SEMINAR ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 13, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
STAT
SEMINAR ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN ASIA
September 13, 1986
I Welcoming Remarks - Secretary of State George P. Shultz
II Introduction to the Seminar: The. United States and Asia -
Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
III The Soviet Union's Asian Agenda -
Thomas Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European
and Canadian Affairs
IV Assessment of Gorbachev's July 28th Speech -
Arnold Horelick, Rand Corporation
V Analysis of China's Response - Harry Harding, The
Brookings Institution
VI Analysis of Other Asian Responses - Lucian Pye, MIT
VII The U.S. Dimension - Robert Scalapino, University of
California, Berkeley and Richard Fairbanks, U.S. National
Committee for Pacific and Economic Cooperation
VIII Summary Remarks - Richard Solomon, Director, Policy
and Planning Staff
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
AL
NI0/USSR
11 September 1986
GORBACHEV IN ASIA
The key questions are:
What is Gorbachev trying to do in Asia with his new initiatives?
How will the Asians react?
How far will the Soviets go if the Asians play along, or fail to
respond?
The first question is easy: Gorbachev is trying to turn the USSR from a
badly underachieving actor into something more like a real political
superpower in Asia. The gap between the Soviet image of what they ought to be
and where they are is perhaps wider in Asia than it is in the Middle East.
The Soviet military power base is considerable and has been growing.
But it is still rickety as a base for political power. Soviet land
combat power is largely limited to facing China. The navy is
susceptible to being bottled up. Nuclear strike forces offend the
locals without gaining the USSR much political clout.
Soviet clients and allies -- Vietnam, Mongolia, North Korea -- are
weak, isolated, and two not really under Soviet control.
The USSR is from nowhere on the economic front, while East Asia
witnesses a Wirtschaftswunder impressing the whole world.
Gorbachev wants to break into this scene. His tools are:
A vague Asian Security System/Conference (a loser for Brezhnev 15
years ago).
A series of very niggardly "offerings" to China (Mongolian
deployments, possible dealings on regional arms control, promise of
better relations) and Japan (visits to the N. Territories, economic
inducements) to see what can be got on the cheap.
A lot of diplomatic flag-showing in regional capitals.
This is certainly only a beginning. But it is not clear whether Gorbachev
is now willing to go further in substance to sweeten his offerings to Asia.
Because of the great overhang of Soviet military power, he has the
most room for maneuver on Sino-Soviet military/border issues. But
the Chinese are also the hardest to bamboozle with moves that don't
really change their regional security situation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
The Soviets are not as inflexible as they sound on the Northern
Territories. They are probably (and some senior Soviets have said
so) willing to give on this issue for something really big, e.g., to
finalize a real break in US-Japanese security relations. But the
Japanese are not so stupid.
For the USSR to go very far on other issues, e.g., Indochina,
Afghanistan, regional military balance, they risk their present
equities in the region and might end up worse off than they are
without changing Asia's orientation.
How will Asia react? We already have indications of mild interest but
great skepticism, a kind of collective shrug of the shoulders.
Moscow lacks political/psychological leverage of the sort it still
has in Europe: A "longing" to overcome the division of the Old
Continent (and for the Germans, their country), and a lingering
leftist nostalgia for solidarity with the Land of Revolution. Most
Asians are not touched by this sentimentality.
Whatever their problems with the US, the Asians don't want another
superpower, especially of the Soviet type, stomping around their
region. What's it get them? From a power-political point of view,
only trouble. From the economic point of view, only the opportunity
to provide charity.
Local and even internal political/security issues can give the
Soviets entree in some areas -- which regional experts must track.
But these don't seem to promise to carry the Soviets into a new
position of influence, unless there is an internal upheaval in China
that somehow works to Soviet favor.
China is at the top of the list. But Chinese and Soviet aims are quite
antithetical. China wants to use a modest Sino-Soviet rapprochement to assert
the independence of its foreign policy, to gently pressure Washington to be
more accommodating to China, to influence Soviet behavior, and generally to
underwrite China's emergence as a regional superpower. If the USSR is ready
to restrict its own ambitions sharply and to support China's, China will
applaud. But Soviet aims are the opposite, and China will not applaud.
From Japan, the Soviets want erosion of the security tie to the US,
limitation on Japanese military potential in the future, and economic help.
It has very little to offer to get this; the islands are not enough, unless
Japanese internal politics go haywire. Economic cooperation could be tempting
in principle, but would require the Soviets to go beyond their present
policies on joint ventures to make it profitable for the Japanese.
The stance of the United States, is a crucial factor. If isolationism and
protectionism or a body blow to out military posture (e.g., in the
Philippines) were to alter the fact and image of US superpower commitment to
East Asia, the Soviets would have much better prospects for the game they want
to play.
Excessive US anxiety about current Soviet diplomacy in the region
could also give the Soviets leverage.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Assuming the US does not pull back from the region and that its countries
are only mildly interested in Soviet approaches, but generally resistant to
Soviet regional ambitions -- what do the Soviets do? Probably more of the
same.
The Soviet foreign policy dilemma in Asia is of a piece with the entirety
of Soviet foreign policy, made somewhat more visible by the lack of the
"peace-arms control-detente" charade which can be played in Europe. The
Soviet Union has only three ways to be a real superpower on a par with the US
as it wishes to be:
The way it now proceeds, through a combination of essentially
deceptive diplomacy (arms control, detente, etc.), aimed at
magnifying the USSR's importance at little risk or cost, and
subversion/penetration of vulnerable spots.
A bolder, more aggressive effort to project military cum subversive
power in regions, to elicit cooperation (Finlandization) from the
locals by threatening them more directly.
To join the community of advanced and advancing nations by paying the
price of membership in reforms to the external policies and the
internal life of the USSR.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, we feared the Soviets might be headed
for a global policy of the second type because the US seemed in decline and
Soviet power in the ascendancy. But Soviet internal problems, US resurgence,
and the enduring difficulties of playing raw power politics in the nuclear age
blocked this development. It is not precluded in the future, but the risks to
the USSR are great.
The third course really means a basic change, in a civilized direction, of
the nature of the USSR and of its role in the world. Gorbachev wants us to
think he's headed in this direction. We are unconvinced. Nevertheless, the
logic of history has its claims, too. Even as the NomEklatura and Russian
tradition resist, history pushes in this direction. But these prospects
cannot mature unless the outside world denies the USSR full superpower status
based on imperial foundations, in Asia and elsewhere.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
S ET
The vector of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #04254-86
11 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Asia Seminar: Sino-Soviet Relations
and the US
1. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech with its enticements for improving
relations with China set off alarm bells in Washington and stimulated the
Department of State to order a review of American foreign policy in Asia.
Secretary Shultz, as a part of this process, has invited a number of key
policy officials and outside experts to participate in a 13 September seminar
examining Soviet intentions and activity in Asia. Much of the excitement and
attention among Soviet specialists focuses on the motives for Gorbachev's
initiative and whether or not Russian rhetoric will be followed by substantial
concessions. Asian watchers look for signs that Beijing may be prepared to
take the Soviets' bait.
2. Those assembled by Shultz can be expected to conclude that:
-- Gorbachev's more sophisticated diplomatic offensive, coupled with the
Soviet military muscle in Asia will be a far greater challenge to US
interests in the Pacific basin than the ham-handed, might is right
approach that traditionally has alienated and frightened most Asians.
-- The Soviet Union's relations with China will improve somewhat if Moscow
is prepared to make concessions along the Sino-Soviet border and more
so, if the Cambodian obstacle is overcome.
-- But, Beijing is not expected to alter its current stance and
orientation significantly. No one, for example, will argue that
Sino-Soviet relations are returning to those of the early 1950s.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
-- Some, however, will probably suggest that the new circumstances make it
even more important that the US take Chinese sensitivities into account
in our dealings with Taiwan (read: pressing Taipei on reunification and
being more careful on arms sales).
-- In short, the US faces more complex challenges and potentially
troubling relationships with both Beijing and Moscow in the years
ahead, but is not on the verge of a calamitous change in Sino-Soviet
relations.
3. In support of this assessment, virtually all China watchers accept as
an article of faith that Deng's opening to the West, and to the US in
particular, signaled a fundamental shift in direction for China that will not
be easily reversed by Deng or his successors. The twin challenges of the long
term Soviet military threat and the requirements of economic modernization
dictate that for now China will not adopt a genuinely equidistant position in
its relations with Moscow and Washington.
4. But, the close working relationship envisaged by many US policymakers
in 1979 and the early 1980s--when Deng talked of China, Japan and the US
coordinating their activities to block advances by the "Polar Bear"--is a
thing of the past. Increasingly, Beijing talks about a foreign policy
independent of both superpowers and signals in various ways and deeds that
such an objective is more than mere rhetoric. Prime Minister Hawke of
Australia, for example, quotes Deng Xiaoping's approach to the Soviets as, "We
want to improve economic relations and political relations, but in the end we
will be friends but never allies," strikingly similar to the Chinese
description of Sino-US relations.
5. The optimistic interpretation of Chinese intentions holds that while
China's foreign policy rhetoric may have changed somewhat and even some
backsliding may have occurred in its relations with Washington, Deng and other
leaders privately still tilt decidedly toward the US.
AN OPTIMIST'S VIEW OF CHINA'S
RELATIONS WITH
MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON
EQUIDISTANT
Moscow (52) . Washington (79)
They note that China has not changed its fundamental assessment of the Soviet
threat--nor it is even reevaluating it. At the same time, they contend that
Beijing is well aware that too positive a response to Gorbachev's proposals
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
could jeopardize its access to US, Japanese, and Western European advanced
technology, investment, trade, and defense cooperation--major Chinese
political goals. Nor does Beijing want to signal its friends and enemies in
Southeast and South Asia that it might reconsider its stand on Cambodia and
Afghanistan.
6. While not quarreling with essential judgments, a revisionist
view--admittedly speculative and only a whisper among the chorus--paints a
somewhat less sanguine picture of US-China relations than suggested by the
more upbeat conventional wisdom. It contends that China has already moved
more equidistant between the two superpowers than most analyst wish to admit
and many policymakers would be comfortable considering.
A PESSIMIST'S VIEW OF CHINA'S
RELATIONS WITH
MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON
EQUIDISTANT
Moscow (52) . Washington (79)
CHINA 86
It does not contradict Ambassador Lord's view that, "we can believe the
Chinese when they assert flatly that they will never return to the
relationship of the 1950s." It also accepts the view of last year's NIE,
"that for the next two years and probably longer Beijing will not move to an
equidistant position in its relations with Moscow and Washington." But, while
the "three obstacles" remain an impediment to equidistant relations with
Washington and Moscow for now, it believes the clear trend is for Beijing to
move more toward the center and maximize its leverage with both superpowers.
7. Although this quasi-debate strikes me as simply a variation on the old
argument of whether or not the glass is half full or half empty, there are
several observations worth making.
-- China in the conduct of its international relations operates on the
principle of national interests not friendship. In fact, we know that
the Chinese instead use friendship to entangle unsuspecting
interlocutors for tactical advantage.
In its drive to become the predominant power in Asia and a major actor
on the world stage China will increasingly run afoul of US interests
and alliance relationships as it pursues economic/trade advantages and
political influence.
3
SECRET 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
-- Our habit of justifying US-China relations on the basis of a common
enemy--the Soviet Union--and parallel strategic interests masks
Beijing's perception of the United States as a secondary, but
important, long-term adversary, and gives China more opportunity to
play one superpower off against the other. A failure to appreciate the
flip side of this coin could over the longer term undermine US
interests.
8. In fact, we have operated in Asia during the last decade or so under
especially ideal conditions. It has been a time when Communist nations fought
and bickered:
-- China and the Soviet Union faced off along their common border with a
real danger that it could lead to major hostilities.
-- China's invasion of Vietnam ended a long close relationship between
communist neighbors.
-- Hanoi became bogged down in a no-win war in Cambodia.
-- Khmer Rouge atrocities soured several generations of non-communist
Asians (except in the Philippines) on the promises of communist
revolution.
-- North Korean miscalculations and blunders, such as the Rangoon bombing,
left the regime isolated from civilized nations and, for the most part,
even its communist allies.
9. At the same time, our friends and allies prospered:
-- Japan rocketed to the number two most potent economy in the world.
-- Asia's "Tigers," South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, emerged with
strong economies and equally strong connections with the US.
-- ASEAN somehow hung together and began to make its influence felt.
Particularly important, despite some reservations on the part of
Indonesia and Malaysia, was ASEAN's united stand in support of Thailand
and opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.
-- Also, American troops have not been engaged in combat in Asia in over a
decade.
10. But, the future does not look nearly so bright:
-- Japan's economic success and the progress several other Asian nations
have made has now begun to pinch--the shoe will get smaller, count on
it!
-- Relations with Australia and New Zealand will become more complicated,
if not worse.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
-- And, a communist victory in the Philippines could dangerously undermine
US strategic interests in the region.
11. Even more worrisome is the possibility that the splits between the
communist powers in Asia over the past 15 years, which we have benefited from
greatly, may have been more anomaly than real. We are unlikely to be so lucky
over the next 10-15 years. Although a monolithic communist block is not in
the cards, look for closer relations and cooperation between Moscow, Beijing,
Pyongyang, and Hanoi, not less.
12. We also should not get so bogged down measuring the legs of the
strategic triangle and boldly predicting no return to the 1950s, that we lose
sight of the fact that it is almost certainly in China's interest to have
better if not warm relations with Moscow.
13. Improved Sino-Soviet relations and even an equidistant relationship,
however, need not seriously harm US interests. We still retain important
political, economic, and military advantages for protecting and advancing US
interests in Asia. The danger lies in not adjusting policies incrementally as
new situations and conditions pertain. In fact, I suspect that much of the
passion expended arguing China's continued tilt to the west and the stress put
on the Soviet Union being China's principal adversary, stems primarily from
present and future policy considerations.
14. Our China policy is essentially founded on the state of play in the
world circa 1979--China seriously at odds with the Soviet Union, in a shooting
war with Vietnam and having newly normalized relations with the United
States. Seen from this perspective, policies such as transferring dual use
and military technology to China, and restricting arms sales to Taiwan make
some sense.
15. But, if you accept the proposition that circumstances have changed,
if only a little, and the future prospects are somewhat more worrisome, you
might expect some rethinking and fine tuning of our approach coming out of
State and the Pentagon. Instead, we put the best face on the changes
occurring in Asia and especially Sino-Soviet relations, and continue to march
down the same road--only faster. Quite frankly, I would be far more
comfortable with marching on, but a little more carefully.
Carl W. Fo
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
NIC #04254-86
11 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Asia Seminar: Sino-Soviet Relations
and the US
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DCI/EX -
1 - AC/NIC
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - D/OEA
1 - C/EA
1 - NIO/EA Chron
1 - NIO/EA Subj.
NIO/EA/CWFord/mm/l1Sep86
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
ET
Central Intelligence Agency
washingon.D C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 August 1986
Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
Summary
Gorbachev's. comments in Vladivostok last month indicate that
his regime is indeed making a more determined effort to improve
the USSR's position in Asia, as several Soviet officials have
predicted within the past year. His remarks also suggest that
the Soviets, after years of 'hanging tough,' are now willing to
address at least some of China's main security concerns--
especially on its northern border--in order to achieve that goal.
The Soviets could follow-up on Gorbachev's speech in various
-- Adopt a more conciliatory position on China's territorial
claims against the USSR.
-- Announce a token force reduction in the Soviet Far East.
-- Withdraw some of their forces from Mongolia.
Judging from the evidence at hand, the Mongolian option may be
exercised first, perhaps even before the next round of Sino-
Soviet political consultations is held in Beijing this October.
The Soviets could, however, hold off until after the October
round ends, if only to get a better reading of Chinese intentions
before making any concessions.
This memorandum was prepared byl Office of Soviet
Analysis. Information available as of 7 August 1986 was used in
its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division
SOV M 86-20068
C E nTIrT n
25X1
25X1
or, %I I
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
JGI.RL I
Gorbachev has not made any promises on the China border
question akin to his announcement that the Soviets will withdraw
six regiments from Afghanistan by the end of this year. But he
has shown more flexibility than any of his predecessors on three
issues--the Sino-Soviet border dispute, troop deployments on both
sides of that boundary line, and the Soviet military presence in
Mongolia. These issues together are one part of the "three
obstacles" cited by China as impediments to improved relations
between Beijing and Moscow; the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and Soviet support for Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia are the
other two.
In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev spoke about turning the
frontier between the USSR and China into a 'zone of peace and
friendship" and noted that the two sides had already taken a few
steps in that direction, especially along the Amur River in the
Far East. He added that the official border there "could pass
along the main navigation channel"--raising the possibility of a
deal regarding Chimnaya Island (Heixiazi), opposite Khabarovsk--
long a major sticking point in the Sino-Soviet border
negotiations. According to the Sino-Soviet
border talks during the 1970s, or ac ev
offer to cede that island to the Chinese.
Gorbachev also called for major force reductions in Asia and
proposed starting in the Far East, adding that Moscow was ready
to discuss with Beijing "specific steps aimed at a balanced
reduction in the level of land forces." His statement on that
point was the first time any top Soviet leader has publicly
endorsed reductions of that sort since the Soviet
buildup opposite China began in the mid-1960s.
Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet and Mongolian
leaders are examining the question of the withdrawal of a
"considerable number" of what we believe to be 60,000 Soviet
troops now stationed in Mongolia. He said nothing about any
preconditions for such a withdrawal. No Soviet leader has ever
publicly stated that the USSR was considering reducing its forces
in Mongolia--some units have been there "temporarily" since
1966. Moreover, both Moscow and Ulaanbaatar have insisted for
nearly a decade that China must sign a nonaggression pact with
Mongolia or find another way to alleviate Mongolian security
concerns before oviet troops can be withdrawn from
Mongolia.
Concrete progress on any of these matters will, of course,
require a good deal of give on both sides. Beijing has
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
SECRETI
stonewalled repeated Soviet requests for a resumption of their
border talks, and Moscow has insisted repeatedly that it will not
improve relations with China at the expense of its friends or
allies like Mongolia. But Gorbachev and his colleagues
reportedly are convinced that Moscow has made some mistakes with
China over the past few years, as Gorbachev himself reportedly
stated in a wide-ranging critique of oviet foreign policy
They may believe that an
of its main security
concerns is worth certain risks, given the strategic importance
of China in their overall scheme of things.
-- Sino-Soviet relations still lag behind China's ties with
the West, and Moscow could lose more political ground by
standing still if Washington and Beijing move closer.
-- An improvement in Sino-Soviet ties would weaken the US
position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle. Moscow also may
again hope for an opDortunit influence Chinese
domestic politics.
The following is a speculative look at various steps that
the Soviets might take--based on what we know about their
territorial dispute with China, the military balance along
China's northern perimeter, and the situation in Mongolia--to
follow up on Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. We would
emphasize at the outset, however, that the Kremlin has yet to
admit that there are any "disputed areas" along the border with
China, or that its military forces in that area pose any "threat"
to the Chinese.
Possible Soviet Moves on the Border Dispute
The Soviets have asked the Chinese on a number of occasions
over the past five years to agree to a resumption of their border
negotiations, which have been suspended since June 1978. To
encourage the Chinese, Moscow could take a more conciliatory
position than previously on some or all of Beijing's main
demands--that Moscow admit that certain parcels of land are in
dispute, withdraw its military forces from those areas (all of
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
them are in Soviet hands at present), and agree in advance to
return all territory that is subsequently determined to be
rightfully China's. A few Chinese leaders have, in recent years,
hinted at some flexibility on those points in their own public
statements, and while the Soviets almost certainly are not
prepared at present to make wholesale concessions, they may be
willing to make some conciliatory gestures:
-- The Soviets might start the bargaining by proposing that
both sides keep their regular army units and border guard
detachments out of all disputed areas along their common
border (see map 1). This gesture would cost Moscow very
little in military terms, but probably would be seen as a
significant move in Beijing. The Soviets currently have
only small border guard units stationed within those
disputed areas.
They could recognize Beijing's claims to almost all of the
700 disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Most
of those islands have little importance in either economic
or military terms. The Soviets could, at the same time,
offer to purchase the strategically important Chimnaya
Island [Heixiazi], opposite the city of Khabarovsk. We
doubt that they would hand the island over to the Chinese,
however, except as part of a final settlement on the
border dispute.
-- They might revive their suggestion about setting up a
joint commission to restudy the old treaties and other
relevent documents, and then conduct a new survey before
installing additional border markers where needed. This
approach would finesse for the moment the question of
which documents, other than formal treaties signed by both
sides, have a legitimate bearing on the subject.
Potential Force Reductions in the Soviet Far East
The Soviets could make some token unilateral gestures
involving their forces opposite China. Although our
understanding of how the Soviets see their military requirements
in that part of the world is imprecise, we can conceive of
several "disengagement" packages that would probably not disturb
the existing balance of forces. The USSR has such an overall
advantage vis-a-vis China that even if the Soviet air and ground
troops in the area were cut by as much as ten percent--that is,
by about 60-70,000--they would still retain a decisive local
advantage in ground forces. While Beijing has about 1.7 million
troops opposite the USSR and Mongolia, its armed forces have much
less firepower and mobility than Soviet or Mongolian units.
China's main forces are, moreover, based 100-200 miles back from
Sanitized Copy Approved for-Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
SECRET
the border, and thus hardly in a position to mount a sudden
offensive into the USSR or Mongolia. This situation may change
in the coming years because the Chinese have abandoned their old
strategy of "luring the enemy in deep" for a more forward defense
posture,2 but the Soviets have a good opportunity at present to
deal from strength. While they presumably remain unwilling to
make moves which would significantly alter the military balance,
they could:
-- Withdraw or deactivate one or more of their ground force
divisions stationed in the Soviet Far East near the
Chinese border. Units guarding strategic targets, such as
the Trans-Siberian Railroad or the Vladivostok naval base,
probably would not be pulled out, but other units in that
area could be moved and not have a major impact on Soviet
capabilities.
-- Withdraw some SS-20s from areas close to China. The
Soviets would, however, have a hard time finding
alternative sites that would not have adverse effects on
European arms negotiations.
A leadership decision to remove significant numbers of
Soviet troops from the Chinese border would test Gorbachev's grip
on the Soviet Ministry of Defense. There are signs that he has
been managing leadership relations with the military pretty well
so far, and in the end would probably get his way on ChJnPsP
border cuts of the size contemplated in this analysis.
Reducing the Soviet Presence in Mongolia
While determined to keep Mongolia in the Soviet camp, the
Kremlin could undertake any one of several moves to alleviate
Beijing's concern over the extent to which Mongolia has been
transformed into a staging area for an offensive Soviet drive
into China. The five Soviet divisions stationed in Mongolia are
the most combat-ready Soviet ground forces facing China. These
divisions, plus the three divisions that the Mongolians now have,
have acquired added importance in recent years as a counterweight
to the Chinese buildup on the Vietnamese border. The Soviets
could withdraw one or more divisions at this time, however,
without seriously eroding their overall security situation.
Indeed, they would only be trimming their military presence in
Mongolia back to its level during the 1970s. A move of this sort
would not necessarily call into question Moscow's support for
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
Ulaanbaatar, and it could easily be reversed by reintroducing the
withdrawn units if Sino-Soviet relations worsened.
-- Moscow also could make a greater effort to promote a Sino-
Mongolian political dialogue, especially if the Chinese
gave any sign of a willingness to negotiate a
nonaggression pact or an agreement on nonuse of force with
the Mongolians.
-- The Soviets may regard the consular pact signed during the
recent visit to Mongolia by a Chinese vice foreign
minister, the first agreement of its kind between China
and Mongolia in over 20 years, as an earnest of Chinese
good intentions toward Mongolia
We have examined the possibility that Moscow might, as a
more significant gesture, offer to keep all regular ground force
units, as distinguished from KGB border guards, some distance--
say, 30 kilometers--from the Chinese border. Such an offer could
even be part of a package of confidence-building measures (CBMs)
that also provided for advance notice of any military exercises
or major troop movements within, say, 200 kilometers of the
border, better cross-border communications, and the like.
Our analysis of the Soviet force posture along the bores
indicates, however, that creation of such a narrow "demilitarized
zone" would require the USSR to relocate some seven divisions and
dicmantla an extensive system of fortified zones along the border
A move of this magnitude would, in our view, be
we beyond the kinds of gestures examined so far and have
significant strategic implications. It would, for example,
require the Soviets to leave long segments of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad unprotected, and probably would have large cost
implications. Accordingly, we believe that such a demilitarized
zone, while probably impressive to the Chinese, would be such an
important military concession by the Soviets that it would be
seriously considered only as part of a major political
agreement.
Implications
Although all of these possible gestures would fall well
short of Beijing's stated demands regarding the "threat from the
North," they would point to a Soviet willingness to discuss
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
SECRET
Chinese concerns in that area seriously. In time, moreover, they,
might lead to further progress on the Sino-Soviet border dispute,
significant force reductions on both sides of that line, or some
sort of an understanding on Mongolia.
If the two sides were to make progress on any of these
issues, it would be the most significant development in their
relationship since the low point in 1969, following the sharp
clashes along their border. Moscow and Beijing would,- of course,
still have major differences--especially over Afghanistan and the
Vietnam/Cambodia question. But even a hint that the Soviets and
Chinese were making progress toward what Gorbachev termed "the
creation of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness" along China's
northern perimeter would have an impact in the West, complicating
US and allied dealings with both the USSR and China.
There could, at the same time, be certain negative
consequences for the Soviets. In particular, the Japanese would
almost certainly regard any Soviet concessions to the Chinese on
their border dispute as a precedent for their own territorial
claims against the USSR. The Japanese might well fail to
recognize the differences between the two cases, and decide to
press their claims to the Northern Territories with more vigor in
the future, believing that this approach would eventually force
the Soviets to return at least some of the islands to Japan. By
the same token, Hanoi and Kabul could well become a good deal
more worried about the possibility that Moscow might sacrifice
their interests to its own. and thus seek even more in the way of
Soviet reassurances.
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Map 1
Chimnaya island (Hei-fiazi)
Ooundary Shown On
Chinese maps
Amur
ore,
aoundary shown on
Russian maps
Soviet Union
Disputed Areas
? on the
Sino-Soviet Border
Principal areas In dispute between China and the
Soviet Union. Chinese Claim the Soviets hold islands in
the Amur and Ussuri and areas in the Pamirs which
were not given to Tsarist Russia even by the 'uneque;
treaties' of the 19th century.
w~wtM / w1I ~.
N COwOO -C.-Iwerw Cam
C h i n a
inset
North
Korea .
South
Korea
asw.o ree .r?uw ?
Sit MtNY~Si SSSS' I M
Island
(Meina`.)
Khsbsrevsd
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
,72(T
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution
White House
The Honorable Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
NSC
White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
USSR-Eastern Europe
NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
Ron St. Martin
Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
Robert Lilac
Director, Political-Military Affairs
NSC
Room 391, EOB
James H. Kelly, Jr.
Senior Staff Member
East Asia
NSC
State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327, Department of State
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
The Honorable Veron A. Walters
US Ambassador to the United Nations
US Mission to the UN
Department of State
5ZtRETF 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Inititatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
Ambassador Gaston J. Siqur
Assistant Secretary
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205, Department of State
James Lilley
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205, Department of State
Thomas Simon
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6219, Department of State
Robert W. Drexler
Director, Regional Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4210, Department of State
Sherrod McCall
Director, Office of Research and Analysis
for East Asia and Pacific
INR
Room 8840, Department of State
Galen Fox
Chief, Northeast Asia Division
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific
Room 8840, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
SECRET
SUBJB2T: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
State
Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
Richard Solomon
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311, Department of State
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
Room 4E808, Pentagon
The Honorable Fred C. We
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4D825, Pentagon
Andrew Marshall
Director of Net Assessment
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Room 3A930, Pentagon
Col. David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Roan 3A948, Pentagon
Carl Jackson
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East and Pacific Affairs
Room 4D825, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. John M. Mollering, USA
Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, Pentagon
SECRET I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Initiatives Along The Chinese Border
External Distribution (Continued)
DOD
Vice Admiral Powell Carter
Director
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS
Roam 2E936, Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Politico-Military Affairs
DIA
Room 2C238, Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Room 2E466, Pentagon
Maj. Gen. Schuyler Bissell, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
RADM Willliam 0. Studeman
Director of Naval Intelligence
5C572, Pentagon
Other
Lt. Gen. William E. 0dam, USA
Director, NSA
T532/CDB
Fort Meade, MD
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
ant I
Central lnteIIigi ..
Washington, D.C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 September 1986
Possible Chinese Responses to Gorbachev's Speech
Summary
We believe China will seize the opportunity presented by
Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech to push for further Soviet concessions, to
increase Chinese leverage with the United States, to explore ways to
reduce the Soviet threat to China, and to sow concern in Hanoi about the
reliability of Soviet support. Domestically, Deng may see an opportunity
to set the course for China's relations with the USSR before he hands over
power to his successors, leaving them free to focus on the reform
program.
In our judgment, China has not changed its fundamental
assessment of the Soviet threat--nor is it even reevaluating it. By
publicly calling for Soviet concessions on Cambodia, Beijing has placed a
constraint on how far it can go with Moscow and tried to reassure
Washington. In responding to Gorbachev, we believe Beijing will attempt
to probe for and encourage additional concessions from Moscow without
alarming the United States and China's Asian friends or allowing Moscow
This memorandum was prepared by
Office o as Asian Analysis. Information available as of 4
ep em er luft was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, International Security Branch, China Division, OEA,
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
LJ/\ I
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
to exploit a Sino-Soviet dialogue to enhance Soviet leverage in the
triangle. In keeping with its "independent foreign policy," moreover, China
will continue to send mixed signals in its press commentary on both
Soviet and US actions.
When the ninth round of bilateral consultations begins in Beijing in
October, we believe, in addition to pressing on Afghanistan and Cambodia,
Beijing will push Moscow to:
? Withdraw the majority of Soviet troops from
Mongolia.
? Pull back troops from its border with China.
? Reduce SS-20s deployed in the Soviet Far East.
? Curtail reconnaissance flights against China
through North Korean airspace.
? Relinquish Chimnaya/Heixiazi Island across from
Khabarovsk.
to our judgment, significant Soviet concessions in at least one area
could induce China to make one or more of the following
counter-concessions:
? Conclude a mutual nonaggression pact with Mongolia.
? Revive Sino-Soviet border talks.
? Agree to confidence-building gestures along its northern border.
? Set dates for foreign ministerial talks.
? Expand Soviet access to senior Chinese leaders.
? Increase working-level exchanges and consultations
We believe the Chinese will continue to rebuff Soviet efforts to
reestablish party ties and will not agree to a summit between Gorbachev
and either preeminent Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping or General Secretary
Hu Yaobang prior to significant Soviet concessions on Cambodia and
Afghanistan. China will most likely normalize party relations with Eastern
Europe--a move apparently sanctioned by Moscow as a way to facilitate
possible normalization of Sino-Soviet party ties later--to promote Chinese
influence in the region at Moscow's expense. The Chinese also will
cont~ o expand defense and economic ties with the United State
SECRE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Beijing's Soviet Policy on the Eve of Gorbachev's Speech
In the months preceding Gorbachev's speech on 28 July, the Chinese increasingly
exhibited signs of frustration with Moscow's refusal to follow up its smooth rhetoric
with concessions on any of what China calls the "three obstacles" to improved relations:
Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan, and the deployment of Soviet troops in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet
border. Beijing last year tried to encourage Gorbachev to reassess Moscow's hardline
policies toward China's security concerns by agreeing--without corresponding Soviet
concessions--to resume long-suspended trade union and parliamentary relations and to
exchange visits by their foreign ministers in 1986. We believe these moves were also
designed to increase Beijing's leverage with Washington.'
Moscow's continued intransigence at the last three biannual Sino-Soviet
consultations and its blatant efforts to exploit the impression of improved Sino-Soviet
ties to enhance its position vis-a-vis Washington, however, caused Beijing to brand
Gorbachev's foreign policy as meaningless "smile diplomacy" and to back away from the
exchange of foreign ministers. We believe Beijing chilled political relations for two
reasons. First, the Chinese wanted to remind Moscow that the Soviets must address at
least one of the "three obstacles" if gradual normalization of relations were to continue.
At the same time, the Chinese sought to reassure the United States, Thailand, Pakistan,
and others that China remained committed to resisting the security threat posed by the
Indeed, Soviet military developments prior to Gorbachev's speech did little to
persuade Beijing that Moscow had altered its long-term strategy of encircling China.
Although Gorbachev has not deployed any new ground forces or SS-20s in the Far East,
he has markedly stepped up reconnaissance flights targeting the Chinese coast
exoanded the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and upgraded Soviet airpower in the region
SECRE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
25X1
2bAl
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Gorbachev's Proposals
In his speech given in Vladivostok on 28 July, Gorbachev made the
following new proposals concerning China:
? The Soviet Union will withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan by
year's end.
? Moscow is ready to discuss "concrete steps" to reduce land forces
along the Sino-Soviet border.
? Soviet and Mongolian leaders are examining the removal of a
"substantial part" of what we believe to be approximately 60,000
Soviet troops in Mongolia.
? The Soviet Union and China could cooperate in space exploration.
Gorbachev once again:
? Proposed bilateral discussions "any time, and at any level"
on improving relations.
? Suggested the official boundary on the Amur River might pass
along the main shipping channel instead of the Chinese bank.
(Although this is the first time Moscow has publicly proposed
this boundary formula, the Soviets did so privately as early
as 1964.)
? Resurrected his call last year for a Helsinki-style Asian
security conference.
? Reiterated Soviet willingness to establish a rail link between
Soviet Kazakhstan and Chinese Xinjiang.
? Endorsed already-begun bilateral negotiations to jointly develop
the Amur River Basin.
SECRE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
Factors Governing China's Response
statements by senior Chinese officials indicate that Beijing
sees Gorbachev's proposals as failing to address China's top security
concerns--Vietnam's efforts to expand its influence at China's expense and Soviet
efforts to encircle China militarily.3 Chinese strategic thinkers have also stressed E
not changed.
that China's assessment of the Soviet threat has
Nonetheless, we believe China has compelling reasons to begin a dialogue with
Moscow on Gorbachev's proposal. In our judgment, Beijing believes further marginal
improvements in Sino-Soviet relations would:
? Buy time for China to modernize its forces along the border. Beijing is in the
process of implementing a new defense strategy that it believes requires at least
a decade of reduced tensions to become completely credible."
? Stimulate competition between Moscow and Washington to woo Beijing.
? Increase tension in Soviet-Vietnamese relations, a major Chinese goal, by playing
on Hanoi's fear of being sold out by Moscow. Vietnam periodically dispatches
delegations to Moscow to seek reassurances of Soviet support.
? Assist domestic political goals.
At the same time, Beijing is well aware that too positive a response to
Gorbachev's proposals could jeopardize its access to US, Japanese, and Western
European advanced technology, investment, trade, and defense cooperation--major
Chinese political goals. Nor does Beijing want to signal its friends and enemies in
Southeast and South Asia that it might reconsider its stand on Cambodia and
Afghanistan. Therefore, we believe China will attempt to:
25X1
25X1
25X1
SECRET NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
? Encourage Soviet -flexibility while continuing to criticize on the three obstacles
and other security issues.
? Probe for major Soviet concessions on the three obstacles and China's northern
boundary.
? Reassure Washington of China's pro-Western tilt without forgoing the option of
being able to play the "Soviet card."
? Reduce Moscow's ability to play the "China card" against Washington.
? Keep Thailand and Pakistan from wavering on Cambodia and Afghanistan.
Domestic Fallout from the Gorbachev Speech
Deng and his reform allies can gain in two areas from some further
relaxation in Sino-Soviet relations, in our view. First, any reduction in tensions
tends to benefit China's economic modernization program. Second, progress on
the issue should smooth the transition to power for Deng's successors.
We believe Deng has designed many of China's foreign policy initiatives,
most notably closer relations with the West, to support his economic reforms.
Consequently, although he distrusts the Soviets, Deng would probably be willing
to be more flexible if he believes he can win real Soviet concessions that can
help his modernization goals. Avoidance of border tensions allows a more
measured pace of military modernization and frees transport, manpower, and
other resources. Deng may also hope to expand exports of goods China cannot
trade elsew gain further Soviet assistance in modernizing Soviet-built
On the political front, Deng may see an opportunity to set China's Soviet
policy before he hands power over to his successors. We believe that Deng has
kept foreign policy issues closely under his own control, relying on his personal
prestige and influence to manage this sensitive area. Deng's successors will
not have his personal clout and therefore might be more vulnerable to groups
that either have a different foreign policy orientation or seek to exploit foreign
affairs for domestic political ends. The more Deng can stabilize relations with
Moscow and win agreement on how to proceed, the more likely we believe his
successors will to carry on the reform program with a minimum of
distraction.
In our estimation, Deng's conservative opponents, who argued last year
for a more flexible approach to the Soviets, cannot capitalize politically on
Gorbachev's initiatives. We believe that recent political developments have
greatly weakened the conservatives--especially those at the top--and have
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
made it increasingly unlikely that the conservatives will be able to challenge
Deng. In any case, it is our judgment that the conservatives are suspicious of
both the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, while there is some support
among the conservatives for more distant relations with Washington, we also
see very little active pressure for closer political relations with Moscow.
Possible Chinese Responses
We believe the Chinese will use scheduled contacts over the next several weeks
to seek further indications of Soviet intentions, but the ninth round of vice foreign
ministerial consultations in Beijing in October provides the best venue to engage the
Soviets in a meaningful dialogue on Gorbachev's proposals. Outlined below is our
speculation about what the Chinese may say in October and why.
Security issues. Remarks by Chinese strategic thinkers support our judgment
that China will not be satisfied with Gorbachev's implicit pledge to freeze the number of
SS-20s in the Far East or his explicit promise not to relocate in the region any SS-20s
that might be removed from Europe. We believe the Chinese will continue to press for
their total withdrawal. We also expect China to protest overflights of North Korea by
Soviet reconnaissance planes targeting the Chinese coast, Moscow's expansion of its
Pacific fleet, and the upgrading of Soviet airpower in the Far East.
We nevertheless believe that the Chinese view Gorbachev's offer to withdraw
troops from Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border as an important unilateral gesture. If
the Soviets commit themselves to withdraw one or more of their five divisions in
Mongolia--a move that would not jeopardize Soviet or Mongolian security--Beijing
could reciprocate in a number of ways without compromising its own security. Chinese
options include:
? Announcing the "deactivation" of the 69th Field Arm o osite Mongolia
F___
? Agreeing to warn each other of military exercises or major troop movements
near the Sino-Mongolian border.
? Pulling back tank regiments from selected border defense divisions along the
Mongolian frontier.
If the Soviets go beyond a token withdrawal and pull back most if not all of their forces
from Mongolia, we believe the Chinese would be willing to go further, perhaps signing a
friendship treaty with Mongolia that would renounce any claim to Mongolian territory
and serve as a de facto mutual nonaggression pact--something the Soviets have been
seeking
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
We believe a Soviet proposal to negotiate some sort of demilitarized zone along
the Sino-Soviet border would be far less attractive to China than deactivation of Soviet
divisions. Beijing has always expressed greater concern about the number of Soviet
divisions in the Far East than about their proximity to the Chinese border. Nonetheless,
if the Soviets offered to pull back all regular ground units 30 kilometers from the border,
China, in our judgment, could respond by transfering northern border security duties
from the PLA to the People's Armed Police.
deployed 100 kilometers back, leaving small
Expanded Political Contacts
China's cautious response to Gorbachev's initiative comes amidst a flurry
of high-level exchanges with the Soviet Union and Mongolia that we believe is
a combination of earlier scheduling, Chinese interest in Gorbachev's proposals,
and Moscow's desire to portray Sino-Soviet relations as improving:
? Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov arrived in China for
"acupuncture treatment" on the eve of Gorbachev's speech
and met with Vice Premiers Li Peng, Wan Li, and Yao Yilin
before returning to Moscow on 26 August. According to a
Western press account, Arkhipov presented the Chinese
with an advance copy of the speech.
? Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing proceeded with
a long-scheduled trip to Mongolia--the highest-level
Chinese visit to that country in over 20 years--which
culminated in the signing of a consular treaty on
9 August. This treaty is consistent with similar
agreements Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian signed in Berlin
and Budapest in late spring, but takes on added signifi-
cance because it follows on the heels of Gorbachev's
Mongolian overture, which the two sides also discussed.
? Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong began a two-week visit to
Moscow 17 August, the first such mayoral visit since
the 1950s.
? Soviet Deputy Premier and Alternate Politburo member
Talyzin, possibly accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister
Rogachev, is scheduled to visit China in early September
as the guest of Vice Premier Li Peng.
the Chinese in early May
pushed for the visit of a deputy premier to reciprocate
for Vice Premier Yao Yilin's visit in July 1985. Talyzin's
visit is in response to this, but its timing nevertheless
fortuitously strengthens the impression of improved ties
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
following Gorbachev's speech.
? We expect Wu and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to
discuss Gorbachev's proposals in the third annual Sino-Soviet
foreign ministerial meeting at the opening of the UNGA in
September in New York.
? Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and President Li
Xiannian will host a visit to China by East German
General Secretary and President Honecker in October.
Honecker's visit to China--the first such trip in many
years by a Soviet bloc party leader other than Romania's
Ceaucescu--and the expected reestablishment of party ties
most likely signal similar developments with other East
European Communist parties. Although intended by Beijing
to increase Chinese influence in East Europe, Honecker's
party position and the certainty that Moscow has
approved his trip nonetheless will give the visit a
Sino-Soviet focus as well.
? Rogachev in October will lead the Soviet delegation
to Beijing for the ninth round of Sino-Soviet vice
ministerial consultations.
Boundary Talks. We think it likely that China could decide to reopen formal
border negotiations, which broke down in 1978 after Beijing publicly insisted on Soviet
withdrawal from disputed areas and added a new demand that Moscow reduce its forces
along the Sino-Soviet border to the level of Khrushchev's time.5 Gorbachev's
acceptance of the deepest channel (thalweg) of the Amur River as the line of
demarcation gives China most of the disputed islands in the river. Ownership of
Chimnaya (Heixiazi) Island opposite Khabarovsk, however, is likely to be a sticking point,
and any negotiations on the border are likely to be protracted as both parties weigh the
impact on disputes with other nations.
Amur River Basin and Railway Cooperation. China earlier this year reopened to
Soviet shipping the port of Tongjiang on the Songhua River near the Amur, and we
believe the two sides will sign an agreement on use of the basin based on their recent
expert-level negotiations. China has announced that it plans to extend the
Harbin-Longzhen railway 240 kilometers to Aihui on the Amur River and might cooperate
with the Soviets in building a rail bridge across the Amur between Aihui and
Blagoveshchensk to facilitate border trade. In the west, China plans to add some 400
kilometers to the single-track Lanzhou-Urumqi railway, extending it to within 80
5 Prior to 1964, the Soviets deployed only 11 active ground-combat divisions with
fewer than 3,500 tanks and armored vehicles opposite China.
SECRE1I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
kilometers of the Soviet railway terminus at Druzhba. We would not be surprised if
Beijing accelerated its construction schedule and agreed to connect the two railways as
a sign of goodwill to. Moscow.
Areas Where Beijing is Unlikely to Accommodate Moscow
Beijing has stated it will not compromise with Moscow on Afghanistan and
Cambodia, and we believe China will hold significant improvements in political
relations--such as party ties and a Deng/Hu-Gorbachev summit--hostage to meaningful
Soviet movement on these "obstacles." China probably calculates that even the hint of
China's flexibility on these issues would greatly harm its credibility with the United
States, and such Asian friends as Pakistan and Thailand. Moreover, we believe the
Chinese will attempt to assuage their friends' natural suspicions of any Sino-Soviet
border agreement, and may couple progress in one area with stepped-up criticism of
Soviet activity elsewhere, especially Cambodia and Afghanistan. We expect the Chinese
to reject Gorbachev's proposed Asian security conference, as they have in the past.
Beijing also will not, in our view, agree to forswear the option of strategic cooperation
with Washington against Moscow.
Finally, Beijing's pride in its own space-launch capabilities most likely will keep
China from taking Gorbachev up on his offer to join the ranks of Mongolia, Cuba, and
various East European satellites as a junior partner in the Soviet space program. The
Chinese, moreover, have alread ex ressed interest in a US invitation to participate in a
future space shuttle mission
Positive Signals China Can Send in Other Areas
Even if the Chinese rule out concessions specifically linked to Gorbachev's
proposals on the grounds that Gorbachev merely responded to earlier Chinese gestures,
they could nevertheless reward Gorbachev and encourage further Soviet concessions in
other ways. Possible moves might include:
? Expanding Soviet access to senior Chinese leaders.
? Increasing consultations between working-level officials on international issues,
including relations with the United States.
? Regularly exchanging views (but not intelligence) between think tank experts on
economic development and foreign policy issues.
? Proceeding with the exchange of foreign ministerial visits.
? Exchanging visits by editors of Pravda and People's Daily.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
Without significant progress on Afghanistan or Cambodia, however, we- believe
the Chinese remain highly unlikely to agree to a summit between Gorbachev and Deng
Xiaoping or Hu- Yaobang. Such a move would be too close to a resumption of party
ties, which Beijing probably believes would give the Soviets excessive leverage within
the strategic triangle while underminin 's credibility as an independent actor in
We expect the Chinese to try to use Gorbachev's initiative to encourage US
concessions on Taiwan, trade, and technology transfer, although Chinese officials in
private probably will take pains to reassure the United States and others of China's
continued goodwill. Beijing, in our judgment, will use Defense Secretary Weinberger's
coming visit and the first port call to China by US Navy warships this fall both to press
the Soviets in October for concessions on Gorbachev's proposals and other security
concerns, such as Soviet reconnaissance overflights of North Korea against China, and
to balance any improvements in ties with Moscow. China will also closely monitor
developments in US-USSR relations as a possible Reagan-Gorbachev summit
approaches, out of concern that Beijing may be caught behind the curve. Finally, in
keeping with its "independent foreign policy," China will to send mixed signals
in its press commentary on both Soviet and US actions. 7
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
SUBJECT: Possible Chinese Responses to Gorbachev's Speech
DISTRIBUTION:
White House and National Security Council
Copy 1 The Honorable Alton Keel, Deputy Assistant to the President,
White House.
Copy 2 James H. Kelly, Jr., Senior Staff Member, East Asia, EOB Rm 302.
Copy 3 James P. Covey, Near East & South Asia Affairs Senior
Director, EOB Rm 348.
Copy 4 Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President,
White House Rm 298.
Copy 5 David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
EOB Rm 302.
Copy 6 Amb. Jack Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for the
USSR and Eastern Europe, EOB Rm 368.
Copy 7 Ron St. Martin, Crisis Management Center Director, EOB Rm 303.
Copy 8 Robert Lilac, Director of Political-Military Affairs, NSC, EOB Rm 391.
Department of State
Copy 9 The Honorable Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Rm 6205.
Copy 10 Amb. Morton Abramowitz, Director INR, Rm 6531.
Copy 11 Herbert Levin, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
Copy 12 David N. Schwartz, Office of Policy Analysis, Rm 7430.
Copy 13 Richard Williams, Director, EAP/C, Rm 4318.
Copy 14 AMB H. Alan Holmes, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Rm 7327.
Copy 15 Richard Devillafranca, Bureau of Political Military Affairs,
Room 7430.
Copy 16 Doug Paal, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
Copy 17 Mark A. Sigler, INR/PMA, Rm 6524A.
Copy 18 Jack Sontag, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
Copy 19 The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Rm 7240.
Copy 20 The Honorable Vernon A. Walters, US Ambassador to the UN, USUN,
Department of State.
Copy 21 The Honorable Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary, European and
Canadian Affairs, Rm 6226.
Copy 22 James Lilley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Rm 6205.
Copy 23 Thomas Simon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and Canadian
Affairs, Rm 6219.
Copy 24 Robert W. Drexler, Director, EAP/RA, Rm 4210.
Copy 25 Thomas Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
Copy 26 Louis G. Sarris, Acting Director, INR/EAP, Rm 8840.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
Copy 27 Mark R. Parris, Director, EUR/SOV, Rm 4217.
Copy 28 Robert H. Baraz, Director, INR/SEE, Rm 4758.
Copy 29 Peter W. Colm, INR/SEE/FOR, Rm 4843.
Copy 30 Wayne Limberg, Chief, INR/SEE/FP, Rm 4843.
Copy 31 Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7311.
Department of Defense
Copy 32 Colonel David R. Brown, Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Rm 3A948.
Copy 33 The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Rm 4E808, Pentagon.
Copy 34 Rear Admiral Baker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Rm 4E817, Pentagon.
Copy 35 Gerald D. Sullivan, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for
International Programs, Defense Research and Engineering,
Rm 30161, Pentagon.
Copy 36 Major General Schuyler Bissell, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Rm 4A932, Pentagon.
Copy 37 Major William Suggs, Office of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, DAMI-FII, Rm 2A474, Pentagon.
Copy 38 Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein, Army Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Rm 2E466, Pentagon.
Copy 39 Lieutenant Colonel Eden Woon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Rm 2E973 Pentagon.
Copy 40 Lieutenant Colonel Gary Weis, ISA, Rm 4C849, Pentagon
Copy 41 John J. Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and
Pacific, Rm 2C238 Pentagon.
Copy 42 Ron Montaperto, JSI-3A, Rm 1C945, Pentagon.
Copy 43 DIA/DB-2B, Rm C2837, DIAC.
Copy 44 DIA/AT-3/China, Rm 1120, Pompano
Plaza West.
Copy 45 Darnell Whitt, Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary,
International Security Policy, Rm 4E838, Pentagon.
Copy 46 Richard J. Millies, HQ USAF/CVAIP, Rm 4C1074, Pentagon.
Copy 47 Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Under
Secretary for Policy, Rm 3A948, Pentagon.
Copy 48 Carl Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Rm 40825, Pentagon.
Copy 49 Lieutenant General John M. Mollering, USA, Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rm 2E872, Pentagon.
Copy 50 Lieutenant General Dale A. Vesser, Director, J-5 Plans and Policy,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rm 2E996, Pentagon.
Copy 51 Vice Admiral Powell Carter, Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS,
Rm 2E936, Pentagon.
Copy 52 Dr. Wynfred Joshua, DIO for European and Soviet Politico-Military
Affairs, DIA, Rm 2C238, Pentagon.
Copy 53 Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Rm 5C572, Pentagon.
SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88G01117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
Copy 54
Copy 55
Copy 56
Copy 57
ChiLuf -Group, Rm 3W106, Fort Meade.
NSA/B-7, Rm 2S015, Ft. Meade.
hief NSA/B71, Rm 2S052, Ft. Meade.
DIA
/DB-2B1, , Rm C2168, DIAC.
Department of Energy
Copy 58 Douglas Faulkner, DOE/DP-421, GA-257, Forrestal Bldg.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Copy 59 Chief, NPIC/IEG/EAD,
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy 60 DDI (7E44)
Copy 61 C/ACTS (6F20)
Copy 62 NIO/EA (7E62)
Copy 63 NIO/NESA (7E62)
Copy 64 C/EA/RR (5D10)
Copy 65 C/DDO/EA/CORR (5038)
Copy 66 DDO/EA/CO/SA (5054)
Copy 67 C/PES (7F24)
Copy 68 NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
Copy 69 PDB Staff (7F30)
Copy 70 CPAS/ILS (7G50)
Copy 71-75 CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
Copy 76 C/OCR/DSG/EA (1H18)
Copy 77 D/NESA
Copy 78 D/SOVA (4E58)
Copy 79 D/SOVA/TWAD/T (4E28)
Copy 80 D/OSWR (5F46)
Copy 82 Senior Review Panel (5G00)
Copy 83 D/OIA (Bldg 213 3N100)
Copy 84 C/OIA/TWD/AB (Bldg 213 3N147)
Copy 85 D/OEA (4F18)
Copy 86 C/OEA/PROD (4G48)
Copy 87 C/OEA/NEA (4G43)
Copy 88 C/OEA/SEA (4F38)
Copy 89 C/OEA/CH (4G32)
Copy 90-91 C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
Copy 92-94 C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
Copy 95 C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
Copy 96-97 C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9 25X1
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000903350002-9