DDI SPEECH ON CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01332R000800990018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 7, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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IOADICIDCAIT-ll All
7 FEB 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: DDI Speech on CIA and the University
REFERENCES: A. Memo for Multiple Addressees, fm DDI,?
dtd 3 February 1986 Subject: Harvard Speech
B. OL Procurement Note 181, dtd 30 Aug 85
1. I find three problems with the proposed speech attached
to Reference A memo:
a. Page 14 - Re the statement "Where a consultant has
no access to classified information, there is no
prepublication review."
-- It should be noted that Reference B requires the
prepublication clause in unclassified contracts unless
certain conditions are met. This clause is effective in
over 40 percent of the DDI contracts. The DDI's
statement is technically correct if the word consultant
is emphasized. Office of Personnel (OP) service
contracts apparently do not have the same constraints as
the Office of Logistics (OL).
b. Page 16 - Re the statement "We are now stating
explicitly to any organization or individual organizing a
conference on our behalf that the participants in the
conference should be informed in advance of our sponsoring
role."
-- This may be OP policy but there is no such
direction within OL.
9 X1
25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DDI Speech on CIA and the University
c. Page 18 - Re the statement "CIA will henceforth
permit acknowledgment of our funding research that is later
independently published by a scholar unless (1) the scholar
requests privacy, and (2) we determine that formal, public
association of CIA with a specific topic or subject would
prove damaging to the United States."
-- This would be precedence setting; it is
certainly not currently coordinated Agency policy.
2. I believe it may be dangerous to start setting Agency
policy on the fly like this, but the things he wants to do are
possible.
Deputy Chief
Procurement Management Staff
Office of Logistics
.CONFIDENTIAL
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Administrative - Internal Use Only
DDI #00032-86
3 February 1986---
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
Deputy Director for Administration
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs
Director, Office of Security
Director, Office of Logistics
Director, Management, Planning and Services, DDI
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Harvard Speech
1. Attached is a final draft of the speech I intend to give
at Harvard on 13 February. Working with the DCI_and DDCI, I have
made some adjustments to certain policies vis-a-vis the DI and
universities. I would appreciateyouur reading it to ensure that
you have no problem with these adjustments.
2. I call to your attention several specific positions in
the speech:
-- For consultants, where there is no access to classified
information, there will be no prepublication review.
jeer rp Where there is access to classified materials by a
-JVkS consultant or contractor, prepublication review of
OJ~ subsequent publication will be limited strictly to the
narrow subject on which the scholar had access to
classified material.
-- On a case by case basis, we will waive prepublication
review on a publication drawing on unclassified research
done under contract for the Agency.
-- We will permit formal, public acknowledgement of CIA
funding for research when (1) the scholar involved
\o' (requests it and (2) when we determine that public
association of the Agency with the topic will not be
damaging to US interests.
-- An outsider organizing a conference for CIA-must advise
participants beforehand of CIA sponsorship.
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Administrative - Internal Use.Only
DDI #00032-86
SUBJECT: Harvard Speech
3. I also attach a draft QUA on the relationship between
non-DDI elements of CIA and the university, an area where I am
sure to get a question. This answer is drawn from 0GC
correspondence with Harvard in 1977.
STAT
Rob e M. Gates
Attachments:
As Stated
2
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Administrative - Internal Use Only
STAT
DDI #00032-86
SUBJECT: Harvard Speech
DDI/RMGates/del
DISTRIBUTION: (all copies with attachments)
1 - OGC
1 - DDA
1 - D/OCA
1 - D/OS
1 - D/OL
1 - D/MPS/DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI Chrono
- 2 -
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 STAT
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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak
about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency,
especially its analytical/research arm, and the academic
community. Recent events here have sparked a broader discussion
of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars
cooperating in any way with American intelligence. On December
3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works
for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent
spirit, a true scholar." These are strong words. In my view
they are absolutely wrong. Nonetheless, there are real concerns
that should be addressed.
My remarks tonight center on two simple propositions:
First, preserving the liberty of this nation is
fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of
academic freedom; the university community cannot
prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the
fortunes of the nation.
Second, in defending the nation and our liberties, the
Federal Government needs to have recourse to the best
minds in the country, including those in the academic
community. Tensions inevitably accompany the
relationship between defense, intelligence and academe,
but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or
elimination of such tensions.
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The History of CIA-University Relations
In discussing the relationship between the academic
community and American intelligence, and specifically the
research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to go
back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links
to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded
President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign
intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving
world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the
universities for experts with long foreign experience and
specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general
conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and
created the Office of the Coordinator of Information, later
renamed the Office of Special Services, under Donovan's
leadership. The prominent Harvard historian, William L. Langer,
was recruited as the Director of Research and he in turn,
recruited some of the finest scholars in America for the OSS,
many of them from Harvard, Yale and Columbia University.
When CIA was established by the National Security Act of
1947, this pattern was repeated. Langer returned to establish
the Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory of the Harvard Law
School faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence
in 1952, and served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other
academicians who joined included: historians such as Ludwell
Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck;
MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic
intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard Bissell, who
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later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane
Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for
the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at
Yale. He is quoted by political scientist Richard Harris Smith
as recalling that he joined the Agency because "Stalin made
Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for
academicians to join the Agency in the early years.
Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were
cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and
faculty or students rarely questioned the nation's need for the
Agency and its activities. Some of the most noted university
professors of the time served on a regular basis as unpaid
consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of probable trends
in world politics.
These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some
criticism on campuses over CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs
expedition in 1961. But the real deterioration in relations
between CIA and the academe paralleled the wrenching divisions in
the country over the Vietnam War, despite continuing academic
cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence. The decline in
CIA-academia ties accelerated with the February 1967 disclosure
in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the foreign
activities of the National Student Association for a number of
years.
Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more
frequent in the media in the early 1970s, culminating in the
establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both
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the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the
House of Representatives.
Even the Church Committee, however, so critical of other
intelligence activities, recognized that CIA "must have
unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our
universities can produce." The Committee recommended that
academic advice and judgment of academics be openly sought. The
Committee concluded that the principal responsibility for setting
the terms of the relationship between CIA and academe should rest
with college administrators and other academic officials. "The
Committee believes that it is the responsibility of ... the
American academic community to set the professional and ethical
standards of its members."
This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks
and numerous articles about the relationship between the
universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President
of the American Association of University Professors, then CIA
Director George Bush replied that the Agency sought "only the
voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director
stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars, rather than the Agency, and he
refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
Adopting this approach, Director Stansfield Turner engaged
in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement
with President Bok of Harvard on relations between this
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university and the Agency. (Ironically, at this time, another
Harvard professor, Robert Bowie, was my predecessor as head of
the analytical element of the Agency.) Some academic
institutions adopted guidelines similar to the stringent
regulations established at Harvard; in most cases less severe
guidelines were proposed. In a great majority of schools where
the issue arose, however, the faculty and administration rejected
any guidelines, usually on the grounds that existing regulations
or practices were adequate to protect both the institution and
individuals.
The Agency's relations with the academic world have improved
in recent years for a variety of reasons, including developments
abroad and recognition in the academic community that CIA,
together with the Departments of State and Defense, has been an
important and useful supporter of area and regional studies and
foreign language studies in the United States. The agencies of
the American intelligence community as well as the Department of
State have long been a primary source of employment for
specialists in these areas. The academic community also
consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence
community in their successful campaign to win support for a
Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence
agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.
In some areas of research, such as on the Soviet Union, our
cooperation for nearly 40 years has remained both close and
constant. This also has been the case often in the fields of
economics and physical sciences. On the other hand, there have
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been much more pronounced ups and downs in our relationships with
political scientists and allied social sciences, particularly
among those with expertise in the Third World.
Why CIA Needs Academe
There are, however, other constants in the history of this
relationship and in its future as well. These include our need
for your help, and the opportunity you have to contribute to a
better informed policymaking process by cooperating with us. Let
me describe how and why.
CIA and the American government need your help today more
than ever before. In just the last dozen years, we have been
confronted with an incredible number of new issues and
developments and also have had to pay attention to some problems
too long neglected. The oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent
skyrocketing of oil prices; the related dramatic changes in the
international economic system and growth of debt in Third World
countries; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the
final passage of European colonialism from Africa; a more
aggressive Soviet Union (with its Cuban and other allies) in the
Third World; changing patterns in international trade; and the
growth of technology transfer, international narcotics networks
and terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national
security is greatly affected by developments and events in
addition to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic
weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering
in their diversity. They include problems such as the
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implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World
countries; problems of political, economic and social instability
and how to forecast them; human rights; narcotics; the illicit
arms market; the implications of immigration flows in various
regions of the world; population trends and their political and
security implications; the global food supply; water resources;
energy, technology transfer; terrorism; proliferation of
chemical/biological and nuclear weapons; changing commodity
markets and their implications for Third World countries; and
others too numerous to recount.
But nearly all of these problems have something in common:
while CIA has experts in virtually all subjects of concern, there
is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the
community of university scholars that can help us, and through
us, the American government, better understand these problems and
their implications for us and for international stability.
With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the
Directorate of Intelligence several years ago initiated an
intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think
tanks of every stripe, and the business community for
information, analysis and advice.
-- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive
areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of
sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of
concern to us and to encourage participation of our
analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private
sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300
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conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable
participation by the academic community and touching on
many of the issues I noted. In addition, we have
recorded more than 1500 instances of our analysts
attending conferences sponsored by the private sector --
and doing so as openly acknowledged CIA employees.
We have increasingly turned to the academic community to
test our own assessments in ways consistent with
protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have
helped scholars get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A
growing percentage of our work is reviewed by
specialists outside the government -- in the academic
community and various think tanks, and by retired senior
military officers, independent specialists, and others).
-- We have established panels of security cleared
specialists from business and the academic community to
meet with us regularly not only to help improve specific
research papers but to help develop new methodologies,
review performance, and help us test new approaches and
hypotheses.
-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own
substantive credentials and expand their horizons by
obtaining outside training at least every two years.
This requirement can be met through taking university
courses, participating in business or other outside
sponsored seminars and conferences, attending military
training courses, and so forth.
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Our involvement with the academic community is as follows:
-- Consulting: This can be formal, under a contractual
arrangement in which the individual is paid a set
government rate, or it can be informal and unpaid -- an
exchange of views between interested specialists. We
are particularly interested in ideas that challenge
conventional wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we
think, but we need to know what others think also.
-- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our
own, but occasionally we contract with others to
organize a conference for us. And, of course, our
analysts attend conferences sponsored by business,
academic and professional organizations, think tanks,
and universities.
-- Research: In some areas, scholars in universities have
the experience and expertise to carry out basic research
for us, for example, on demographic and economic
subjects. The recent controversy at Harvard and the
media have focused on this area of cooperation. In
fact, it presently is a very minor element in our
overall relationship with the academic community. To be
specific, all this fuss has been over fewer than a dozen
contracts nationwide amounting to less than $750,000 in
1985 -- and that represents a high water mark. It is
hardly a program, as recently alleged, of "covert fees
and fellowships" with which we can "buy scholastic
priorities."
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-- Scholars in Residence: We have had a scholars-in-
residence program for a number of years under which
individuals from the academic world can spend a year or
two working with us, with full security clearances, on
topics of interest to them and us.
-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with
scholars who willingly to share with us their
impressions after traveling to places of interest or
participating in events of interest abroad.
A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars
is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range
of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged
research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large
organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not
famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although
there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to
rely solely on information funneled through government channels
inevitably would constrict the range of views and information
needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views, to
argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to
make us think and defend and to go back to the drawing board when
we have missed something important. In short, we don't want
scholars to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would
make our entire effort pointless.
Finally, this relationship is not necessarily a one-way
street. Just as we are conscious of our need for the injection
of ideas and information from outside government channels, I
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believe you should concede that there is at least the possibility
that you might learn something from discussions with us.
Your Concerns
Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been
raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with
us. I would note that certain of these concerns reach well
beyond just CIA and involve the entire question of relations
between government, business and academe.
1. Doesn't research or analysis under-CIA auspices of events
abroad inevitably compromise academic freedom and the
honesty of academic research?
-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist
on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook
the books and we would never consult or contract with a
scholar a second time who did that. Our research and
analysis must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by
other intelligence agencies, but by other elements of
the executive branch, the oversight committees of the
Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's
Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a variety of
other panels and organizations that have access to our
information. While we acknowledge we can be and have
been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable and
objective assessments. Any research we use should have
the same qualities.
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Second, it seems to me that academic freedom depends on
a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence or
rigid ideological conceptions but only to the pursuit of
truth. The scholar should be free to search where he or
she wishes and should not be constrained by any improper
influences, including the preferences of colleagues or
prevailing cultural winds. Actually, improper influence
potentially can be exerted on a scholar in a number of
ways: funding from contracts and consultantships with
business, foundations and foreign governments -- or even
the threat of withholding tenure. Indeed, American
academics have long consulted with officials of foreign
governments of all stripes. In light of this, singling
out a US government agency as a particular threat to
honest inquiry represents a double standard if not
outright hypocrisy. If a university requires public
exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely logic
and equity require a similar practice for relationships
with foreign governments and, in fact, all other outside
relationships. And, indeed, if our funding should be
openly acknowledged, should not all outside funding, of
whatever source, be openly acknowledged? You are
rightly proud of your ability to do objective
research. CIA does not threaten it.
Third, I agree with the proposition that it is the
responsibility of the university itself to establish and
monitor the rules governing all these relationships. It
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is both foolish and irresponsible to do so by isolating
the scholar from any outside contact under the guise of
protecting academic freedom.
2. Won't publicly acknowledged contacts with CIA hinder a
scholar's access and freedom of inquiry overseas? I
acknowledge this might be a problem for some individuals.
However, many who have worked with us for years have not had
any difficulty.
3. Can't a colleague's contacts even with the analytical side
of CIA compromise an entire department? I have been asked
before about the danger of one scholar's association with us
involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of
guilt by association. I would simply offer two
observations. First, the university community is a
remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many
departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort
of activity with which their colleagues disagree or which
they do not support. So, again, this problem is not limited
just to CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on
such relationships that could be kept confidential would
seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My
second observation, however, is that at some point some
courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it." The freedom of those who do wish to
consult with us can be infringed upon by of the fears of
their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your
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government to help bring about better informed policy is
shameful; indeed, it should be a source of pride and
satisfaction. Contributing to a better understanding of
some of the most difficult and occasionally dangerous
problems of the world, in my view, is responsive to the
scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount to CIA censorship?
No. Our review applies only to cases where the author has
had access to classified materials. And then, our review is
only to insure that no classified information is included in
the book or article and that the text does not reveal
intelligence sources and methods. We have no interest in
altering the substance or conclusions of writings we review
and take great care to avoid asking for such changes. Where
a consultan has no access to classified information, there
~,(g\ is no prepublication review. Finally. wa 1 pnoo 4t- ?,. "-
%
Q judgment of the scholar which of his or her writings are
subject to review -- and we have had f
ew occasions to
___--
%J L AN
CP V9,11- 5. What about the view that CIA engages in covert action as
well as collection and analysis and a variety of "immoral"
acts and therefore association with any part of CIA is
unacceptable? Activities at CIA are carried out within the
law, with the approval of appropriate constitutional
authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They
are activities mandated by the decisions of elected
officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches.
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As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds
for legal intelligence activities with which they disagree
thereby terminating such activities.
-- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy
instrument of the elected representatives of the
American people, just like the military, USIA or the
Department of State. If you find some element of the
government's foreign policy or activity inconsistent
with your professional judgment, I would encourage you
first to do all you can to test the validity of your
position. You also can decline to have any association
with us at all. But in the latter case, the decision
whether to associate with us should be left to the
individual. One individual's freedom of association
should not be denied because of another's personal point
of view. A university steps on precarious ground and
itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making
arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may
participate in or talk with -- and, I would add,
especially if one of those organizations is a branch of
its own democratically chosen government.
Our Rules
Before I close, let me review the rules and policies of the
analytical arm of CIA for dealing with the university
community. We continually review our regulations and policies in
the light of new opportunities, new problems and new issues. For
example, well before the recent controversy here at Harvard, we
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decided to revise our policy with respect to prepublication
review, narrowing that review -- which again, is simply to avoid
the compromise of classified information -- to the specific
subject area in which a scholar had access to classified
information.
We have again looked at our rules and policies as a result
of the controversy here at Harvard, and this too has produced
some modifications. For example, we are now stating explicitly
to any organization or individual organizing a conference on our
behalf that the participants in the conference should be informed
in advance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly, because we
organize the overwhelming majority of our conferences ourselves,
this problem had not arisen before.
Let me review three key policies of particular interest to
the university community:
-- First, while the Directorate of Intelligence presently
has no contracts for classified research at any academic
institution, the Directorate of Intelligence can and
will let contracts for classified research where
university rules permit, where appropriate facilities
and circumstances allow, and when a genuine need exists.
-- Second, when we contract for research to be done for us,
we spell out explicitly for the scholar the conditions
governing use of that research. In some cases, the
research will be done strictly for us, and we will be
the only recipient. In other cases, once we have
received the research and assured ourselves that the
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terms of the contract have been carried out, we will
acquiesce in a scholar's request to publish a book or
article drawing on that research. We do not commission
or contract for books or articles. We are realistic
about pressures on scholars to publish, however, and, in
order to attract some of the best people to work with
us, we try to accommodate their desire to draw on
unclassified research they have done for us for
publication for their own purposes. And, finally, there
are cases where we allow research done for us later to
be published under the scholar's name without any
prepublication review on our part.
But in any of these circumstances, our review is
simply to ensure that the work we contracted to be done
has been done, meets appropriate standards of quality
and does not contain classified information. Taxpayers
justifiably would be displeased if we were not to ensure
that we had received true value for their money.
-- Third, we also have looked again at the question of
whether our funding of research that is subsequently
used in a publication by a scholar should be openly
acknowledged. There are several good reasons why this
has not been done in the past, including the possibility
of difficulty with a foreign government by virtue of
acknowledged CIA interest in its internal affairs; the
possibility that acknowledged CIA interest in a specific
subject -- such as the financial stability of a
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particular country -- could affect the situation itself;
and, finally, concern that readers might assume the
scholar's conclusions were, in fact, CIA's.
As a result of the controversy here at Harvard and
expressions of concern about this policy, we reexamined
this issue with considerable care. We have decided that
our interest in obtaining the cooperation of this
country's scholars and allaying the misunderstandings
and suspicions that have grown out of our earlier
approach warrants at least some change in our policy.
Accordingly, CIA will henceforth permit acknowledgement
of our funding of research that is later independently
published by a scholar unless (1) the scholar requests
privacy and (2) we determine that formal, public
association of CIA with a specific topic or subject
would prove damaging to the United States. Any
acknowledgement of CIA funding would be accompanied by a
statement to the effect that the views expressed are
those of the author and do not reflect the views of CIA
or of the US government. I assume, of course, that
universities also will press hard for public disclosure
of other sources of funding for research.
-- Fourth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults
or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or
her home institution in terms of reporting the
relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the
responsibility of the institution to set such rules and
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to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar
to comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce
such compliance.
Conclusions
The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the
security and well being of the American people are increasingly
diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the
Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees
believe that contacts with universities and others in the private
sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry
out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and
warning the government about developments around the world -- the
same mission identified by General Donovan and President
Roosevelt. Our ability to carry out our mission, as in the days
of Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary cooperation between
those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and
those in the university, business, retired military, and others
who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast
them more accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the problems facing
our world are not threats to academic freedom. Some allege that
"The craft of intelligence is rooted in secrecy and deception."
What a tragic misunderstanding. The craft of intelligence is
rooted in information, knowledge and understanding. We exist to
provide these; if we fail at that, we will disappear. And,
accordingly, I believe that freedom of inquiry is limited, a
desire to render public service sometimes tragically thwarted,
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and the nation disadvantaged by those who would deny a scholar's
willingness to work with the American intelligence service in
assessing the world around us.
The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or
work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or
CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prevented by
academic institutions or colleagues from doing so. And none
should have to worry that his reputation will suffer because of a
public-spirited, patriotic willingness to help us better
understand and forecast developments abroad affecting our
national well-being and the forces that threaten our freedom.
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