1980s. The Soviet leadership would face an
agonizing decision to use this option. Soviet forces
would face fierce Iranian resistance as well as major
terrain and logistic problems. The Soviets would be
acutely aware that a US military response would
further complicate the task and risk a broader super-
power confrontation. Moscow probably would consid-
er pursuing this option only under one or more of the
following conditions:
? The Soviets perceived that the United States was
preparing to intervene in Iran.
? Central power in Iran collapsed, and chaos and civil
war erupted.
? A leftist faction seized power and appealed to the
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The Soviets are likely to cite Articles 5 and 6 of their
1921 Treaty of Friendship with Iran as legal justifica-
tion for any intervention, just as they did in 1941. The
Shah unilaterally abrogated Articles 5 and 6 of the
treaty in 1959, and the Khomeini regime reiterated
the abrogation in November 1979. The Soviets have
ignored the Iranian moves and continue to refer
publicly and privately to the entire treaty being in
force.
Soviet and East European arms sales to Iran provide a
means for the Soviets to keep open prospects for better
relations even though they are significantly less than
those to Iraq and limited to small arms and ammuni-
tion. We believe that Moscow has little role in the
transfer of Soviet-made arms to Iran by North Korea
Espionage and Covert Activity
We expect that Iran will continue to be a major target
of Soviet espionage and covert political activity. The
operational environment for the Soviets, however, has
steadily worsened over the past few years as the
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Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic,
Signed in Moscow, 26 February 1921
quelling unrest among ethnic minorities has reduced
Soviet capabilities for meddling in those areas. Al-
Article 5
The two high contracting parties undertake:
though Soviet covert action opportunities are likely to
(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their
respective territories of any organizations or groups
or persons, irrespective of the name by which they are
known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility
against Persia or Russia. They will likewise prohibit
the formation of armed troops within their respective
territories with the aforementioned object.
improve in the post-Khomeini era, Moscow probably
will have a better chance of gaining influence in
Tehran by cultivating support among factions within
(2) Not to allow a third party or any organization
whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other
contracting party, to import or to convey in transit
across their countries material which can be used
against the other party.
(3) To prevent by all means in their power the
presence within their territories or within the territo-
ries of their allies or forces of a third party in cases in
which the presence of such forces would be regarded
as a menace to the frontiers, interest, or safety of the
other contracting party.
Article 6
If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy
of usurpation by means of armed intervention in
Persia, or such power should desire to use Persian
territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if
a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of
Federal Russia or those of its allies, and if the
Persian Government should not be able to put a stop
to such menace after having been once called upon to
do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to
advance its troops into the Persian interior for the
purpose of carrying out the military operations neces-
sary for its defense. Russia, however, undertakes to
withdraw its troops from Persian territory as soon as
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the danger has been removed.
regime has repressed the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party,
closed Soviet offices, and expelled almost all Soviet
economic advisers and some diplomats
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The government's success in
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the regime than by manipulating covert assets.
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Figure 4
Estimated Values of Soviet and East European Military
Deliveries to Iran and Iraq, 1981-858
Warsaw Pact countries
USSR
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Secret
Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party lost what slight influ-
ence it had after the regime declared it illegal in 1983
and arrested several of its leaders, including General
Secretary Kianuri. Harassment by the regime had
already curtailed its ability to operate.
pro-Soviet majority faction.
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ues to provide the Tudeh with financial and other
support in the hope that one day it will be able to
exploit a change of regime in Tehran.
The party is attempting to formulate a new strategy
under exiled leaders-including new General Secre-
tary Ali Khavari-living in Eastern Europe.
Ethnic Minorities. The USSR has long cultivated
contacts with national minorities in Iran-Kurds,
Azerbaijanis, Turkomans, and possibly Baluch. We 25X1
believe Moscow is maintaining contact with minority
groups to gain information about them, to influence
them in the hope of gaining leverage over the central
government, and to gain equities throughout Iran in
case of national political fragmentation.
my, but not separatism, for Iran's minorities.
Moscow's official policy is to support greater autono-
during a period of
The Non-Communist Left. We believe that Moscow
has almost no influence with the two main non-
Communist leftist groups, the Mujahedin-e Khalq
and the "minority" faction of the Fedayeen-e Khalq
that split with the majority faction in 1979 when the
latter merged with the Tudeh. According to press
reports, these groups have rejected calls by Moscow
and the Tudeh for a united Iranian leftist front, and
the nationalistic Mujahedin has been explicitly anti-
Soviet.
We believe the nationalistic, Islamic-Marxist philoso-
phy of the Mujahedin is still attractive to many
younger, well-educated Iranians. The party could
make a resurgence in the post-Khomeini era if fac-
tionalism among the clerics weakens their control.
Should Mujahedin members have a chance to share in
power, they might turn to the USSR for support, but
we would expect them to try to remain politically
independent of Moscow.
ethnic unrest while the clerics were consolidating their
power in the early 1980s, the Soviets provided at most
only limited arms and money to the dissidents. Since
then we believe that Moscow has subordinated its
contacts with minorities to its major aim of establish-
ing good relations with the central government. Soviet
media have consistently called for the peaceful resolu-
tion of ethnic disputes in Iran.
We believe the USSR would prefer to maintain good
relations with a relatively united Iran than to pursue
uncertain gains that might be made by encouraging
independent entities. Moscow, if it supported the
fragmentation of Iran, would have no guarantee that
its assets would prevail or that the new political
entities would prove sympathetic to Soviet interests.
The Iranian minorities generally have only parochial
interests-their main concern is with autonomy in
If relations with Tehran deteriorate, Moscow might
upgrade its contacts with the minorities and become
more supportive of minority demands. Moscow might
also attempt to increase its influence among the
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minorities if Khomeini's departure leads to internal
chaos and separatist sentiment begins to rise indepen-
dent of Moscow's instigation
The USSR's occupation of northern Iran in World
War II probably gave Moscow some assets it could
still exploit. It established puppet "people's republics"
in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, led respectively by the
Azerbaijani Democratic Party (ADP) and the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP). The "republics" collapsed
after the Soviets withdrew in 1946 under international
pressure, but Moscow maintained contacts with the
autonomy-minded Iranian groups.' The Soviets have
spoken out openly since 1982 for Kurdish autonomy,
and the media in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan
occasionally issue veiled calls for "reunification" of
Soviet and Iranian Azeris.
The Baluch minority in eastern Iran is dissatisfied
with clerical rule from Tehran, but there are no signs
of Soviet support for the Baluch. Moscow has good
ties to a major dissident Pakistani Baluch leader in
Kabul and has the incentive to encourage Baluch
separatism in both Iran and Pakistan because these
regimes support the Afghan insurgency.
Opportunities in the Post-Khomeini Era
Even after Khomeini's death, Moscow is unlikely to
make major moves to improve relations until Tehran
reduces its anti-Soviet rhetoric and posture and begins
to address Moscow's other concerns. Moscow's tactics
could change quickly, however, if one or more of the
following occurs:
? Infighting tears apart the ruling coalition, and Iran
moves into a period of major instability.
? The Iran-Iraq war ends.
? Iran and the United States begin to improve ties or,
conversely, become involved in a military conflict.
? Iran suddenly decides to meet Soviet conditions and
embarks on a major effort to acquire Soviet arms.
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If the Radical Clerics Take Over
Possible shifts in the political balance in Tehran
following Khomeini's death would offer some pros-
pects for the USSR to gain significant influence. We
believe that there is an even chance that the more
radical clerics eventually will dominate the govern-
ment in Tehran. We do not believe that any of the
radicals are pro-Soviet. Like Khomeini, they view
Islam as basically incompatible with Communism.
They are virulently anti-Western and anticapitalist,
however, and committed to undermining pro-US
Arab governments. In the absence of Khomeini, some
radicals might decide that close relations with Mos-
cow would best serve their domestic and foreign policy
goals. Should the radicals gain power, many regime
clerics now identified as pragmatists would be likely
to support a turn to the USSR rather than seek aid
from the West. The USSR's geographic proximity
would be a major advantage to the Soviets in funnel-
ing aid to such factions.
More likely, however, an Iranian regime dominated
by radical clerics would have strained relations with
the USSR. The clerics would try to remain indepen-
dent of Moscow while seeking Soviet economic and
military aid. Even though the clerics' desire to export
the Islamic revolution to the Muslim community in
the USSR might trouble the relationship, we believe
that the common goal of the Soviets and the Iranian
radicals in preventing the restoration of US influence
in Iran would give them a powerful incentive to reach
a modus vivendi on these and other issues.
If a Leftist Coalition Takes Over
The Soviets would have their best opportunity to
make major gains in a post-Khomeini era if the clerics
lost power to a leftist coalition of Revolutionary
Guards, technocrats, students, and members of such
leftist groups as Tudeh and the Mujahedin-e Khalq.
Many opportunistic members of these groups are not
deeply Islamic and probably resent clerical rule.
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Factional differences among the clerics influence
Iran's policies. We believe three groups are contend-
ingfor primacy. The radicals support aggressive
export of the revolution, continuation of the war with
Iraq, and greater government control of the economy.
They are most vehemently opposed to the United
States. A moderate/conservative coalition generally
opposes violent export of the revolution, favors a
negotiated end to the war, and seeks to limit the
government's economic role. This group is the most
anti-Soviet. A group of leaders we have labeled
pragmatists maneuvers between the two other fac-
tions, for the most part choosing policies that they
believe further Iran's national interests.
Such a coalition is likely to gain the upper hand only
after a period of serious instability, probably including
armed conflict. We believe that its hold on power
would be tenuous and based mainly on force. Its
leaders would probably ask for Moscow's help in
consolidating power and eliminating their opponents.
These leaders-except for members of Tudeh-would
probably turn to Moscow not out of ideological con-
viction, but for personal and political survival. Soviet
aid would not guarantee this outcome, but it could
prove decisive in tipping the balance in the leftists'
favor, especially if it is provided after the factions
have been exhausted by internecine conflict. Moscow
in particular is likely to offer support to staunchly
anti-Western factions such as the Revolutionary
Guard. East European countries already sell small
arms and ammunition to the Guard.
If the leftists gain control in Tehran, they probably
would attempt to remain politically independent of
Moscow. The Soviets, however, would use their aid
and influence to press the new government to adhere
to a pro-Soviet line. An Iranian leftist-oriented gov-
ernment is almost certain to seek large-scale Soviet
military and economic aid and bring in Soviet advis-
ers. The Soviets would use their access to cultivate
supporters and to develop an active measures capabili-
ty with the aim of bringing to power a Communist
government firmly in the Soviet sphere.
End to the War With Iraq
In the post-Khomeini era we believe Iran's policy
toward Iraq will continue to impede rather than
facilitate Moscow's relations with Tehran. Those cler-
ics who are the most likely power brokers probably
will advocate continuing the war rather than risk
being accused of betraying Khomeini's legacy. They
will be preoccupied with the domestic power struggle
and will want to neutralize the Army as a political
factor by keeping it tied down on the Iraqi border. A
new government is unlikely to alter its war policy even
if the Soviets promised major arms deliveries or,
alternatively, tried to cut off all arms aid from
Communist countries.
A military victory by Iran would provide the USSR
with a limited opportunity to improve relations with
Tehran. The Soviets could offer economic and possi-
bly some military assistance to appease and gain
working relations with the Iranian Government. Al-
ternatively, if Iraq wins the war or fights Iran to a
draw, Iran is more likely to turn to the West for
military equipment than to the country that equipped
Iraq.
Moscow's Concern About the United States
Concern that the United States will try to regain its
influence in Tehran remains high in Moscow. Soviet
scholarly and journalistic writings on the Islamic
regime as well as clandestine radiobroadcasts have
been highly critical of the Iranian leadership for
maintaining what the Soviets consider a more West-
Should the Iranian Government begin to turn toward
the United States, one Soviet option would be to
attempt to stir up the minorities on the, assumption
that instability is preferable to an Iran that is once
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again pro-US. Moscow might also soften its condi-
tions for improving relations, expand economic coop-
eration, and sell arms to Tehran.
Alternatively, should the United States and Iran
engage in a serious confrontation, such as over Iranian
attacks in the Persian Gulf on oil tankers or facilities,
the Soviets almost certainly would be eager to exploit
the anti-US sentiment in Iran by exaggerating the US
threat and military intentions. They might provide
arms to Iran but probably would seek Iranian conces-
sions in return.
The mutual suspicions between the USSR and Iran
have served US interests by preventing Moscow and
Tehran from drawing together. The Islamic funda-
mentalists' inherent distaste for Communism and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have neutralized much
of whatever advantage the USSR gained from Kho-
meini's designation of the USSR as the "lesser Satan"
relative to the United States as the "great Satan." We
believe, however, that the Soviets still have greater
potential than the United States for establishing
closer relations. Iran is at least willing to hold a public
dialogue with the Soviets. Unburdened by the legacy
of having its diplomats held hostage, Moscow has
more leeway than the United States to offer Iran
economic and military benefits if Tehran decides to
resolve political differences.
A dramatic improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations is
unlikely as long as Khomeini or the clerics wedded to
his policies rule in Tehran. This will at least buy time
for developments that might work to the advantage of
the United States, such as the acquisition of increased
political influence by leaders more willing to advocate
improving ties to Washington. The chief danger to US
interests in Iran is if a leftist coalition gained power
following Khomeini and sought close ties to the
USSR. Another potential threat is that the Soviets
will be able to exploit prolonged upheaval in the post-
Khomeini era to bring pro-Soviet elements to power or
to weaken Tehran's authority over the provinces if
groups friendly to the United States gain the upper
hand in Iran.
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