INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 87 (H.R. 4759) / HOUSE DEBATE AND BILL AS PASSED WITH AMENDMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01332R001100130018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 September 1986 ;`
OCA 86-3154
FROM: Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 87
(H.R. 4759)/House Debate and Bill as Passed
with Amendments
1. Attached for your information is a copy of pages H7008
through H7043 of the Congressional Record for 17 September
1986. These pages reflect the debate and passage, with
amendments, of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 87.
2. When the bill was reported from the House Intelligence
Committee (HPSCI), section 107 would have restricted the use of
funds to support military or paramilitary operations in
Angola. Congressman Stump offered an amendment to strike
section 107 of the bill. The Stump amendment to strike was
adopted on a recorded vote of 229 to 186. Debate on the issue
begins on page H7015 through H7043.
3. Two other significant amendments were adopted.
Congressman Stokes offered an amendment which restricts and
conditions intelligence cooperation with the government of
South Africa. (see pages H7013-14) A similar but not identical
provision was added to the Anti-Apartheid bill in the Senate,
S. 2701. See Congressional Record for 15 August 1986, page
S11812.
4. An amendment by Congressman Shaw was offered and
adopted providing for a drug testing program for employees of
the intelligence community. It appears from the language of
the amendment that the head of each agency is afforded wide
discretion in the implementation and administration of the
testing program. See pages H7015-15, Congressional Record for
17 September.
5. According to SSCI staff the Senate is expected to take
up its version of the bill (S. 2477) some time during the week
of 22 September.
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Attachment:
as noted
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 87
(H .R. 4759)/House Debate and Bill as Passed
with Amendments
Distribution:
1 - DDO
1 - DDI
1 - DDA
1 - OMS
1 - ADGC/L~CA/OGC
1 - ADGC/IL~SS/OGC
1 - ADGC/ALMS/OGC
1 - ADGC/OS&PL/OGC
1 - C/LEG/EPS/DDO
1 - DDL/OCA
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Registry
1 - JM Signer
1 - OCA/LEG/Subject File: INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 87
OCA/LEG 19 Sept 86)
STAT
STAT
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~ ?008
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE September 1T, 1988
pi,i Nrcr+oys? whose' foresight anti
~~~l,fr, to this area have produced
sit future generations will herald as
ar>K of the most significant reforms of
~r national defense.
ws It is with any major reform
eoubters and detractors abound. The
R,.crganization Act is no exception.
y~?hcr; Ixe $KELTON, a fellow colleague
on the House Armed Services Commit-
u'e'. and I first discussed this proposal,
I must admit I had my own doubts
about its enactment. But today, Mr.
Speaker, the primary sponsors of this
bill have reached the summit. They
have done much to earn the deepest
respect and gratitude of this Chamber.
I sincerely believe that this act will
long be remembered as one of the
most significant accomplishments of
this Congress.
In an editorial entitled "The De-
fense Reform Congress", Baltimore
Sun editor, Joseph Stem notes that:
If the military units t~n't handle limited
operations in Iran, Lebanon, and Grenada,
how would they do in a big war? That !s the
gnawing worry that led to the Pentagon re-
organization bill. It was enough to alert the
best military minds on Capitol Hill.
I am going to stop there because I
think when he said that, he meant
BILL NICHOLS.
I also want to commend Mr. NICH-
oLS, along with Mr. HOl?KINS, Mr.
KnsICII, Mr. AsPIN, Mr. Ss>;I,T'oN, Col.
Archie Barrett, and all the others who
have done so much to Dring this bill
before us today.
[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 17, 19861
Dsrexss RErotuc Coxoarss
Defense reform may edge aside tax reform
when historians look back to select the most
Important accomplishment of the 99th Con-
sress. This week legislation 1s breezing
through Congress that will do more to unify
the armed services than all the reorganiza-
tion moves of the past 40 years.
The chairman of the Joints Chiefs of
Staff will become principal military adviser
to the President, an officer with real strate-
gic planning authority, rather than the
chairman of a committee functioning
through logrolling unanimity.
The unified commanders in chief (CINCs)
in regional theaters of operation will finally
get control of component service units
whose loyalty in the past was mostly to
their home offices back In Washington.
Service on assignment to the joint chiefs
of staff will no longer be a drawback for of-
ficers with ambitions. They will be given a
"joint officer" specialty that could lead to
top commands.
Many factors had to come together to
bring about these first. real steps toward
unification of the armed services since the
present flamed structure was pasted togeth-
er in 1947.
Procurement scandals had a role. Six-hun-
dred-dollar toilet seats did much to awaken
the public that something was wrong. Run-
away budget deficits, linked to the huge de-
fense buildup, had their effect. On Capitol
Hill reform-minded military hawks defined
national security not in lock-step bupport of
every Pentagon proposal but in criticism of
its efficiency and fighting posture.
But the key catalyst was the successful
terrorist bombing attack on the U.S. Ma-
rines barracks in Beirut in October 1983.
Congressional investigators soon found a
gimcrack command structure partly to
blame for a lack of preparedness, poor liai-
son among the services and the fumbling re-
spouse alter the tragedy. When a so-called
military victory came later in Grenada, sto-
ries soon leaked out that the component
aen-ices couldn't even talk Lo one another
by radio-a flaw that also bedeviled the
botched rescue attempt in Iran in 1979.
If U.S. military units can't handle limited
operations in Iran, Lebanon and Grenada,
how would they do (n a big war? That Is the
gnsa-ing worry that led to the new Penta-
gon reorganization bill It was enough to
alert the best military minds on Capitol
Hill. It prodded President Reagan into the
appointment of a commission that largely
agreed with congressional defense reform-
eni. And It overcame the footdragging of De-
fense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and
the outright opposition of Navy Secretary
John Lehman.
Greater unification of the armed services
must not be considered a panacea. But it
may provide the framework for a military
establishment with a sharper fighting edge,
greater cohesion and an agility to deal with
the myriad threats to U.S. tecuritq in
today's world.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, one provision of the
bill would require consolidation of cer-
tain functions in the Office of the Sec-
retary of each of the military depart-
ments. One of the named functions re-
quired to be consolidated is "legislative
affairs." In fact, with respect to legis-
lative affairs this provision is merely a
codification of the status quo. The leg-
islative affairs function has been con-
solidated under the service secretaries
for many years.
A question has arisen concerning the
relationship between each military de-
partment comptroller office and the
Defense Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Appropriations. It was not the
intent of the conferees to alter the ex-
isting arrangements. The term "legis-
lative affairs" as used in the confer-
ence report refers to the function per-
formed by the existing legislative af-
fairs offices.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, let me say
that I am most appreciative of the
many accolades that have been
handed to me personally and to the
committee that I am honored to Chair
by my colleagues here in the House.
I would be very negligent, however,
if I did not, as we conclude what has
been the climax of about 5 years of
legislative effort on the part of the
committee toward reform if I failed to
duly acknowledge the service per-
formed by one member of the staff of
the House Armed Services Committee.
I refer to Mr. Arch Barrett, a distin-
guished military graduate of the II.S.
Military Academy in the year 195?.
Mr. Barrett wrote the book on reorga-
nization. Without his efforts through-
out the August recess when he worked
tirelessly, including Labor Day, and I
am sure he did not get double pay for
that, he came down to my home in
Alabama 2 weeks ago and spent a day
with me going over the bill. I fed him
a good lunch of Crowder peas and okra
and a little corn bread and blackberry
pie for his efforts. But I want to pub-
1[cly express my deep appreciation,
and I am sure that. goes for my col-
league Mr. Horxtrrs, and all of us on
the committee for the fine sen?ice? that
he rendered.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further re-
quests for time and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I move the previous
question on the conference report.
The previous question was ordered.
The conference report a?as agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
conference report on H.R. 3622.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. is
there obJection to the request of the
gentleman from Alabama?
There was no obJection.
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR, 1987
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu-
ant to House Resolution 595 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House
in the Committee of the Whole Houac
on the State of the Union for the fur-
ther consideration of the bill, H.R.
4759.
O 1300
rR rs~ cos~Irras or rIa wxou
Accordingly the House resolved
itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the
Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4759) to authorize ap-
propriations for fiscal year 1987 for in-
Lelligence and intelligence-related as
tivities of the U.S. Government, the
intelligence community staff, and the
Central Intelligence Agency retire-
ment and disability system, and for
other purposes, with Mr. Mvx'rx~- in
the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Com-
mittee of the Whole rose on Tuesday,
September 16, all time for general
debate had expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 646,
the bill shall be considered by titles
for the purpose of amendment under
the 5-minute rule, except for section
107, and each title 1s considered as
having been read.
The amendments recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and by the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service nos
printed in the blll are considered is
having been adopted.
Section 107 shall not be considered
for amendment until the remainder of
the bill is considered for amendment.
No amendments to section 107 or
amendments which affect the auDJed
matter of section 107 are in order
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,Sr~7temi~r 17, 19~~` CO?~GRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 711(14
rxrr?p! one motion to strike the SPC- A[`THORITI' FOR THE CONPPfT Or rNTEL17(:LN^F. shall be detailed or, a rein,bursabh ba~,~
tlon. It offered by' Representative Ac-rlvrTlES except that any such ottlcrr, empioy~? ~,
firt;wr, or his designee, w'hlch shall be SEC. 104. The authorization of appropria memb7?r mad- be detailed on a nonreimnursa
debatablf? for 2 hours equally divided Lions by this Act shall no! be deemed to con- ble basis for a period of less than one year
and controlled by the proponent and a stitut.e authority for the conduct of any ln- for the performance of temporary functiolo-
Member opposed thereto. telligence activity e?hich L~ not othel?n?ise au- as required by the Director of Central Intl i
The Clerk will desigr7ate section 1. thorized by the Constitution or lass of the Iigence.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I United States. rNTELLICexcE COMML-NITY 6TAYf ADMINIS
ask unanimous consent that the bill be INCREASES IN EMYLOYEf COMFEN5,17K,N AND TEREn IN SAME IUNN[R A9 CEKTBAI. INTLI-LJ
printed In the RECORD, and that, BENEFITS AUTHORI7.ED by LAw CENCE AGERCY
except for section 107, it be Open t0 SEC. 105. Appropriations authorized by SEC. 203. During fiscal year 1981, tcthitier.
amendment at an}' point. this Act for salaay, psy, retirement. and and personnel of the Intelligence Communi
The CHAIRMAN. I5 there Objection other benefits for Federal employees may ty Staff shall be aublect to the provisions of
be Increased by such additional or supple- the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
to the request of the gentleman from mental amounts as may be necessary for in- 401 et eegJ and the Contra) Intelli(ence
Indiana? creases to such compensation or benefits su- Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et aeq )
There was no ob.iection. thorized by law. In the same manner as activities and person
The text of H.R. 4759, as amended RESTRICTION OA SIIPPOA7 TOR MILITARY OA r1e1 of the Central Intelligence Agency.
by amendments considered t0 have PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN FICARACIIA TITLE III-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
been adopted, pursuant to House Res- SEC. 106. Funds available to the Contra] AGENCY RETIREMENT AND RELAT?
olution 545, Ls es follows: Intelligence Agency, the Department of De- ED MATTERS
H.R. 4759 fence, or any other agency or entity of the AUTHOAIZASION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Be tt rnacted 6y the Senate and Xowe of United States involved in Intelllsence activi- gam, f01. There L wthorized to be appro-
Rrpresrntatirrs of the United States of ties may be obligated and expended during priated for the Central Intelligence Agency
A7nr*tca in Congress assembled That this fiscal year 1987 to provide funds, materiel, Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
act may be cited as the "Intelligence Au- or other assistance Lo the Nicaraguan demo- year 1987 the sum of 1125,800,000.
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987". cratic resistance to support military or para-
TITLE I-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES military OperatiOnS !n NICSraguB Only 98 aU- SIIA VIVOR BENEFITS FOA CERTAIN FORMER
thorized in aectlon 101 and as specified Ln BPOIISES OF C1A ICMPLOYEES
A IITHOGIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS the classified Schedule of Authorizations re? SEC. 302. (a) Part C of title II of the Cen-
Sec. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to !erred to In section 102, or pursuant to sec- teal Intelligence Agency Retirement Act. of
be appropriated for fiscal year 198? for the lion b02 of the National 8ecurlty Act of 1~4 for Certain 1t:mpbyeea 1a amended by
conduct of Lhe intelligence and intelligence- 1947, or pursuant to any provi? aion of law adding at the end thereof the following new
related activities of the following elements specifically providing such funds, materiel, section:
of the United States Government: or assistance. '?svavrvoA BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN OTIIER
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency. RESTRICTION ON SIIPPORi TOR MILITARY OR -ORMER SPUIISES
(2) The Department Of Defense. PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. "SEC. 224. (e)[1) Any lndh?1dus1 who was a
(4) The National Security Agency. SEC. 107. During fiscal year 1987, the Cen? former spouse of s participant or former
(5) The Department of the Army, the De- teal Intelligence Agency, the Department of participant on November 15, 1982, shall be
Partment of the Nacy, and the Department Defense, or any other agency or entity of entitled, to the extent of available appro-
of the Air Force. the United States Involved to intelligence Priations, and except to the extent such
(6) The Department of State. activities may obligate or expend funds- former spouse is disqualified tinder subsec?
(7) The Departmen( of the Treasury. (i) to conduct, directly or indirectly, mill- Lion (b), to a aunivor annuity equal to 55
(8) The Department of Energy, Lary or paramilitary operations in Angola, per centum of the Greater of-
(9)The Federal Bureau of Investigation. or "(A) the full amount of the participant's
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administra? (2) to provide any financial, material, or or former participant's annuity, as comput.
lion. other assistance, directly or indirectly, to ed under section 221(x); or
CLASSIFIED SCHEDIILE OF ALTI'riORIZATIONS any group engaged 1r1 military or parantili? "(B) the full amount of what such annuity
Sec. 102. The amounts authorized to be Lary operations in Angola, as so computed would be u the participant
appropriated under section 101, and the au- only if the use of funds for that purpose is or former participant had not withdrswn a
thorized personnel ceilings as of September the openly acknoa*ledged policy of the lump-sum portion of contributions Glade
30. 1987, for the conduct of the Intelligence United States GovetTUnent, as determined with respect to ouch annuity.
and intklLgence-related activities of the ele- ~ accordance with section 2(b), and consist? "(2) A sun`ivor annuity payable tinder this
moots listed in such section, are those speci? eat with the conditions of section 2te) and section shall be reduced by an amount equal
fled in the classified Schedule of Authorize- section 2(d), of H.R. 4278 of the Ninety- to the amount of retirement benefits, not
Lions prepared by Lhe Permanent Select moth Congress as reported by the Perms- including benefits tinder title II of the
Committee on Intelligence to accompany vent Select Committee on Intelligence of Social Security Act, received by the former
H.R. 4759 of the Ninety-ninth Congress. the House of Representatives. spouse which are attributable to previous
That Schedule of Authorizations shall be TITS II-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY employment of such former spouse by the
made available to the Committees on Ap- STAFF LTnited States.
propriations of the Senate and House of AIITHORIZAT70N OF APPROPRIATIONS "(b) A former spouse shall not be entitled
Representatives and to the President. The SEC 201. There 1s suthorized to be appro- ~ a sun?ivor annuity under this section if-
President shall provide for suitable distribu- prfated for the Intelligence Community ~ (1) en election has been msde with re-
tion of the Schedule. or of appropriate por- Staff for fiscal year 1987 the sum of sport tq sucF. former spouse under section
[ions of the Schedule, x?ithin the executive x21,700,000. 223;
branch. "(2) the former spouse remarries before
ALrTHORr7.Artnx nr vracnxrvs-, ~...........-..,.-.. _. _ _.
SEC. 103. The Director of Central Intelli- Staff is authorized Lwo hundred and tt?irty- year )ofrage..o.*mer spouse Is less than fifty
Bence may authorize employment of civilian five full-time personnel es of September 30, "(c)(1) The entitlement of a former spouse
ized for fis al xcess of the numbers author- 1987. Such persoltnet of the Intelligence to a survivor annuity under this section-
year 1987 under sections 102 Community Staff may be permanent em- "(A) shall commence-
and 202 of this Act when he determines that ployees of the Intelligence Community "(1) in the case of a former spouse of a
such action is necessary to the performance Staff or personnel detailed from other ele? participant or former participant who is de?
of important intelligence functions, except menu of the United States Government. ceased as of the effective date of this aec?
.that such number may not, for any element (b) During fiscal year 1987, personnel of Lion, beginning on the late of-
ot the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 per the Intelligence Community Staff shall be " may continue the
enrollment under the conditions of eligibil?
ity which the Director of the Office of Per-
sonnel Management shall by regulation pre-
scribe, except that any former spouse who
remarries before age fifty-five shall not be
eligible for continued enrollment under this
section after the end of the thirty-one-day
period beginning on the date of remarriage.
"(d) No individual may be covered by a
health benefits plan under this section
during any period in which such individual
is enrolled in a health benefits plan under
any other authority, nor may any individual
be covered under more than one enrollment
under this section.
" fix the compensation of such indicid-
guidelines approved by the Attorney Gener- owls for service In such positions.
el for foreign intelligence collection and for- "(b) The Secretary of Defense shall sub-
PERSONNEL or under which the military departments 1zed, In his discretion, to assign civilian em?
DErENSE IpTEI.LIGENCE AGENCY CIVILIAN may employ individuals described by section ployees of the National Security Agency as
5342(s)(2)(A) of such title. students at accredited professional, techn!-
MEDICAL LVACUATION BENEFIT ?(d) ~ addition to the basic pay payable cal, and other institutions of higher learn-
SEC. 501. Subsection 1605(a) of title 10, under subsection (b), civilian intelligence of- ins for training at the undergraduate level
United States Code, is amended by inserting facers and employees of the military depart- ~ skills critical to effective performance of
" (5>" after "paragraphs (2), (3), (4)" and manta who are citizens or nationals of the the mission of the Agency.
after ?'(22 U.S.C. 4081 (2), (3), (4)". United States and who are stationed outside " To be eligible for assignment
lieu thereof "fiscal years 1986 and 1987". pay are fixed by statute. Such allowances under subsection (b), an employee of the
AccEPTANCE or alRErroR or CENTRAL INTELLI- shall be based on- Agency must agree in writing-
GENCE AWARDS 6Y MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ~ (1) living costs substantially higher than "(A) to continue In the service of Lhe
PERSONNEL in the District of Columbia; Agency for Lhe- period of the assignment
SEC. 503. Sect[on 402 of the Intelligence differ substantially from condi oti ns of enlvi- tni'aining forpwhich the demployee is~uaolgns~
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 ronment in the continental IInited States "(B) to continue 1n the service of the '
(Public Law 98-215) is amended by adding at and warrant an allowance as a recruitment Agency following completion of the aasign-
the end thereof the following: incentive; or went for a period of one-and-a-half yearn
"(c) The Director of Central Intelligence '?(3) both of the factors described to pare- for each year of the assignment or part
may exercise the authority granted in sec- graphs (1) and (2). thereof;
Lion 4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, "(e)(1> Notwithstanding any other provi- "(C) to reimburse the IInited States for
with respect to members of the Armed sion of law, the Secretary of Defense may, the total cost of education (excluding the
Forces who are assigned to foreign intelli- during fiscal year 1987, terminate the em- employee's pay and allowances) provided
Bence duties at the time of the conduct ployment of any civilian intelligence officer under this section to the employee if, prior
a
agency o
the United States, only u such provided in the General Schedule under aec-
lniormation is clearly relevant to the su- Lion 5332 of title 5 for positions subject to
thorized responsibilities of such agency. such Schedule which have corresponding
"(C) On a semiannual basis the Attorney levels of duties and responsibilities. Except
General shall fully Inform the Permanent in the case of a civilian intelligence officer
Select Committee on Intelligence of the or employee of a military department serv-
House of Representatives and the Select ing as a member of the Senior Executive
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate Service of a mllltary department, no clvillan
concerning all requests made pursuant to intelligence officer or employee of a m111-
this paragraph, Lary department may be paid basic pay at a
"(D) No financial institution, or officer, rate in excess of the highest rate of basic
employee, or agent of such institution, shall PSY Payable under such General Schedule.
disclose to any person that the Federal "(c) The Secretary of Defense. is suthor-
Buresu of Investigation has nought or ob- ized, consistent with section 5341 of title 5,
twined access to a customer's or entity's fi- to adopt such provisions of such title as pro-
nancial records under this paragraph.". vide for prevailing rate systems of basic pay
TITLE V-ADMIPTISTRATIVE AUTHORI- and to apply such provisions to positions for
TIES RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE civilian intelligence officers or employees in
H 7011
or employee of a military department when-
ever he considers that action to be In the in-
terests of the United States and he deter-
mines that the procedures prescribed In
other provisions of lea' that authorize the
termination of the employment of such offi-
cer or employee cannot be invoked In a
manner consistent with the national aecurl?
ty. The decisions of the Secretary under
this paragraph are final and may not be ap?
pealed or renewed outside the Department
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall
promptly notify the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence o! the House of Rep?
resentatives and the Select Caetsmittee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever this
termination authority is exercised.
such officer shall be appealable to the Sec-
retary of Defense.".
. of- ?'u
date five years afi,er the date of termination (b) The table of contents of chapter 18? of Sac 803. Section 8512(cXiXC) of title S,
of the assignment or employment or earlier title 10, United States Code, >: amended by
at the option of the employee. adding at the end thereof: United States Code la amended by striking
"(e) When an "2795. Exchange of mapping, charting, and the period at the end thereof and inserting
this section to at~institut~io~the Agen y 1n lieu thereof "or section 801 of the Natlon-
geodetic data with foreign al $ecurlty Act of 1947 (re-
shall disclose to the institution to which the countries and tnternattona] or- lating to intelligence identities).".
employee is assigned that the Agency em- ganizations.".
ploys the employee and that the Agency NoTlcs ro r"NOasss or cattrAra raessrsRS oP AMENnMS,NT oPrxaao sY ML HnMIlrox
funds the employee's education Darslrss AaTICLa6 aNn us-alrss szotvICas ~'. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
"(f) Chapter 41 of title 5 and subsections SEC. 802. (a) Title V of the National Secu- Offer an amendment.
(a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 31, United rity Act of 1947, relating to accountability The Clerk read 8S fOlloR'S:
States Code, shall not apply with respect to for intelligence activities, is amended by Amendment offered by Mr. B.AMILroN: On
this section. _~?-- -..~- _-, .~ __-- -... ...
after completing the educational course of Post Office and Civil Service and the Per- once Act of 1981, the Arms Lhrport Control
training for which the employee is assigned, manent Select Committee on InteAigence of Act, title 10 of the United States Code (tn-
the ernDloyee'a employment sith tho ~~ House of Representatives acid to the eluding a law enacted pursuant t0 section
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September 17, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman,
this amendment 1s purely technical. It
corrects three printing errors and has
no substantive effect. I ask for its
adoption.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. HAIKILTON].
The amendment was agreed to.
AMENDMENT OFf'EAID 0Y MR. HAMILTON
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment.
The Clert read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. HAacTLroN: On
page 3, Ilne 3, insert "(s)" after "102".
On page 3, line ?, strike "classified Sched-
ule of Authorizations Drepared by the Per-
manent Select Con.mittee on Intelligence"
and insert in lieu thereof "amended classi-
fied Schedule of Authorizations dated Sep-
tember 15, 1986 signed by the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
on file at the offices of that Committee"
gild strike "Schedule" each time it appears
thereafter in subsection 102(x) asld insert in
lieu thereof "amended Schedule".
On page 3, after line 15, add the following:
"(b) Funds appropriated to Lhe Depart-
ment of Defense for Fiscal Year 1987 for in-
telligence and intelligence-related activities
and listed under the heading "ADDITIONAL
SPECIFICALLY AIITHOAIZED ACTIVITIES" in the
amended Schedule of Authorizations to
which subsection (a) refers, shall be consid-
ered to be specifically authorized by the
Congress for such activities for purposes of
section 502 of the National Security Act of
1947, notwithstanding the absence of au-
thorizations of appropriations for such ac-
tivities in this Act."
Mr. HAMILTON (during the read-
ing). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be con-
sidered as read and printed in the
RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. IS there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Indiana?
There a'as no objection.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman,
this is a budget amendment. It
changes amounts authorized for both
the National Foreign Intelligence Pro-
gram and Tactical Intelligence and Re-
lated Activities so that the bill is in
congruence with H.R. 4428. The fiscal
year 1987 Defense Authorization bill,
a-c it passed the House. AS Members
will recall. H.R. 4428 was amended by
the Spratt-McCurdy amendment. to
lower the total budget authority for
defense from ;292 billion to ;286 bil-
lion. Since the intelligence bill a?as re-
ported out at a time when the Defense
authorization bill was pegged to a 5292
billion total. Its authorizations now
must be adjusted downward to reflect
the lov~'er 5286 billion total.
My amendment does this. It ensures
that the authorization of appropria-
tions in this bill are as reflected in the
defense authorization bill. The Intelli-
gence Committee worked closely with
the Committee on Armed Services at
the time of its original markup and
since then in setting levels for intelli-
gence accounts. This amendment ad-
justs intelligence authorizations at
levels agreed upon between the com-
mittees and reflected in floor action
on the defense authorization bill.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment also
waives the effect of section 502 of the
National Security Act of 1947 as to
certain intelligence accounts in the
fiscal year 1987 Defense Appropria-
tions bill, H.R. 5438. The Defense Ap-
propriations Subcommittee marked up
after the Intelligence Committee. It
recommended some additional appro-
priations not authorized by the Intelli-
gence Committee using funds which it,
in effect, transferred from other de-
fense accounts. The amendment would
not authorize these amounts, but it
would remove any obstacle to their use
if they are actually appropriated.
Mr. Chairman, both elements of this
amendment represent efforts at coop-
eration and coordination with the
Committees on Appropriations and
Armed Services. It is the aim of the
Intelligence Committee to secure as
good an understanding in both these
committees for the continued demands
being placed on our intelligence serv-
ices and the relatively higher budget
priority that we believe intelligence
deserves. This is a message that needs
to be given greater attention within
the executive branch as well. Until it
is, the increasing fiscal restraints
placed on all defense expenditures a*ill
act to underfund this crucial national
security function.
O 1305
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, we urge adoption of
the amemdment on this side also.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. HA>tallxoNl.
The amendment was agreed to.
AMENDMENT Ol/ERED BY MR. STOKES
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. STOKES: On
page 5, after line 22, insert the folloa`ing
nea? section:
"RESTRICTION ON INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COOPERATTON WITH SOIITH AFRTCA
"SEC. 108. No agency or entity of the
United States involved in intelligence activi-
ties may engage in any form of cooperation,
direct or indirect, with the government. of
South Africa, except activities which are
reasonably designed to facilitate the collec-
tion of necessary intelligence. It is Lhe
policy of the United Stags that no agency
or entity of the United States involved in in-
telligence activities may provide anY intelli-
gence information to the government of
South Africa which pertains to a South Af-
rican internal opposition group, movement,
organization, or individual. Any change in
such policy, or the provision of intelligence
information contrary to such policy, shall
be considered a significant antiMpated intel-
ligence activity for purposes of Section 501
of the National Security Act of 1947."
Mr. STOKES (during the reading).
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the amendment be consid-
ered as read and printed in the
RECORD.
H 7013
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
(Mr. BTOKES asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks. )
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, recent-
ly, the New York Times published an
article by Seymour Hersh which al-
leged a significant intelligence ex-
change between the United States and
the Government of South Africa. In
particular, Mr. Hersh charged that the
United States Drovides information
concerning the African National Con-
gress and other South African opposi-
tion groups to the Government of
South Africa.
Given the position of the United
States Government oonotrniag Routh
Africa and the strong feeling in this
body about the immoral and unsup-
portable nature of apartheid, I joined
other members of the committee in
carefully reviewing this article and in
fully investigating all of its charges.
We spoke with intelligence officials.
We demanded and received written re-
sponses to our questions about this al-
leged relationship.
That process led us, I believe. to a
reasonably good understanding of the
nature of II.S. intelligence activities in
question. It also led me Lo the convic-
tion that it would be important, both
because of the allegations in Mr.
Hersh's article and because of the
deep concern in this House about the
United States relationship to South
Africa, to offer an amendment which
would make clear the acceptable limits
of any potential intelligence relation-
ship with South Africa.
The amendment which I offer pro-
hibits intelligence cooperation with
the Government of South Africa
except for intelligence collection. It
also states that it is the policy of the
United States not to provide a,rly intel-
ligence information to the Govern?
ment of South Africa. concerning any
opposition group or individual. Fur-
ther, in the event that arI exception is
promulgated to this policy, or any in-
telligence information is ever passed,
the Director of Central Intelligence
must inform Lhe House and Senate In-
telligence Committees of this prior to
such an event.
Mr. Chairman, this provision is es-
sentially amodification of the Kenne-
dy amendment to the South African
sanctions bill passed by the Senate.
My understanding is that it was
worked out in connection with the
Central Intelligence Agency and that,
although this administration opposes
all. legislation on South African sanc-
tions, my modification of the Kennedy
amendment is not viewed as prohibit-
ing activities which the United States
contemplates entering into.
Mr. Chairman, my judgment, and I
believe that of the intelligence com-
munity, is that this amendment would
not result in the loss of any necessary
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H 7014 COI`~GRESSIOI~'AL RECORD -HOUSE
intelligence, nor would it prevent the
United States from acting to forestall
the loss of innoceni life, which is the
only circumstance under which intelli-
gence likely would be provided. What
It does do is state clearly for al] the
world to know that the United States
mill not side with white South Africa
agair;st black South Africa.
It is unfortunate that such a mes-
sage needs to be sent, but it is clearly
one that must be sent, and sent again.
until it is finally understood in the
councils of white South Africans that
apartheid and the system which it
supports cannot stand against the in-
alienable rights of black South Afri-
cans to determine their own destiny
and to acquire Lhe rights of represen-
tation. free passage, and hunsan digni-
ty that are daily denied them in the
ghettos of South Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the support of
this amendment.
Mr. BTITMP. Mr. Chairman, R?fIl the
gentleman yield?
Mr. STOKES. I yield to my distin-
guished tasking minority member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman
from Arizona [Mr. STV>~l.
Mr. STOMP. Mr. Chairman, while
there 1s some reluctance to this
amendment, we have examined it on
thLs side and are willing to accept it.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
manfrom Ohio [Mr. Srosasl.
The amendment was agreed to.
AI~ND~I@TT Ol1ERID HY 1La. SHAW
Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by 11!D dotal ?OViet-
bloc disengagement from Mgola,
probably would occur ii the United
States withdrew its aid. They were
wrong again. The United States totally
withdrew all aid to the Angolan resist-
ance but the amount and sophistica-
tion of Soviet-bloc military and other
aid steadily and massively increased.
By 196 the Cuban troop presence had
escalated to 40,000 combat troops and
Soviet arms deliveries now include sur-
face-to-air missiles. Mfg fighters? and
sephfattcated hetiooptetw.
Allow me to puote from the debate
again in 1975. in which they said,
"Now they have some X00 Resales ad-
visers over there. They have Russian
rockets and, by the way, the forces do
not know how to use them. They scare
each other to death," according to the
testimony that we had. This was in
197b. "They have 3.000 or 4.000
Cubans over there that really want to
go home," according to the testinnoriy
that we have, "and they have serious
morale problems."
In other words, all we have to do b
just get the evll United States alt of
the way and then indeed an the
Cubans and the Russians can go back
to doing whatever it was that they did.
Of course, we followed their Iced. we
implemented their amendment, we
withdrew Americas aid, and the Sovi-
ets moved in massively. They have
been proven wrong again.
Those who cut oft aid to 1975 de-
cried what they charsaterized sa the
immorality of U.S. assistance. They
argued that further war-irifltcted
death and suffering by Angolans wsa
intolerable and that the conflict and
its effects would cease once the United
States withdrew. Indeed, this issue was
raised in the preamble to moat bnla
and resolutions on the subject. Their
cutoff of U.S. aM, to tact. brought
about just what Lhey said they wanted
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~1 7024 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE September 17, 1986
to e~ Did The a-ar steadily Intensified Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman. I yield 3 policy toward Mgola ahould not be
after the U.S. aid cutoff. United States minutes to the gentleman from Michi- avoided by simply notifying thoar
nor.in~ol~emE?nt and diplomatic poll- gan [Mr. BaooMr'IELnl. Members of Congress on the intelL_
ciE?; hai~e prolonged rather than short- (Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was Bence committees. But, this fs precise.
cned the conflict, by allowing the given permission to revise and extend ly the role of the intelligence commit.
Marxist-Leninist regime in Mgola a his remarks.) tees and It has nothing to do with
decade in which to solidify its power Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, avoiding substantive questions.
base. LEE HAMILTON, our respected colleague In keeping with their statutory obil?
Tl]o5e a?ho supported the aid cutoff and chairman of the House Intelli? gationS, the Intelligence cotnmitteea
in 1975 argued that in supporting op? Bence Committee, has attached to the oversee covert operations and develop
position Lo the MPLA the United intelligence authorization bill a provi- legislation each year to authorize
States would be supporting s lost sion which would reinstitute the Clark funds for such programs. In other tn-
cause. They belie~~ed there was no amendment banning United States as? stances, one can presume. the ootmtlt,
hope that the beaten and fragmented sistaace to freedom fighters in Angola. tee passes Judgment on covert actions
opposition would ec?er mount s viable M one who Joined Mr. HAMILTON Hoa?erer, in this case, Chairman HAM-
military or political movement. Well, sad a substantial maiority of our col- II,TO1v insists that it i8 not appropriate
the heroic efforts of UNITA have leagues in dumping the Clark amend- for his committee to do so.
prored them wrong. UNITA recovered ment barely a year ago, I find this re? This transparent maneuver is in-
from near-elimination to mount an ex- vernal confusing and unfortunate. tended to revive the Clerk amend?
tremely effective resistance move- The Hatilton provision, despite its ment, and, in so doing, give new life to
went. UNITA occupies over one-third sponsor's protestations to the con- a discredited and dL~eatded h'adlUon
of Angolan territory and performs LrnT3'? ~ Indeed the Clark amendment of selective oongtessional attapenslon
both defense and civil administration resurrected and newly clothed. Its of legitimate Presidential authority. It
functions. author contends that the provision is ~ an attempt to abdicate the responsi?
Mt. Chairman, the House was wrong designed to foster open debate on an ~~~ ~~ ~ the ~~~~
a decade ago, and history shows it. Let important foreign policy issue. In es- committees and it would set s terrible
us not repeat the mistakes of the past. sence, it requires that the Congress precedent, in procedural terms.
The United States should support the enact a Joint resolution of approval Furthermore, in response to the er
-
freedom fighters of the Angolan re- before the executive branch may pro- roneous argument trot support !or
sistance. Vote to strike section 107 ~~ ~' assi8tance to any group en- VPTITA would >n ac
me Gray place the
from the intelligence bill. Based in military or paramilitary oiler- United States in an aUisace with the
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I ations in Mgola. South African GovelTUnent, I would
yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Going a step beyond the Clark lige to submit for the RECOnn an op-ed
New York [Mr. WALDONI. amendment, the Hamilton measure I authorized that was recently pub-
(Mr. WALDON asked and a?as given explicitly invites Congress in its Joint lashed in the Washington Post.
permission Lo revise and extend his re- resolution to list what kind of assist- Congress has an important role to
marks.) aace is permissible. This approach play in the formulation and oversight
Mr. WALDON. Mr. Chairman, I rise makes about as much sense as Con- of U.S. foreign policy and it is well
in strong opposition to the move to ~~ telling a neurosurgeon which in- equipped to carry out this task.
strike section 10? of the intelligence struments to use during brain surgery. I urge my colleagues to support the
authorization bill. This important sec- ~ this, and its many other dubious .Stump/Pepper amendment. To do so
lion deletes funding for the UNITA features, -the sequel to the Clark does not diminish our roles is tlals
amendment attempts to lobotomise
forces which are closely allied with executive branch flexibility 1n dealing p~~' it simply maintains an appro.
South Africa's racist regime. South With the situation in Angola. prlate ~~~ of authority between
Africa provides arms, training, fuel, There are very good reasons for op- the President and the Congress.
transport, sad military support for pce~g the new Hamilton leaguage. The article follows:
UNITA and they are working closely Covert action may be the talk of the [From the Washington Post, Aug. sE, 19aa1
together to destabilize Angola sad to ~~ but a specified alleged operation T~ Fovrmtxa FArrmts WOIILD Nor iHnvs
maintain South Africa's military occu- ahould not be the subJect of open ~~ Am ~o>r ~~ EVI
pation of Namibia debate on the House floor. This serves (By William 8. Broomfield)
The South African Government sup- ~ ~~ and appall our allies with The moat recant gust of hot atr to blow
ports UNITA because Angolans are whom we exchange useful intelligence through this town was dlaplsycd Aug. 16 on
aiding the fight against the apartheid information on a variety of subJects. It the op-ed page >n "Mixed Signal to Preto-
system. Apartheid is morally Corrupt, results in the embarrassment of our ~'~ by Anthony Lake and Richard Moose,
politically unacceptable, and doomed friends who may also be allegedly in- ~~ f an~deMo~~admeinistratio~o ~
to failure. As a nation we oppose volved in an ongoing operation. ''Booth African-backed guerrilla forces et
apartheid sad we should support Covert action is an essential arrow in IINITA ~ Msois would oonatitute "seading
southern African nations who are the foreign policy quiver of say ad- mixed signals to both blacks and whites" in
working to dismantle this system of in- ministration and has been used by South Africa, ? move that would "Daly
stitutionalized preJudice and segrega- both Democrats, Republicans, and reduce American cndibllity, weaten oar N
lion. The South Africans also support their predecessors, throughout the forts against apartheid and lose influence to
UNITA because they want to Bain h~~ry of the Republic. the benefit of the Soviets."
access Lo Mgolan oil, which South To so cavalierly terminate as elleg- Thy curious comments are the latest fe
Africa desperately needs for their in- edgy ongoing program in this a growing chorus of howl by those who are
dustry and as a protection against as manner-which is clearly the intent of c~cally ~~ to exploit popular and >,uai-
antiapartheid petroleum embargo. the Hamilton initiative-places the Pied American opposition to apartheid h-
I do not believe that America has President in sn embarrassing position South Africa to reimpaee the Clark Amenb?
ment prohibition on 17.8. std to h~eeds~
the right to use our intelligence agen- and raises serious questions about the fighters in Angola. Last year, Congress n?
ties to destabilize and overthrow the reliability of any commitment by the pealed the 'decade-old prohibitbn, which
Angolan Government. If we are unable United States. tied the hands of three presidents and een-
to support the fundamental principle Congressional participation in sensi- trlbuted to the tact that there an curraoily
of political pluralism at the interns- five matters of this nature should be 85?~ ~~' combat troops in Angola. sa
tional level we open ourselves to the confined to the intelligence Commit- c?mpanied by thousands of Soviet and iQast?
criticism of self-righteous bigotry. I tees who have been ern bloc advisers.
urge my colleagues to Join me in pro- sibility. given that respon- Now, 1n support of new eftorta to limit
hibiting sad to the presidential authority, much !a being made
opposing the $tum a~mend~mente~ by tive~. HAMILTOx argues that substan- of the fact that UNITA receives aid from
p questions about United States South Africa. According to the argtmseet.
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September 1% 19b'6 CO'~GRESSIONAL RECORD - HOtiSE
U.S. support for UNITA would som~?:~ow as
SOCIaLP our country with the rafi5t Rocern~
went of South Africa. By lmpltcation,
UNITA fs also criticiu?d for accepting aid
from South Africa- Consistent with this
logic. the United States should not hate
fought Hitler !n VYorld War II Decau.e it
placed our country on the same side as
Joseph Stalin and the Sorter Union. Fur-
thermore, during the U.S. a?ar for independ-
ence, Clark Amendment proponents would
have had our Founding Fathers refuse aid
from Louis XVI because of the monarchial
nature of the French government. Anyone
who believes that Thomas Jefferson ad-
mired royalty or that UNITA leader Jonas
~vtmbi supports a
artheid is 1n serious
p
need of a cerebral tune-up.
The fact is, any support a?e might provide
UNITA would have the effect of reducing
the freedom fighters' reliance on South
Africa for assistance. That should not be
our oNy goal, but a reduction of South Afri-
can influence in the region would be desira-
ble. Furthermore, 1t is important to note
that according to a recent Post aeries,
UNITA reportedly receives assistance from
a number of other African, European and
Middle Eastern countries.
UNITA b a legitimate and popular move-
ment in Angola that ass prevented by
Cuban combat troops from taking its right-
ful place with rival groups !n the Angclan
soverameat in 1975. Siritx that time, there
has not been a free e]etKfon in Angola and
tens of thousands of Cuban, Soviet and
Eastern bloc military personnel continue to
shield an unpopular regime from the Anso-
lan people. It remains U.S. policy to encour-
age negotiations among all factions in
Angola. U.S. support of UNITA could have
the effect of forcing the Angolan regime to
Dome to terms with its opponents.
To remote one importsllt policy tool from
the president's grasp does nothing to hasten
an end Lo the conflict in Angola. Conversely,
to leave unfettered the president's author-
ity to carry out American foreign policy
does not entangle us with the apartheid
regime.
~ 1425
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. WElssl.
(Mr. WEISS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. WEISS. I thank the gentleman
for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, this administration
has already decided that aid to IINITA
should be overt, that is, open and
public. The question today is whether
we in Congress will abdicate our re-
sponsibility to review that decision
through the regular congressional au-
thorization and appropriation process.
I urge that we not abdicate that re-
sponsibility because our Angola policy
is inseparable from our South Africa
policy. Every dollar spent helping
IINITA is s dollar that helps finance
South Africa's foreign policy. It is not
morally acceptable to subsidize apart-
heid. nor is it in our interest to do so.
But that is exactly what the adminis-
tration is doing with this aid program
for IINITA.
South Africa has consistently at-
tacked its neighbors to preserve apart-
heid. It has attacked Botswana, Leso-
tho. Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Angola. It has not
been particular ss to what kind of
groups it supported in those attack.
In Lesotho, it supported a Marxist. in-
surgency group. These attacks have
caused E10 billion in economic damage
in the last b years. They hate led to
starvation and dependence on the
front line states. These attacks have
also presen?ed the apartheid regime's
illegal occupation of Namibia.
Do we really want to support this
pattern of aggression without full con-
gressional review? Do we really want a
military alliance with the apartheid
regime without congressional review?
Is it really in our interest to earn the
hatred of the majorities in all of
southern Africa?
It is totally inconsistent to Vote for
sanctions against South Africa one
day and then leave the administration
free to join military forces with South
Africa on the next. Our Mgola policy
must be considered together with our
South African policy.
I urge my colleagues to vote to
defeat the Stump amendment today.
Mr. Speaker, I include at thLs point
in the RECORD a study on this issue un-
dertaken by the Arms Control and
Foreign Policy Caucus of the House of
Representatives:OZ84846 smith fj 9/
17/86 J.71-060 F.260a A17SE7.117
SOrzH ArRICA'S WARS: THE MILITARY AND
ECONOMIC CAMPAIGN BY SOUTH AFRICA TO
PRESERVE APARTHEID
Congress is likely to vote again this year
on ta?o issues related to South Africa: eco-
nomic sanctions (perhaps on a veto over-
ride) and aid Lo South Africa?backed rebels
in Angola. This Report frames this latter
issue of aid to the Angolan rebels not in the
ideological context in which it has so far
been debated (e.g. do we support or oppose
the communist government of Angola?), but
rather in a regional context-the way it 1s
seen throughout Southern Africa and per-
haps even throughout all of Africa. The
Report thus raises the fundamental ques-
tion of whether U.S. aid to Sa~imbi will be
viewed in the region as a bona fide Ameri-
can attempt to help freedom-fighters, or ss
an inadvertent act that helps South Africa
preserve apartheid.
The Report documents South Africa's on-
going military and economic campaign
against all seven of its neighboring states-a
campaign to preserve apartheid. Thin 15-
year campaign, which has not been covered
widely 1n the western press, has caused
some =10 blllion in economic damage to the
majority-rule states in the past five yells,
and still includes assassination attempt,
economic sabotage, aid to rebels, military
strikes on capital cities and military occupa-
tion.
BD7tMARY
Tn 8n effort to protect its system of ahite-
minority rule known as apartheid, South
Africa has engaged in a lb-year campaign of
H 7025
for m:~jority rule in southern Afnca-the
ANC In Snuth AtTica and SLVAPO In South
African?occupitd Namibia. However, as well
as attsckirg ANC and Svt%APO offices,
South Africa also attacks its neighbors'
ecor,c,mies, hoping generally to weaken the
majority rule countries and keep them de?
pendent on South Africa.
In addition, some South African attacks
are military and economic attempla to dis~
rupt even non-tiolent political pressure for
majority' rule. For example, South African
aircraft bombed Zambia this May in part Y
retaliation for Zambia hosting a meetfnR of
South African busineac leader with t2-e ANC
and la part to disrupt a Coeomontivealth dip'
lomatic mission that was trying Lo set up
talks between the ANC and South Africa.
Also, just last month, South African cus-
toms agents started singling out for ha2'raas-
ment and delay all exports from Zambia and
Zimbabwe, after those two countries public-
ly called for economic sanctions on South
Atrita.
Whatever its motfvstioa for particular ac-
tions, there is consensus among regional an?
alyat that South Africa's wars on Ira netgh-
bors are part of Its strategy to weaken all
ptlssiDle pressures asalnst apartheid and
block diplomatic progress toa?srd majority
rule in South Africa and Namibia As Secre-
tary of State Shultz said of South African
m111tary attat3s ea three aotmtrles to May,
1956. Routh Africa's catnpatgn Is 'Yuada-
mentally seated in apartheid."
The imminent debate to Congress over aid
to rebels in Angola is cast primarily in the
context of anti-Communism, due to Soviet
and Cuban backing of the Angolan govern,
went and recent anti-Communist state-
ments by rebel leader Jonas Savlmbi. This
Report attempts to balance this focus by
placing the aid debate 1n ? regional context,
as it is seen by all of South Africa's neigh,
hors and most of Africa: by aiding Savimbi's
rebels (who have received as much as =1 bll-
lion in aid as well as direct military support
from South Africa). doss the IInited States
inadvertently encourage and assist South
Africa in its campaign to Preserve apart-
heid?
While South Africa's milit,aly and eco-
nomic campaigns against its neighbors are
not w?tdely covered in the western press,
they are constant. tm-going sad quite effec-
tive. This Report document these tam-
palgris, revealing that South Africa's attacks
on it seven neighbors, from democratic
Botwana to Marxist Angola, have shared
the common purpose of preserving apart-
heid:
In Angola, South Afrka has attempted to
seise the capital t4 place 8avhnbi to power,
carried out over 4b major air and gmuad at?
tacks. sustained UNITA with aid valued at
x200 million a 3'ear for the last fire years ~
and used it troops to protect UNITA and
fight with it against the Angolan Army;
In Botswana, South Africa has tarried out
helicopter-borne commando raids, damaged
transport links to neighboring countries to
force Botswana to trade through South
Africa, and assassinated political exiles, ap?
nelghbOlS. AS tillb Report and it s000mpa-
nying map indicate. since 1982 South Africa
has attacked with it military forces all
seven countries bordering South Afritan-
controlled territory; has subjected five to
severe economic blackmail; has conducted or
sponsored economic sabotage raids against
four, and has been the primary fonder and
supplier of rebel groups in three.
South Africa justifies these actions as nec-
essary Lo stop it neighbors from providing
support and sanctuary to groups fighting
~ Th1s estimate wY provided of Prot. l3erald
Render of U8C. in a telephone interview with
Caucus staff, August !, 19l0. Caucus staff wY
ulfable to determine any UB. C7ovemment estimate
of Booth African aid to UNITA, since the State De?
partment, CIA, House lbreisn Attain and Senate
Poreian Relauons declined W provide ? asue'e or
comment on Prof. Bender's estimate. Prof. Bender
b neoanleed Y (In the words of a leadina African,
1st who favors aid to UNITA. t3eorsetown IInivenf?
ty's Richard Sfseell) "one of the flndt hlstorlans
on AoaoLn aftalrs." Prot. Header Y a iregtunt wlt?
Qess DE1ore (bngresslonal Oommittlea.
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H ?026 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE September 17, 19F6
parrntl} rr~ortinE irr oar case to the usr of could cooperate vrith South Afri,;a. and itr South Africa's campaign aQainat
a ct.r bn >so~?aray
the use of a letter-bomb), aid funded rebels Angola by the yon-violent political history, were oanduc?ted
~~~ ~ ~~ Soviet IInion barred South Africa's final ap? w, ~~ Atr~aa aRatai:
sabotage sad offsets preach to the capital, am eie~pitt public In June. 1888. helteopter-borne >8outh Af~
00 ~~~ ~e ~~ ~~~ pleas from Sat?imbi, the South African
In Swaziland, South Africa has used coo- celun~ retreated, forcing UNITA to return ~~ wmmandos raided suspected ANC
nomic coercion. military attack sad appar- Lo its tribal atrotrghoid In seuiheastern residences in the capital City, aeekiag put
early bribery k+ gain Lhe oooperatbn of the Angola. and killing 18 heath African cxAex (the p$
government in identifying and expelling Since 1975 South Africa bas conducted lied its ambassador to Bouth Africa In
anti-apartheid activists; nearly non-stop aggreaslon against, Angola, vroteat);
In Zami:i:. South Africa has carried out lncludlrtg direct military atta!+ks, paramili- ~ May 1988, hel(copter-borne South Afrl-
terial bombardment of the capital and com- tars operations and support for UNITA's Can commandos stormed a pol-Ce alatio~n
manse raids on refugee camps suspetged of economic sabotage. Crrrf+emt]y, 8louth Afrka and housing comple= near the aapttal, Hpl.
serving as SWAPD sad ANC ~~, mO?~d provides UNITA with (according to one re- ewana reported that those tIIled or inbred
transport links in neighboring countries to ~~ U.S. scholar, IISC's Gerald Bender) were its citizens, and not ANC members, but
force Zambia W trade thrargh South some =200 million per year sin aid, bombs 8fouth Africa Called the mission "atsoceaa-
Atrica, and mz?,? hat?r funded an unsuccess- Lpyyns ~ ~ 700 ~~ ~~ ~oL sad bas ful": and
fnl O?~: and some 8.000 troops occuPYing parts of south- tiouth llfrlcan-backed rebel stoltps ~-
In Zimbabn?e, South Africa has carried ern Angola and protecting IJNTTA forces, atroYed rail lines through Ansoh and 1Io-
out commando raids, conducted economic reinforced by up to 20,000 troops that oper- tambique that could eene as aiteraatr
sabotage raids Inside the country, damaged ate on both sides of the Namibian-Arrgolaa mutes for overseas trade lac y
transport slinks in nelshtrorfng ppuajr~ tp border. beef turd minerals
force Zimbabwe Lo trade throtagh 6otrth As s result of South Africa's tarnpaign, >m dependent on So'utphp~rl ~~?
Africa, and may have funded a rebel group. Angola has moved Namibian refugee camps r.asoeuo
From a tactical standpoint, South Africa's farther away from the border and appears
use of its overwhelming military and eco- to have restricted SWAPO sotivity. Specific South Africa's four-year campaign aaainst
nomic superiority against its neighbors has components of South Africa's campaign Lesotho, a kingdom of 1 millloa the site of
been largely successful: the attacks have against Angola since 1975 include: Maryland that -s completely surrounded lay
caused t10 billion >n economic damage in More than 25 major attacks and Countless South Africa, has been -ts most efleexive.
the majority-rule states over the last five Cross.border raids by South African troops ?be campaign, started in 1982 tttrith oom-
years (far more than ai= their foreign aid on Namibian refugee camps allegedly aerv- monde raids with the backing of a li[arrtst
during the same period). leading to atarva- irre as SWAPO bases. resulting in thousands rebel group. whose sabotage raids South
lion and dislocation, and have left the ma? of Namibian and Angolan deaths. In one Africa offered to call oft u Lesotho retpig.
jorit y-rule states weak, economically de- attack >n 1978 on a U.N. Nish Commission Wired the independerra of the "tribal Moms
pendent on South Africa and largely unwiil- on Refugees camp, South Africa killed 800 lands" ~ which 8oulh African blacks !rave
irrg to provide refuge or support to groups refugees, and both the VNSCR and the bEen a$s1~ed by the sover)Yrsent, Tieaa-ar
attacking apartheid, or to take part in diplo- ~gorM gib Orssnitstion found evidence paistr ended lhte year after an eeoyorie
mats( initiattvea for majority rule. Only of the use of "paralyzing" gas; blockade resulted in the overthrow o/ the
- Zambia openly harbors the atttl-apartherid Aerial bombardment of bridges, roads and sovernaaent and the Installation of a oom-
groups, while the other countries have ex- anti-aircraft instaliations throughout south? pliant regime.
palled their members or restricted their ac- ern Angola, moat recently >n 1985 to protect ~ ~ return for South Africa's liltltttt of tie
tlvitles. T.~~~.....--- - - - - - -- - - -
independence. When Colonial aria ended in ~ the majority rule country closest to exues who had been Iderrttfied by Borrth
1975. South Africa sent an armored brigade Pretoria, Botswana, a democracy of 1 mil- ~~~ ANC members;
with air over 700 miles through Angola lion mughiy the size of Texas, has become In August, 1988,, the t3OUt:h Airjaa>o-ltao)ted
toward the capital city Lo inctalt Jonas Sa? an important refuge for South Africans LLA unsuccessfully attempted to aaaaad-
vimbi's UNITA group in poser. South fleeing their country. including AICC roam- Irate Lhe Prkne 8>tirrlBLer, iia the year D!'eeaa-
Africa believed, as it does now, that Sacittrbl ~~ or sympathisers. Although Botswana lnB this attempt, the LLA had creased tiotis
does not permit ANC training camps or Lesotho from heath Africa and araaeinaLad
transit to rebels carrying out operations, or government officiate three 13mis~
' This 1s an estimate of the southern African De- even ANC politics! office:;, South Africa has In December, 1985,, tollowlrag a tlk-rasat
veropmenc eoordinacion commictee, the economic attacked Botswana, and openly threatened South African complaint t0 IsOtile ~
a~xlation of the ??rronwne^ states. It ~ pteaented it with severe reprisals U it Changes its the activities of South Atriearr refia~eaa, the
to their January,lses, r+rport. policy and assfsts the ANC. South African-backed LLA raided the eaP
went, training, transport of troops ditrbig In December, 1982, t3outh Ahican coos.
arecosa battle, logistical aid ouch as petroleum and manses kllled 4! people m raids pa pelpte
Angola has been subjected to severe and vehicles and the purchase of goods pro- trmea in the aipita! is aeas,clr eat AIfC mar.
nearly continuous South African mllitary daces in UNITA-controlled territory; hers;
attack and South African-backed economic Occupation of a aubstaatiai taco of south- 3rr sate January sad lhhruary. i'IetRB. ~hlie
~ ~tora~~ly iAnsola. an ethnf Africa's ~ AnsO~,ls~,tq from 19T8 to theme pr~eae~lau il~ o ot+t+aa hostins a iroat-Lae ak~s' aaa
vises country of 8 million on Namibia's An attempt >n 1985 to sabotage oil instal. on South Afrr ~tmomic de~arrdeaae
nonhern border that is twkx the size of lotions in northern Angola owned jointly by (tire LLA) that 8otrth~Ai~l~od ~'ebN ~~
Texas, has Included full-stile invasions, American oorporationa acrd the Angolan bared and prm?lded with e~xploslt v~~enteh ed
countless raids on refugee camps allegedly Qrovernment. Several South African oom? Lesotho and destroyed eooneeste qr~~, ~,
aexving as SWAPO bases. ongoing occupa? manses carrying explosive devices were cap- cieding the caPltal'a water stera~e tlioeiio
t[ar of southern Angola and primary aerp- tared near the installatioffi; and sad a major fuel depot;
Poa't fs well as battlefield help for Angolan The sinking by South African commandos ~ the spring d 191 ~~ Africa eee-
r+ebe)s. in June. 1988. of a UNICEF ship carrying sled econoaie Chaos In I.eaatho ilor tl3riue
heath Africa attacks on Angola date back I7-S? food aid to Angolan refugee camps. months by arlsyins enoasioedar tbeattde
to Lhe early 1970s. when 1Cniit.t, ei,a..e ~.Byi,~A antic t~...rr,.. ~~..~nea .. v...L ..~~_
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September 1i, 1~~6
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H ?027
Iasi and gunny d dov:^^. nine me mbc rs of the
ANC:
At the start. of January. 198f,, South
Afncn Impcned a military biockadc~ on heso?
rho, which must conduct all its foreign
trade throuF~h South Africa: and
On Janue:y 2U. 1985. with food, gasoline
and medicinrs runnu~s out because of Lhe
bto:kade. Le:.othr's government was ocer-
throx-n by a South Afncan?backed military
coup. The new- leac!ers moved quickly to
expel all South African exiles that South
Africa Identified ss ANC members. and
South Africa lifted the blorkadc.
atoworQVs
South Africa's three pronged eampairn
against Mozambique-military attacks,
severe economic sabotage and the funding
of a rebel group-has devastated Mo~am-
Dique'a economy and disrupted international
famine relief operations there. Mozambique,
a nation of 13 million the size of California
that la On SW1txl Africa i sorter-eaei,erD
border. ha>e never provided bates to the
ANC, but it does host ANC political offices
that Bouth Africa has accuatd on atding at-
tacks Ituide South Africa.
eoutb Atrba bNped Portssal Im the early
1970s to its war with independence forces in
Ddo?ambique, and when Portugal withdrew
Irr 1974, South Africa supported an abortive
..settlers. rrvolt" t~saltwt. aoRlodty ruk.
When laaombiQtre sopported 8buodesiaa
rebels in the late 1970s, the white-minority
government m Rhodesia created a rebel
movement (MNR> m Mozambique and sup-
plied it with training and equipment for eco-
nomic sabotage.
South Africa took over sponsorship of the
MNR when Rhodesia Decame the malority
rule stair of Zimbabwe to 1980, providing
weapons, explosives and sanctuary, and the
IiNR has continued to attack Mozambique's
economic infrastructure and international
rtrliet operations. In particular, South Africa
lass helped the MNR damage transport
Rata between lilosambique and its land-
locked neighbors Zimbabwe and Zambia, in?
er~easing those countries' dependence on
South Africa as a conduit for their Interna-
tional trade.
South Afritx's campaign asaimt lfozam-
bique included these components:
In January, 1981, helicopter-borne South
African commandos raided the capital tdky.
and used rockets and mortars to destroy
residences of South African exiles. Bouth
Africa claimed at least 6 ANC member
tilled, whlle 1![ozambique reported 18
people killed:
In August, 1982, aletter-bomb addreeaed
to Ruth First, an exiled South African
writer and one of the mast prominent white
members of the ANC, killed her and wound-
ed three by,standera. While South Africa
denied responsibility, Mozambique protest-
ed the lnddent to South Africa, claiming
that the letter-bomb was tent b7 Sotith Af-
rican agents:
In 11[ay, 1983, South African aircraft
bombed houses and a factory in the capital.
Mozambique reported 19 killed and 200 in-
Jured, while South Africa claimed 40 ANC
members kllled:
In 1983, the South African-backed MNR
sabotaged international relief efforts to Mo-
zambican victims of the worst drought of
the century:
In 1984, under the Nkomatl Aa~ord, Mo-
zambique ousted ANC members in exchange
for South Africa's pledge to stop funding
the MNR,. However, South African-backed
attacks on economic infrastructure linking
i~[caatnbique to Zimbabwe resumed immedf-
stely,and the next year South Africa pub?
liCly admitted that it had decided to violate
the Accord and continue supporting the
MNR. (Everwally, Zimbabwe sent troops
into Mozambique at Mozambique's request
to prated its transport links.t
In January, 1985. South African-backed
MNR guerrillas sabotaged power lines and
the railroad bridge linking Mozambique to
South Africa: and
In 1985 and 1986. the MNR attacked inter-
national relief vehicles and supplies for the
famine In Mazambique, forcing a reduction
to deliveries to famine areas.
SWAZII.AI.TD
South Africa's military attacks and eco-
nomic coercion have forced S>;aziland, a
tiny ethnic kltredom on half a m1lLcat nearly
surrounded by and totally dependent on
South Africa, to expel ANC political opera-
tives and other South African refugees.
South Africa's campaign to cut off Swazi
refuge and support for the ANC started in
1982 after the death of the Swazi king (who
had been supportive of the ANC) and con-
sisted o[ er+oooaste eoeraon and, reoeotly.
dtreci mWwy attaeita. According to tesion-
al expert William Mtnter, Washington
editor of the Africa News Service, the Swart
Government rmw cooperates with South
Aftlaa m ideotKylnt rod errpelli~ ANC
members, and 6outh African intelligence
agents operate in Swaziland with the knoa?1?
edge of the Swazi Government.
Tlae slleoetatd eta4paita started with the
sknlns m 19q o! a seeaet agreement to stye
landlocked Swaz[land one of South Africa's
"tribal homelands," Including a seaport, in
return for the expulsion of ANC from Swa-
ziland. Although as part of the agreement
Swaziland deported 100 ANC members.
some of whom had lived in Swaziland for 20
years. South African courts later voided the
transfer of the territory and its seaport.
South Africa established close relations
with members of the roysi inner circle over
Lhe next few gears, and in 1983, the Swazi
Finance Minister publicly charged that
South Africa had bribed some of the royal
family and other Swssi officials m leWra
Ior their oooperatbn. This minister war
Jailed for two years after South African
President Botha Gent a telegram to the
Swazi Government defending those he had
accused. By 1984, according to Minter,
South Attica was then free rein inside 8ws-
tilaad when a teoehed permission to open a
trade mittioa there staffed by mIIitavy and
iateiligmoe personnel who gather faforma-
tioa m opponents of apartheid.
Using its intelligence network. South
Africa identities South African eziles tt sus-
pects of ANC membership or other anti-
apartheid activities, and asks the Swazi
Cioverameat to expel them. To reinforce ifs
demands, South Africa had !fa troops
occupy Swazi villages twice 1n Deoennbet,
1985.
~~~
Zambia, a nation of 5 million the sfse of
Texas that borders Namibia, openly harbors
members of SWAPO arrd the ANC, sad
President asunda has been an outspoken
opponent of South Africa's racial policy and
a leader is diplomatic initiatives on both
Namibia sad South Africa. In retaliation for
Zambia's role, SSouth Africa has attacked it
with air raids sad commando attacks, eco-
nomic pressure, and possibly support for a
coup attempt.
However, Zambfa, because tt b less Boo-
nomically dependent on South Africa than
are other front-else states (for esample, be-
csuae of alternate routes, it conducts one-
third of tta trade through South Africa,
compared to Zimbabwe's two-thirds), has
not succumbed to South African attacks and
moderated its role in the anti-apartheid
movement.
South Africa's campaign against Zambia
has included the tollowin? components
In August 1978, Sauth Africa raised refu?
gee camps in Zambia it suspected of being
SWAPO bases. killing 12 people;
Throughout the late 1970s and continuing
until today. South African-backed rebels in
Angola and Mozambique have destroyed nil
and power links between Zambia and the
seaports in both countries, forcing It to con-
duct more of its overseas trade through
South Africa;
In October 1980. Zambia claimed that
South Africa had recruited and trained
mon than 100 Zambian disaldeats m ? plot.
to overthrow- the sovernment, s charge
South Africa denied;
From 1980 W 1985, South African aircraft
repeatedly bombed refusee campe m Zambi-
an territory, stating that the attacks were m
response to SWAPO attacks in Namibia;
In May 1986, !n retaliation for Zambia's
b0atiltlg tl-e hest taaeting ietween
ANC leader aiod South ~trioan bosinsss
leaders and Lo disrupt a Commonwealth dlp-
lomatic miswn explorlnt talks between the
ANC and South Africa, the South African
sir lame lnombsd a Vatted Natbos i'talllsee
camp near the capital city, kfIIinQ two
people; and
In August 1986, in retaliation for Zambie'a
public call fat economic wactieos atalost
apartheid, South Africa dlQapRed Zambian
economic activity by slowing border inspec-
tions for Zambian goods.
xr>~cseswa
South Africa's campaign against Zim?
babwe has relied primiarily on economic
pressure, because of the dependence of land-
locked Zimbabwe, s nation of 8 mlllioa on
South Africa's northern border, oa South
Africa as its link to international trade.
However, South Africa has reiaforoed this
pressure with military attacks, economic
sabotase raids and, accordins to a number
of regbnai etperta. ltrndltait iot a aebel
Croup.
South Africa's lavolvement la Zimbabwe
dates back to its military and ?oonomk sup?
port for Rhodesia's white-minority govern-
ment in the war of independence fa the
1970s. Since indepeadcnoe m 19e0, Prime
Minister ffiutabe has been reoosaited Y a
key spokesperson for the anti-apartheid
movement. While he has provided refute to
ANC members sad other South Afrloaa
exries, he has been unwNtnt to tirovide
bases or assist ANC operations. South
Africa, however, claims that the ANC has
crossed the border from Zimbabwe to plant
road mesas.
The South Airless campaita atainst Zim-
babwe Las included the tollowiag oompo-
neater
In 1981. to l+etaliatiOn for what It called
Zimbabwe's "hostile" diplomatic activity
~ to
his remarks.) provide military assistance to the agree to a Nambian settlement wlsidl
Mr. McCURDY. I thank the gentle- UNITA forces in Mgola. would require them to cease auppo'E-
man for yielding me this time- ~ Is the purpose of the program to ,~ ~? _Savimbi and UNTTA because
fea
nsta
ment. Since then, significant gain support for covert aid. It has by Mr. Savimbi in an effort to achieve
m.;,tary ana economic attacks have taken come very close to making the same national reconclliation in that Coun-
place, and its appears that as international mistake with respect t0 Angola. The ~?
pressure builds against apartheid, the South president Cannot have it both ways: O 1435
African campaign may escalate.
This Report shows how South Africa He cannot Claim that Covert aid LO
relies on a regional policy to presen?e apart- ETA 1s vital to protect American in- The truth 1s that the prospects for
held. similarly, the United states needs s terests and encourage the support of such a negotiation which, L
regional policy to assist the transition to our allies, and at the acme time an- would be s desirable way of Iwoly~
majority rule in South Africa and Namibia. pounce to the world that we must help the internal conflicts in Mgola, woWd
Future F3.S. polcy toward South Africa, the freedom fighters in Angola, es he ~ far more significantly advanced by
Angola end the rest of the front-line stat
amendment offered by the gentleman ALA regime in Luanda? There is not ~' association with the United Staq~
from Florida [Mr. Parriutl and the a single, credible military analyst who ~_~lY~ it would be a diplimatic aleck
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 :CIA-RDP88G01332R001100130018-7
that disappro~?al of section 20? would
encourage the policy of apartheid. I
would not support the Pepper-Stump
amendment I Dave the lama contempt
for this abominable policy as do all
other freedom-loving people.
Mr. Chairman, let me take just a
minute to talk about the strategic Im-
portance of Angola. I support Pepper-
Stump primarily for economic reasons.
V4 a are Import dependent for many of
the strategic materials that make up
our industrial bare. Many of these ma-
terials can be found !n abundance in
only two areas: Africa and the Soviet
Union. The So~-iet Union is now in-
stalled on the Horn of Africa. It sits
astride the Mozambique Strait on the
Indian Ocean dde of the continent,
and by consolidating its position in
Angola will have aitiactl~e a#r and sea
surveillance of the entire ooaatineat of
Africa. This will impose a serious
threat Lo Lhe shipping lanes.
I believe, therefore, that the nation-
al interest will be served by the adop-
tion of Pepper-Stua-p.
Section 10? of ttat lntelligenoe biII
takes away the option for ooge~e?t sup-
port of the UNITA t+esiatanee forces
fight[ng the goverldn: Communist
regime in Angola. Section 107 makes
two fundamental policy mistakes.
First, it ruptures the secrecy of the
statutory process for congressional
oversight of intelligence activities; and
second, it abandons United States stra-
tegic interests in Angola?
The existing statutory process for
oversight of covert actions achieves si-
multaneously two critical goals--con-
gressional oontroi of innding, and the
maintenance of the secrecy essential
to intelligence activities.
The la~v requires that, before CIA
conducts a covert action, the President
must personally find !n writing that
the proposed operation is important to
US. national security. The proposed
action must be reported in advance to
the tntel]Jgence committees of Con-
gress. Covert actions are funded
through appropriations made avail-
able annually by Congress for such
purposes. If the intelligence commit-
tees disapprove of a covert action that
the President has found important to
national security. They may deny
funding for continuation of the action
during the annual authorization and
appropriations process.
This system established by lau? and
congressional rules permits all of this
to be done in confidentiality, to pre-
serve the secrecy essential to intelli-
gence activities. There is no need to
break this essential secrecy about
covert actions. The executive branch
should not do it and the Congress
should not do it.
In addition to encouraging the
breach of secrecy, the other major
problem with section 107 is its aban-
donment of United States strategic in-
terests in Angola. From my service as
a member of both the Intelligence
Committee and the Armed Services
Committee. I remain extremely con-
cerned about the continuing offensive
Soviet military buildup around the
globe.
Angola provWes airfield and naval
port access to the Soviet IInion from
which they could attack the sea lines
of communication around southern
Africa. including the critical Cape sea
route for maritime tra.-sport of strate-
gic minerals vital to the economies of
the West.
Luanda, Angola, has one of the best
natural harbors in west Africa and is
the main support base for the Soviet
Navy's West Africa fleet element.
The So~?iets and their allies have
poured E4 billion in military aid into
Angola in the past decade, =2 billion of
which was given just since 1983. I
would point out to my colleagues that
this massive Soviet-bloc aid to Angola
occurred during s period in which the
Clark amendment prohibited the
United 6tates from prnviding any aid
to the Angolan freedom fighters.
The Soviet~upported air and naval
infrastructure. combined with the
35.000 Cuban troops already m
Angola. severely threatens United
States interests in the region.
I urge m7 colleagues to vote for the
Pepper$tump amendment to str[ke
section 107 against covert aid to the
Angolan redstance. The United States
should stand four-square behind the
forces of freedom meeting the Com-
munist challenge in Angola.
11Rr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
Delegate, the gentleman from the Dis-
trict of Columbia [Mr. Fetnvrltoyl.
a lifaally winnins thetr inde-
pendence. That may mean that we are
siding a group which is also getting
funds from South Africa. It does not
mean that we support the internal
policies of South Africa end it does
not mean that we condone the contin-
ued policy of the Government in Na-
mibia.
Rather it means that we want the
Cubans and the East Germans and the
PLO and the Soviets and the Bulgar-
ians out of southern Africa. we want a
southern Airka- where the majority of
the popuLtion !n each country V free
to decide its own destiny.
This House has had the wisdom to
aid freedom flghers in Afghanistan.
Nicaragua, and Cambodia Are the
people of Angola any less worthy of
our support? Do we now abandon
people because their country borders
on a detestable regime? If so. the Nor-
wegians, Turks. and Japanese are iA
for a surprise.
I urge my colleagues to support the
Stump-Pepper amendment and restore
a bit of sanity to our foreign policy.
Mr. STAMP. Mr. Chairman. I yield 1
minute to the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Co>S my
colleagues believe that we have a place
in Angola, then let it be demonstrated
by public accord and full congressional
concurrence. We have so much to lose
from a misguided policy in Africa. Let
ua, at the very least, not determine
such policy by cloaking it in secrecy
and by abrogating Congress' responsi-
bility to participate in foreign-policy
decisions.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge a "no"
vote on the pending amendment.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. STVaasl.
(Mr. STUDDS asked and vca.: i:itc~,
permission to re~~ise and extend his re-
marks. )
Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Chairman, I rist?
in opposition Lo the amendment. The
legislation brought to the House floor
toda}- pTO~'ldeb simply that United
States policy toward Mgola should be
openly debated by Congress, Just as it
!s open]}' discussed 1n other venues by
the President and his chief advisers.
This debate is not about the right of
the President to authorise coy ert oper-
ations; II.S. aid to UNITA !s not a
secret.
This debate is not a referendum on
the Marxist government of Angola, for
Mgola's government is no threat to us
or to its neighbors, and we have cor-
dial relations with Marxist govern-
ments throughout the world.
What this debate >s about-or should
be about-is whether our current
policy toward Angola serves the beat
interests of the United States. dad is
discussing that Issue, it is important to
remember that the aeU-described best
and brightest in ow Government have
never understood Angola very weft
Seventeen years ago. Henry SMsin-
ger's National Security CouncU ques?
tinned "the depth and permanency of
black resolve" and "ruled out s black
victory at any stage" in Angola's battle
against Portuguese colonial rule.
Having failed to predict the Mgolan
revolution, ow Government has re-
fused, as well, to admit it ever hap-
pened. South Africa and the United
States are -the only countries that
have not acknowledged the legitimacy
of the government >n Luanda.
The Angolan people have survived
an era of brutal colonial rule: they
have been fighting a war of one form
or another for Z5 years: they are
among the poorest and least healthy
people in the world; and the price of
ori. their only major export. has ool-
lapsed.
Angola's Government is Msrzist, but
it seeks close economic and diplomatic
ties with the west. Its rival. UNITA. is
a legitimate political force. with its
own ethnic base, but without a genu-
ine claim on the moral or material
support of the United States.
During the past decade. the Soviet
IInion and the Government of South
Africa have both intervened in Angola.
seeking to fill the vacuum left by Por-
tugal ss an imperial power.
The question before Congress today
is whether the United States. too,
should play the role of an imperial
power, or whether our interests could
better be served through a more lauag-
inative, more creative, and more con-
ciliatory role.
Last year, Secretary of State George
Shultz warned that United States aid
to the rebels in Mgola would Lead
only to a military stalemate at a
higher lever of violence, and that such
a stalemate would serve the interests
of Moscow. Business Week magazine
recently said in an editorial that "aid
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 __'~.'73ii~ilnisi~3r ?~ ? a~ni.,K.. - . - A, rnr AVA![ .. - 4AIM iiir.Ai m.:. _
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117034 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 17, 1986
I be; eve the requirement set forth in section Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support I am deeply concerned about the argument
107 is prudent, and I believe it is fair. I com- of section 107 of the intelligence authorization that a vote for this amendment says that the
mend Mr HAMILTON'S work with this very im- bill which would require the President to publi- United States supports the apartheid Govern.
porant piece of legislation. rally request assistance for the UNITA forces ment of South Africa. I have long been an op-
Mr. TOWNS. Mr Chairman, today as we in Angola and that the congress approve ponent of apartheid in South Africa. I cospon-
consider the Intelligence Authorization Act for such assistance specifically. sored sanctions last year and whole-heartedly
fiscal year 1987, we must make a very impor- Angola is, unfortunately, experiencing a supported them this year. On every occasion I
tant decision regarding our Nation's involve- state of civil war in some sections of the have voted to express the United States' utter
merit in Angola's civil war. country. The UNITA forces led by Joseph Sa- outrage with racist policies of South Africa.
As we make this crucial decision, we must vimbi oppose the Angolan government. UNITA If I felt that the Stump amendment some-
consider the long term . . . the far-reaching has the overt support of the South African how says we support apartheid, says we sup-
effects What will our approval of covert aid to apartheid regime as well as the support of the port the atrocities that are Wring place in
the UNITA forces fghti in Angola say to the administration. Although this support is la- South Atrice. ?m the United States supports
world? beled as "covert," the reality is that the sup- oppression, then I would avidly oppose It.
In my opinion, such support will signal our port is well known, open and publically ac- But simply because we vote to give the
willingness, not only to become Involved in a knowledged by the administration. President flexibility in conducting foreign policy
war where our assistance will have little or no There are a very limited number of situa- in Angola does not mean that the United
effect on the outcome, but also to engage in tions in which the United States should be in. States is at all addressing the issue of apart.
an unholy alliance with the Government of volved in covert activity. As a democracy, we held In South Africa, two countries away.
South Africa, which has been supporting the pride ourselves on our open society and we However one faeM about aid b UNITA, ore
Angola UNITA forces for over 10 years. tend to criticize totalitarian only n wddles the bow regimes which ha-
Through our overwhelming approval of bitually operate In a covert manner which ex- aid to apartheid. The UN TA forces are such
sweeping economic sanctions against South cludes citizens from the decision making proc- desperate position; they are not able to turn
Africa, we have openly admitted our rejection ess as well as excluding them from the inner down much needed aid, from whravar it may
of that countrys government and its racist circles of those who know just what ft is that tome. Should we condemn our fore fathers
policies of apartheid. How, then, can we now, their government is doing. In the case of who were fighting for the cause of "democra-
knowingly, become partners with this same UNITA, support for so-called covert activities cy" for accepting aid from a monarchy?
Government of South Africa, in their obvious merely seeks to remove the question of sup- Should we ra rk -- our own country for fight-
intent to continue military attacks and eco- port from con onej consideration. In Irtg shoulder to shoulder with Stalinist Russia
nomic sabotage against Angola. short, the administration seeks to exclude the against facism? I encourage my colleagues on
Mr. Chairman, quite simply, we must deter- people of the United States from participation both sides of the issue to debate the question
mine whether we will become materially in- a this Vedecision through their elected repre- of covert aid outside of the question of apart-
volved in the civil war being waged in Angola, Why, one might ask, would the administra- heed'
or whether we will continue the course we lion seek to keep aid to UNITA behind the I support this amendment to the intelligence
have already embarked upon, respect our own closed doors of the covert action closet? The authorization bill because section 107 of the
decision regarding South Africa and its poli- answer is dear. The administration knows full bill would significantly reduce the possibility of
ties, and take a real step toward supporting well that the people of the United States do ending the conflict through a negotiated set-
freedom and democracy in southern Africa. not Dement. It was only last year that this Con-
I want to urge my colleagues, then, to join support the South African apartheid
me in supporting the recommendation of the Mme and they would want no part in sup- up possibility of aid to UNITA ITA as ft tool for
Intelligence Committee. southern part o f A f r i c a b y III* O F , Akkan ores We gnat now flan around and
Lets make our position in southern Africa, Government when they, understand that these say that covert aid is not a poaibil ty. This
abundantly dear. Let two be no confusion. activities are directed toward the shoring up of flies In the face of the massage we were
Let's support the Hamilton provision In the the apartheid regime. In sftort, the aid to trying to send to the repressive Government
Intelligence bill, which will prohibit covert aid UNITA is basically an alliance with South of Angola. When than we 30,000 Cuban
to UNITA, unless It is specifically approved by Africa to harass one of the independent ma- troops propping up this Government of
Congress. And lets oppose any amendments jority ruled countries in the southern part of Angola, the United States needs the poseibiti-
which will strike this provision. Africa. To put an alliance with South Africa's ly o le
for the Let's respect our own decision and uphold MWMM
our own judgment, by voting "no" to covert is an government Into the covert category
is an affront to the basic decency of the Pepper amendment and Isew the hands of
aid Moth. Angola. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I find man people which abhor the apartheid Our ^ -
the awkward position of myself In policy of South Africa's minority sovernment- PeppMr. erSWrtp L amendment to delete tsection the
being opposed to aid Americans do not support alliances with apart-
to UNITA but also opposed to the Hamilton held and it is about time that this issue be 107 of the Intelligence authorizations.
language thorization. in section 107 of the intelligence au- day stated so that the people, through their As wittlim this bill regkiss that any aid to
representatives, can egresa their commit- Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola must
What section 107 does, essentially, is blow ment to majority democratic rule In Africa. be oven. I believe that providon unnecessarily
the cover off a covert aid program. it does not Section 108 of the intelligence authorization and unwisely ties the hands of the President
ban aid to UNITA, which the Intelligence Com- bill does not make any ultimate decisions on Congress can review and support or prohibit
mittee could have done quite effectively in the aid to UNITA. it merely requires that the ad- any aid, whether overt or covert. Until recently
classified report that accompanies this author- ministration state Its policies and aims dearly we banned any forth of aid to UNITA. Recent-
ization bill. ft does establish a precedent that and make an open and honest request for ly that ben was lifted. Now, It seems to ms,
controversial covert initiatives cannot be funding. I urge my colleagues to support open opponents of aid have simply s ifted to
covert. That is wrong. and free consideration of t ils issue. I urge my focus of their argument to tins covert aid
If we need a stronger method to review colleagues to keep the door open so that the Issues in hopes of gaining some political ad-
covert operations, then that is what we should American people can be fully aware of just vantage.
provide. But to say that anytime there is dis- what their government Is doing. I urge my col- Today aid to UNITA Is not the real Issue.
agreement within the Intelligence Committee, leagues to support the democratic process The Issue is whether the Congress will vote to
there shall cease to be the possibility of a here as well as in Africa. deny the President the kind of flexibility that
covert operation, seems to me to be a very Mrs. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support he needs in the conduct of foreign policy.
dangerous proposin? of the Stump amendment to H.R. 4759, the in. Our efforts will be feeble In effect If we to
If it was the intent of the Intelligence Com- telligence authorization bill. our opponents what we will or will not do.
mittee to cutoff aid to UNITA, it should have I do so because of my strog belief that Without the Stump amendment we will be tell-
done that head on. I should have supported people should be able to determine the nature Ing what we will not do.
that. But I do not believe It is the function of of their own government It is for democratic Covert aid is necessary in Instances when
the Intelligence Committee to eradicate a reasons only that I cast a vote for this amend- we need to support a government or resist-
covert aid program by blowing its cover. menu
once group, alone or in conjunction with other
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&p.'cmber 17, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 7035
2
nations b,;' cannot afford to make public our
involverr, . ? e' the involvement of other co-
operamat ~,',s It is something with which I,
and many Americans, an rncomtortable. I
prefer owes p6icymaking However, in sorre
cases we have vital interests to advance, and
need the cloak of secrecy. The only way we
can successfully continue that practice is to
allow the President considerable discretion..
Because I believe congressional prohibi-
tions like that proposed in section 107 must
be justified by extreme and unusual events, I
support the amendment to delete that provi-
sion.
Ms. WKULSKI. Mc Chairman, the United
States should not be sending covert aid to
UNITA for two basic reasons.
First, the administration openly ackno,.d_
edges its support for UNITA, but sends covert
aid to avoid congressional and public debate.
United States policy toward Angola and
UNITA is a major foreign policy issue that
show pbe o tk m to && waNK al a
and The second and perhaps most important
reason involves the South African Govern-
ment's arpI I of UNITA. By aiding Jonas So
vimbi, Pretoria seeks to destabilize Angola
and protect its system of apartheid.
South Africa's ongoing military and econom-
ic compel against all sown of Its nei
-var.
t I
order to pre-
v
m
rta
sioon
al
involvement in this impo
nt foreign
serve aPargleld
and destabilize its au*x*-
rule neighbors, South Africa: policy matter.
Has caused $10 billion in economic dame" Finally, U.S. aid to UNITA wall greatly dimin-
to its neighbors, ish our ability to act as a mediator in resolving
Has repeatedly initiated assassination at- the Problems that are troubling the southern
tempts against Southern African leaders, African region. We cannot expect the Gwsrn-
Aids rebels attacking legitimate govern- ment of Angola to negotiate with us on the ce-
ments. moval of Cuban troops from Angola if we are
Has and has launched military strikes on funding a croup that seeks its overthrow. And
capital cities, and the issue of Namibian indspeadence qR
Centimes ft illegal nwlRary occupation of be harmed by aiding the UNITA rebels. Mo SWAPO in IftmBIe. Alt to UNITA pops up
Namibia. Over, U.S. aid to UINITTA is strongly oppowd Mott to SwM AMa; by b*ft a, -
Tacit Unbd States support of the South A#- by most black Africans and others thraigMort lb the llttlled SthDes Wits, ama fir sM
rican Goi.ariueent and these policies does not the worth The Organization of African Unity aids as the tadbt regfrrfe.
serve United States strategic or political irrier- [OAU], comprised of the flreads of state of Aft It is ueosasary br both Was. at this fair to
eats. By sending covert aid to UNITA, the ad- rican nations, opposes this aid and has tread be openy, dia6at d before such a dpnUoc
ministration weakens U.S. itaedibility as art us to and iL I urge my colleagues to vow breipn ply dichTpa is mods. The Poaaidapt
honest bivhsr throughout tie region. It aloe against the Stomp arnendfrtent and for peace himseff has PubloIy decoeaed his efillipolti I)rr
Pushes Angola closer to to Cubans and Saud- in southern Aiwa and an and to racism and UNITA. so Compass would cot bit bll~q
etc as the war escalates. valence. slats seaats or thassuft
aatiopal aa0raa
Instead, the United States should have Mr. LEHIIWI of Calliornia. Mr. Chairman, t be debat a this suds[ bilast-
mxora honorable and malisbc podeies toward urge my odleapues to support the Intelligence We UM Oanttirara to oppose aials"ift we
the region. The United States abonld seek, are Committee's eastrictian an aid to the Angoli tt must sot be tricked Nlo arrapaift chill's
and to apartheid in So
ttn Af
i
b
l
u
r
ca rem mama re
e
s let by Jonas Sa mbi. I support the In.
also seek independence for Namibia, a sedge- tegnty of the committee's position and also
Von in Soviet and Cuban influence in the the deeper relevance to United States for. is
region, and the evolution of democratic icnatikl- relatias a black Soulk Africa. If we ditti lrs
fleas In Angola as wed as sit of soullima the proAibitiort on aid to Angola, we weaken
Africa- Covert aid to UNITA will undermine our stated abhorrence of apartheid in SouW
these goals and should be ended, Africa as well as continue to give the Prasi.
Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Misr. Chairman, dent the authority to initiate and dictate for-
there are four major reasons why we sboWd eign policy without congresmani oversight-
Osppose the Stump antendme nt to the intent. After marry months of hard work, the House
few authorization bill This amendment and Senate completed work on a sanctions would delete the bfs prohib on or* covert aid bill against the repressive Government of
to support military or Paramilitary operations io South Africa I have spoken cut in favor of a
Angora. toughs heeiga policy against President BoNr's
First, the United States should not be coop- government of South Africa and have heard
erating militarily with the racist Government of President Reagan tell the American public 1wt
South Africa. Current U.S. policy places us he hopes apartheid is dismantled. But, if we
firmly in this role as we join South Africa in give support to Savimbi's UIWTTA we might as
sending weapons and other crucial military aid well steed togiether with President Sottta In
to the National Union for the total independ- support of Guerrilla war is Angola and in ilno-
since of Angola [e1N1TA], an insurgent group rance of star stand on dismantling apartheid,
that is trying to Overthrow the sovereign Gov- not to mention ignorance of the illegal occu-
entitle nt of Angola. UNITA receive over 90 pation by South Africa of Namibia. Our posi-
tion in southern Africa would been seen as in-
consistent and hypocritical
The Peaidu t and many of my colwagras
in the House feel that aid to Jones Savimbi
and his rebels should continue. However, con-
tinuing a program of covert aid to Angola
under present circumstances does not give
the Congress the ability to debate the issue in
an open forum. In the past the President and
his advisers have made public announce.
melts on the benefits of supporting Angola as
well as specific details of the Covert Aid Pro-
gram. The President has taken the meaning of
=No action atAnorltjr to meow that he are
pron+olgete a eotrlnrt Policy Pr Angola, gain
support for it with our constituents, and effec-
tively deny the role of Congress in debalrne
and deaoairg pop~Aar lareiign policy
h urge my colleagues to support the commit-
tee's poeRion and bring the Issue of Sing
UNITA out into the open for public discussion
where R bebVe.
Mr. LELAND. Mr. Chairman, today we have
Vie opportu" to corldrius, MOO" " car.
rect Policy toward southern Afire. faller.
*V to section fly? of the btAlgp law Atnetorl.
zation Act, which would require congressional
approval before the United States could pro-
vide assistance to Jonas Savimbfa tld1TA, or
any o1w' i Atary or ps n' Noy bless in
Angola. This section Is an important folowup
to the message this body sent to the Govern.
INN.! of South Africa last each.
United States policy toward Angola is par.
tlculary important because of UNFTA's strong
ties to the Government of South Africa aid to
UNITA automatically thrusts the United States
Into an alliance with Pretoria. South Africa's
assistance to UNITA secures its own position
in the region, since UNITA tomes hey w
flea 147. Gabdoe 69 dtanoe to spats daialWo
strati as andemnat e at apaatheid ear Ili -
lowing the cpaad cowse, In asMea Mrim
Mr- CLAY. Mr. t bdrmaeu I am" ofto my
osdeapuee lefty to tlr , -- my bet! onallr
has to any nova to darts whim up fraat
the lotellipaace Aumm*mt . Act. Ta scram
lima sac ova, at" cartons alert aaramo
to UNITA faces in Angora raMbott aw4mw
sional, aI I ,, wndd ckm* show ttto Ul
Stews, to. be in somplaft ~
"V" at tit~?
smrMM of Schutt AA
Pssvidlry air to OR tiffA flApat
would Nduce 1 adm iabation s w
Fwthermore, aid to WW A eS orlMairy
Ian Government by supporters such
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percent of its funding from t, e South African
Government. To aid UNITA is to aid South
Alike.
Second, Congress has recentry voted to
impose sanctions on South Africa because of
its repugnant system of racial discrimination
and apartheid. By providing aid to UNITA, a
client of the South African Government. the
United States is undermining the effect of any
sanctions. Our message to South Africa about
its policies should be crystal clear. United
States sanctions against South Africa should
not be rendered meaningless by a United
cail+ wry aYiaaco wtA Ira Sochi African
Goverrinrie
Thud, Congress should debate and vote on
whether or not to aid UNITA. Our c sent aid
to UNITA, which is estimated at between $15
to 25 million, is not really covert aid. On a
number of occasions Vie President and mem-
bers of his administration have publicly talked
about the so-called covert aid to t,W1TA. They
have alien publicly daaamsed Our amount
and kind of aid being given to UNITA. Since
U.S. aid to UNITA is not covert, Congress has
the debate, far' vote on a ells , A key OW In
our policy in southern Africa deserves con.
gressional participation and comment. The ad-
rnlmistratiWa tactic Of setting am" air
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Ii 7036 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
5:,:, c, Union and Cuba At what point do we
Stop?
S r,ce the ea'ly 1970's, when Angola began
her St uggle for independence, there has been
a constant and overt mission by neighboring
South Africans to undermine this country and
keep her people economically dependent on
others
Mr. Chairman, undermine is a rather light
word to describe the economic sabotage and
severe military attaci.s by UNITA and South
African forces of which Angola has been sub-
jected to for the last decade. There have
been full scale hi ms;ons. raids on refugee
camps that were thought to be SWAPO
bases, and an occupation of southern Angola
since 1975.
The South African Government has given
UNITA aid to the tune of tit billion over the
past 5 years This has enabled the two forces
to attack not only Angola but neighboring
countries as weft with increasing regularity.
In addition, the South African Government
hopes to keep apartheid alive and well by in-
stling fear in Its neighbors through means of
econor?ic and military attacks. They can
achieve their means only If the United States
subscribes to their type of ideology and ap-
proves aid to UNITA.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I use in opposi-
tion to Mr. STUMP'S amendment and urge my
colleagues to vote against the Stump amend-
ment and retain section 107 of the intelligence
authorization bill (H.R. 4759). which would
prohibit covert assistance to Savimbi's UNITA
forces in Angola unless it is approved by the
Congress.
Today, we are voting on the future of United
States involvement in Angola's civil war and
our relationship wdM 50 African countries for
years to come. The administration's policy of
provking ,Overt aid to tHilITA places our
Nation in an unholy atfience with South AM-
ca's minority Government, thereby damaging
our interests throughout Africa That is pre-
cisely the wrong message to be sending at a
time when Congress; has given final approval
legislation I npoaing economic sanctions on
to Africa.
South
The admkNSbation has failed to develop at
a consistent, concrete policy in southern
Africa. While urging the frontline states in
southern Africa to be patience, the administra-
tion continues to push toward a military solu-
tion to the conflict in Luanda.
We cannot continue to play a type of rou-
lette with our foreign policy in southern Africa.
South Africa is the principal backer of UNITA
and has been for more than a decade, supply-
ing occasional ground and air attacks, trans-
portation, and other equipment It is clear that
the administration's policy of covert aid to
UNITA has tacitly placed us in an alliance with
the Government of South Africa While the
United States, which for years has sought to
act as an honest broker between Angola and
South Africa to secure the independence of
Namibia, seems to have squarely come over
to the side of South Africa.
It is time to move toward a consistent, cor-
rect, and workable policy in southern Africa.
The United States has an Interest in promot-
ing peace and reconciliation in Angola, as it
does throughout southern Africa in general.
Yet how can we continue to do so when we
militarily support one side in the conflict?
This is an important issue that will have far-
reaching effects on our relations with African
nations I urge you to vote against the Stump
amendment, and support the Hamilton provi-
sion in the intelligence bill prohibiting covert
U.S. aid to UNITA.
I urge you to vote to restore honesty and
respect for human dignity to United States for-
eign policy in South Africa. Vote "no" on
covert aid to Angola-vote no on the amend-
ment to strike section 107 of the intelligence
authorization bill
Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, I
make the point of order that a quorum
is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a
quorum is not present.
Members will record their presence
by electronic device.
The call was taken by electronic
device.
The following Members responded
to their names:
[Roll No. 3861
ANSWERED "PRESEN7""-390
Ackerman
Coyne
Gordon
Akaka
Craig
Gradison
Alexander
Crane
Orgy (IL)
Andrews
Crockett
Orsy (PA)
Annunzio
Daniel
Green
Anthony
Dannemeyer
Gregg
Applegate
Darden
Ouarini
Armey
Daschle
Gunderson
Atkins
Daub
Hall (OH)
AuCoin
Davis
Hall. Ralph
Badham
de Is Garza
Hamilton
Barnard
DeLay
Hammerschmidt
Bartlett
Dellums
Hansen
Barton
Derrick
Hatcher
Bateman
DeWine
Hawkins
Bates
Dickinson
Hayes
Bedell
Dicks
Hefner
Beilenson
Dioouardi
Hendon
Bennett
Dixon
Henry
Bentley
Donnelly
Hertel
Bereuter
Dorgan (ND)
Hiler
Berman
Dorman (CA)
Hillis
Bedell
Dowdy
Holt
B
Downey
Hopkins
Biurskis
Dreier
Horton
Bliley
Duncan
Howard
Boehlert
Durbin
Hoyer
Boner (TN)
Dwyer
Hubbard
Bonior (MI)
Dymally
Huckaby
Ronald
Dyson
Hughes
Boson
Early
Hunter
Boucher
Eckert (OH)
Hutto
Boulter
Eckert (NY)
Hyde
Boxer
Edgar
Ireland
Brooks
Edwards (CA)
Jacobs
Broomfield
Edwards (OK)
Jeffords
Brown (CA)
Emerson
Jenkins
Brown (CO)
English
Johnson
Bruce
Erdreich
Jones (NC)
Bryant
Evans (IA)
Jones (OK)
Burton (IN)
Evans(IL)
Jones (TN)
Bustamante
Fascell
Kan,lorskl
Byron
Pawell
Kaptur
Callahan
Patio
Kasich
Carney
Feighan
Kemp
carper
Fiedler
Kennelly
Carr
Fields
Kildee
Chandler
Fish
Kletzka
Chapman
Florio
Kolbe
Chappell
Poglletta
Kolter
Chappie
Foley
Kostmayer
Cheney
Ford (MI)
Kramer
Clay
Franklin
LaPalce
Clinger
Frenzel
Lagomarsino
Coats
Fuqua
Lantos
Cobey
Gallo
Latta
Coble
Garcia
leach (IA)
Coelho
Oaydos
Leath (TX)
Coleman (MO)
Oefdenson
Lehman (CA)
Coleman (TX)
Oekas
Lehman (FL)
Collins
Gibbons
Leland
Combest
Oilman
Levin (MI)
Conte
Gingrich
Levine (CA)
Cooper
Glickman
Lewis (FL)
Coughlin
Gonzalez
Lightfoot
Courier
doodling
Lipinski
September 17, 1986
Livingston
Panetta
Smith. Robert
Loeffler
Parris
(OR)
Long
Pashsyan
Snnse
Lott
Pease
Snyder
Lowery (CA)
Penny
Solar.
Lowry (WA)
Pepper
Solomon
Luken
Perkins
Spence
Lundine
Petri
Spratt
Lungnn
Pickle
St Germain
Mack
Porter
Staggers
MacKay
Price
Stalling,
Markey
Purcell
Stangviand
Marlenee
Quillen
Stenholm
Martin (IL)
Rahail
Stokes
Martin (NY)
Rangel
Strang
Marunei
Ray
Stratton
Matsui
Regula
Studds
Mavroules
Reid
Stump
Mazzoli
Richardson
Sundquist
McCain
Ridge
Sweeney
McCandless
Rinaldo
Swift
McCloskey
Ritter
Swdndall
McCollum
Roberts
Synar
McCurdy
Robinson
Tallon
McDade
Roe
Tauke
McSwtn
Roomer
Tauslm
McGrath
Rogers
Taylor
McRutrh
Rose
Thomas (CA)
McKernan
Rostenkowski
Thomas (GA)
McKinney
Roth
Torres
McMillan
Roukcma
Torricclll
Meyers
Rowland (CT)
Towns
Mica
Rowland (OA)
Traftcant
Michel
Roybal
Trailer
Mikulski
Rudd
Valentine
Miller (OH)
Russo
Vander Jest
Miller (WA)
Sabo
Vtaeloaky
Mineta
Savage
Vbikmer
Mitchell
Saxton
Vucanovich
Moakley
Schaefer
Weldon
Molinari
Schneider
Walgren
Mollohan
Schroeder
Walker
Monson
Schuette
Watkins
Montgomery
Schulze
Waxman
Moody
Schumer
Weaver
Moorhead
Sensenbrenner
Weber
Morrison (Cr)
Sharp
Weiss
Morrison (WA)
Shaw
Wheat
Mrazek
Shelby
Whltehurst
Murphy
Shumway
Whitley
Murtha
Stkoraki
Whittaker
Myers
811Jander
Whitten
Watcher
Sisisky
Willi ms
Nelson
Steen
Wllsm
Nichols
Skelton
Wirth
Nielson
Slattery
Wiae
Nowak
Slaughter
Wolf
Oskar
Smith (FL)
Wortley
Oberstar
Smith (IA)
Wright
Obey
Smith (NE)
Wyden
Olin
Smith (NJ)
Wylie
Ortiz
Smith. Denny
Tales
Owens
(OR)
Ttstron
Oxley
Smith, Robert
Toamg (FL)
Packard
(NH)
Young (MO)
0 1520
The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred
ninety Members have answered to
their names, a quorum is present. and
the Committee Will resume its busi-
ness.
The Chair will announce that 16
minutes are remaining for the gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON]
and 15 minutes are remaining for the
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. STUMP).
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman. I yield
such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER].
(Mr. PORTER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in strong support of the Stump-Pepper
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, last year, the Congress sup-
ported the repeal of the Clark amendment
which for years barred aid to rebel groups
fighting against the Soviet-backed Marxist
Government of Angola. Following years of civil
war and fruitless negotiation, we voted to free
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September 17, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
the President's hands in his negotiations with
parties to the conflict in Angola.
Section 107 of the bill we have before us
will effectively repeal that historic decision. I
urge my colleagues to support the deletion of
this section from the bill.
There are currently up to 45,000 Cuban
troops in Angola supporting the governing po-
litburo largely confined to the capital city of
Luanda.
As long as they remain, there will be no
human rights, open elections, no economic
development, no free markets and no peace
in Angola. Given our support for the freedom
fighters of Afghanistan, two Is no reason
why we should not support those who would
resist the Communist regime in Angola.
The President must have a range of options
in dealing with foreign policy beyond doing
nothing in Angola. as the gentleman from Indi-
ana would want, and sending in the marines.
Covent action, especiw to freedom fighters
throughout the world, Is essential In stopping
the slow and methodical capture of nations
within the Soviet bloc.
Many have argued that since U.S. covert
aid to freedom fighters has been widely re-
ported, we might as well open up these oper.
ations to full public disclosure. This would be
a mistake. Aid to the freedom fighters of Af-
ghanistan is well known, but how it gets there
and what is specifically provided is not dis-
cussed. Full public disclosure of these meth-
ods and operations would shut off the flow of
aid. By opening up these operations, we kill
them, restricting the President's flexibility.
Mr. Chairman, we had a full debate on
Angola last year and are having another one
now. I only wish the Soviets and the Cubans
would also give us a full and open public
debate on their military aid and troops sent to
prop up the Marxist Government of Angola
1 urge adoption of the asrtandrrment.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5
minutes to the distinguished minority
leader, the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. Mxcmml.
(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, as an
ex-officio member of the Intelligence
Committee, I have had the opportuni.
ty to work with an outstanding bipar-
tisan group of Congressmen and an ef-
ficient and dedicated staff. The com-
mittee does a fine job.
I say this because. quite frankly. I
am puzzled by the inclusion of section
107 in the Intelligence Authorization
Act before us.
In effect it says that if the President
wants to help freedom fighters in
Angola, he must openly acknowledge
this and the Congress must openly
debate the issue and then enact a joint
resolution approving such aid.
It is as if a chief of police was told
he could have a sting operation to
catch criminals but would have to pub-
licly announce such operations in ad-
vance with time, place, and date and
number of police involved.
He would certainly get a public
debate-but he would never catch any
criminals.
The same principle applies here. If
we accept this section, we force our
President to either tell the enemies of
Angolan freedom fighters exactly
what he wants to do before he does it
or else stop him from doing anything
at all.
And so this proposal presents an
American President with two options
in Angola-futility or impotence.
We are told that support for Ango-
lan freedom fighters involves serious
and substantive foreign policy issues
concerning United States relations
with black African nations and the
entire question of the future of south-
ern Africa, Including Namibia.
We are also told there have been
public statements and pledges of as-
sistance to the Angolan freedom fight-
ers from the administration including
the President. Therefore, say the crit-
ics of Angolan aid, since vigorous
public debate on the issue is already
going on, the issue Is no longer a
secret and there is no need for covert
assistance.
But both of those prfndples-long-
term regional effects and existing
public debate-could be used to make
public all our covert operations.
Every operation of our foreign policy
covert or overt, has long-term regional
effects on geographic regional ques-
tions. And all you need is one leak to
the media and we have what is called
public debate.
And so what does this amendment
really do? It asks us to embrace princi-
ples that could leave all our covert op-
erations at the mercy of anyone with
the price of a telephone call to the
Washington Post.
As soon as a "Bob Woodward" re-
ports that he believes there is a covert
operation somewhere, some opponent
of that aid will jump up and say he is
shocked and we will have public
debate in the newspapers.
And, for the supporters of the Ham-
ilton approach that alone will be
enough to require the President to tell
the Communists what he wants to do.
Let me speak to those Members who
support this approach.
You don't like Savimbi. You don't
like UNITA. You don't like the fact
that Savimbi, in order to fight Com-
munists, has accepted aid from South
Africa.
So you feel justified in your ap-
proach. But I say you are very short-
sighted.
Think of what impact your proposal
will have on American allies all around
the world.
I don't mean freedom fighters only.
I mean those nations that are quietly
and secretly helping us in certain
areas.
How can they trust us to keep their
help a secret if we plan to disclose
every single fact about our Angola
policy in the event we wanted to send
aid to UNITA?
Either we keep the principle of
covert operation, with the President's
right to propose them and the Intelli-
gence Committee's right to pass judg-
ment on them as we do now-or else
H 7037
we abandon it. There is no middle
ground or half-way house so to speak.
What we have here is the Clark
amendment reconstituted the very
same Clark amendment repealed last
year.
It is a bad proposal because it gives
to any one Member who wants to
spread true or false information the
power, through this mechanism of
public debate, to thwart the Presi-
dent's objective of exercising any
covert operation.
In fact, this proposal undermines
the collective thinking and judgment
of the Congress if by majority we sub-
scribe to the President's view.
I reject such an approach. It is dan-
gerous and irresponsible. I urge dele-
tion of section 107 in the interest of
the legitimate foreign policy goals of
our country.
I am including a letter from Secre-
tary George P. Shultz to me on this
section:
Txs SECRSrARY OF STAT!,
Washington. September 17,198&
Hon. ROBERT H. Micxai.,
U.& Home of Repnraeatalfves.
Dsua Boa: I am writing to express to you
the strong opposition of this administration
to the passage of the FY-87 Intelligence au.
thorization Bill without the deletion of Sec-
tion 107. I understand that the Bill will be
brought to the floor of the House for a vote
September 17.
? The administration has major objections
to Section 107. The amendment requires
that any U.S. Government support for mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in Angola be
openly acknowledged and publicly debated.
It would also prohibit the furnishing of any
assistance to UNITA unless Congress enacts
a joint resolution speofflosilly a.,.,. dg
such assistance. Quite simply, this section
will terminate the ability of the administm
tion to provide aid to UNITA. It will stop
any movement toward a negotiated settle-
ment in Angola. Section 107 will legislate a
policy that will maintain the status duo in
Angola, guaranteeing the continuing peer
once of 30.000 Cuban troops and flow of aid
from the Soviet Union. which has already
amounted to 3 billion dollar.. This lsidds-
tive constraint on Presidential actions will
make more difficult the achievement of our
objective of bringing about independence
for Namibia and the and of the illegal pres-
ence of South African troops in that pun-
try.
The Congress repealed a measure slasher
to Section 107, the Clark amendment, less
than one year ago. The administration sup-
ported and applauded that repeal because
the Clark Amendment had left us powerless
to negotiate a settlement. The adimiabtra-
tion also supports the desire of the atmport-
ers of this amendment to bring the senfriet
in southwestern Africa to the attenRisn of
the American people and to conduct po108c
debate on the situation In Angola. The ad-
ministration In not seeking to cut off public
debate on this conflict. There are carefully
designed procedures for statutory ovenkht
of activities that are not debated to POOL
Section 107 departs markedly from thm
well established procedures.
The administration supports Jon" Svd-
bi's struggle against Soviet and Cubas alb
venturism, and is committed to povlding af-
fective and appropriate assistance IS
UNITA. This support does not MW
port, in any way. for the South Atrktaw"
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117038
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 17, 1986
ernm' nt. UNITA accepted significant mill-
tary aid from South Africa only after pas-
satce of the Clark amendment cut off assist.
ance from the United States. Savimbl has
clearly stated his opposition to apartheid.
No critic of UNITA asserts that UNITA re-
ceives from South Africa assistance compa-
rable to the flood of Soviet and Soviet-bloc
military aid given to the MPLA.
For these reasons the administration
places the highest priority on supporting
action to delete Section 107.
Thank you very much for your attention
to this matter.
Sincerely yours.
Qsoame= P. SEEM=
0 1530
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from California IMr.
Parrrrra).
(Mr. PANEITA asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, our foreign policy has taken
a decided turn in recent years. Instead of pur-
suing a policy which reflects the will and the
conscience of the American people we have
been oordro ed with a poicy which quietly
and covertly circumvents them.
First there was Nicaragua. The administra-
tion pursued a covert policy which amounts
realty to a war by proxy. When the war be-
cause too obvious, the covert aid program
became overt. But even now, with an overt
aid program to the Contras, we still cannot get
all the information and facts we need about
the aid program and the effect it will have not
only on Nicaragua, but on the general foreign
pokey of the United Stales.
Now we have Angola. Agars, this is sup-
posed to be a ca stta d program..jut a tinny
thing happened. The Pneiderrt, and the Vice
President and senor State Department a fi-
cials tallied publicly about to assistance we
ought to, and will be providing to Angola. They
talked The nesispspws priried And now a
covert aid program is anything but covert
Even through It was On adrrridstralion which
broke the story, 0 is now this same adminie-
traiion which warns to preserve a cloak of se-
crecy around the Angola Issue. And they have
a very important reason. Because, irk the ad-
ministration can keep its aid program covert-
at least in principle-the aid moue can be de-
cided as part of the intelligence authorization;
with little debate and even less public eorpo-
0".
But it is time to put a stop to this kind of
maneuvering. It limits public debate and de-
means the democratic process.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of
the Intelligence Authorization as written and in
opposition to the Stang Amendment I
oppose this amendment for two reasons.
First. aid to UNrTA will not verve the interests
of the United States In Africa. And second,
the issue of aid to UNITA should be an overt
issue.
On the fist point we ought to examine
whether aid to UNITA will help or hurt our in-
terests in Africa How will aid to UNITA affect
our anti-apartheid efforts, and will it increase
the likelihood of the withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola?
Instead of helping our antiapartheid efforts,
aid to UNITA world only hurt those efforts. It
is no secret that South Africa has been almost
solely responsible for keeping UNITA going
for the past decade Since 1976, South Africa
has provided the bulk of UNITA'a material
support -weapons, explosives, vehicles, food,
and medical supplies. It has even been report-
ed that UNITA has infiltrated the Namibian in-
dependence group SWAPO and provided
South Africa with information about that group.
For the United States to help UNITA is to join
in an alliance of association with South Africa.
This move could only hurt our antiapartheid
efforts and make us look hypocritical to the
world.
In addition, aid to UNTA would not further
one of our most important goats: the removal
of Cuban troops from Angola. United Skies
aid to UNITA would be perceived as an obvi-
ous threat to the Government of Angola and
would reduce a
reduuce their wia npnsss to ask the
If our ultimo s aim in /Angola Is the removal
of Cuban troops, then we ought to continue
along the diplomatic path We have made
some progress in encouraging the removal of
the Cuban hoops in ardragpe for 1111 and to
South Africa's incursions into Angola and its
occupation of Namibia. If this were to take
place, Angola would feel less Uweawrsd, and,
more inclined to ask dire Cubes to Isms. Aid
to UNITA, on the other hand, would only en-
trench the status quo and increase Angolan
reliance on Cuba.
Even If the goals of this aid package were
unquestionable-and they certainly are not-
this is not the right way to pursue such a
policy. And that leads me to my second
reason for opposing this amendment: If the
Policy of aid to UNITA is the right o s, then
there Is no reason why we cannot debate it in
an open forum.
This is not, after all. a covert aid program by
any eh"-,L .of the hvAgkwmm IN 41110A It
Seems that the only people who carrot t lk
Publicly about the aid program to UNITA we
Members of the U.S. Congress.
Whether or not to provide assistance to
UNITA is a major foreign policy decision. It will
Impact on our relations Will all the rmalbame of
Africa and It will rolled on our wwolgMffeid
policy. But instead of debating this fps In
the open, as we do In the course of debt a on
the foreign aid bl, we now have to speak in
whispers and pretend that the world does not
know whet we are doing.
But the world does know. And doskig the
issue with appearance or secrecy veil not
dhwVe that re
it is time to open this issue up to the public
debate that it deserves. Lot us talk about the
reasons for our actions and the possible con-
sequences of these actions. That is the way a
democracy works.
As written, to bill prohibits aid %D UNTA
unless the President publicly requests the aid
and the Congress gives its approval. Thet is
the proper, and constitutional, way to set
policy. After all, it Is not the job of Congress to
give a rubber stamp to a foreign policy set by
the President and the CIA. It is the responsi-
bilIty of Congress to join in this process and to
have input. If we forfeit that responsibility now,
how can we ever hope to retrieve it?
exchange and debate that we will formulate a
foreign policy that reflects the Mil, and has
the support of the American people, instead
of sneaking around behind their collective
backs.
I urge a "no" vote on the Stump amend-
ment.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman. I
yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
HArssl-
(Mr. HAYES asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
pairs. )
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposi-
tion to as Stump a endment and ask unani-
mous corners to revise and eeetand my re-
marks.
f=irst of all, Ist we mire It clear that I am
opposed to sift UNITA in any form-covert.
overt, or euwr fte. Mower slrras the stater
of lend Is raffled to to we of covert aid. I
will knit my remarks In that Issue.
Listening to the debuts on whether our
Government shout slow to ow*s ncs Of
''Covert" rnltary operatlons In Angola, I have
yet to hew any b I'llike reason why this
Congress should authorize covert assistance
when the antra wadd wady Isla s@ erectly
what we have been doing In Angola. The
President, the Vice Preesident, the Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, and
other high-ranking officials of the Reagan ad-
ministration, have publicly detailed the type
and extent of aid Jonas Savimbi and UNITA
have received from the United States.
As an instrument of foreign policy, covert
assistance Is an important tool for the Chief
Executive to have available. But when that as-
sistance is public amowlsdge, all of the justifi-
cations for its use we moot.
So who an we lryifi8 b I odev 7 to It be-
cause this type Cl afsfalarros am % not stand
a through debate? Is 1 becalm are open ds-
oussion of such ON would uncover the fact
that support ng t1MfTA Is tantamount to aup-
TT The k inoa comma"
censc14- ap-
proved this I O ftllon for A minter Cl ma-
sons, not the Issas Cl allia is rteNoltactp that
Unshed stales with the RVWLiipeWc Cl South
Africa. The Reagan Adrt d*u6om's pokey of
constructive engagement has already proven
to be a tbalise and No been overwhelm gly
fejooled by tam Harty d Congress.
I bellow we have an obtigalisn to ourselves
and to our ccnolt carts, to My and openly
debate a decision whits would essentially put
our country In the sums posbue that we have
already rejected Fifty African Nations have
publicly opposed American aid to UNfTA. I
strongly urge my colleagues to do Nkewise.
Retain section 107 and oppose the Stump
amendment
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman. I
yield I minute to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Fis1U.
(Mr. FISH asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman. South
If we examine this issue openly and honest- Africa provides UNITA with weapons,
ty, than we will see that aid to UNITA will not logistical support, intelligence Infor.
further United States interests In Africa and mation. and strategic planning. South
could significantly harm the progress we have Africa periodically Invades Angola.
made against apartheid. it is through this open South Africa's aim Is to create a buffer
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September 17, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 7039
of surrounding nations that are de- Angola and independt ace for South question is not informing the Commu-
pendc nt upon it for survival. South African occupied Nan-"-'a The Ani;o- rist:;; it is informing. the Conga:
Africa believes that this oppression Ian Foreign Minister announced yes- There are questions that need to be
will prcvrnt the oth, r southern African terday that he is asking for a mec ling ansv cred. Hov much money? It is $15
states from joining in a call for inter- with Secretary Shultz to discuss nor- million to $25 million this year alone,
national sanctions against South malization of relations. We would ccer- For how long? Committed to whom?
Africa. Assisting UNITA rebels is an tairily be in a better position to moni- Savimbi is the chameleon of African
integral part of this plan. tor developments and influence policy politicians.
The United States program of covert in Angola if we had a mission there, Third, aiding the rebels in Angola
lethal assistance to UNITA puts the and clearly support for UNITA erodes may or may not allow us to reach im.
United States squarely behind South such a possibility. Angolan President portant objectives, which are an end
African attempts at regional domina- Jose Eduardo Dos Santos said last to apartheid, withdrawal of foreign
tion and destabilization. To the rest of week he would welcome a meeting troops, independence for Namibia.
Africa and much of the rest of the with President Reagan to ease ten- But I believe any foreign policy Initi-
world, it smacks of complicity with the sions and discuss diplomatic relations. alive to be successful requires the sup.
apartheid regime in Pretoria. This was Savimbi is an opportunist. In the port from the Congress. Any attempt-
made clear during last week's visit by early sixties he broke with another ed end run past congressional author.
several members of European parlia- group opposed to Portuguese coloniza- ity is a bad start to any important ini-
ment, who said that a United States tion, the FNLA, because that group tiative.
policy of aid to UNITA is seen as con- was too closely tied to the United Fourth and finally, providing aid to
tradictory to stated U.S. policy regard- States. In the early seventies UNITA UNITA will put America squarely on
ing South Africa.
UNITA
i
was helping Portugal meat in a murderous civil wag and in
ues to p
suport UNITA, South Africa t
me
will bthey have a free hand to against the MPLA and FNLA. In 1985, opposition to most of Africa.
will believe
destabilize Angola and the rest there was a split in the ranks of Cuba and the Soviet Union have
d i
con- e UNITA. Dissidents Within UNITA ac- generously supported the other side.
egion This would clearly send of
region. y and wrong message to the cased Savimbi of waging a war against So there is good reason to consider
white leadership on South Africa as "those who do not obey him uncondi- American assistance. But the dangers
well as the black majority of South tionally." It is thus not entirely clear accompanying that assistance demand
Africa. that aid for Savimbi is aid to our na- a full debate. We ought not blindly
Congress has already taken the im tionai interests in the region. serve as a tool of South Africa foreign
portent steh of approving sanctions Some have argued that passage of policy. Aiding UNITA hurts our ability
por ant South Africa. approving next step is the bill's language will set a precedent to work against apartheid with South
a stop t cooperation with South that will require a vote on all covert Africa's frontline neighbors and dam-
to stop U.S. Ucooploo er against its neighbors actions. This is not the case. The In- ages our relations with other African
and to require SAfrica e begin telligence Committee approves the governments and future South African
and to require majority of covert operations, leaders.
cooperation with South t the United wit nited Nations ioions ns Today's vote should be seen simply as Like Angola, the other six African
which . uti n 435, the oversight process in action. As in countries bordering South African-
w
tion hich of provides for U.N. a Angola the
and northern the case with aid to the Contras of controlled territory have been the
Namibia wan agreed -to d interne- Nicaragua, Congress has the chance to target of South Africa's military and
Namibia a with hhe ng gree determine whether it will approve economic campaign to force them to
Aid to acek UNITA ng does not.
make practi- funding for a controversial program. abandon groups fighting against
cal sense. It increases the reliance of Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I apartheid.
the Angolan Government on its shield yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from These countries, virtually all of the
of Cuban troops. It has interfered with Louisiana [Mr. Rom]. other African countries and the lead-
the search for a settlement in Na- (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given ers of every major antiapartheid group
mibia, since the Angolan Government permission to revise and extend his re- inside Africa and Namibia oppose
is hardly likely to view Washington as marks.) United States aid to UNITA.
a fair mediator so long as the United Mr. ROEMER. I thank my colleague support Hamilton. vote against the
States helps arm it internal enemies. for this time, misguided, open-ended spending. knee-
The language in section 107 of H.R. Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult and jerk administration amendment. That
4759 does not prohibit aid to UNITA, complex subject, and I know Members, vote is both good and procedure and In
It merely says that any aid must be ap- like myself, are struggling to do the the long run for America good policy.
proved by Congress. This issue is clear- right thing. I am going to urge today Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield
ly controversial-therefore public that we support the committee's posi- 10 minutes to the distinguished chair-
debate about the merits of such a pro- tion and section 107 of Mr. HAMILTON man of the Committee on Rules, the
gram is clearly in the public and na. and reject this amendment for four gentleman from Florida [Mr. Perini]
tional interest. reasons. to close debate for this side.
The United States is Angola's largest First, in 1985 we, I, voted to repeal Mr. PEPPER. I thank the gentle-
trading partner. U.S. investment pres- the Clark amendment because it was a man for yielding.
ently exceeds $500 million. Two-way unnecessary restriction on Presidential Mr. Chairman and my colleagues of
annual trade between the United discretion. The question was never one the committee, you know that this bill
States and Angola has grown to over of providing covert or overt aid to the provides that no military or paramlll-
$1 billion during the Reagan adminis- Angolan rebels. In fact, the adminis- tary aid may be given to Angola with-
tration, a significant portion of which tration said then it had no such plans. out the authority of the Congress. The
was backed by U.S. Eximbank credits. Second, the administration now effect of that provision which we seek
Today the United States remains the talks-you can talk about leaks and to strike in our amendment is primari-
only country besides South Africa that phone calls all you want-but the ad- ly twofold: First, it would stop the rel-
does not recognize the Government of ministration now talks publicly and atively insignificant aid that we are
Angola-referred to as MPLA [popular often about supporting UNITA. Clear- now giving to Angola; and second. It
movement for the liberation of ly, that removes the aid from the would hamstring the arm of the Prtlm-
Angola]. Negotiations between the covert category. But none of the ad- dent of the United States and the
United States and Angola for the es- ministration's talk has been with the Government of our country In giving
tablishment of relations were broken Congress. We have been denied the op- assistance to those who seem to be
off earlier this year over the issues of portunity to fulfill our constitutional worthy of the support of the greatest
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11 7040 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 17, 1986
I have a letter here that came ment to our tragic civil war by encour- little help. And because of some Cacti.
thrnurh an international organization, aging the Soviets, Cubans, and MPLA Cal reasons, we cannot ask Congress'
TKY, from Savimbi, and he says of Communists to believe military victory full support. They want to cut off the
these people in Angola: over UNITA is possible. little help that we are giving them.
In Ana we have never had elections. 0 1545 That is not the thing that we ought
Th~ cour.try is ruled by an iilegithnate ml- to do. Are we going to stop all covert
norit?, revive prop,xd up by 45.000 Cubans. Now then they say, oh, but the aid all over the Earth? Who are more
1.500 So.i'-;.?. 2.500 East Germans. 2,000 people in Angola, Sambibi, Is receiving meritorious than these people over
North Koreans and other Eas ern?bloc help from the South Africans and there in Angola?
forces. they are an odious people because
That is who these people in Angola they have apartheid as their policy against We prisdthe to South day sanctions
are. What are we proposing to do now? against their own black people. apartheid o outh Africa bet
be-
To give them some help. My friends, you remember there was cause they cannot vote. They do not
Nobody knows better than the dis- a man named Benjamin Franklin who have freedom. of These Africans not ie
tinguished Intelligence Committee of was the United States Minister to Angola cannot . because They they ot have
this House exactly what aid we are France during the time that the colo- freedom either. because thare at
now giving them. I am not at liberty to nies began their intrepid struggle for the vice of the Communist forces that
disclose all the information I have. our independence so we could estab. have their grip on this land.
But I think anybody knowledgeable of lash a democracy in this blessed Amer- So I ask you, my colleagues, let our
the subject will realize from what was ica. To whom did he go for help? He amendment be passed. Let us strike
said by the minority leader quoting went to one of the most despotic mot- this prohibition out of the bill. Let us
the Secretary of State, and by the archies on the face of the Earth, Louis allow this little help which is meaning.
knowledge that we have, that it is very XVI. and he persuaded Louis 8VI to f ul to these People who are lighting
small, relates to one weapon that they give help to the struggle of the Amen- for their freedom. to continue to aid
need the most. Why is it that we do can colonies for freedom. We were them In their struggle and iwomote
not have the matter before the Con- fighting for democracy. He was so the likelihood of a negotiated settle-
gress? Well, there again the Intelli- much of an odious monarch that his went or likelihood that possibly the
Bence Committee, I am sure, knows own people cut off his head and that Government would be changed and we
more about it than anybody else of his queen. too. So he was not exact- can. have freedom on that country,
except the Government itself. ly a Democrat. too. That, it seems to me, would be the
But I can tell you according to the We have heard the expression In proper role of our country. I hope we
information that I have there is a America, "Any old port in a storm." will not approve this prohibition
reason, because it would be impossible We needed help, and if a despotic king under these Peculiar and particular
to get the aid to them if we were pub- could give it to us, it made it possible circumstances that mean so much to
licly to announce that we were sending for Yorktown to come to be the end of these fighting people for their own lib-
them this aid. the Revolutionary War. It denied erty and their freedoms.
It might be similar in respect to Af- Cornwallis the opportunity to escape Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman. I
ghanistan. You remember that we au- from the seclusion in Washington that yield such time as he may consume to
thorized aid to the Afghan rebels who forced .him. It held off the possible the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
are fighting for their lives against an British fleet interference. America, BoSr:oal.
insidious Soviet Communist conquest through the aid of this despotic mot- (Mr. BONIOR at bifiehican asked
of their own Country . Yet everybody arch. who was not loos after to Use and was vin parmholon to revise Seed
knows we are giving them aid. There is his head because he abused his own extend his remarks.)
a reason, I assure you, why we are not people, it made It possible for us to Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr.
publicizing to the world what we are have our democracy. Chairman, last week this body ever
giving to Afghanistan. There Is a Remember Churchill talked about, whelmingly voted tough sanctions
reason. Should we atop giving aid to "I'd say a few kind words for the devil Mkt the Got of South
certain countries in the Par Fast? to if he would come out against Bitkr." Africa - Zia. we will con ider the
those besieged people in Afghanistan And he said some rather unkind fame Of eofelt aid $0 the UNITA
fighting as courageously as patriots things about the Soviet Union, but rebels ig In Angola. These issues
have ever fought for their land and when the Soviet Union headed its art two Was et the same coin,
their lives? Who wants to stop that? mighty force against the dastardly South Africa provides about 90 per-
Are we going to say here in this House Hitler, he said some kind words for Bent of UNITA's foreign aid Its mill-
by the action we take this afternoon him. Lary aid to Angola has totaled $1 bil-
that nowhere on Earth when our Gov- Give Savimbi the help that he needs }Jinn In the past 5 years.
ernment, elected by the people of our from America, and I can assure you he We Cannot condemn the system of
country. says somebody is entitled to will not get any help from South apartheid 1 week and endorse its cam.
the support of the world's greatest de- Africa. pagin to destabilize southern Africa
mocracy in their fight for freedom, Here is what he says about apart- the next. Aid to UNITA Is aid to apart-
that unless we follow a certain public held. held, make no mistake about it.
formula we cannot give them any- We In UN1TA take a back seat to no one If we vote today to continue covert
thing? We understand, of course, that in abhorrence of apartheid. Apartheid Is an aid to UNITA. by striking section 107
if the amount of aid given is volumi- evri szstem doomed to perish. However, of the tntellegence bill, we will be tell-
Dous, large, immense in importance, of those sooting Justice In South AMOR cannot Ing the world we are not serious about
course the Government would not morally Ignore the right of Angolans to our campagin against apartheid. and
have the aid to give them unless Con- fight for their own mom The obsess will be endoming a wider war in south-
that UNITA is a "tool of south Afriea? is ri-
gress authorises that aid. But I can
diculous and unsubstantiated. Whom would em Africa.
assure you that if we cut off this aid UNITA apply the apartheid system against? Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
that we are now giving, small and in- Would we apply this system against our- yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
consequential in character, then this is selves'' Pennsylvania (Mr. GRAY].
what Savimbi says about it, and this So here are some people in part of Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania. Mr.
section places large and unqualified black Africa, no elections, 45,000 Chairman. I rise in opposition to the
roadblocks In the way of any President Cuban military personnel over there. Stump amendment. Prior to additional
of the United States, present or these people from East Germany, tax dollars being sent to UNITA. we
future, which would help Angolan from North Korea, these mighty Com- must be given the opportunity to
freedom fighters, the Soviet Union munist forces concentrated there, who debate this issue.
and Cuba, in doing no, it would weaken deny these people of Angola the right The Congress debated whether or
the prospects of a negotiated settle- to be free, and we are giving them a not we should aid the Contras in Nica-
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September 17, 1986
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 70 1 1
ragua. We debated whether or not we
should aid t1rc non-Communist resist-
ance in Cambodia. We debated wheth-
er or not we should aid the Mujaha-
deen in Afghanistan.
Why shouldn't we debate the issue
of aid to UNITA? Are we saying that if
UNITA is good enough for South
Africa, UNITA is good enough for us?
Because South Africa finds it in its
best interests to arm UNITA, does
that automatically mean that it is in
the best interests of the United States
for us to do likewise?
I urge my colleagues to be very cau-
tious.
Just 1 week ago, we voted over-
whelmingly to reduce our economic
ties with South Africa. Are we really
ready now to increase our military ties
with South Africa?
We must not walk into this issue
blindly.
Some say that we must aid UNITA
because this Is the only way to get for-
eign troops out of Angola.
No one feels more strongly than I
that foreign troops must leave Angola.
But let us not forget how the Cubans
came to be in Angola to begin with.
South Africa was the first foreign
force to descend -,Pon Angola. It was
in response to South African troops
closing in on Angola's capitol in 1976
that that government issued an inter-
national appeal for military support.
From that day until now, South
Africa has occupied southern Angola.
How then will our further strength-
ening the UNITA/South Africa alli-
ance cause the Cubans to go home?
This action on our part would only
deepen Angola's reliance on foreign
troops.
Mr. Chairman, I want Cuban troops
out of South Africa. And I believe that
all of my colleagues here today want
Cuban troops out of Angola. But I also
know that South Africa does not want
Cuban troops out of South Africa, be-
cause South Africa has stated quite
clearly that they will not end their fl-
legal occupation of Namibia until
Cuban troops leave Angola, and South
Africa has no interest in leaving Na-
mibia
But this is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not we have the right to
debate further involvement with
UNITA. I, for one. Mr. Speaker, feel
that debate is crucial.
Continued American aid to UNITA
has serious foreign policy implications,
and has been met with strong opposi-
tion by the nations of Africa. Our pro-
viding aid to UNITA also destroys our
credibility as an impartial arbiter of a
settlement in Namibia. Mr. Chairman,
the leader of UNITA has declared that
he will destroy the American corpo-
rate presence in Angola. Clearly our
providing aid to UNITA has not been
thought through-
I urge my colleagues to debate the
implications of aid to UNITA fully and
openly.
We must defeat the Stump amend-
ment.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman. I
yield such time a-s, she may consume to
the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs.
COLLINS ].
(Mrs. COLLINS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend her re-
marks.)
Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, ever
since Ronald Reagan took over the
White House, he has been looking for
Communists to kill. Unfortunately, his
"shoot first and ask questions later"
attitude threatens to destroy U.S. for-
eign policy.
The newest target for President
Reagan's guns is the Government of
Angola. Even though Angola is linked
to the United States economically and
welcomes American business invest-
ment, the President insists that
United States interests will be best
served by a change in government.
Instead of the existing government,
the administration wants to install the
rebel foroe of UNITA, under the lead-
ership of Joseph Savimbi. One won-
ders If anyone in the White House has
ever taken a dose look at Savimbi.
In truth, Josepb Savimbi Is no demo-
crat, only a supreme opportunist. A
former student in Communist China
and a self-style Marxist, Savimbi origi-
nally fought as a Communist. He only
began to depict himself as a Western-
oriented democrat in an effort to
obtain American money.
Recently, during the same time he
was begging for American money, Sa-
vimbi' threatened to blow up Ameri-
can-owned oil facilities. In this the
sort of Individual that will bring de-
mocracy to Angola or who can be
trusted with millions of United States
dollars?
Savimbi has even allied his UNITA
rebels with racist South Africa. Preto-
ria, now supplies arms, training, fuel,
and transport facilities to the rebels. A
call from UNITA is all it takes to initi-
ate South African air strikes in
Angola. The Afrikaners are even pro-
viding close combat support for the
rebels.
In return for this aid. Savimbi se-
cures South Africa's borders, thereby
releasing Pretoria's military forces to
repress Its black population. By sup-
porting Savimbi, the United States
will be propping up apartheid repres-
sion.
Support for UNITA will also destroy
America's long-range interests in
Africa. All of the frontline states, and
almost every other African nation, has
condemned Savimbi and his UNITA
rebels. Funding for Savimbi would
place the United States in a de facto
alliance with South Africa and alien-
ate other African nations. Black Afri-
cans would then be forced to turn to
the Soviet Union for support. Such a
policy would actually increase the
spread of communism in Africa.
The House Intelligence Committee
understood the true nature of Sa-
vimbi. They prohibited the covert
funding of UNITA rebels in section
107 of the Intelligence authorization
bill. This insures that any attempt& to
fund UNITA will be sub;,,ct to con.
gressional debate and its consequences
fully considered. I urge my colleagues
to support human Justice and Ameri.
can interests-reject any attempt to
delete section 107.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from New York [Mr.
McHUCHI.
(Mr. McHUGH asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman. I rise
In opposition to the Stump amend.
ment and urge my colleagues to sup-
port the Intelligence Committee's In-
clusion of section 107 in this bill.
Section 107 would prohibit the fund-
Mg of Military or paramilitary oper-
ations in Angola by any agency of the
United States involved in intelligence
activities, unless such funding is
openly requested by the President and
approved by the Congress. The effect
of section 107 would be to preclude the
President from using funds autborimed
In this bill for so-called covert oper-
ations In Angola.
In my judgment. and In the judg-
ment of a majority of the Intelligence
Committee, section 107 deserves your
support on both procedural and policy
grounds.
In this case, the procedural issue is
at least as important as the policy ar-
gument. It relates to the question of
when a President, acting alone. should
be able to commit the United States to
a fuadsmemtafy new policy wllhout
first obtaining congressional sppee.L
More specdtlally. when slmdd a Peael-
dent be able to dreumvent the normal
authorization and appropriations pros
an in providing military aid to a for-
eign government or foreign forces?
As you know. Mr. Chairman, e s t
In extraordinary dreuaostaoees the
President must submit any request last
foreign assistance to Congress 3ar
open consideration, debate. and dIspo.
sition. This Is because foreign policy
commitments are not the sole p, ue
of the Executive; they are antlend
commitments In which the Ctmg~
and our people have a vital fnteret.
These fundamental decisions are
shared responsibilities. Under Most
circumstances they must not be andsr-
taken by the President alone and In
secret.
Congress has recognised. howsosr,
that in exceptional cases the Presklent
should have the authority to Initiate
covert operations abroad without >oelsr
congressional consideration and 4W
proval. In such cases. Congress has
ceded to the President the authority
to Initiate action unilaterafy ,-
simply notifying the Inteligencs
mittees of the House and Senate (.iii
"finding" that the Interests Of the
United States justify the use of tilde
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1170,12 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 17, 1966
lr,Jt.d, there is no knowledge on the dicrous on Its face. The covert nature in Angola, it is we who seem to be re-
pnrt of most b'emhers of Congress or of this operation was blown before it sisting peaceful change and stability.
the public that the United States has began by the President and key offi- And what can we hope to gain by
bfen committed. cials in his administration. To insist on putting our country in this position?
In this democracy that is truly an covert procedures now is simply to Certainly not a military victory in
extraordinary procedure, and it should deny to Congress its right and respons- Angola. The aid we are providing to
be u:,, d only when the interests of the bility to participate in a major policy Savimbi is a mere fraction of what the
United States require secrecy, or re- decision. South Africans are providing, and a
quire "plausible deniability." We can Therefore, whatever your views on mere fraction of what the Soviets and
all appreciate that in certain limited the policy question may be-whether Cubans are providing to the Angolan
ca the need for secrecy or plausible you support aid to Savimbi or not-the
de: :,';i:ity should o.crride the right policy decision should be made in the Governce an Our aid won't make -
of Congress to participate in funds- traditional way. just as other impor- ministration on ton ground; even the ad-
;r, ;.l policy decisions. Indeed, I tent policy decisions are made: By mon concedes that our in-
should emphasize that all of us on the open deliberation, debate and vote in volvement will not tip scales in vimbi's Intelligence Committee have supportCongress. That's all that section 107 an eno fa avor. We are the herefore paying
ing
ed certain covert operations for those requires, and that's one reason why enormous political price In south
very reasons. However, this is not an the Stump amendment to delete it ern Africa for military aid that will
appropriate case for dispensing with should be defeated. have only a marginal impact in the
congres.ional rights and responsibil- Beyond this fundamental question conflict.
ities, and that is why the Intelligence of procedure, of course, there Is sub- The administration argues that our
Committee included section 107 in this stantive policy issue: Does it serve the aid Rill serve to bring the combatants
bill. interests of the United States to pro- to the bargaining table. That is a
In the case of Angola, the President vide military aid to the Savimbi forces worthy goal, but is it realistic? Can we
himself has publicly disclosed the com- in Angola? In my view. It does not, and really expect the South Africans to ne-
mitment of the United States to the the Stump amendment should be re- gotiate? Why should they when they
Savimbi forces. He and other key jected on substantive grounds as well. have reason to believe that the United
members of his administration have A succession of administrations has States has now taken a partisan posi-
ostentatiously taken political credit said that promoting peaceful change tion-their position? And why should
for it. Accordingly, there is no reason and stability in southern Africa is con- the Angolan Government negotiate?
for secrecy in this case, and any denial sistent with American interest. More Isn't it more likely that in the face of
of involvement by our Government specifically, they have identified the escalating military pressure it will
now would hardly be plausible. following goals as paramount in the become even more dependent on the
On November 23, 1985, in a state- pursuit of our legitimate interests: A Soviets and Cubans?
ment to the New York Times regard- peaceful end to apartheid in South No, Mr. Chairman, this is a losing
ing aid to Savimbi the President said: Africa; independence for Namibia; a policy. It has no prospect of securing a
We all believe that a covert operation reduction of Soviet and Cuban influ- military victory on the ground and it
would be more useful to us and have more ence as compared to our own; and is
politically costly to our interests in
chance of success right now than the overt
proposal that has been made in Congress. meaningful human and economic de- southern Africa. The time to call a
On December 6, 1985, Secretary velopment as well as the evolution of halt is now, before it is too late. Let us
Shultz said publicly democratic systems in the region. bring our policy in Angola into con-
Asfar as spublic to UNrrA and Mr. Sa- These are rational goals, consistent formity with our policy in South
vimbi are concerned, as the President has not only with our own interests but we Africa Let us send a consistent mes-
said and I have said, we support those who believe with the interests of most Afri- sage to the people of southern Africa.
fight for freedom against the Soviet and cans. They are goals that the Ameri- Congress Can't credibly vote to impose
Communist regimes around the world, in- Can people can support. But does mill- sanctions an South Africa one week
cluding Angola. Our desire is to support tary aid to Jonas Savimbi advance and then align itself with South Afri-
them effectively. those goals? I think not. can policies the next. Let us cast our
On February 6, 1986, in his State of It's clear that aiding Savimbi ap- lot today, clearly and unequivocally,
the Union Address, President Reagan pears to put us on the side of the with the majority in black Africa.
again announced support for Savimbi: white minority regime in South Africa, That Is what the American people
We are moved by the efforts of freedom the regime which has been the major want, and that is what will best serve
fighters such as Jonas Savimbi and the supplier and sponsor of Savimbi for American interests.
members of UNITA. They deserve our sup- more than ten years. The vast majori- Mr. Chairman. I urge my colleagues
port in their brave struggle against Soviet- ty of Africans see this policy as incon-
Cuban imperialism in Angola sistent with an end to apartheid, as in- to reject any simplistic appeal to anti-
On February 18, 1986, Assistant Sec- consistent with independence for Na- communism, to reject anything but a
retary of State for African Affairs, mibia, as inconsistent with stability clear-eyed appraisal of American Inter-
Chester Crocker, proclaimed to the and peaceful change in the region. As cats' and to reject, on both procedural
world that the covert operation was black African leaders have told us pub- and substantive grounds, the Stump
underway: licly and often, this policy is seen as amendment.
The decision has been made, and the proc- United States complicity in the poli- 0 1555
ess is in motion. cies of South Africa. That can hardly
Finally, we can all recall that when serve the interests of the United The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
Jonas Savimbi visited Washington he States. the amendment offered by the gentle-
was received by the administration In fact, it plays into the hands of the man from Arizona [Mr. Sruxpl.
like a chief of state, including a well- Soviet Union and Cuba, whose influ- The question was taken; and the
photographed meeting with the Presi- ence we seek to diminish. It is they Chairman announced that the noes
dent in the Oval Office. The adminis- who seem to be resisting South Afri- appeared to have It.
tration orchestrated a high-profile can aggression. It is they who seem to asooaI vors
campaign of public appearances for be defending the black majority
Mr. Savimbi to demonstrate Its sup- against the efforts of the white minor- Mr. STUMP Mr. Chairman. I
port for his cause. ity regime to destabililze the region demand a recorded vote.
For that same administration to and thereby hold into its power and A recorded vote was ordered.
argue now that an open debate and de- privileges. At a time when our admin- The vote was taken by electronic
cision by Congress would compromise istration resists sanctions against that device, and there were-ayes 229, noes
the covert nature of its operation is lu- minority regime and supports its client 186, not voting 16, as follows:
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September 17, 1986
rrw
A v.
r sd
Archer
Arniey
Bad ham
Barnard
BarUc tt
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Biaggi
Bilirakis
Bliley
Boehlert
norws
Ikulter
Broomfield
Brown (CO)
Bryant
Burton; IN)
B?sum me
Byron
Callahan
Carney
Carper
Chandler
Chapman
Chappeil
Cbappie
Chaney
Clinger
cos"
Cobey
Coble
Csiemsa (MO)
Comfiest
Coughlin
Getter
Craig
Crane
Daniel
Dannemeyer
Darden
Daub
Davis
Delay
DeWine
Dilcklawart
DloGuardl
Dorman (CA)
Dreier
Driest
Dlaroo
Bckert (NY)
Sowards (OK)
Mwerson
TSng1ah
2rdrefeb
IlVans (IA)
Ptowu
Flswell
Fiedler
Fields
Franklin
Frermel
Frost
Fuqua
Gallo
Oaydas
Oaks.
Gilman
Otngrich
Glickman
Goodling
Oradison
Green
Gregg
Ackerman
Akaka
Alexander
Anderson
Amttolao
Applegate
Aspin
Atkins
AuCoin
Barnes
Bates
Bede"
Denenson
Bennett
Berman
Bevlu
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 7043
(Roll No. 387)
Early
Lehman rFLa
Rovba!
Eckan (011)
Leland
R
.
AYES-229
Edgar
Lenin (Mb
ut
.'
e
Gunderson
Petri
Edwards 'CA I
Levine !rA)
abo
Sa: aF,
Hall Ralpt.
Pickle
Evan,(IL,
Lon(
Scheucr
Hammerschmidt Porter
Fazio
Lowry rWA)
Schneider
Hanseri
Pursell
Peighar,
Luken
Schroeder
Hatcher
Quillen
Fish
Lundin-
Schumer
Hefner
Ray
Florin
Mantor,
se:herhnr
Hendon
Regular
Fogliettt:
Markel
Sharp
Henry
Ridge
Foley
Martine.
Sikorski
Hiler
Rinaldo
Ford (MI)
Matsu:
Sls.sky
Hillis
Ritter
Frank
Mavroules
Slattery
Holt
Roberts
Garcia
Mazzoli
Smith 'IA)
Hopkins
Robinson
Geidenson
McCloskey
Solar
Hubbard
Rogers
Oephardl
McHugh
Spratt
HuckaL,,
Roth
Gibbon:;
M(x iaz ey
at Germ. in
Hunter
aoukmi&
Oaoaalet
Mlktlbki
iltassera
Hutto
Rowland (Cr)
Gordon
Miller (CAI
Stark
Hyde
Rowland (GA)
Gray (II.)
Mineta
Stokes
Ireland
Rudd
Gray (PA)
Mitchell
Studds
Jenkins
Saxton
Ouarinl
Moakley
Swift
Johnson
Schaefer
Hall (OH)
Moody
Synar
Jones (OK)
Schuette
Hamilton
Morrison (CT)
Torres
Kan)ordtt
Schube
Hawkins
Mrazek
Torriceul
sadeh
Someribrenner
Hayes
Murphy
Towns
Kemp
Shaw
Hertel
Neal
Traficant
Kolbe
Shelby
Barton
1lowak
Trsslar
Kramer
Bls.mway
Howard
Oskar
Udall
Lagomarsino
Shuster
Royer
Oberstar
Vento
Lantos
_Biander
Hughes
Obey
Visclosty
Latta
Skeen
Jacobs
Olin
Waldon
Lent
Skelton
Jetfrds
Owseri
Watgrea
Levels (CA)
asUghter
Jones (NC)
Panetta
Waxman
Lightfoot
Smith (FL)
Jones (TN)
Pease
Weaver
LAp4rki
Smith (NE)
Kaptur
Penny
Wetss
Livingston
Smith (NJ)
Kastenmeier
Perkin:.
Wheat
Loyd
asaith, Denny
Kennelly
price
WMtiey
lwslner
(OR)
Klldee
Rau
Wuusms
Lott
Smith, Robert
Kleazka
Rangel
Wirth
Lowery (CA)
(NH)
Koller
Reid
Wise
Lujan
Smith, Robert
Kostmayer
Richardson
Wolpe
Lungren
(OR)
LaFalce
Rodino
Wright
Mack
Snowe
Leach (IA)
Roemer
Wyden
MacKay
Snyder
Leath (TX)
Rose
Yates
Madigan
Marlen
Solomon
S
Lehman (CA)
Rostenkowski
Young (MO)
ee
Martin (IL)
pence
Stallings
NOT VOTING-16
Martin (NY)
Stangeland
Boland
Flippo
Lewis (FL)
McCain
Stenholm
Bonker
Ford (TN)
Moore
McCandless
strong
Breaux
Fowler
Roe
mecoskm
Stratton
Burton (CA)
mullau
Mcc dy
Stump
Campbell
Hartnett
McDade
Sundquist
Clay
Kindness
amemwm
Sweeney
MCKeraan 'flint.
McMillan Tauke
Meyers Taurln
Mime Taylor
Michel TLowas (CA)
Miller (OH) Thomas (GA)
Miller (WA) Valentine
Mothtari Vander Jest
Mollaban Vaamer
Monson Vwaoovicb
Montgomery Walker
Moorhead Watkins
Morrbon (WA) Weber
Murtha Whitehurst
Myers Whittaker
Matcher Whitten
Nelson Wilson
Nichols wolf
Nielson Wortley
Ortiz Wylie
Oxley Patron
Packard Young (AK)
Parris. Young (FL)
Pashayan
Pepper
NOES-186
Boner (TN) Coyne
Bonior (MI) Crockett
scrod Daschle
Bowes de is Oerza
Boucher Dellums
Boxer Derrick
Brooks Dicks
Brown (CA) Dingell
Bruce Dixon
Can Donnelly
Coelho Dorgan (ND)
Coleman (TX) Dowdy
Collins Downey
Conte Durbin
Conyers Dwyer
Cooper Dymally
0 1615
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. kindness for, with Mr. Banker
against.
Mr. Campbeu for, with Mr. Pali of Ten-
aeagee against.
Mr. Lewis of Florida for, with Mr. Chi
against.
Mr. Hartnett for, with Mr. Roland against.
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was an-
nounced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule,
the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose;
and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
MINETA) having assumed the chair.
Mr. MuarHA, Chairman of the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that
Committee, having had under consid-
eration the bill (H-R. 4759) to author-
ize appropriations for fiscal year 1987
for intelligence and intelligence-
relat-ed activities of the U.S. Government,
the intelligence community staff, and
the Central Intelligence Agency retire-
ment and disability system, and for
other purposes pursuant to House
Resolution 545, he reported the bill
back to the House with sundry amend-
meats adopted by the Committee of
the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
the rule, the previous question is or-
dered.
The amendments recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service, now
printed In the reported bill, are consid-
ered as having been adopted.
Is a separate vote demanded on any
offer ameadnvent?
If not. the Chair Will put them en-
gross.
The amendments were agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time. was read the
third time, and passed, and a motion
to reconsider was laid on the table.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker. I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days to which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
bill just passed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is
there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Indiana?
There was no objection.
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGI-
CIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1986
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, by direc-
tion of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 636 and ask for
Its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as tai-
lows:
H. Has. 535
Resoloe4 That at any time after tide admp.
tics of thin resolution the a", ab I 'sty,
pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 31III, de.
Clare the House resolved into the Cm Mt
tee of the Whole House on the State of the
union for the consideratlon of the bill (H R.
$482) to amend the Federal lmeegctse,
Puagidde, and Redestielde Act, and tier
other psrposw, and the that nosing of the
bill shall be dhpeaeed with. After de'-
debate, which shall be confined to this r
and to the amendment made In order 1w
this resolution and which shall osotlsus unt
to exceed one hour, to be equally divided
and controlled by the chairman and ranltiiog
minority member of the Commdttee on Aa"-
culture, the bill shall be read for unload-
ment under the five-minute raln. la Men of
the amendment to the nature at a substi-
tute recommended by the Oofaaftee an Ag-
riculture now printed In the bEL It 9MB he
in order to consider an amsndosot An the
nature of a substitute consisting at the tort
of the bin R.R. 5440 as an oil ,l bill Abe
the propose of amendment >mdelr t e
minute rule, mid substitute shag tee MIX
wed for amendment by atlas Melded of 10
sections and each title shall be * ..I I 1655
having been read, and alt paints of cedar
against said substitute for failars he
with the provisions of clause t d rtre
and clause 5(a) of rule 2Z~ a N
waived. No amendment to titles I
of said substitute shall be to order
germane amendments printed in 1Ms
II'easional Record and pro (bias
ments for the porpoise of detiata W
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02: CIA-RDP88G01332RO01100130018-7