SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000100020018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 15, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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15 January 1986
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
BULGARIA: Repression of Turkish Minority
The Bulgarian government's efforts to force assimilation of its ethnic
Turkish minority continue to foment discontent as well as cause greater strain
in Turko-Bulgar relations.
POLAND: Prospect of Upheaval Continues
Jaruzelski remains unable to stifle the influence of the Church or
Solidarity, and rejects their role in a national reconciliation. Relations
with the populace will fester as a result of the Church's tough stance against
the government, the purge of Solidarity supporters in universities, and the
indictment of Lech Walesa. The danger of upheaval continues as a product of
broad popular resentment triggered by extensive political and economic
discontent.
ROMANIA: Bleak Winter Aids Soviet Pressure
A particularly bleak energy situation and food shortages this winter will
compound Romania's dismal economic prospects. These developments, and a debt
repayment crisis, make Romania especially vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
Ceausescu's recent call for closer collaboration between his army and the
Warsaw Pact--a sharp change in Romanian policy--may already reflect Soviet
success.
YUGOSLAVIA: Economic Ferment and Regional Restiveness
Yugoslavia's political problems continue to grow, with the expectation of
further Soviet pressure and the problems of dissent, increasing economic
troubles, regional restiveness and divisions in national leadership.
USSR/EASTERN EUROPE: Growing Vulnerability to Tighter Soviet Control
The Balkan countries face serious food and energy shortages, as a severe
winter compounds the problems of a prolonged drought, poor harvests, a
drawdown of hydropower reserves, and chronic infrastructure problems. As
conditions worsen, popular acts of defiance may occur, especially in
Romania. Gorbachev may try to exploit Soviet leverage through selective
energy exports to loyalist regimes to pressure these countries to bring
themselves closer to Soviet interests.
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WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY: Tinderbox
Continued Greek intransigence on Aegean issues--that already has sorely
tested Ankara's patience--may spark a crisis that could provoke the Turks into
making a military response.
MALTA /LIBYA: Libyan Gains
In the wake of the hijacking incident, Libya appears to be stepping up
pressure on Malta to permit Libya to install and operate an air early warning
radar system on the island under terms of last year's security protocol. If
Malta turns the Egyptair hijacker over to the PLO, Malta's vulnerability to
Libyan blandishments would rise. Valletta is renewing military cooperation
with Rome, but Malta is still finding it hard to resist Libyan expansionism.
PORTUGAL: Election Fallout
A period of intense political jockeying, and possible anti-American
activities, will follow January 26th's presidential election and probable
runoff. Concerns of military traditionalists that the pro-Soviet Communist
party will emerge dominant in the political scene are overstated, but Prime
Minister Cavaco Silva's relations with the US--until recently, extraordinarily
warm--will cool as he searches to build a new ruling coalition.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Fighting Intensifies and Resistance Spreads
Although Moscow is unlikely to reduce significantly infiltration from
Pakistan, aggressive Soviet or Afghan aerial and ground incursions into
Pakistan are occurring and may presage larger operations and clashes with
Pakistani forces. Increased Soviet exploitation of tribal restiveness in
Pakistan is also emerging as a growing problem for Islamabad.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Nuclear Weapons and Instability
Nuclear weapons development is proceeding unabatedly in Pakistan, and
testing of nuclear device components continues. The Soviet Union is
aggressively using every opportunity to heighten India's fears of Islamabad's
intentions. Gandhi announced that New Delhi is keeping its own nuclear
weapons option open. There is a substantial probability, though not yet as
high as 50 percent, that either country will test a weapon over the next year
or so.
IRAN/IRAQ/ARAB GULF STATES: Search and Seizure of Free-World Shipping
Iran continues to interdict Iraqi-bound shipments further out in
international waters, but appears to be consciously avoiding Soviet ships,
even arms carriers. Tehran apparently has broadened its efforts to patrol
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south of the Strait of Hormuz to halt Iraqi cargo transloaded in the UAE.'
Recent Iranian attempts to board merchant ships escorted or accompanied by
foreign' warships may portend a serious incident and possible US involvement.
Moreover, Persian Gulf states have agreed to provide armed helicopter escorts
for ships entering the Gulf, which also increases the prospect of an Iranian-
Arab military incident and possible US involvement.
ISRAEL /SYRIA: War?
At a minimum, limited Israeli military action against Syrian air defense
capabilities seems inevitable, as Israel appears firmly committed to prevent
yielding control over Lebanon's airspace. Moreover, recent large exercises by
both Syria and Israel may be indicative of their concerns that one side or the
other may be prepared to risk escalation. Although neither side appears to
want a general war, there is a substantial probability--one in three--that
Israel.will react with great force in the next six months, especially,if
Israel's perception grows.that Syria's political presence in Lebanon is part
of a deliberate and successful effort to establish a "Greater Syria."
LEBANON: Peace May Prompt War
Despite some tactical accommodation with Jordan, Syria's efforts to
control a peaceful political process in Lebanon probably will result only in
more severe factional infighting and further acts of terrorism. Iraq's
increased support for the PLO in Lebanon--designed to undercut Damascus' bid
for regional leadership--most likely will only plummet Lebanon deeper into
anarchy. Should Syria's efforts, however, appear to Israel to be succeeding,
the prospect of formation of a formidable Syrian-controlled Lebanon will pose
an intolerable situation for Israel, necessitating military action to derail
Damascus' peace efforts.
LIBYA/US: Confrontation Over the Gulf of Sidra
Given the current unusually high level of tensions between Libya and the
US, it seems likely Qadhafi will lie low in the near term, but Libya's more
aggressive patrolling of the Tripoli flight intercept region, including the
Gulf of Sidra, is eventually likely to result in a hostile act against a US
aircraft. The introduction of the SA-5s in Libya, to begin operation by the
Soviets evidently this month, will increase the threat, although probably not
until the Libyans take control. Qadhafi's recent confusing remarks about
Libya's rights to conduct reconnaissance over other countries could, if true,
be a prelude to a new confrontation with the US or its allies.
MOROCCO/ALGERIA/WESTERN SAHARA: Mounting Strains
Morocco's economic problems are severe; debt rescheduling will not be
enough to stave off internal economic unrest that Islamic militants are trying
to exploit. The military drain on the economy will continue. Active defense
of the expanded berm suggests that King Hassan is willing to risk
confrontation with Algeria to consolidate control over the Western Sahara.
The Polisario are conducting almost daily harassing attacks in the berm area,
and acts of terrorism in other areas are likely to increase.
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PERSIAN GULF STATES: Potential for Revolution
Declining oil revenues and increasing Shia restiveness will exacerbate
the problems of unfulfilled political and economic expectations. Dissent and
subversion in the region are likely to increase.
TUNISIA/LIBYA: Intervention Still Possible
Tension and confusion in the area continue the risk of a confrontation
with Libya. Deepening economic crisis, rising anti-Americanism, and
infighting over post-Bourguiba succession may increase the possibility of
instability followed by military intervention or exploitation by Libya.
TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurds in the Way
Violence is worsening in Kurdistan, and Baghdad's harsh response will
further increase support for the separatists. Turkey's cross-border
operations into Iraq, and Iran's continuing provision of arms to the Kurds,
will complicate regional relations and may be contributing to Turkey's
willingness to cooperate with Syria, Iran, and Libya on arms flows.
EAST ASIA
CHINA/VIETNAM: Fighting Accelerates
China is building up its border forces and continues to pressure Vietnam
in the border area with periodic ground attacks and more extensive daily
artillery shellings. China may be expanding hostilities to other areas of the
border.
NORTH KOREA/PRC/USSR: Shifting Alliances
Strains between North Korea and China appear to be worsening on a range
of domestic and international issues because of North Korea's growing closer
relationship with the USSR. The improved Soviet position affords new
opportunities for mischief-making and complicates maintenance of the peace in
the Korean peninsula.
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA: North Korean Miscalculation Possible
South Korean students, church groups and other opposition elements are
evidently planning protests and demonstrations. North Korea might interpret
this as weakened control in South Korea and escalate activities against the
South.
PHILIPPINES: Disintegration
Marcos is facing a major health crisis; the rigors of campaigning have
taken a heavy toll. Marcos' death before, or soon after, the election would
prompt a massive, and possibly violent, succession struggle. A struggle that
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divides the government might even precipitate regional revolutions led by the
NPA or Moros. The general breakdown in government and military discipline
will continue, and polarization between the government and the people may
reach new levels with few avenues for releasing tension except violence.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ANGOLA: Prospects for Clash with South Africa Grow
As the Soviets step up their direct involvement in Angolan military
operations, the risk of a direct South African-Soviet/Cuban clash increases,
particularly in the air. New Soviet arms deliveries to Angola may presage an
early resumption of the MPLA offensive against UNITA.
CHAD/LIBYA: Libyan Offensive?
The potential for further incidents of larger scope or intensity 'near the
16th parallel continues. Given Libya's other problems in-the international
community, however, Qadhafi probably will not encourage action in the hear-
term. NIO/Africa notes that the possibility for Libyan-backed insurgent
activities is still high.
LIBERIA: Deadlocked
Widespread domestic grievances against the brutal and inept Doe regime
will continue to spark violence. Because Doe has bankrupted the economy,
exacerbated tribal tensions, and even alienated the military that brought him
to power, he remains chronically vulnerable to assassination or removal.
MOZAMBIQUE: Advantage to the Insurgents
RENAMO is likely to make new gains that could seriously strain the Machel
government. As it develops, the situation may drive Machel to seek armed
assistance from foreign military forces.
SOUTH AFRICA: Is Peace Possible?
Mounting unrest. in black townships and spontaneous attacks on whites may
prompt the government to retaliate quickly and harshly against ANC facilities
in neighboring countries. Because the origin of domestic 'unrest in South
Africa is not primarily external, it is likely to expand no matter the' level
of attacks.
SUDAN: The Fragile Grip Weakens
Economic discontent will mount, now that Sudan's inability to meet its
debt obligations has triggered a halt to US aid disbursements., The TMC's,
fragile hold on the country--further strained by its inability to defeat the
southern insurgency--will be challenged. Demonstrations and possible violence
against US interests, citizens, and facilities--almost certainly with Libyan
encouragement--are probable. as anti-American sentiment grows. Protests may
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spread from Khartoum to Port Sudan, which could disrupt famine relief
distribution efforts and jeopardize prepositioned US military supplies at Port
Sudan.
LATIN AMERICA
GUATEMALA: An Economic Challenge to Democracy
The newly elected civilian government under Cerezo immediately will face
serious economic problems that it is ill-prepared to confront. Any efforts to
implement meaningful reforms will be strenuously opposed by conservative
elements.
HAITI: Unrest Flares
Public unrest--sparked by abject economic and living conditions--is a
relatively uncommon occurrence in tightly controlled Haiti, and Church,
military and business leaders blame Duvalier for mishandling the current
situation. There is little momentum, however, from these groups to force
Duvalier to improve the fundamental political and economic situation that
cause the protests. Duvalier seems likely to maintain his tight grip on
power--without real opposition--in the foreseeable future, but if unrest
continues, opportunities for foreign exploitation will grow.
HONDURAS: Presidential Transition Still Up in Air
Political tensions remain high following the recent presidential
election. Outgoing president Suazo continues to work to prevent the apparent
winner, Jose Azcona, from taking office on January 27th, which may provoke the
military to intervene directly to ensure adherence to the constitution.
JAMAICA: Hard Times Aid Manley
Jamaica's grim economic outlook is helping opposition leader Manley's
political prospects. The weakening economy is eroding President Seaga's
little remaining support and could quickly lead to social unrest, which, in
turn, would further enhance Manley's prospects for forcing--and winning--early
elections.
MEXICO: Growing Economic Inefficacy and Declining Governmental Influence
Significant deterioration in Mexico's economy over the last few months--
potentially as serious as the 1982 financial crisis--will test President de la
Madrid's political effectiveness. Rapid inflation, flight of capital, and
austerity measures are generating widespread popular and business protests,
which may provoke civil disturbances in January.
NICARAGUA/HONDURAS: Escalation of Hostilities
Sandinista patrols have carried out attacks within Honduran territory
several times in recent weeks while searching for FDN base camps and
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infiltration routes. These Sandinista attacks--while targeted primarily at the
insurgents and their supply lines--increases pressure on the Honduran.
Government to restrict rebel activities. The potential for these patrols to
fire on US military personnel in Honduras will increase during- the upcoming
large troop exercise.
PANAMA: The Military in Control
President Delvalle has virtually no political base and is broadly,
perceived as just another weak president providing a democratic facade 'for
continued domination of the country by General Noriega. Delvalle is unlikely
to cope effectively with Panama's mounting economic difficulties or to,provide
leadership required to develop any meaningful democratic institutions.; He
could be removed. by the military at any time.
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