LUNCHEON MEETING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WHITEHEAD, MICHAEL ARMACOST, MORT ABRAMOWITZ, CLAIR GEORGE AND DICK KERR, FRIDAY, 20 JUNE, 1200, AT STATE DEPARTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000501380002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DDCI
Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State
JOE' ~EERE~
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead,
Michael Armacost, Mort Abramowitz, Clair George and
Dick Kerr, Friday, 20 June, 1200, at State Department
NO TAB SSCI Testimony on Regional Security Policy. Armacost has indicated a
nnrT will hp nrPnPntin2 next Tuesday before the SSCI.
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TOP SECRET
TAB C DDCI Appearance Before Secretary Shultz's Advisory Committee on South
Africa. The DDCI intends to raise with Armacost this invitation to appear
at the 10 July meeting of this group before responding to the invitation.
At Tab C is a rundown on the membership of the Committee.
TAB D Moscow and an Angolan Offensive. We still are getting conflicting
evidence on whether there will be large-scale offensive operations against
UNITA this year. A variety of reports suggest that Luanda is concerned
that falling oil prices would hinder its abilities to sustain operations
and that its forces should concentrate on defending high-value economic
targets in the north instead of going after UNITA's stonghold in the south.
suggests that the
Soviets also are arguing against a major o ens ve. Our analysts in SOVA
don't buy this and believe that such reporting may well be Soviet
disinformation. They point out that:
-- Angola holds out a particularly tempting near-term opportunity for the
Soviets to back up commitments made in recent months to defend their
Third World allies.
-- The Soviets may calculate that Pretoria presently preoccupied with
internal problems will be less willing and able to bring force to bear
in Angola in support of UNITA this time around.
But the thing that weighs most heavy with our analysts is the fact
that the Soviets, since last fall's government offensive, have been
pumping record amounts of military equipment into Angola.
-- Over the last couple of months at least a dozen and perhaps as many as
20 MIG-23 fighters have been delivered.
-- Nineteen arms carrier ships have visited Angola since last November
bringing at least 8 MI-25 attack helicopters, 20 MI-17 transport
helicopters, more than 300 trucks, jeeps, vans and armored cars, radar
and communications equipment and hundreds of tons of aircraft spare
parts.
While some of this equipment makes up for losses in last year's
campaign, the Soviets clearly have been augmenting Angolan offensive
capabilities. At Tab D is a fuller SOVA argument.
DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
2
TOP SECRET
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Recent Soviet Proposals on ABM, ASAT, and Space Weapons
At the 29 May session of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) the Soviets
proposed that the United States and USSR strengthen the 1972 ABM Treaty by
agreeing not to withdraw from the treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years. The
proposal "assumes" that agreement on non-withdrawal would imply compliance
with all obligations contained in the treaty including the ban on "large-
scale" ABM systems and the prohibition on the development, testing and
deployment of space-based systems and components.
The Soviet proposal calls for agreement on the following definitions "to
avoid difficulties in understanding the treaty provisions:"
-- The obligation not to develop space-based ABM systems or components
"would" mean banning the construction and testing of mock-ups and test
models of ABM systems or components in or outside of laboratories.
-- A component "would" be understood to mean any space-based device
capable of being part of an ABM system and capable of being used for
tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory, guiding kill systems toward them, or actually destroying
them.
-- A mock-up "could" mean a simplified version of the weapon being
developed that is used to check out the operational characteristics of
the weapon design.
-- A test model or prototype "could" mean a device that reproduces the
actual weapon being developed and that is used to verif the
operational and design specifications of the weapon. 25X1
The proposal calls for each side to use national technical means to monitor
whether mock-ups or test models (prototypes) of space-based ABMs have appeared
outside the laboratory for testing and to open relevant laboratories to allow
the other side to verify that no work on the development of mock-ups or test
models (prototypes) of such systems or components is being conducted inside.
The Soviets emphasized that none of the proposed definitions were final
and that they should be considered as "guidelines for discussion," and they
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admitted that there were ambiguities in them. In particular, the use of the
term "could" in the definitions for mock-up and test model may indicate that
the Soviets are relatively less certain about the definitions they have
assigned them. Their definition for "component," on the other hand, seems
more clearly to reflect Soviet concerns and negotiating objectives. The
Soviets acknowledged that the ABM Treaty definition for component applies only
to systems existing at the time the treaty was drafted and not to those based
on other physical principles. They said they had concluded that a clearer
definition for space-based ABM components is required because it is not
apparent what part of a space-based ABM system would replace an ABM
interceptor, radar or launcher, that they want to make the definition specific
to new technologies, and that the term "component" would refer only to major
space-based elements of an ABM system. Their proposed definition for
"development" would cover the same activities that they had sought to ban in
the previous rounds even though they have now dropped the phrase "including
scientific research." It appears to reflect continuing Soviet concern that
real weapon capabilities can exist without test demonstrations and that the
United States could use the results of SDI research for early strategic
defense deployments.
In informal conversations about the Soviet proposal, one member of the
Soviet negotiating team claimed that the Soviets were prepared to consider
time frames other than the 15-20 year period they had suggested but that they
did not believe a lesser period could be justified. Another member of the
Soviet negotiating team commented that the suggested period was based on the
program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 proposed by General
Secretary Gorbachev in January. Other members of the Soviet delegation
explained that the USSR was proposing definitions only for space-based ABM
systems and components because they are the subject of the NST negotiations.
If the United States is interested in extending definitions to the other
systems and components of Article V, they said, the Soviets would be prepared
to discuss them.
At the 3 June session, the Soviets proposed two other agreements. One
would prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based weapons
capable of hitting targets in the atmosphere or on the ground, and the other
would ban ASAT systems and ensure the immunity of satellites. At an 11 June
joint plenary meeting the Soviets tabled a new initiative on offensive
strategic arms reductions and linked it to US agreement to strengthen the ABM
Treaty.
Taken together, the three new space-related proposals reflect the same
goal that Moscow has been consistently pursuing since the opening of NST in
March 1985--banning all "space-strike" arms. Although agreement on the ABM
Treaty proposal alone would not place specific limits on space or ASAT
{
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weapons, the Soviets could claim that US research and development activities
in these areas were aimed at circumventing ABM Treaty restrictions.
The distinction that the Soviets appear to be drawing between permissible
and banned ABM development activities fits better with Soviet weapons research
and development activities than with those of the United States. They have
not proposed changes that would affect the ABM Treaty provision that allows
development and testing of ground-based ABM weapons or components based on new
physical principles. Therefore, implementation of the proposal would:
-- Permit the Soviets to continue pursuing advanced ground-based ABM
technologies including those based on exotic technologies and such
activities as the construction of the laser facility at Saryshagan,
which could potentially have ASAT applications. Soviet negotiators in
Geneva have argued that the Saryshagan facility is an experimental
laser facility with a space track mission and that therefore its laser
does not qualify as a mock-up, test model, or prototype of any kind of
weapon system.
-- Prevent the United States from pursuing SDI activities beyond the stage
where mock-ups and models of a space-based ABM weapon system are
constructed and tested, either inside or outside a laboratory.
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Iq
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CONFIDENTIAL
- Wr-~_.,
NIO/AF
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0568
INFO NAMIBIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 4944
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY 2270
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY 5022
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL. US. AF
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF SECRETARY OF
COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA
1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE IS TO BE ISSUED TOMORROW.
DECEMBER 19 RPT DECEMBER 19 AT 12:30 P.M. EST RPT EST.
ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT RELEASE TEXT OR NAMES OF COMMITTEE
UNTIL THAT TIME. TEXT FOLLOWS:
2. QTE: SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ TODAY ANNOUNCED
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTH
AFRICA. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE WAS MANDATED BY THE
PRESIDENT IN HIS EXECUTIVE ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 9 CONCERNING
U.S. RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.
THE COMMITTEE WILL BE CO-CHAIRED BY FRANK CARY. FORMER
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE IBM CORPORATION, AND WILLIAM
T. COLEMAN. JR.. SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF
O'MELVENY AND MYERS.
THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN FORMED TO ADVISE THE SECRETARY ON
WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN
SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING ABOLITION OF APARTHEID AND THE
EFFECTS THEREOF. THE COMMITTEE WILL INVESTIGATE CONDI-
TIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S.
POLICY TOWARD THAT COUNTRY. IT WILL GIVE A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY FROM TIME TO TIME AND RENDER A FINAL REPORT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT IN ANY EVENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS
FIRST OFFICIAL MEETING. WHICH IS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE: THE HONORABLE GRIFFIN
B. BELL, SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF KING & SPALDING
AND FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; OWEN F.
BIEBER. PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION. UAW; JOHN R.
DELLENBACK, PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE COALITION
AND A FORMER CONGRESSMAN; THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S.
EAGLEBURGER, PRESIDENT OF KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; TIMOTHY S.
HEALY. S.J.. PRESIDENT OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; VERNON E.
JORDAN, JR., ESQ., SENIOR PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF AKIN.
GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE; HELENE L. KAPLAN, ESQ., SENIOR
PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM OF WEBSTER & SHEFFIELD AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK AND OF BARNARD
COLLEGE; ROGER B. SMITH, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, THE REVEREND
LEON H. SULLIVAN OF THE ZION BAPTIST CHURCH, THE AUTHOR
OF THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES; AND FRANKLIN A. THOMAS.
PRESIDENT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION.
IN INTRODUCING THE COMMITTEE TODAY AT THE DEPARTMENT, THE
SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO ITS MEMBERS FOR
VOLUNTEERING THEIR TIME AND FOR THEIR PATRIOTISM. HE ALSO
DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS
INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA IN 1986, THE YEAR IN WHICH THE
COMMITTEE WILL BE DELIBERATING. END OTE.
3. FOR PRETORIA: PLEASE INFORM APPROPRIATE SAG OFFICIALS
ASKING THEM TO HOLD INFORMATION CONFIDENTIALLY UNTIL
SECRETARY'S ANNOUNCEMENT HERE.
SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
? CONFIDENTIAL
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18 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Fritz Ermarth, NIO
Fred Wettering, NI
/USSR,
O/Africa
SOVA/
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VA~--
25X1
The Soviets and An
gola's Expected Offensive
1.
(
Moscow's att
itude toward offensive opera
tions by the GJ~I
Angolan government this summer and
fall has painted a confused
picture.
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in
dicate that the Soviets told
diplomats in
25X1
Luanda that they were not in favor
of large-scale action agains
t UNITA this
year. Meanwhil
e
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portray the Sovie
ts as favoring an offensive a
gainst UNITA in 25X1
southern Angola.
2.I I the Luanda government may indeed be
having second thoughts about the timing and direction of an offensive. Reported
motives for delaying the offensive include concern that falling oil prices will
hinder Luanda's ability to sustain operations, and that Angolan forces should
focus their attention on defending high-value economic targets in the north of
the country against UNITA instead of attacking it in the south. However, we
have to date no evidence to corroborate reports that Moscow is discouraging
Luanda from ma or operations against UNITA this summer.
(raises the possibility that they are part of a deliberate campaign
of deception intended to cover Soviet intentions.
3. Despite the confused reporting, we believe that the Soviets are still
committed to an Angolan offensive this year. Our conclusion is based first and
foremost on the extent and timing of military deliveries in recent months:
o Since last fall's government offensive a record number of Soviet ships
and transport aircraft have delivered military equipment to Angola.
Between 15 April and 25 May, Soviet heavy-lift transports delivered at
least a dozen and perhaps as many as 20 MiG-23 fighters. Nineteen arms
carrier ships have visited Angola since last November, bringing at least
eight Mi-25 Hind attack helicopters, 20 Mi-17 transport helicopters, more
than 300 trucks, jeeps, vans, and armored cars, radars and communications
equipment, and hundreds of tons of aircraft spare parts. In addition,
late last year Moscow augmented its VTA element in Angola by sending
another two AN-12 transport aircraft to Luanda. While some of this
equipment makes up for losses in last year's campaign, we believe that
Angolan capabilities in key areas has been expanded, most notably by the
doubling of the force of Mig-23 interceptors.
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4. We also see several secondary considerations that point in the direction of
Soviet support for an offensive in 1986:
o The Soviets have generally counseled the Angolans to keep the military
pressure on the insurgents. Such action this year offers Luanda the
prospect of striking UNITA before outside aid builds up, and of getting
the maximum from its Soviet-supplied equipment, which would be subject to
attrition by UNITA if the Angolans delayed the offensive significantly.
o Angola holds out a particularly advantageous near-term opportunity for
the Soviets to back up commitments made in recent months to defend Third
World socialist allies against "US neoglobalism." An Angolan offensive
that Moscow could portray as successful might bolster Soviet credibility
in the eyes of other allies facing insurgent challenges, and influence
Western debate on aiding UNITA.
o South African attention is presently focused on its severe domestic
challenges, and the Soviets may calculate that Pretoria will have to
commit more military units in its efforts to deal with opposition forces.
This, Moscow might reason, could limit Pretoria's willingness and ability
to bring force to bear in Angola in support of UNITA, as it did last year.
We expect the Soviets to play a strong advisory role in any offensive this
year, including extensive involvement in planning operations. Soviet rules of
engagement have apparently not changed, and Soviet military personnel probably
will attempt to avoid combat. However, in rare situations in which the senior
Soviet officer in Angola deems it advisable, Soviet advisers may play a more
direct combat role, as scattered reporting suggests occured last year when
Soviet pilots may have flown a small number of fighter and helicopter missions.
The Soviets also play a large role in logistic support, and likely will
concentrate on improving this aspect of their support for Angolan offensive
operations.
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