TRANSITION PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000401060004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 11, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
October 11, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE INTERAGENCY GROUP
SUBJECT: Transition Paper
Attached is the paper on Questions on a Possible
Transition to Greater Reliance on Effective Defenses
for Deterrence as approved by the SACG on October 4 and
given to the Defense and Space Negotiating Group.
Louis V. Nosenzo
Acting Assistant Director
for Strategic Programs
Attachment
As stated
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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October 7, 1985
Questions on A Possible Transition to Greater
Reliance on Effective Defenses for Deterrence
Introduction
The IG draftee a set of questions related to a possible
transition to reliance on defenses for which appropriate
responses are needed to support the requirements of the Defense
and Space Negotiating Group. This paper provides material for
such responses, i.e., the material in the main body of the paper
is for use in the Negotiations in discussion with the Soviets.
The material is aimed at specific issues to supplement, but not
supersede, previous guidance on the general US approach to a
possible transition.
Material from current guidance and additional material are
woven so as to provide a single answer on each issue. A
relatively small amount of new material is provided. In
addition, illustrative questions designed to draw the Soviets
into constructive dialogue are included in the answers. In
general, it would be desirable to use such questioning to prevent
the US from being placed in a "defensive position" on this issue
in the talks.
Current guidance and relevant Soviet statements on each
question are provided in Annexes "A and B.
This paper is intended solely for use in the negotiations;
it is not intended to be used with Congress, the Allies, or the
Public.
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Al: What are the implications, given Soviet efforts on offenses
and defenses, of a continuation of the present US deterrent
posture based on offensive forces?
US Position
-- Continuing Soviet buildup of offensive and defensive
capabilities would continue to erode stability and the long term
deterrent on which the US and its Allies currently rely. These
Soviet developments could diminish deterrence by improving their
potential for a successful first strike against significant
portions of our deterrent forces and by improving their active
defenses to further minimize effective retaliation.
-- The several Soviet research programs, developments and
deployments of specific concern include:
- Improved capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces to
attack US deterrent forces, including the addition of new Soviet
ICBMs contrary to SALT II.
- Improvements to Soviet ABM systems.
- Large increases in Soviet threater range ballistic
missile capabilities.
- Extensive deployment of more effective surface to air
missile systems with apparent increasing potential to engage some
types of ballistic missiles.
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Deployment of high performance look-down-shoot-down
interceptor aircraft with airborne warning and control aircraft
to engage penetrating cruise missiles and aircraft.
- Increasing efforts on passive defense measures for
protecting Soviet offensive forces, Soviet command, control and
communications, and the Soviet population against attack; and
- Extensive Soviet research into new technologies
applicable to defensive systems.
-- The US has reviewed most of these developments in the-
current negotiations. The Soviets have not, however, provided a
convincing rationale for their enormous and potentially dangerous
efforts, nor presented their views on the present and future
offense-defense relationship. The massive Soviet arms buildup of
the past two decades and continuation of past trends implies a
perspective on the role of forces and strategy that is
substantially different from that of the US, which relies on
deterrence. This difference in US and Soviet perspectives on the
role of strategic forces must be recognized in these
negotiations.
Questions for the Soviets
-- If the current situations were reversed (i.e., US
development and deployment of offensive and defensive forces and
Soviet development and deployment of offensive forces only) would
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the Soviet Union think it prudent to continue to rely on
offensive forces only? Would the Soviets think that stability
could be long preserved in such a situation?
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A2: What is meant by the criteria the US has established for
evaluating the results of the US research program?
US Position
-- The US has established explicit criteria that SDI-derived
ballistic missile defenses must satisfy. The criteria for
effective defenses include the following:
-- Capability. Defenses would have to be effective against
attacks by likely current and future offensive forces.
-- Survivability. Defenses would have to be sufficiently
survivable to enable them to continue to function effectively
even in the face of dedicated attacks against them. This is -
necessary not only to maintain the effectiveness of the defensive
system, but also to maintain stability.
-- Cost-effectiveness at the margins. If new defenses could
be countered easily by improvements in offensive forces,
development and deployment of such defenses could serve to
stimulate growth in offensive arms rather than to provide each
side with increased security (unless there is an effective
agreement limiting offensive forces). Therefore, for defenses to
be effective, it must be possible to enhance them at signifi-
cantly less cost than it would be to enhance, qualitatively
and/or quantitatively, the offensive forces they are designed to
counter. If this criterion can be met, there should be no
incentive to increase offensive forces, because such an increase
could be countered at less cost by a commensurate increase in the
defenses.
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- New technologies have great potential for providing
ballistic missile defenses, cost-effective at the margins, which
can be augmented to counter increased threats at far less cost
than that of an increased offensive threat.
-- The criteria are designed to assess technologies which
must demonstrate that defenses would be effective in coping with
a potentially unlimited threat.
-- Future decisions regarding strategic defense must await
the results of our research which will determine if defenses can
be effective in terms of our stated criteria. It will be several
years before the US can determine the extent to which these
criteria can be satisfied. The sides should reexamine the
current strategic relationship to determine how it can be made
safer and how incorporating defenses that would meet these
criteria can afford greater stability and security for both
sides.
Questions for the Soviets
- Does the Soviet Union believe that such criteria could
never be met? In pursuing its defensive programs, does the
Soviet Union share these criteria? What criteria does the Soviet
Union use with respect to its own defensive programs including
the Moscow ABM system?
- What is the purpose of the Moscow ABM system?
- Does the Soviet Union believe that, even if these
criteria could be met, there would be no enhancement of global
stability from deployment of defenses satisfying these criteria?
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- Or does it, as its actions in the area of defensive
systems imply, fully understand the existence of a possible major
role for defenses in the strategic equation and seek to use its
long-term concentration on defensive systems to complement its
offensive capability for unilateral advantage -- irrespective of
whether or not such defenses are, in fact, cost effective at the
margin?
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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward
the ultimate goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?
US Position
-- The President has stated, and the Soviet Union has agreed,
that the ultimate goal of both sides should be the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. As a practical matter, certain
prerequisites would apply before such a goal could be realized.
For example:
- Such a ban would have to be global in scope, including
all nuclear weapons held by other nations;
- Verification measures would have to be extremely
effective to establish compliance with such a ban; and
- Effective defenses would have to be erected to hedge
against a possible violation or abrogation.
- There would have to be a stable conventional force
- There would have to be safeguards against nuclear
weapons possession by non-governmental organizations.
-- Eliminating the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles would clearly be both a necesssary element of, and a
large step toward, eliminating all nuclear weapons. Threats of
nuclear weapons delivered by other means would present comparable
problems.
-- If effective defenses against ballistic missiles proved
feasible the US would seek joint management of a transition to
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increased reliance on such defenses. Exploration of the other
steps necessary for the longer term objective of complete
elimination of all nuclear weapons would likely require the
development of other defensive capabilities as well as
comprehensive US-Soviet arms control agreements. It also would
require the elimination of existing inbalances in conventional
forces that favor the Soviet Union.
Question for Soviets
Under what circumstances does the Soviet Union envision
realizing their stated goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons?
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B1: What would be the implications for deterrence (extended and
central) and stability of deployment of effective defenses
(within a continuum that includes partially through fully
effective ones)?
-- Assuming US research criteria for effective defenses are
met, following close consultations with our Allies, the US
intends pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty to consult and
negotiate with the Soviet Union, as appropriate, how security
could be enhanced for both sides through greater reliance by both
sides on new defensive systems, and to explore whether the Soviet
Union is prepared to negotiate arrangements that would facilitate
such a transition. This commitment should in no way be
interpreted as according the Soviets a veto on possible future
defensive deployments.
-- we seek to begin now a discussion of the offense-defense
relationship and stability, in the Defense and Space talks, to
lay the foundation to support such possible future consultations.
-- Defenses, of course, would not need to be perfect to
enhance deterrence and to increase the stability of our deterrent
forces.
-- Less than-perfect defenses could enhance stability by
creating uncertainties in the mind of a potential aggressor
whether his attack could achieve its military objectives and
hence decrease the likelihood of war.
-- Defenses that do not enhance stability should not be
deployed by either side.
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-- Obviously, the greater the perceived effectiveness of
strategic defenses, the more likely it becomes that military
planners will be persuaded that an attack could not succeed and
hence the greater is the likelihood that they will be deterred
from planning aggression.
-- By reducing or eliminating the military effectiveness of
ballistic missiles, and thereby making it more difficult for an
attacker to destroy the other side's military forces, defensive
systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence against not
only strategic nuclear war, but against nuclear and conventional
force attacks on our allies as well.
Questions for the Soviets
-- What does the Soviet Union believe are the levels of
effectiveness required before defense investments are justified?
-- The SU is now investing heavily in air defenses. What
level of effectiveness calculations were made to support such an
investment? Would similar calculations be made in assessing
Soviet ABM investments?
-- What impact does the Soviet Union believe different
levels of effectiveness have (if any) on national security?
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B2: What would be the impact on nations other than the US, its
Allies, and the Soviet Union, such as potential proliferating
states, of possible moves by the US to greater reliance on
defenses?
US Position
-- Any action that could decrease the likelihood of
strategic nuclear war or any kind of nuclear war would benefit
all of the nations and peoples of the world.
-- In addition, all possibilities for reducing the risk of
war should be considered in accord with commitments made under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Questions for the Soviets
-- Does the Soviet Union seek to perpetuate Soviet
superiority in defensive systems in order to secure significant
unilateral military advantage?
-- Is the USSRs' investment in strategic defenses intended
exclusively to protect against unlikely attacks against the
Soviet Union by the US or are they understood to be useful in
defending against third parties?
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C1: How are the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the
results of both side's research programs, to view increased
reliance on-defense by the US, and under what conditions are they
likely to join the US in a jointly-managed transition to such
reliance on both sides?
US Position
-- In contrast to the US, the USSR has long had a vigorous
research, development and deployment program in defensive
systems. This program includes: an ABM system deployed around
Moscow which is being modernized with a new radar and new missile
interceptors; extensive air defense deployments including
development and testing of new air defense missiles that have
capabilities against tactical and some strategic ballistic
missiles; a new ABM system that can be deployed rapidly because
it requires little site preparation; and extensive work on
advanced ballistic missile defense technologies, such as high
powered directed energy weapons. In fact, over the last two
decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its
strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive
buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important
advantages in the-area of active and passive defenses. There is
no evidence that the Soviet strategic investment program has been
sensitive to US decisions to forgo investments in defensive
capabilities.
Questions for the Soviets
-- How, in view of this extensive concentration on defensive
systems, can the Soviet side claim to lack interest in the
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possibility of a more secure future based on greater reliance on
defenses?
-- Is not the Soviet Union creating an uncertain and
undesirable situation by, at one and the same time, both
conducting a comprehensive development and deployment of
traditional defenses and an aggressive research program on new
technologies, and yet refusing to discuss its nature and the
potential implications of its possible success?
-- The Soviet side has implied that defenses could not be_
cost effective and survivable; how can the Soviet Union know this'
and still claim not to have conducted exhaustive research such as
US SDI is only now beginning?
-- The Soviet side has asserted that SDI technologies would
give rise to offensive weapons; to what offensive weapons is the
Soviet side referring? How does the Soviet Union see the
advantages of augmenting offenses (penetration aids, etc.) versus
augmenting defenses?
-- If US research shows that effective defenses are
feasible, would the Soviet side join in discussions at that time
aimed at effecting a jointly-managed transition?
-- If the active Soviet research program were to show that
effective defenses were feasible, would the Soviet side then
propose, or agree to, such discussions? Or would the Soviet side
seek unilateral advantage from such defenses?
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-- Would it not make sense to discuss now the possibility of
mutual deployments of effective defenses? Such discussions would
lay the groundwork for a possible jointly managed transition.
-- Defenses that met all the US criteria for effectiveness
would render ballistic missiles militarily obsolete and would
preclude any countermeasures. How then can the Soviet Union
refuse to discuss this possibility?
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C-2: What are the potential negotiating tactics or approaches
the US might take in anticipation of potential Soviet responses
to US progress in the area of Defense and Space?
(No material under this heading is needed for discussion with
the Soviets at this time.)
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C3: What are potential steps the US might take to guard against,
discourage, or respond to any unfavorable Soviet programmatic,
military, diplomatic, or declaratory responses to the SDI
research proqram or to a possible future US decision to proceed
to full-scale development and later deployment of defensive
systems?
(No material under this heading is needed for discussion
with the Soviets at this time.)
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D1: What are the different areas of cooperation that could be
envisioned for a jointly-managed transition and what are possible
scenarios for such transitions?
US Position
-- Should strategic defenses prove feasible, the US has made
clear that, following consultations with its allies, it will
consult or negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets (pursuant
to the terms of the ABM Treaty) on how security might be
strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems
into the force structures of both sides. This commitment in no
way implies a Soviet veto power over actions deemed necessary for
US and allied security.
-- The raison d'etre of a jointly-managed transition would
be to facilitate the transition from an offense dominated regime
to increasing reliance on defensive systems so as to increase
confidence in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving
strategic balance. A possible transition should be managed so
that neither side would see an increased risk of a first strike
and so that neither side would have an incresed incentive for a
first strike. Contrary to unilateral, independently pursued
transitions, a jointly managed transition would have the
advantage of providing both sides with improved confidence in the
future -- confidence derived from a predictable evolution of a
more stable strategic balance.
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-- Joint management of a transition to greater reliance on
defense could take many forms and variations, including, at
least, the following:
- verifiable negotiated regime of offensive force
reductions;
- discussions and verifiable agreements between the sides
regarding the various steps in such a transition.
-- The US has not reached a decision yet on whether
effective defenses are feasible and therefore does not seek a
transition to reliance on defenses at this time. However, the US.
does seek to lay the groundwork for a possible future decision to
proceed with such a transition.
Questions for the Soviets
-- In particular, the US seeks Soviet views on such a
transition, including:
- What is the Soviet understanding of the current
strategic relationship -- especially in light of the heavy
emphasis the Soviet Union has placed, and continues to place, on
strategic defense?
- Is the Soviet Union willing to provide the US with a
description of Soviet research on new strategic defense
technologies comparable to that given to the Soviets on SDI?
If not, why not?
-- Why are the Soviets anxious to limit BMD research now in
view of the fact they have been conducting such research for a
long time?
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D2: What would be the implications of various possible joint
management scenarios, including the effects of each side's
perception of the effectiveness of the other's offensive and
defensive forces?
US Position
-- A transition to reliance on effective defenses against
ballistic missiles would be more stable to the extent it would
eliminate militarily meaningful first strike capabilities. In
this connection the US believes radicg] reductions in offensive
weapons would be in the interest of both sides today and for the
future, independent of whether effective defenses prove feasible.
-- The introduction of strategic defenses could move the
present strategic situation toward greater stability through
decreased incentives to attack and increased uncertainty about
the effectiveness of a prospective attack. A jointly managed
transition could facilitate the mutual appreciation of these
stabilizing factors, and thereby reduce potential misperceptions,
but would not necessarily be itself a condition for enhancing
stability.
Question for Soviets
-- A jointly managed transition to mutual deployments of
effective defenses would eliminate the instabilities associated
with the Soviet Union's first strike attack potential. If the
Soviet Union does not favor such a transition, is it because the
Soviet Union does not believe its first strike capability is
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destabilizing or is it because the Soviet Union believes its
first strike capability is useful despite its destabilizing
nature?
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D3: What are the implications, for joint management of a
transition, of Soviet violations of existing agreements?
US Position
-- The US has determined that the Soviet union has violated
the 1972 ABM Treaty:
- The new large phased array radar under construction at
Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty in that its
associated siting, orientation, and capability are prohibited by
this Treaty.
-- The US also has determined that the Soviet Union probably
has violated the ABM Treaty in other respects:
- The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM
and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the
prohibition on testing SAM Components in an ABM Mode. In several
cases this may be highly probable.
- The aggregate of these and other Soviet ABM and ABM-
related actions, such as the development of components of a new
ABM system capable of being deployed at sites with little or no
preparation, suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM
defense of its national territory (which would be a violation of
the ABM Treaty).
-- The Soviet Union is not in strict compliance with other
arms control agreements either, as described in the President's
report of February 1, 1985, on Soviet non-compliance.
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Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It calls into
question important security benefits from arms control, and could
create new security risks. It undermines the arms control
process and makes achievement of new agreements very difficult.
-- Non-compliance with existing agreements would have a
similar effect on joint management of a possible transition to
greater reliance on defenses.
-- On the other hand, the US SDI program is in full
compliance with all Treaties. While our research examines a
potential future improved deterrent regime involving strategic
defenses, we are also attempting to reverse the erosion of the
ABM Treaty occasioned by instances of Soviet noncompliance and to
seek major reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear
forces.
-- The aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related
actions raises the question of whether the Soviet Union might be
planning for a Soviet unilateral, rather than jointly managed,
transition to greater reliance on defenses.
-- The US stands ready to work with the Soviet Union to find
acceptable ways to resolve compliance issues and to establish a
regime of strict compliance with existing agreements.
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The Krasnoyarsk radar should be dismantled as one part
of such an effort.
Questions for the Soviets
-- Does the Soviet Union believe that violations of arms
control treaties undermine the arms control process and make
achievement of new agreements very difficult?
- If yes, why isn't the Soviet Union willing to fully live
up to its current arms control obligations? Does the Soviet
Union expect the US to adopt a double standard of compliance that
is harmful to its security? Would the Soviet Union adopt such a
standard?
- If no, then what do you believe is the purpose of arms
control, if you do not believe compliance is important?
-- Does the Soviet Union believe that the Krasnoyarsk radar
and other violations of treaty obligations and committments are
worth the risk of undermining the possibilities for future US-
Soviet arms control agreements?
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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-
cooperative transition and what would be the implications for
stability of'various alternatives?
US Position
-- The US must counter ongoing Soviet offensive and
defensive advances, for they threaten the viability of
deterrence - the cornerstone of global security and stability
today.
-- The Soviet offensive buildup, particularly in ballistic
missiles, poses an ever-increasing threat to the survivability of
US retaliatory forces.
-- Recent improvements in Soviet active and passive
defenses, which include the world's only operational ABM and ASAT
systems, are also steadily eroding Western retaliatory
capabilities.
-- If current and prospective progress in their two-decade-
old strategic defense program continues unabated and unaddressed
by the West, the Soviets could further undermine the
effectiveness of the Western deterrent.
-- In the face of such extensive Soviet military
developments, the US and its allies must continue to pursue their
own offensive and defensive programs.
-- Modernization of US strategic and LRINF forces will help
re-establish the nuclear balance; provide arms control incentives
for the Soviets; and enhance deterrence while we explore options,
such as SDI, for the future.
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-- Should effective defenses prove feasible, it would make
little sense for the US to rely on offensive forces alone when a
combination of offensive and defensive forces could bring
increased deterrence effectiveness.
-- Under such conditions, the US would seek a jointly-
managed transition to increased reliance on defenses.
-- The US could not allow a Soviet refusal to join in such a
transition to prevent the US from taking steps necessary for
establishing strategic stability and ensuring its security and
that of its allies. We do not believe that a jointly managed _
transition is essential to bringing about the stable benefits of
deterrence based on defensive as well as on offensive forces.
-- Because of the role we believe joint management might
play in facilitating the transition, however, the US will
continue in its attempt to secure Soviet participation.
Questions for the Soviets
-- In light of the intensive Soviet research program on
strategic defense, the Soviet side should explain how they would
proceed with their program should their research prove effective
defenses feasible. What would their criteria be for effective
defenses? Would they refrain from developing them if they failed
to meet these criteria? What are the goals for current Soviet
defensive progams? Would their criteria differ from ours? Would
they seek joint management of a transition to reliance on
defense, or would they seek to use such defenses for unilateral
advantage?
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Annex A -- Current Guidance on Transition Issues: Pages 28 - 57
Annex B -- Soviet Statements on Transition Issues: Pages 58 - 70
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August 12, 1985
Annex A
Current Guidance on Transition Issues
This annex includes the relevant existing guidance on each
question addressed in this paper. Current Delegation material,
drawn from instructions to Round One and Two, the SDI briefing
gives to the Soviets in Round Two, NSDD 172, and selected
additional sources, it gives for each question individually.
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Al: What are the implications, given Soviet efforts on offenses
and defenses, of a continuation of the present US deterrent
posture based on offensive forces?
Current Guidance
From selected source
Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that
did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the
development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems
of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements,
will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental
assumptions upon which our current strategy is based.
The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic
missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill _
capabiliity, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of
our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure
that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has
continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development
of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving
US retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant
resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the
survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and
national leadership -- ranging from providing mobility for its
latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing networks of super-
hard bunkers to protect its leadership -- thus further eroding
the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent.
These trends indicate that continued long-term US dependence
on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a
steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the
United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be
permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive
and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the
resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which
deterrence has rested for several decades.
From NSDD-178 10 July 85
The modernization program will guide the continued high
priority, long term modernization of our strategic forces...to
ensure that our national technical resources are fully utilized
to develop and deploy strategic systems which insure the
endurance of our national strategy to deter nuclear war and to
provide strategic stability.
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A2: What is meant by the criteria the US has established for
proceeding toward greater reliance on defensive systems?
Current Guidance
From SDI Presentation in D and S Talks 27 June 85
The Fletcher study also indentified the reasons why an
intensive technology development and research program is
necessary before any decision to proceed could be made. It
identified five critical problems that need additional work.
First, how, in detail, to intercept attacking missiles in boost
phase or as soon after they are launched as possible. Second, as
we pursue these new sensor technologies, we must be sure that we
will be able to discriminate between the warheads and decoys.
Third, and perhaps most important, for defense to be effective it
has to have the ability to survive. By this we mean that the -
defensive system must be constructed so that it would not itself
be an appealing target for attack. The fourth requirement is
also as important. Once a system is in place, we must be able to
engage additional ballistic missiles and warheads more cheaply
than it would be for an opponent to proliferate those offensive
forces. Moreover, we must be able to maintain that cost
advantage even against redesigned offensive threats. Last,
although we have computers that can do a billion calculations per
second, we must find better ways to program and control these
computers. The Fletcher study showed that a multi-layered
defensive system would require a computer program that contains
up to a hundred million computer instructions. This is much
larger than computer programs today. This study has stood the
test of time: the program is focused on technologies for defense
that would be lethal, survivable, and cost effective.
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the
results of this research whenever they become available. Some
options which could provide interim capabilities may be available
earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we
maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the
primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on
generating options for the earliest development/deployment
decision, but options which best meet our identified criteria.
Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to
be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at
the margin.
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Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment
of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it
would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We
have identified specific criteria to address these fears
appropriately and directly.
Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern.
If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an
adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike
first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this
criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be
deployed, and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no
incentive nor prospect of overwhelming it.
Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any
deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not
to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would
cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to
defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument,
although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider,
in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the
degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their
nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them
with additional offensive capability while others can discourage
such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide
clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional
offensive forces.
In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear
arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable
agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of
warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly
lower than exist today.
From Instructions for NST 28 May 85
A possible transition should be managed so that neither side
would see an increased risk of first strike and so that neither
side would have an increased incentive for a first strike.
From Instructions for NST 28 May 85
Survivability of strategic offensive systems is essential to
stability.
It would be important to stability that both sides be able
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to maintain, in a verifiable fashion, the survivability of their
offensive forces during that portion of a transition when
offensive forces would continue to be important for deterrence.
In this manner, neither side would believe that improvements in
defenses on the other side could create an additional capability
for either side to carry out a first strike.
Survivability of strategic defensive systems would be
essential to stability during and after a transition.
From Instructions for D and S Talks 10 March 85
Emerging technologies. Negotiating group should emphasize
that emerging technologies offer the possibility of strategic
defenses that could enhance deterrence. Present the rationale
for the SDI program and emphasize that all activities under the
program are being undertaken in strict compliance with all treaty
requirements. Negotiating group should review with Soviet side
relevant treaty requirements. Negotiating group should describe
the US view of criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of
systems based on new defensive technologies:
-- First, the defensive systems developed must be
survivable. Otherwise, they would contribute to
instability, not stability.
-- Second, they must also be cost effective, i.e., the
defense's capability to neutralize offensive nuclear
weapons must be less costly than either effective
countermeasures or the proliferation of more offensive
systems. Otherwise, the deployment of defenses would
merely stimulate more offensive systems.
-- Third, the transition must be stable. One of the
principal reasons we have offered to discuss SDI with the
Soviet side now is that should these technologies prove
feasible, we want the transition to a more stable and
reliable strategic relationship to be a cooperative
effort.
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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward
the ultimate goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next ten years, the
US objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and
planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of
the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms,
whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to
a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly
reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter
war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear
defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the
threat of military aggression and also free of nuclear arms is-an
ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other
nations can agree.
To support these goals, we will continue to pursue
vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements
leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals.
As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning
the mechanisms used to achieve these reductions, but will judge
these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the
United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability,
and to reduce the risk of war.
Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.
By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as
we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish
the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through
conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms
reductions and confidence building measures.
We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to
deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the
destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and
the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger
posed by the threat of aggression through such means.
Internal Discussion
The followng material is taken from a draft internal
analysis; completion of which was deferred by the IG in June,
1985:
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The President has stated, and the Soviets have agreed, that
our_ultimatp goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
As a practical matter, there are certain prerequisites that must
apply before the United States could agree to a nuclear weapons
ban: such a ban would have to be global in scope, including all
nuclear weapons held by other nations; verification measures
would have to be extremely effective to enforce such a ban; we
would have to maintain an effective residual strategic defense as
a hedge against possible violations of the regime; there would
have to be sufficient controls on nuclear weapon possession by
non-governmental organizations; and the East/West conventional
force balance would have to be such that nuclear weapons would
not be needed to support deterrence.
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Bl: What would be the implications for deterrence (extended and
central) and stability of deployment of effective defenses
(within a continuum that includes partially through fully
effective ones)?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
US and Allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program
is designed to enhance Allied security as well as US security.
We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that,
as our research progresses, allied views are carefully
considered.
Although this has been a fundamental part of US policy since
the inception of my Strategic Defense Initiative, and US
statements have been consistent on this point, we will continue
to consult closely with our allies and to be sensitive to the
manner in which we present and defend the SDI program before
allied audiences. We have made a serious commitment to consult,
and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to
the SDI research program which may affect our allies.
If and when our research criteria are met, and following
close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and
negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms
of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how
deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both
sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way
be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible
future defensive depoloyments. And, in fact, we have already
been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense
relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks
underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future
possible consultations.
If, at some future time, the US, in close consultation with
its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive
systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for US/Soviet
consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such
mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own
expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to
proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.
It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive
technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing
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consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage
a transition'to a more defense-reliant balance.
From Instructions for D and S Talks 28 May 85
If strategic defenses prove feasible, we believe that a
transition to greater reliance on such defenses would enhance
strategic stability and hence improve Soviet as well as US
security.
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Cl: How are the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the
results of both side's research programs, to view increased
reliance on defense by the US, and under what conditions are they
likely to join the US in a jointly-managed transition to such
reliance on both sides?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
The Soviet Union also fully understands that the SDI program
-- and most especially, that portion of the program which holds
out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost,
and mid-course portions of their flight -- offers the prospect of
redressing Soviet offensive advantages, accumulated over years of
investment. In reponse, even while continuing its own pursuit of
improved defenses, the Soviet Union will likely continue to -
emphasize its propaganda theme of "preventing the militarization
of space." In doing so, it can be expected to continue to
attempt to block certain advanced technologies associated with
the SDI research program in order to confine the potential for
future defensive developments to more traditional areas which are
consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and
where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. The
Soviet Union is likely also to propose restraints on US anti-
satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI
technologies.
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
The Soviet Union's View of SDI
As noted above, the USSR has long had a vigorous research,
development and deployment program in defensive systems of all
kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has
invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in
its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it
enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and
passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to
protect this massive, long-term investment.
A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI
is designed to secure military superiority for the US. Put in
the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our
allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear.
Superiority is certainly not for purpose. Nor is the SDI program
offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed
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at seeking better ways to ensure US and allied security, using
the increased contribution of defenses -- defenses that threaten
no one.
Soviet propagandists attempts to contrast the US and Soviet
strategic defense programs by claiming that the SDI research
program is a violation of the ABM Treaty while similar Soviet
research is not. This is based upon their false assertion that
the US has already decided to deploy a territorial defense. To
support this allegation, they assert: "that the US has already
decided to abrogate the ABM Treaty; that the US is emphasizing
Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty and other obligations in
order to justify this action; and that abrogation will occur in
the near future."
Soviet propagandists have accused the US of reneging on
commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly
not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is
just the opposite -- a cooperative approach designed to maintain,
at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive
systems of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all
nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving
strategic balance.
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C-2: What are the potential negotiating tactics or approaches
the US might take in anticipation of potential Soviet responses
to US progress in the area of Defense and Space?
Current Guidance
From NSDD 172 30 May 85
We should take every appropriate opportunity to make clear
that we are conducting a broad-based research program, in full
compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to
proceed beyond research. Some of the themes below build upon
this critical point.
From Instructions for D and S Talks 10 March 85
Further understandings. Negotiating group should not raise
the subject of future understandings, clarifications and
modifications of the ABM Treaty. But should do nothing to
preclude them. If the Soviet side brings subject up, negotiating
group should ask questions for clarification but offer no further
encouragement.
Space and ASAT weapons. Negotiationg group should not make
any US ASAT or "space" arms control proposals in the first round.
Negotiating group should seek to clarify any Soviet proposals,
and in response to Soviet proposals should describe the defects
in the Soviet proposal and present the difficulties of further
"space" arms control in general, within the context of overall US
objectives for Round I.
Response to a Soviet moratorium proposal. If Soviets repeat
their proposal for a moratorium on testing and deployment of ASAT
weapons, negotiationg group should indicate to the Soviets that
this specific proposal is not acceptable and provide reasons to
the Soviets for this conclusion but avoid stressing our
difficulties in verifying compliance with a moratorium.
Mutual restraints. If the Soviets question the US regarding
the President's UNGA statement on mutual restraints, or similar
statements by US officials, negotiating group should respond
along the following lines:
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-- The President's remarks on restraints must be read in
the Context of the full statement regarding the
offense/defense relationship and his call for genuine
stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.
-- The President's remarks were not restricted to ASAT
restraints. The US will consider any specific Soviet
proposal on its merits. Any restraints would have to be
in the context of progress toward a broader range of
arrangements which would provide for stabilizing
reductions in nuclear arms.
From selected source.
The US Approach. For our part, the thrust of the US effort for
the foreseeable future will be as follows.
1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of
equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction
of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other
complementary means (including cooperative and
confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and
reducing the risk of war.
2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by
the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term
prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more
stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically
involves protecting those SDI technologies that may
permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost,
and mid-course elements.
3. Complementing this, we will also protect the US
strategic modernization program which is needed to
maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of
offensive forces, and to provide incentives for
negotiating real reductions in the size of existing
nuclear arsenals.
Characterizing the US Approach. To support this approach
publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to
the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics
the basic, central concept that the US is pursuing at the Geneva
meetings and in subsequent negotiations.
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"During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical
reduction in'the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear
arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between
offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space.
We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a
more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms
and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon in the increasing
contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear
arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual
elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A
world freee of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we,
the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree."
From selected source.
Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the
discussions, the US delegation will provide to the Soviet
delegation our conceptual thinking about the offense/defense
relationship. This presentation is critically important since it
sets the stage for the US proposals about format, objectives and
substance which follow. It also should permit the US to preempt
Soviet charges about the US SDI program by citing the record of
Soviet actions which have called into questions the fundamental
assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed
to the growing instabiity in the current situation.
This presentation should make the following points:
- The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is
inconceivable that the US would initiate military action
against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or
its allies were to be directly attacked. The US hopes
the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of
initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.
- The United States is determined to assure itself and
its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by
anyone on our vital security interests. The US expects
that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar
capability.
- It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so
much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization
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of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The
US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and
defensive capabilities.
- Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that
each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation
primarily form the viewpoint of its own security. Each
must assume that at some time a situation may. arise in
which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be
dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully
analyze what it must do to deny the other side a
meaningful military victory.
- Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable
future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly
and decisively with their military power, both nuclear
and conventional. This creates an unstable situation
which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if
conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate,
escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.
- This is a dangerous situation. It is one the US and
the Soviet Union must address both together and
unilaterally. The political and military measures
necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But
we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.
- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US hoped that
both sides would be able to agree on measures which would
be helpful to the security of each of nation. It was
accepted that each side should have rough equality in the
aggregate power of its nuclaer weapons systems, that if
defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should
be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and
that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention
or failure-to adhere to the letter and spirit of the
limitations agreed upon.
- For a time it appeared that we had made some progress
in that direction. As one looks at the situation today,
it appears that US anticipation of suc progress may have
been illusory.
- Since that time, your building program -- in both
offensive and defensive systems -- has violated any
reasonable sense of strategic balance.
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C3: What are potential steps the US might take to guard against,
discourage,'-or respond to any unfavorable Soviet programmatic,
military, diplomatic, or declaratory responses to the SDI
research program or to a possible future US decision to proceed
to full-scale development and later deployment of defensive
systems?
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
US policy supports the basic principle that our existing
method of deterrence, and NATO's existing strategy of flexible
response, remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as
long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing
war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact tht the US
continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization
program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to
sustain their own commitments to maintain the forces, both
nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.
We must avoid denigrating current western nuclear deterrent
strategy. The US objective is to explore better ways of
maintaining deterrence and the strategic balance in the future.
The purpose of the SDI research program is to generate options
for future decision that will permit us to do more than simply
threaten offensive retaliation. We seek options that would let
us move to a more stable and secure deterrence of all war based
upon the contribution of defenses that threaten no one. However,
our research will take time.
Since we will be living with reliance on offensive
retaliation for deterrence for may years to come, it does us and
our allies a significant disservice to question the morality of
our current deterrent. Given the realities of the situation we
face, including the limited options we currently have for
maintaining peace and freedom, deterrence based upon the threat
of nuclear retaliation is both necessary and moral. However, we
do hope that our research will extend the range of options
available to us and, thus, the fundamental naature of the
situation. Until it does, we should not fail to recognize fully
the necessary contribution that deterrence based upon the threat
of nuclear retaliation makes and will be required to make for
some time to come. In this regard, we strongly support efforts
by our allies to strengthen their forces, just as we as strongly
support basic Alliance military strategy.
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For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the
prospect of-'nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of
deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible and
credible strategic nuclear forces.
This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use
a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for
better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It
expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the US strategic
modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed
national modernization programs being conducted by the United
Kingdom and France.
From selected source.
-- And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of
indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.
-- For the immediate future the United State wishes to work
with the Soviet Union to restore and strengthen the regime for
stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our
common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective
limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the
ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent
instability in the present and projected array of offensive
systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM
Treaty which has taken place.
-- The research, development, and deployment programs of
both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The US SDI
program is. The Soviet program should be.
-- If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then
there are provisions for discussing that. In the US view, such
discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that
stability is guaranteed.
-- The US SDI research program is fully consistent with the
ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its
own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants
at this time to ban the research and concept development
permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such
activities could be designed, even if desired.
-- For the long run we should have bolder and more radical
objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to
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nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total
elimination'." This should be worldwide and agreed to by all
nations.
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D1. What are the different areas of cooperation that could be
envisioned for a jointly-managed transition and what are possible
scenarios for such transitions?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
-- At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be
conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the
research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies
about the potential next steps. We would then, consult and
negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the
terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on
how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased
introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of
both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the
Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a
veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs.
Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if
our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move
forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of
bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for
the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of
both sides at such time as the state of the art and other
considerations may make it desirable to do so.
Allied Views Concerning SDI
Our allies understand the military context in which the
Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI
research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the
statement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister
Thatcher in December, to the effect that:
-- first, the United States and Western aim was not to
achieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking
account of Soviet developments;
-- second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of
treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;
-- third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to
undermine deterrence; and,
-- fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve
security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both
sides.
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From NSDD-172 30 May 85
If and when our research criteria are met, and following
close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and
negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms
of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how
deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both
sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way
be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible
trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense
relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks
underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future
possible consultations.
If, at some future time, the US, in close consultation with
its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive
systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for US/Soviet
consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such
mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own
expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to
proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.
It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive
technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing
consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage
a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.
Soviet propagandists have accused the US of reneging on
commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly
not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is
just the opposite -- a cooperative approach designed to maintain,
at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive
systems of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all
nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving
strategic balance.
From Instructions for D and S 28 May 85
-- If strategic defenses prove feasible, we believe that a
transition to greater reliance on such defenses would enhance
strategic stability and hence improve Soviet as well as US
security.
-- Discussion now about the possible contributions of
defensive technologies to enhancing stability could allow us to
reach some consensus views before specific technologies may be
available.
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-- Our goal, should effective defenses prove feasible, would
be for our two nations to manage jointly a future transition to
greater reliance on strategic defenses.
-- We do not seek superiority over the Soviet Union and
believe that our past and current strategic force structures
demonstrate this fact clearly: furthermore, we believe we could
ensure that neither side would obtain superiority and thus
achieve our mutual goal of preventing an arms race in space
through a jointly-managed transition to greater reliance on
defenses.
-- The arms control process can provide a mechanism for
facilitating the transition we envision. We wish to embark now
on a US-Soviet dialogue which we see as continuing over the long
term on strategic defense. These discussions can serve to
clarify ambiguities and could contribute toward smoothing a
transition on both sides to a strategic posture more reliance on
defenses.
-- A possible transition should managed so that neither side
would see an increased risk of first strike and so that neither
side would have an increased incentive for a first strike.
-- In order for arms control to contribute effectively to
cooperation, the arms control process must be in a satisfactory
condition to begin with: this is one of the reasons we are
seeking to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime and one
reason why we are seeking now to deal with the matters of Soviet
non-compliance with the Treaty.
-- When the time for decisions on the possible production
and deployment of defensive systems comes, we should discuss and
negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union; however, we would
not allow a Soviet veto over actions which we deem necessary to
improve our security and that of our allies.
-- We believe that, even now within the limits of our current
knowledge of potential defensive systems, as well as within the
limits of military security considerations on both sides,
meaningful and useful exchanges can take place.
-- Reductions now in offensive nuclear weapons, especially
those that are most threatening and destabilizing, such as large,
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highly-MIRVed land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles,
would help dteate more stable conditions for the future,
independent of whether effective defenses prove possible. If
such defenses prove feasible in the future, prior reductions
could also help enhance stability during a transition.
-- Substantial reductions in offensive arms, with priority
on the most destabilizing systems would decrease concerns in a
jointly-managed transition that growth of defenses could be part
of a first strike strategy. Such offensive force reductions
could allow an offense-defense regime that is more stable and
involves fewer forces on both sides.
-- A transition should be implemented in a manner which
would
enhance stability during the transition and
afterwards
-- a
period
limit
in which we need jointly to manage in ways
the possibility of unilateral advantage.
that would
From selected source.
-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology
can make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United
States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on
which it would be integrated into force structures.
-- At the same time, both the US and the Soviet Union
recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of
reductions toward disarmament. The US believes that during the
transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive
forces'of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move
toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.
-- It appears that new technologies may open possibilities
of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial
improvement in our respective defenses. To the US, high-
confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to
peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability
to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could
produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.
-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other
forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and
sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We
believe that the security interests of both sides could be served
by such an evolution.
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D3: What are the implications for joint management of a
transition of Soviet violations of existing agreements?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
Soviet Non-compliance and Verification. Finally, the
problem of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in
both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty,
is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in
constructing their new phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in
Central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences.
When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase
the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic
missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a
contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of
such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms
for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The Soviet Union's
activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the
ABM Treaty.
Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of non-
compliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet
Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to
verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their
increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at
degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other
actions contribute to the problem we face in monitoring Soviet
compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of its
mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple,
independently targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile
systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we
fail to respond to these trends, we should also expect to reach a
point in the foreseeable future where we would have little
confidence in our-assessment of the state of the military balance
or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control
escalation during crisis.
With respect to Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty
and with other obligations, we have made it clear that we have
expressed our legitimate concerns because such actions threaten
US and allied security and significantly undermine the prospects
for geniune progress in negotiated arms reductions.- Our concerns
about Soviet non-compliance should be presented in this context.
Care must be exercised that they not be linked to SDI in such a
way as to appear to reinforce the Soviet propaganda line.
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From Instructions for Defense and Space 28 May 85
In order for arms control to contribute effectively to
cooperation, the arms control process must be in a satisfactory
condition to begin with: this is one of the reasons we are
seeking to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime and one
reason why are seeking now to deal with the matters of Svoiet
non-compliance with the Treaty.
Treatment of compliance issues. Negotiating group should
draw on guidance to the US SCC component to ensure consistency on
compliance issues. Negotiating group should press strongly for
Soviet corrective action ith regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar; it
should, drawing on papers prepared for the US SCC Component,
reiterate reasons for the US view that this radar violates the
ABM Treaty and repeat the US call that the radar be dismantled.
Negotiating group should also present concerns regarding mobile
ABM components.
From Instructions for Defense and Space 10 March 85
Erosion of the ABM Treaty regime. Negotiating group should
describe in general our views about how recent Soviet actions
have eroded the basis of the ABM Treaty. Such Soviet actions
include: -
Violation of the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk Radar).
A probable violation (testing air defense components in
an ABM mode).
An aggregate of ABM-related activities which suggests
that the USSR may even now be preparing an ABM defense
of its national territory.
In addition, negotiating group should stress two other factors
with respect to offensive forces that are of direct concern to
the viability of the ABM Treaty.
- The massive Soviet offensive buildup.
Failure to agree on effective offensive limitations that
constrain and reduce the offensive forces of both sides
as provided for in Article XI of the ABM Treaty, the
importance of which was emphasized in ABM Treaty
negotiations by the May 9, 1972 Smith statement.
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Treatment of compliance issues. Negotiating group
should describe our views that recent Soviet violations
and probable violations of Arms Control treaties
undermine the arms control process and make achievement
of new agreements very difficult. In particular,
negotiating group should press strongly for Soviet
corrective action with regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar.
It should, drawing on papers prepared for the US SCC
Component, reiterate reasons for the US view that this
radar violates the ABM Treaty and repeat US call that
construction be halted pending resolution of our
concerns. Negotiating group is authorized also to
repeat US call for discussion between US and Soviet
civilian space experts within either this forum or the
SCC. Negotiating group should not, however, explicitly
condition achieving new agreements on the prior
resolution of compliance issues.
From Selected Source
-- And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has
also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done
everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken
steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.
-- The ABM Treaty rested importantly in the limitations of
large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to
build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars
would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less
time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting
actions.
-- Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these
were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be
defended, and for radars required for space track and for
national technical' means of verification.
-- It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and
radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i..e., fixed to
the ground.
-- It was further agreed that other systems, such as air
defense, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that line
between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and
unambiguous.
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Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be
accompanied'by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces
from of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was
hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and
certainly within five years.
-- Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.
From Selected Source
-- The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk
radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics
to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can,
if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.
-- The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be
transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made
operational in a relatively short period of time.
-- The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have
a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an
intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction
between air defense systems and ABM systems.
-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on
more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to
future ballistic missile defense capabilities.
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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-
coope-rative'*transition and what would be the implications for
stability of various alternatives?
Current Guidance
From NSDD-172 30 May 85
-- Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show
the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive
forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The
trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and
defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet
deception and of non-compliance with existing agreements, if
permitted to continue unchecked over the long-term, will
undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of
vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.
-- Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains
the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As
a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its
military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its
ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target
kill capability, has increasingly threatended the survivability
of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an
especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory and
conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter
conflict and aggression.
-- Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time,
the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage
through the development and improvement of active defenses.
These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily
increasing capability to counter US retaliatory forces and those
of our allies, especialy if our forces were to be degraded by a
Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are
extensive. For example, the Soviet Union is currently improving
all elements of this system. It also has the world's only
currently deployed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, deployed
to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all
elements of this system. It also has the world's only deloyed
anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air
defense network and it is aggressively improving the quality of
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its radars,_interce_ptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles.
It also has'a very extensive network of ballistic missile early
warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of
relative advantage in strategic defense today, and, with logical
evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive
advantage in the future.
-- Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union
is also spending significant resources on passive defensive
measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces,
military command structure, and national leadership. These
efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its
latest generation of ICBMs, to extensive hardening of various
critical installations, including the construction of a network
of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership.
-- Soviet Research and Development on Advances Defenses.
For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of
strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive
elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and
expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current
patterns of Soviet research and development, ranging from
demonstrating a capability with their SA-X-12 surface-to-air
missile against some ballistic missiles to a long-standing and
intensive research program in many of the same basic
technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate
that these trends will continue a pace for the foreseeable
future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements
will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing
deterrent, based as it is now, almost exclusively on the threat
of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this
long-standing Soviet program of defensive improvements, in
itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.
-- Responding to the Challenge. In response to this long-
term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvement, the
United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both
to maintain security and stability in the near-term, and to
ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main
areas.
-- Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must
modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is
necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in
the near-term, and to create the strategic conditions that will
permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms
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reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in
1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program was
specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the
same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the
Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in
the nuclear arsenals of both sides.
-- In addition to the US strategic modernization program,
NATO is modernizing its Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway
important programs to improve their own national strategic
nuclear retaliatory forces. The US SDI research program does not
negate the necessity of these US and allied programs. Rather,
the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national
modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we
explore options for future decision of how we might enhance
security and stability over the longer term.
-- The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor
influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear
arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our
Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet
Union knows that the SDI represents a major US resurgence of
interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous
research, development and deployment program in defensive systems
of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet
Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as
it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result,
today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of
defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect
this massive, long-term investment.
-- The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program --
and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out
the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and
mid-course portions of their flight -- offers the prospect of
permitting the US technologically to flank years of Soviet
defensive investment and to shift the "state-of-the-art" in
defenses into areas of comparative US advantage. This is one of
the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on
attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to
deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but
rather, on "preventing the militarization of space." While the
Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential "space
weapons" programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an
attempt to confine future US defensive activity within more
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traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern
of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a
competitive advantage.
-- The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its
ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target
kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability
of our land-based retalitaory forces and the leadership structure
that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has
continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development
of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving
US retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant
resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the
survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and
national leadership -- ranging from providing mobility for its
latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of
superhard bunkers to protect its leadership -- thus further
eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent.
-- These trends indicate that continued long-term US
dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely
lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic
disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact,
should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet
investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed
unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy
the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several
decades.
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August 12, 1985
Soviet Statements on Transition Issues
This annex includes relevant Soviet statements on each
question addressed in this paper on which the Soviets have
spoken.
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A3: What are possible criteria and scenarios for moving toward
the ultimat2,goal of elimination of all nuclear weapons?
Soviet Statements
From DST-11-003 Soviet Plenary Statement 4 June 85
-- You express the hope that this transition period of
saturating space with space-strike systems could ultimately lead
to the elimination of all nuclear arms. But this hope is totally
unfounded. The US side itself is not counting on such a
prospect. In any event you do not conceal your intent to base
your strategy on "nuclear intimidation," which will be
supplemented by the deployment of space-strike systems, for the
duration of this period. Why then do you ask us to believe what
you do not believe yourselves? Why do you ask us to join in a
venture which, it is known, will not solve the problem on which
the future of humanity depends, namely, the complete elimination
of nuclear arms everywhere? After all, we are not dealing with
an issue which it might seem advantageous to turn one way today
and another way tomorrow. We are dealing with decisions which
will determine the course of events for the entire period under
consideration. Political games and maneuvers based on expediency
and looking ahead just a year or two are totally inappropriate
here.
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C1: How are.,the Soviets likely, over time and depending on the
results of both sides research programs, to view increased
reliance on defense by the US, and under what conditions are they
likely to join the US in a jointly managed transition to such
reliance on both sides?
Soviet Statements
From DST-11-M-032 Post-plenary 9 July 85
-- Modisett asked Goryainov to specify what the Soviets
would like to know about the transition period. Goryainov
responded that the US side has not revealed what kinds of weapons
it has in mind, what it considers the ultimate goal of the
negotiations, what kind of final document it has in mind, and how
the outcome it envisions would relate to the goal of preventing
the militarization of space. He asked what weapons would be
subject to prohibition in the initial phase of a transition.
Moser noted that the US side already has answered these questions
on which data was available and that the answers to others
depended upon the results of SDI research. He said that a
document dealing with the transition period could be modeled upon
the 1971 US/Soviet measures agreement. He noted that the sides
could discuss the criteria for defensive systems, the schedule
for reducing offensive systems, and the kinds of offensive
systems that would remain deployed during the transition.
From DST-11-011 Soviet Plenary Statement 18 June 85
-- It is as if this program has become a unique sort of
sacred cow for the US Administration as a result of the political
and military brouhaha around it. In any event, the blinders of
the "Strategic Defense Initiative" clearly hinder our US partners
from taking a sober look at the real world and giving thought to
what the Soviet side is proposing. And this is futile. You are
deluding yourselves with the dream of scaling the heights of
military superiority through the SDI program and are thus
refusing to even consider the possibility of banning space-strike
arms. There may be a rude awakening. We are not afraid of the
US SDI program. We want an honest accord. But we have the
wherewithal to counter US military programs. We have the
economic and intellectual potential to effectively ensure the
security of the USSR and the countries of the Socialist
community. The US side should take this into account from the
very outset.
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The US side asserts that the space-strike arms being
developed within the framework of the SDI are being developed for
defense. Of course, discussions about defense are a convenient
front. But in reality the possible use of space-strike arms
depends on the intentions of those who have them at their
disposal. And these intentions may very well be determined by
the illusion of impunity from a retaliatory strike by the other
side. After all, it is no accident that apostles of the SDI are
not in any way limiting their efforts to space, but are at the
same time actively working to build up the offensive nuclear
potential of the United States by giving all elements of that
potential the capability of being used in a first strike.
-- It is also completely obvious that if so-called
"defensive" space-based ABM systems are developed, they can serve
as systems for striking analogous systems of the other side, not
to mention military space objects for support purposes
(spacecraft for communications, navigation, intelligence,
meteorological support, topographic and geodesic support, early
warning of missile attack, etc.), as well as those serving
practical economic and scientific-research purposes.
-- And can there really be any doubt that even when using
technologies already in existence, the relevant space-strike
systems are fully capable of being used to strike targets in the
earth's atmosphere and on its surface?
-- We cannot ignore all this, nor do we have the right to do
From DST-11-007 Soviet Plenary Statement 11 June 85
-- The US side has again spoken here in favor of "orderly,"
"predictable" and:"stabilizing" deployment of space-strike arms.
In this connection, we consider it necessary to emphasize once
again that there can be no stabilizing manner of deploying space-
strike arms. Once begun, such deployment will be difficult to
predict. And it will not be orderly -- on the contrary,
everything indicates that it will result in a galloping arms race
in all areas.
-- The beginning of a race in space arms is by no means a
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remote, theoretical prospect, as the US delegation at times
assures us here. The US side has made a number of official
statement about its intention to demonstrate prototypes of space-
strike arms soon. And tests of the ASAT anti-satellite system
against an actual target in space are planned for the near
future.
-- One should not think that the Soviet side will stand idly
by and watch. As stated in 1983, the Soviet moratorium on
putting anti-satellite arms into space is in force so long as and
provided that other countries do not place such arms into space.
From DST-11-008 Post-plenary 11 June 85
-- Grinin then asked how SDI deployment would be managed and
which weapons would be managed. Moser responded that Grinin's.
question was premature because SDI is presently a research
program with no weapons as yet developed. He stated that the
weapons we can manage now are those in our strategic and INF
arsenals. He went on to say that if we were to agree to reduce
these weapons now, then we would have taken the first step by
limiting the arms race on earth, which was one of the objectives
of the 8 January statement. He concluded by saying that if SDI
research produces weapons, the United States has offered to
jointly manage their deployment to prevent an arms race in space.
Worden continued that while we do not have specific weapons now,
we can talk about functional steps in the transition. He noted
that the first step is to reduce offensive forces. Defenses
could then be added, along with additional offensive reductions
to stabilize the strategic relationship and add stability at each
step. He continued that possible defenses may or may not be
space-based. What we should be discussing now are the capability
and effectiveness steps for a transition, not specific systems.
-- Grinin then asked if his conclusion was correct that the
United Stated does not want to limit or ban weapons but just
regulate systems under the SDI program. Wattawa responded that
his question was not appropriate because SDI is a research
program as Moser and Worden had explained. He continued that it
was clear the Soviets understand the need for defenses and that
should serve as a basis for discussion. He noted that the
publication "Soviet Military Power" provided by Barry during the
first round, clearly shows that the Soviets understand defensive
capabilitites and forces as reflected in their decades of work in
the area. Consequently, the United States doesn't understand the
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Soviet reluctance to talk about a move to a defense dominant
environment-which would be safer for all peoples. Goryainov
responded saying that the fact is that we have 40 years of
stability based on mutual vulnerability. He stated that whether
it is good or bad is not the question but that the Soviet side
was convinced that we should not tamper with this foundation. He
went on to say while fear of mutual annihilation is not the best
basis for stability and is admittedly bad, but the Soviets don't
want to change the foundation -- the Soviet union is opposed to
disrupting the foundation although they are not opposed to
defense.
-- Grinin then continued stating that he did not understand
what Wattawa's problem was. He asked how could the United States
understand a transition without regulation, management, and
control of SDI weapons. He indicated that all the United States
seems to desire controlling is strategic offensive forces. He
stated that the United States asserts that there are no weapons
deployed under SDI yet. He then asked how the United States
envisions the steps in a transition. Wattawa answered, noting
that it was premature to completely answer Grinin's question now,
but that the Soviet side would clearly see the details of our
approach in future US statements. He went on stating that our
goal is to President Reagan has clearly stated. He noted that it
was the Soviet offensive force build-up that is making the world
situation more unstable and that improved defenses on both sides
would make the world safer -- which is a view the Soviets must
share. Consequently, we must have a basis for discussion.
From DST-11-003 Soviet Plenary Statement 4 June 85
-- The US side has urged us to join it in studying the
possible consequences of implementing the President's concept of
a "Strategic Defense Initiative," advertising this as a means of
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth.
-- We have already provided our assessment of SDI as part of
an overall offensive plan designed to destroy strategic parity
and obtain military superiority and the capability of delivering
a first nuclear strike with impunity. At the same time, we are
perfectly willing to set forth once again our view on the
consequences of what the US side is contemplating. We would ask,
however, that you listen carefully to our words and try to
understand that our objections are prompted by concern over the
real possibility of serious destabilization of the situation and
an increase in the military threat. And, of course, such a turn
of events would not be in anyone's interest.
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-- If, as the US delegation stated on March 19, 1985, the US
is in fact pursuing the objective of reaching agreement on
measures which would ensure greater security for both sides, if
it wants to build a stable strategic relationship between our two
countries at significantly lower levels of nuclear armaments, if
it wants to preserve the integrity of the regime established by
the ABM Treaty, then the course of developing space-strike arms,
which it has taken, precludes achievement of the above
objectives. Such a course will lead to directly opposite
results.
-- And as for discourses about "orderly" deployment of
space-strike systems, these are either falsehoods or self-
deception. The same can be said of assertions regarding the
possibility of some sort of "stabilizing" deployment of only
defensive space systems, which it is alleged, would not be arms
in the strict sense of the word. If a new class of arms is
permitted to emerge, its further development will acquire its own
momentum. Experience with the emergence of nuclear arms
demonstrates this quite eloquently. Only one conclusion is
possible here, namely that the "Strategic Defense Initiative"
does not and cannot bring about any stabilization of the
relations between the US and the USSR. Nor will it bring
tranquility or security to the world as a whole.
-- You believe that the process of making space-strike arms
operational marks some sort of "period of transition to a more
stable world with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms." This
is also not the case. The true picture would be different.
-- Even now the "Star Wars" program stands in the way of
solutions for limiting and reducing nuclear systems. And this is
understandable. When, under conditions of approximate parity,
one side announces its intent to render as many as possible of
the other side's arms "meaningless" and "obsolete," it cannot
expect the other side to assist it in this endeavor. On the
contrary, in order to ensure its own security, it will be
compelled to do everything to prevent the success of such a
project.
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-- No special shrewdness is required to realize that the
transition period which the US side refers to would not be a
period of increased stability in the world. Nor would it be a
period during which the levels of nuclear arms would be lowered.
It would be a period of an inevitable heightening of tension, of
the appearance of ever newer and more sophisticated nuclear
systems, as well as other arms, and of a corresponding increase
in the nuclear threat, including the nuclear threat to the United
States of America.
-- You are advocating a program whose success is not
guaranteed even by its authors. What you will actually get --and
you will most assuredly get it -- is twenty or more years of
steady deterioration of US security and increased threat of
military catastrophe. We do not understand why such a transition
period, or such a prospect in general, should be so attractive.
From DST-1-013 Soviet Plenary Statement 16 April 85
-- During the SALT I negotiations the USSR and the US
reached the joint conclusion that only an unambiguous
renunciation of attempts to deploy any large-scale ABM Treaty
ensures the necessary conditions for efforts to reduce strategic
offensive arms. This was not an accidental or temporary
conclusion; rather it ensued from the objective situation. The
logic of nuclear confrontation is such that if one side acquires
an additional potential just in ABM systems, this inevitably
leads to upsetting the existing strategic parity, to
destabilization, and to an increase in the risk of nuclear war.
How much more serious and destabilizing, then, would be the
appearance not just of additional anti-missile systems but of a
whole new class of arms, namely, space-strike arms. The side
which embarked on the path of developing such arms would
obviously be seeking military superiority in the hope of
acquiring the capability of delivering a first nuclear strike
with impunity, having deprived the other side of its retaliatory
capability or having substantially weakened that capability.
-- This is precisely how one should understand the meaning
of the interrelationship between limitations on defensive and
offensive arms and the reason why it was only the ban on large-
scale ABM systems that opened the way for the process of limiting
and reducing strategic nuclear arms in 1972. Herein also lies
the meaning of the interrelationship between the question of
preventing an arms race in space and the question of halting the
arms race on earth, which was recorded in the joint Soviet-US
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statement of January 8, 1985. What we have here is one basic
line,- one premise, one indisputable conclusion, which was valid
in 1972, which is still valid in 1985 and which will be valid for
the foreseeable future. And it is certainly no accident that the
preamble to the ABM Treaty emphasizes the "effective measures to
limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial
factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would
lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving
nuclear weapons." This provision is recorded in the Treaty,
which is of unlimited duration. It must serve as the guiding
principle for the actions of the two sides both now and in the
future.
-- While eroding the reliable basis established by the ABM
Treaty and proven in practice, the US is attempting to justify.
its actions by presenting a concept which comes down to the
following: in the current situation, where significant
technological developments are taking place, possibilities are
opening up for strengthening security through a substantial
improvement in strategic defense systems. The US contends that
this process will render offensive arms powerless and useless and
will all but automatically lead to the elimination of nuclear
weapons. And at the same time the US itself is stepping up its
programs for both nuclear and space-strike arms. The lack of
substance and, what is more, the danger of such an approach are
obvious. The development of a fundamentally new class of
weapons, i.e., space-strike arms, would have consequences which
at this time it is even difficult to foresee. The arms race would
not be halted; on the contrary, it would even be given new
impetus. The introduction of qualitatively new systems into the
structure of strategic forces would considerably alter the whole
system used for assessing the strategic balance, would increase
the risk of ambiguity and uncertainty on both sides, and would
increase mutual suspicion as a result, the world would be faced
with a drastic increase in political and military tension, the
security of our countries would sharply decrease, and efforts to
limit and reduce offensive arms would be blocked. In a case like
this, how in the world can one talk about a sensible approach to
questions of peace and security?
From DST-1-007 Soviet Plenary Statement 2 Apr 85
-- In other words, it is being suggested that we talk up a
storm about nothing, while the US feverishly tries to take the
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high ground of military superiority in space. And as if that
were not enough, at the same time the US side graciously proposes
that we shelve the question of space-strike arms and reach an
accord on reducing strategic nuclear arms in order to make the
system being developed by the US for protecting itself from a
retaliatory strike function more effectively.
-- We readily believe the US side's statement at the last
meeting that such a turn of events would be "central" for it.
But this would in no way serve the objectives of strengthening
stability. In order to resolve the question of nuclear arms, an
honest and constructive solution to the issue of space is
required. In order to radically reduce strategic offensive arms,
it is necessary to ban space-strike arms. Anyone who does not
want an agreement on space does not want an agreement on nuclear
arms either. Thus and only thus can the matter be viewed.
From DST-1-004 Soviet Plenary Statement 26 March 85
-- Today the space arms group is beginning its work. As the
USSR delegation emphasized at plenary meetings, the question of
preventing an arms race in space is of priority importance. The
Soviet side, of course, advocates that all the questions assigned
to the negotiations be considered in a businesslike, specific
manner, and in parallel, with all three areas -- space, strategic
and medium-range arms -- considered in linkage with each other.
However, it is obvious that if things were to move toward
implementation of programs to develop space-strike arms,
including the development of large-scale ABM systems with space-
based elements, i.e., what you addressed so eloquently just now,
then limitations and reductions of nuclear arms would become
impossible. Moreover, there would be an impetus for developing
new systems and kinds of such arms and making them operational.
This would have a highly negative effect on strategic stability
and a negative impact on the negotiations. On the other hand,
progress by the space arms group in resolving the questions
assigned to it -- and we would again like to remind you of this -
-would act as a stimulus for considering and solving problems in
other areas of the negotiations.
From NST-1-021 Soviet Plenary 21 March 85
-- A cardinal solution that would block all channels for an
arms race in space is precisely what is required now. Only a ban
on the entire class of space-strike arms can provide a truly
effective solution.
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-- This would be a step of immense importance. Such a
solution would protect our countries -- and, indeed, all humanity
-- from a new, exhausting spiral in the arms race and would
reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Conversely,
development and deployment of space-strike arms would bring about
an unprecedented destabilization of the strategic situation, an
increase in political tensions, an intensified arms build-up in
all areas, and the diversion of vast material and intellectual
resources from the solution of crucial problems of global
significance, problems which involve the very future of our
planet and civilization. Together we have a political and moral
duty to prevent this.
From NST-1-021 Soviet Plenary Statement 21 March 85
-- Naturally, in discussing questions related to space arms,
we do not intend to consider some kind of joint schedules for
violating the ABM Treaty and suspending over the planet one
series of space-strike arms after another. The Soviet Union is
not a partner for plans of that kind.
-- Let me now turn to the question of strategic offensive
arms. As indicated above, it is very closely connected with the
subject of space.
-- If the US side would agree to work in the negotiations
toward a total ban on space-strike arms, this would open the way
for considering the possibility or reaching agreement on radical
reductions in strategic offensive arms. These reductions would
involve both the total number of nuclear weapons on all strategic
delivery vehicles themselves.
-- In the context of such a radical solution the sides could
also assume a mutual obligation to fully refrain from programs
for the development and deployment of new kinds and types of
strategic offensive arms, namely, long-range cruise missiles of
all basing modes, ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
From NST-1-008 Soviet Plenary
For objective reasons the question of space strike
weapons is now of key, priority importance. If implemented, the
US administration's plans to extend the arms race to space would
lead to a sharp increase in the nuclear threat. Attempts to
camouflage these plans with references to some sort of
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"defensive" considerations are nothing more than sophistry and
playing with'words. This is by no means a matter of defense;
rather it involves measures which are part of an overall
offensive plan designed to destroy strategic parity, as well as
to obtain military superiority and the capability of delivering a
first nuclear strike with impunity. Such designs cannot but give
rise to legitimate concern. It is quite obvious that these are
incompatible with the task of reducing and completely eliminating
nuclear weapons.
-- If, in defiance of common sense and the will of the
overwhelming majority of states, which has been clearly expressed
at the United Nations, the US were to take to course of
implementing space militarization programs, including the
development of a large-scale ABM system with space-based
elements. This would have the gravest consequences. The Soviet
Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which
is of unlimited duration, would be wrecked and many other
international agreements now in force would be undermined.
Limitations and reductions of strategic offensive arms would
become impossible moreover, there would be an impetus for
developing new systems and kinds of strategic arms and making
them operational.
-- The development of space strike weapons would inevitably
be a catalyst for an unrestrained arms race in other areas as
well. All this taken together would have a highly negative
effect on strategic stability and would increase the risk of
outbreak of nuclear war. Peace on earth would become even more
precarious.
-- The USSR delegation would like to emphasize that if the
United States moves toward the militarization of space, this
would ultimately blow the negotiations apart. The responsibility
for this would rest entirely with the US. We are stating this
bluntly from the very outset of the negotiations so that there be
no ambiguities on this score and no need to talk about this in
the future during the discussion of specific issues.
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D4: What would be the possibilities for evolution of a non-
cooperative transition and what would be the implications for
stability of various alternatives?
From DST-11-011 Soviet Plenary 18 June 85
-- In this connection, I would like to recall an old truth:
he who digs a hole will fall into it and he who knocks down a
fence shall be bitten by a serpent. The development of a large-
scale ABM system and the resulting inevitable destruction of the
ABM Treaty will force the other side to take countermeasures.
This would be dictated by the interests of maintaining stability
and preventing illusions about the possibility of delivering a
nuclear attack with impunity.
-- It is completely obvious that the other side can take the
path of building up and qualitatively improving its nuclear arms,
with the aim of saturating and penetrating or circumventing the
ABM system of its adversary. It can take the path of developing
systems to counter an ABM system and the path of parallel
deployment of its own ABM system.
-- All this would inevitably be accompanied by a race in the
quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of the
respective systems. The US side must realize that it is
impossible today to foresee all the consequences of such a course
of events. In any case, it would be idle for the US side to
count on the other side's taking the course of copying US
programs and acting within the framework of the schemes to change
the correlation of forces in the international arena, devised by
the United States for its own benefit. We are warning you about
this in advance.
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