LETTER TO WILLIAM F. DONNELLY FROM CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01332R000901080003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 8, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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;;Cr CFR 101-11.305
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8 September 1986
Honorable William F. Donnelly
Deputy Director for Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Donnelly:
The Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) provides a vital link in our security
system. It is, of course, charged with the transportation of the nation's most
vital classified information and material, including that which is Top Secret,
cryptographic information, and Sensitive Compartmented Information. The ser-
vice provided by ARFCOS is worldwide in its scope and extends to agencies out-
side of the Department of Defense.
We are in the process of redefining the ARFCOS mission, its organization, and
its charter. The attached background paper provides additional information
concerning this effort, to include its origins. Also attached is a copy of the
summary of an 8 April 1986 U.S. Army Audit Agency report on ARFCOS; this docu-
ment provides an overview of ARFCOS and its strengths and weaknesses.
Because the ARFCOS mission is important to both the Department of Defense and
the Federal Government at large, it is important that any redefinition of
ARFCOS consider fully the needs of all organizations which use this service.
We therefore will hold a meeting at 0930 hours on 3 October 1986 in Room 3E869
in the Pentagon to discuss our concepts for the redefinition and your require-
ments for the organization. I wish to invite you or your representatives to
attend this meeting and take part in the discussions.
During the meeting on 3 October, we will form working groups composed of DoD
representatives to address subsequently the policy and organizational details
of the redefinition. Observers from non-DoD organizations are welcome to
attend any of the meetings of these working groups.
Mr. David E. Whitman of my staff is available to answer questions and he may be
contacted on 695-2289 or 695-2686.
Crag Alderman r.
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ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE (ARFCOS) - BACKGROUND PAPER - SEPTEMBER 1986
The ARFCOS organization began in 1953 to meet security and other concerns for
the transportation of classified information, particularly that which is Top
Secret. ARFCOS is a tri-Service organization operating under an Organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved charter.
is designated as the executive agent for ARFCOS. The The Chief Ncf Staff, U.S. Aan
officer assigned for a 3-year tour of duty from the Army, Navy, and Air is
on a rotational basis. Beyond Top Secret information, ARFCOS ' and transport For
s en
sitive Compartmented Information, cryptographic keying material, aandother-
material of a similarly sensitive nature.
One of the many recommendations of the 19 November 1985 report to the Secretary
of Defense by the Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices
(also known as the Stilwell Commission) was to assess the adequacy of ARFCOS
facilities, vehicles, aircraft, and distribution elements to protect the highly
sensitive information which it transports. That recommendation was approved Secretary of Defense Weinberger on 4 February 1986. Subsequently, riti
cal audit report (// HQ 86-708) by the U.S. Army Audit Agency was accepted as
satisfaction of the immediate concerns of the Stilwell Commission. That report
concludes, among other things, that the ARFCOS "was not organizationally
aligned or structured to facilitate accomplishing its mission." The summary of
the report is attached.
Coincidentally, and due to an ongoing reorganization within the Army staff, The
Adjutant General will no longer be able to exercise staff cognizance of ARFCOS
for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Other concerns about the type being transported by ARFCOS and its schedules and service areas, coupledewith
the subsequent involvement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Con-
trol, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Director of the National Secu-
rity Agency, make this an auspicious moment for redefining the ARFCOS mission,
its organization, and its charter.
Considerable staffing within the offices concerned has brought this process to
the point where a new DoD Directive is being formulated that will give effect
to the work accomplished to date. Because ARFCOS supports _
side of the Department of Defense, thorough coordinationwithgallzconcernedtis
deemed essential prior to Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense decisions on
a new ARFCOS.
Attachment
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U. S. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22302-1596
AUDIT OF THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND
AUDIT REPORT: HQ 86-708
SUMMARY
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
8 APRIL 1986
The Armed Forces Courier Service provides for the secure and expeditious
transportation and delivery of highly classified and extremely sensitive material
requiring controlled handling by courier. The general objective of the audit was to
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of these operations. The specific
objectives were to determine whether:
-The organization was aligned and structured to facilitate accomplishing its
mission.
-Resources were appropriate for meeting mission requirements.
-Controls over authorized materials were adequate.
-The most effective and economical methods for transporting authorized
materials were used.
-The Courier Service had taken action to comply with the Army's Internal
Control Program.
The audit, performed from January through December 1985, was made in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and, accord-
ingly, included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. Audit work was done at the U. S. Army Adjutant General Center;
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; the U. S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command; Headquarters, Armed Forces Courier Service; and 16 courier
stations in CONUS and overseas. The stations visited are listed in the Annex.
Work was also done at the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Department of State. The audit covered transactions which were
representative of operations current at the time of the audit.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Courier Service generally accomplished its mission in an effective
manner. Materials were usually safeguarded from wrongful access and processed
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promptly. However, improvements could be made that would increase the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of courier operations.
The Courier Service was not organizationally aligned or structured to facili-
tate accomplishing its mission. The Adjutant General was designated by the Chief
of Staff, Army to act as the executive agent for the Courier Service; however, The
Adjutant General's organization did not have the intelligence or communications
security background necessary for effective oversight of courier operations. As a
result, management reviews of courier operations were not performed and high-
level security issues had to be resolved by the director of the Courier Service.
Also, the director of the Courier Service had only limited control of courier
operations because, under the tri-Service organization, the Courier Service
received funding and personnel resources from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Since FY 83 the Office of the Chief of Staff has made two studies that have
questioned the organizational alignment of the Courier Service. With a possible
conversion of the service to civilian or contractor performance, effective oversight
could best be provided by an organization with an indepth knowledge of the nature
of the materials processed by the Courier Service.
Funding resources furnished by the three Services were sufficient for meeting
the day-to-day mission requirements. However, other resources-facilities,
vehicles, and equipment at courier stations-were less than desired because the
Courier Service did not develop and control its own budget. Inadequate facilities,
vehicles, or equipment were identified at 11 of 16 courier stations visited.
Additionally, staffing guides which could be used for determining
requirements at courier stations had not been developed. The lack of ides personnel
caused
some stations to be overstaffed while others were understaffed.
Controls over authorized materials were generally adequate, but increased
emphasis on operations security was needed. Courier personnel reported
115 security incidents for the 7 months ended 31 July 1985, and our reviews
identified operational weaknesses at 14 of the 16 courier stations visited. More
intensified training of courier station personnel in operations security and expanded
security inspections were needed to reduce the number of incidents and weaknesses
identified. Additionally, courier stations often did not take appropriate actions
when facilities had security weaknesses or when security systems were inadequate,
and the stations did not promptly update forms used to identify authorized
customers of the Courier Service.
Methods for transporting authorized materials could be more effective and
economical. A uniform system for making transportation and routing evaluations
and documenting their results had not been established and data in existing routing
guides needed correction to reduce unnecessary expenditures of travel funds and
inefficient use of courier personnel. Costs for transporting materials by air were
paid without adequate verification that the services were actually received.
Written procedures needed to be established to adequately verify air transportation
billings and contractors' invoices for commercial air services. Further, the Courier
Service did not have plans for delivering materials during mobilization and had
incomplete plans for contingencies. Without complete plans, the service might not
be able to adequately support mobilization or contingency operations.
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Establishment of an integrated Courier Service data management system
would improve the effectiveness of courier operations. Plans for acquiring such a
system needed to be revised to prevent the unnecessary expenditur of at least
$2.4 million. The initial determination of the requirement for 36 min computers
was made without completing and testi ~
the requirement was overstated. software for the system and, as a result,
Additionally, security requirements for the
system had not been determined even though it was recommended that the system
comply with DOD data processing security directives. the j for
productivity investment funding required revision to accurately eflecteworkl ad
requirements and substantiate the anticipated return on the investment.
The Washington station, the Courier Service's largest station, needed to
improve the effectiveness of its methods for handling an transportin authoriz
Station personnel should encourage Customersto make direct shipm nts
to the ultimate users and to consolidate their materials into larger
Station personnel also needed to packages.
areas
became full and to process items on aa first i n basis.r In dd tion,vthe station needed
a plan to minimize the disruption of its operations resulting from a failure ofa needed
computer system.
The Courier Service had not taken actions to fully implement the Army's
Internal Control Program. The service had developed internal control review
checklists covering the 17 major areas of courier operations. Courier Service
personnel used these checklists to evaluate internal controls and found no control
weaknesses. Our audit found, however, that the effectiveness of some controls in 4
of the 17 areas could be improved. The effects of these control weaknesses are
described at Part II of our report in findings on operations security, air transporta-
tion costs, and movement of materials. e
MISSION AND RESOURCES
The Courier Service is a tri-Service activity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Chief of Staff, Army has been designated by the Joint Chiefs as the executive
agent for the Courier Service and in turn has delegated this responsibility to The
Adjutant General. The Courier Service provis for the e
transportation and delivery of highly classified and extremely secure
ensiti a pmatet ial
requiring controlled handling by courier escort. Materials qualified for transporta-
tion and delivery by courier include top secret and sensitive compartmented
information; classified cryptographic, cryptologic, ima er
security material; and crypt g Y~ and communications
ographic material marked "controlled COMSEC item."
The Courier Service moves materials for the three military services, the National
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Department of State,
various other DOD and Federal agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
countries, and other customers such as government contractors. During FY 85 the
Courier Service processed about 530,000 items of
qualified- 13 million pounds. These services were furnished through e a anet orgk loo
35 courier stations located worldwide. The Courier Service is authorized a total
454 persons: 135 Army, 190 Air Force, and 129 Nav of
operating budget, generally shared equally by the thre
y. The e Services, 'Iwas $14.8 mi 1 ons
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