PAKISTAN'S BALUCHISTAN: A POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOT

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
FiF CM1314.
I :O' MIX Ct'
I~1-, t~~M.r ARC
Instability
Pakistan's Baluchistan:
Prospects for Renewed
Secret-
NESA 86-10012
February 1986
COPY 373
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Pakistan's Baluchistan:
Prospects for Renewed
Instability
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
with the Directorate of Operations.
Analysis, with a contribution from
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 86-10012
February 1986
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Pakistan's Baluchistan:
Prospects for Renewed
Instability
Summary Growing ethnic tensions and religious rivalries will cause an increase in
Information available violence in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province over the next year or two. The
as oft January 1986 government will probably be able to cope with this unrest, but resentment
was used in this report.
of the central government will linger and the province's economic prospects
will continue to be uncertain. Potentially unstable, the province will be
vulnerable to Soviet subversion, especially if the government in Islamabad
weakens in the post-martial-law period.
Government-sponsored economic progress during the past five years has
increased the material well-being of the average Baluch and done much to
alleviate problems that led to full-scale revolt in Baluchistan in the mid-
1970s. Baluch economic expectations, however, are likely to accelerate at a
faster pace than real economic growth. Federal funding has increased the
province's dependence on Islamabad and has given the central government
increased control over the province, but potential budgetary constraints
may force a reduction in federal funds allocated to Baluchistan.
The convening of the National and provincial assemblies in March 1985
has provided peaceful outlets for Baluch grievances. Traditional Baluch
autonomist aspirations remain, however, and could spark new tension now
that martial law has been lifted.
Separatist and nationalist sentiments remain high among some of the
younger, better-educated Baluch. Tribal chiefs-the traditional power
brokers in Baluchistan-resent Islamabad's undermining of their tradition-
al authority, although they have adapted to new political rules imposed by
A crackdown on Baluch separatists would increase anti-US sentiment
among Baluch leaders and endanger US nationals in Baluchistan. Disaf-
fected Baluch tend to see Washington as their enemy because of US ties to
the government in Islamabad and US supply of military hardware to
Pakistan's armed forces. In the face of government suppression, more
moderate Baluch may turn to Afghanistan or the Soviet Union for support.
iii Secret
NESA 86-10012
February 1986
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The Soviets have maintained contact with Baluch dissidents over the past
year. The most powerful pro-Soviet Baluch tribal chief lives in Afghanistan
in self-imposed exile with his followers. Some of his retinue have infiltrated
into Pakistan to set up rebel camps. The Soviets' willingness to increase
support to this group is probably constrained by their realization that, even
with outside help, the Baluch would be hard pressed to successfully
challenge the Zia government.
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Contents
Summary
? Economic Development
Baluch-Pushtun-Punjabi Tensions 4
Separatist Sentiments
Soviet Meddling
Will Instability Return?
More Disruptive Development Policies
Iranian Meddling
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Figure 1
Baluchistan Province
Federally
Arabian
Sea
sirabad
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Divisional boundary
District boundary
Gas pipeline
Railroad
Hard-surfaced road
Loose-surfaced or unsurfaced road
NO Chagai
andi _
palbandin
- KherM
Ham,i- -
Mashkel /
Zlhob
Kalat okdha
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Pakistan's Baluchistan:
Prospects for Renewed
Instability
The province of Baluchistan has been relatively quiet
since the Pakistani Army quelled a major insurgency
in 1977, but the Baluch's strong grievances against
the government in Islamabad have not disappeared.
The martial law regime's measured efforts to assimi-
late the Baluch into the Punjabi-dominated state
contributed to the province's stability. An intensive
economic development program and occasional use of
force have reduced Baluch dissent. If the new civilian
government in Islamabad fails to meet Baluch expec-
tations for political representation and access to eco-
nomic resources, separatism, in our view, could again
become a potent force.
Baluchistan is Pakistan's largest, least populated, and
least developed province. Large stretches of the region
are uninhabited, and even the inhabited portions are
rugged and barren. Ethnic Baluch in the province
represent about half of the estimated provincial popu-
lation of 5.6 million.' The province's other major
ethnic group, the Pushtuns, numbers about 40 percent
of the population and tends to be better off than the
Baluch.
The Baluch have resented the outsiders who have
ruled the region for most of its modern history-first
the British from 1877 to the partition of India in
1947, and, since then, the Punjabi-dominated Govern-
ment of Pakistan. Scholarly studies have shown that
the Baluch have long opposed central government-
sponsored development efforts that they believe are
undermining their tribal culture. The Baluch believe
these programs are designed to submerge Baluch
ethnicity into an all-embracing Pakistani identity.
'The Baluch are found mainly in western Pakistan, southwestern
Afghanistan, and southeastern Iran. In addition to the Baluch in
Pakistan, Western scholars estimate that 300,000 Baluch live in
Baluchistan has been a thorn in the side of every
Pakistani government' since independence. Baluchi-
stan's leaders-mostly semifeudal chieftains-op-
posed the area's integration into Pakistan at inde-
pendence and sought far-reaching autonomy. Shortly
after Pakistan declared independence in 1947, the
Khan of Kalat-the most influential Baluch leader-
created the state of Kalat. Located in central Baluchi-
stan, it was to be independent of Pakistan except in
defense and foreign policy. The Pakistani Army spent
almost a year subduing the rebel state. Formal acces-
sion agreements between Islamabad and the Baluch
leadership were not signed until late 1948.
Baluch tribal chiefs, known as sardars, mounted
armed rebellions in 1958 and 1962 and conducted an
extended insurgency from 1973 to 1977. The revolt in
the mid-1970s was sparked by the policies of Prime
Minister Bhutto, who, fearing a Baluch move for
autonomy, dismissed the elected Baluch-controlled
provincial government and arrested key Baluch lead-
ers. During the height of this revolt, the Pakistani
Government had 70,000 troops-nearly 20 percent of
the Army-in the area. About 3,500 Pakistani sol-
diers and at least 6,000 Baluch were killed, according
to press estimates. The rebellion was quieted only
after then Army Chief of Staff General Zia seized the
national government and reversed the policies of
Prime Minister Bhutto.
Economic Development
President Zia has resolved many of the problems that
contributed to earlier violence in Baluchistan, and we
believe his policies are largely responsible for the
relative quiet in the province. He has taken a concilia-
tory approach that recognizes the sardars' authority
over aspects of tribal ways of life and has allocated
more funds for provincial economic development
sought by Baluch leaders.
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Figure 2
Pakistan: Provincial Comparisons
Population
Million
Total: 97.4 million (1984)
Baluchistan
Punjab
North West Frontier
Sind
Land Size
Square Kilometers
Total: 799,804
Baluchistan
Punjab
North West Frontiers
Sind
Baluchistan has lagged behind the rest of Pakistan in
development. Per capita income is about half of the
national figure, according to Western diplomatic
sources; health services are inadequate; and the ma-
jority of the people still support themselves by herding
and subsistence agriculture. Of the province's mineral
resources, only natural gas and coal are exploited.
Zia's commitment to Baluchistan's development is
reflected in the growth in federal funds devoted to this
purpose. These have increased fourfold since the early
1970s, and Baluchistan's share of Pakistan's develop-
ment spending has increased from 8 percent in FY
1972-73 (July-June) to 10 percent in FY 1985-86.
Development expenditures for FY 1985-86 are to
increase by 14 percent over the previous fiscal year,
with most funding to be used for water facilities and
schools. Furthermore, the US Consulate in Karachi
reports that each member of Baluchistan's provincial
assembly, which was elected in early 1985, has re-
300 400 ceived about $500,000 from the federal government
for discretionary purposes.
Islamabad has sought foreign aid for Baluchistan's
development. Foreign assistance for development
projects in Baluchistan has come from the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Kuwait, and other
countries are looking into underwriting development
projects, according to US officials.
Federal Budget Allocations, 1985-86b
Million US $
Total: US $ 546 million
Baluchistan c
Punjab
North West Frontier
Sind
a Includes tribal areas.
b Pakistan fiscal year starts l July to June 30.
c Plus a supplementary $12.5 million for special development projects.
The primary emphasis of Zia's development program
is on the economic infrastructure (extending the road
network, drilling tube wells for water, building irriga-
tion systems, and expanding the electric power net-
work). The increase in federal largess has increased
the province's dependence on Islamabad and created a
rationale for cooperation with Zia's regime. In 1983,
President Zia opened a gas pipeline from the main
line in central Pakistan to Quetta, the capital of
Baluchistan. This was a key demand of the Baluch,
who resented the fact that the province's most valu-
able resource was supporting industries in Punjab and
Sind Provinces, but not in Baluchistan.
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Figure 3. Baluch tribesmen in
Quetta.
Development has reduced the influence of the tribal
chiefs. In the past, the sardar was judged on his
abilities as a warrior-leader and was considered the
embodiment of tribal independence. Western scholars
and diplomats note that a good sardar is now judged
on his ability to represent tribal interests to the
authorities, to wheel and deal with the bureaucracy,
and to take advantage of new opportunities for acquir-
ing resources. Government officials in Baluchistan
assert that the dilemma among tribal chiefs is wheth-
er to be "left behind by history" or make peace with
the central government and retain some of their
authority.
US diplomatic reporting indicates that the provincial
governor of Baluchistan during 1984-85, Lt. Gen.
K. K. Afridi, brought local leaders and groups into
closer touch with Islamabad, unlike his predecessors.
President Zia made a short, peaceful tour of Baluchi-
stan in November 1984 and met with tribal leaders,
according to US diplomatic reporting.
Some Baluch tribal resentment toward the central
government remains. The fiercely independent Marri
tribe is suspicious of government intentions, according
to US Embassy reporting, and is reluctant to allow
the establishment of major road projects in its tribal
areas, fearing that such projects would displace the
indigenous Baluch population. Islamabad temporarily
ceased construction of a major road in 1983 that
passes through Marri territory to avoid a confronta-
tion with the tribe
Emigration to other parts of Pakistan, as well as to
the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, is contributing both to 25X1
detribalization and to modernization among Pakis-
tan's Baluch. No longer must a Baluch depend solely
on his tribe for support and security. Even if a
tribesman does not choose to migrate, the knowledge
that this option is available weakens tribal authority.
Remittances from migrants to relatives still living
within tribal areas provide a measure of economic
independence by creating small centers of economic 25X1
power not directly controlled by local tribal leaders.
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Historically, most migrants have come from the west-
ern Baluch tribes. Migration from the Kharan, Mak-
ran, and Lasbela districts has apparently offset an
estimated 2.5- to 3-percent annual natural increase in
population;
More recently, the construction boom in
Figure 4. Pakistani Government propaganda
against sardar system during Bhutto era.
In our view, emigration has provided a safety valve for
the Pakistani Baluch's population and unemployment
pressures. The number of Baluch who have emigrated
during the last 100 years is estimated at 1.5 million, a
figure based on estimates of expected natural increase
in population. About half of these migrated to the
Indus valley lowlands and half to the Persian Gulf
and East African coastal regions. The number of
Baluch living outside Baluchistan may exceed the
estimated 2.8 million living within the province. At
least 1.5 million Baluch are settled in Sind and
Punjab Provinces
large but unknown number
of Baluch live in the Persian Gulf states and elsewhere
outside Pakistan.
Karachi and the Gulf states has attracted migrants
from the eastern hill districts, draining the traditional
areas of Baluch dissidence and easing job competition,
which is a source of tension. Leaner economic times in
the Persian Gulf region, however, are probably revers-
ing this trend and forcing some Baluch to return to
Baluchistan.
Baluch-Pushtun-Punjabi Tensions
The influx into Baluchistan of some 400,000 Afghan
refugees since 1979, mostly Pushtuns, increases the
chances for significant unrest, in our view. Western
diplomats report that the Baluch see Afghan refugees,
who were once welcomed as persecuted Muslims, as
competitors for jobs and land.
The Baluch also have long been concerned that many
of Punjab's 55 million inhabitants will increasingly
look to Baluchistan as a potential home. Punjabis
already dominate the commerce and administration of
Baluchistan as roads have penetrated formerly inac-
cessible areas.
immigrant Punjabi landholders and retired military
officers from Pakistan's other three provinces have
acquired much of the newly irrigated land in Baluchi-
stan.
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The Physical and Human Geography of Baluchistan
Topography
Baluchistan is the westernmost province of Pakistan
and covers an area of 347,188 square kilometers. The
terrain alternates between mountains, with some
peaks rising to 1,830 meters, and broad expanses of
barren, sandy desert. Baluchistan has a few fertile
areas near the rivers and the Arabian Sea, but the
rest of the region receives less than 25 centimeters of
rain a year. The province's 965-kilometer coast has
three harbors at Ormara, Pasni, and Gwadar, which
are relatively undeveloped, although the Pakistanis
are constructing jetties at Ormara and Pasni in
The interior districts of Kalat, Khuzdar, Lasbela,
Sibi, Kohlu, Kachhi, and Nasirabad comprise a third
zone. This region is home to the large Baluch tribes
such as the Brohi, Marri, Mengal, and Bugti, whose
chiefs rule with little deference to outside authority.
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addition to the one already built at Gwadar.
Population
Baluchistan is divided into four distinct population
zones characterized by ethnic, geographic, economic,
and historic differences. The northern area is inhabit-
ed by Pushtuns. The districts of Pishin, Zhob, and
Loralai have absorbed the majority of the 350,000 to
450,000 Afghans who have entered the province since
1979.
Quetta, the provincial capital and major city, repre-
sents a second zone. Most of the 400,000 people in the
city are Pushtuns.
The fourth zone is near the Makran Coast (Gwadar,
Turbat, Panjgur, and Kharan districts) that borders
the Arabian Sea. The Baluch who inhabit the Mak-
ran coastal area are more progressive and detribal-
ized than those in interior Baluchistan and play a
marginal role in Baluch politics.
Economy
The province's economy is primarily pastoral and
nomadic, with fishing and smuggling along the coast.
In recent years, significant mineral and energy devel-
opment has occurred, a major example being the Sui
gasfield and pipeline, which supply natural gas to
Punjab and to Karachi, Pakistan's major port.
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Figure 5
Population Density in Baluchistan Province by District, 1981
District boundary
Nok
t.:
di
Relit
IrS A
Arabian
Sea
Federally
Administered v
Tribal Are !5V North-
)a Fort
Sande an
(Zho
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Figure 6
Baluchistan: Progression of
Development Funds, 1972-85 a
Total annual central
government budget
for provinces
Annual budget for
province of
Baluchistan
0 1972 74 76 78 80 82 84
Figure 7. Street scene in
Quetta.
Separatist Sentiments
Baluch separatists remain active, but, with the major
leaders either under arrest or in exile, we do not
believe these dissidents can transform Baluch discon-
tent into action against the government. With the
lifting of martial law and a civilian government
returning to power at the end of 1985, however,
Baluch separatism may gain strength if the Baluch
cannot compete with the more populous provinces for
resources.
Groups gathered in a loose political alliance called the
Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF) seek to
promote separatism. The front encompasses detribal-
ized Baluch professionals, students, radical sardars
and tribesmen, and former students living in Quetta
who claim that Punjabi immigrants are monopolizing
economic and professional opportunities in Baluchi-
stan. About 1,700 fighters belonging to the militant
Marri tribe are located in BPLF camps inside Af-
ghanistan, according to a usually knowledgeable
Western scholar. Khair Bakhsh Marri, the leader of
the Marri tribe, has been in self-imposed exile in
Kabul since 1982 and maintains strong links to the
BPLF.
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Figure 8
Major Ethnic Groups and Tribes in Baluchistan Province
N
BALUCH Ethnic group
Makran Tribe
International boundary
-?- Provincial boundary
- - - Divisional boundary
District boundary
Hard-surfaced road
Loose-surfaced or unsurfaced road
Nok
? undi
Haman-i-
Mashkel /
IrS A ;
AD
S.Khuidir
Arabian
Sea
Federally `
Administered,v
Tribal Area
North-
West
Frontier
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Baluch separatism.
The Baluchistan Students' Organization (BSO) is a
loose collection of Baluch students who also advocate
We doubt that the Marri rebels can convince many
Baluch tribesmen to join them in an insurgency
because of intertribal rivalries and also because most
Baluch are probably aware that a new insurgency
would invite a military crackdown similar to that in
1977. There have been no major incidents of antigov-
ernment violence perpetrated by militant Baluch
tribesmen since January 1983.
strength, according to US diplomatic reporting.
BSO has gone largely underground since Zia banned
political activity in 1979 and appears to be losing
Cooperation between Baluch and Sindhi separatists
poses a potential threat to political stability in Balu-
chistan. Both groups share an anti-Punjabi interest,
and both fear gradual Punjabi encroachment upon
their home provinces. Exiled Baluch leader A. K.
Mengal in mid-1985 helped form the Sind/Pushtun/
Baluch Front, which advocates a confederal structure
for Pakistan. The civil disobedience campaign spon-
sored by Zia's political opposition and the ethnic
violence in Sind in August-September 1983 failed to
arouse much of a response among the Baluch. Baluch
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supported Sindhi 25X1
do little to further Baluch autonomy.
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the Sindhi opposition's acceptance of the 1973 Consti- 25X1
tution, which calls for strong federal authority, would
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Major Baluch Dissident Groups
The Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF) en-
dorses armed struggle and employs Marxist rhetoric
in its advocacy of an independent "greater Baluchis-
tan" encompassing parts of Pakistan, Iran, and Af-
ghanistan. Formed in 1976 by hardcore supporters of
the 1973-77 insurgency, the BPLF moved into Af-
ghanistan in 1977, where it has been supported by
successive Afghan regimes.
The Pakistan National Party (PNP), led by former
Baluchistan Governor Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was
founded in 1979 and is the predominant party in
Baluchistan. It stands for complete provincial auton-
omy with only defense, foreign affairs, and communi-
cations left to Islamabad. The PNP seeks to restruc-
ture Pakistan's administration on the basis of culture
and linguistic affinity.
some 1,700 Baluch tribes-
men affiliated with the BPLF are in Afghanistan with
several thousand sympathizers in Pakistan.
the BPLF has strong links to
The Baluchistan Students'Organization (BSO) is the
most vocal advocate of Baluch separatism and radi-
cal political and social change. The BSO staged
frequent protests and engaged in minor violence at
Quetta University in 1983 during the nationwide civil
disobedience campaign staged by President Zia's
political opposition. Most Baluch students identify
with the Baluch nationalism voiced by the BSO, but
we doubt the majority would support the pro-Soviet
rhetoric of the jar left element in the group.
The government-estimated 3,000 BSO members,
roughly half of Baluch high school and university
students, are organized into chapters at the university
and colleges of Baluchistan and at universities in
Sind. The merger of two factions of the BSO in
1983-one had supported Khair Bakhsh Marri and
the other supported Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and
Ataullah Mengal-may indicate a trend toward a
broader antiregime coalition of student dissidents.
The PNP traces its lineage to the old National
Awami Party (NAP), which was outlawed during the
Baluch insurgency in the 1970s. As heir to the NAP,
Bizenjo's party enjoys considerable prestige because
the NAP was the only sustained organizational vehi-
cle for Baluch aspirations before the insurgency. The
roughly 2,000 members of the PNP,
come primarily from
detribalized Baluch in Quetta and smaller urban
centers in the province as well as from Baluch
migrants in Karachi and other parts of Sind.
nist Party of Pakistan
The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD), suspicious of Bizenjo's motives, has rebuffed
his attempts to obtain MRD membership, according
to US Embassy reporting. Consequently, the PNP is
now in "association" with the MRD. Although it
shares the MRD's opposition to the Zia regime, the
PNP is suspicious of the MRD's dedication to Baluch
provincial autonomy. The PNP has recently merged
with the smaller National Progressive Party, which is
the overt manifestation of the pro-Moscow Commu-
In the 1985 elections, the PNP, like all political
parties, was banned from running candidates. The
ban on political parties was lifted in late 1985, but it
is unlikely that the PNP will abide by restrictions,
such as registration and a full audit by the govern-
ment, that Islamabad has imposed. Nonetheless, we
believe that in free and open provincial elections, the
PNP would win strong Baluch support even if more
militant Baluch groups boycotted the elections.
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Shia-Sunni Tensions
Increasing Shia grievances toward the Sunni-
dominated government in Islamabad are another de-
stabilizing factor. Although most of Pakistan's Baluch
are Sunni, many Pushtuns in Baluchistan are Shias.
Like their brethren in other provinces, Shias in Balu-
chistan believe that the government discriminates
against them and have demanded their own Islamic
legal system. In July 1985, several days of fighting
between Shias and police in Quetta left some 30 dead
and 50 wounded, according to US Embassy reporting.
The provincial government responded by arresting
several hundred Shias, deporting about 70 Afghan
Shia refugees to Iran, and restricting traffic across
the Iranian-Pakistani border, according to US diplo-
matic sources.
Meddling by Iranian zealots may have caused some of
the sectarian violence in Quetta last summer. Accord-
ing to US diplomatic sources, local authorities in
Baluchistan suspect that the Shias in Quetta were
given arms by Tehran. Several Baluch members of the
National Assembly publicly charged Iran with incit-
ing the Shia rioters. Both Islamabad and Tehran tried
to smooth over strains caused by the Quetta incident,
according to US Embassy reports, but Pakistani
suspicions of Iran, which has a long border with
Baluchistan and a consulate in Quetta, are strong.
Soviet Meddling
We believe that the Soviets are attracted to the
possibility of gaining warm-water ports on the
Arabian Sea on the Baluchistan coast. In our view,
however, they will not risk a confrontation with a US-
supported Pakistan over the issue. Furthermore, the
Baluch harbors in Pakistan, principally at Gwadar,
Ormara, and Pasni, are still under development by
Pakistan. Only small fishing settlements are located
there, they lack good access, and heavy sea conditions
frequently preclude their use during the southwestern
monsoon months.
Moscow has long had contact with Baluch dissidents. Several Baluch opposition figures represent potential
Soviet contacts with assets for any Soviet designs on Baluchistan.
the radical tribal sardars and pro-Soviet elements of he radical
the Baluchistan Students' Organization predate the
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
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tribal chief Khair Bakhsh Marri believes outside aid
is necessary for a successful revolt in Baluchistan and
would accept Soviet support for a new insurgency.
The Pakistani press reports that Marri traveled to
figure, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, has called for direct
talks between Islamabad and Kabul on the war in
Afghanistan. Bizenjo traveled to the USSR for the
Moscow Youth Festival in July 1985, according to US
diplomatic reporting.
Afghanistan provides the Soviets with a contiguous
base and long border for infiltrating aid to Baluch
dissidents. In our view, however, continued strong
Afghan insurgent pressures on Soviet forces and lines
of communication inhibit Moscow's ability to increase
dramatically its involvement in Baluchistan. We be-
lieve most Baluch leaders, who closely monitor events
in Afghanistan, distrust Soviet long-term objectives in
Baluchistan and are wary of accepting substantial
support from Moscow
Return to Civilian Rule
The coming to power of a civilian government in
Islamabad will probably make it more difficult for
Baluchistan to attract the federal government's atten-
tion. Punjabis are a majority in the National Assem-
bly, and they may be less sensitive to Baluch concerns
than the previous military government. President Zia
will probably continue to push for high levels of
development funds to Baluchistan, but the other
provinces will also demand larger allocations of gov-
ernment resources. Budgetary constraints in the fu-
ture will probably force Islamabad to level off eco-
nomic aid to Baluchistan.
Will Instability Return?
We believe Baluchistan will be relatively stable for
the rest of the decade unless Pakistan as a whole
experiences serious unrest. Although radical Baluch
and disaffected Shias and Pushtuns will cause some
law-and-order problems, we expect the security situa-
tion to be manageable.
We expect, however, that ethnic and tribal violence
will gradually increase in Baluchistan. The new gov-
ernment in Islamabad, in our opinion, will be faced
with local disorders as Baluch and other ethnic
groups, armed with weapons infiltrating from Af-
ghanistan, seek to settle grievances with each other as
well as with the authorities. Local paramilitary forces
and, if necessary, the Army can be used to keep these
fights from getting out of hand. We believe that such
disorders, while not threatening the government, will
hinder economic development and make the area
dangerous for Western technicians. We consider un-
likely another prolonged insurgency similar to that of
1973-77. Baluch separatist groups, in our judgment,
are aware that Islamabad will have the authority to
declare a state of national emergency and that the
Army would again intervene to suppress any insurgen-
cy if civilian authority in Baluchistan seemed in
danger of collapse.
Although the Soviets almost certainly would step up
covert assistance to Baluch dissidents, we do not
foresee Soviet involvement deciding any conflict be-
tween the Baluch and Islamabad. In our view, Mos-
cow is aware that Baluch separatists would have
difficulty mounting a serious challenge to the Paki-
stani Army in Baluchistan. We believe that the
Soviets also would calculate that heightened support
for the Baluch would prompt increased Western and
Islamic support for Islamabad.
More Disruptive Development Policies
A Pakistani government without President Zia may
follow more aggressive economic development policies
in Baluchistan as part of an effort to displace the
traditional tribal chiefs. Many Baluch would react
with hostility to such a policy change and might again
take up arms against federal authorities. In the face
of renewed Baluch resistance to government policies,
the central government might decide to dismiss the
provincial government and rule directly from Islam-
abad or even declare a state of emergency for Balu-
chistan.
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Indicators of Possible Future Problems
in Baluchistan
? Budgetary pressures in Islamabadforce a sharp
cutback in development and current expenditures
for Baluchistan.
? Afghan refugees begin to compete seriously with
Baluch for access to scarce grazing land and water.
? The number of Punjabi settlers who move onto
prime Baluchi agricultural lands increases
substantially.
? Islamabad arbitrarily dismisses elected provincial
officials.
? The government aggressively pushes economic de-
velopment in tribal areas and attempts to displace
the local tribal population.
? Exiled leaders Marri or Mengal return to Pakistan.
Political linkages are established between Baluch
and Sindhi separatist groups.
? Campus demonstrations increase among Baluch
students at colleges in Quetta and Karachi.
? Substantially more Soviet arms appear in Baluch
hands, possibly indicating a Soviet intention to
back rebellion in Baluchistan.
If fighting between federal and tribal forces was
sustained, rebel Marri tribesmen in Afghanistan,
aided by Soviet and Afghan arms, would probably
attempt to move into Pakistan to support the Baluch
insurgents. Islamabad would probably respond by
requesting additional US military aid. If a civilian
government could not halt a Baluch insurgency, the
Army would probably step in again and reestablish
martial law.
Iranian Meddling
Iran could seek to destabilize Pakistan's Baluchistan
Province by supporting Shia dissidents in the Quetta
area. Although we believe the present regime in
Tehran is divided on promoting an Islamic revolt in
Pakistan, a more radical Iranian government might
increase support for Shias in Baluchistan by supplying
arms and providing sanctuary for Shia dissidents.
Other antiregime forces, such as the Baluch Marris,
could take advantage of sectarian violence and also
challenge federal and provincial authorities. We be-
lieve, however, that the Shias in Baluchistan, by
themselves, are not strong enough to threaten govern-
ment authority in the province.
Increasing violence, even well short of an insurgency,
poses significant risks for US nationals and other
Westerners traveling in Baluchistan. We believe
antiregime tribal or Shia groups would seek to capture
Americans to obtain ransom, local concessions from
provincial authorities, or simply embarrass Islam-
abad. Foreigners connected with non-US aid projects
were kidnaped by Baluch tribesmen in 1985 and
taken to Afghanistan and held captive, according to
US diplomatic sources.
In the worst case-full-scale revolt-the Soviets
would have a much greater opportunity to meddle in
Pakistani affairs. Even a relatively modest Soviet 25X1
effort to funnel aid to Baluch insurgents would sub-
stantially increase the government's counterinsur-
gency costs and almost certainly prompt Islamabad to
seek more military assistance from the United States.
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