ISSUES FOR NSC U.S. SPACE LAUNCH STRATEGY NSDD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000501600001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 15, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88G01117R000501600001-8
Used by DCI for 15 May 86 NSC.
ISSUES FOR NSC U.S. SPACE LAUNCH STRATEGY NSDD
Background
Meeting is culmination of deliberations on national space la
recovery since Challenger disaster. SIG (Space) reviewed issue.
? D/ICS represented you on SIG (Space) and ICS served on thi
The agenda is:
-
Introduction
John M. Poindexter
-- Background
(10 minutes)
-- Issues for Decisions
-
Senior Interagency Group
Gerald M. May (NSC)
Study Findings
(15 minutes)
-
OMB Funding Options
Randall Davis (OMB)
(5 minutes)
-
Discussion
All participants
(25 minutes)
-
Summary
John M. Poindexter
(5 minutes)
Potential Issue #1: Commercial Space Transportation
? Competition with U.S. industry is not STS but rather ARIANE V and
other foreign launchers
? Because of large up-front costs ($1B) and market uncertainties, U.S.
industry must have tangible incentive to make required investment
Incentive begins with NSDD policy and may involve Government support
during development
National security significantly benefits from.conmercial medium-range
lift capability for small payload satellites
? Position: A competitive commercial expendable launch vehicle
capability is of first-order national importance
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CONFIDENTIAL
Potential Issue #2: Procurement of Fourth Orbiter
? Postponing the procurement of a fourth orbiter in favor of developing
an STS follow-on system would mandate reliance on an orbiter fleet with little
or no backup for 7 - 10 years
? Position: A fourth orbiter is in the best interests of national
security even though it would be based on dated technology
Potential Issue #3: Delay in Vandenberg Shuttle Launch Complex Operational
Capability
? Discussion of Vandenberg not included in draft NSDD
NASA may want to introduce wording in NSDD to require VAFB capability
NASA view is that any decision to delay VAFB can be read as reducing
national security commitment to shuttle program and undermines fourth orbiter
procurement
? Position: Should resist as not required in the policy document
-- Specific wording reduces future flexibility
-- Current Vandenberg mothball proposal maximizes operational
capability at Kennedy in the near term
-- Vandenberg could be reactivated when new fourth orbiter becomes
operational and in time to support national security launch (October 1991)
Potential Issue #4: Supplemental Funding Approaches
? Overlaying the entire discussion is how to pay for the supplemental
to recover from Challenger accident
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CONFIDENTIAL
? OMB position is that DOD and NASA should identify offsets to fund
- OMB alleges that NASA has identified offsets
- Messrs. Weinberger/Taft strongly resist coming up with offsets
Position: Support DOD in this area as offset drill may require
sources from NFIP
Potential Issue #5: Whether the Draft NSDD Should "Supercede" or "Update"
NSDD 164 - National Security Launch Strategy
? NSDD 164, dated 25 February 1985, outlines in very specific terms
shuttle launch rates (24/year), DOD share of launches (at least one-third of
available STS flights) and pricing policy
? NASA favors using "updates" wording to keep basic tenets of this
policy in tact
? DOD believes this document should supercede the certain paragraphs
dealing with the above specifics
? NSDD 164 was the source for press allegations that the White House
put pressure on NASA to maintain artificial flight rate ("24/year")
Flight rates and pricing policy will undoubtedly change as a result
of Challenger aftermath and TITAN accidents
? Position: If raised, support DOD in inserting "supercedes paragraphs
2, 3, and 4 of NSDD 164" vice "updates . . ." as this will preserve your
flexibility for operational requirements and cost-effective launch options
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