SIG(SPACE) MEETING, 18 APRIL 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Perlour 17 April request (see Tab A), enclosed
is a copy of materials used in the 18 April
SIG(Space) meeting on space launch policy.
An MFR summarizing the decisions reached in the
meeting is also enclosed.
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FOR OFF ILIAL U urn.,
DCl/ICS 86-4302
24 April 1986
MMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting, le April 1986
1. The subject meeting, chaired by VADM Poindexter, was held to discuss
issues related to the loss of the Challenger. The meeting started at 1600
hours and lasted until 1820 hours with attendees as shown in Attachment A.
2. Before starting the meeting, VADM Poindexter asked Mr. Aldridge to
give information on the Titan launch failure. Mr. Aldridge stated that a
Titan 34D had blown up earlier in the day after five seconds of flight. The
cause was as yet unknown.
3. VADM Poindexter started the meeting by stating that it was to be a
precursor to a NSC meeting. Two SIG(Space) members, who were unable to
attend, had sent memos to the Chairman. Mr. Burnley, DoT, had emphasized the
need for a firm transition date for discontinuing Shuttle launch of commercial
and foreign payloads. Dr. McTague, OSTP, had stated that a replacement
orbiter was needed.
4. VADM Poindexter commended the 1G(Space) for the report and stated that
the meeting would focus on the three issues highlighted in the meeting
agenda. A number of lesser issues related to bracketed items in the report
would also be covered.
5. The next 45 minutes were spent discussing the commercial ELV issue.
VADM Poindexter concluded this discussion by stating that all had the same
objectives (i.e., they desired a transition from the Shuttle to US commercial
ELV industry), but that a transition plan needed to be developed.
VADM Poindexter said that he would discuss the matter with members of the
Economic Policy Council (EPC). He would then request that they convene a
subgroup (as they had in the past under the Cabinet Council on Commerce and
Trade) to develop this plan with appropriate industry consultation.
Discussion points on this subject are given in Attachment B.
6. VADM Poindexter than opened the discussion of the funding issue by
noting that the President wanted to restore our space launch capability and
support the Shuttle program, but that the provision of funding of the
magnitude required was a serious problem. VADM Poindexter further noted that
all agencies appeared to support Option 3A (the option that replaced the
Orbiter by 1990 and provided an expanded DoD ELI/ program). mon Poindexter
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SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting, 18 April 1986
then started the discussion of the funding issue by stating he understood that
DoD would provide offsets for their required funding, but that NASA could
not. DoD corrected him on this point and a 45-minute discussion followed (see
Attachment C). VADM Poindexter concluded the discussion by asking 01113 to
reconvene the Budget Working Group to address the funding issue. The Working
Group was to come up with innovative funding approaches for cases based on the
following:
- FY 1986 and FY 1987 starts (presumably for orbiter only).
- With and without offsets.
The ground rules appeared to be:
? NASA budget authority could be requested year by year vice NASA's
desire to get all of it in the first year.
? DoD would offset its outlays in FY 1986, but would not offset the
FY 1986 budget authority (The policy on DoD FY 1987 offsets was
unclear).
7. VADM Poindexter then turned the Group's attention to the timing of
this report with respect to that of the Rogers Commission. The discussion
brought out that the Rogers Commission report would be going to the printer in
the middle of May. Since the NSC meeting to discuss the launch recovery plan
would not be held until after the economic summit meeting (not earlier than
8 May), all agreed that consistency with the Rogers Comlission report would
not be a problem.
8. VADM Poindexter then turned the meeting to a discussion of the minor
issues. Of these, the only significant item was the discussion of the
alternate wording for the first sentence of Section II in the draft NSDD.
NASA wanted continuation of the wording that stated that "the STS remains the
primark launch system and a vital element of the US space launch program."
The majority view was that this sentence should be changed to reflect the new
goal of a more balanced national launch capability with wording of this
sentence as follows: The STS remains a key element of the US space launch
program." In arguing his case, Mr. Graham pointed out that the language that
he preferred was already in national policy and he was concerned that a change
could be interpreted in the Congress as a lack of support for the Shuttle
program. Others, however, pointed out that it was important to modify this
sentence to reflect more accurately the Shuttle's new role in the US space
launch program. Several compromise approaches were offered during the
discussion:
(1) Replace the wording "the primary" with "a primary."
(2) Leave out the sentence entirely.
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SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting, 18 April 1986
The issue was sot resolved, but it appeared that VADM Poindexter might want to
avoid the issue completely by leaving out all general policy statements and
focusing the NSDD on the implementation actions necessary for the recovery of
US space launch capability.
9. VADM Poindexter concluded the meeting by reviewing the follow-up
actions:
Colonel May will redraft the NSDD to reflect the agreements reached
In the meeting. (Colonel May will presumably convene a working group
for this purpose.)
_ Briefings will be prepared for the NSC meeting. (No specific
assignments were made.)
- A draft package of materials for the Congress will be prepared.
(This will presumably be based on the work of the OMB Budget Working
Group.)
STAT
?
Deputy Director for Policy
Planning and Policy Staff
Attachments:
A. Attendees at SIG(Space)
Meeting, 18 April 1986
B. Discussion of ELY
Contirrcialization Issue
C. Decision of Funding Issue
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SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting, 18 April 1986
Distribution:
1 - D/ICS
1 - D/PBS
1 - AD/PPS
1 - PPS Subject (Rosen)
1 - PPS Chrono
1 - ICS Registry
DCl/ICS/PPS
:s) 14 April 1986 STAT
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Members:
DoT:
Do S:
NASA:
DoD:
DoC:
DCI:
JCS:
ACDA:
Attachment A
Attendees at SIG(Space) Meeting, 18 April 1986
Chairman: VADM John M. Poindexter
Jennifer Dorn, Madeline Johnson.
William Schneider, John Negroponte.
William Graham, Conrad Forsythe, Thomas Newnan.
William H. Taft, IV, Edward Aldridge, Don Lathan.
Clarence J. Brown, Courtney Stadd.
VAN E. A. Burkhalter
LtGen John H. Moellering, Maj. Tom Bishop.
Michael Mobbs, Vigdor Teplitz.
Observers:
OMB: Randall Davis, Dan Taft, Jeff Struthers.
OSTP: Richard Johnson, Col. Maurie Roesch.
Assistant to the President, Cabinet Affairs: Al Kingon.
Assistant to the President, Policy Development: John Svahn
CEA: Thomas Moore
Executive Secretary: Col. Gerald May, Director of Space Programs, NSC Staff
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Attachment B
Discussion of ELY Commercialization Issue
DoT/Dorn
^ Secretary Dole has met with the CEOs of Martin Marietta and General
Dynamics Astronautics. Both are very interested in entering the
commercial ELY market, but they feel they need a clear signal that
the Government will not compete with them for this business.
DoT feels that transition problems should be minimal.
- -
DoT has been working on the regulatory framework for two years.
A "date certain" (e.g., October 1988) is imperative. This will
provide two and a half years notice to all parties.
It is unlikely that the backlog will permit NASA to fly the
commercial payloads on the Shuttle until the early 1990s.
NASA/Graham:
^ Agrees with the overall goal and policy.
The US commercial ELY capability does not exist now, and the
transition is, therefore, a problem.
^ The launch services industry is more than just the provision of
hardware. There are legal problems, insurance problems, etc. An
example is that NASA negotiated for two years with Hughes for a
recent launch services agreement.
^ NASA will help with the transition, but they believe they also have
an obligation to support the US COMSAT industry. Setting a date
certain would not show US support for this industry.
^ RASA proposes that the Government work on a transition plan that will
provide the appropriate assurances to both the ELY industry and the
US COMSAT industry.
^ NASA will not act as either a competitor or an impediment to the US
commercial launch industry.
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DoC/Brown:
^ The (LV industry needs assurance that the Government will not compete.
? NASA needs to contribute its expertise in the provision of launch
services for commercial payloads.
- Would like to see a six-year manifest on the table. DoC does not
understand what we can and can't launch.
- US Government needs to negotiate with the (LV companies. (DoT
restated their view that these firms have already been involved and
are ready to transition now.)
ACDA/Mobbs:
? Whatever approach is followed, ACDA would like a provision that the
SIG(Space) would review, on an annual basis, progress on
commercialization and leadership goals.
State/Schneider:
^ State agrees with NASA on the need for a transition plan. Hughes has
stated that it will be four years before a US commercial ELY launch
capability is available.
^ State is concerned about the timeliness of the market's development.
They don't want to force the US COMSAT industry to foreign launch
vehicles.
Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs/A1 Kingon:
^ Without a clear signal to the contrary, industry would be reluctant
to enter the market if they know that we are expanding NASA's and
DoD's launch capacity.
? Two and a half years is ample time for a transition. As chairman of
the President's Privatization Task Force, supports the DoT position.
DoT/Taft:
- A very clear signal is needed. This could be a specific date or
could also be the availability of commercial capacity.
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DoC/Brown:
? The problem is that nobody trusts anyone else. The potential
commercial launch suppliers have strong economic ties to NASA.
? Wants clarification of the market and the potential industry capacity.
OMB/Davis:
- ELVs are not new. In the past, the Government has undercut its
commitment to the creation of this industry.
? We need a strong comitment now. If the date we pick is wrong, we
can revisit it at a later time.
NASA/GrahaT:
^ Agreed again that a strong signal is needed, but that we should not
send a hostile signal to the users. We need to work together to
accomplish the transition as quickly as possible.
VADM Poindexter:
^ All seem to have the same objectives.
^ Agreed with Bud Brown's proposal that we set up an EPC group to
develop a transition plan.
Taft and Graham:
Need a firr commitment that once the industry is established, the
Government will not compete.
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Attachment C
Decision of Funding Issue
VADM Poindexter:
- Understands that DO will supply offsets.
DoD/Taft:
- Tnis is not correct. DoD can handle the problem of offsets in
FY 1988 and beyond. FY 1986 and 1987 are problems.
DoS/Schneider:
- Stated that there was $1.1 billion of EX/IM bank direct loan
authority in FY 1986 and some amount in FY 1987 which is equated with
budget authority by Congressional Committees. EX/IM bank does not
need the funds. OMB may be able to devise an approach to use this
authority to offset the space launch funding.
NOTE: OMB privately advises that they do not believe this is
feasible.
VADM Poindexter:
- Can we find offsetting funds in the savings from lower fuel costs?
OMB/Davis:
- The fuel savings are small in FY 1986, but they might be laryer in
FY 1987.
DoD/Taft
- The fuel savings that are being discussed have
many times.
already been spent
JCS/Bishop
JCS believes that the Challenger disaster was a national problem that
requires a national solution. JCS does not believe that it is
appropriate that Defense and NASA alone must fund the recovery plan.
NASA/Graham
- NASA believes that it can get by with about $1 billion less than
shown in the IG(Space) report.
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- NASA wants a full commitment for replacement orbiter funding so that
the budget profile can be as efficient as possible. NASA needs about
$3 billion.
DoD/Taft:
? DoD has already provided $46 billion in offsets; we can not provide
any more.
OMB/Davis:
? OMB wants to fund the program starting in FY 1987. OMB sees no way
to solve the FY 1986 funding problem.
VAD!: Poindexter:
(After extended further discussion of Ad-inistration policy on
offsets.) Changing the Administration policy offsets would be very
difficult.
^ Why can't we provide the NASA budget authority on a year-by-year
basis?
NASA/ Graham:
- Pointed out that the US Government does not buy insurance; it
self-insures. The tragetly has happened, and now it is appropriate
for the entire Government to provide the insurance payment, i.e., the
recovery funds.
DoD/Taft:
^ DoD can handle offsets for the DoD outlays required in FY 1936
(approximately $100 million). DoD can not provide offsets for the
budget authority.
^ 1987 is not a problem with respect to offsets. (Note: [1] Not clear
whether this refers to outlays, budget authority, or both. [2] OMB
has been in contact with DoD comptroller after the meeting. DoD
comptroller says there will be no DoD offsets in FY 1987).
OHB/Davis:
- If the principle that we require offsets has indeed been established,
OMB recommends that they reconvene the Budget Working Group to work
out the details.
Ifo?
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VADM Poindexter:
^ Agrees that we should reconvene this Working Group to address the
problem based on the agreements reached.
- Working Group should consider orbiter starts in either FY 1986 or
1987; it should also consider cases with and without full offsets.
- VADII Poindexter urged OMB to seek innovative approaches for
identifying the budget offsets. It was implied that these need not
be within the budgets of the affected agencies.
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BRIEFING BOOK
FOR
18 APRIL SIG(SPACE) MEETING
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tUK UttlUIAL Ubt UNLT
SIG(Space) Meeting (4/18/86)
Subject meeting will address three issues (see Tab A).
1. Identify funding offsets.
2. Deciding policy changes to relieve NASA of the
responsibility for launching all commercial and foreign
payloads.
3. Release of the report with the Rogers Commission report.
Report (Tab B) is essentially complete and coordinated at the Working
Group level.
Agency differences are accommodated by numerous inclusions of
alternate text. Alternate text inserts and their proponents are
shown in brackets. Desired deletions are shown by underlines.
The text has been highlighted in key sections to make it easy to
locate the points of disagreement.
Both the Executive Summary and the main report are complete. If
time is short, suggest that you concentrate on the Executive
Summary, but you may also wish to spend some time reviewing the
Issues and Conclusions sections of the full report (pages 33-38).
The report highlights four issues, three that have been the subject
of Working Group debate and one being a last-minute insertion by a
nonmember of the Working Group (SDI).
How can required funding be provided?
When and how should NASA discontinue flying commercial and
foreign payloads that do not require a manned presence?
Should NASA consider the use of ELVs for civil missions?
Should the decisions regarding the recovery of US space launch
posture in the pre-1995 period await the conclusions of the
Joint National Space Transportation and Support System Study?
The first two of these issues will be a focus of discussion at the SIG(Space).
There is also another fundamental issue that drives the choice among
the options:
-- Should the CHALLENGER orbiter be replaced?
These issues (plus a few others that might come up) are discussed in the
following pages and recommended positions are given.
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List of Issues
1. How can Required Funding be Provided? (S/TK)
2. When and How Should NASA Discontinue Flying Commercial and Foreign
Payloads that do not Require a Manned Presence? (FOUO)
3. Should NASA Consider the Use of ELVs for Civil Missions? (FOLIO)
4. Should the Decision '41T.rding the Recovery of US Space Launch
Posture in the Pre-1 Period Await the Conclusions of the Joint
National Space Transportation and Support System (SIAS) study? (FOUO)
5. Should the CHALLENGER Orbiter be Replaced? (FOUO)
6. Should the SIG(Space) Report be Released with the Rogers Commission
Report? (FOUO)
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Funding
Issue: How can required funding be provided? (U)
Key Points in Report: (U)
- Funding unanticipated.
- Difficulty with GRH.
- No attempt to resolve.
- How to provide funding, including offsets, to be addressed through
the budget process.
Funds should be assessed against overall Presidential budget (NASA
and DoD position).
Discussion: (S/TK)
In last IG(Space) meeting, OMB-chaired "Mafia" Working Group was
formed to address this problem separately.
Group had one meeting with 'epresenting DCI. No 25X1
consensus was reached on the issue ot otsets (see Tab C).
- Issue paper for Budget Review Board (BRB) (chaired by Don Regan)
was recommended and prepared (see Tab C).
-- ICS received draft issue paper and sent comments (see Tab C).
Do not know if issue paper was finalized.
OMB Director Miller discussed the offset issue with Poindexter prior
to the previously scheduled 7 April SIG(Space) meeting.
Poindexter did not agree to send issue paper to BRB.
Agreed instead to direct agencies to come forward with offsets
(not necessarily 100 percent). This is expected in memorandum
inviting members to SIG(Space) meeting and is apparently causing
delays in getting the memorandum out.
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DoD continuing to resist identifying offsets.
Informally agreed that they will provide offsets in FY 1988 and
beyond. Resisting offsets in FY 1986 and FY 1987.
NASA has apparently put forward some candidates for offsets.
OMB is not pushing them for 100 percent offsets, as they are DoD.
We are unaware of any DoD requests for NRP identification of offsets.
NRO Staff believes that DoD offsets, if any, will be outside the
NRP.
Poindexter's SIG(Space) Agenda memorandum (Tab A) states "I believe
the DoD should identify full offsets." DoD does not interpret this
as firm direction. DoD is prepared to discuss the policy on offsets
and may have some preliminary thoughts in their hip pocket.
Recommendation: (U)
Points in
3 April memorandum to OMB (Tab C) are worth
repeating.
Cost of an acute emergency (such as the CHALLENGER accident)
should not be accommodated by drawing down other planned Federal
activities.
Impact on budgetary process of recovery package without offsets
can be minimized by citing this as an extraordinary case--an
acute and unexpected emergency.
Press for Presidential decision on the substantive recommendations
first.
-- Funding mechanisms and necessary offsets can then be worked as
part of budget process. Note: DoD draft supplemental has been
prepared (see Tab D).
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Issue: When and how should NASA discontinue flying commercial and foreign
payloads that do not require a manned presence?
Key Points in Report:
Except for NASA, Working Group consensus is that STS should not be
used for routine commercial deployment and that NASA will actively
support and facilitate the acceptance of US commercially-offered
launch services.
Clear signal must be sent that Government will no longer compete with
US private sector.
-- Limited size of market.
-- Uncertainty of Government's intentions.
-- Long-term nature of capital investments.
DoT Proposal and Arguments:
After satisfying contractual commitments originally manifested for flight
through FY 1988, the Government will discontinue providing launch services for
commercial and foreign missions that do not require a manned presence.
- Will give industry a firm point in time when Government competition
will cease.
- Matches the time when US commercial ELVs can begin to be available in
volume (1988).
Does not impact presently manifested customers.
NASA Proposal and Arguments:
An approach should be established whereby the Government would, to the
best of its ability, accommodate all existing contractual commitments, but
would not in the future compete with a viable and competitive US ELV
industry providing launch services for commercial and foreign satellites
that do not require a manned presence.
Maintains US leadership in space launch capability.
- Provides clear signals to the private sector.
Maintains best efforts of Government to fulfill contractual
obligations for provision of launch services.
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Discussion:
- Working Group has heard from potential ELV suppliers and
communications satellite manufacturers. Justice has also examined
NASA's services contracts to determine the extent of Government
liability, should the Government attempt to terminate them.
- ELV suppliers state that they stand ready to enter the market and
could have vehicles available by 1988.
TCI is a potential supplier of Delta launch vehicles. Its
financial staying power has limited its success to date.
General Dynamics could supply Atlas vehicles. They need
commitments for four vehicles before they will make the needed
capital investments.
Martin Marietta is in the best competitive position because they
have production base for CELVs and Titan IIs.
All of these suppliers will have difficulty competing with
Ariane's current price, but Ariane has been raising its price
recently.
- DoD's proposed procurement of ELVs for GPS could provide an
additional production base for one of these ELV suppliers.
DoD procurement could provide for a commercial buy.
- ELV suppliers desire a strong signal that Government will not compete.
- COMSAT manufacturers have multiple interests and concerns.
Pleased with current low (subsidized) Shuttle price. Recognize
that prices will go up.
Concerned about Shuttle's ability to supply a launch slot in
near term.
Do not want to incur satellite modification costs for a new
launcher.
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-- Do not want to become dependent on single supplier or a foreign
supplier (e.g., Ariane).
-- Believe that US ELY industry is not commercially competitive at
this time.
How to accomplish the transition from Shuttle to US commercial ELVs
is indeed a serious problem.
DoT approach is clear and unequivocal. NASA's legal liability
on unmaintained launches is open to question.
NASA approach gives NASA considerable room to continue in the
market if they so desire.
- A viable US commercial ELY industry will benefit national security by
broadening the US ELY manufacturing base.
- DoD issue paper on this subject has been made available
(Tab E). Recommend you take the time to read it.
Recommendation:
- I'm not completely pleased with either NASA's or DoT's policy
formulation:
DoT's formulation could result in Government legal liability;
this should be examined more carefully. It also does not permit
NASA to provide launch services for commercial customers under
any circumstances (e.g., an ELY grounding).
NASA's formulation, on the other hand, does not define what is
meant by "in the future," does not define what is a "contractual
commitment," and provides that someone (presumably NASA) will
determine whether the US ELY industry is "viable and
competitive" before NASA can decide to compete.
DoT's formulation will provide the clearest signal to the
industry; NASA's formulation will ease the transition for all
parties but would probably not encourage an ELY industry to
develop.
Recommend that both policy formulations be combined using guidelines
as follows:
-- Eliminate reference to "viable and competitive."
-- Use NASA's formulation on not competing.
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Policy language might be something like this:
"After satisfying contractual commitments originally manifested for
flight through 1988 to the best of its abilities, the Government would not
compete with a US ELV industry providing launch services for commercial
and foreign missions that do not require a manned presence."
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Issue: Should NASA consider the use of ELVs for civil missions? (OMB issue).
Key Points in Report:
- Civil offload could be substantial (perhaps equivalent to capacity of
an orbiter).
- Use of ELVs for routine deployment of civil missions is consistent
with strategy to offload DoD and commercial payloads.
Discussion:
This is an issue that OMB repeatedly tried to raise for Working Group
consideration. NASA resisted and it was never thoroughly addressed.
We agree that there are a number of civil payloads that could be
offloaded. Transition costs could be incurred for those that are
already in development.
NASA's main argument against this was based on launch cost. They
asserted that marginal cost of Shuttle launch would always be less
than that for an ELV.
If major civil offloads were implemented, the case for a replacement
orbiter would be weakened.
Recommendation:
This is not an issue agreed to by the majority of the Working Group,
and is for the most part an internal NASA issue that can be resolved
later.
If pressed to comment, we should recommend that this issue should be
deleted as a separate highlighted issue in the executive summary. It
can be mentioned in the main report as a possible argument against a
replacement orbiter.
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Issue: Should the decisions regarding the recovery of US space launch
posture in the pre-1995 period await the conclusions of the Joint
National Space Transportation and Support System (STAS) study?
Key Points in Report:
STAS report due in May.
-- Will contain recommendations for post-1995 time frame.
Will require sizable investments in rocket and air-breather
propulsion.
These investments should be recognized as elements of near-term
fiscal planning.
Discussion:
Systems resulting from STAS report recommendations will probably not
be available until close to the year 2000. These systems can not
address our near- and mid-term problems and the funds for solving our
immediate problems can not be traded off against the funds for these
STAS proposals.
Recommendation:
- This last minute SDIO issue does not contribute to the resolution of
the major SIG(Space) issues.
Recommend that it be deleted from the report.
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FUR OFF lelAL USE UNLY
Issue: Should the CHALLENGER Orbiter be replaced?
Key Points in Report:
- All agree that a more diversified launch posture composed of STS and
expanded use of ELVs should be established.
- Replacement orbiter contributes to nation's total launch capacity.
Options with expanded ELV usage and a replacement orbiter are the
only ones that eliminate the backlog before 1995 for conservative
Shuttle flight rates.
There is considerable risk inherent in operating a three-orbiter
fleet. If one of the remaining orbiters is out of service for an
extended period of time, a two-orbiter fleet would be inadequate to
satisfy manned space flight, Shuttle-unique, and national security
requirements.
Discussion:
- To make the three-orbiter fleet acceptable from a risk perspective,
the nation would probably seek to offload the STS to a greater
extent. This implies an increased national security use of ELVs and
some attempts at a civil offload (see previous OMB issue).
Use of ELVs significantly beyond that proposed by DoD would likely
require additional investment in production and launch capacity.
- The outyear demand projections are undoubtedly overstated. NASA
program adjustments (yet to be determined) will exacerbate this
problem.
- National security use of ELVs may have to be increased for other
reasons:
Performance limitations and/or VAFB Shuttle facility closure
might require one payload to transition to ELVs.
Centaur safety concerns could affect some high altitude payloads
currently planned for the Shuttle.
DoD may modify its planning to allow for a Shuttle, down-time
greater than the 12-months that is the basis for all current
planning. Note: According to the press, NASA has now increased
their estimate of the down-time to 18 months. We have reviewed
the down-time estimates with Air Force staff. One knowledgeable
individual states that a down-time of two-three years is
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rvm urri,LiiL UaL VNLI
possible. This is based on the need to redesign and requalify
the SRB joint. This would include the time to complete the
design, order forgings, do machining, load propellants,
manufacture the SRB, and conduct test firings. On 17 April,
RADM Truly met with D/ICS and restated the NASA position that
the down-time will be between 12 and 18 months. The discussion
showed that this was based on a redesign approach that would not
require new forgings and propellent loading.
The accident and its ramifications are likely to have a profound
near-term impact on the Shuttle and its operations:
Performance could be reduced significantly by increased weight
of the SRBs and from other yet to be determined fixes. Filament
wound cases needed for highest Shuttle performance, appear to
have design deficiencies that may preclude their effective use.
Cost per launch will be increased. SRB cost may go up because
Rogers Commission may recommend one-time use only. This may add
$20 million/launch. Any turn-around time increase will also
increase cost per launch. Factors here include additional
weather conservatism, more extensive safety checks, etc.
Launch capacity, related to turn-around time, is likely to
decrease from preaccident estimates. NASA's preaccident
planning goal of 24/year was previously thought to be optimistic
by most observers outside NASA.
The accident investigation has shown that NASA's flight qualification
testing for the SRBs was deficient. NASA's review of safety-related
Shuttle subsystems may turn up additional candidates for
requalification and, perhaps, redesign.
We understand that Rogers Commission has not turned up any major
orbiter design problems.
We understand that NASA's cost estimates may include a large
contingency for redesign efforts.
Building a replacement orbiter of the same design on an
accelerated schedule may therefore be reasonable.
Recommendation:
National security interests are best served by a robust orbiter
fleet. However, our primary need is for expanded ELVs since our
parochial needs can be satisfied by a three-orbiter fleet.
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- We believe that a replacement orbiter will ultimately be required and
that the nation should plan for it. Rogers Commission report and
NASA's internal safety investigations should be completed first so
that replacement orbiter can incorporate all necessary redesigns.
This will also ease the near-term budget impact.
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ruK urrit,imL u WILT
Timing/Rogers Commission
Issue: Should the SIG(Space) report be released with the Rogers Commission
report?
Key Points in Report:
- Proposed recovery options treated as coherent strategies.
- Consolidated package to Congress advantageous.
- If orbiter replacement decision delayed, need to reconsider approach.
- DoD ELV-related procurements must proceed ASAP to meet critical
schedules.
Discussion:
As far as we know, proposed strategies are indeed consistent with
probable Rogers Commission recommendations.
President can decide issue on basis of current report.
Recommendation:
Move report to President ASAP.
- Depending on President's decision, move DoD and NASA budget requests
to Congress through the normal budget process.
Report itself should not be sent to Congress, but can be used by
agencies as a resource document.
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Table of Contents
SIG(Space) Meeting (4/18/86)
A - SIG(Space Agenda.
B - IG(Space) Report, Recommendations for the US Space Launch Program,
14 April 1986.
C - Papers Relating to Budget Offset Issue.
1. Draft Issue Paper Entitled "Funding for National
Space Launch Program Recovery."
2. Funding Options for US Launch Program Recovery.
3. Funding for National Space Launch Program Recovery.
D - FY 1986 Budget Supplemental/FY 1987 Budget Amendment for Space
Launch Recovery-Action Memorandum.
E - Private Sector Expendable Launch Vehicle Industry.
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TO:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
4D/ICS)
X
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt .
13
D/Coll
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
ES/Mary
X
18
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks To : for action as DCI rep to this meeting.
(Please provide a copy of materials used in this
meeting plus an MFR, to ES so DDCI-D canekok
over to get up to speed.)
3637 (":"")
Efyutive Secretary
17 Or 86
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WilZrar za.sa a-bad yr ems a. ab 4.?
tit, " X - ef
? THE WHITE NOOSE
I
?4 ItaiM
W' C ,
J
*0
Avr 17
All?
MESSAGE NO. 6 3 VkLASS IFICAT ION
rim RODNEY B. MCDANIEL 01
(NAME)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SIG SPACE AGENDA
CONFIDENTIAL
456-2224
PAGES two
(EXTENSION) ( ROOM JMBERI
E
NSC LOGS 90265
TO ( AGENCY)
STATE
DEFENSE
' COMMERCE
DELIVER TO
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER
WILLIAM H. TAFT
DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION
UNDER SECRETARY
SECURITY ASSISTANCE & TECP
DEPUTY SECRETARY
DEPUTY SECRETARY
JCS
ACDA
LTG JOHN H. MOELLERING ASSISTANT TO CHAIRMAN
DAVID F. EMERY
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
REMARKS
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESSEES.
URGENT
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(t le/VX-eC
COKr/DENI'IAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 17, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS, SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP FOR SPACE
SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Agvnda (U)
A meeting of the SIG(Space) will be held on April 18, 1986,
4:00-5:00 p.m., Room 208 0E0B, to discuss three major issues
related to loss of the Challenger. The first is one of identi-
fying funding offsets. We must reconcile the need to expedite
recovery of U.S. space launch capabilities with the fact that we
cannot submit an unfunded req.:Le:et tTs the evngress. :
DOD should identify full offsets, and RASA should identify
appropriate additional of to the extent possible, by year,
for those programmatic actions that must be started. OMB has
committed to assisting in the search for offsets within curren4-
budgetary limits. (C)
Tie second issue is deci.ding pzlicy changes to reLieve VASA -cf
the responsibility for 'Launching all commercial and foreign
payloads. At the same time we most ensure a permanent role in
national and international space launch operations for the
commercial U.S. space launch industry. While all SIG partici-
pants agree to privatization of a commercial ELV capability, how
and when such systems will be made available is an issue. I am
looking to DOC, DOT and WAS& to identify policy changes, options
and transition plans to addzess this issue..
will asx the opinion of the SIG on the third issue vl the
release of this report with the Rogers Commission report. I -,roe
all participants to give the interagency process renewed interest
and commitment and be prepared to present your points of vie Ni at
the SIG meeting. I enjoin you to continue to treat our decisions
and deliberations confidential. (u)
Attendance at this meeting will be limited to principals plus
one. Please call Col Jerry May (395-5022) with the names cf
representatives by COB April 17, 1966. (U)
Attachment
SIG(Space) Membership List
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
John M. Poindexter
CONFIDENTIAL
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CHAIRMAN: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
Members ELIZABETH H. DOLE
Secretary of 77an5wrTat1vn
Observers
ULLA. Mk SCMEIvaER
Under Secretary cf State for 5ecurit3
Assistance, and Technology
DR. WILLIAM F. GRAEAM
Acting Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administrain
10.12.1AM E. WIFT, IV
Deputy Secretary of Defense
CLARENCE J. EAWU
Deputy becrf-tary pf Cnomerce
ROSEPT M. GATES
Deputy Director-Designate
Central IntPlligence Agency
LT GENERAL JOHN H. MOELLERING
Ass:stz7A tc the Chairman
joint Chiefs vf Staff
DAVID F. Er-,,y
Deputy Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ZOSE -
Pk: . W-7-?
R .77
Dep,A.ity Zirecty.-,z
Office -c.! Kanagement and Swiset
.7,4RIX Met-AGUE
Deputy Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy
ALFRED PINGON
Assistant to the President for Cabinet Al!
JOHN SVAHN
Assistant to the President for Policy tkevelpummt
LT COLONEL TERRY MATTRE
Military Assistant/Aide to the Vice PresaCert
Executive Secretary: COLONEL GERALD M. MAY
Director of Space Programs, NSC Staff
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C
INTERAGENCY GROUP ON SPACE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE U.S. SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM
April 14, 1986
NOT FOR RELEASE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE NSC
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOREWORD
This draft report has been prepared in response to the directives
received from the National Security Council Interagency Group (Space) per
memorandum dated February 7th 1986, Rodney B. McDaniel to Donald P.
Gregg and al., sLibject: IG (Space ) Actions. The following members of the
IG(Space) Working Group participated in the preparation:
Otho Eskin / V. Malahy
Robert H. Brumley / C. Stadd
M. Johnson / Karlyn Daube
D. Taft /J. Struthers / A. Wu
T. J. Bishop
L. Nosenzo/ V. Teplitz
M. Roesch / R. Johnson
Department of State
Department of Commerce
Department of Transportation
Office of Management and Budget
Intelligence Community Staff
Department of Defense (OJCS)
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Office of Science and Technology
C. 0. Forsythe / D. Branscome National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (Co-Chairman)
T.P. Rona /T.E. Maultsby Department of Defense
(Co-Chairman)
i
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.
NOTICE
This report is for official U.S. Government use only. It shall not
be reproduced or released without the authorization of Col.
G. May, Executive Secretary of the IG (Space), National Security
Council.
II
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INDEX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PAGE
INTRODUCTION
1
I.
BACKGROUND
3
A.
The CHALLENGER Accident
3
B.
U.S. Space Program
3
C.
National Space Goals and Objectives
4
D.
The Space Transportation System
5
E.
Expendable Launch Vehicles
5
II.
IMPACTS
A.
Introduction
7
B.
Impact on Launch Capability
8
C.
Impacts during the Accommodation Period (FY 86-88)
9
III.
RECOVERY OPTIONS
A.
Objectives
11
B.
Criteria
11
C.
Common Assumptions and Considerations
14
D.
Options
17
1. Return to Pre-Accident Baseline
18
2. Three Orbiters With Expanded ELVs
21
3A Four Orbiters With Expanded ELVs
25
3B Four Orbiters (delayed delivery) With Expanded ELVs
28
Option Summary (Table)
32
IV.
ISSUES
33
V.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
36
III
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. General
This report specifically addresses strategies for reconstituting the national space launch
capability in the aftermath of the CHALLENGER accident. While this is a complex subject on its
own right, there are far-reaching national implications associated with each strategy, since
launch capability is a basic element of all space activities.
If the nation is constrained by a limited space launch capability, our national space goals
are impacted: the perception of the U.S. as a world leader in peaceful space activities would be
eroded; our ability to provide flexible and responsive launch services to critical national security
missions would be impaired; it would further force reconsideration of the role of the STS in
flying commercial and foreign payloads that do not require a manned presence; our ability to
pursue advanced space R & D and to continue the pace of our manned spaceflight program
would be reduced; and our ability to continue international cooperative programs in
furtherance of our foreign policy objectives would be limited.
These implications are important for the final decision, but were for the most part consi-
ered beyond the scope of the Working Group's effort. The Working Group considered these
ractors in a general sense as well as reviewing the full spectrum of launch vehicle options from
existing ELVs and STS through the future capabilities, such as the NASP.
[ General Perspective
The loss of the CHALLENGER has serious bearing on the Nation's ability to implement the
President's space policy as promulgated in NSDD-42. It disrupts the planned timetable for
national security and for civil Government space missions. The disruption threatens to delay
during the 1989-1995 period the transportation support for the Space Station and for the
Strategic Defense Initiative-related experiments. It forces reconsideration of the role of the
space shuttle in flying commercial and foreign customers' satellites. The accident also raises
broader questions in regard to the Nation's means for gaining access to space with the requisite
degree of assurance, flexibility and surge capability. Actions need to be defined and
implemented in order to improve these attributes at an affordable cost and to enhance the
public perception of these improvements. (Alternative text by DoD, NASA, DoS)
In addition of its well recognized contributions to national security, the U.S. space pro-gram,
particularly our highly visible manned spaceflight program, has been a powerful tool for
sserting leadership in international affairs. It has encouraged many nations to link their space-
,elated efforts with ours, rather than with those of our adversaries. Failure to restore quickly a
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strong and reliable national space launch capability and a vigorous manned space program will
erode our position as a world leader in science and technology at a time when the Soviet Union
continues to pour large resources in their highly publicized manned space program. Such a
trend, if allowed to continue, would limit our ability to achieve foreign policy objectives through
space cooperation: Already the loss of the CHALLENGER has forced the delay of many foreign
and cooperative missions, and may encourage the efforts of our political adversaries and of our
commercial competitors. A clear and unambiguous national commitment to maintaining the
momentum of our space program would eliminate growing doubts among our foreign partners
about our ability to support the Manned Space Station activities. Again, failure to act deliber-
ately but decisively, could open opportunities for the Soviet Union. (Alternative text by DoD,
NASA, DoS)
This report is primarily focused on policy and programmatic actions that could be taken to
mitigate the near-term impact of the accident and to restore, preferably in an improved form,
the space launch posture of the U.S. The attractive options require significant additional re-
sources in the 1986 - 1993 period. Decisions on these options must be made in the broader
context of our long-term space policies and objectives. Specifically, the recommendations of the
Joint National Space Transportation and Support Study, conducted under NSSD-6-85, will be
available in May 1986 and will call for sizeable technology investments. The National Aerospace
Plane program is in the planning stage, aiming at a demonstration starting in 1994-95; it will
row into a multi-billion dollar investment by the mid-1990s, if the techno-logy proves
consistently promising. The recommendations of the National Commission on Space also call for
substantial increases in the Nation's space-related budgets. While the recommendations of this
report should be assessed on their own merits, the associated funding commitments must be
part of the broader decision of giving steadfast support to the ambitious long-term space goals
of the United States. (Alternative text by DoD, NASA, DoS); OMB strongly objects to the
inclusion of the General Perspective section on the grounds that it is well beyond the scope of
the Working Group's effort and contains programmatic assertions for which there is no
analytical support.]
I. Tasking. Following the Challenger accident on January 28th, 1986, the Interagency
Group (Space) was tasked to evaluate the effects of the loss in space launch capability and to
identify possible recovery options.
This tasking was divided into the following three areas:
a) an assessment of the near term impact of the Space Transportation System (STS)
accident on the U.S. space program;
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b) an assessment of the loss of an orbiter on the national space launch capability
and the identification of options for reconstituting this lost capability;
C) the identification of policies and strategies to recover from the interruption of
STS launch capability and minimize such effects in the future.
II. Near Term Impacts on U.S. Space Program. The STS was in the process of build-
ing up its flight rate toward the target of 24 flights a year when the accident occurred. A total
of 14 STS flights had been planned for FY86 and the Challenger accident was the fifth STS
flight of the fiscal year.
The remainder of the STS fleet will be grounded for at least 12 months and a backlog of
unlaunched satellites will grow in direct proportion to the length of the grounding period.
Once flight operations resume, a gradual buildup of the flight rate will be required before full
effectiveness can be achieved with the three remaining orbiters.
Once normal flight operations have been resumed, there will be a period when
missions will have to be flown on the basis of priority, rather than what had been previously
scheduled. This reprioritization will continue until additional launch assets can be made
,vailable. The earliest that additional expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) could be available is
1988; the earliest that an additional orbiter could be made available is 1990.
If the STS is not grounded longer than 12 months, as assumed in this report, the near
term impacts to the U.S. space program are significant, but can be held to manageable levels.
Should this grounding period be significantly longer than 12 months, the impacts will become
progressively more severe, and the actions to implement recovery may have to be reassessed.
III. Assessment of Reduced Launch Capacity and Recovery Options. The loss
of CHALLENGER reduced the STS fleet from four to three orbiters. The U.S. use of ELVs was
essentially programmed to end by 1988-89, except that the DoD was planning to continue
using ELVs at a rate of about 2 STS equivalents a year through 1992.
The basic goal of the recovery / reconstitution strategy is twofold -- (1) to recover from
the interruption in launch operations as efficiently and quickly as practical, consistent with
safety, and (2) to rebuild a more balanced and flexible national space launch capability lar-
gely independent of failures in a single system.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page ES -4
Four criteria were selected for evaluating possible recovery options.
1. Capability / Risk. This criterion considers the number of STS equivalent launches a
year that can be supported, the diversity of the assets that provide this capability, and the risk
to the nation's launch capability if an interruption in launch operations should occur.
2. Backlog / Lost Flight Opportunities. In the near term (FY86-89) the backlog repre-
sents existing payloads whose launches have been delayed by the reduced launch capacity. In
the mid term (FY90-95) the backlog represents lost flight opportunities that would have been
available before the accident but have now been lost due to the reduced launch capacity. This
criterion assesses the ability to reduce the backlog.
3. Affordability. All recovery options require funds that had not been envisioned
before the CHALLENGER accident and therefore exceed the Balanced Budget Act (Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings) deficit reduction targets. This criterion addresses the funding requirements
without regard to how such funding would be provided. Initial cost estimates available to the
Working Group for additional funding requirements, beyond those originally included in the
President's budget, have been used for relative evaluation of the options. It is important to
note that the funding requirements used to assess affordability are not the costs to fully
implement the described options. These funding estimates will be revised during the
Administration's budget review.
4. Private Sector Launch Capability. The commercialization of U.S. ELVs is a specific
Presidential initiative, whose potential has not yet been achieved. This criterion assesses the
extent to which the option specifically encourages or discourages the private investment criti-
cal to developing a domestic, commercial ELV industry.
Flight Rate. Throughout the report, two flight rates were consistently used for all
assessments. The NASA planned flight rate (building to 24 flights a year with 4 orbiters) was
used as a baseline. A more conservative flight rate (building to 16 flights a year with 4
orbiters) was assumed by the majority of the IG (Space) Working Group to be more
appropriate for planning purposes.
Analysis of Options
All options include actions necessary to restore the remaining three orbiters to a safe
operational status in as short a time as possible.
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Option 1 -- Return to pre-accident baseline (four-orbiters---no additional ELVs) - This
option does not improve the diversity and flexibility of the overall national launch posture
since no additional ELVs (beyond those previously planned) would be procured. In addition,
Option 1 does little to reduce or eliminate the STS backlog and does not encourage the
development of a U.S. commercial ELV industry. Replacement of the fourth orbiter protects
the Nation's capability to support critical programs requiring the presence of man in space. It
also provides increased flexibility for responding to schedule changes, maintenance and
refurbishment requirements. Estimated costs related to this option are about $ 3.5 Billion.
Option 2 Three-orbiters---expanded ELVs - The procurement of additional ELVs provides
additional launch diversity which reduces the risk of dependence on a single launch system.
However, in the event an orbiter is out of service for an extended period of time, a two-orbiter
fleet would be inadequate to satisfy manned space flight, Shuttle-unique, and national
security requirements. Depending on assumptions about the amount of off-loading to ELVs
and the flight rates achieved by the STS, the backlog would either be reduced very slowly or
continue to grow. The private U.S. ELV industry would be encouraged. Estimated costs
related to this option are about $ 5.1 Billion.
Option 3A --Four-orbiters by FY 1990---expanded ELVs- This option combines the advan-
tages of both Option 1 and Option 2 by replacing the fourth orbiter and expanding Govern-
ment ELV usage to achieve a more diversified launch capability. This option would eliminate
the STS backlog by 1993 (under NASA planned flight rates) or (under more conservative flight
rates) would stabilize the backlog by 1992. This option would encourage the development of
a private ELV industry by offloading commercial and foreign satellites from the STS. Estimated
costs related to this option are about $ 8.1 Billion and it has the highest total outlay impact in
FY 1987 ($1.8 billion), [and would be the most difficult to fund with offsets because of its
requirements to identify larger offsets in FY86 and 87]. (Insert by OMB, Dor, and DoC)
Option 3B -- Four-orbiters by FY 1991---expanded ELVs - This option is the same as
Option 3A except the fourth orbiter delivery is delayed about one year to ease the impacts in
meeting the deficit reduction targets imposed by the Gramm-Rudman legislation and
Presidential policy. Affordability would be improved by reducing the budget authority and
outlays by about $ .6 Billion in FY 87 with respect to Option 3A. Estimated costs related to this
option are about $ 8.0 Billion. The backlog would be eliminated at a slightly later date,
because this option provides fewer flights in 1990 and 1991. [Slightly higher risk exposure
results from the one-year additional period in which only three orbiters are operational.]
(Insert by NASA, DoS and DoD)
The summary results of the analysis are shown in the Table on Page ES - 6:
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I WI' WI U
ICurrent
Posture
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3A
OPTION 3B
.APABILITY / RISK
Balanced Launch Capability
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
Number of Orbiters
3
4
3
4 (by 1990)
4 (by 1991)
Launch Capability/Diversity
(Shuttle Equivalent/year)
STS
Ade DoD ELVs (i)
Commercial ELVs
, 12 - 18
0
0
16 - 24
0
0
12 - 18
3-5
3
16 - 24
3 - 5
3
16 - 24
3 - 5
3
TOTAL
12 - 18
16 - 24
18 - 26
, 22 - 32
22 - 32
2. BACKLOG or LOST FLIGHT
OPPORTUNITIES (NASA
Planned /Conservative Flight Rates)
Near Term FY 89 (Cum)
Mid-Term FY 95 (Cum)
(See accompaning Graphs)
-33/-46
-69/-118
-33/-46
-35/-97
-28/-41
-22/-71
-28/-41
+ 12/-49
-28/-41
+ 4/-53
4FFORDABILITY (2)
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
FY86
FY87
REMAINDER
494
934
2053
177
878
2398
798
951
3286
199
660
4176
1055
1683
5364
289
1308
6505
988
1051
5965
229
745
7030
TOTAL NASA (3)
3844
2470
5537
5439
TOTAL DOD (4)
-364
2565
2565
2565
TOTAL
,
3481
5035
8102
8004
Current Posture
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3A
OPTION 3B
4. Private ELV Industry
Encouraged
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
(1) The ELV increments provided by each option are in addition to the 10 CELVs currently being procured by DoD
(2) Initial cost estimates available to the Working Group for additional funding requirements, beyond those originally
included in the President's budget, have been used for relative evaluation of the options. These estimates include NASA
/ DoD reimbursables not yet negotiated. Funding requirements used to assess affordability are not the costs to fully
implement the described options. These funding estimates will be revised during the Administration's budget review.
(31 Based on NASA cost estimates ( FY86 -91) that include anomaly resolution, hardware items, flight savings, reimbursables
and program adjustments.
(4, Based on DoD cost estimates (FY86 -92) that include hardware items, reimbursables and program adjustments.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations represent the consensus of the Working Group, except
as noted:
1. A more diversified national launch posture composed of the STS and expendable
launch vehicles should be established and maintained to meet the full range of space launch
needs and to avoid dependencies on single launch systems to the extent practical.
2. The CHALLENGER orbiter should be replaced to help ensure that a minimum of
three orbiters are routinely maintained in operational service throughout the rest of this
century. (OMB, DoC and DoT reserve their positions).
3. [Options 3A and 38 satisfy the recommendations (1) and (2) above; 3A should be
considered for implementation.] (Insert by NASA, DoD, and DoS)
4. The STS program should emphasize those missions that best exploit the unique
capabilities of the shuttle and manned spaceflight, should support research and development
activities and should not be used for routine commercial and foreign satellite deployments.
(NASA reserves its position.)
5. During the period of limited launch capacity, critical national security and civil
missions, including international cooperative missions, should be given the highest STS launch
priority. For other U.S. Government missions, the launch priorities should be established to
reflect, as far as practical, a reasonable balance among users.
6. In the future, selected payloads, primarily national security, commercial and
foreign satellites, should be offloaded from the STS to ELVs in order to improve assured access
to space, to eliminate the backlog of delayed missions and to encourage the development on a
domestic ELV industry. (NASA questions timing).
7. In order to encourage the establishment of a U.S. ELV industry based on private
capital, after satisfying existing contractual commitments originally manifested for flight
through FY 1988, the Government will discontinue providing launch services for commercial
and foreign customers that do not require a manned presence.
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IIIL.ES-8
[7A. In order to encourage the establishment of a U.S. ELV industry based on private
capital, an approach should be established whereby the Government would to the best of its
ability, accommodate all existing contractual commitments, but would not in the future
compete with a viable and competitive U.S. ELV industry providing launch services for com-
mercial and foreign satellites that do not require a manned presence.] (NASA Alternate for
(7))
8. The STS should continue to be used to encourage commercial exploitation of space,
including development of new materials, products, and services.
9. References to STS flight rates and quantities of DoD ELVs should be deleted from
current national policy directives. A projection of annual flight rate goals consistent with
safe and sustainable Shuttle operations should be established by NASA to provide for
planning and budgeting of Government space programs.
Unresolved Issues: The following issues have been identified, but not addressed or
resolved within the purview of the report:
o How can required funding be provided?
Each option represents unanticipated funding [in excess of the spending targets
established by the President and the Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (GRH)
and other legislation] (NASA and DoD delete). No attempt was made to resolve
the funding issue; rather, the question how to provide the necessary funding,
including offsets as required, will be addressed separately through the Administra-
tion's budget process. [The funds required for recovery, following the disaster of
the CHALLENGER accident, which impacts the whole Nation, should be assessed
against the overall Presidential budget.] (NASA and DoD position)
o When and how should NASA discontinue flying commercial and foreign payloads
that do not require a manned presence?
It is the consensus of the Working Group that the STS should not be used for
routine commercial and foreign satellite deployment (NASA reserves its position)
and that NASA should assist potential customers in the transition to U.S. privately
supplied ELVs. The Group further agrees that a clear signal must be sent to the U.S.
private sector that the Government will no longer compete with the U.S. private
sector for this market. The issue is one of timing.
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One approach for a clear signal is that, after satisfying contractual commitments
originally manifested for flight through FY 1988, the Government will discontinue
providing launch services for commercial and foreign missions that do not require a
manned presence. This timing was selected on the basis that it: (1) Will give the
industry a firm point in time when Government competition will cease; (2) Matches
the time when U.S. commercial ELVs can begin to be available in volume; and (3)
Does not inipact presently manifested STS customers. (NASA delete)
[The alternative advocates an approach which will satisfactorily accommodate
current commitments and future commercial and foreign requirements using U.S.
launch systems. The Government will not, in the future, compete with a viable and
competitive U.S. launch vehicle industry. This approach recognizes that transition is
not a discrete event; a period of transition is required to best achieve these
objectives. The timing of implementation of spectific elements of this transition
may vary, and unequivocal signals will be sent for each. This approach has the
merits of: (1) Maintaining U.S. leadership in space launch capability; (2) Providing
clear signals to the private sector; and (3) Maintaining the best efforts of the
Government to fulfill contractual obligations for provision of launch services.]
(NASA alternative)
o [Should NASA consider the use of ELVs for civil missions?
If a substantial volume of civil traffic could be offloaded (space science and some
aspects of space station deployment / resupply), additional STS capacity could be
made available for high priority missions, perhaps equivalent to the capacity of
another orbiter.
One approach is to use the STS for all civil missions. Another is to use the STS for
high-priority civil missions and those requiring manned presence, and not for
routine deployment of civil satellites, consistent with the strategy to off-load DoD,
commerical and foreign payloads.] (OMB and DoT issue)
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o [Should the decisions regarding the recovery of U.S. space launch posture in
the pre-1995 period await the conclusions of the Joint National Space
Transporta-tion and Support System Study?
The -Joint National Space Transportation and Support System (STAS) Study is
being conducted under the mandate of NSSD-6-85 and is expected to report by
May 1986 on the technologies and potentially attractive concepts for space
launch and support systems in the 1995 period and beyond. While the details of
the SIAS report are not known at this time, it is clear that it will contain recom-
mendations for sizeable near-term investments in both rocket and air breather
propulsion technologies. These investments will be necessary to ensure the
availability of cost-effective space transportation options in the post-1995 time-
frame. Continued U.S. leadership in space, a major tenet of the President's
various directives on national space policy, requires that provisions for these
needed investments be recognized as elements of near-term fiscal planning.]
(Issue identified by the SDIO)
Implementation
The attached draft NSDD reflects the policy recommendations listed on page ES -7.
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UN-ILIAL t.Mt VINILT roye - 1
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER
U.S. Space Launch Strategy
I. Introduction and Principles
The loss of Challenger highlighted the vulnerability of all space launch systems regardless
of their redundancy, sophistication, and reliability; and demonstrated the risk of relying on
any single space launch system for all U.S. access to space. This directive affirms the nation's
commitment to recovering and reconstituting a sound national space launch capability and to
maintaining U.S. leadership in space.
The objective of this space launch strategy is twofold -- (1) to recover from the interrup-
tion in space launch operations as efficiently and quickly as practical, consistent with safety,
and (2) to rebuild a more balanced and flexible national space launch capability, largely
independent of failures in a single system.
This directive [reaffirms and] (NASA add) updates the policies that apply to the space
launch capabilities of the national security, civil, and commercial sectors; it is consistent with
the basic objectives embodied in NSDD's 42, 80, 94, 144, 164, 181, and related Executive
Orders, but modifies implementation as appropriate.
II. National Space Launch Capability
The Space Transportation System (STS) remains a key [the primary launch system and a
vital] (NASA alternate) element of the U.S. space launch program. However, a balanced mix
of STS and expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) is necessary to provide assurance that critical
space mission capabilities can be supported regardless of specific launch vehicle availabilities.
A. CIVIL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
The Shuttle represents a capability unequaled in the world to provide routine
manned access to space; this capability must be exploited in those areas that offer the
greatest national return. The STS fleet should be reconstituted to maintain the Nation's
capability to support critical programs requiring man, as well as to provide flexibility for res-
ponding to STS schedule changes, maintenance and refurbishment requirements. NASA will
emphasize exploiting the unique capabilities of the Shuttle as well as supporting civil re-
search and development programs.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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rui urritmAL U3C j1IT re:19c INIJIJI.J 4
Implementation: NASA will procure a replacement orbiter, structural spares and other
lost equipment in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. Specific STS target flight rates
established in previous NSDDs are no longer in effect. NASA will establish safe and sustainable
flight rates to provide for planning and budgeting of Government space programs. [ NASA
will not maintain an ELV adjunct to the STS. When need dictates the launch of a civil mission
on an ELV, NASA-shall obtain these either from the DoD or the private sector.] (OMB and DoT
insert)
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE TRANSPORTATION
The Department of Defense will develop and maintain an adequate ELV capability
to ensure that critical national security missions are not jeopardized by dependence on a
single launch system. This effort will include the actions required to make selected satellites
compatible with more than one launch system or other strategies to assure adequate mission
availability.
Implementation: The DoD will procure additional ELVs as necessary to maintain a
balanced launch capability and to provide a more assured access to space. Specific ELV quan-
tities and flight rates established in previous NSDDs are no longer in effect. The DoD will im-
plement assured mission capability in satellite/launch vehicle compatibility, and scheduling,
and establish a launch capability for ELVs at both the East and West Coast launch sites. [ The
DoD will establish, jointly with NASA, a revised pricing agreement for national security
missions on the STS.] (OMB add)
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
Consistent with previous Administration policy to encourage and facilitate a
domestic ELV industry, and with the recovery strategy to be implemented, the STS will be
phased out from providing commercial and foreign satellite deployments that do not require
manned presence.
Implementation: (1) After satisfying existing contractual commitments originally
manifested for flight through FY 1988, NASA will launch only those commercial and
foreign payloads that either require a manned presence or for which there are no U.S.
commercial ELV alternatives. [An approach should be established whereby the Government
would, to the best of its ability, accommodate all existing contractual commitments, but
would not in the future compete with a viable and competitive U.S. ELV industry providing
launch services for commercial and foreign satellites that do not require a manned presence.]
(NASA alternate) NASA will use the experience developed in working with the private sector
to actively support and facilitate the acceptance of U.S. commercially-offered
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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rlJK urriumL U3C WALT ray= 111.11-OLO - .7
launch services by existing shuttle customers. (NASA delete) The STS p[ricing policy for
foreign and commercial customers will be reviewed and modified accordingly. (2) NASA,
DoT, DoC and OMB will jointly plan and implement the transition of satellites to a commercial
space launch industry; and (3) The Department of Commerce will work with NASA and OMB
to create an environment that will attract commercial experimentation, development, and
exploitation of unique Shuttle capabilities.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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rvn vrrimmL vac vriLT rage I
INTRODUCTION
This Interagency Group (Space) draft report responds to the National Security Council
directive dated February 7, 1986 on the subject of recovery from the accidental loss of the
STS orbiter CHALLENGER on January 28, 1986.
Three specific objectives have been set forth for the study reported here. First, consider,
and report on, the expected impacts on the nation's capabilities to implement the national
space policies. Second, summarize the recommendations made by the cognizant agencies
on the ways to mitigate the immediate impact of the CHALLENGER accident on the on-
going programs in the three sectors of the U.S. space activities: national security, civil, and
commercial. Third, develop and assess the measures to be taken for reconstituting the U.S.
means for providing assured access to space in order to accommodate the President's
broad space policy objectives. The Group was encouraged to identify any longer-term
policy issues that may require future consideration in the light of the CHALLENGER
accident.
In broad terms, the several tasks have been completed. Two essential questions have
not been answered: how will the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the
causes of the CHALLENGER accident ("Rogers Commission") impinge upon the schedule
and the cost of regaining operational status of the Space Transportation System; and what
are sound approaches for providing the resources recommended for the reconstitution.
The Interagency Working Group has made assumptions on the effects of the Rogers Com-
mission's recommendations and has limited its work to the identification of the funding re-
quirements associated with the recommendations.
The main body of the report contains the essential facts, suppported by background,
approach and argument. Detailed quantitative background and supporting information is
provided in Appendices.
Chapter I recapitulates the background of the situation addressed by the Working
Group in the period immediately following the CHALLENGER accident.
Chapter II discusses the impacts on policy implementation and the means for mitigating
the impact on our immediate space launch capability prior to resumption of operations
and in the following period when the 3-orbiter STS fleet is operational. Chapter III defines
and assesses the options available to recover and reconstitute the U.S. space launch posture
to a level adequate to support the U.S. space policy goals for the mid-to late 1990's.
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run vrrummL %Jac %.1111L T rayv
Chapter IV briefly identifies the issues pertinent to the recovery / reconsti-
tution, but which have not been explicitly addressed or resolved by the Working
Group.
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions and recommendations.
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FUK UI-I-ILIAL Ubh UNLY vage 3
I. BACKGROUND
A. The CHALLENGER Accident. In January of this year, the twenty-fifth STS mission
suffered an accident that destroyed the CHALLENGER and its crew. The accident
highlights the vulnerability of all space launch systems regardless of their degree of
redundancy, sophistication, and reliability and demonstrates the risk of relying on any
single space launch system for all U.S. access to space.
While the Presidential Commission is investigating the cause of the CHALLENGER
accident, the Interagency Group (Space) has been separately charged with assessing
the impact on scheduled satellite deployments and identifying appropriate launch
capability recovery options. [This report was requested on an accelerated schedule to
support the President's option of submitting an FY86 supplemental budget / FY87
budget amendment request for implementing recovery actions.] (OMB delete)
B. U.S. Space Program. The U.S. space program is composed of three independent, but
highly interactive sectors -- national security, civil, and commercial. The national
security and civil space programs are the direct responsibility of the U.S. Government.
The commercial space activities are the responsibilities of the private sector; the
government encourages and assists the commercial space sector by developing
technology and providing a legal and policy environment which encourages sound
investments for commercial space activities. Administration policy specifically
encourages the development of a U.S. commercial space launch industry.
The national security space program is principally oriented toward deploying and
operating satellite systems that provide information and support to the National
Command Authority (NCA) and operational military forces. These space systems
provide critical functions such as attack warning, strategic communication,
environmental monitoring, global navigation, and treaty monitoring.
Civil space systems provide opportunities for basic scientific research, planetary
exploration, research and development, technology applications, including
operational monitoring of the earth and its atmosphere, and manned spaceflight.
These systems provide technology spinoffs that enable new commercial products and
services, and advance our understanding of physics, astronomy, meteorology,
environmental and life sciences. The U.S. manned spaceflight program is a part of the
civil space program. These programs are a visible demonstration of U.S. technological
leadership and offer opportunities to share space exploration with our international
partners and allies.
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Commercial space systems provide services to both the public and government.
These ventures exploit private capital and augment government investments in space
activities. Services are sold both domestically and internationally and contribute to the
image of American leadership in space and technology.
Each sector of our space program relies on basic space services -- command and
control, tracking, and launch services. To date, the government has been the sole
provider of space launch services; until recently launch services were based on
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) developed by the government for primarily
government use. Early this decade, the space shuttle entered operations and NASA
began to phase out the use of ELVs; commercial satellite operators that had previously
relied on NASA's ELVs for launch began to transition their payloads to the space
shuttle.
The European Space Agency (ESA) developed an ELV and spun off its production
and operation to the world's first quasi-commercial space launch system. This French
company, Arianespace, began offering commercial launch services in competition with
other launch systems, principally the shuttle.
The Department of Defense, while transitioning the majority of its payloads to
the STS, established a policy of assured access to space and is procuring a limited
number of ELVs as a complement to the shuttle. This effort was specifically designed to
avoid total dependence on a single space launch system for all national security
satellites.
C. National Space Goals and Objectives. The U.S. has established space policy goals or
objectives which provide a focus for the activities in the individual space sectors. These
goals are as follows:
1. Maintain U.S. space leadership.
2. Assure critical space system support to the NCA and operational
commanders.
3. Provide a more assured access to space.
4. Provide routine, cost effective space transportation.
5. Establish a permanent manned presence in space.
6. Maintain a vigorous and balanced space research and development
program.
7. Encourage U.S. private sector involvement and investment in space
activities.
8. Encourage commercialization of U.S. ELVs.
9. Continue international cooperation in space.
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D. The Space Transportation System. The STS was developed to be the workhorse of
the U.S. space launch capability. The original concept called for a fleet of five reusable
orbiters, providing 60 launches a year, and reducing space transportation costs well
below the costs of ELVs. During the decade that the STS was being built, its costs
increased, then umber of orbiters was reduced, and the projected number of launches
dropped to around 24 per year.
While the co' ncept was based on high usage, rapid turnaround, and frequent
satellite recovery and refurbishment, none of these have yet fully developed. Plans for
intensive usage have not been achieved; turnaround is more complex and time
consuming than originally planned; and satellite recovery and refurbishment have
gained slow acceptance by system designers. A reluctance to commit all U.S. space
assets to sole dependence on a single launch system has led DoD to maintain an ELV
capability in addition to the STS. These factors combine to undermine the economic
premise that encourages flying every spacecraft on the shuttle and using the shuttle as
intensively as possible to reduce the cost per flight.
The spacecraft deployment capability of the STS is only one of its features; the
other major capability of the shuttle is its ability to carry man into space and support
experimentation there for several days. This is the truly unique capability of the STS
that cannot be matched by ELVs or any current foreign competition other than the
Soviet Union. This capability has never been accounted for in the economic arguments
of the STS concept. All costs were attributed to the cargo mission, and the importance
of manned presence was not assigned a cost. Despite the emphasis on cargo carrying,
the STS has been the centerpiece of the U.S. manned space program following
Apollo/Skylab and is an essential element in satisfying the national space objectives.
E. Expendable Launch Vehicles. As the STS became operational in the early 1980s,
national security and civil space systems were planned to transition from ELVs to the
shuttle. Civil missions, and foreign and commercial missions launched by NASA have
essentially completed this transition; the DoD and NOAA usage of ELVs was planned to
continue into the 1988 timeframe.
The current DoD inventory of ELVs consists of seven (7) T34D, one (1) T34B,
sixteen (16) ATLAS vehicles, and nine (9) THOR vehicles in inactive storage. NASA has
four (4) completed DELTA vehicles, three (3) partially built vehicles, as well as long-
lead materials for eight (8) more.
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The DoD has implemented an assured access to space strategy which calls for a
limited number of ELVs to augment an otherwise complete dependence on the STS.
This effort included ten (10) Complementary ELVs (CELVs), which are capable of
launching Shuttle-size and weight payloads. The first of these will be available in the
fall of 1988. In addition, thirteen (13) TITAN II ICBMs are being refurbished to launch
selected small payloads; these will first be available in the spring of 1988.
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II. IMPACTS
A. Introduction. The recent STS failure has two principal effects on the U.S. space
launch capabihty. The first is the loss of the reusable flight hardware. The second is the
disruption of all STS flight operations until the cause of the CHALLENGER accident is
determined and corrected. This will create a backlog of missions that will have to be
worked off in addition to the normally scheduled flights. The size of this backlog will
be directly proportional to the length of time the STS is grounded. Once flight
operations resume, both the normal schedule and the backlog will have to be
accommodated with only 75% of the planned orbiters until additional space
transportation can be made available.
The types of actions that can be taken as well as the options available to decision-
makers vary with time; five timeframes have been identified and considered by the
study group.
The first timeframe is the grounding period defined by the length of the accident
investigation and the time required to correct the cause of the STS failure. At this time,
the most optimistic estimate of the grounding period is one year.
The second timeframe is the accommodation period. This period begins with the
resumption of STS flight operations and continues until that time when additional
launch assets (either additional ELVs or a replacement orbiter) can be brought into
service. This period is characterized by reprioritizing missions and most effectively
using the limited launch assets that are available. The earliest that a replacement
orbiter could be available would be 1990 and the soonest that additional ELVs could be
available would be 1988.
The third timeframe is the recovery period. This period could begin around 1988
when the first additional ELVs become available to assist in reducing the growing
backlog of STS missions. The length of the recovery period will be determined by the
operational capability of the orbiter fleet, the quantity of ELVs available, and any
reduction in demand that may have resulted from payloads that have been canceled or
lost to foreign competition during the disruption of STS launch operations.
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The fourth timeframe is the nominal operations period. The period begins when
the combination of U.S. space launch assets, both the STS and ELVs, are capable of
handling each year's operational demand for launches.
The fifth timeframeis the next generation period. This period begins when new
technology enables new launch systems and they enter operational service. This
period is judged, to be post 1995-2000, even if sizable near-term technology
investments are made.
B. Impact on Launch Capability. The CHALLENGER represented one fourth of the
total STS fleet. It was one of two orbiters configured to carry the CENTAUR upper
stage. This reduction in the number of available orbiters will significantly impact the
nation's space launch capability. The remaining orbiters will be grounded pending
the determination of the cause of the accident and the subsequent repairs. The
current baseline assumption is that the STS fleet will be grounded for 12 months.
Based on a 12-month grounding, the same pre-accident demand for STS flights, a
three-orbiter fleet, and the previously planned NASA STS flight rate, and no
procurement of additional ELVs, the following backlog of missions would develop:
TABLE ll - 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9*
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
18
18
18
18
18
18
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-33
-39
-45
-51
-57
-63
-69
* Does not include the five missions previously flown in FY 1986,
including 51-L (CHALLENGER accident)
If more conservative flight rates are assumed, the resulting backlog is
correspondingly increased:
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TABLE II - 2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
FISCAL YEARS
Payloads
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Conservative
0
4
8
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
Flight Rates
(three orbiters)
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-46
-58
-70
-82
-94
-106
-118
The Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) being developed by the
DoD could accommodate a shuttle-sized payload. Increases in production and launch
rates could be achieved with additional capital investment. The first CELV will be
delivered in the fall of 1988. By that time the STS is already 24 to 32 shuttle equivalent
missions (depending on the flight rate assumptions) behind pre-accident demand.
The FY 1986-89 backlog consists of existing payloads, whose launches will be
delayed by reduced STS launch capacity. The FY 1990-95 backlog is better
characterized as "lost flight opportunities" for missions not yet funded or completely
defined that could not be launched as planned as a result of the CHALLENGER loss.
Until additional ELVs can be made available in 1988, the nation will have to
operate with essentially the launch capability that now exists. Therefore, the
remaining orbiters, once they are released from grounding, will provide the only
resources that can be reallocated to accommodate the highest priority launches over
the next two years.
C. Impacts During the Accommodation Period (FY 1986-88). If the current
assumption that the STS fleet will be grounded for 12 months is valid, high priority
national security missions will not be significantly impacted. DoD is in the midst of
transitioning its payloads to the STS; the number of DoD payloads still on ELVs lessens
the impacts of the STS grounding on defense, but some of the DoD payloads will have
to be flown on the shuttle, as soon as practical. Civil and commercial missions will be
impacted to a greater extent. Individual missions will be slipped on the order of 3 to
15 months. Initial manifest impact charts are provided in Appendix I and a preliminary
manifest, based on a 12-month grounding is provided in Appendix II.
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If the STS is grounded for longer than 12 months, the impact on national security
missions will become more serious and commercial and foreign customers might try to
reschedule on Ariane or another ELV. Foreign partners cooperating in scientific mis-
sions, when ficed with lengthy or unknown delays, may elect to develop cooperative
agreements with the U.S.S.R. or China, causing complex technology transfer and for-
eign policy problems. No efforts were made in this study to quantify the schedule im-
pacts for downtimes longer than 12 months.
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III. RECOVERY OPTIONS
A. Objectives. Before attempting to identify possible recovery options, a basic
statement of the objectives of the recovery plan should be made. Simply stated the
basic goal of the recovery! reconstitution strategy is twofold -- (1) to recover from the
interruption in launch operations as efficiently and quickly as practical, consistent with
safety, and (2) tcf rebuild a more balanced and flexible national capability largely
independent of failures in a single system.
B. Criteria. The following general criteria were selected for evaluating and
comparing possible recovery options.
1. Capability / Risk.
In addition to adequate capacity, the U.S. space launch capability must offer a
high degree of operational availability and be able to reliably satisfy the diverse
requirements of all three sectors of the space program.
Time critical national security missions require assured access to space and need
launch diversity to avoid total reliance on a single launch system. The majority of civil
missions have become highly dependent on manned interaction and recovery of
experimental equipment; they, therefore, require the unique STS capabilities.
Commercial satellite operations are concerned with launch schedule availability and
costs. Commercial R & D activities rely extensively upon STS capabilities.
The unique manned capability of the shuttle must be explicitly considered in
addition to its ability to support launching routine cargo. Routine cargo delivery not
requiring manned capability may be allocated to expendable launch vehicles. STS-
unique capabilities will be required to support programs such as space station,
materials processing, and other space commercialization activities; revisit/resupply
missions like the Hubble Space Telescope; as well as national security missions, such as
the SDI-related experiments.
Civil missions, including some with time-critical constraints (i.e., NOAA weather
and remote sensing satellites) and many requiring the unique STS capabilities, are
required to maintain U.S. leadership in space, in scientific research and exploration, in
advanced space technology and applications and in manned space systems; to foster
international cooperation in space and to facilitate and encourage private sector
developments in space.
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Each option is assessed on its ability to provide a balanced space launch posture
throughout the rest of this century.
The risk associated with each option's launch capability is a measure of the
consequencesif this capability is again perturbed or interrupted. The risks posed by
this possibility of interruption are different for each sector of the space program.
Elements of' this risk assessment include diversity of launch capability versus
reliance on a single launch system; adequate reserve capability beyond anticipated
demand to accommodate interruptions in launch operations without creating an
unacceptable backlog of missions; the ability of a private sector expendable launch
vehicle industry to augment government launch capacity on either a routine basis or in
emergency situations; adequate capacity to accommodate growth in specific
requirements. Risk is especially critical for those missions that must have manned
interaction and must rely solely on the shuttle since only one launch system can satisfy
these requirements.
2. Backlog/Lost Flight Opportunities.
Backlog is a measure of reduced flight capacity -- the difference between the
flight projections before the accident and current post-accident flight projections.
Backlog can be divided in two general categories:
-- Near-term (FY 1986-89) consisting of existing payloads whose launches will
be delayed by reduced launch capability.
-- Mid-term (FY 1990-95) consisting of lost flight opportunities for planned
missions not yet built.
The size of this cumulative backlog and the time required to eliminate it are
indicators of the recovery capacity of each option.
A launch capability that is unable to eliminate the mid-term backlog would
reduce the scope and extent of the U.S. space program in the 1990s.
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ulk.on %our mops& %Orli. %JIM'. I
3. Affordability.
The Balanced Budget Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) and Presidential policy
mandate that specific deficit reduction targets be met. The President's FY 1987 budget
meets the targets from FY 1986-91. OMB advises that Administration policy requires
any funding requests to Congress be accompanied by offsets. Initial cost estimates
available to the Working Group for additional funding requirements, beyond those
originally included in the President's budget, have been used for relative evaluation of
the options. It is important to note that the funding requirements used to assess
affordability are not the costs to fully implement the described options. These funding
estimates will be revised during the Administration's budget review.
This criterion addresses the ability to fund the required costs within each budget
year.
The magnitude of the required budget authority and outlays projected for FY
1986-92, and the total costs will be shown for each option, and the ability to fund each
option in the currently constrained fiscal environment will be discussed.
4. Private Sector Launch Capability.
The availability of a privately funded U.S. ELV industry could represent an
important element in developing a balanced U.S. space launch strategy. Even a limited
commercial ELV launch capability could effectively augment government launch
capacity for selected missions.
This criterion assesses the extent to which the individual option specifically
encourages or discourages the private investment critical to developing a domestic,
commercial ELV industry, consistent with existing Presidential policies.
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C. Common Assumptions and Considerations
(1) Flight Rate Assumptions.
Throughout this report, two flight rates are consistently used for all assessments.
The NASA planned flight rates were used as a baseline; this planning builds to a rate of
6 flights per orbiter per year or a total of 24 flights a year with 4 orbiters.
A more conservative flight rate was assumed by the majority of the IG(Space)
Working Group to be more appropriate for planning purposes. This planning builds to
a rate of 4 flights per orbiter per year, or a total of 16 flights a year with 4 orbiters.
These two flight rate assumptions represent a reasonable range of boundary
conditions for the purpose of this study. In the current circumstance, conservative
planning assumptions are warranted. Once new flight rate schedules are established,
any significant shortfall in achieving these rates will increase the already large backlog
created by the accident. Costs to the government will also increase due to program
delays -- costs that can be avoided now by conservative planning.
These planning assumptions are not a ceiling; higher rates may be achieved and
could permit backlogs to be reduced more quickly. Rather, they represent prudent
nominal capacity to be used for more conservative program and budget planning.
For the space shuttle program, the flight rate target of 24 per year by 1989 was
based on detailed NASA pre-accident plans consistent with expected technical
achievements in production, launch processing, and in-flight operations. While the
Working Group recognizes that such flight rate schedules may be technically feasible,
they would not provide the conservative margins that are essential to reduce the risk of
further serious disruption of the U.S. space program.
(2) NASA Salvage Operations and Corrective Action.
All options include actions necessary to restore the remaining three orbiters to a
safe operational status in as short a time as possible, consistent with safety. This
includes salvage operations, redesign, procurement, requalification of flight hardware,
and additional flight instrumentation. While it is assumed that orbiter performance
will not be significantly reduced as a result of these post-accident modifications, a
decrease in payload lift capability may occur. Initial estimated costs for these necessary
actions are included in every option considered.
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(3) Initial Cost Estimates
Because of the limited time available to assess the programatic implications
resulting from the STS backlog created by the loss of CHALLENGER, the costs presented
for each option focus on launch system assets, such as vehicles, facilities, and payload
impacts.
Effects of the near-term backlog were addressed, where possible, in terms of
changes in reimbursements, STS flight savings due to lower post-accident flight rates,
and program adjustments through FY 1991. These net effects tend to increase the
total costs and are included with each option.
Additional effects due to potential delays in future programs or offsets from
future reductions or cancellations, were beyond the scope of this effort. These
unidentified effects could lower the cost impacts identified in each option but were
not addressed in this study due to the limited time available.
OMB advises that Administration policy requires any funding requests to Congress
be accompanied by offsets. No offsets were used in developing the cost estimates.
Estimated costs used to compare the options are not meant to preempt the responsible
agencies' efforts to finalize their preliminary estimates.
(4) Next Generation Technology
Consistent with the NSC tasking to the Working Group, advanced technology,
such as the National Aerospace Plane, was reviewed. The operational availability of
these next generation launch systems was judged to be no earlier than 1995 through
2000. Since the recovery / reconstitution period covered by this report extended only
through 1995, these new systems were not considered viable candidates.
A specific study of second generation space transportation systems, the National
Space Transportation and Support (STAS) Study, is being conducted in response to
NSSD-6-85. This study and the other ongoing NASA and DoD technology programs must
reflect the strategy adopted to solve the near and mid-term launch problems. This can
be done within the normal coordination/ budget process to ensure a coherent long-
term plan. [Technology investment and demonstration programs in this context may
require up to $ 500 M / year for 10 years or more] (SDIO Insert)
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(5) U.S Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicles.
In May 1983, a Presidential policy was established to encourage and facilitate
development bf a U.S. commercial ELV industry. This policy was based on the premise
that the existence of a viable commercial ELV industry would add to the general
economic vitality of the U.S. and provide it with a robust space launch capability. The
policy was not fully implemented; low STS prices for commercial and foreign payloads,
set in order to compete with Arianespace, precluded domestic ELV companies from
gaining a share of this market.
Several of the options considered in this paper assume the availability of a U.S
commercial ELV industry given proper government encouragement. The following is
the status of this industry and vendor estimates of production and launch rates that
could be achieved in the 1989-1990 timeframe without major capital investment in
new facilities:
TITAN - 14 TITAN vehicles per year of various configurations.
ATLAS - 16 CENTAUR upper stages and 17 ATLAS vehicles per year of various
configurations.
DELTA - 10 DELTA vehicles per year.
These quantities clearly exceed the available commercial and foreign market but
provide strong assurance that a U.S. ELV industry could develop from existing
resources. Both General Dynamics and Transpace Carriers, Inc. (TCI) have been
negotiating with NASA for nearly two years, for commercial production, marketing,
and launch responsibilities for the ATLAS and DELTA vehicles, respectively.
Commercialization of the TITAN launch vehicles is also possible.
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D. Options
The options described in this paper represent the spectrum of alternatives
considered by the Working Group. Each option is described and assessed in relation to
the preceding-criteria.
The options addressed are:
1. Return to pre-accident baseline - replace the fourth orbiter with no change in
STS goals or objectives and with no additional ELVs.
2. Three orbiters with expanded ELVs - do not replace the fourth orbiter; use
the remaining three orbiters as efficiently as possible and augment launch capability
with USG and commercial ELVs.
3A. Four orbiters with expanded ELVs - replace the fourth orbiter, and augment
launch capability with USG and commercial ELVs.
3B. Four orbiters (delayed delivery) with expanded ELVs - the same as Option 3A
except the delivery of the replacement orbiter is delayed to ease the near-term
funding impact.
These options correspond to space launch strategy alternatives; they do not repre-
sent specific programs. It is important to note that the funding estimates used to
assess affordability are not the costs associated with the full implementation of the
described strategies. They represent current estimates of the costs associated with
the major elements of these strategies.
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Option 1 -- Return to Pre-Accident Baseline (Four Orbiters - No Additional ELVs)
This strategy represents the baseline option in that it would attempt to return
to pre-accident conditions. The lost orbiter would be replaced using existing
structural spares and the spares would be replaced. The replacement orbiter would
be operational in 1990. Under this option, the shuttle would be the nation's primary
space launch system.
National security and critical civil missions would be given highest priority;
commercial and foreign customers would be given the next highest priority; other
civil missions would be the lowest priority.
The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require orbit
inclinations unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus
essentially dedicated to Kennedy usage to reduce the STS backlog.
No additional ELVs beyond those currently approved (i.e., ten CELVs and 13
TITAN Ils) would be procured. NASA's commitment to three STS equivalent
commercial and foreign flights per year would be retained.
The following tables show the STS backlogs under two assumptions of flight
rates ( i.e., NASA planned rates of six flights per orbiter per year and conservative
rates, i.e., four flights per orbiter per year):
TABLE III - 1 OPTION 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION ( NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
22
24
24
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-33
-35
-35
-35
-35
-35
-35
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TABLE III - 2 OPTION 1 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
..
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
Conservative
0
4
8
10
13
16
16
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-46
-57
-65
-73
-81
-89
-97
For the NASA planned flight rates, the backlog/lost opportunities remains
constant at 35 for the early 1990s.
For a conservative flight rate, the backlog continues to grow and almost doubles
in the first half of the 1990s.
Assessment of Option 1
'
Capability/Risk. This option includes only the additional launch capacity from a
restored four-orbiter fleet (16 to 24 STS flights a year). The option restores the assets
lost in the accident, but does not improve the diversity and flexibility of our national
launch posture from the posture planned prior to the accident. It further does not
meet the national security requirement for a launch capability essentially independent
of failures in a single launch system. However, a four-orbiter fleet provides increased
flexibility in responding to changes to payload schedules and events. The replacement
orbiter helps to ensure that the STS fleet would not be reduced to two orbiters in the
event that one of the three remaining orbiters was out of service for an extended
period of time.
Backlog. As shown in Tables III - 1 and III - 2 this option does little to reduce or
eliminate the STS backlog under either the NASA planned or conservative flight rate
assumptions.
Because this option returns to the launch posture planned prior to the accident,
it leaves the nation just as susceptible to future outages and does not provide the
ability to recover quickly.
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The decision to replace CHALLENGER must consider that elements of the shuttle
fleet will inevitably experience downtime for repairs. Furthermore, it would be
prudent to recognize the possibility of another major shuttle accident and to protect
the nation's capability to support critical programs requiring man, like SDI and space
station, in the wake of such an accident. In addition, a four-orbiter fleet provides
increased flexibility in response to launch schedule changes from payload and weather
delays as well as Maintenance and refurbishment.
Affordability. Table B.1 shows the fiscal impact of Option 1. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter, Inertial
Upper Stage Airborne Support Equipment (IUS ASE), and replacement structural spares)
is estimated at $2.8 billion. NASA costs (including replacement items) considering flight
savings, lost reimbursables, and program adjustments, are estimated at $3.8 billion.
DoD impacts consist of program adjustments of about $0.3 billion and STS reimbursable
credits of about $0.6 billion resulting in a net savings of about $0.3 billion. Total USG
cost for Option 1 is about $3.5 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $493 million in FY 1986 and $882 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $177 million in FY 1986 and $867 million in
FY 1987.
DoD would require budget authority of $1 million in FY 1986 and $53 million in FY
1987. DoD outlays are projected at less than $1 million in FY 1986 and $11 million in FY
1987.
Option 1 is the least costly of all options in terms of total costs with a total outlay
impact of $0.9 billion on the FY 1987 deficit reduction target required by Gramm-
Rudman legislation.
U.S. Commercial Space Industry. Since the STS continues to fly commercial and foreign
payloads, a U.S. commercial ELV industry would fail to develop.
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Option 2- Three-Orbiter / Expanded ELVs
This option does not replace the fourth orbiter, but relies on expanded use of
expendable launch vehicles. The STS would provide for all manned missions and other
civil and national security missions which most effectively use the capabilities of the
shuttle. The option also assumes the availability of a U.S. commercial ELV industry.
The DoD would increase its procurement of CELVs and expand existing ELV
production to maintain the full spectrum of launch capability required in addition to
that offered by the U.S. commercial ELV industry.
An ELV launch capability would be maintained on both eastern and western test
ranges. The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require inclinations
unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus essentially dedicated
to Kennedy usage to reduce the STS backlog.
No commercial or foreign communications satellites beyond existing contractual
commitments originally manifested for flight through FY 1988 [existing
contractual/legal commitments] (NASA alternate) would be flown on the shuttle,
although the shuttle would be used to fly commercial and foreign experiments
requiring manned intervention to help explore new space applications. Approximately
three STS equivalents would be offloaded from the STS and would be available for
launch on commercial expendable launch vehicles. A U.S. commercial ELV industry,
created through private investment, would compete with foreign ELVs. The
government could buy U.S. commercial launch services for selected government
missions.
This offload, when combined with the DoD offload, would result in the following
backlog projections:
(See Tables III - 3 and III -4 Page 22)
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?
7,Jge 22
TABLE III - 3 OPTION 2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION NASA Planned Fli ht Rates
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand ,
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
Flight Rates
0
6
14
15
18
18
18
18
18
18
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-28
-29
-28
-26
-24
-22
TABLE III -4 OPTION 2 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
Flight Rates
0
4
8
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-47
-54
-59
-63
-67
-71
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 :_CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2 ige 23
Assessment of Option 2.
Capability/Risk. This option includes launch capacity from a three-orbiter fleet (12 to 18
flights per year), additional DoD ELVs (three to five STS-equivalents per year), and
commercial EtVs (three STS-equivalents per year) resulting in a total national capability
of 18 to 26 STS-equivalents a year, starting in FY 1989. This provides additional launch
diversity beyond that planned prior to the CHALLENGER accident and satisfies the
national security'requirements for assured access to space for critical national security
payloads. The launch vehicle diversity in this option reduces the risk of dependency on
a single launch system. A three-orbiter fleet provides less flexibility in responding to
changes in payload schedules and delays. In the event an orbiter was out of service for
an extended period of time, a two-orbiter fleet would be inadequate to satisfy manned
spaceflight, shuttle-unique, and national security requirements.
Backlog. Offloading some DoD missions from the STS and not flying commercial and
foreign communication satellites beyond existing contractual commitments originally
manifested for flight through FY 1988 [existing contractual/legal commitments] (NASA
alternate) results in an adjusted demand which is depicted in Tables III - 3 and III - 4.
Under these assumptions and NASA planned flight rates, the backlog would stabilize
by 1989 at about 28 flights and would be reduced by approximately 2 shuttle
equivalents per year beginning in 1992. If conservative flight rates are used, then the
backlog continues to grow by approximately four STS-equivalents a year through 1995.
Affordability. Table B.2 shows the fiscal impact of Option 2. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions and IUS ASE is estimated at
$0.4 billion. NASA costs (including replacement items) considering flight savings, lost
reimbursables, and program adjustments, are estimated at $2.5 billion. DoD costs
include program adjustments, launch recovery plans estimated at $4.3 billion, and
reimbursable credits of about $1.7 billion for a total DoD cost of about $2.6 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 2 is estimated at about $5.0 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $236 million in FY 1986 and $150 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $87 million in FY 1986 and $219 million in FY
1987.
DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $801 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $112 million in FY 1986 and $441 million in FY
1987.
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Option 2 requires more funding than Option 1, with a total outlay impact in FY
1987 of $ .7 Billion. Option 2 is the least difficult to fund with accompanying offsets
and has the least to the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction target for FY 1987.
U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for
routine commercial and foreign communications satellite launches and with proper
government encduragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market.
DoD could buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do
not have high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use
commercial ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound
economic base and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would
implement the President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment
of a U.S. commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This
industry could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch
systems were grounded for protracted periods of time. No direct government funds are
required to maintain this capability. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also
maintain and enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market,
particularly if the dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
rvn vrrn.uati. LOJC WIIL I rage 25
Option 3A -- Four-Orbiters by FY 1990 / Expanded ELVs
This option replaces the fourth orbiter and delivers it by 1990, increases the DoD
procurement of ELVs, and reserves the STS essentially for government use and those
missions requiting unique STS capability. The option also assumes the availability of a
U.S. commercial ELV industry.
After satisfying existing contractual commitments, originally manifested for
flight through FY 1988, [ After current commitments are met] (NASA alternate)
routine commercial and foreign satellite deployments not requiring manned presence
would not be deployed by the shuttle. New commercial exploitation requiring
manned interaction (i.e., materials processing and experimentation) would be
encouraged on the STS. DoD would continue to use the STS for those high priority
missions where the payloads cannot be effectively reconfigured for ELVs or where
man's presence is required as well as in contingencies when ELVs are grounded.
National security missions would rely equally on both the STS and ELVs.
Civil missions tend toward designs that take advantage of the unique manned
capabilities of the orbiters and therefore rely heavily on the use of the STS. However,
both DoD and commercial ELVs would be available for civil use.
An ELV launch capability is maintained on both the eastern and western test
ranges. The Vandenberg STS facility would be activated on schedule and, until the
delivery of the fourth orbiter, used only for those missions that require inclinations
unattainable from Kennedy. The existing three orbiters are thus essentially dedicated
to Kennedy usage to minimize the STS backlog.
Commencing in FY 1989, Defense would launch additional ELVs ranging from
two to five STS-equivalents per year (see Tables Ill - 5 and Ill - 6). This offload, when
combined with the elimination of three equivalent STS flights a year for commercial
and foreign customers, beginning in FY 1989, would reduce the demand for shuttle
flights to about 16 a year by FY 1993.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 ? CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
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TABLE III -5 OPTION 3A STS BACKLOG PROJECTION ( NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand ,
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
22
24
24
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-24
-19
-12
-4
+4
+ 12
TABLE III - 6 OPTION 3A STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
0
4
8
10
14
16
16
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-45
-48
-49
-49
-49
-49
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rum vrrimmL tJ3C IJIIL.T rage 27
Assessment of Option 3A.
Capability/Risk. This option includes the launch capacity for a restored four-orbiter
fleet (16 to 24 flights per year), additional DoD ELVs (three to five STS-equivalents per
year), and commercial ELVs (three STS-equivalents per year) resulting in a total national
capacity of 22 to 32 STS-equivalents per year starting in FY 1991. The combination of
replacing the fourth orbiter and expanding government ELV usage achieves a more
diversified launch 'capability. This option satisfies the requirement for assured access to
space and the need to avoid dependencies on single launch systems. The emphasis on
assuring mission capability for critical national security missions can best be satisfied by
the diversified launch capability. This option allows the ability to select from various
strategies (e.g., dual compatibility, mixed scheduling) to assure minimum interruption
of critical national security functions, despite possible future launch vehicle outage. A
four-orbiter fleet provides increased flexibility in responding to changes in payload
schedules and events. The replacement orbiter ensures that the STS fleet would not be
reduced to two orbiters in the event that one of the three remaining orbiters was out
of service for an extended period of time.
Backlog. This option, assuming NASA planned flight rates, could support all manned
missions, including space station and other civil and national security missions.
Assuming that NASA-planned flight rate projections could be achieved, this reduction
in combination with the availability of a replacement orbiter would allow the
elimination of the backlog by 1994 (see Table III - 5). Under more conservative flight
rate assumptions, the backlog would be stabilized by 1992, rather than eliminated. (see
Table III -6).
Affordability. Table B.3 shows the fiscal impact of Option 3A. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter, IUS
ASE, and replacement structural spares) is estimated at $2.8 billion. NASA costs
(including replacement items) considering flights savings, lost reimbursables, and
program adjustments, are estimated at $5.5 billion. DoD costs for program
adjustments, launch recovery plans, and STS reimbursable credits are about $2.6 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 3A is estimated at about $8.1 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $493 million in FY 1986 and $882 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $177 million in FY 1986 and $867 million in
FY 1987.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
I wil, ...pi I ,....,,-.,- .....,,,- ....,.,.. , age 28
DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $801 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $112 million in FY 1986 and $441 million in FY
1987.
Option 3A requires the most funding of all options and has the highest total
outlay impact in FY 1987 at $1.3 billion. Option 3A has the greatest impact to the FY
1987 deficit reduction target required by Gramm-Rudman legislation and would be the
most difficult to fund with accompanying offsets.
U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for routine
commercial and foreign communications satellite launches, with proper government
encouragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market. DoD could
buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do not have
high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use commercial
ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound economic base
and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would implement the
President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment of a U.S.
commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This industry
could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch systems were
grounded for protracted periods of time. No direct government fund are required to
maintain this capability. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also maintain and
enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market, particularly if the
dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
Option 3B -- Four- Orbiters By FY 1991 / Expanded ELVs
This option is the same as 3A except that the fourth orbiter delivery is delayed
approximately 1 year. The additional orbiter procurement would proceed on a slower
schedule to ease the impacts in meeting the deficit reduction targets imposed by the
Gramm-Rudman legislation and Presidential policy.
With this option, the backlog under NASA planned flight rate assumptions, would
be eliminated by 1995. More conservative flight rate assumptions would allow
stabilization of the backlog by FY 1992.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
rage 29
TABLE III - 7 OPTION 38 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (NASA Planned Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand ,
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
NASA Planned
0
6
14
15
18
20
24
24
24
24
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-20
-24
-28
-28
-27
-20
-12
-4
+4
TABLE HI - 8 OPTION 38 STS BACKLOG PROJECTION (Conservative Flight Rates)
Shuttle-
Equivalent
Payloads
FISCAL YEARS
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
Pre-Accident
Demand
9
17
18
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
DoD Offloads
0
0
0
-2
-3
-2
-4
-5
-5
-5
C & F Offloads
0
0
0
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
Adjusted
9
17
18
19
18
19
17
16
16
16
Demand
Conservative
0
4
8
10
12
14
16
16
16
16
Flight Rates
Backlog
-9
-22
-32
-41
-47
-52
-53
-53
-53
-53
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. ...... NI/ I I I ??? I 8-'1 ha V mir On V I M Om I
Assessment of Option 3B.
Capability/Risk. Because of the capacity provided by an additional shuttle, manned
flights, and unmanned payloads requiring the unique capabilities of the shuttle would
have greater flight opportunities. The overall U.S. launch posture would be
strengthened by the purchase of additional ELVs for DoD missions and the availability
of a U.S. commercial ELV industry. Greater diversity and flexibility would be provided
for the U.S. space launch program due to the replacement of the orbiter, increased
DoD use of ELVs, and a strong market incentive for private investment in commercial
ELVs. Slightly higher risk exposure results from the one year additional period in which
only three orbiters are operational.
Backlog. This option, assuming NASA planned flight rates, could provide for all
manned missions, including space station, and other civil and national security missions
while eliminating the backlog of planned missions before FY 1995.
As with Option 3A, at conservative flight rates, this option would stabilize the
backlog of lost flight opportunities by the early 1990s. Under this option some civil
government payloads may be further delayed as a result of delivering the fourth
orbiter about one year later.
Affordability. Table B.3 shows the fiscal impact of Option 3B. Cost for selected
replacement items (anomaly resolution/corrective actions, replacement orbiter, IUS
ASE, and replacement structural spares) is estimated at $3.1 billion. NASA costs
(including replacement items) considering flight savings, lost reimbursables, and
program adjustments, are estimated at $5.4 billion. DoD costs for program
adjustments, launch recovery plans, and STS reimbursables are about $2.6 billion.
Total USG cost for Option 3B is estimated at about $8.0 billion.
NASA would require budget authority of $426 million in FY 1986 and $250 million
in FY 1987. NASA outlays are projected at $117 million in FY 1986 and $304 million in
FY 1987.
DoD would require budget authority of $562 million in FY 1986 and $801 million
in FY 1987. DoD outlays are projected at $112 million in FY 1986 and $441 million in FY
1987.
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Option 3B has a total outlay impact in FY 1987 of $ 0.7 Billion, reduces the NASA
outlay impact in FY 1987 of Option 3A by $0.6 Billion with about a one year delay,
reducing the fiscal impact to the FY 1987 deficit target required by Gramm-Rudman
legislation. Option 3B would be less difficult to fund with accompanying offsets than
Option 3A; it would be slightly more difficult to fund than Option 2.
U.S. Commercial ELV Industry. This option supports the development of a U.S.
commercial ELV industry. Without direct competition from the government for
routine commercial and foreign communications satellite launches, with proper
government encouragement, this industry should be competitive in the world market.
DoD could buy commercial launch services for those classes of defense missions that do
not have high security requirements. Potentially, some civil satellites could also use
commercial ELV launch services. This government business would enhance a sound
economic base and contribute to competitive commercial prices. This option would
implement the President's ELV commercialization policy by enabling the establishment
of a U.S. commercial launch industry to augment government's launch systems. This
industry could provide emergency relief in those cases when government launch
systems were grounded for protracted periods of time. No direct government funds
are required to maintain this capability. A U.S. commercial launch industry could also
maintain and enhance the U.S. competitive position in the international market,
particularly if the dollar/French franc exchange rate remains favorable.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 29,14/02.2.: CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001 2 ge
32
ICurrent
Posture
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3A
OPTION 3B
APABILITY / RISK
Balanced Launch Capability
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
Number of Orbiters
3
4
3
4 (by 1990)
4 (by 1991)
Launch Capability/Diversity
(Shuttle Equivalent/year)
STS
Addil DoD ELVs (1)
Commercial ELVs
12 - 18
0
0
16 - 24
0
0
12 - 18
3-5
3
16 - 24
3 - 5
3
16 - 24
3 - 5
3
TOTAL
12 - 18
16 - 24
18 - 26
22 - 32
22 -32
2. BACKLOG or LOST FLIGHT
OPPORTUNITIES (NASA
Planned /Conservative Flight Rates)
Near Term FY 89 (Cum)
Mid-Term FY 95 (Cum)
(See accompaning Graphs)
-33/-46
-69/-118
-33/-46
-35/-97
-28/-41
-22/-71
-28/-41
+ 12/-49
-28/-41
+ 4/-53
1\FFORDABILITY (2)
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
$ MILLIONS
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
Budget
Auth.
Budget
Outlays
FY86
FY87
REMAINDER
494
934
2053
177
878
2398
798
951
3286
199
660
4176
1055
1683
5364
289
1308
6505
988
1051
5965
229
745
7030
TOTAL NASA (3)
3844
2470
5537
5439
TOTAL DOD (4)
-364
2565
2565
2565
TOTAL
3481
5035
_
: 8102
8004
Current Posture
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
-
OPTION 3A
OPTION 3B
4. Private ELV Industry
Encouraged
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
(1) The ELV increments provided by each option are in addition to the 10 CELVs currently being procured by DoD
(2) Initial cost estimates available to the Working Group for additional funding requirements, beyond those originally
included in the President's budget, have been used for relative evaluation of the options. These estimates include NASA
/ DoD reimbursables not yet negotiated. Funding requirements used to assess affordability are not the costs to fully
implement the described options. These funding estimates will be revised during the Administration's budget review.
(3) Based on NASA cost estimates ( FY86 -91) that include anomaly resolution, hardware items, flight savings, reimbursables
Ind program adjustments.
(4) Based on DoD cost estimates (FY86 - 92) that include hardware items, reimbursables and program adjustments.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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IV. ISSUES
The following issues were identified as requiring resolutions:
1. Funding. Although funding estimates were used to compare the relative fiscal
impacts of the various options, each option represents unanticipated funding [in
excess of the spending targets established by the President and the Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (GRH) and the Congressional Budget Control and Impoundment
Act.] (NASA and DoD delete). No attempt was made to resolve the funding issue;
rather, the question how to provide the necessary funding, including offsets as
required, will be addressed separately through the Administration's budget process.
[The funds required for recovery, following the disaster of the CHALLENGER accident,
which impacts the whole Nation, should be assessed against the overall Presidential
budget.] (NASA and DoD position)
2. Restrictions of STS Competition for Commercial and Foreign Launch Services.
The Working Group has agreed that the current practice of selling excess STS launch
capacity within the commercial and foreign satellite market as a revenue generating
practice should be discontinued. This proposed new policy would make an additional 3
STS flights a year available to reduce the backlog and provide extra capacity for future
government needs. While there is no disagreement over this proposed new policy,
there is an issue over the timing and definition of the commitment. Without a clear,
unambiguous transition point defined by the government, as well as the precise
definition of the payload categories that would no longer be flown on the shuttle, it is
unlikely that private investors will take the risk of potentially competing with the
government. This is due to the limited size of the market, the uncertainty of the
government's intentions, and the long term nature of the capital investments required
to establish the industry. Because of the backlog of STS missions resulting from the
CHALLENGER accident, a commercial ELV industry would be useful as soon as practical;
under the most favorable conditions, this could be 1988. This early date would only be
achieved if a realistic market were available in this timeframe. The government can
best influence the size of the available commercial market in this timeframe is by
establishing a firm date to discontinue government competition for this market. NASA
believes that it must continue to honor all its commitments to commercial and foreign
customers, including those projected into the early 1990s. DoT believes that the
earliest practical transition date must be established to convince the industry that they
should invest now.
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3. Flight Rate Planning. Presidential policy establishes an STS flight rate of
24 flights pr year as a target. Throughout this report, two flight rates were used
for all assessments. The NASA planned flight rates reflect their estimates of the
technical capacity of the STS as a whole. The rest of the working group, while
not challengin'g the technical capacity of the system, used a more conservative
flight rate. These lower rates were believed to be more realistic for planning
purposes during the recovery period in light of the many routine operational
problems that are likely to continue to reduce the technically achievable capacity
of 24 flights per year. The working group (with the exception of NASA) believes
that a more conservative flight rate should use used for planning purposes. A
lower flight rate should be planned than what is physically achievable; this
reserve capacity could be required to recovery from brief interruptions of flight
operations without developing a further backlog. [No longer an issue for the SIG]
4.NASA use of ELVs for civil missions If a substantial volume of civil traffic
could be offloaded (space science and some aspects of space station deployment
/ resupply), additional STS capacity could be made available for high priority
missions, perhaps equivalent to the capacity of another orbiter.
One approach is to use the STS for all civil missions. Another is to use the STS for
high-priority civil missions and those requiring manned presence, and not for
routine deployment of civil satellites, consistent with the strategy to off-load
DoD, commerical and foreign payloads. (OMB and DoT issue)
5. [Conclusions of the Joint National Space Transportation and Support
System Study The Joint National Space Transportation and Support System
(STAS)Study is being conducted under the mandate of NSSD-6-85 and is expected
to report by May 1986 on the technologies and potentially attractive concepts for
space launch and support systems in the 1995 period and beyond. While the
details of the STAS report are not known at this time, it is clear that it will contain
recom-mendations for sizeable near-term investments in both rocket and air
breather propulsion technologies. These investments will be necessary to ensure
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the availability of cost-effective space transportation options in the post-1995
time-frame. Continued U.S. leadership in space, a major tenet of the President's
various directives on national space policy, requires that provisions for these
needed investments be recognized as elements of near-term fiscal planning. j
?
(Issue identified by the SDIO)
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions.
The following major conclusions were unanimously agreed to by the Working
Group, except as noted.
1. CHALLENGER salvage operations and STS anomaly resolution costs must be
funded regardless of the recovery/reconstitution strategy adopted.
2. The loss of CHALLENGER created a significant reduction in U.S. space launch
capacity that must be restored. This launch capacity could be restored by a replacement
orbiter or expendable launch vehicles or a combination of both.
3. Second generation launch systems are currently under study but could not be
operationally available until after the 1995 timeframe. In addition, technology risks
could well delay 10Cs beyond 2000. These systems were not considered realistic alter-
natives for a near- to mid-term recovery/reconstitution strategy.
4. Because the production and use of ELVs were being phased out, no significant
additional ELV capability could be operationally available before 1988. Until that time,
all STS payloads will have to compete for the limited launch capacity of the remaining
three orbiters.
5. A growing backlog of unlaunched missions is being created by the loss of one
orbiter and the interruption of STS flights while the failure analysis and corrective
actions are being completed. Selected missions should be offloaded from the STS to
ELVs to free up additional capacity and assist in recovering from this backlog. Selected
DoD missions and commercial communications satellites represent the most practical
offload candidates. Civil missions tend to rely more on the unique manned capabilities
of the orbiter and could not be easily offloaded. [ Further study is required to examine
civil offloads.] (OMB and Dot add] Offloading could not begin until additional ELVs
become available in the 1988 timeframe.
6. A replacement orbiter could be operationally available as early as 1990 if
sufficierftesources are provided.
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r?an ?arrigh.irti- V JG W1111.1 rage 3/
7. The large backlog of STS flights represents delayed launches in the near term
and lost flight opportunities in the longer term; these lost flight opportunities will
reduce the scope of what could have been included in the U.S. space program in the
early 1990s. Funding to restore the lost launch capacity will compete in part for the
same funds that would be required to develop future space systems and the related
payloads that would have flown. Further study will be required to understand this
competition and ensure that a proper balance between restoration of launch capacity
and new and existing programs is maintained.
8. A more diversified national space launch capability must be developed and
maintained to reduce the impacts of any future accidents and system groundings. The
nation cannot afford to rely totally on a single launch system; a launch posture must be
developed that avoids dependence on single systems, to the extent practical. A variety
of ELV capabilities must be established and maintained to complement the STS to
ensure that all weight classes of [critical] (NASA add) payloads could be launched by
more than one launch system if necessary.
9. Since the effects of the CHALLENGER loss impact several agencies, every effort
was made to treat the proposed recovery options as coherent strategies. The
advantage of presenting a consolidated package containing all the necessary actions to
Congress is obvious. However, if the decision to recommend replacing the orbiter is
significantly delayed, this consolidated approach needs to be reconsidered. If the
additional ELV capability is to be available in the 1988-89 timeframe to meet critical
DoD schedules, this activity must proceed as soon as possible.
10. The manned spaceflight program is totally dependent on the STS. While
three orbiters could service all projected manned spaceflight needs, the ability to keep
three orbiters routinely in service is uncertain. A future accident, significantly less
severe than the loss of CHALLENGER, could reduce the fleet to only two orbiters for a
protracted period of time. Such an interruption of flight operations results in
significant delays and backlogs. Four orbiters would help to assure that at least three
orbiters can be maintained in operational service on a routine basis.
11. The emphasis of the STS program must be on the exploitation of the truly
unique capabilities of the shuttle. Previous goals of increasing the flight rates to reduce
the cost per flight should be reconsidered. Cost per flight is only a measure of the cost
and ignores the effectiveness of the mission. STS flights should be focused on
applications that require the unique capabilities of the orbiter. If these concepts are
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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. ? ????-?
accepted by the Administration, a consistent rationale must be adopted by all agencies
that reflects this altered set of goals and priorities or the recommended strategy will
be interpreted as inconsistent with what has been defined as the "most cost effective"
use of the STS. (NASA reserves judgement)
12. References to STS flight rates and quantities of DoD ELVs should be deleted
from current national policy directives. A projection of annual flight rate goals
consistent with safe and sustainable Shuttle operations should be established by NASA
to provide for planning and budgeting of Government space programs.
The planning flight rates should not represent a ceiling or the maximum achievable
flight rate. In any given year, a flight rate higher than planned may be flown when
such rates would clearly meet program safety standards and sufficient program
resources are available.
13. To help ensure that the U.S. can maintain a solid share of the international
launch services market, and consistent with the President's ELV commercialization
policy, the government should work to have the U.S. private sector provide these
launch services and maintain U.S. private competitiveness with private capital, rather
than with Government funds.
14. The critical factor in encouraging the development of a domestic ELV industry
is a clear and unequivocal statement of the government's intent to not compete with
the private sector for this category of foreign and commercial payloads. Without this
commitment from the government, the private sector will not risk investing the capital
required to establish a competitive domestic launch services industry. Existing ELV
production and launch capacity, developed with government funds for previous
government needs, could be converted into a commercial venture. Additional ELV
capacity being developed for DoD as well as future government purchases of
commercial launch services to meet selected needs would further contribute to the
economic base for a U.S. commercial ELV industry.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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. 1MIV .-1 a
W IsIlf \mir1 3 1\mM?fin. faInsIen fon11\ 1.. 1
B. Recommendations
The following recommendations represent the consensus of the Working Group,
except as noted:
1. A more diversified national launch posture composed of the STS and
expendable launch vehicles should be established and maintained to meet the full
range of space launch needs and to avoid dependencies on single launch systems to
the extent practical.
2. The CHALLENGER orbiter should be replaced to help ensure that a
minimum of three orbiters are routinely maintained in operational service
throughout the rest of this century. (OMB, DoC and DoT reserve their positions).
3. [Options 3A and 38 satisfy the recommendations (1) and (2) above; 3A
should be considered for implementation.] (Insert by NASA, DoD, and DoS)
4. The STS program should emphasize those missions that best exploit the
unique capabilities of the shuttle and manned spaceflight, should support research
and development activities and should not be used for routine commercial and
foreign satellite deployments. (NASA reserves its position.)
5. During the period of limited launch capacity, critical national security and
civil missions, including international cooperative missions, should be given the
highest STS launch priority. For other U.S. Government missions, the launch
priorities should be established to reflect, as far as practical, a reasonable balance
among users.
6. In the future, selected payloads, primarily national security, commercial
and foreign satellites, should be offloaded from the STS to ELVs in order to improve
assured access to space, to eliminate the backlog of delayed missions and to
encourage the development on a domestic ELV industry. (NASA questions timing).
7. In order to encourage the establishment of a U.S. ELV industry based on
private capital, after satisfying existing contractual commitments originally
manifested for flight through FY 1988, the Government will discontinue providing
launch services for commercial and foreign customers that do not require a manned
presence.
: Not to be released without NSC approval :
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run vrrimmL UC VIILT rage 4U
[7A. In order to encourage the establishment of a U.S. ELV industry based on
private capital, an approach should be established whereby the Government would to
the best of its ability, accommodate all existing contractual commitments, but would
not in the future compete with a viable and competitive U.S. ELV industry providing
launch services for commercial and foreign satellites that do not require a manned
presence.] (NASA, Alternate for (7))
8. The STS should continue to be used to encourage commercial exploitation of
space, including development of new materials, products, and services.
9. References to STS flight rates and quantities of DoD ELVs should be deleted
from current national policy directives. A projection of annual flight rate goals
consistent with safe and sustainable Shuttle operations should be established by NASA
to provide for planning and budgeting of Government space programs.
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CUMULATIVE STE; FUGHTS
0
A:z;;.A. PLANNED FLIGHT RATES
CU k4ULATWE 13ACIKLOCS
'11
87 E:8 E.:9 90 91 92 93 94 95
OPTION 1 4. OPTION 2
CUMULATNE STS FUGHIS
100
90
El)
70
50
40
.30
23:1
10
0
FISC.J4_ YEAR
0 OPTION .3A OPTION 38
CONSERVATIVE FLIGHT RATES
CUMULATIVE EIAChi_OCS
88
87 8'8 '
89 90 91 92
017110N 1 4- OFrTION 2?
93 94 95
FISCAL YEAR!
OPTION 34 h. OPTION 38
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FAcnre 21.C. t.
1
OP:1101\J ONE
CUMULATIvE BACKLOGS
_._
90
...--
,..
03
/.'".
....'''
70
...r.
60
.../1......
...,"
50
40
...
11
0
o o
0
0
il
?/ ,s------
.30
20
./.........../
10
0
. .
be
87
813
0 OPTI hasnc was
Fart( Z e. 3.
0
90
33
40
.33
20
10
C.
be
at 90 *1 92
93
FISCAL TEAR
I. CONSERVATIVE RATS
OPTION THREE-A
CUMULATTVE BACKI-OGS
98
I II
a7
as
0 OPTIMISTIC RATES
at so 9 92 93 94
MCA- YEAR
CONSERVATNE RATES
fumes Z.C.2.
1 03
90
00
OPTION TWO
CUMULATIVE ILACKLOGS
SO
AO
.30
30
IC'
0
86
87
Oa
o arm IAIST1C RATES
9e
Pow( r .c. 4. ?
2
In
1
69 90 *1 *2 *3 94 9
FISCAL YEAR
1. CONSERVATIVE MAIM
OPTION THREE--a
CUMULATIVE BACKLOGS
90
00
?
70
SO
50
,..,..-
-4
?
?
40
30.'V.A
....,".
20
........17-41-
10
I/
0
' ' ' I
'
?
.
.--11
66
87
88
OP'Ilkasnc RATES
89 *0 *1 92
IT.AR
CONSERVi.TIVE BATIM
93
94
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*6
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BUDGET SUMMARY FOR OPTIONS
1986 1987
Current Budget
Year GRH Year 1988 1989 1990 1991
Option 1. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
BTO
Total
All
Years
DOD Budget Authority 1 52 106 -363 -240 el
0
-364
Outlays 11 48 -4 -198 -213
-8
-364
NASA Budget Authority 453 882 1008 953 312 196
0
3844
Outlays 177 867 1002 1147 364 185
102
3844
Total Budget Authority 494 934 1114 550 72 277
0
3481
Outlays 177 878 1050 1143 166 -28
94
Option 2. No New Orbiter with Offloads
DOD Budget Authority 562 801 926 32 30 254
-40
2565
Outlays 112 441 754 709 300 75
173
2565
NASA Budget Authority 236 150 137 808 343 427
369
2470 '
Outlays 87 219 187 856 370 395
369
Total Budget Authority 798 951 1063 840 373 681
329
5035
Outlays 199 660 941 1566 670 470
542
Option 3A. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
DOD Budget Authority 562 801 926 32 30 254
-40
2565
Outlays 112 441 754 709 300 75
173
2565
NASA Budget Authority 493 882 1046 1268 696 783
369
5537
Outlays 177 867 1040 1381 689 686
697
5537
Total Budget Authority 1055. 1683 1972 1300 726 1037
329
8102
Outlays 289. 1308 1794 2090 989 761
870
8102
Option 3B. Early 1987 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (4/87 Start, 1/91 Delivery)
DOD Budget Authority 562 801 926 32 30 254
-40
2565
Outlays 112 441 754 709 300 75
173
2565
NASA Budget Authority 426. 250 502 1646 977 794
444
5439
Outlays 117 304 899 1668 1047 832
572
5439
Total Budget Authority 988 ' 1051 1828 1678 1007 1048
404
8004
Outlays 229 745 1653 2378 1347 907
745
8004
_
Note: See fiscal data for each option
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TAB LE 8. )
Option 1. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
1986 1987 Total
Current Budget All qi...
Year GRH Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 BTC Years
DOD
Program Adjustments/1
1
52
106
45
24
30
0
258
$TS Reimbursable Credits/4
0
0
0
-408
-264
51
0
-621
DOD Budget Authority
1
52
106
-363
-240
81
0
-364
Outlays
0
11
48
-4
-198
-213
-8
-364
NASA
Program Adjustments/1
67
179
259
314
218
239
0
1276
Replacement Items/3
493
882
895
365
115
55
0
2805
Flight Savings/Reimb Loss/2.4
-67
-179
-146
274
-21
-98
0
-237
NASA Budget Authority
493
882
1008
953
312
196
0
3844
Outlays
177
867
1002
1147
364
185
102
3844
Total Budget Authority
494
934
1114
590
72
277
0
3481
Outlays
177
878
1050
1143
166
-28
95
3481
Notes:
1) Adjustments to programa based upon 12 month STS Standdown,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follow-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assurance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and R&M
2) NASA/DOD reimbursables changes it negotiation
3) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IUS ASE,
and Replacement Structural Spares
4) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
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TAL3LE 8,2
Option 2. No New Orbiter with Offloads
DOD
1986
Current
Year GRN
1987
Budget
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
BTC
Prog Adjust/Launch Reoovery/1,2
562
801
926
744
450
493
329
STS Reimbursable Credits/3
0
0
0
-712
-420
-239
-369
DOD Budget Authority
562
801
926
32
30
254
-MO
Outlays
112
441
754
709
300
75
173
NASA
Program Adjustments/1
67
179
259
314
218
239
0
Replawneent Items/4
236
150
0
0
0
0
0
Plight Savings/Reimb Loss/3,5
-67
-179
-122
494
125
188
369
NASA Budget Authority
236
150
137
808
343
427
369
Outlays
87
219
187
856
370
395
369
Total Budget Authority
798
951
1063
840
373
681
329
Outlays
199
660
941
1566
670
470
542
Notes:
Total
All
Years
4305
-1740
2565
2565
1276
386
808
2470
2483
1) Adjustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdown,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follow-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assurance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and RAPN
2) DOD Recovery Plan - Dual compatibility/payload integration, ELV's,
launch facility modifications and support
3) NASA/DOD reimbursables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions and IUS ASE
5) Plight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
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i
1
1
1
.
1
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TAR. Lm . 34
Option 3A. Late 1986 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (42 Month Delivery from Authority to Proceed)
1986 1987
Current Budget
Year GRH Year
DOD
Total
All
1988 1989 1990 1991 RTC' Years
Prog Adjust/Launch Recovery/1,2
STS Reimbursable Credits/3
DOD Budget Authority
Outlay.
NASA
Program Adjustments/1
Replacement Items/4
Flight Savings/Reimb Loss/3,5
NASA Budget Authority
Outlays
Total Budget Authority
Outlays
562
0
562
112
67
4 93
-67
493
177
1055
289
801
0
801
441
179
882
-179
882
867
1683
1308
926
0
926
754
259
895
-108
1046
1040
1972
1794
744 450 493 329 4305
-712 -420 -239 -369 '-1740
32 30 254 -40 2565
709 300 75 173 2565
314 218 239 0 1276
36
365 115 55 0
589
363
489 9 2805
1456
1268
1381
IN: 696
689
10971 it? 5537
5537
726 329
81::
989 761 870
NOt088
1 1) Adjustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdown,
I NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follow-on, Spartan, STS changes inoluding reliability II quality
assurance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and RAPM
2)
DOD Recovery Plan - Dual compatibility/payload integration, BLV's,
launch facility modifications and support
1 ii NASA/DOD reimbursable. changes in negotiation
Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IUS ASS,
and Replacement Structural Spares
8)
Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
1
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3
Option 38. Early 1987 Orbiter Buy with Offloads (4/87 Start, 1/91 Delivery)
1986 1987
Current Budget
Year GRH Year 1988 1989 1990
DOD
1991
BTC
Total
All
Years 'atar
Frog Adjust/Launch Recovery/1,2
562
801
926
744
450
493
329
4305
STS Reimbursable Credits/3
0
0
0
-712
-420
-239
-369
-1740
DOD Budget Authority
562
801
926
32
30
254
-40
2565
Outlays
112
441
754
709
300
75
173
2565
NASA
Program Adjustments/1
67
179
259
314
218
239
0
1276
Replacement Items/4
426
250
765
830
575
180
75
3101
Flight Savings/Reimb 1055/3,5
-67
-179
-122
502
184
375
369
1062
NASA Budget Authority
426
250
902
1646
977
794
444
5*9
Outlays
117
304
899
1668
1047
832
572
5*9
Total Budget Authority
988
1051
1828
1678
1007
1048
404
8004
Outlays
229
7A5
1653
2378
1347
907
745
8004
Notess
1) Adjustments to programs based upon 12 month STS Standdown,
NASA adjustments include TDRSS Follow-on, Spartan, STS changes including reliability & quality
assurance, Tracking and Data, Science and Application, and R&M
2) DOD Recovery Plan - Dual oompatibility/payload integration. WI's,
launch facility modifications and support
3) NASA/DOD reiebursables changes in negotiation
4) Anomaly Resolution/Corrective Actions, Replacement Orbiter, IUS ASH,
and Replacement Structural Spares
5) Flight Savings due to reduced NASA Planned Flight Rates
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Intelligence Community Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
3 April 1986 ,
Randall E. Davis
Associate Director for Natural Resources,
Energy and Science
Office of Management and Budget
FROM: Deputy Director, Program & Budget Staff
SUBJECT: Draft Issue Paper entitled "Funding for National
Space Launch Program Recovery"
1. The following comments are offered in response to your request of
1 April 1986:
2. I believe that most of us would agree that there is some threshold
above which it would make no sense to attempt to absorb the cost of an acute
emergency by drawing down other planned Federal activities. The central
question then becomes one of whether or not the cost of recovery from the
Challenger tragedy exceeds that threshold. One problem I have with the issue
paper is that, after correctly citing the gross cost at about $86, it masks
the budget impact for given fiscal years by citing ranges of costs, the low
ends of which apply to options that, having been judged unacceptable by the
IG(Space) Working Group, are not presently being seriously considered.
3. A second problem is what I believe to be an exaggeration of the impact
on the budgetary process of putting forth a recovery package without offsets.
If a package without offsets were the Administration's selected option, it
would presumably be defended as an special case, e.g. by emphasizing the
extraordinary circumstances being remedied and by drawing a strong distinction
between adding to the deficit to solve acute and unexpected emergencies and
adding to it by failing to correct chronic imbalances between receipts and
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Draft Issue Paper entitled "Funding for National
Space Launch Program Recovery"
expenditures.- Futhermore, the FY 86 deficit will be changing as a result of
variations from economic projections, the refusal of the Congress to endorse
rescissions, etc. Hence, a Supplemental for Recovery from the Challenger
Tragedy would be swallowed along with a host of other adjustments and would
not have high visibility. Looking to FY 87, it would not seem unreasonable to
beat Congress to the punch by suggesting that a part of the $106 margin
allowed by G-R-H before sequestration is automatically triggered be allocated
to the Challenger Recovery Amendment.
4. If a replacement orbiter is to be procured, Option 36 as urged by OMB
is preferable to Option 3A. With all the uncertainties surrounding the STS
there is no reason to rush toward acquiring capacity we seem to be in the
process of deciding we will use only when an unmanned vehicle cannot do the
job. If offsets are mandated, the case for Option 38 in preference to 3A will
be stonger still. Moreover, it is not unlikely that considerable support will
build outside of NASA for Option 2 which is the least cost/least risk
solution to restoring absolutely essential capabilities.
5. The package about to be sent to the Congress should avoid getting
ahead of our understanding of what makes sense for the long run. It should
stress the need for emergency measures dictated mostly by national security to
maintain access to space while we sort things out. By the time the FY 88
budget is ready for submittal it should be possible to have a good
understanding of the prospects for sharing with the commercial sector the
costs of restored production capacity and launch facilities for ELVs. We also
need to "re-baseline" the cost of ELVs so that we can better assess the
economic aspects of second- and possibly third-generation reusable launchers.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/02 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000300780001-2
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Draft Issue Paper entitled "Funding for National
Space Launch Program Recovery"
Distribution:-
Orig. - Randall E. Davis, OMB
1 - PBS Subject
1 - PBS Chrono
1 - PPS
1 - ICS Registry
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503
April 1, 1986
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POGRAMS AND BUDGET STAFF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Randall E. Davis
/66
Associate Director for Natural Resources,
Energy and Science
Funding Options for U.S. Launch Program Recovery
Per agreement at our Monday, March 31, meeting on the subject
topic, we have prepared a draft issue paper (see attached) as a
vehicle for resolving the offsets issue through the Budget Review
Board. Also enclosed are minutes from the meeting. Please
provide me your comments on the draft issue paper by Thursday,
April 3.
Attachments
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STAT
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT: Funding for National Space Launch Program Recovery
Introduction.
The IG(Space) is nearing completion of its recommendations to
the SIG(Space) in the wake of the Space Shuttle Challenger
accident. The options being considered by the IG(Space) would
require new funding for NASA and DOD totalling up to about $8
billion for 1986-1992, with outlay impacts of $0.2-1.3 billion
per year in the 1986-1987 period. A summary of the funding
requirements for NASA and DOD identified by the IG(Space) is
attached. These funds would be applied primarily to fixing
Shuttle problems, procuring a replacement orbiter, and procuring
additional expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for national
security missions. However, the IG(Space) has not attempted to
resolve the issue of how to provide this extra funding within the
fiscal constraints imposed by the President's deficit reduction
policy, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (G-R-H), and the budget
resolution targets required by the Congressional Budget Act.
At issue now is whether or not reductions will be proposed la
the President to offset anyiTaTFTpated 1986 sliTTTemental funding
ilia 1987 budget aiiFilaiints for the space ?launch recovery program.
Background and Discussion.
Each of the options being considered by the IG(Space)
represents unanticipated funding in excess of the spending
targets established by the President and the Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (G-R-H), and the resolution limits mandated
by the Congressional Budget Control and Impoundment Act. If the
new funding needs for space launch recovery are not offset, the
President's commitment to fiscal responsibility through spending
restraint could be undermined seriously, signalling to the
Congress that fiscal responsibility no longer matters. Moreover,
if any supplemental requests were not offset fully, the current
Congressional spending situation would make such a proposal
subject to a point-of-order challenge under the Congressional
Budget Act, requiring a majority vote for waiver in the House and
a 3/5 vote in the Senate.
If full offsets are required, space programs needs must be
traded against other priority Administration programs. If first
recourse is made to other NASA and DOD programs, space launch _
recovery needs would be traded primarily against other priority
civil space and defense programs (e.g., Space Station). Funding
for other Defense programs, which has been repeatedly reduced by
Congressional action, would be further reduced.
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Beyond NASA and DOD, there are no other large Federal
programs which offer further savings opportunities sufficient to
address fully the new space launch recovery funding needs. Also,
any across-the-board re-opening of the budget would be
impractical, as it would affect every agency during a sensitive
period of budget defense before the Congress. Furthermore, there
is no practical opportunity to consider now re-estimates of
economic assumptions, as no economic update is planned or
required by law until August, 1986. Moreover, preliminary
indications are that such re-estimates might not be favorable.
Finally, the degree of difficulty of identifying offsets
depends upon the approach chosen for space launch recovery. The
problem would be most acute if the Administration seeks to
replace the lost orbiter on the fastest possible schedule, and
seeks a $3.4 billion 1986 supplemental to provide for most civil
space recovery needs (including full forward funding of a
replacement orbiter) and initial defense needs. Finding offsets
of this magnitude late in the current year would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible.
The identification of offsets would be relatively more
manageable if the Administration seeks a slower, annual funding
approach to minimize funding needs in the 1986-1987 period. For
example, reprogramming of funds from some civil space programs
that are likely to be delayed anyway due to the accident or
Congressional action. It might also be possible to realize some
relief from lower DOD fuel prices. However, there may still be
some painful trade-offs required in civil space and defense
programs.
Options.
1) Require no offsets (let Congress decide priorities).
2) Require NASA and DOD to offset fully their respective needs
by reprogramming funds from lower priority programs.
3) Require DOD to offset fully its needs by reprogramming, and
require NASA to offset a substantial portion of its needs, to
the extent practical. Remaining offsets would be found in
the budgets of other agencies.
-2-
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Option 1. Require no offsets (let Congress decide priorities).
Pros.
o Would allow the Administration to propose the fastest
possible recovery for the U.S. space launch program,
reaffirming the high priority of the U.S. space program
(e.g., the Space Station).
o Would avoid further trade-offs by the Administration with
other priority programs, especially for national security.
Cons.
o Would undermine seriously the President's commitment to
fiscal restraint, which will only encourage Congress to
ignore Budget Act and G-R-H limitations.
o Would not necessarily achieve the proposed launch recovery
schedule, as Congress may find it difficult to ignore the
fiscal constraints.
o Would likely face Congressional offsets from Administration
priority programs because of Budget Act requirements which
would otherwise have to be waived.
Option 2. Require NASA and DOD to offset fully their respective
needs by reprogramming funds from lower priority programs.
Pros.
o Would not require the President or the Congress to abrogate
their joint commitment to fiscal responsibility.
o Would require offsets from the agencies receiving most of
the benefits of the new space launch capabilities.
o Would not require reopening the budget process for other
agencies during a sensitive budget defense period.
Cons.
o Would not permit the Administration to propose the fastest
possible recovery for the U.S. space launch program.
o May require trade-offs with other Administration priority
programs, especially for national security.
o May cause undue hardship on NASA, because of the need to
find large ?WTTiets in 19857 iFFW additional funds are also
needed to resolve Shuttle anomalies. If the fastest
procurement schedule is sought, it would require drastic
reductions in many other NASA programs.
-3-
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Option 3. Require DOD to offset its needs by reprogramming, and
require NASA to offset a substantial portion of its
needs, to the extent practical. Remaining offsets
would be found in the budgets of other agencies.
Pros.
o Would not require the President or the Congress to abrogate
their joint commitment to fiscal responsibility.
o Would require offsets primarily from the agencies receiving
most of the benefits of the new space launch capabilities.
o Would not require reopening the budget process for other
agencies during a sensitive budget defense period.
o Would permit NASA to identify substantial offsets from
programs that would have likely been delayed anyway due to
the accident or Congressional action (e.g., 1-2 year space
station delay already included in the Senate Budget
Resolution).
o Would allow NASA partial relief in 1986 and after 1987,
where it would be impractical to seek full offsets now.
Cons.
o Would not permit the Administration to propose the fastest
possible recovery for the U.S. space launch program.
o May require trade-offs with other Administration priority
programs, especially for national security.
o May also require some additional offsets from other Federal
programs (e.g., DOE energy conservation grants).
Decision.
Option 1 -- Require no offsets (let Congress decide
priorities). II
Option 2 -- Require NASA and DOD to offset fully their
respective needs by reprogramming funds from
lower priority programs. II
Option 3 -- Require DOD to offset fully its needs by
reprogramming, and require NASA to offset a
substantial portion of its needs, to the extent
practical. Remaining offsets would be found in
the budgets of other agencies. 1.1
-4-
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RANGE OF COSTS FOR U.S. SPACE LAUNCH RECOVERY OPTIONS
(IG(Space) estimates, dollars in billions)
1986
1987
TOTAL (1986-1992)
DOD
Budget Authority
0 to 0.6
0.1 to 0.8
0 to 2.6
Outlays
0 to 0.1
0 to 0.4
0 to 2.6
NASA
Budget Authority
0.2 to 0.5
0.2 to 0.9
2.5 to 5.5
Outlays
0.1 to 0.2
0.2 to 0.9
2.5 to 5.5
Total
Budget Authority
0.4 to 1.0
0.9 to 1.1
3.5 to 8.1
Outlays
0.2 to 0.3
0.7 to 1.3
3.5 to 8.1
0 --
-5-
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MARCH 31, 1986 MEETING MINUTES
SPACE LAUNCH RECOVERY FUNDING OPTIONS
Senior budget officials (see attached list) from agencies
affected by the IG(Space) process for developing U.S. space
launch recovery options met at room 248 EOB to discuss funding
requirements and the process for resolving funding issues.
The following are highlights of the topics discussed:
o IG(Space) Process. It was noted that the program recovery
options being HITieloped by the IG(Space) raised major budget
issues which were not being addressed by the IG(Space).
It was agreed that these issues need to be addressed by
cognizant budget officials through the budget process.
o Funding Constraints and Options. OMB representatives
outlined the current ?FFesidential and Congressional policies
for fiscal restraint and the requirements of the
Congressional Budget Act and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
- -
- -
- -
gM,
OMB representatives indicated that full offsets are
required if the President and the Congress are not to
abrogate their policies and responsibilities under
current law, and that all supplementals proposed to-date
have been covered fully by offsets.
The Defense representative requested that there be a "no
offset" option because of the importance of the programs
and the difficulty of identifying sufficient offsets. It
was agreed that there should be a "no offset" option.
The Defense representative also raised the possibility of
re-estimating economic assumptions as a possible revenue
source, as was done in April of many previous years. The
OMB representatives noted that an April update is not
planned or required under G-R-H, and that preliminary
indications suggest that such re-estimates would not
likely yield favorable results.
The Defense representative noted that DOD has "lost" some
$61 billion in "hits" from Congressional reductions and
the budget process, and would have grave difficulty if
asked to offset the full costs of the recovery program.
There was discussion between DOD and OMB staff on
possible offsets in DOD, including lower oil prices. the
T-46 trainer, and funds appropriated but not authorized.
The Defense representative, however, stated that he was
not prepared to propose specific offsets at this meeting.
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There was also discussion between the NASA representative
and OMB representatives regarding possible NASA offset
areas. The NASA representative indicated general
agreement with the target areas identified by OMB staff,
but indicated the need to discuss specific estimates
further.
The Defense representative and others suggested that
offsets might be sought from agencies other than NASA and
DOD. The OMB representatives indicated that such offsets
would generally be difficult and that it would be
impractical to reopen the budget process across-the-
board. However, OMB representatives noted that some
limited offsets from agencies other than NASA and DOD
might be possible if the overall recovery needs could be
minimized in the 1986-1987 period.
o Process for resolving the offset issue.
The Defense representative suggested that the offset
policy and launch recovery options need not be decided by
the President. The Defense representative suggested that
the Budget Review Board be reconstituted to address the
funding offset issue.
Several agency representatives also suggested that OMB
take the lead in preparing a decision paper for the BRB
as a vehicle for resolving this issue.
OMB agreed to draft a decision paper for consideration at
the BRB level and to circulate it to the senior agency
budget officials for comment.
-2-
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTME?ECRIETIR FORCE
WASHINGTON. 0 C 20330
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: FY 1986 Budget Supplemental/FY 1987 Budget Amendment
for Space Launch Recovery - ACTION MEMORANDUM
(U) The attached FY 1986 budget supplemental ($562.0 million)
and FY 1987 budget amendment ($832.1 million) identify funding
requirements to implement the recovery of space launch
capability. Our requirements assume a twelve month Space
Shuttle standdown and are consistent with the Space
Transportation Architecture Study.
(U) The supplemental and amendment are in consonance with
SecDef guidance to selectively offload missions to expendable
launch vehicles (ELV) while maintaining the DoD commitment to
the Shuttle program, to develop dual coast Shuttle and
complementary expendable launch vehicle (CELV) launch
facilities, and to achieve satellite dual compatability where
practical.
(U) It is imperative that we take immediate action to restore
our launch capability, and I urge expedited action on these
requests.
2 Atchs
1. FY86 Budget Supplemental (S)
2. FY87 Budget Amendment (S)
cc: The Secretary of Defense
ASD(C31)
ASD(C)
SECRET
WI Mles10)
es elessillsollo 0 ON OSIM111010111111 1111
is suedsd I 88000188 NO US MI
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gSECRET
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986
BUDGET SUPPLEMENTAL
MARCH 1986
SECRET
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Department of Defense
FY 1986 Supplemental Appropriation Request
Table of Contents
Summary of Requirements
Missile Procurement, Air Force
- Appropriation Language
- Program & Financing/Object Classification
- Narrative justification pages
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
-Appropriation Language
-Program & Financing/Object Classification
-Narrative justification pages
PAL?
1
2
3
7
8
10
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense Agencies
-Narrative justification page 12
General Provision
13
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Department of Defense
FY1986 Supplemental Appropriation Request
Summary of Requirements
The following is a recap by appropriation of funds needed in support of space launch
capability recovery. Funds will provide for an expanded CELV program and an expendable
launch vehicle competition for GPS.
Avimppriatilm
Missile Procurement, Air Force
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Air Force
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Defense Agencies
Total
$329,400
232,500
$562,000
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Missile Procurement, Air Force
For an additional amount for "Missile Procurement, Air Force", $329,400,000, to remain
available until September 30, 1988.
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Missile Procurement, Air Force
(Supplemental Now Requested, Existing Legislation)
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
Identification Code 1985 actual
57-3920-0-1-051
Program by activities:
Direct Program:
00.05 Other Support
10.00 Total obligations
Financing:
Unobligated balance available,
start of year:
21.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
Unobligated balance available, end
of year:
24.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
39.00 Budget Authority
1986 est.
1987 est.
171,288
108,702
171,288
108,702
-152,112
152,112
43,410
329,400
Budget Authority:
40.00 Appropriation 329,400
-3--
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Missile Procurement, Air Force
(Supplemental Now Requested, Existing Legislation)
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
Relation of obligation to outlays: 1985 actual
71.00 obligations incurred, net
72.40 obligated balance, start of year
74.40 obligated balance, end of year
90.00 Outlays
1986 est
171,288
-116,602
34,686
1987 est.
108,702
136,602
-159,001
86,303
Budget Plan (in thousands ot dollars)
(amount for procurement actions programmed)
Direct:
07.05 Other Support
329,400
Object classification (in thousands of dollars)
31.0 Direct obligations, equipment
171,288 108,702
:
,
:
:17
Department of the Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force
a
a
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY1986 Presently Available $ 7,909,732
FY1986 Revised Estimate $
a FY1986 Proposed Supplemental $ 329,400
0
> Budget Activity: Olhgr_Suppprt ($329,400)
lAkalifigatign_pf 5upplementAl_LQUIAirgnignt-s,
a aMallarY:
?
7) .-1_1,111.g Itgm QuantiLy
m
(T) IDIBL.SQ.at
m
w
m 33 Global Positioning (HPY) 6,000
m
o 40 Defense Satellite Comm 1,000
_.
-r. System (1yr)
6 43 Space Boosters 46,000
_.
6 44 Space Boosters 188,700
m Advance Procurement (CY)
_
0 52 Special Programs 117,71).D___
F"'
7) Total 329,400
0
m
m G1obAl_f2sitioning MP) 6,000
m
0 This line provides for integration, minor hardware changes, and other program impacts of
o
_. launching GPS satellites aboard expendable launch vehicles beginning in FY 89. Also
_.
_. provides for GPS program support for an expected ELV competition. No provision is made for
--.1
7) major satellite design changes. '
o
o
o Defen?e_5attilitg_ComM_Y;APMANYPJ 1,000
w
o This line provides for necessary spacecraft storage, engineering/launch support contract
o
--.1 extensions, and software modifications resulting from an STS stand-down until Feb 87.
m
o ,
0
0
n.)
U! PaWSsuluidU
ap.aLe_p_ODZI.en5=AslY.ancD.O_EFQ.PEtPlera 188,700
CELV Production. This line provides necessary funding to procure long lead materiels
necessary to increase Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) Production from the
proposed multi-year buy of 10 vehicles to a multi-year buy of 23 boosters. The first of
the additional 13 Titan 3407 boosters will be available in FY 89. Includes funding to
enable a 3 per year Centaur G Prime upper stage flight rate. Assumes a Jun 86 ATP.
ZDAgg_BSWZIer 46,000
CELV Production. This line provides necessary funding to increase CELV Production from the
a proposed multi-year buy of 10 vehicles to a multi-year buy of 23 boosters. It also
0 provides for additive requirements at Titan launch facilities at the Eastern Space and
Missile Center to provide increased Centaur launch rates. Buys competitively procured
ELV's for GPS satellites at a launch rate of 4 per year beginning in FY 89. (Procurement
p
funding begins in FY 87).
8
<
agtgigl PrpixAm 87,700
a
Justification materials will be provided through special access channels.
(D
(T)
CD
(/)
(D
n.)
n.)
0
0
o.)
co
n.)
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Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
For and additional amount for "Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force",
$232,500,000, to remain available until September 30, 1987.
?7?
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Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Fiirce
(Supplemental Now Requested, Existing Legislation)
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
Identification Code
57-3600-0-1-051 1985 actual 1986 est. 1987 est.
Program by Activies
Direct program:
00.02 Advanced technology development
00.03 Strategic programs
00.05 Intelligence and communication
00.06 Defensewide mission support
10.00 Total obligations
Financing:
Unobligated balance available,
start of year:
21.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
Unobligated balance available, end
of year:
24.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
39.00 Budget authority
Budget Authority:
172 28
13,760 2,240
104,318 16,982
D.147.00
199,950 32,550
32,550
232,500
-32,550
40.00 ApprppriPtign
2324500
Relation of obligation to outlays:
71.00 Obligations incurred, net
199,950
32,550
72.40 Obligated balance, start of year
97,650
74.40 Obligated balance, end of year
=97,650
r31.1375
90.00 Outlays
102,300
95,325
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Budget Plan (in thousands of dollars)
(Amount for procurement actions programmed)
Direct: 1985 actual
1986 est. 1987 est.
07.02
Advanced technology development
200
07.03
Strategic programs
16,000
07.05
Intelligence and Comm
121,300
07.06
Defensewide mission support
_95A00
08.93
Total budget plan
232,500
Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)
Direct obligations:
31.0 Equipment
199,950 32,550
Z-1-0008L00?0001L 1-1-0988dC1I-V10 Z0/1-0/171-0Z 3S3I3I -104 panaiddv /Woo pazwues - IJed u! PeWsseloaCI
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Department of the Air Force
RDT&E, Air Force
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY1986 Presently Available $ 13,115,216
FY1986 Revised Estimate $ 13,477,716
FY1986 Proposed Supplemental$ 232,500
Budget Activity: Aglyangej_jec_bnolgzy_Deyglgpment_il%.201
Jpstificati9n_kf Zukiakmentai BquirQmeni.
11-1 Idnk Itgm Thlal_Cpst
40 63410F Space Sys Environ Interactions Tech $200
This line provides for necessary payload storage, and software modifications resulting from
STS stand-down until Feb 87.
Budget Activity: StrAteZig_ETUrDJU_1111201
R=1_Lint Ilem Iptal_cs51
102 33603F Milstar Comm Sat System $16,000
Milstar Dual Compatibility. Provides for required integration analysis and documentation,
interface redesign, and other program impacts of integrating Milstar to the CELV at
Satellite 1. This effort is in addition to the ongoing STS Centaur integration
activities for Milstar. Assumes an Apr 90 ILC based upon a Jun 86
ATP.
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Department of Defense
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Defense Agencies
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY1986 Presently Available C. 6,317,154
FY1986 Revised Estimate 6,317,254
FY1986 Proposed Supplemental C 100
Budget Activity: Defen?ewle_1ipp_ZwaDr1
JustifigPtipn of ZuPPiPMPrilDiAigQMirtinenIZ.
Provides for necessary payload storage and software modification resulting from an STS stand-
down until Feb 87.
--/ g ?
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Provision
4.)
cf)
Fr)
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SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987
BUDGET AMENDMENT
MARCH 1986
?
SECRET
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Department of Defense ?
FY 1987 Budget Amendment
Table of Contents
Summary of Requirements
Page
Missile Procurement, Air Force
- Appropriation Language
- Program & Financing/Object Classification
-Narrative justification pages
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
-Appropriation Language
-Program & Financing/Object Classification
-Narrative justification pages
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense Agencies
-Narrative justification page
I
i
1
2
3
5
7
8
10
12
:
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1
Department of Defense
qi
. FY1987 Budget Amendment
a
Summary of Requirements
3'
-o
The following is a recap by appropriation of funds needed in support of space launch
capability recovery. Funds will provide for an expanded CELV program and an expendable
launch vehicle competition for CPS.
a Appropriation Dollarl_in_Thousands
0
-0 Missile Procurement, Air Force $567,000
Research, Development, Test and
-0 Evaluation, Air Force 251,500
-0
8
< Research, Development, Test and
a Evaluation, Defense Agencies
Total 832,100
0
0
0
0
O.)
0
0
CO
0
0
0
n.)
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Air Force
Procurement,
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Missile Procurement, Air Force
(FY 1987 Budget Amendment)
Program and Financing (in thousands or dollars)
Identification Code 1985 actual 1986 est. 1987 est.
Program by
activities:
Direct
Program:
00.05
Other
Support
294.840
10.00
Total
obligations
294,840
Financing:
Unobligated balance available,
start of year:
21.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
Unobligated balance available, end
of year:
24.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
39.00 Budget Authority
272.160
Budget Authority:
40.00 Appropriation
567,000
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0
-0
co
co
0
0
0
0
0
0.)
0
0 ,
co
0
0
0
Missile Procurement, Air Force
(FY 1987 Budget Amendment)
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
Relation of obligation to outlays: 1985 actual 1986 est.
71.00 obligations incurred, net
72.40 obligated balance, start of year
74.40 obligated balance, end of year
90.00 Outlays
1987 est.
294,840
-235,t35
59,705
Budget Plan (in thousands of dollars)
(amount for procurement actions programmed)
Direct:
07.05 Other Support 567,000
Object classification (in thousands of dollars)
31.0 Direct obligations, equipment 294,840
D
A
A'
a Department of the Air Force
5 Missile Procurement, Air Force
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY1987 Budget Request Pending $ 8,982,400
FY1987 Revised Request $ 9,549,400
FY1987 Proposed Amendment $ 567,000
a
0
Justification of Budget Amendment
Budget Activity: Other Support ($567,000)
summary:
<
a
P-1 Line item Opantlty Total Cost
33 Global Positioning (MYP) 15,500
(T. 35 Space Shuttle Operations 9,500
40 Defense Satellite Comm 1,000
System (HYP)
0 43 Space Boosters 279,000
44 Space Boosters 145,000
6
Advance Procurement (CT)
6 52 Special Programs 117,000
0 Total 567,000
Global Positioning (MI?) 15,500
This line provides for integration, minor hardware changes, and other program impacts of
launching GPS satellites aboard expendable launch vehicles beginning in FY 89. Also
0
0 provides for GPS program support for an expected ELY competition. No provision is made for
major satellite design changes.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
n.)
Space SbytIle Operations 9,500
a
Defense Satellite Comm vstem (MYP1 1,000
5
D This line provides for necessary spacecraft storage, engineering/launch support contract
a) extensions, and software modifications resulting from an STS stand-down until Feb 87.
w Space BegAter*-Advanced Procurement 145,000
m
D CELV Production. This line provides necessary funding to procure long lead materiels
.=.
N necessary to increase Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) production from the
m
a proposed multi-year buy of 10 vehicles to a multi-year buy of 23 boosters. The first of
0 the additional 13 Titan 34D7 boosters will be available in FY 89. Includes funding to
0
-0 enable a 3 per year Centaur G Prime upper stage flight rate. Assumes a Jun 86 ATP.
..<
>
-0 Space Boosters 279,000
-0
8 CELV Production. This line provides necessary funding to increase CELV production from the
<
m proposed multi-year buy of 10 vehicles to a multi-year buy of 23 boosters. It also
a provides for additive requirements at Titan launch facilities at the Eastern Space and
? Missile Center to provide increased Centaur launch rates. Buys competitively procured
7) ELV's for GPS replenishment satellites at a launch rate of 4 per year beginning in FY 89.
m
(17.
Da Special Programs 117,000
w
CD
0 Justification materials will be provided through special access channels.
6
6
pi
0
0
0 4
0
0
0
"NI
0
0
0
n.)
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Air Force",
Development,
0...4
CO 0
C.',
0
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Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
(FY 1987 Budget Amendment)
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
Identification Code
57 -3600-0-1 -051
1985 actual 1986 est. 1987 est.
Program by Activies
Direct program:
00.02 Advanced technology development
00.03 Strategic programs
00.05 Intelligence and communication
00.06 Defensewide mission support
10.00 Total obligations
Financing:
Unobligated balance available,
start of year:
21.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
Unobligated balance available, end
of year:
24.40 For completion of prior year
budget plans
39.00 Budget authority
860
15,136
52,460
147,834
216,290
35,210
251,500
Budget Authority:
40.00 Appropriation
Relation of obligation to outlays:
71.00 Obligations incurred, net
72.40 Obligated balance, start of year
74.40 Obligated balance, end of year
90.00 Outlays
216,290
=105,63()
110,660
1-led u! PaWsseljidU
Budget Plan (in thousands of dollars)
(Amount for procurement actions programmed)
Direct: 1985 actual 1986 est. 1987 est.
W 07.02 Advanced technology development 1,000
m
D 07.03 Strategic programs 17,600
N 07.05 Intelligence and Comm 61,000
m
a 07.06 Defensewide mission support 171,900
0 08.93 Total budget plan 251,500
0
Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)
a
Direct obligations:
a 31.0 Equipment 216,290
cT
'Jed u! pawssepaa
Z-1-0008L00?0001L Z0/1-0/171-0Z eseeiei -104 penaiddv Ado paz!4!ue3 u! PeWsseloaCI
Department of the Air Force
RDT&E, Air Force
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY1987 Request Pending
FY1987 Revised Request
FY1987 Proposed Amendment
$ 17,275,400
$ 17,784,700
$ 251,500
Justification of Budget Amendment
Budget Activity: Advanced Technolpsy Development ($1,00)
8-1 Line PE. Item Total Cost
40 63410F Space Sys Environ Interactions Tech $ 100
This line provides for necessary payload storage, and software modifications resulting from
STS stand-down until Feb 87.
41 63424F Cruise Missile Surveillance Tech $ 900
Budget Activity: Strategic Programs ($1746001
B-1 Line PE. Item Iota]. Cost
102 33603F Milstar Comm Sat System $17,600
Milstar Dual Compatibility. Provides for required integration analysis and documentation,
interface redesign, and other program impacts of integrating Milstar to the CELV at
Satellite 1. This effort is in addition to the ongoing STS Centaur integration
activities for Milstar. Assumes an Apr 90 ILC based upon a Jun 86 ATP.
0
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Evaluation
0 0 0
000
en 0% vO
4' r- rfl
%Co l"- ?-
fr1 fv)
Oh II?
CO CO
CO CO 000
CT 0% ON
1.? IP..
fa. Cs. La.
0
0
4:4
Budget Activity:
I
_
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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SICRETARY
HEMORANDUM FOR AF/CV
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON. O.C. 203.10-1000
21 March 1986
SUBJECT: Recovery of Space Launch Capability - ACTION MEMORANDUM
In the short time since the Challenger loss, your staff has done an out-
standing job of assessing the impact, developing recovery alternatives, and
recommending a general course of action to recover space launch capability.
Given the environment of turmoil in the wake of the accident, this effort
represents a significant accomplishment.
The next step in this process is to submit a FY 86 supplemental and FY 87
budget amendment to Congress and determine FY 88-92 POM requirements.
The FY 86 and FY 87 information must be firm, should assume a twelve month .
Shuttle standdown and should use the attached mission model as a baseline. -
The POM data can be an approximation of requirements that will be updated for
new projections of Shuttle downtime, flight rates and mission priorities.
To assist in this effort, the following guidance is provided: 1) Maintain
DOD's commitment to the STS, 2) selectively of missions to ELVs, 3) develop
dual coast STS and CELV launch facilities, and 4) achieve satellite dual compat-
ibility for Milstar, GPS, DSP and DSCS.
DOD and NASA must present a joint position to the President and Congress
as soon as possible. Please provide the FY 86 emergency supplemental pack-
age for my approval by March 28.
E. C. C. Aldridge, Jr.
1 Atch
Mission Model (s)
...? SEC
When Standing Alone This
Page is Unclassified.
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STS 51-L IMPACT OPTION / 86018:1670
PAYLOAD
JAN
23
GPS
(MISSION
DES 16.)
12 MO.
DOWN
GPS 1
1
87
(71-A)
8
87
-7
GPS 2
3
87
(71-F)
11
87
-8
BPS 3
7
87
(71-K)
2
Be
-7
GPS 4
8
87
(71-L)
88
-7
GPS 5
8
87
(71-1)
6
88
-7
GPS 6
11
87
(81-C1
11
88
-6
GPS 7
12
87
(81-0)
1/
Be
-11
GPS 8
12
87
(81-0)
11
88
-11
GPS 9
3
88
(81-H)
7
89
-17
GPS 10
6
88
(814)
7
89
-14
GPS 11
6
88
(81-L1
11
89
-18
GPS 12
7
88
(81-M)
12
89
-17
GPS 13
4
90
GPS 14
1
91
GPS 15
1
91
GPS 16
2
91
GPS 17 AND SUBS
MOVED TO ELV's
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Private Sector Expendable Launch Vehicle Industry
ISSUE When and how should NASA discontinue flying commercial
and foreignpayloads that do not require a manned presence?
BACKGROUND Prior to the accident NASA planned to sell excess
STS capacity (on the order of 3 shuttle flights a year) to
commercial and foreign customers (principally communications
satellites.)
This came into direct conflict with the President's 1984
decision to encourage and facilitate the development of a U.S.
private sector commercial launch services industry to
capitalize on the previous U.S. government investments in ELVs
that were no longer required by the government. The Department
of Transportation was given the lead in this initiative.
Since the commercial satellite market consists of a limited
number of commercial and foreign communications satellites, the
potential commercial ELV industry found itself in direct
competition with the U.S. government (i.e., the NASA STS)
for these customers. This led to a Cabinet Counsel study to
establish "full cost recovery" for the STS to ensure that the
commercial ELV industry could fairly compete with the STS.
The range of full cost recovery prices identified varied widely
depending on the definition of what items were to be included
or excluded. A political concern was raised that the European
launch firm, ArianeSpace, would continue to subsidize their
launches and capture the entire world market. For this reason,
a low price for STS full cost recovery was established.
The companies that comprise the potential commercial ELV
industry interpreted this as an indication that the government
did not seriously want them competing with the STS. As a
consequence, there has been no serious investment of private
capital to establish a domestic, commercial ELV industry.
CURRENT FACTORS With the loss of Challenger and the subsequent
grounding of the STS fleet, several factors influencing this
issue have changed.
Given the backlog of STS missions produced by the grounding of
the fleet and the availability of only 3 orbiters to service
this backlog through about 1991, there will be no excess STS
capacity until well into the 1990s.
NASA had 16 commercial or foreign communications satellites
scheduled for launch on the STS between Feb 86 and the end of
FY 88. If the STS is down 18 months, none of these will be
flown until at least FY 88 if the STS is down 18 months.
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These customers are paying STS prices established before "full
cost recovery" i.e., 1/3 to 1/4 of what current Ariane prices
would be). Even if Ariane can accept additional payloads,
these customers may well elect to stay on the shuttle despite
the long launch delays.
U.S. Commercial ELVs could be available by early TY 88 to
compete with Ariane. Although the originally commited 16
payloads may stay on the STS for economic reasons, an
additional 16 payloads were potentially planning to use the STS
during the TY 89-91 timeframe. It is unlikely that the STS
will be able to accommodate these users. (NASA disagrees with
this assessment since they assume 24 flights/year in this
period with a fourth orbiter.)
The Working Group agreed that NASA should discontinue providing
commercial launch services; the issue is one of timing. All
agree that NASA should attempt to honor those firm commitments
(i.e., payloads manifested before the accident through FY 88).
Most agree that trying to compete for those projected for FY
89-91 with the STS is unrealistic.
Additional the political issues raised are:
- We must not allow Ariane to capture the world market in
commercial launch services or they will undercut both the U.S.
commercial ELV industry and the U.S. satellite communication
industry.
- How can we be sure that a commercial U.S. ELV industry
will be viable and competitive.
- If we do not maintain our current market share, the
Russians, Chinese, and Japanese will capture whatever Ariane
cannot fly.
Major ELV manufacturers (Martin and General Dynamics) have told
the IG working group that they are willing to invest, and that
they believe they can be competitive. They await the
government's decision on this issue.
The communications industry expressed concern to the IG Working
Group over a policy that would preclude their use of the STS.
Despite their obvious interests in maintaining low launch costs
through the use of the government supported STS, they have
legitimate concerns for those payloads they currently have
under contract (i.e., through FY 88). They agree they need
alternatives and do not want to be totally dependent on Ariane.
Hughes representatives expressed confidence that, if current
contracts were honored, they could accommodate increased STS
prices or commercial ELVs in the FY 89 and beyond period.
NASA has raised the issue that they are legally liable for all
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projected missions (i.e., through about FY 91). The Department
of Commerce requested the Department of Justice review this
assertion. The NASA legal opinion is attached at TAB 1; the
Justice comments are attached at TAB 2.
CONCLUSIONS The establishment of a domestic, commercial ELV
industry is in the best national interests for the following
reasons:
1) There is little-to-no excess STS capacity available in
the FY 89-91 period; therefore, the STS is not a viable
competitor for the available commercial communications
satellites in the FY 89-91 period.
2) The U.S. should strive to retain a solid share of this
market for both political and economic reasons; a commercial
ELV industry offers the best promise of meeting this objective
in this timeframe. Should they fail for any reason, the U.S.
government could reenter the market as the STS regains its full
operational capacity.
3) Without positive, immediate action by the government
to encourage the industry to invest and compete for this market
it is unlikely that such an industry will develop at all and
certain that it will not develop in time to assist in
recovering from the backlog created by the loss of Challenger.
4) The DOD must procure ELVs for its own needs from these
same limited number of manufacturers. If Defense becomes their
only customer, all our best efforts will not be adequate to
prevent increases in costs. They will become the sole provider
of a service critical to national security space programs and
will have little incentive to reduce costs. If on the other
hand, they are attempting to provide a commercially competitive
launch service to the private sector, Defense can reap the
benefits of this competition.
5) By the same token, if the size of the commercial
satellite market is judged to be too small to permit the
establishment of a commercially viable ELV industry, the sale
of ELVs to DoD increases this economic base and essentially
enables commercialization.
6) Finally, offloading commercial and foreign satellites
from the STS frees up additional capacity to reduce the backlog
of U.S. government missions and allows the STS to be used for
those missions that take advantage of the truely unique manned
capabilities of the orbiter.
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