ATTEMPTED PRO-SOVIET COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000100020009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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A
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 00231-86
14 January 1986
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Attempted Pro-Soviet Coup in South Yemen
1. The recent effort by key pro-Soviet elements in the PDRY to seize
power -- and their subsequent seizure and execution -- has major
implications both for the PDRY and for Soviet policy among its radical
allies in the Third World.
Information is very limited, but the coup effort seems to
have been led by Abd-al Fattah Ismail, the Soviet Union's
main ally in South Yemen and long-time revolutionary figure.
He was ousted from power around 1977 and was five years in
exile in Moscow. His return to Aden several years ago caused
many of us to wonder whether the Soviets might not attempt to
use him to replace Aden's more moderate leadership with a
more radical one.
In my Shevardnadze-to-Gorbachev memorandum of last year, I
also suggested that the Soviets might wish to restore Aden to
the more revolutionary posture in the Peninsula that it held
in the 70's.
2. The critical unknown is how the Soviets were involved in this
recent attempt. It is almost inconceivable that they would not have
known of Abd-al Fattah's plans to move. The Soviets, therefore, either
prompted the coup attempt,or blessed it upon being informed, or decided
to stay out of the fray figuring that would come out okay no matter who
won.
Despite my feelings that the Soviets might be interested in the
longer run in a more radical Aden, I would not have said that now
was the best time for such a move. Moscow has done well in the
Persian Gulf recently by projecting an image of moderation and
has just established a new diplomatic presence in Oman and the
United Arab Emirates. Perhaps they simply believed that the
opportunity was ripe in Aden.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL: OADR
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3. We do not know how the severe fighting among factions in Aden
will ultimately come out. The more moderate President Al Hasani may
himself be dead, but Soviet interests may well be threatened in the
PDRY.
-- An attempted coup by pro-Soviet elements will not make the
Soviets look good elsewhere in the Peninsula.
-- It is just possible that the "irreversibility" of Marxist
revolutions in the Third World could face its first critical
test in Aden.
-- The chances are the Soviets can still put together an
acceptable pro-Soviet regime out of whatever is left, but the
failure of this coup attempt, whether specifically directed
by Moscow or not, will have important repercussions on
Moscow's standing in the region.
CL
Graham E. Fuller
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