SUDAN: ROOTS AND FUTURE OF SOUTHERN INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000100070003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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MASUR FILE C81
0O NOT GIVE UT
i OR MAR-11, ON
Sudan: Roots and Future
of the Southern Insurgency
-Seen t
NESA 86-10007
February 1986
Copy 3 3 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudan: Roots and Future
of the Southern Insurgency
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis;
with contributions from
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
This paper was prepared by
NESA
Reference; and
Office of Global
Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate for
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
Secret
NESA 86-10007
February 1986
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Sudan: Roots and Future
of the Southern Insurgency
Key Judgments North-south tensions, rooted in ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences
Information available between southern animists and Christians and the politically dominant
as of 17 January 1986 northern Arab Muslims, have been a major factor in the fall of Sudan's
was used in this report.
last three governments. These tensions now threaten the stability of the
current regime. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)-the
major southern rebel group backed by Ethiopia and, until recently,
Libya-has substantially improved its operational capabilities and rapidly
expanded since 1983 to 12,000 to 15,000 men under the leadership of
former Sudanese Army Col. John Garang.
The southern rebels' emphasis on national grievances and goals-not just
southern ones-has increased since the ouster of President Nimeiri last
April. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-the insurgents'
political arm-claims to seek a secular, unified, democratic, federal, and
socialist Sudan. Garang has placed the onus on Khartoum to initiate
dialogue, demanding the convening of a national conference in which the
south's problems are addressed in a national context and at which a new in-
terim government is elected to replace the current transitional regime.
Resolution of the southern conflict will not be easy and probably will not be
possible within the next year for any government in Khartoum. A military-
dominated regime probably would be more successful in negotiating an end
to the insurgency than an elected civilian government hobbled by the
demands of its constituents. A successful political settlement will have to
include a federal form of government for Sudan, providing constitutional
guarantees to the south that limit the application of Islamic law and assure
revenue sharing.
Ethiopia is likely to be a key player in a future settlement. Its provision of
safehaven, arms, military training, logistics, and political support is largely
responsible for the SPLA's dramatic growth since 1983. Addis Ababa
views the Sudanese rebels' military and political activities as its best
instrument to press Sudan to end support to Ethiopian dissidents and
possibly to gain a more ideologically compatible leadership in Khartoum.
Ethiopia would support a political settlement in Sudan only if it can attain
a large part of these objectives.
Fighting probably will continue and may intensify this year whether or not
a dialogue takes place between Khartoum and the rebels. Both sides are
likely to violate any cease-fires as they try to improve their bargaining
iii Secret
NESA 86-10007
February 1986
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to support the rebels.
positions by achieving military superiority. The insurgents probably will try
to increase pressure on Khartoum by staging limited operations in the
north, possibly even attacking northern strategic targets. As these clashes
continue, there is a strong possibility that Khartoum will attempt to impose
a military solution. No amount of foreign military aid that Khartoum can
reasonably expect to acquire, however, will provide sufficient military
capability to quell the insurgency, especially given Ethiopian determination
factions.
Continued fighting portends bleak political and economic prospects for
Sudan. It will further discourage foreign creditors and investors and
generate additional burdens for the already hard-pressed leadership in
Khartoum. The war in the south has strained the Army's unity and loyalty
and increases the prospect of yet another coup, possibly led by younger,
more radical officers or those who identify with ethnic and religious
equipment.
Khartoum's concern for undercutting assistance for the rebels has given
Libya and the Soviet Union an opportunity to improve their position in
Sudan. Since the rapprochement in April 1985, Libya has won influence in
Khartoum by providing a significant amount of petroleum, some food, and
small arms and by ending its earlier backing of the southern insurgents.
Khartoum believes that the Soviet Union can press Ethiopia to stop
supporting Garang. It continues working to improve relations with Moscow
in an effort to acquire spare parts for its aging Soviet-made military
creased Khartoum's interest in finding other suppliers.
The effort to isolate Garang and the search for alternative sources of arms
are forcing Khartoum in directions that are straining US-Sudanese
relations. US economic aid is crucial for Khartoum, but US influence on
the government's policies toward the south is limited. Khartoum is aware
that Washington has no leverage on Ethiopia to end its support to Garang,
and restrictions on the use of US military equipment in the south have in-
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Key Judgments
The Setting
Size, Leadership, and Organization of the SPLA
Ideology, Goals, and Strategy
Insurgent Military Strategy, Tactics, and Capabilities 7
Geographic and Logistic Factors Affecting Military Operations
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Figure 1
Selected Sudanese Tribal Groups a
597 tribes comprising 55 tribal
groups in Sudan.
Ash Shamali
Libya
Khartoum
Central
African
Republic
Darfur
Zaire
Despite the reinstatement of the
Addis Ababa Accords in April 1985,
providing for one Southern Region,
there remain three regions under
military governors.
A`ali an Nil
(Upper Nile)
Lake
Albert.
Admiplsir 1/ -
4iti~Lb l y1$'~3'~
Saul
Arabi
STAT
STAT
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Sudan: Roots and Future
of the Southern Insurgency
The "southern problem" was a major factor in the fall
of the last three Sudanese governments. The resump-
tion of the insurgency in southern Sudan in 1983
contributed to President Nimeiri's loss of control and
eventual ouster by senior military officers in 1985.
Khartoum's current interim military government,
weaker than most of its predecessors, has so far failed
to reach a political settlement with the south, despite
diplomatic overtures and the restoration of the south's
legal status as one region in response to dissident
demands. As a result, Khartoum finds itself embroiled
in a war it cannot win.
Since fall 1983, the most prominent of the southern
insurgent groups, the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA), has put pressure on Khartoum by
kidnaping foreign workers and attacking government
garrisons. The deterioration of security in southern
Sudan has set back economic development by forcing
foreign firms to suspend vital oil and water projects
and placed an added financial burden on the govern-
ment, estimated by Sudanese officials to be about
$500,000 a day for military operations. The insurgen-
cy strains the unity and loyalty of the government's
forces, increasing the prospect of additional coups by
younger, possibly more radical officers, or non-Arab
and non-Muslim ethnic minorities, who comprise a
majority in the enlisted ranks.
The roots of the southern rebellion can be found in the
fundamental ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions
between northern Muslim Arabs, who dominate the
central government, and southern animists and Chris-
tians, who identify with their black African heritage.
Former President Nimeiri, a hero in 1972 for signing
the Addis Ababa accords ending a 17-year-long civil
war, by the late 1970s was pursuing policies that
revived old fears among southerners of northern polit-
ical, economic, and cultural domination. According to
US Embassy reporting, the Nimeiri regime increas-
ingly interfered in southern politics and pressed for
the replacement of English with Arabic in the schools;
it decided to build an oil refinery in the north to
process oil from the south; and it started construction
of the Jonglei Canal, which many southerners be-
lieved-correctly-would mainly benefit northerners
and Egypt.'
Several controversial decisions in 1983 by the Nimeiri
regime brought north-south tensions to a boiling point
and laid the groundwork for the creation of the
SPLA. Khartoum precipitated a mutiny in May by
ordering some southern Army units to rotate to the
north. Loyal government forces crushed the mutiny,
but some 1,000 rebels from the towns of Bor, Pibor
Post, and Pachala crossed the border into Ethiopia
with their families and military equipment. Addition-
al southern troops and dissident politicians fled to
Ethiopia following Khartoum's partition of the south
into three regions in June and the imposition of
Islamic law throughout Sudan in September. By
November the rebels, supported by Ethiopia and
Libya, organized themselves into the SPLA and be-
gan their attacks against government garrisons and
foreign workers in southern Sudan.
Size, Leadership, and Organization of the SPLA
On the basis of reporting from the
we estimate 12,000 to 15,000
rebels belong to the SPLA, a significant increase over
an estimated 2,000 rebels in late 1983. Several small-
er independent rebel groups exist alongside the SPLA.
' In October 1982 Egypt and Sudan agreed to strengthen coopera-
tion in all fields, including foreign policy, national security, and
social integration. The Jonglei Canal, begun in 1978, is the largest
Egyptian-Sudanese economic project. The two governments are to
share the costs and benefits of increasing the volume of Nile water.
Kidnapings and other insurgent attacks caused the French contrac-
tors to shut down operations by March 1984, leaving the canal's
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Figure 2
Major Southern Sudanese Dissident Activity
(2D Dissident action (see table)
Libya
Central
African
Republic
Bstttiu
Bahr al Ghazal ?A \ i) 2i
.\. .........~ aYirsl
MaIsY /
Al
Istiwa'i
quatoria)
Zaire
Lol River Bridge ~~J~Q/~
providing for one Southern Region,
there remain three regions under
5 Administrative
Boundary
Lake
Nasser
h `'-; /anplei
h Ci nol D
R /cokstrucbon
Lake
Rudolf
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
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Major Sudanese Dissident Activity,
May 1983-December 1985
3 Foreigners held hostage/ released
Rub Kona (Chevron camp), Jonglei
Canal (French company-CCI-base)
November 1983
17 Boma Plateau captured, camps established
April 1985
18 Garang declared cease-fire
April 1985
19 SPLA attacks in Kordofan
June-July 1985
20 Army conducted road-clearing operation
Juba-Bor Road
July-October 1985
21 Foreigners captured, released
Southern Kurdufan
July 1985
22 Three helicopters downed
Juba, El Lier, Upper Nile
July-August 1985
23 Rebel infighting
Fangak
August 1985
24 2 US-supplied F-5s deployed
Juba
September 1985
25 2 US-supplied F-5s crashed
Near Juba
October 1985
26 Garang declared cease-fire
October 1985
Some refer to themselves as Anya Nya 11-a collec- Equatorian tribes play a smaller role in the current
tive name for small southern rebel bands which insurgency than they did in the original Anya Nya
predate the SPLA and which initiated minor attacks movement. The US Embassy reports several Equator-
on government garrisons from Ethiopian territory ian groups have attempted to create their own insur-
between 1975 and 1983. gent movement and may even seek a separate settle-
ment with the central government to avoid being
Nilotic tribesmen-mainly Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and subordinate to the Dinkas. Equatorian sympathy for
Anuak from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile re- the SPLA, fueled earlier by Nimeiri's imposition of
gions-are dominant among the insurgents.' The Islamic law, has receded since the coup in 1985.
' The Dinkas and Nuers account for 60 percent of the southern
population.
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The Addis Ababa accords of 1972 ended a 17-year-
long civil war and granted the south limited autono-
my. The south elected its own regional assembly,
which in turn elected a president and a Higher
Executive Council. The Addis Ababa accords gave
southerners considerable financial independence, in-
cluding the right to impose taxes. Security and
foreign policy, however, remained the responsibility
of the central government. The accords also provided
for a southern military command of 12,000 troops,
half of whom were to be southerners, including
former members of the principal southern guerrilla
movement, the Anya Nya (Snake Poison).
Many southerners viewed the division of the south
into three separate regions in 1983 as an abrogation
of the Addis Ababa accords, but then President
Nimeiri contended it was experimental and that
southerners were free to decide the fate of partition
through a referendum. The US Embassy reported
after partition that the regional governors were no
longer elected but appointed by Nimeiri. The central
government was given wider powers to veto legislation
adopted by the local assemblies, and southern police
forces were placed under central government control.
The power to collect taxes was also rescinded.
Khartoum's ruling Transitional Military Council re-
instituted the provisions of the Addis Ababa accords
in April 1985 and appointed members to an interim
Higher Executive Council. Khartoum's new leaders
promised a conference at which southerners would
determine the future administrative structure for the
south before the national elections planned in 1986.
Until then, the three southern regions are to remain
under military governors.
At a recent US Government-sponsored conference, a
US academic expert described most of the rebel
leadership as relatively young, energetic, and unhappy
with those they regard as self-seeking, old-guard
southern politicians. Many leaders from both the
Figure 3. Col. John Garang walking through one
of the SPLA's camps in the area of Gambela,
rebel army and its political arm, the Sudanese Peo-
ple's Liberation Movement (SPLM), served in the
lower echelons of the first Anya Nya movement. Most
have served since 1972 in either the southern regional
government or in the Sudanese armed forces. Most
are Dinkas, Christians, and well educated by Suda-
nese standards. Some have studied in Khartoum, the
West, or the Middle East. Almost all fled Sudan
following the mutiny of May 1983. Only a few
leadership positions in the SPLA have gone to rebel
leaders in the Anya Nya II or to non-Dinkas.
The SPLA is headquartered near Gambela, Ethiopia,
with a political office in Addis Ababa. Its chief, and
also chairman of the Executive Committee of the
SPLM, is John Garang. Educated in the United
States, he has a doctorate in economics from Iowa
State University, is a former Army colonel, and is a
Dinka. In the event of Garang's death, we believe his
successor would be SPLA Deputy Commander in
Chief and SPLM Deputy Chairman Karbino Kwan-
yin. No successor would have the charisma and
personal loyalty that have contributed to Garang's
success in building the rebel movement.'
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Figure 4
Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) a
Southern Upper Nile and
Equatoria Operational Zone
Lion Battalion
Iron Battalion
Lightning Battalion
Cobra Battalion
Chief of Operations
William Non
Deputy Chief of Operations
Lt. Col. Kawac Makuei
Central Upper Nile
Operational Zone
Tiger Battalion
Crocodile Battalion
Oil Battalion
Twik Twik Battalion
Shark Battalion
Other battalion names noted: Buffalo, Condor, Elephant, Hippo,
Maur Maur, Rhino, Scorpion and Thunder.
a Incomplete structure of SPLA derived from SPLA radiobroadcasts. There are
probably at least two more operational zones in War Zone I (the south) that
cover northern Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal.
Garang has created a conventional military command
structure in the SPLA, according to SPLA radio-
broadcasts and US Embassy reporting. His subordi-
nates include several well-trained former Sudanese
Army officers who have combat experience in insur-
gent operations in southern Sudan. Garang generally
directs operations from his headquarters in Ethiopia,
although he has claimed publicly that he has led
Figure 5
Sudanese People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM)
oreign Policy
Maj. Riek Marshar Teny
Propaganda
Maj. Alfred Lado Gore
Chairman Provisional of
the Executive Committee
Deputy Chairman
Lt. Col. Karbino Kwanyin
Africa (Kenya)
Dhol Acuil
Western Europe (Great Britain)
Stephen Madok Bak
Central Europe (West Germany)
Costello Garang Ring Lual
United States and Canada
Dominic Muhammad Arig
Administration and Legal Affairs
Martin Majier
animals native to the south.
operations inside Sudan. The insurgents usually fight
as om n -size units. even h h n the basis of
we estimate the
SPLA is organized into at least 15 battalions, each
designated by a special name, often taken from
The SPLA finds recruits in the large number of
defectors from the poorly paid southern Army, police
forces, and unemployed southern youth, according to
the US Embassy. Another source of recruits may be
southern refugees in the UN camps near Gambela,
Ethiopia. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa has
received complaints from southern students in Addis
Ababa that Ethiopia has coerced southern Sudanese
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in the UN camps in the Gambela area to join the
SPLA. We cannot confirm this type of recruitment,
but reporting from the US Embassy suggests that
family members of many SPLA recruits may reside in
the UN camps.
Former southern Sudanese politicians who staff the
SPLM's political committees generally remain in
Ethiopia. In addition, the SPLM has representatives
in the United Kingdom, Kenya, West Germany, and
the United States. According to a reliable source of
the US defense attache in Khartoum, a political
school for the SPLM is located in the Gambela area.
The school, according to the same source, teaches
Marxist doctrine and is staffed by foreign personnel,
including Cubans and East Germans.
The grassroots political organization of the SPLM
appears less developed than the corresponding SPLA
structure. Since the coup in 1985, southern politicians
in Khartoum known to sympathize and collaborate
with the movement have formed a political party
called the Sudan African Congress, according to the
US Embassy. Some members of this party provide an
intelligence network for Garang on developments in
Garang claims to seek a secular, unified, democratic,
federal, and socialist Sudan, according to SPLM
radiobroadcasts since November 1984. He believes
that through an African and socialist identity the
country can achieve national unity among Muslims,
animists, and Christians, as well as among the tribes.
He strongly opposed former President Nimeiri's ef-
forts to unify the country by imposing Islam and the
Arabic language, which he and other insurgent lead-
ers believed threatened the cultural identity of non-
Arabs and turned non-Muslims into second-class citi-
zens. SPLM propaganda has consistently
characterized Khartoum's central government as un-
der the rule of a minority "Arab clique," and it
describes Khartoum's new military leaders as "Ni-
meiri's generals."
In the wake of Nimeiri's ouster, Garang's radiobroad-
casts increasingly emphasize national over purely
southern grievances and goals. He calls for the cre-
ation of a federal system of government that will give
all regions a fair share of political power, social
services, and economic development. Garang stresses
that the south's problems are shared by almost all
Sudan's regions outside Khartoum. He argues, for
example, that the imposition of Islamic law and the
integration treaty with Egypt were personal initiatives
of Nimeiri's that harm the interests of all Sudanese.
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Garang's insurgent movement suffers from many of
the same internal tensions that have reduced the
cohesion of earlier southern dissident movements.
Personal rivalries and tribal and ideological differ-
ences cause infighting and keep numerous small rebel
groups independent of the SPLA. For example, a
well-placed source of the US Embassy says that the
movement is divided into several political factions, one
of which favors a peaceful solution for the south and
another, an uncompromising military wing, which
seeks victory on the battlefield. US Embassy report-
ing also indicates continuing tensions between the
Nuer rank and file and the Dinka leadership, and
factional infighting between the Dinkas from Bor in
Upper Nile-Garang's constituents-and those from
the Waw area of Bahr el Ghazal.
The SPLM has found some support among northern
non-Arab tribes like the Christian Nuba and the
Muslim Beja, some of whose members fight with the
rebels, according to US Embassy reporting. The
Movement's radiobroadcasts indicate that non-Arab
tribes from western Sudan are also a focus for
recruitment. Mansour Khalid, former Foreign Minis-
ter and a Nimeiri opponent, is the only northern
politician known to have joined the Movement. He
told US officials last August that he is developing a
platform based on national, as opposed to strictly
southern, concerns for the SPLM to use if it runs as a
party in future elections.
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The SPLM's platform differs from those of earlier
southern Sudanese opposition movements, which gen-
erally have advocated specifically southern goals,
often including secession from the north. According to
a US academic specialist, the SPLM's stated inten-
tion not to seek secession reflects the nationalist
attitudes of Garang and a new generation of southern
leaders. The Movement's leadership, moreover, may
view an independent southern Sudan as only a last
resort because it would be politically and economical-
ly nonviable. In addition, SPLM leaders are probably
seeking to gain the support of member states of the
Organization of African Unity, whose charter opposes
secession.
Garang and other leaders have openly advocated
socialism, claiming that capitalism cannot work in
Sudan because the country is too undeveloped and
lacks a large middle class. The SPLM's manifesto of
July 1983, its other publications, and radiobroadcasts,
however, do not convey a coherent socialist ideology.
The movement's leaders may be deliberately keeping
their formal pronouncements vague to avoid alienat-
ing those of its members who are wary of socialism,
fearing that it may in fact be Marxism.
We believe the occasional outburst of Marxist rheto-
ric in the SPLM's radiobroadcasts is the price that
Garang pays for continued Ethiopian support. Gar-
ang's collaboration with Ethiopia probably is more
pragmatic than ideological. Nonetheless, the adoption
of a more radical ideology by Garang and his follow-
ers, who, we believe, are mainly opportunists seeking
support for their movement, cannot be ruled out,
especially if they remain dependent on Ethiopian
support for the next several years.'
In our view, Garang's movement is not anti-Western,
despite its socialist rhetoric. Propaganda attacks
against the United States or Western Europe on the
rebel radio have been infrequent. Insurgent leaders
have stated that they will accept aid from any source,
and they probably would accept support from West-
ern governments. Southerners considered the West
' There is little conclusive evidence to categorize the ideology of
Garang or the SPLM. Sudanese officials claim Garang is a Marxist
or Communist. Other Sudanese and outside observers have argued
that the Marxist rhetoric of the SPLM reflects an Ethiopian-
their ally during the earlier civil war, when the
Nimeiri government received support from the
USSR. The US Embassy reported recently that, since
Nimeiri's ouster in April 1985, the SPLM representa-
tive in Nairobi has asked twice for US humanitarian
Nonetheless, the SPLM was critical of Western,
especially US, support for Nimeiri. By mid-1984 rebel
representatives had urged US officials to stop military
aid to the Nimeiri government because they alleged
US arms were being used against innocent southern
civilians. They defended the shutdown of a US com-
pany's oil operations as an effort to deny Khartoum a
means to underwrite the war.' They also told US
officials to evacuate foreign aid personnel from the
south because their safety could not be guaranteed.
By December 1984 the level of fighting in the south
caused virtually all US and West European personnel
to be evacuated, with the exception of Western mis-
sionaries.
We believe the insurgents' overall strategy is designed
to demonstrate the government's lack of control over
the south and to expand their own influence into the
Equatoria Region, where the SPLA is weaker than in
other southern areas. The strategy also is intended to
increase the rebels' leverage in negotiations for a
settlement and to demonstrate their effectiveness to
ensure continued external and internal support.
'Oil exploration and development by a US firm in .;outhern Sudan
has been indefinitely suspended since February 1984 because of
unsettled security conditions. Output from these fields, originally
expected to yield 50,000 to 100,000 barrels per day by 1986, would
have provided critical foreign exchange earnings of at least $275
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The insurgents hope to accomplish this strategy by
inflicting tactical defeats on government forces that
will eventually lead to the capture of a major southern
regional capital
The rebels already have unrestricted movement
throughout the countryside and can block most roads
south of Bor. They also have cut the single rail line to
the south and have blocked most river traffic south of
Malakal they have
gained control of an area on the Boma Plateau in
southern Upper Nile region, where they have estab-
lished three camps.
Over the past two years, the rebel army has expanded
its area of operations significantly. Operations were
limited to Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal until late
1984, when the first major probes were made in the
region of Equatoria. In June 1985 rebel operations in
southern Kurdufan began with a clash with govern-
ment forces. US Embassy reporting indicates the
SPLA plans to move farther north this year to carry
out sabotage against key strategic targets, including
those in the Khartoum area. In late 1985 the SPLA
made additional probe attacks in the north into the
Blue Nile Region near Ad Damazin, the location of
Sudan's major hydroelectric dam.
over the last year.
he movement's foreign supporters have sup-
plied a steady flow of weapons such as Soviet SA-7s,
RPGs, mortars, and heavy machineguns, as well as
.ammunition, radios, and food. SPLA tactical intelli-
gence regarding government forces has been good
enough to prevent major defeats.
Garang's insurgent movement has received most of its
external support from Ethiopia and, until recently,
from Libya. According to US Embassy reporting,
Tripoli apparently ended most of its support for the
SPLA in April 1985 following a rapprochement with
Khartoum's new leaders, who, in return, have ceased
support for Libyan dissidents. Ethiopia views its sup-
port as a way of retaliating for Khartoum's support
The Sudanese Army's strategy since the coup in 1985
has been to place military pressure on the insurgents
to improve Khartoum's bargaining position. This has
taken the form of limited offensives to reassert
control over the main road to Juba. Additionally, the
US Embassy reports the Army is using tribal rival-
ries against the SPLA by supporting breakaway
factions and arming southern tribes who oppose the
Dinka-dominated group.
The Sudanese Army, which we estimate has about
8,000 combat troops stationed in the three southern
regions, is incapable of containing, much less quell-
ing, the insurgency. It is hindered by incompetent
leadership, ethnic tensions, mediocre intelligence, and
shortages of supplies, equipment, and fuel. Moreover,
the SPLA's tactical successes and well-orchestrated
propaganda broadcasts have lowered the morale of
troops stationed in the south.
reports northern soldiers view duty in the south as
punishment, and some have refused orders assigning
them there. Also, northern officers cannot be sure of
the loyalty of their southern troops, who make up
about 40 percent of the enlisted men.
Most of the Army's operations have been primarily
defensive because of the military's poor intelligence
and lack of mobility. In early July 1985, government
forces launched an operation to open road and river
links to the south, but they took three months to
clear one road. The Air Force deployed two US-built
F-5 fighters to Juba in early September but lost all
its ground attack capability when both F-5s crashed
in October. Meanwhile, Khartoum lost several heli-
copters to insurgent fire and has suffered heavy
casualties.
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Figure 6
Area of Operations of the Sudanese Liberation Army
SPLA area of operations Sudanese Army headquarters
= 1983 0 1985 Regional
Insurgent camp it Tactical
Troop strength in southern Sudan'
Sudanese Armed Sudanese People's Liberation
Forces (SPAF).. 7,000 to 9,000 Army (SPLA).. 8,000 to 12,000
Central
African
Republic
Nyala
A'ali an Nil
(Upper Nile)
Ad'
aamazino,
a Bonga
Birhane Selam
? r.
Bar \ b o m i
_
Al Istiw'fi'i it
(Equatoria) Mongalla Adminis(istive
Jubi Boundary j# 1
T
,Despite the reinstatement of the
Addis Ababa Accords in April 1985,
providing for one Southern Region, Lake
there remain three regions under Albert
Lake
Rudolf
Boundary repreientetion is
not necessarily authoritative.
0- 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
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Libya's major contributions to the SPLA were eco-
nomic support and military supplies. Tripoli gave
financial aid to Garang and his representatives
abroad
we estimate that, between September 1983
and April 1985, the Libyans sent at least four major
arms shipments to Ethiopia, part of which probably
was delivered to the southern insurgents. In our
judgment, past Libyan aid is the major reason the
insurgents are better armed and outfitted than most
Sudanese Government forces.
four camps in the vicinity of Gambela, Ethiopia, that
together house more than 10 battalions. The Ethiopi-
ans act as the conduit for arms from other countries.
thiopia's exten-
sive support is largely responsible for the SPLA's
dramatic growth since 1983. In addition, Ethiopia
helps keep Garang's army unified by denying aid to
other southern rebel groups. Addis Ababa occasional-
ly serves as an intermediary in negotiating the release
of foreigners taken prisoner by the SPLA during
operations in southern Sudan. Ethiopia also features
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radiobroadcasts into Sudan.
the SPLA in its newspapers and provides the insur-
gents equipment they use to transmit clandestine
ly to replace lost Libyan support.
Since early 1984 rebel leaders have worked to broad-
en their sources of foreign assistance and more recent-
Tripoli's suspension of
arms transactions. The US Embassy
support for the SPLA has increased the insurgents'
reliance on Addis Ababa as an intermediary for such
indicate Garang had hoped to reduce Ethiopi-
in future negotiations with Khartoum.6
an control over his activities and keep the southern
insurgents from being a card for Addis Ababa to play
In 1985, Garang-seeking alternative bases for safe-
haven and greater legitimacy for his insurgency-
looked for support from the other states bordering
southern Sudan. These states are sympathetic to the
insurgents but are wary of incurring the wrath of
Western and Arab supporters of Khartoum.
client of Libya.
Central African Republic have rejected Garang's
requests for aid, according to reporting of the US
Embassy, but, in our view, they will reverse this policy
if they are persuaded that Khartoum has become a
Garang made public his first serious proposal for
dialogue with Khartoum last October after meeting
with northern civilian politicians in Addis Ababa. He
declared a limited cease-fire as a show of good faith
and stated that a dialogue would have to be preceded
by Khartoum's agreement to:
? A national conference, including representatives of
all Sudan's major political forces, to seek solutions
for the country's problems.
? The election of an interim government at the nation-
al conference to replace the current Military Coun-
cil and Cabinet, which would hold power until
Sudan could prepare for nationwide elections.
? The repeal of Islamic law throughout Sudan, specif-
ically the Nimeiri laws of September 1983.
? The end of the state of emergency imposed follow-
ing the coup of April 1985.
? The cancellation of the 1982 integration treaty with
Egypt and the 1985 military protocol with Libya
until they can be ratified or rejected by the Suda-
nese people.
through the mediation of a third country.
Subsequently Garang acknowledged that Khartoum's
interim government has de facto sovereignty, that it
would have to oversee any national conference, and
that it would be a legitimate political force participat-
ing in the conference. He stated that he does not
oppose the convening of other conferences to prepare
for the national conference-even one dealing with
the south-as long as they did not oppose the interests
of his movement. He also stressed his preference for
negotiating directly with Khartoum rather than
Garang's proposal is a significant departure from his
previous hard line, in that the rebel leadership has
openly accepted the role that the interim government
must play in convening a national conference. Most of
Garang's demands probably can be finessed with the
exception of the interim government agreeing to its
Embassy reporting indicates that Garang is under tight control in
Ethiopia, especially with respect to contacting personnel from
Western embassies. Nonetheless, Garang keeps direct contacts with
SPLM representatives abroad and has met with Sudanese politi-
replacement by one elected by the participants in a
national conference. We believe this demand and the
promise to abolish Nimeiri's Islamic laws are the most
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significant. It is an effort by the SPLM to gain
recognition as a legitimate national force and to enter
the government on an equal footing. Garang clearly
hopes to postpone national elections scheduled for
April 1986 because the SPLM is poorly organized
important step in containing the insurgency. Khar-
toum had hoped Libya would act as an intermediary
with Ethiopia but has in past months encouraged
other countries, including Egypt and South Yemen, to
mediate. We expect, however, that Addis Ababa will
politically within Sudan.
The interim government's carrot-and-stick tactics to-
ward the insurgents may have prompted Garang's
overture. In response to Garang's initial rebuffs, the
Military Council has pursued a two-track policy. It is
working to exert political and military pressure on
Garang and to isolate him while the Cabinet and
other civilian groups pursue dialogue. The Council cut
off a significant source of external support to the
rebels through its rapprochement with Libya. Ethio-
pia rebuffed the Council's efforts to improve ties
because Addis Ababa doubts that Sudan will cease its
support to Ethiopian dissidents. The Council demon-
strated its willingness to apply direct military pressure
on the rebels when it launched a campaign in July
1985. We believe that Khartoum late last year dealt
the rebels and Ethiopia a psychological blow by
making a great show of recent military aid from
Libya and its efforts to acquire military aid from
Arab states, China, the Soviet Union, and the West.
Garang's overture in October not only put Khartoum
on the defensive but also created the conditions that
make dialogue possible. We believe Garang's overture
is an honest attempt at dialogue, but Khartoum's
Military Council views it as an Ethiopian-backed
tactic to buy time to improve the insurgents' military
situation for a dry-season offensive. Nonetheless, the
civilian Cabinet and the National Alliance-a politi-
cal lobby including all the major trade unions and
political parties-are trying to meet Garang's condi-
tions while publicly stating there can be no conditions.
Ethiopia-as the rebels' main benefactor-is, in our
view, the key player in any future settlement. US
Embassy reporting indicates that Khartoum views
improved ties to Ethiopia, specifically an agreement to
end support to each other's dissidents, as the most
continue to distrust Khartoum's intentions.
Chairman Mengistu, in our view, would support a
political settlement in Sudan only if it gave Garang
and other SPLM leaders key positions in Khartoum.
The US Embassy reports Mengistu believes that the
rebel leader would help end Khartoum's support for
Ethiopian dissident operations out of Sudanese terri-
tory. On the basis of US Embassy reporting, we
believe the Ethiopian leader considers it essential to
prevent a consolidation in Khartoum of a strongly
pro-US or Islamic regime, and that SPLA political-
military activities are his best instrument to accom-
plish this. Addis Ababa, moreover, would like to see a
more ideologically compatible regime in Khartoum.
Mengistu may be more willing to enter negotiations
with Khartoum if the SPLA cannot exploit Sudanese
Army weaknesses in the south. He probably calcu-
lates that a military stalemate would undercut rebel
morale, leaving Garang's supporters vulnerable to
exploitation by southern spokesmen who are not tied
to the Ethiopians. Mengistu, however, is unlikely to
forgo his military options altogether. The Ethiopian
Government may well increase assistance to Garang's
forces and encourage them to conduct cross-border
operations against Sudanese troops to weaken Khar-
Resolution of the southern conflict will not be easy
and probably will not be possible within the next year
for any government in Khartoum. The fluid political
situation in Sudan before elections offers the rebels
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and Khartoum an opportunity for compromise, but
the uncertain political outlook has created obstacles.
We do not know whether the government in Khar-
toum will be headed by an elected civilian govern-
ment, a reconstituted interim regime, or younger
generals and senior middle-grade officers who would
take over through a coup during a crisis. In the
current situation, we believe a military-dominated
regime run by more senior officers who were not close
to Nimeiri would be more successful in negotiating an
end to the insurgency than an elected civilian govern-
ment hobbled by the demands of its constituents.
Fighting probably will continue and may intensify,
whether or not a dialogue takes place between Khar-
toum and the rebels. Both sides are likely to violate
any cease-fire as they each try to improve their
bargaining positions by achieving military superiority.
There is a danger that Khartoum or the rebels will be
tempted by opportunity or necessity to try to force a
military solution. In our view, no amount of foreign
military aid that the government can reasonably hope
to receive can provide Khartoum with sufficient mili-
tary capability to quell the insurgency, especially
given Ethiopian determination to support the rebels.
The continuation of the insurgency, in our judgment,
will place a serious drain on Sudan's already limited
economic reserves, preventing the return of the for-
eign personnel needed to develop oil and water re-
sources and, in turn, discouraging foreign creditors
and investors. The political stability and even territo-
rial integrity of Sudan is seriously challenged by the
insurgency. US Embassy reporting suggests the pros-
pects of uncontested civilian elections or viable civil-
ian rule are remote while the fighting continues. More
important, we believe the southern conflict will con-
tinue to strain the Army's unity and morale and
increase the prospect of additional coups, including
those led by younger, possibly more radical, officers
or regional and ethnic factions.
send a delegation to the conference. Rebel participa-
tion in a national conference almost certainly would
strengthen the SPLM politically and offer the oppor-
tunity to enhance the SPLM's image as the sole
legitimate representative of southern Sudanese aspira-
tions. Khartoum, moreover, probably would use the
opportunity to try to co-opt Garang. US Embassy
reporting suggests many of Sudan's politicians and
intellectuals already favor adoption of a federal sys-
tem of government, a major demand of the rebels. If
agreement is reached on a federal system, it probably
will have to include provision for at least four semiau-
tonomous regions to handle local affairs and a federal
district of Khartoum, with the central government
responsible for defense, foreign policy, and other
national concerns.
out of a national conference also remains high.
Several factors are likely to make the outcome of a
national conference difficult, possibly even a failure.
In our judgment, the strong likelihood that both
Khartoum and the rebels will continue fighting during
the conference will jeopardize the atmosphere for
discussions. The wide-ranging agendas of the partici-
pants and the reluctance of the Army to see the
central government relinquish power to the regions
will also be major sources of friction. We believe the
prospect that the SPLM will not attend or will walk
Even if a national conference is successful and a
federal system of government adopted, a political
settlement with the south probably will be difficult to
negotiate. US Embassy reporting indicates Equator-
ians, for example, would reject any government struc-
ture that allowed the more numerous Nilotic tribes to
dominate the political process in the southern region.
We believe constitutional guarantees that the south
will not be forced to adopt Islamic law and formal
agreements regarding revenue-sharing from develop-
ment projects will be at the heart of any settlement
with the SPLM. Garang probably will insist on key
positions in the central and southern governments for
himself and other rebel leaders and integration of his
army into the government's forces. He is also likely to
In our view, there is a strong possibility that a
national conference will convene this year, and it
probably will address the country's structural prob-
lems along the lines of most of the SPLM's demands.
There is at least an even chance that the SPLM will
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demand that southern troops be stationed only in the
south and that Khartoum's treaties with Egypt and
Libya not harm southern interests.
Khartoum's concern for undercutting support for the
insurgents has given both Libya and the Soviet Union
an opportunity to increase their influence at the
expense of the United States. The interim government
and any successor is likely to value its rapprochement
with Libya as long as Tripoli refrains from renewing
military support to Garang. Libya has gained favor in
Khartoum since the reconciliation in April 1985 by
providing food, oil, ground transport, and small arms
and is offering military training and even advanced
fighter aircraft. Libyan petroleum shipments during
1985 covered at least 25 percent of Sudan's consump-
tion requirements and were valued at over $50 mil-
lion. Khartoum believes that the Soviet Union has
leverage over both its Ethiopian and Libyan clients
and can force Addis Ababa to stop supporting Gar-
ang. The government will continue working to im-
prove relations with the USSR and also hopes to
acquire spare parts for old Soviet ui ment that can
be refurbished to fight the rebels,
The effort to isolate Garang and the search for
alternative sources of arms are forcing Khartoum in
directions that are straining its relations with the
United States. US economic aid of $62.5 million in
FY 1986, together with $20 million in military assis-
tance, is crucial to Khartoum's survival, but, despite
this, US influence on the government's policies toward
the south is limited. Khartoum is aware that the
United States has no leverage to press Ethiopia to end
its support to Garang. In addition, restrictions on the
use of US military equipment in the south increase
Khartoum's interest in finding other suppliers.
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Figure 8
Sudanese Geographic Regions
Geographic region boundary
Paved road
Unpaved road
Selected southern airfields
$ Paved runways
+ Unpaved runways
Kurdufan
'Al Uba
?? T < .G~-~`~ . 1 AI A w"
Central
African
Republic
Zaire
-------_Despite the reinstatement of the
Addis Ababa Accords in April 1985,
providing for one Southern Region,
there remain three regions under
military governors.
Jibi
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Appendix B
Geographic and Logistic
Factors Affecting Military Operations
In the current conflict most geographic factors favor
the dissidents over Sudanese Government military
forces. Fighting has been concentrated in the Wet
Plains, where the rebels are using their familiarity
with the terrain to good advantage. During the wet
season, population centers and government outposts
are isolated by dense vegetation, floodwaters, and
mud. Airfields are closed and air support operations
are halted for long periods because of frequent torren-
tial rains. Government troops cannot patrol or pursue
rebel bands either by vehicle or on foot. The insur-
gents also are better able to recruit new members in
the rainy season because this is when most of the
region's nomadic tribesmen return to their villages
and many other southerners come home from seasonal
Movement on foot or with military vehicles is diffi-
cult, and offroad dispersal is almost impossible.
Small, lightly equipped guerrilla forces are less likely
to become bogged down. Conditions for movement
improve during the short dry season, but deep cracks
in the clay soil present obstacles for wheeled vehicles.
Tall grasses, reeds, and papyrus afford excellent
concealment from ground observation throughout
most of the region. Dense stands of trees along some
of the streams can hide military equipment from both
air and ground observation. Smoke and haze from
grass fires greatly reduce visibility and can disrupt air
operations for short periods during the dry season.
Water is plentiful throughout the year but often
contaminated.
employment in the north.
The harsh physical environment and rudimentary
transportation facilities in southern Sudan pose formi-
dable problems for military and logistic support oper-
ations. During the long wet season from March
through October, the climate is hot, humid, and
debilitating. In the rainiest period, between June and
August, skies are usually cloudy, the humidity is
particularly oppressive, and daytime temperatures are
between 25 and 35 degrees Celsius. During the other
months of the wet season, temperatures may reach 40
degrees Celsius. In the dry season, temperatures over
40 degrees Celsius are common, humidity is low, and
rain extremely rare. Although skies are mostly clear
during the dry season, brushfires may obscure exten-
We divide southern Sudan into three distinct military
geographic regions:
Wet Plains. Military operations are extremely diffi-
cult for most of the year over the flat, swampy plains
of the south. During the wet season the region's dirt
roads and tracks, as well as all low-lying ground
surfaces, become soft and slippery. Many areas are
flooded. Heavy rainfall expands the already extensive
and impassable swamps into adjacent higher ground.
Dissected Plains. Military operations are somewhat
easier on the dissected plains, at least seasonally.
During the dry season, foot troops and vehicles have
little difficulty moving cross-country or dispersing
from roads in most places. Local rock fields, hills, and
steep stream banks present obstacles and require
detours. Movement is difficult in the wet season
because of flash floods and soft, slippery ground
following heavy rains. Traffic can usually be resumed
in a day or so because surfaces dry out quickly. The
denser vegetation that springs up in the wet season
also impedes movement. Tropical forests, excellent for
concealment, become impenetrable to vehicular traf-
fic. Water is available throughout most of the region.
Uplands. Military operations in the rugged uplands
region are difficult, but easier for guerrilla forces.
Cross-country movement is largely impractical in the
mountainous and hilly terrain, where bare rocky
surfaces alternate with thick mantles of forest, bam-
boo, and tall grass. In the few broad, northwest-
southeast-oriented valleys, movement is easy during
the dry season but impossible for long periods during
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the wet season when they are transformed into quag-
mires. Concealment is good in the savannas for most
of the year. During the wet season, broadleaf forests
and tall grasses provide additional concealment. Mod-
erate amounts of water are available in most places
year-round.
Southern Sudan's sparse and poorly developed trans-
portation network is inadequate to support extensive
or sustained military operations.' The only railroad is
a narrow-gauge line extending 250 kilometers north-
ward from Waw to the national rail network. Fre-
quent derailments and washouts make it unreliable.
The poorly maintained gravel and unimproved dirt
roads and tracks that crisscross the region are impass-
able for most of the long wet season. The Nile links
the important port cities of Juba and Malakal, but
slow-moving river traffic (impeded by dense vegeta-
tion) falls easy prey to rebel attackers. For rapid
deployment of troops and supplies the government
must rely on the four airfields in the south capable of
supporting cargo aircraft. Juba and Malakal have
paved 2,000-meter, all-weather runways; Waw and
Bentiu have unsurfaced 1,500-meter runways, usable
only when dry.
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