SUDAN: THE ARMED FORCES IN DISARRAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300360001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan: The Armed Forces
in Disarray
Seeret
NESA 86-10038
IA 86-10061
September 1986
Copy
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan: The Armed Forces
in Disarray
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
ffice of Imagery Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by
Comment and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
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Secret
NESA 86-10038
IA 86-10061
September 1986
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in Disarray
Key Judgments The military capabilities of Sudan and the quality of its armed forces'
Information available leadership have reached an alltime low. The military can neither defend
as of /4 August 1986 the country from external attackers nor maintain internal security. Khar-
was used in this report.
toum will remain heavily dependent on external suppliers even to maintain
its current diminished capabilities. Military assistance issues are likely to
figure increasingly as an irritant in US-Sudanese relations.
The military has failed to score any gains against the two principal threats
to the country's stability and security-the southern insurgency and
Libyan subversion. Inconsistent strategy, inappropriate tactics, poor intelli-
gence, low morale, and insurmountable logistic problems contribute to
government losses in the south. Even when combined with the civilian
security services, the armed forces' ability to contain Libyan hostile
activity is hampered by inadequate resources and a lack of counterterrorist
expertise.
Sudan's ability to improve the capabilities of its armed forces is limited by
its lack of resources and the reluctance of foreign donors to give more than
token amounts of grant aid. Prospects for the regime of Prime Minister Sa-
diq al-Mahdi to rebuild and strengthen the armed forces successfully-and
gain their loyalty-are poor. Relations between the civilian government
and the military will continue to sour as the military's problems mount and
the government's fortunes decline. There is a strong prospect that the
Army would return to politics either in a ruling coalition with the civilian
government or, more likely, through a military coup.
Continued deterioration of the armed forces, therefore, is virtually a
certainty. Over the next two years this decline will add to Khartoum's
problems with the south and could ultimately generate a large-scale
mutiny among Army units in the southern commands. Splits in the military
will intensify pressure for regional autonomy, especially in the south and
west.
The pressing need for equipment will drive Sudan into more deals with
suppliers, such as Libya, that will exact a political price for assistance and
add to frictions with the United States. The Sudanese Government, which
has already backed away from its support for the Camp David accords, will
be less supportive of US policy. Even a successor government run by senior
or older middle-grade officers who favor the United States would attempt,
at least initially, to show independence from foreign influence.
Secret
NESA 86-10038
IA 86-10061
September 1986
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Key Judgments
The Decline of the Military
Restrictions to Sadiq al-Mahdi's Control of the Military 7
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Army: Mission: Defend country from external attack,
maintain internal security, support internal security
services.
Ability to perform mission: Marginal, cannot defend
against more than one threat at a time.
Estimated amount of equipment operational: 50
percent.
Authorized strength: 51,000.
Combat units: three infantry divisions, four indepen-
dent infantry brigades, one armored division, one
airborne division.
Location of headquarters: Khartoum.
Air Force: Mission: Defend national airspace, provide
close air support to ground forces, provide logistic
and reconnaissance support to ground forces.
Ability to perform mission: Incapable because of
equipment shortages, low pilot morale.
Estimated amount of equipment operational: 30
percent.
Authorized strength: 3,000.
Combat units: three fighter squadrons, one training
squadron, one transport squadron, one helicopter
brigade.
Location of headquarters: Khartoum.
Air Defense Force: Mission: Assist Air Force in
defending national airspace, provide warning of hos-
tile air activity.
Ability to perform mission: Incapable, no early warn-
ing capability, majority of equipment inoperable, no
communications link to Air Force.
Estimated amount of equipment operational: 20
percent.
Authorized strength: 3,000.
Combat units: two AAA brigades, one SAM brigade.
Location of headquarters: Port Sudan
Navy: Mission: Defend coastline, prevent smuggling,
perform sea search and rescue.
Ability to perform mission: Marginally capable, no
ship-to-shore communications, no night navigation
capability.
Estimated amount of equipment operational: 45
percent.
Authorized strength: 1,500.
Combat units: three patrol boat squadrons, one land-
ing craft squadron, one auxiliary and service craft
squadron, one harbor craft squadron.
Location of headquarters: Port Sudan.
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in Disarray
Politicization, 20 years of fighting insurgencies in the
south, and budgetary stringencies have steadily erod-
ed Sudanese Army capabilities since the country
gained independence in 1956. Field Marshal Suwar
al-Dahab, the former Military Council chairman, told
the US Ambassador in early 1986 that Sudan's
military needs to be rebuilt, retrained, and recondi-
tioned from the bottom up.
Sudan's Army has suffered from having been drawn
repeatedly into politics. The military-the strongest
institution in a country rent by ethnic, tribal, and
sectarian divisions-stepped in to take over from
weak civilian governments in 1958 and again in 1969.
President Nimeiri, who ruled for 16 years after his
May 1969 coup, was especially instrumental in politi-
cizing the Army, according to US Embassy reports.
Nimeiri appointed officers to a highly corrupt Mili-
tary Economic Board that administered most of the
national industries and controlled much of the coun-
try's foreign investment. He demanded that officers
actively participate in his political party and in his
efforts to implement Islamic law in Sudan after 1983.
Nimeiri dominated the professional military, person-
ally assuming key positions and favoring loyalty over
competence in the selection of his senior officers.
The current insurgency in the south, which began in
1983, has been even more destructive to military
capabilities than previous rounds of fighting in the
area. Combat losses, equipment shortages, and lack-
luster leadership have sapped morale and perfor-
mance. Most of the military budget supports counter-
insurgency operations instead of needed military
improvements. Major equipment-US-made F-5E
fighters, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers,
for example-lost in the war has not been replaced.
Sudanese officials claim the war costs about $500,000
a day.
Table 1
Operating Defense Expenditures
Fiscal Defense Percentage of Cen- Percent-
Year Expenditures tral Government age of
(million Budget (current GDP
US $) b expenditures)
1981 379.8 14.1 2.5
1982 419.0 12.1 2.8
a The Sudanese fiscal year begins on 1 July.
b Dollar value converted at an exchange rate of 2.45 Sudanese
pounds per US $.
Projected.
The abysmal state of the Sudanese economy and
Khartoum's dependence on foreign donors for supply
and even maintenance are major contributing factors
to the current disarray in the military.
notes that the diversity 25X1
of Sudan's equipment and suppliers has resulted in
low operational rates and little compatibility among
units. Khartoum has run the gamut in its sources of
supply, ranging from reliance on the West from
independence to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, to a close
military relationship with the Soviet Union from 1968
to 1971, to dependence on the nonaligned world-
principally China-from 1972 to the late 1970s, and
then back to reliance on the West in the late 1970s.
By any standard, the Sudanese armed forces are
incapable of meeting the principal threats to Sudanese
stability and security-the insurgency in the south
and the Libyan subversive and conventional threat.
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Figure 1. Airborne troops such
as these are used in counterin-
surgency operations.
The Southern Insurgency
Despite a commitment of 35 to 40 percent of its
51,000-man forces to the south, the Sudanese Army
has made no headway against the insurgents in the
three-year-old struggle. On the basis of Embassy
reporting and insurgent radiobroadcasts, we estimate
that the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
now numbers 15,000 to 20,000 men, a significant
increase over the estimated 2,000-man force that
formed in late 1983 after southern Army units mutin-
ied and fled to Ethiopia. Operating from bases in
Ethiopia and,
armed by such Soviet surrogates as East Germany
and Cuba, the rebels control much of the southern
countryside. They operate in all three southern re-
gions and occasionally probe into adjacent regions to
the north. Operating in their home areas, they are
better able to live off the land and to put the terrain to
better military advantage than government forces
can.
Khartoum's strategy to contain the SPLA is inconsis-
tent and poorly managed, in our judgment.
He reports that, at the
field level, the Army has used the south as a dumping
ground for less capable or untrustworthy officers and
that recent efforts to reverse this trend have fallen far
short.
The government's efforts to take advantage of tribal
rivalries by providing arms to those who oppose the
rebels have proved to be only marginally successful.
The US Embassy reports that the arms provided these
tribes generally increase instability throughout the
south. The tribes use their government-supplied weap-
ons to settle old scores and confront central authority
rather than to attack the rebels.
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Figure 2
Areas of Influence and Activity, Summer 1986
Government-influenced area
Insurgent-influenced area
Refugee and dissident activity
Refugee, dissident, and Libyan
activity
Refugee, dissident, banditry,
smuggling, and tribal
warfare activity
Central
African
Republic
Historic
north- south
line
Despite the reinstatement of the
Addis Ababa Accords in April 1985,
sh
mail
Ad
Boundary ^,I
Lake
Nasser _J
it
Ili 'n NPl
ppe i e)
Con o providing for one Southern =n ,
these remain three regions Lake
military governors. Albert
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Al Fashir
Bahr al Gha
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Khartoum's attempt to use a group of about 5,000
Nuer tribesmen known as Anya Nya 11-named after
the rebels who fought in Sudan's civil war from 1956
to 1972-who split from the Dinka-dominated rebel
movement in 1983, has foundered on the group's
inexperience and political unreliability. F_
but it
has used the tribesmen primarily, and with limited
success, to harass the SPLA.
The use of inappropriate counterinsurgency tactics
has hamstrung the Army's performance:
military units in the south are primarily in
de ensive positions in small towns and villages and
conduct few offensive campaigns and little protec-
tive patrolling. The Army uses its few tanks in
defense of garrisons or airfields and other armored
vehicles on reconnaissance missions without much
success.
? Most of the government's forces in the south have
no training in counterinsurgency tactics and little
knowledge of the local terrain
nfantry units are supporte y
artillery-100-mm field guns and 105-mm and
122-mm howitzers-which we believe has been
largely ineffective because of ammunition shortages
and low operational rates. Both the insurgents and
the Army favor mortars-primarily 81-mm, 82-
mm, and 120-mm-but the rebels' use of them to
pin down Army units in towns or garrisons has
proved more effective than the Army's use of mor-
tars to support its own forces.
? The government has failed to make effective use of
its limited air assets against the insurgents or in
support of its own forces.
, an a ground attack capability
was lost when Sudan's last two F-5Es crashed in
1985. Insubordinate pilots earlier had sabotaged the
Strikemaster light attack aircraft to avoid having to
use them in the war. little
evidence of the use of helicopters for reconnaissance
missions and fire support for ground forces.
Logistic problems have also impeded the performance
of government forces in the south. Because of a
limited number of transport vehicles and manpower
shortages, the Army cannot support operations in all
three southern regions simultaneously and lacks the
capability to provide sustained support for a major
operation. The poor transportation network underlies
many specific logistic difficulties in the south-roads
and remote rail lines become impassable in the April-
October rainy season, river transport is limited by a
shortage of qualified crews as well as by poor security,
and rebel landmines and destruction of bridges dis-
rupt traffic. US officials note the Army's logistic
problems are compounded by problems endemic to the
military as a whole: lack of equipment accountability,
little management and planning, insufficient funds to
purchase spare parts and supplies, and lack of quali-
fied supply and maintenance personnel.
The Army's combat performance also suffers as a
result of low morale, which, according to thcE:::
all levels of the forces
and, more telling than the loss of face,
the troops' perception is that Khartoum is indifferent
to their difficult situation and does not trust them.
Khartoum, in an effort to reduce desertions to the
SPLA, recently began to pull southerners out of the
south for duty elsewhere.
Libyan Threat
The military-which is responsible for assisting the
civilian external intelligence service in watching sub-
versive activity in addition to its primary task of
defending the country's borders-falls well short of
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meeting the threat from Libya, in our judgment. Of
the eight countries bordering Sudan, we believe that
Libya presents the greatest subversive and conven-
tional military threat. Although Tripoli ended its
support to the southern Sudanese dissidents after the
coup in Khartoum in April 1985, it still poses a threat.
The US Embassy reports Libya has penetrated Su-
dan's security services, and it recruits among the
military to prepare for potential antiregime activities.
In our view, military intelligence lacks sufficient
resources and manpower to monitor subversive activ-
ity in Khartoum, much less in more remote areas such
as Darfur and Kordofan, where Libyans are working
to gain influence. The military's 120-man counter-
terrorist unit cannot do its part to contain the terrorist
threat,
Even the
military and civilian intelligence services combined
are inadequate to meet the threat. We believe that
infighting within and contests for control of the new
civilian security services that were formed following
the dissolution of President Nimeiri's security agen-
cies have crippled Khartoum's ability to protect Suda-
nese and foreign interests.
The military's ability to defend against the conven-
tional threat from Libya-most likely consisting of
limited military actions such as an airstrike, the
occupation of a small area of Sudan, or the introduc-
tion of troops to support a coup attempt-is slight. A
Libyan military attack is unlikely, at least as long as
Qadhafi believes that maintaining good relations with
Khartoum favors his goals, but the mercurial Libyan
leader has kept his options open for a more coercive
policy.
Tripoli bombed a radio station near Khartoum in
March 1984. Although the attack did not destroy the
station, it demonstrated Khartoum's vulnerability to
air attacks. In the event relations sour again, Sudan's
ability to defend against a Libyan airstrike is no
better.
early warning radars are rarely operational,
We believe Libya established a supply depot in west-
ern Sudan for contingency use in either Chad or
Sudan. US Embassy an
reported the arrival in Marcn o yan truck
convoys totaling at least 150 trucks with some 1,100
"relief workers," including 160 soldiers.
as many as 900 of them were
pulled out of Darfur in August 1986 as a result of
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's requests during his
visit to Tripoli earlier that moi
has confirmed the withdrawal.
If Qadhafi were to end his current support for the
Sadiq government, he could rebuild the Libyan foot-
hold in the west to exert pressure on Khartoum.
Driving out the occupation force would require the
government to reduce its military presence in other
parts of the country. Although a force large enough to
meet the task could probably be pulled from the
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capital area and Port Sudan, without external assis- 25X1
tance the logistic burden of airlifting and supporting
the units would require drastic reductions in counter-
insurgency operations in the south.
Khartoum's ability to retrain and rearm the armed
forces is severely constrained by lack of resources and
by dwindling contributions from foreign donors. Sadiq
al-Mahdi has publicly pledged to upgrade the mili-
tary's capabilities, but, given his less than firm grip on
the government, he is even less able to deliver on such
promises than his predecessors were. The difficulty of
coaxing enough ammunition, replacement weaponry,
and transport out of foreign donors is likely to derail
plans for force modernization. Many suppliers, espe-
cially the Arab countries, have given only token
amounts of assistance.
Rearming the Sudanese military will require prepara-
tion and the taking of steps to increase its ability to
absorb the equipment that are probably beyond Su-
dan's capabilities. These steps include providing basic
and refresher training; developing a permanent cadre
of trained technical personnel, instructors, pilots, and
others; and instituting a viable maintenance program.
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Given Khartoum's extensive needs-and its $10 bil-
lion debt- we expect Sudan to continue to seek
military assistance from diverse suppliers. Even to-
gether these assistance programs are unlikely to make
much headway against the problems besetting the
military.
Khartoum considers the United States its primary
supplier despite cuts in military assistance over the
past year, according to Embassy reporting. US assis-
tance in fiscal year 1986 has been geared toward
rehabilitation of air defense radars, overhaul of C- 130
transport aircraft, establishment of a national logistic
system, and sales of V-150 armored personnel carriers
and limited amounts of ammunition.
France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
Canada are providing primarily nonlethal aid. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy, this assistance consists
mostly of training programs, instructors for Sudanese
military schools, and support teams for major military
equipment. US officials have noted that the West
Germans are attempting to develop military industry
in Sudan in the form of a small-arms ammunition
plant in Khartoum, but production at the facility is
limited by raw materials shortages.
Among the Communist countries, China is Sudan's
supplier of longest standing. Beijing has provided
major equipment items such as tanks and aircraft as
well as training and maintenance support. According
signed an
agreement this year to provide an aid package worth
$7 million. the assistance consists
mainly of ammunition and aircraft spare parts.
Sudan since 1977, but
indicates East European countries have continue
assistance at low levels. We believe Moscow may
restore some military aid in an attempt to gain
influence with the Sadiq government. US officials
noted Romania recently completed delivery of 20
Puma helicopters. Discussion on a new agreement
with Yugoslavia for rehabilitation and maintenance of
Soviet equipment, on the other hand, was suspend-
ed-probably because of Sudan's inability to pay.
110
Figure 3. Colonel Qadhaji offered aid to the
transitional government and continues assistance
The Sudanese are looking to Libya for military
assistance as aid from Western, Chinese, and East
European suppliers dwindles. Although we believe
Libya is not capable of providing the extensive assis-
tance needed to upgrade significantly the Sudanese
military, Tripoli has provided stopgap assistance-
small arms, ammunition, uniforms, trucks, and pilot
training. In addition, the US Embassy reported that
in early 1986 Libya sent two TU-22 bombers for
direct support of the Sudanese Army operating in the
south.
Egypt, despite a mutual defense treaty with Sudan,
provides minimal military aid. Egypt provides instruc-
tors for Sudanese military schools and positions in
Egyptian military training programs for Sudanese.
Cairo, in cooperation with Washington, attempted to
upgrade Sudanese air defenses following the bombing
of Omdurman, but it abandoned the program in 1985,
claiming the Sudanese were not supporting the Egyp-
tian program. US Embassy and
that the Egyptians use Sudan as a dumping
ground for obsolete equipment.
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The wealthy moderate Arab countries such as Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait have confined most of their
assistance to nonmilitary aid-oil, money, and hu-
manitarian relief-in the past several years. Small
amounts of military assistance-geared toward coun-
terinsurgency operations-have come from other
moderate Arab countries such as Oman, the United
Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
Figure 4
Sudan: Military High Command
Restrictions to Sadiq al-Mahdi's
Control of the Military
We believe that Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi must
address the military services' grievances-the south-
ern insurgency, force improvement, and, to a lesser
extent, the role of Islam-if his government is to
retain their loyalty. Since Sadiq assumed office and
the defense portfolio-the first civilian to do so since
the 1960s-he has concentrated on weaning the Army
from politics and winning its support. Specifically he
is:
? Seeking to end the insurgency-fighting the insur-
gents is the most serious grievance of the armed
forces-by attempting to undercut foreign support
to the insurgents.
? Making pleas for military assistance in state visits to
donor or potential donor states.
military leaders gave Sadiq a list of
equipment needed to upgrade and modernize the
armed forces. We believe Sadiq raised some of these
topics during his trip to Moscow in August 1986,
but no agreements were reached.
? Pursuing a "hearts and minds" campaign with the
military. Soon after the parliamentary election, he
began a series of visits to military installations
throughout the country to show his personal interest
in the troops. he was
subjected to criticism and hard questioning at many
of the meetings. A recurrent question that he re-
So lereignty Council Chairman
Commander
of the Air
Force
Commander
of the Navy
Commander
of the Air
Defense Force
Director
of Logistics
Director Director Director of
of Operations of Administration Military
Intelligence
views of Islam, and
? Awaiting the right opportunity to take advantage of
retirements and promotions in the senior ranks-
part of an armed forces reorganization effort-to
insert loyalists into the military hierarchy,
Despite these efforts to woo the military, Sadiq will
find it difficult-if not impossible-to consolidate his
power over the armed forces. Constitutional restric-
tions and party and sect loyalties will stand in his way.
fuses to address is why he continues the southern The interim Constitution gives the Supreme Council,
war. not the prime minister or defense minister, ultimate
authority over the armed forces. The head of the
? Moving cautiously on the controversial issue of
Islamic law. The role of Islam is a potentially
explosive issue. Muslim officers are divided in their
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Supreme Council, Ahmad al-Mirghani, has constitu-
tional powers as a check to Sadiq's control of the
Army, according to the US Embassy. Mirghani is also
leader of the Democratic Unionists, the political arm
of the Khatmiyyah sect and a rival of Sadiq's Ansar
The current officer corps, a product of the Nimeiri
period when the Khatmiyyah gained strength at the
expense of the Ansar, has little personal loyalty to or
trust in the Prime Minister and even less commitment
to parliamentary democracy. US Embassy reports
suggest most senior officers are sympathetic to the
Democratic Unionists and the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is Sadiq's key opponent in the Assembly.
The US Embassy reports the Army is increasingly
dissatisfied with Sadiq's support for legal action
against those who supported former President
Nimeiri's coup in 1969. Military officers see the
Prime Minister's move as a personal and Ansar-
related vendetta hostile to military interests.
the Prime Minister is also
reinvestigating a 1971 Sudanese military attack on
Jazirat Aba (Abba) Island, the ancestral stronghold of
the Ansar. The attack, launched because the Ansar
militia refused to surrender to government forces,
resulted in numerous casualties and drove Sadiq into
exile in Egypt. If carried through, the investigation
would embarrass senior Sudanese military leaders,
some of whom commanded the units involved in the
attack.
Outlook and Implications
for the United States
Improvement of the Sudanese armed forces is years
away, at best, and in the meantime the deterioration
of the military as a professional force will continue to
pose significant dilemmas for the government in
Khartoum. In the next year, we expect at a minimum
that:
? The Army will be unable to provide a military
solution to the southern insurgency if the civilian
government, or even a successor military govern-
ment, demands it.
If the Military Steps In
We believe relations between the armed forces and
the civilian government will continue to sour as the
military's problems mount. Assuming there is no
near-term solution to the southern insurgency and the
government's fortunes continue to decline, the sense
of dissatisfaction with and blame of the new civilian
leadership probably will grow within the officer
corps.
If, as expected, the government comes under increas-
ing criticism in the coming year and cannot cope,
there is a strong prospect that the Army will return to
politics, possibly in a ruling coalition with civilians
but most likely as a result of a coup. Although in
1958 Sudan's Prime Minister handed the reins of
government to the military during a crisis, we believe
Sadiq would not resort to this precedent. Instead,
Sadiq would probably try to ward off a coup by
asking senior officers to enter a coalition with the
civilian government. Such a civilian-military coali-
tion probably would not improve decisionmaking or
stability. We believe that eventually the Army would
dominate or the government would be removed
through a coup.
Younger generals and senior middle-grade officers
are the most likely candidates to lead a successful
coup against the civilian government. Such officers
pressed their seniors in 1985 to remove Nimeiri. In
addition, officers from this level have command over
combat units large enough to stage a coup and to
impose martial law. A seizure of power by junior
officers is less likely and probably would come about
only after a prolonged period of civil unrest and
economic decline in which senior officers failed to
take charge. In our view, such a coup would be
bloody and would need the external backing of Egypt,
Libya, Ethiopia, or the Soviet Union for the coup
plotters to attract sufficient support to topple the
government.
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? The equipment needs of the military will drive
Khartoum into deals with suppliers like Libya-or
possibly the Soviet Union-and into accepting at
least some of the conditions these states are likely to
attach to the assistance. Sadiq's recent rhetorical
condemnations of the United States, for example,
probably are part of the price exacted by the
Libyans for the military assistance they have ex-
tended over the past year.
? Sudan will remain vulnerable to subversive activity
or to conventional military pressure, particularly
from Libya or Ethiopia. Sudanese security forces,
including the intelligence agencies and the mili-
tary's counterterrorist force, are unlikely to develop
into an effective deterrent to terrorist activity or to
provide reliable security for foreign installations in
Khartoum.
We anticipate that the deterioration of the Sudanese
military and tensions stemming from the southern
war will contribute to bloody confrontations that will
splinter the Army and strengthen pressures for re-
gional autonomy. Carrying on the fighting in the
south as capabilities continue to diminish is already
generating an increasing number of desertions. In our
view, if the fighting continues, it will ultimately spark
a large-scale mutiny among Army units in the south.
In the north, tensions generated by a prolonged
southern war may spark clashes between conservative
Muslim groups and southern Sudanese in Khartoum
and possibly a collapse of public order. The police
probably could not stop the violence, because most
riot-control police in Khartoum are southerners who
would not sympathize with the northern-dominated
government. In addition, a split along religious or
Even if Khartoum avoids these worst case scenarios,
relations with the United States will be complicated
by military assistance issues. Given the cuts in US
assistance and Khartoum's search for alternative sup-
pliers, Sudan will be less supportive of US policy
initiatives. It has already turned its back on the Camp
David accords. Most Sudanese elites are more com-
fortable with the present policy of nonalignment than
with Nimeiri's strong pro-Western tilt and the
charges it drew of dependence on the West. Even a
government run by senior or older middle-grade offi-
cers, generally well disposed toward the United
States, would attempt at least initially to project the
appearance of independence from foreign influence.
regional lines in Khartoum would pit rival groups
within the military against each other.
Further weakening of central government control
would intensify pressures for regional autonomy. The
southern regions already are handling many of their
own affairs now that the insurgency has cut many of
their ties to Khartoum.
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Appendix A
Factors Affecting Capabilities:
Manpower and Training
volunteer force,
Volunteers serve a minimum of tree years
with six reenlistments allowed. Specialists and techni-
cians must serve nine years. Retention is a problem,
especially among the specialists and technicians, as
they tend to leave the military after their enlistment
and follow more lucrative careers in the private sector
in Sudan or in foreign countries.
The government passed a conscription law in 1971
and has attempted to implement it several times since
then. The latest attempt was on 1 April 1984. The
economics and politics of registering the target popu-
lation (males between the ages of 18 and 27) and
enforcing conscription, however, prevented its imple-
mentation. Although a 50-percent inflation rate and
limited employment opportunities ensure a continued
supply of volunteers, supporting an expanded military
Once in the military, volunteers for the Navy, Air
Defense Force, and Army go through six months of
the Army's basic infantry training and then are sent
to their own service schools. Air Force volunteers
receive basic pilot and maintenance training by the
countries of equipment origin-primarily China, the
United States, and the United Kingdom.
Prospective officers go to the Military College
through a program emphasizing political and military
science and physical training and then are commis-
sioned as second lieutenants. Those who require more
technical or specialized training, such as Air Force or
Navy officers, go abroad to study. Officers receive
more schooling as they move up through the ranks.
Majors are required to attend a one-year course at the
Armed Forces Staff College before promotion to
lieutenant colonel. Colonels and brigadiers who are to
assume high-ranking positions are sent through the
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force would be impossible.
The 1971 conscription law provided for a reserve
program by requiring that men fulfill an additional
eight-year commitment in the reserves following ac-
tive service. This also was never implemented, leaving
Sudan without reserves. In addition, there is no
evidence of a national mobilization plan to fill man-
power shortfalls in a national emergency.
Military High Academy to prepare them for their
jobs and update their military theory.
There are shortages of training aids, ammunition,
equipment, and fuel. Aircraft fuel shortages in partic-
ular have been devastating to Air Force pilot profi-
ciency. The Air Defense Force has not conducted
training against airborne towed targets for at least
eight years, and so much of the Navy's equipment is
nonoperational that there is little to spare for training.
Shortages of funds also have forced Sudan to cut back
ranges from six years of primary education to univer-
sity training. Those with secondary to university-level
education are considered for the officer corps
people from the west and
south are at a disadvantage because many are not
fluent in Arabic, the primary language of Sudan and
most of its military schools.
its foreign training programs.
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Appendix B
Sudanese Armed Forces
Order of Battle
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Table 4
Naval Equipment
Total Operational
Number
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Secret
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