THE BA''TH PARTY OF SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300330001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
The Bath Party of Syria
NESA 86-10035
August 1986
Copy 3 7 2
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The Bath Party of Syria
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
NESA 86-10035
August 1986
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The Bath Party of Syria
Key Judgments The Bath Party has served as an ideological guide for Syria's rulers for
Information available nearly a quarter of a century and is a pervasive feature of Syrian life. The
as of 8 July 1986 party effectively uses multiple tools to indoctrinate Syrians and mobilize
was used in this report.
popular support for the regime's revolutionary aims. The party may play an
even larger role in a post-Assad Syria.
Since the Bath Party came to power in Syria in 1963, its focus has shifted
from Pan-Arab aims to Syrian nationalist goals. The party has backed
away from its original hardline socialist agenda to one that reflects
President Hafiz Assad's more measured and pragmatic style of rule.
Syria's confrontation with Israel is at the heart of Bath Party rhetoric. The
party justifies and ennobles its policies by equating its success with the
eventual attainment of victory over "the Zionist entity." The party's
confrontational approach is likely to outlast Assad and deeply influence
any successor's policy.
Bath ideology provides a flexible medium through which Syria can
promote its foreign policy and avoid political isolation. As a socialist party,
the Bath Party acts as a point of contact between Syria and Communist
states, particularly the Soviet Union. As a party of national development,
the Bath includes itself in the ranks of the nonaligned. As a Pan-Arab par-
ty, the Bath fancies itself as representing the interests of all Arab people.
The party's zeal to implement socialist reforms has waned over the years,
but centralized planning of the economy persists. In response to the current
economic crisis, President Assad is considering backing advocates of
liberalization of the Syrian economy. Should Assad endorse a new
direction for the economy, he probably would have to press the party to de-
part from the status quo.
Despite the belief throughout Syrian society that the Bath Party is merely
a rubberstamp for Assad's policies, the effects of the massive political
indoctrination of a generation of Syrians are great. Most Syrians have been
born since 1963 and raised on the notion of secular government and
society, and, although this has not eliminated the importance of sectarian
ties, it may have weakened them.
Secret
NESA 86-10035
August 1986
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The Bath Party has not alleviated sectarian tension between the ruling
Alawites and the Sunni majority, but it has had considerable success in re-
cruiting members from the Sunni population, elevating many to prominent
government positions. Advantages afforded to Bath Party members in
educational opportunities and career advancement have created strong
incentives for Sunnis and members of other sects to join the party.
In the event of Assad's death or incapacitation, the military will play the
decisive role in choosing a successor, but the Bath Party will have a key
role in ensuring the stability of any future regime. The military will be cer-
tain to solicit the endorsement of the party to give legitimacy to the
selection. The Alawite military kingmakers are certain to choose a
successor with solid Bath Party credentials. Although the Bath Party
lacks the power to promote its own candidate in a post-Assad Syria, any
successor with less power than Assad would probably delegate a greater
share of decisionmaking to the party apparatus to smooth the transition
and broaden his power base.
Should the Sunnis make a play for power after Assad's departure, they
may use the Bath Party as a rallying point. Even though most Sunnis
consider the party to be an instrument of Alawite control, they probably as-
cribe its shortcomings to the minority elite and not to Ba'thism itself. In
particular, the generation of Sunni youth who have been reared in a secular
society may find it hard to identify with the traditional Muslim Brother-
hood opposition, which advocates a theocratically based government.
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Key Judgments
Indoctrinating Radicalism: The Major Success
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The Bath Party and the Government
3
Altering Socialism to Syrian Economic Realities
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The Bath Party of Syria
We believe that the strength of the Bath Party is
attributable to its ability to give vent to the unsatis-
fied aspirations of a majority of Syrians. Historians
note that Syrians have been instilled with the notion
that the post-World War I definition of their borders
by the European powers prevented the fulfillment of
their role as the historic center of the Arab nation or
at least greater Syria. For example, Syrian maps still
identify Hatay Province in Turkey (returned to Tur-
key by France in 1939) as part of Syria; the Syrians
have never had an embassy in Lebanon (also formerly
part of Syria); and there have been several Syrian
attempts to seek political federation with other Arab
states, intended to at least symbolically erase national
borders.
Under Assad, the Bath reoriented its revolutionary
ideology to consolidate the Syrian nation. The regime
has rationalized this as consistent with Pan-Arab aims
since it ostensibly strengthens Syria's ability to oppose
"Zionist imperialism." We believe this aim has also
served as a rallying point to unite a Syrian population
that is troubled by deep-seated sectarian tensions
between the Sunni majority and the ruling Alawites.'
Indoctrinating Radicalism:
The Major Success
The revolutionary aims of Ba'thist dogma, while
irreconcilable with the political realities of the region,
still appeal to many Syrians. During the 1950s and
1960s, Syrian Ba'thists continually pressed for unifi-
cation with other Arab states, despite notable failures
in their experiences with Nasir's Egypt and Iraq.
More recently the Bath Party in Syria has attempted
' The Alawites, a heterodox Muslim sect, make up the largest
religious minority in Syria (12 to 14 percent of the population).
Most Alawites in Syria are from rural areas and are concentrated
in the Jabal an-Nusayriyah (Alawite Mountains) in western Syria.
Alawites believe in divine incarnation and the divinity of Ali and
hence are viewed as heretical by most other Muslims.F___-]
to reaffirm its radical credentials through ties to
Libya and Iran and continuing support for extreme
Palestinian elements. Embassy reporting suggests the
Ba'th's radical views are widely held among Syrians.
Although individuals who have attained full Bath
Party membership represent less than 5 percent of
Syria's voting-age population, an entire generation of
Syrians has been indoctrinated with its secular politi-
cal values. Sunnis can achieve social and political
advantages through their membership in the Bath
Party. Prominent Sunni party members and close
associates of the President, such as Vice Presidents
`Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Zuhayr Mashariqa,
along with Bath Assistant Secretary General `Abdal-
lah al-Ahmar, provide models for Sunni youths who
aspire to high office.
Many Sunnis view the Bath Party as an instrument
of Alawite control, but Embassy reports indicate they
apparently do not believe that this invalidates the
institution or its goals. Having become accustomed to
a secular state, many young Sunni activists probably
do not regard the aims of groups like the traditional
Muslim Brotherhood opposition as representing their
vision of a future Syria. Should the Sunnis vie for
power, they probably will attempt to use the Bath
Party as a common denominator and legitimizing link
to the past.
The Bath Party's Grassroots Organization
The Bath Party is organized down to the grassroots
level to generate popular support for the Assad regime
and indoctrinate the masses. Western academic ob-
servers note that the party organization consists of a
series of assemblies, including formal party congresses
and the more frequent meetings of party branch
secretaries with the commands, which provide limited
channels for the expression of popular views to the
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decisionmakers and the party bureaus that implement
government policies and explain them to the public.
These assemblies are linked to a series of auxiliary
organizations that serve as lobbying groups for peas-
ants, workers, youth, women, and professionals. F_
The effort to impose ideological discipline on the
Bath Party has had only limited success, according to
academic observers. Following the Ba'thist seizure of
power in 1963, recruitment procedures were often
bypassed. The leadership needed to reconstruct the
party's ranks-depleted by defections during the peri-
od 1958-61, when Syria and Egypt were united-and
elite conflicts drove rivals to try to pack the party with
their own supporters. Party ranks were flooded with
newcomers brought in on the basis of friendship,
kinship, and sectarian ties. As the party has continued
its control of government institutions over the years,
use of the party as a vehicle for personal and profes-
sional gain has flourished.
Education as Indoctrination
The public school system, in which 94 percent of
Syrian youth are enrolled, plays the key role in
indoctrinating new generations of Syrians in Ba'thist
the last decade the party has also created financial
The Bath Party Militia
The quasi-military arm of the Bath Party is the
Ba'th Party militia, the Jaish al-Sha'b (The People's
Army). The militia was founded in 1963 as a civilian
home guard in the event offoreign invasion. Since
1964 the militia has been under the command of old-
time Ba'thist Gen. Muhammad Ibrahim Ali. Schol-
ars note that in the 1960s the militia's role was like
China's Revolutionary Guard, and it was often used
by Syrian officials to harass political enemies of the
use of small arms and indoctrinated in Bath Party
principles
incentives to steer students into vocational studies that
are compatible with long-range development plans.
The Bath Party Vanguards is a youth organization
that indoctrinates selected elementary school students
with party ideals in preparation for their later service
as party cadres and leaders. Vanguard members are
sent to summer camp where they study Ba'thist
ideology and analyze President Assad's speeches to
the accompaniment of national and patriotic music
broadcast continually over loudspeakers.
The Higher Institute for Political Science, attached to
the Bath Party National Command, trains party
cadres for positions of responsibility in Syria and
abroad. Among the thousands of graduates are for-
eign students who return home from Syria to serve as
officials in their own country's Bath Party, according
to an Arab scholar. The school offers the equivalent of
a master's degree to students completing the four-year
curriculum.
Intense indoctrination in Ba'thist principles in Syria
and parts of Lebanon has inspired a small cadre of
Lebanese and Syrian youth to volunteer as martyrs
for the Bath cause. The press reports that many of
the suicide car bomb attacks in southern Lebanon in
the last year have been carried out by Lebanese Ba't'
Party cadres in their late teens or early twenties.
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Figure 3. Lebanese Bath "martyrs" in testimo-
nial to Bath principles and President Assad.
influences the other two leading state-controlled
newspapers, Tishrin and Thawra, which resemble Al-
Ba'th in content and format.
Perquisites and Rewards
Bath Party indoctrination is reinforced by a wide
range of perquisites offered to party members, which,
have been an
important factor in the party's steady growth.
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According to the US Embassy in Damascus, at least
one of these attacks was carried out by a Syrian Bath
Party member. These youth, both men and women,
make preattack videotapes in which they praise the
leadership of President Assad and extol the virtues of
Ba'thist socialism.
The Media as a Tool
Although the Syrian media appear to have as their
main task the lionizing of President Assad, they also
disseminate party positions to further indoctrinate the
masses. In the mid-1960s, competing factions within
the party were represented in the media, resulting in
confusion among the rank and file as to the party
position on many issues. Since that time party offi-
cials have worked with the media to present a uniform
position on every issue of public concern. Scholarly
sources point out, however, that party officials allow
some debate and self-criticism in the press.
Television, radio, the press, and publishing houses are
largely owned or centrally controlled by the Ministry
of Information. The Ministry coordinates its activity
with various offices of the Bath Party, especially the
Ideology/ Indoctrination Office headed by Ahmad
Dirgham. The government and the party control
media output directly via censors and indirectly
through self-censorship. According to the US Embas-
sy in Damascus, the party's journal, AI-Bath, is one
of the three most widely read newspapers in Syria
(circulation 25,000 to 30,000). The party heavily
standing within the party.
party members and their children are given prefer-
ence for admission to universities and professional
schools. Bath
members seek to preserve their privileged status by
maintaining a strict and protracted membership ap-
plication process.
The advantages of party membership extend to the
private sector. According to a US scholar, business-
men overcome bureaucratic obstacles to obtain li-
censes through their party contacts. Party member-
ship is considered a status symbol by social climbing
Sunnis who are trying to get ahead in an Alawite-
dominated society. Tradespeople and peasants join
party associations and use them as lobbying groups to
insure the government's support for their economic
interests.
The Bath Party officially shares power in the Syrian
Government, including the Cabinet, the ministries,
and the People's Assembly, with several other parties
in a coalition called the National Progressive Front.
The Bath dominates the Front; it provides the chair-
man and eight of the 16 seats on the Front's governing
board. Four other parties share the remaining seats-
the Communist Party, two Nasirite parties (the Arab
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Socialist Union and the Socialist Unionists), and the
Arab Socialists (followers of Akram Harwani, a pow-
erful politician of the 1950s). By law, only the Bath
Party is allowed to conduct political activity in the
military.
The Bath and other parties in the National Progres-
sive Front participate in parliamentary elections every
four years for seats in the People's Assembly.
the candidates from
all parties are carefully selected by leading members
of the Bath Party and Assad, who also determine the
percentage of seats each party will hold in parliament.
In the most recent election held in February 1986, the
Bath won 129 seats out of a total of 195. Of the
remaining seats, eight went to the Socialist Unionists,
nine to the Arab Socialist Union, five to the Arab
Socialists, nine to the Communists, and 35 seats went
to independents
Bath Party members also hold most portfolios in the
Council of Ministers. According to the Syrian Consti-
tution, the President alone has the authority to ap-
point ministers, including the Prime Minister and any
number of deputy prime ministers (of which there are
presently three) who may be drawn from the ranks of
the People's Assembly. Subordinate to the Council of
Ministers is a large bureaucracy that carries out the
day-to-day operations of the government. We believe
that Bath Party membership as much as technical
aptitude offers a decided advantage for those seeking
prestigious civil service positions.
The Parallel Government
The Bath Party's Regional Command parallels the
Syrian Government in structure. Its role is to guide
government policy along Ba'thist principles. Each of
the 21 members of the Regional Command has a
specific function like a ministerial portfolio, and in
some cases a Regional Command member is also a
government minister. Among the most notable of
these are Prime Minister Kasm and Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense Talas.
The parallel structure often results in rivalries and
duplication of work. In the area of foreign policy, non-
Command member Shara as Foreign Minister clearly
is overshadowed by foreign affairs specialist and
Figure 4. President Assad meeting with the
Regional Command following his recuperation
Regional Command member Vice President
Khaddam. Parallel offices exist for national security,
labor, youth, education, higher education, "peasants,"
and economy and finance. These lines occasionally
become tangled in the case of the economy. For
example, until 1985 Regional Command members
Kasm and Qaddura specialized in economic affairs in
their Cabinet posts but not in the Command's eco-
nomic office, which was then headed by non-Cabinet
member Sulayman Qaddah.
Bath Party members have become more active in
their jobs, creating a situation in which some areas
are managed more by the party than by the govern-
The party has formed branch commands on all
state university campuses, and
student members enjoy preferen-
tial treatment with regard to admission, grading, and
job placement.
Foreign Policy Uses
Bath Party ideology is a flexible medium through
which Syrian leaders conduct much of their foreign
policy. For socialist countries the Ba'th emphasizes
socialist fraternity and promotes exchanges between
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worker and student organizations. The US Embassy
in Damascus reports that since the party's takeover of
professional organizations in 1981, contacts between
these groups and their Communist counterparts have
been stronger than ever. The Bath Party structure
approximates East European models, and visiting
Communist Party officials are often greeted by their
Bath Party counterpart.
The Bath characterizes itself as a party of national
development when dealing with developing countries
and Western nations. The Bath sends delegates to
conferences of nonaligned nations, and Syria consis-
tently votes with Third World nations in the United
Nations. As a Pan-Arab party, the Bath, bolstered by
its opposition to Israel, considers itself a champion of
the Arab cause.
Despite its dogma, we believe the Bath Party has
evolved over the last two decades from a Pan-Arab
socialist party to one with a more nationalist charac-
ter. Under Assad, the party has deemphasized the
need to pursue federations with other Arab or Bath
states and instead has concentrated on giving the
party an indigenous character. Assad's policies have
been marked by pragmatism, which has offset some of
the initial excesses of socialist reforms.
We believe the area in which the Bath Party enjoys
the greatest amount of authority is in the planning
and implementation of the centrally planned econo-
my. According to a US scholar, Assad and his inner
circle are unfamiliar and therefore uncomfortable
with economic theory and prefer to delegate responsi-
bility for economic decisions to others, provided they
stay within the loose strictures of Ba'thist ideology. As
with other sectors of government, the economic Cabi-
net ministers follow the advice of the party's Regional
Command and the quadrennial party congress, where
delegates, both technocrats and ideologues, debate the
course of economic policy.
The Bath Party congress and Regional Command set
general economic targets consistent with their ideo-
logical goals, which are translated into one-year and
The Syrian and Iraqi Bath Parties
As neighboring Ba'thist states, Syria and Iraq have
been in competition since 1968 when Iraqi Ba`thists
seized power. The new regime in Baghdad invited
Ba'thist ideologues who had been ousted from power
in Syria two years earlier by leftwing neo-Ba'thists to
join their government. Since that time, both parties,
while guided by the same doctrine, have developed
their own brand of socialism and Arab nationalism.
Both countries have their own National Commands,
and recurrent attempts to join them have been
thwarted by intense regional rivalries and personal
hatred between Assad and Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn.
five-year production plans by the Ministry of Econo-
my. The ministry is responsible for meeting produc-
tion quotas and allocating resources to the various
state-run enterprises.
the party's economic office acts as a watch-
dog nsure that the ministry stays within Ba'thist
guidelines.
The Bath Party envisions a Syria in which economic
development will lead to the fulfillment of two goals: a
self-sufficient society and social justice. According to
Ba'thist doctrine, a self-sufficient society will come
about through the mobilization and development of
all resources, both human and material. Economic
self-sufficiency is seen as a means to achieve political
autonomy. In contrast to the Marxist model for
economic development, Syrian socialists stress the
importance of rural development. This emphasis on
agriculture reflects the Ba'th's strength in rural areas.
Syrian socialists aim to create social justice through
the provision of public goods and social services,
which is consistent with the traditions of Islam.
According to a US Embassy study, many Muslims
who otherwise hold the Ba'thist regime in contempt
believe that its socialist economic programs are pref-
erable to the capitalist alternative.
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Figure 5. President Assad ad-
dressing the Regional Congress,
Altering Socialism to Syrian Economic Realities
From 1963, when the Ba'thists first came to power, to
1970, the development of a socialist economic policy
ebbed and flowed between competing factions.
the moderate wing dominat-
ed by older, experienced party founders, emphasized
gradual economic reform to avoid major social dislo-
cations. The progressive wing, controlled by mostly
Alawite Army officers, called for a radical restructur-
ing of the economy along socialist lines.
The progressive group, the so-called neo-Ba'thists,
came to power in 1966 in a coup led by Alawite Gen.
Salah Jadid. The moderates, mostly civilian Ba'thists,
including founders Aflaq and Bitar, were exiled from
the party and in some cases from the country. For the
next four years the neo-Ba'thists embarked on an
ambitious program of land redistribution and farm
collectivization.
When Assad took power in 1970, he attempted to
unite the moderates and progressives and ousted the
most militant progressives. He launched a "Corrective
Movement" designed to reverse some of the more
radical policies and to encourage expatriates to return
to Syria by creating incentives for private initiative in
some sectors of the economy. Although Assad did not
repudiate the socialist direction of the economy, he
curtailed agrarian reform in response to major short-
falls in production between 1966 and 1970.
Assad's encouragement of a larger role for the private
sector did not prevent the Bath Party from pressing
ahead with ambitious programs to develop Syria's
state-owned industrial base. Impressive development
programs extended paved highways, electricity,
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schools, water supplies, and health care to all of Syria.
The Ba'th's principal focus, however, was on develop-
ing the rural sector, making it a bulwark of Ba'thist
political support.
technocrats, who are mostly Western-
educated, believe that the private sector should be
allowed to play a more visible role in the economy.
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We believe one of Assad's key aims has been to break
the hold on Syria's economic life traditionally exer-
cised by the Sunni Muslim elite and to improve the
economic standing of traditionally impoverished rural
Alawite coreligionists. The basis of the Sunnis' pre-
dominance-privately held banks, factories, and large
farms-has been undermined by land reform and
nationalization.
Economic Problems and Inconsistencies
The structure of economic decision making in Syria,
while dominated by the Bath Party, reflects the
centralized administrative structures of the military
and the government. The high degree of centraliza-
tion and interdependence of these structures has
imposed a heavy burden of bureaucracy with authori-
tarian inclinations at the top of the economic hierar-
chy. For example, the Planning Minister is responsi-
ble for reaching the yearly target of the centralized
plan, but he is generally restricted by the excessive
power of the Ministers of Economy, Finance, Defense,
and Supply.
According to Embassy reports, the Syrian economy is
plagued with problems common to other centrally
planned economies:
? Shortages of consumer items.
? Lack of a skilled managerial class.
? Lack of worker and peasant incentives.
? Rigid structure that allows little flexibility and
creativity in the marketplace.
? Low-quality industrial outputs (particularly in im-
port substitution industries).
? An unrealistic pricing system that makes Syrian
goods uncompetitive abroad and contributes to
smuggling and black marketeering
We believe that disagreements within the economic
apparatus between party ideologues and technocrats
responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the
economy are a major source of bureaucratic disrup-
tion. Party cadres act as watchdogs to ensure that the
government does not deviate from the socialist guide-
debate took
place during the party congress in 1985 when leftist
delegates argued that Syria should adopt an economic
relationship with the Soviet Union similar to Cuba's,
while moderates recommended opening up Syria to
foreign investment from the West.
ssad seems content to let this debate continue,
as long as the result does not stray too far from
standard Ba'thist formulas.
In talks with US officials in April 1986, Assad
affirmed the importance of the private sector, which
in Syria includes farmers, merchants, and contractors
who supply state-owned industries, to the Syrian
economy; but officially it remains scorned. In an
authoritarian state such as Syria, toleration of thriv-
ing private markets must be regarded as tacit govern-
ment policy. The private sector provides capital
through savings and foreign investors and also fills
productivity gaps created by the public sector's lack of
skilled labor.
Although the uneasy coexistence of the two competing
systems deprives the public sector of resources, we
believe it holds important political benefits for Assad:
? By clinging publicly to Bath Party ideology, where
state domination of the economy is a key element,
he legitimizes his one-man rule while avoiding the
increased inefficiency and consumer dissatisfaction
that would result from greater state control.
? Underground trade, one of the few sectors of the
economy in which people can act independently of
state control, helps forestall more open opposition to
Assad's sometimes heavyhanded authoritarian rule.
? By placing the private sector under constant scruti-
ny, Assad keeps the business community psychologi-
cally and financially vulnerable and impresses on
them the importance of not antagonizing the
regime.
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? Factories are kept operating and workers employed
because the nationalized industries use the black
market to obtain raw materials.
For all its economic failings, the Bath Party, particu-
larly under Assad, has made significant improvements
in the material lot of the lower classes:
? Hundreds of villages have been electrified and
thousands of kilometers of roads paved since
Assad's accession to power.
? The percentage of children attending school has
risen sharply in rural areas-particularly in Assad's
predominantly Alawite home district of Latakia.
? Regional development has helped head off massive
rural-urban migration characteristic of other devel-
oping nations.
? Government clinics provide free health care to rural
residents and to those city dwellers whose income
falls below a set minimum
Opposition to the Bath Party
Scholarly sources suggest that cynical if not hostile
attitudes toward the Bath Party exist within the
majority Sunni community, particularly among the
prominent urban landowning families, and include the
following grievances:
? The political and economic reforms of the Bath
have promoted the interests of the peasants and
minority sects, reducing the Sunnis' traditional pow-
er base.
? Senior Sunni officials in the Bath, even in the
Regional Command, lack a power base comparable
to their Alawite counterparts.
? The grassroots organization and indoctrination of
the Bath Party is an instrument of state control
geared toward secularizing the Sunni community in
the hope of eliminating them as a recognizable
political entity.
? Although the party in principle is a secular one, it is
controlled by Alawites, a sect many Sunnis regard
Despite the Bath Party's preeminence in Syrian life,
it suffers a serious image problem resulting in cyni-
cism among large segments of society, according to
scholarly sources and US Embassy reporting. This
diminishes regime support and may damage the par-
ty's survivability in a post-Assad Syria. It is not clear
whether Syrians view the country's problems as sys-
temic or an aberration caused by the current regime.
In the latter case, the rank and file may hope to
reform the party once the present regime is gone. In
any event, scholars note that the
following attitudes are prevalent throughout Syria:
? Assad's monopoly in decisionmaking and his reli-
ance on mostly senior Alawite military advisers
relegate the role of the party to that of a
rubberstamp.
? The manipulation of elections and the preselection
of candidates by the Bath Party make a mockery of
participatory government.
? The Bath and its centrally planned socialist eco-
nomic agenda are the source of economic stagnation
and rampant corruption, neither of which are likely
to improve.
as heretical.
Islam and the Bath Party
The Bath Party has emphasized Arabism as the focus
of national identity and as a means for transforming
Syria's Islamic identity. The party has tried to recon-
cile the two by identifying Islam and Ba'thism as
complementary manifestations of Arab culture. By its
doctrine, however, the Bath provides for freedom of
religion, placing no one faith above the rest. The one
exception to this rule, as a result of public pressure,
was an amendment to the 1973 Syrian Constitution
requiring the President to be a Muslim. The regime's
omission of this requirement from the draft constitu-
tion prompted Sunni riots.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the
leading opponent of the Alawites and the Bath Party
in the early 1970s, when it mobilized popular conser-
vative sentiment against the secular orientation of the
new elite on behalf of the traditional urban mer-
chants. According to Western academic studies, the
merchants' resentment of government interference in
trade-and fear of Ba'thist socialism as a weapon
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in the hands of long-neglected and suppressed rural
people to extract revenge against the cities-led to
their support for the Brotherhood and contributed to
the revival of Islam as an answer to wrenching change
and the loss of unity within the Sunni community.
Assad's brutal suppression of the Muslim Brother-
hood revolt in 1982 in Hamah has minimized the
threat the Brotherhood poses to the regime
A recent demographic study noted that, despite wide-
spread disgruntlement, conditions for many middle-
and lower-class Sunnis have improved over the last
two decades-an improvement they probably ascribe
to the Ba'thist system. We believe families uprooted
from their villages, taking up new and more secular
lifestyles in the cities, have left behind both traditions
and a politically meaningful Sunni identity. The Bath
Party and its numerous affiliated institutions have
supplanted the Sunni-dominated political parties of
the 1950s. Many Sunnis from the old elite, particular-
ly the younger generation, have joined the party,
realizing it is the only path to power.
The Ba'th Party and the Succession
Article 88 of the Syrian Constitution, which sanctions
procedures for selecting a successor, stipulates that, in
the event the President is permanently incapacitated
or dies, a successor is to be nominated by the Bath
Party Regional Command, ratified by the People's
Assembly, and approved in a national referendum.
We believe that any successor to Assad will rely
heavily on the Bath Party apparatus to lend continu-
Most experts believe that in a post-Assad Syria,
power will be assumed by senior Alawite officers who,
after agreeing on a successor, will go through the
formality of seeking Bath Party endorsement. Under
these circumstances, we believe a senior Bath Party
leader, particularly, a Sunni official, stands a good
chance of being selected as nominal head of state as
well as party secretary general. The selection of a
high-ranking Sunni Ba'thist-such as Ahmar,
Khaddam, or Mashariqa, who are not in a position to
compete for the presidency because they lack a mili-
tary power base-would legitimize the party's role
and possibly galvanize support from the Sunni com-
munity for the new regime.
In time, a figurehead president could eventual-
ly accrue substantial decisionmaking power as an
arbitrator of factionalized Alawite kingmakers, but
real power would remain in the hands of Alawite
officers J
Should Syria be ruled by a collegial body of Alawite
generals and some prominent Sunnis, the members
probably would use the Regional Command as a
medium through which to govern. Many inner circle
members are already on the Command and have used
this forum to air their grievances against each other.
The size of the Command may have to be reduced to
serve as a "Politburo" for Syria's elite.
this could result in inner circle
members establishing patron-client relationships with
particular offices of the party bureaucracy, which
would compete to promote their parochial policy
interests.
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ity and legitimacy to his rule.
We believe that the Bath Party stands to gain a
greater role in ruling Syria should Assad's successor
be less willing or able to monopolize decisionmaking.
As none of the leading candidates in Assad's inner
circle appear more knowledgable on economic matters
than Assad, we expect the party to continue its
leading role in this sector. Should any successor
attempt major policy changes, we believe he would
depend on the party apparatus for their implementa-
Implications for the United States
tion.
We believe that Assad or any successor will continue
to garner popular support by adhering to the Ba'thist
hardline position toward US interests in the region.
Although a pragmatic leader like Assad may be open
to compromise, the party will continue to act as the
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Figure 6. Bath Party Assistant Secretary Gen-
eral Ahmar boarding Libyan airplane after
conscience of the regime and implacably oppose an
accommodation with Israel. Although Ba'thist doc-
trine does not preclude peaceful coexistence with the
United States and the West, a successor less confident
than Assad may adopt a more anti-US position to
curry public favor
Nonetheless, the evolution of the Bath Party from a
Pan-Arab socialist to a more Syrian nationalist party
has made it more amenable to improving ties to the
West. The party's retreat from a revolutionary plat-
form to one striving for domestic stability and, to a
limited degree, experimentation with a mixed econo-
my may provide US interests with greater opportuni-
ties for economic involvement with Syria in terms of
trade and foreign investment. The Syrian perception
that the United States supports Israel unconditional-
ly, however, will prevent a significant realignment of
foreign policy away from the Soviet Union.
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Appendix A
History and Structure of the
Bath Party
The Bath (Renaissance) Party was founded in
Damascus in April 1947 at a time when Arab political
thinkers were groping for expressions of statehood and
an ideology that would be unique to the Arab condi-
tion. The party's primary ideological commitments
were to Arab unity, socialization of the economy, and
secularization of politics. The Bath from its start has
had a multiconfessional character. Its founders in-
cluded an Alawite, Zaki Arsuzi; an Eastern Orthodox
Christian, Michel Aflaq; and a Sunni, Salah Bitar.
Figure 7
Sectarian Affiliation in Syrian
Society and the Bath Party
Central Committee (BPCC)
Percent
Alawite
Sec( Affiliation in Syria
Combined Christian
Druze
The Bath became the political instrument of the
Syrian military in the 1960s. Originally dominated by
Syrian civilians, a group of officers-including Hafiz
Assad and Salah Jadid-clandestinely founded a
Bath military organization separate from the main
party apparatus while Syria was united with Nasir's
Egypt (1958-61). This small group of officers master-
minded a coup on 8 March 1963, taking over the
party and ousting its founders, including Aflaq and
Bitar, in February 1966. Assad steadily rose to the
top, ousting regime strongman Salah Jadid in Novem-
ber 1970.
The officers who came to dominate the Army and the
party in the 1960s represented a sharp break with
Syria's traditional political leadership. The latter had
come from the landlord-merchant class centered in
the big cities and were primarily Sunni. The officer
corps, in contrast, contained members of minority
groups and often stressed rural reform. The minorities
were overrepresented because they found the military
to be the only path for social and economic advance-
ment, given the Sunni domination of political and
commercial life.
Since 1963 the Bath Party has drawn its broader
membership as well as its leaders from minority and
rural segments of the population.
scholars note that Damascus has never been a Ba'thist
stronghold and that the party's support there has been
drawn essentially from rural-based students and
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teachers. The core of the Bath base in the military
has come from the Alawites, the Druze group from
Jabal al-Duruz, the Sunni group from Hawran, and
the Sunni group from Dayr az Zawr.
The Bath has retained a multiconfessional character
by extending the political alliance to Sunnis who
share the rural background of the rural Alawites or
who have forged their own connections to the new
elite. Most of the Sunni officers who rose to high-level
military positions during the past 20 years have come
from the country towns and rural areas or from the
city districts inhabited by former peasants. Army
Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi, for example, is from a
small town near Aleppo, and Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Defense Mustafa Talas is from Ar
Rastan, a village between Hamah and Hims. Vice
President Khaddam is a Sunni, but he is married to a
member of the Hawwash family, which provided
leadership of the Assads' Alawite Mutawirah tribe
under Ottoman rule.
The Bath Party professes to be a revolutionary
organization, but Western scholars note that it has
increasingly assumed the character of a large bureau-
cracy. Members advance by progressing through a
training program as much as by performing required
functions. Party schools at various levels run courses
for cadres and potential leaders.
Information on party membership is difficult to ob-
tain, and no official statistics on the size of the party
have been made public. The Bath came to power in
1963 with no more than a few hundred members.
although party offi-
cials boast a membership of nearly 400,000, the
actual figure is probably less than half that number.
According to the US Embassy in Damascus, the
discrepancy in the numbers is probably attributable to
the various levels of party affiliation, which range
from full member, to candidate, to supporter.
The basic unit of the party is the ring (haqlah), which
consists of two to seven individuals, one of whom is in
command. Some rings, particularly in the military,
are based on profession. Recruits outside the military
who form a ring are called supporters (nasir). The first
three months are usually probationary for most
recruits. Following three years of heavy indoctrina-
tion, recruits may join the company (firgah). The
company is made up of five rings or less. At this level
the recruit is referred to as a worker. Mobility to the
next stages, which are the division (sha'bah) and
branch (far) depends on perceived commitment by
party officials, regularity of attendance at meetings,
favoritism, and luck. Two or more companies consti-
tute a division, and two or more divisions constitute a
branch.
The Ba'thist branch is the highest party organ below
the Regional Congress. All relatively important Syri-
an cities and each of Syria's 13 provinces has a
branch. The branch secretaries occasionally gather in
Damascus for sessions with party commands. General
secretaries and undersecretaries attend the Regional
Congress to elect the party leadership. There is a
separate structure of branches in the military.
The Regional Congress is the supreme Bath Party
forum in Syria. The National Congress, to which it is
formally subordinate, has had no real power for the
last 25 years because of the split in the Bath Party
within the Arab world. The Regional Congress meets
every four years, most recently in January 1985, at
which time it determines party policy and elects
members to the Regional Command.
The party leadership is divided into two commands: a
Regional Command responsible for the Syrian
"region" of the Arab "nation," by far the more
important of the two, and the National Command,
which supervises the Bath Party organization
throughout the Arab world. Until 1966 there was one
Bath National Command. Since then there have been
competing commands and competing parties centered
in Syria and Iraq. President Assad is secretary gener-
al of both the Regional and National Command in
Syria.
The National Command regularly disseminates infor-
mation designed to portray the external Bath Party
organizations as activist bodies that have an impact
on the politics of the countries in which they are
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Figure 8
The Bath Party Organization
Regional Secretary
General
Hafiz al-Assad
Regional Command
21 members
I-
Branch Commands Military Commands
Idlib Province Army Division
Halab Province Missile Forces
Ar Raqqah Province Air Force
Al. Hasakah Province Defense Companies
Dayr az Zawr Province
Hamah Province
Tartus Province
Hims Province
Dimashq Province
Al Qunaytirah Province
Dar'a Province
As Suwayda'Province
Damascus City
Aleppo City
Damascus University
Aleppo University
Latakia University
Al Ladhiqiyah Province
Regional Congress Central Committee
Meets every four years 90 members
750 delegates
j Inspection and Control
Committee
Party Bureaus
Youth Bureau
Student Bureau
Labor Bureau
Training Bureau
Peasants' Bureau
Party Organization Bureau
etc.
People's Organization
Revolutionary Youth Organizations
Union of Students
I Women's Organization
Peasants' Federation
General Federation of Trade
Unions
Vanguards
Union of Writers etc.
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located. The US Embassy in Damascus reports that
these organizations attempt to promote Bath Party
principles among host country citizens, including the
promotion of Palestinian rights and achieving Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories.
National Command organizations operate with the
permission of the host country, both Arab and non-
Arab, and therefore try to avoid being perceived as
instruments of Syrian foreign policy. An exception to
this rule is the Bath Party in Lebanon led by Assam
Qansu, which has consistently, overtly, and directly
supported-both politically and militarily-Syrian
foreign policy objectives in Lebanon. In Arab coun-
tries the local Bath parties are staffed by nationals of
that country, but funding often comes from Damas-
cus. In non-Arab countries Bath Party members
organize within the Arab student populations and
expatriate communities.
The Regional Command consists of 21 members and
is the official party governing body responsible for the
day-to-day management of party affairs. According to
the US Embassy in Damascus, the President will
often encourage debate in the Regional Command to
gauge the depth of public feeling on a broad range of
issues and policies. These discussions may often lead
to selection of a new Cabinet, many members of
which are represented in the Command.
A subsidiary Bath Party leadership body was created
during the party's Regional Congress in January
1980. A Central Committee of 90 members was
established, according to press accounts, to serve as a
supreme governing body for the party. It consists of
the Regional Command, representatives of the Army
leadership (13 senior officers, among them the Chief
of General Staff, division commanders, and the heads
of the security apparatus and Syria's elite forces), and
some provincial governors and Cabinet members. The
Central Committee meets once or twice a year, and its
discussions center mainly on economic matters, ap-
proval of budgets, annual party programs, and the
party's and country's five-year plan. In practice, the
Regional Command and the Cabinet have been an-
swerable to the Central Committee only when govern-
ment policy has been debated approximately every six
months.
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17 April 1946
April 1947
16 May 1948
30 March 1949
14 August 1949
19 December 1949
25 February 1954
February 1958
1959
28 September 1961
March-April 1962
January 1963
8 March 1963
June 1963
July 1963
23 February 1966
8 September 1966
Appendix B
The Bath Party in Modern Syrian History
French forces leave Syria.
Bath Party founded.
Syrian forces move into Palestine.
Husni Za'im seizes power in Damascus.
Sami Hinnawi ousts Za'im.
Adib Shishakli ousts Hinnawi.
Shishakli ousted, restoration of civilian rule.
Syria and Egypt form the United Arab Republic (UAR).
Military committee formed by Syrian Ba'thist officers in Egypt.
Military coup takes Syria out of UAR. By December 1961 coalition government is
formed representing all important factions except the Bath and pro-Nasir
elements.
Coup attempt.
Army elements led by non-Ba'thist Ziyad Hariri stage a coup with assistance of
Bath leaders.
Amin Hafiz deposed; rival Ba'thists stage coup putting extremist wing of Bath in
power. "Old Guard" of Bath Party ousted in coup. Move toward socialism
intensifies.
Salim Hatum fails in countercoup against Salah Jadid, flees to Jordan.
Syrian Army loses Golan to Israel.
Coup conspiracy uncovered; Hatum, who had returned to Syria, is shot.
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February 1969
September 1970
13 November 1970
March 1971
October 1973
February 1976
8 October 1980
February 1982
June 1982
November 1983
11 March 1984
November 1985
February 1986
Assad uses control of military to strengthen his standing.
Syrian forces enter Jordan to aid Palestinians.
Hafiz Assad seizes power from Jadid; Jadid imprisoned. Assad begins "Corrective
Movement."
Assad elected President, also leads military and Bath Party.
War with Israel.
Muslim Brotherhood begins anti-Ba'th activity in Syria.
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Security forces destroy much of Hamah in putting down Brotherhood revolt.
Israeli move into Lebanon; heavy losses of Syrian aircraft.
Assad seriously ill.
Assad appoints three vice presidents to share workload.
Two Syrian jets shot down by Israeli Air Force over Syrian territory.
Israeli Air Force forces down Libyan passenger jet; Bath Assistant Secretary
General Ahmar aboard.
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