NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 6 MARCH 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000400190001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP88T00091R000400190001-3
Director of
,,
. - Alt 4,t, 1,,, ) Central
g Intelligence
St" gi
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National Intelligence Daily
Friday
6 March 1987
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Top Scarct
CPAS NID 87153JX
6 March 1987
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Contents
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Nicaragua: Rebel Activity in South-Central Region
1
China: Mixed Policy Signals
2
Haiti: Military Discontent Growing
3
Notes
Netherlands: Gorbachev Proposal and INF Deployment
4
USSR-Syria-Lebanon: Mild Endorsement of Intervention
4
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China-Japan: Offshore Oil Discovery
6
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Iraq-Saudi Arabia-Turkey: Pipeline Problems
7
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Tanzania-Mozambique: Funding Dar es Salaam's Troops
8
Peru: Production of Coca Leaf
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
Syria-Lebanon: Initial Progress in Beirut
10
Top Secret
6 March 1987
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To ? Secret
NICARAGUA: Rebel Activity in South-Central Region
The Nicaraguan rebels have conducted several effective attacks
in the south-central part of the country, but the mobility and
firepower of the Sandinistas' helicopters will ? robably continue
to limit the scope of insurgent activity.
laims the insur ents
owerpan4annitit4avpostdateeaqq_ji,e_wtt:Re, te icy tng
44.Fandoppaundirigesevemdefenriers.
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Comment: Rebels operating in south-central Nicaragua are among
the best combatants in the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Their
heightened activity may win new supporters and recruits in an area in
which opposition to the regime remains strong. Consistent resupply of
weapons and ammunition, a long-elusive goal, will be essential,
however, for them to sustain a high level of fighting.
The Sandinistas apparently have not responded well with gunships
and other armed helicopters to small hit-and-run attacks in the south.
The helicopter fleet may be strained by recent operations in the north
and by maintenance problems. Although the rebels' recent
acquisition of large numbers of SA-7 antiaircraft missiles will increase
the risks for the Sandinista Air Force, the helicopters will probably
continue to be a factor in deterring the rebels from massinq for large-
scale attacks on prominent targets.
Top Secret
1 6 March 1987
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CHINA:
Mixed Policy Signals
Top Secret
Mixed signals on policy coming out of Beijing indicate that
infighting among the leadership is continuing.
Premier Zhao and other reform leaders continue to insist
that the current campaign against "bourgeois liberalism"
will be strictly limited and will not affect basic reform policies. GAinese..
leader.sysougll 4 ZtintmtV
ORAAVA-9:4M-0?ritii_AAVY.elahead,soon_on,
P.O.W-,a14aforms utriNseNgeffelMi 1?Iffelftcope
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Numerous party elders, meanwhile, are still sounding conservative
themes in the media, often citing speeches of Deng Xiaoping to
buttress their points. The media have announced that a new
collection of Deng's writings and speeches will soon be published as
guidelines for the antiliberalization drive. Deng himself has been ?uiet
except for a few comments to visiting foreign dignitaries.
Comment: Deng's role is unclear, but it is not unusual for him to keep
a low profile after major upheavals while he works out new policy lines
and coalitions. Meanwhile, supporters of reform are clearly trying to
limit the conservative-led campaign to a few areas involving political
reform and policy toward intellectuals. More dogmatically minded
party elders seem to be trying to reopen the debate on key economic
policies.
The scheduled National People's Congress this month and the effect
of Deng's book on the antiliberalization campaign should provide
indications of the new balance of power between contending factions.
But the relative strength of reformers and traditionalists may not
become clear until the party congress in the fall.
2 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
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HAITI:
Military Discontent Growing
Poor morale within the armed forces and the deterioration of key
units threaten to undercut the government's security capabilities
as political activity intensifies over the next few months.
Some senior Army officers believe that dissatisfaction with the ruling
council's overall performance is high in the 7.700-man military
Some senior officers reportedly believe the government's failure to
equip the military adequately or to implement a needed
reorganization has reduced the effectiveness of the armed forces to
its lowest point in years.
Leopards Battalion, an elite counterinsurgency force, is at less than
one-third its authorized strength and is essentially nonfunctional
because of General Staff neglect
Comment: The Arm; is the government's only instrument for
maintaining order, and growing disunity in the military may seriously
impede the council's ability to control disturbances expected as
electioneering gains momentum. The council has not yet publicly
favored any presidential candidate.
Top Secret
3 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
NETHERLANDS: Gorbachev Proposal and INF Deployment
Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's recent INF proposal may
increase pressure on the Netherlands Government to postpone the
pending deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles. Several
Netherlands leaders believe the initiative shows a genuine intent by
the Soviets to reach an agreement with the US, and the Defense
Minister has admitted publicly that the proposal decreases the
likelihood of INF deployment. Moreover, the US Embassy reports that
prominent members of Prime Minister Lubbers's party have cited the
Gorbachev proposal as reason to avoid deployment. Foreign Ministry
officials, however, argue that these remarks are premature
speculation that undercuts the government's position.
Comment: Preparations for deployment?scheduled to begin in
1988?are continuing, and the government probably would deploy
the missiles if an agreement between the US and the USSR seemed
unlikely at that time. If, however, negotiations appeared promising by
early 1988?or if the US appeared to be blocking an agreement?the
government would probably face heavy pressure from parliament to
postpone deployment
USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Mild Endorsement of Intervention
Moscow has endorsed Syria's troop deployment in West Beirut as a
step toward restoring stability, but it has expressed concern about
the possibility of Syrian clashes with Soviet friends in Lebanon and
doubts about Syria's ability to control the situation. Soviets in both
Damascus and Moscow claim they were not consulted before either
the outbreak of Druze and Communist_fighting against Amal or the
Syrian intervention,
? ?, ? ?
Syrian.militar_y_intelligence chief in Lebanon has announcecrlhat a
"headquarters' has been .set up in the Soviet Embassy to-ensure -the"-
security and-safety and safety of all embassies in West Beirut.
Comment: The Soviets appear anxious to disclaim any complicity in
either Syria's intervention or the Druze and Communist fighting
against Amal. Although Moscow is concerned that Assad will use the
troop deployment as a means of driving the pro-Arafat Palestinians
from Lebanon and that he will attempt to control the Druze and
Communists, who are longstanding Soviet friends, it appears for now
the Soviets will work with the Syrians to stabilize West Beirut.
Top Secret
4 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
a
Gulf of Tonkin
Laos
? ? Top Secret
6 March 1987
?D
,allataU
? ?" (Port.)
Oil discovery by
Japanese consortium
Hong Kong
(U.K.)
South
China
Sea
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
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Top Secret
CHINA-JAPAN: Offshore Oil Discovery
A Japanese consortium has discovered oil off southern China,
according to press reports. Although the reports do not indicate
production potential, test well results have led the consortium to plan
additional drilling for next year, with commercial production by 1991.
The Japanese are financing the exploration but China will pay
51 percent of development costs.
Comment: The consortium's optimism suggests this is probably the
best find to date in China's disappointing effort to cooperate with
foreigners in finding offshore oil. Most foreign companies have given
up after drilling the minimum number of wells required by Beijing, and
many bid blocks remain idle. Even with a sizable find by the Japanese,
China will probably produce less than 200,000 barrels per day from
offshore oil by the turn of the century, well short of its original
expectation of at least 1 million b/d.
Top Secret
6 6 March 1987
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IRAQ-SAUDI ARABIA-TURKEY: Pipeline Problems
Construction of Phase II of the Iraqi-Saudi pipeline?which would
increase Iraq's export capacity by 1.1 million barrels per day in
1989?may be further delayed, causing Baghdad to consider new
export capacity through Turkey. Discussions between Saudi and Iraqi
engineers broke down last month?the awarding of the construction
contract is already two months behind schedule-
Meanwhile, according to the US Embassy in Baghdad, Ankara
has proposed that Iraq enlarge the scope of the ongoing Turkish
pipeline expansion by 500,000 b/d, for a total of 2 million b/d.
Comment: The breakdown in discussions is probably caused in part
by oil policy differences between Riyadh and Baghdad. The Saudis
have pressed the Iraqis to restrain oil production in support of the
OPEC accord and are limiting the full use of the current Iraqi-Saudi
pipeline. Iraq is becoming increasingly concerned that even if Riyadh
allows construction of Phase II it will restrict Iraq's use.
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TOD Secret
7 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
TANZANIA-MOZAMBIQUE: Funding Dar es Salaam's Troops
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Tanzania is still looking for funds to support the 1,200- to 1,600-man
expeditionary force it has deployed in Mozambique. "v.1
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Tanzania has recently
received some foreign aid for the expeditionary force, including a loan
from Ethiopia of two cargo planes and 54 tons of military equipment.
arms, and ammunition from Bulgaria.
Comment: The deployment
is likely to be unpopular. The cost to Tanzania in lives and
money is likely to increase, given Mozambique's inability to make
good on promised logistic support and the ineptness of Maputo's
troops. Tanzanian President Mwinyi's hard-won, desperately needed
IMF agreement may also be in danger if Dar es Salaam exceeds
IMF-prescribed ceilings on government spending
PERU: Production of Coca Leaf
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LOA
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The first comprehensive estimate of coca
cultivation shows that Peru is the leading producer of coca leaf for the
international cocaine market. Peru had about 250,000 acres
(100,000 hectares) under coca cultivation in 1986?nearly twice the
estimated amount being grown in Bolivia and Colombia and enough
to produce an estimated 60 tons of cocaine annually. More than
60 percent of Peru's cultivation is in the Huallaga Valley in north-
central Peru. where r small manual eradication program is under way.
Comment: Peru will remain the leading source of coca leaf for
many years. The government's eradication effort is insignificant-
6,500 acres (2,600 hectares) in 1986?and is outstripped by
expanding cultivation in the major growing regions. Even with more
resources, manual eradication is too slow and laborious to keep up
with the crop's current rate of expansion, and an effective aerial
eradication program may be years away.
Top Secre!
8 6 March 1987
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Ton Secret
In Brief
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East Asia
Europe
Americas
? China responded to USSR's proposal for withdrawing MRBMs
from Europe by calling for simultaneous, balanced reduction of
MRBMs in Europe, Asia... concerned West will ignore SS-20s in
Soviet Far East to reach early agreement in Europe.
Support growing in Japan's Defense Agency for Japanese design
for new fighter... US Embassy reports no active support for
coproduction of US-derived design ... defense officials resent US
attempts to influence ... decision due in June.
Some 1,000 students demonstrated recently in Krakow, Poland, to
commemorate founding of banned independent student union ...
affair peaceful but regime still lacks credibility with youth ... other
demonstrations over political issues likely.
e-sy C:
March protesting anti-Sandinista rebels in Honduras brought out
less than 1,000 leftists erd .. meager turnout reflects weak
organizational abilities of radicals ... government reportedly
behind propaganda effort to discredit march.
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US-Etillstessy-says Nicaraguan opposition groups planning anti-
Sandinista rally in Managua on .. one group refusing to
participate, planning separate emonstration ... disunity a major
weakness of opposition, likely to reduce impact.
Mutinous former Ecuadorean Air Force Commander Vargas in
hiding but giving press interviews ... says will seek presidency
next year ... will fuel Army's anxieties about his support on left.
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Soviets, Guatemalans met in Guatemala City last week to discuss
resuming ties broken in 1954.. Moscow
wants to proceed immediately, talks to continue ... Guatemala
remains hesitant, fearing opposition from military.
Top Secret
9 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
Syrian Occupation in Beiru
Mediterranean
American
University
occupi
Mediterranean
Sea
Beirut
International
-Airport
Top Secret
5 March 1987
Palestinian refugee
camp boundary
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709719 (E00039) 3-87
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
SYRIA-LEBANON: Initial Progress in Beirut
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Syrian President Assad probably hopes to capitalize on his
uccess in curtailing violence among rival factions in West Beirut 25X1
by pressing for a comprehensive political settlement among
militia leaders. Damascus still faces formidable obstacles in
Beirut?especially Hizballah?and a breakdown in political talks
could place Syria in the middle of renewed confessional warfare.
Syria has already attained its two key objectives: strengthening its
principal ally, Amal, which lost ground to Druze and other leftist
militias last month, and restricting PLO activity in West Beirut. Some
7,000 Syrian troops are acting as a buffer between Amal and other
pro-Syrian militias, and the Druze have recalled many of its fighters
from Beirut to their strongholds in the Shuf. With Lebanese Army
units expanding Syria's security zone to the outskirts of Sidon, Syrian
and pro-Syrian troops are now in a position to interdict arms
deliveries to the Palestinians through the illegal ports and to hel
Amal break Palestinian resistance in the refugee camps.
Many countries have praised Syria's suppression of violence in West
Beirut and are hopeful that Syrian security sweeps will free hostages,
although Syrian officials insist this is not their top priority. Damascus
dampened criticism of its camps war policy by allowing limited
supplies of humanitarian aid into the camps. The Arab League "good
offices" committee gave tacit support to the Syrian move over the
strong objections of PLO chief Arafat, aesor.diag-to-tte-LIZ-Emiaa6sy
Political Reform
Lebanese Muslim leader agreed on Mentl-aron a draft formula for
political reform after a week of negotiations in DanTikusaaeser4313.4es-0,
to-the..1.1.S.Embaseritreetrat, Envoys of President Gemayel, who
launched the initiative in January, have resumed talks with Syrian
officials in the hope of setting up an Assad-Gemayel summit, but
Gemayel has little backing from other Lebanese Christian leaders and
will probably encounter opposition from Lebanese Forces leader
Samir Jaja. Any Syrian military attempt to bring the Christians to heel
in talks would probably unify and harden the Christian position.
continued
Top Secret
10 6 March 1987
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Top Secret
Complications With Shia and Iran
Assad's attempts to limit Hizballah's expansion at Amal's expense
threaten to rupture Syria's ties to Iran. Emotions remain strong after
last week's clash between Hizballah and Syrian troops in which
20 radicals died. Syria, for the moment, has cracked down on
Hizballah in West Beirut only and has avoided Hizballah-controlled
neighborhoods in the southern suburbs.
Assacias.pc.abalaly-pfejaafeci4or.preforigueMelks.plzop.ing_4421.
c,ofts/r,ainaHizballaradttallrwhile,eraGotavaging-A.stoAntervsify
operations a.940,4?I-JX4P1.i.13,sokijheyk4p4101,17jizballglo,,w5,?&rit?,
GotrIttlaeliS b.a?gs ia,Jabakks
takerrailiatory line Isicagir.BamAgetirililt5IffaTi-ialgnoririg
Iranian pronouncremertfelfftended to stir up trp,k.p.le,ip4Beiazutiorrix5W-
but will xpsigrkt qj9r,S, yrightmoveTintethes-ulairbs.
_
AtAhe7sameAim-e-rAm-esipositiorrappeAt6461:5#erodinglinsoutherri
Lebanon, its stronghold LAmalAchiettNIEW
? - ,?,_ - -
Barri returned hurripply,to,Darrrastirs-IfieWee-k-following an uprising
led by formerartie Hassan Hashem in southern Lebanon, beyond the
mparrGch of the Syrians. The extent of the uprising is unclear, but
4111'aehem represents a growing trend toward radicalism among the
a a hden_cy that is suppodecidDyAlizPallafifiaiitr-'w
--
Arafat.
Outlook
The days of easy Syrian victories appear to be over, and Damascus
will probably avoid major clashes while using its military presence as
pressure for political compromise. The current lull in violence in part
appears to owe its existence to the fact that Syria has yet to threaten
various belligerent parties. The possible resumption of hostilities on
many fronts could immerse Syria in sectarian violence from which it
might have difficulty emerging.
Top Secret
11 6 March 1987
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