SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES BOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001202350006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X /
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
X
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DDI
X (5
opies)
6
DDA
X
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DDO
X (5
opies)
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X (5
o p i eS
10
GC
11
IG
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Compt
x
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D/OLL
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D/PAO
13X
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D/PERS
V C/NIC
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S/ER
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Remarks
To: 5/7/9. Please share as appropriate.
Exe ,jee~ecrry
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EXECBtiyE 'CL' -_-
86? 0766x/4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 25, 1986
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Secretary
FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIELOV' "-"
SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues Book
Attached for your use and distribution, please find the July 1986
issue of the Selected National Security Issues Book.
This publication provides a concise, unclassified Administration
policy assessment on major national security issues. A total of
25 copies are being provided for your use.
Your contributions to this publication have consistently ensured
a high caliber product; any comments, suggestions, or additions
you have for future issues would be appreciated.
Selected National Security Issues Book
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Selected
National
Security
Issues
July 1986
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Selected National Security Issues
July 1986
Table of Contents
Page
Overview ..............................................1
Regional Issues
The Soviet Union .................................4
Eastern Europe ................................... 9
Western Europe ................................... 13
Japan ................. ..........................17
Peoples Republic of China ........................ 20
East Asia/Pacific Basin ..........................22
South Pacific ....................................25
Israel/Arab States/Lebanon ....................... 27
Iran-Iraq War .................................... 30
Afghanistan/South Asia ........................... 32
Southern Africa .................................. 35
Africa: Security ........................ 37
Africa: Development .............................40
Central America ..................................43
Latin America/Caribbean ..........................46
Global Issues
International Economics .......................... 49
International Energy ............................. 53
Technology Security .............................. 56
Terrorism ........................................ 59
Narcotics ........................................ 64
Defense/Arms Control
Arms Control ..................................... 67
Deterrence ...... ................................76
Strategic Modernization .......................... 78
ICBM Modernization .... .. .......................80
Strategic Defense Initiative ..................... 82
ASAT Development and Arms Control ................ 85
Space ......... ..................................88
Military Capability/Readiness . ..................92
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in NATO ............ 95
Non-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons ................. 98
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Overview
The Administration's record in the national security policy realm
over the past five years is one of progress and accomplishment.
o America has reasserted the kind of vigorous and prudent
leadership the Free World expects and needs.
o Because of this leadership, the world has become a safer
place.
o Because of this leadership, economic recovery in the West has
been hastened, and democracy is taking root and growing in
parts of the Third World.
o Perhaps most important of all, America has regained the sense
of self-confidence that is the bedrock upon which true
national security is built.
As the result of a useful meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva in November of 1985, we
have made a fresh start in our relationship with the Soviet
Union. Even though our two governments disagree on much, we
understand each other better now, and as President Reagan has
said, "that's key to peace."
o Our policy toward the Soviets is, and will continue to be
based on the principles of realism, strength, and dialogue.
o We have the opportunity and mandate to reduce the danger of
nuclear war by mutually agreeing on drastic cuts in our
nuclear arsenals.
o We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence
through armed intervention and subversion, and hence, we have
proposed negotiated regional settlements, the withdrawal of
outside forces, and international assistance in building
economies and meeting basic human needs.
o We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which
respect human rights are unlikely to begin wars.
o We must establish better communications between our two
societies, to minimize misunderstandings.
We have made clear and steady progress in reversing or containing
other challenges to our security interests that we found upon
assuming office in January 1981:
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o Soviet military advances -- and more subtle forms of
penetration -- into other parts of the world, have been
checked: Not one square inch of free territory has fallen to
communism in the past five years.
o In Europe, relations with our Allies have been put on a
stronger, steadier course.
o The leading Western industrialized nations -- and many
developing nations as well -- are increasingly standing behind
President Reagan's market-oriented approach to solving global
economic problems.
o Both Israel and the Arab states, with U.S. encouragement, are
making serious efforts to address their differences through a
dynamic and far-reaching Middle East peace process.
o Our consistent support and encouragement has helped foster
democratic institution-building, especially in Latin America,
where 26 of 33 countries are now democratic, or in transition
toward democracy.
o In Central America, we have met the challenge of
externally-supported subversion of democracy head on, and
thanks in part to our support, have seen heartening progress
in building democracy in El Salvador.
o In Africa, we have seen several governments move away from
Marxist/socialist economic models, toward more
privately-oriented economies, and the U.S. has led the world
in providing humanitarian aid to drought and famine-stricken
millions.
o We have united the free world against repression in Poland,
and the Soviet conquest in Afghanistan.
o We are working with all peace-loving nations to combat
terrorism effectively, and we are fighting the international
drug traffickers poisoning our young people.
o U.S. leadership has helped to ease the threat of energy
shortages; oil supplies are now plentiful, and we have forged
effective emergency energy arrangements with our Allies; OPEC
control over energy prices has been weakened, and global oil
impact prices have fallen.
o We have begun taking effective steps toward stemming the flow
of militarily-sensitive technology to the Soviet bloc.
Despite our achievements thus far, we know we will have to work
even harder in coming months to protect the gains already made,
and to cope effectively with other international problems we face
as a Nation -- and we are quite determined to do so.
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o Reaching sound and realistic arms control agreements with
Moscow will continue to require much patience and effort. The
Geneva Summit showed the need to continue our effort to gain
Soviet acceptance of the proposition that a system of
strategic deterrence based on defensive, instead of offensive
weapons, would be more stabilizing than our present system.
o President Reagan's regional peace initiative which he
described at the U.N. General Assembly last October, proposing
negotiations among the warring parties, followed by bilateral
U.S.-Soviet discussions, and U.S. participation in the
economic reconstruction of the affected areas, will require a
long-term commitment by all parties.
o Clearly much remains to be done to reverse the spread and
deter the perpetrators of international terrorism and drug
trafficking -- steps all nations must take if we are ever to
halt the growth of these twin scourges of mankind.
o Much remains to foster democratic and market-oriented economic
growth in those Third World countries looking to us for help.
o Helping the peoples of southern Africa to attain social and
political justice peacefully poses an especially difficult
challenge to us.
o Our efforts against economic protectionism, and against
short-sighted approaches to the international debt problem,
must be maintained if the world economy is to flourish.
o Instabilities and conflict in many parts of the world -- the
Persian Gulf, Central America, and the Middle East, to name
but a few -- will continue to flare up in new challenges to
our interests that will require our best efforts to counter
effectively.
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SOVIET UNION
Issue:
How can the United States deter Soviet direct and indirect
aggression, reducing the risk of a U.S.-Soviet war?
Objectives:
o Build on the fresh start made at the Geneva Summit to develop
a U.S.-Soviet relationship characterized by mutual respect,
understanding, and cooperation -- as well as peaceful
competition.
o Build a relationship which will endure in the long term.
Recognize that the basic relationship is adversarial, but that
gains can be made from restraint and understanding.
o Work on all the items in the U.S. agenda: arms control, human
rights, regional questions, and bilateral issues.
o Seek Soviet agreement to deep cuts in the vast stockpiles of
weapons in the world, particularly nuclear weapons, on a
balanced, stabilizing, and verifiable basis.
o Continue to improve U.S. forces, as well as assist our Allies
and friends, in order to provide strong deterrent and defense
capabilities.
o Counter Soviet efforts to use armed intervention and
subversion to gain influence in other countries. Seek
diplomatic settlements to regional conflicts where possible.
o Counter Soviet efforts in the Third World and elsewhere as
they portray their system as progressive on social and
economic issues in the Third World and elsewhere.
o Convince the Soviets that it is in their best interests to
negotiate arms reduction agreements that will contribute to
military stability.
o Defend human rights in the Soviet Union, insisting that the
Helsinki accords and other international agreements on human
rights be observed by all nations.
o Open up communication between the American and Soviet
societies and peoples through an active program of
people-to-people and cultural exchanges.
o Expand mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, while
denying the Soviets military significant Western technology
they seek to acquire.
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o Establish better communications between the two governments to
minimize misunderstandings that might lead to dangerous
situations.
In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three
guiding principles:
o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of the
Soviet system and must therefore deal forthrightly with
problems.
o Strength, which is more than military power, but includes
political determination and strength of Alliances, economic
health, and adequate defenses. The Soviet Union respects
strength and takes advantage of weakness.
o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss all the
issues that divide us, and are prepared to work for practical
and fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
Accomplishments:
o By restoring our economic health, continuing to invigorate our
defenses, and strengthening our political will at home and in
our Alliances, we have established the basis for a
constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union. The world is
safer today than it was five years ago.
o Our Alliances and traditional friendships around the world are
sound.
o President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva from November 19-21, 1985, and held intensive and frank
discussions on the entire range of U.S.-Soviet issues. The
Summit represented an important step forward in our efforts to
build the basis for more stable and constructive East-West
relations.
o Although the two leaders disagreed on much, they succeeded in
beginning a new and direct dialogue they agreed will lead to
an intensified process of high-level meetings between the two
sides at all levels.
o However, since the Geneva Summit, the Soviets have stalled on
the high-level dialogue, while expert-level discussions have
continued. They have resisted setting dates for the next
summit or foreign ministers' meeting, attempting to set
ambiguously-worded preconditions.
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o on arms control, although our differences with the Soviets
over the relationship between strategic offense and defense
remain profound, we both have agreed that a nuclear war cannot
be won and must never be fought.
o At Geneva NST, the U.S. has made a series of proposals
designed to bridge the gap between the U.S. and Soviet
positions for a beneficial and verifiable agreement. Recent
Soviet proposals at the Geneva NST included new elements that
may provide the basis for significant progress in the
negotiations.
o Other U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions are continuing. An
exploratory meeting on establishing risk reduction centers was
held in Geneva in May; (nuclear nonproliferation talks were
held in July). We are continuing bilateral discussions at the
multilateral Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Chemical
Weapons Ban Treaty, and held useful initial talks on CW
proliferation in March.
o The Soviets are cooperating to implement the Geneva agenda of
bilateral exchanges. Good progress is being made on
people-to-people and cultural exchanges.
o On human rights, Jewish emigration figures remain at the
lowest level in a decade. Modest progress made with the
recent Soviet announcement for favorable resolution of 71
divided-family cases involving more than 200 people --
constituted the biggest positive human rights step since 1979.
The United States continues to push for improvements.
o Regional experts talks on Central America/Caribbean, southern
Africa, East Asia/Pacific, and Middle East issues have been
held. Talks on Afghanistan will be scheduled. These have
been useful opportunities for the exchange of views to avoid
miscalculation. They may provide the basis for constructive
achievements aimed at supporting diplomatic settlements to
urgent regional conflicts.
o Recent bilateral progress has included measures to promote
safety on air routes in the North Pacific; resumption of
direct commercial air service; an agreement on the opening of
Consulates General in New York and Kiev, and various
scientific, medical, sports, and educational exchanges.
o At the same time, we have continued to make it clear that
Soviet compliance with existing agreements has an important
effect on our relationship. The President's decision on the
expired SALT I and II Treaties reflected our concerns about
Soviet observance.
o In short, we have put in place a policy designed for long-term
management of U.S.-Soviet relations to pursue our interests
without the rapid fluctuations of the past.
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o Have initiated discussions with the Soviets in Geneva on
moving to a more secure deterrent relationship based on a mix
of offensive and defensive forces.
o By announcing that the U.S. cannot continue to support
unilaterally a flawed SALT structure that the Soviets have so
egregiously undermined, President Reagan has demonstrated U.S.
resolve to seek effective arms control agreements that will
contribute to military stability at reduced levels of
armaments, rather than abide by a cosmetic agreement that does
nothing to reduce the level of armaments or insure strategic
stability.
Talking Points:
o We seek to deter further Soviet direct and indirect aggression
in the world and achieve a lessened reliance on the use or
threat of force; a reduction in nuclear and other armaments,
and a more constructive U.S.-Soviet working relationship.
o The United States wants progress in all areas of our arms
control agenda with the Soviet Union -- but we are prepared to
be patient. We will pursue our interests on the basis of
realism, strength, and dialogue.
o We will continue our planned defense modernization program to
maintain our strength, and give the Soviets sufficient
incentives to negotiate meaningful and verifiable arms control
agreements.
o We will continue to counter Soviet expansionism. No
additional country has fallen to Soviet aggression since 1981,
and Moscow has been more cautious in undertaking new military
adventures in recent years, although they and their proxies
remain active in such countries as Afghanistan, Angola, and
Cambodia.
o our policy objectives were significantly advanced as a result
of the Presidents' Summit meeting in Geneva November 19-21,
1985. The Summit was a good start toward establishing a more
constructive relationship.
o We look forward to a Summit in 1986 in the United States, and
in 1987 in the Soviet Union, as agreed to at Geneva. While we
regret the Soviet reluctance to proceed with scheduling these
summits, and with scheduling other high-level U.S.-Soviet
meetings, we are proceeding on the assumption that the Soviets
will honor their commitment to hold the next summit this year
in the United States.
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o Soviet noncompliance on arms control treaties remains a major
problem. The President's decision on Interim Restraint
followed years of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to improve
Soviet performance in this area. We will continue to exercise
utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence and
working for reductions in strategic arsenals of both sides.
o The U.S. has made a series of proposals in Geneva NST designed
to bridge the gap between U.S. and Soviet positions. The aim
is for a verifiable agreement that will radically reduce
nuclear arsenals.
o Recent Soviet proposals at Geneva present new material. In
his June 1986 Glassboro speech, the President stated that,
while we could not accept the new Soviet proposals without
change, they could represent a "turning point" in arms control
negotiations. We will study them carefully and prepare a
response.
o Soviet resolution of humanitarian cases is a positive step,
but must be seen in perspective. Jewish emigration figures
stand at less than 1000 per year, compared to 50,000 in 1979.
Sakharov remains in exile, and arrests of religious activists
continues.
o We have continued our dialogue with the Soviets on regional
issues through exchanges of view among senior experts. These
have been useful, but Soviets show no signs of responding to
our calls for national reconciliation in conflict-torn areas
such as Afghanistan, Angola or Nicaragua.
o We are pleased by the first results of the Summit agreement on
bilateral exchanges. The Kirov Ballet performance in the
U.S., and Vladimir Horowitz in the Soviet Union exemplify the
benefits. We are actively working on other exchange programs
in medical, scientific, educational, and sports fields, and
have renewed commercial air links.
o In short, we have made progress, and there is much more to be
made. At the same time, we continue to be realistic. The
U.S.-Soviet relationship is fundamentally adversarial and will
remain so. But both sides agree they have a responsibility to
ensure this competition remains peaceful. We are ready for
the long effort and steady course to pursue our national
interests in this fashion.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Given the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and Soviet
efforts to retain stringent controls on Eastern Europe, how can
we maintain and improve our relations with East European
countries?
Objectives:
o Recognize and encourage the diversity that exists among
individual East European countries, with particular reference
to domestic liberalization and more autonomous foreign
policies.
o Relate the level of activity selectively to manifestations of
foreign policy autonomy or domestic liberalization, use
international meetings, high-level visits, cultural and
scientific exchanges, and bilateral councils, as well as
traditional government-to-government contacts, to achieve
specific U.S. objectives in each country.
o Provide briefings and consultations to East European countries
on such subjects as arms control and international terrorism
to ensure that U.S. positions are known, and that there is an
alternative to the Soviet line.
o Help foster genuine national reconciliation in Poland that
includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the people
(especially the Polish workforce); release of political
prisoners; restoration of free trade unions; implementation of
economic reform; and an enhanced role for the Church.
o Maintain our strong support for an independent, unified,
non-aligned, economically-viable, and stable Yugoslavia.
o Further develop dialogue with Romania on political and
economic issues to encourage continuation of independent
policies; use this dialogue to express our strong concerns
about Romania's performance on emigration and other major
human rights issues -- and stimulate improvements.
Accomplishments:
o In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet controls
in Eastern Europe, we have improved bilateral relations with
several East European countries.
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o U.S.-Hungarian relations have improved significantly through
resolution of virtually all family reunification cases,
Hungary's adherence to conditions for MFN status, and our
support for Hungarian membership in the IMF in 1982.
Secretary Shultz had productive meetings in Budapest in
December 1985, and there have been several other high-level
visits during the past two years.
o In December 1985, Secretary Shultz visited Romania, Hungary,
and Yugoslavia. This trip, once again, manifested our strong
interest in maintaining and improving relations with Eastern
Europe, without at the same time sacrificing our objections in
the human rights area. Specifically, in Romania, Secretary
Shultz met with President Ceausescu and vigorously reaffirmed
our interest in seeing concrete improvements of their human
rights situation.
o Romania has continued its independent foreign policy, notably
with respect to participation in the Warsaw Pact on its own
terms, and expansion of high-level political and military
contacts in Western Europe and the United States. Romania
also continues to direct a higher share of its foreign trade
to Western industrialized nations than other members of the
Warsaw Pact. The Romanian Government has implemented an
agreement reached in 1985, governing emigration from Romania
to the United States, which provides for orderly processing
under U.S. law and greatly reduced hardships suffered by
intending emigrants prior to their departure from Romania.
Emigration to the West continues at a level far higher than
any other East European country. We are encouraged by the
Romanian Government's release of several religious activists
from prison in May-June 1986, and by the announcement of a
broad amnesty of political prisoners. However, we have been
concerned by the Romanian Government's limited response to
numerous expressions of strong U.S. public, Congressional, and
Administration concern about its performance in areas of human
rights generally, and religious issues. In June 1986, the
President directed Secretary Shultz to further press our
concerns in these areas.
o Since ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman first led a U.S.
delegation to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary in January 1985
to brief East European officials on the results of the
Shultz-Gromyko meetings in Geneva, other U.S. arms control
experts have traveled periodically to Yugoslavia, Romania,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and GDR to keep these
countries abreast of U.S. positions at the Nuclear and Space
Talks, the CDE, and MBFR. These briefings and consultations
were very successful. East European interlocutors expressed
appreciation for the information provided, and we were able to
counter Soviet propaganda and foster greater East European
interest in this vital area of East-West relations.
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o Bilateral relations with Yugoslavia were strengthened further
by Prime Minister Planinc's visit to Washington in May, 1985,
and Secretary Shultz's trip to Belgrade in December, 1985.
Conclusion of a constructive debt rescheduling agreement in
May, 1986 between Yugoslavia and its official creditors marked
the fourth consecutive year of U.S. involvement in financial
assistance to Yugoslavia in support of its economic
stabilization program. We have intitiated a useful dialogue
with the Yugoslav Government on the strengthening of bilateral
cooperation against terrorism, and are encouraged by recent
developments in this field.
o In 1985, the Bulgarian Government agreed to establish a
mechanism for exchange of information related to illegal
trafficking in narcotics.
o Although our sanctions policy toward Poland contributed
earlier to a certain moderation displayed by Warsaw (e.g., in
July 1984, an amnesty announced by the Polish Government for
all political prisoners enabled us to take positive measures
in response), the past eighteen months have witnessed a rise
in political repression, leading to a standstill and renewed
hardening of relations. Despite calls from Solidarity and
Church leaders within Poland for a lifting of our sanctions,
we continue to view sanctions as an effective lever to
encourage the Polish Government toward more concrete progress
toward genuine national reconciliation, which remains the
precondition to better bilateral relations.
o Since 1981, we have provided over $300 million in humanitarian
food aid to Poland. Specifically, the Administration has
assisted voluntary agencies (CRS, CARE, and World Vision) by
providing dairy products and grains to the Polish people
through nongovernmental channels. Following the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster of April 1986, the U.S. Government donated
over 2600 MT of dairy products to Poland for distribution
through private voluntary organizations.
Talking Points
o Through our policy of acknowledging diversity in the region,
we have successfully maintained good bilateral relations with
several East European countries, despite overall East-West
tensions and persistent Soviet efforts to tighten political
controls.
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o We have rejected any notion that there has been a "lawful"
division of Europe. The Yalta agreement did not divide Europe
into "spheres of influence." Rather, the Soviet Union pledged
itself to grant independence to Poland and other states in
Eastern Europe, and to hold free elections. The Soviet
violation of these obligations is a root cause of East-West
tensions today.
o With respect to Poland, we have maintained a measured,
effective, step-by-step approach, under which we began easing
our sanctions in direct response to liberalization measures
taken by the Polish Government. However, fluctuations in the
number of Poles detained for political reasons and other
unfavorable developments have brought further progress to a
standstill for the time being. At the same time, we are
continuing to provide humanitarian aid through
non-governmental channels, which has totaled over $300 million
since 1981. It remains essential that the regime move toward
genuine dialogue and reconciliation with all elements of
Polish society, including the workforce, if bilateral
relations are to improve further.
o With respect to Romania, we seek to encourage further
development of that country's independent foreign policy
through expansion of political and economic dialogue on
broader issues. Emigration from Romania to the West and
Israel continues at a high level. Although we are heartened
by the release of several Romanian political and religious
activists from prison, we remain deeply concerned by the
conditions and practices that put them there. We shall
continue to engage the Romanian Government on the question of
religious expression.
o We strongly support Yugoslavia's independence and unity, and
respect its non-aligned status. We are pleased that
Yugoslavia has reached agreement with its commercial and
official creditors on debt rescheduling, and we will continue
to provide appropriate assistance to Yugoslavia in support of
its economic stabilization program. We continue to consult
with the Yugoslav Government to improve biateral cooperation
against international terrorism, and believe that our meetings
have been useful and productive.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively expand and strengthen
our deep, longstanding political, economic, and military ties
with Western Europe?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and military
relations with Western European nations.
o Thwart Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its West
European Allies.
o Work with our Allies to improve NATO conventional and nuclear
deterrents.
o Work with our European Allies and friends to promote
sustainable, non-inflationary growth in our countries.
o Secure support for our opposition to protectionist tendencies
and for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
o Ensure that Allied dependence on the Soviet Union for energy
supplies remains at a level that does not pose a security
threat.
o Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies,
products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union and
its Allies.
o Strengthen U.S.-Allied cooperative efforts to combat
international terrorism and drug abuse.
o Expand Allied consultations and cooperation on regional issues
outside the European area, with a special focus on the
promotion of democracy.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has put relations with our European friends
and Allies on a stronger and steadier course. This was
largely accomplished through intensive consultations with our
Allies at all levels, including frequent meetings between the
President and key European leaders, Ministerial-level
meetings, and the use of special emissaries.
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o We have secured a general consensus that free market policies
and reduced government spending will promote non-inflationary
growth and elimination of structural rigidities; we also have
Allied agreement on a pragmatic approach to Third World debt
problems.
o We have forged a strong Allied consensus behind a realistic
approach to East-West relations, based on strength and
dialogue.
o NATO's unity on INF deployment policy has helped thwart Soviet
efforts to decouple the U.S. from Europe, and has sent Moscow
a strong signal of Alliance resolve and solidarity. At the
same time, we and our Allies remain fully committed to
achieving significant arms reductions.
Western Europe has taken an important step with the entrance
of Spain and Portugal into the EC. The historic vote of the
Spanish people to endorse NATO membership was a solid victory
for the Alliance, and collective defense.
o We have played a major role in developing a conventional
defense improvement program to enhance NATO's conventional
defenses. NATO is actively examining additional improvements.
We are leading complementary efforts supporting better
utilization of emerging technologies and enhanced arms
cooperation.
o The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate
non-inflationary economic growth in West European countries.
European real GNP grew 2.4% in 1984 and 2.3% in 1986; outlook
for 1986 is for 2.5%,
o Progress has been made toward launching a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations, including trade with and
among developing countries. Further trade liberalization will
strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western
Europe, and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
o Our Allies have supported the U.S. initiative to address the
problems of the major debtor countries.
o We have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet
economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering
preferential trading terms or easy credits.
o We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of
products, materials, and technology which would increase
Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
o We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic
understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and the
means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.
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o We have agreed with the Europeans on a strategy to reduce
European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier.
o We have reached an agreement with our Allies to explore the
possibility of a joint space station.
o We have strengthened and intensified dialogue with our Allies
on steps to combat international terrorism and drug abuse.
o We have obtained Allied support for the President's Strategic
Defense Initiative research program as a prudent hedge against
Soviet ballistic missile defense efforts.
Talking Points:
o our objectives in our relations with our Western European
Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our
political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist in
spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet efforts
to sow discord among us.
o The Western Alliance system has become strong again. We have
excellent relations with all of our Allies, and President
Reagan has developed strong personal ties with many European
leaders. As President Reagan said when he met with the NATO
Foreign Ministers in May 1984, "For us, our NATO partnership
is an anchor -- a fixed point in a turbulent world."
o We continue working closely with our Allies in a number of
areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include:
the pursuit of peace and arms control with the Soviet Union;
planning cooperative responses to a possible oil shortage;
resolving the world debt problem; restricting the flow of
sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and its Allies;
reducing European dependency on Soviet energy; exploring the
possibility of a joint space station; combating international
terrorism and drug abuse, and promoting democracy around the
world.
o Allied solidarity in the face of Soviet intimidation and
threats succeeded in getting the USSR back to the negotiating
table. We now have an opportunity to pursue real and
verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides,
enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war.
o The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the nature
of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.
Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF missiles to
counter the SS-20 deployments, has reached a new consensus on
preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies to
the East, and has undertaken a program to enhance NATO's
conventional defense capability.
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o The U.S. economic expansion has provided the impetus for
growth in West Europe. Other joint initiatives, designed to
eliminate protectionist tendencies and promote trade with
developed, as well as less-developed nations, will continue to
strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western
Europe and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
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JAPAN
Issue:
How should the United States manage the vital and complex
relationship with Japan?
Objectives:
o Maintain and strengthen our excellent overall bilateral
relationship.
o Continue to manage our trade relations carefully, and prevent
spillover of tension to other areas. Increase efforts to open
Japan's markets more fully to U.S. goods, especially
manufactured goods, and promote Japanese shift toward
domestic, rather than export-led growth.
o Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared self-defense commitments;
steadily expand bilateral defense cooperation.
o Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in
high technology.
o Seek a positive Japanese regional and global role in support
for our key security, foreign aid, and other policies in East
Asia as well as around the world.
o Urge Japan to import more U.S. energy.
Accomplishments:
o Groundwork for recent cooperation was set at the meeting of
the President and Prime Minister Nakasone in Los Angeles on
January 2, 1985. Further discussions that set the tone
occurred at the Camp David meeting in April 1986, and the
Tokyo Economic Summit in May 1986. At these meetings,
President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened
their already close personal working relationship which has
led to increased U.S.-Japanese cooperation in economic and
security areas.
o The Japanese government has additional steps. to take to help
meet growing demands by the Congress for increased U.S. access
to the Japanese market in several areas, including
telecommunications and other products. There still remain,
however, several problems to be solved in important market
access areas, including semiconductors and fish.
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o Intensive talks begun in January 1985 in four sectors (MOSS
talks) to eliminate trade barriers, have expanded business
opportunities for U.S. companies in Japan, and are now in the
third follow-up phase of four phases. A negotiating package
arrangement on semiconductors, agreed-on transportation
machinery (including auto parts), is the fifth sector.
o Following the rapid strengthening of the yen in late 1985 and
early 1986, the Tokyo Summit partners agreed to compare
economic data in an effort to improve the stability of
exchange rates, establish a consultative mechanism for
stronger macroeconomic coordination, and schedule regular
meetings of ministers of finance.
o We have agreed to launch dialogue on structural economic
issues, such as the saving/investment imbalance. This will
enable us to influence and monitor progress on reform.
o We have initiated negotiations on a voluntary restraint
agreement for machine tools. A long-standing case on leather
products was settled last year.
o In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded
self-defense role which, if properly funded, will aid global
and regional deterrence. In September 1985, the Nakasone
cabinet approved a five-year defense program to significantly
increase Japan's capability to meet its national defense
goals. The program has official Japanese Government backing,
as opposed to its two predecessors, which were only Defense
Agency estimates that carried no weight in the government.
Moreover, the first year of the plan, also in contrast to past
practice, was fully funded in the 1986 budget.
o we have seen increased Japanese support for U.S. military
presence and expanded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
Talking Points:
o The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S.
policy in the Pacific.
o The President's trips to Japan in May 1986, and Prime Minister
Nakasone's visit to the U.S. in April 1986 strengthened
U.S.-Japanese ties, and the partnership for peace existing
between our two countries.
o Japan has committed itself to restructure its economy from
export-oriented, to demand-based over a period of years.
Based on a report by Prime Minister Nakasone's Maekawa
Commission, the long-term restructure has been adopted as
government policy.
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o Japan has set as a national goal the reduction of trade
surpluses, pledged to shift its economic structure to one
dependent on domestic-led growth. This should increase
imports, particularly manufactured goods, and greater
purchases of energy materials from the U.S. over the long
term.
o Japan's decision to identify a target figure of 18.4 trillion
yen (over $110 billion) in defense spending in a five-year
defense plan is a further indication of Japan's continuing
commitment to attain its defense objectives.
o We are pleased Japan has shown resolve to improve the defense
establishment, has committed to increase further economic aid
to the developing world, and has promised more market-opening.
Japan can take on even greater responsibility in both the
military and international economic areas, and has
increasingly assumed a global political stance in line with
its economic superpower status.
o The U.S. and Japan entertain a good coincidence of views on
relations with the Soviets, the Philippines, the need for
Central American stability, the importance of easing debt
burdens of LDCs, and other global issues.
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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Issue:
How can the United States develop strong, stable, and enduring
relations with China?
Objectives:
o Work for continued growth in our trade, economic and cultural
relations.
o Increase our dialogue with Beijing on global political issues
where we share parallel interests, as well as areas on which
we disagree.
o Assist China's economic modernization, encourage expansion of
market forces in its economy and continued trade relations
with the West.
Accomplishments:
o Our relations have been strengthened and expanded considerably
in recent years due to consistent effort and determination on
both sides.
o We have enhanced our mutually beneficial relationship with
China without compromising our commitments to the people of
Taiwan.
o We have begun a program of military cooperation with China to
strengthen our mutual defensive capabilities.
Talking Points:
o The successful visits in 1984/85 of President Reagan, and Vice
President Bush to China and Premier Zhao and President Li
Xiannian to the United States broadened the dialogue and depth
of relations. High level exchange visits have continued in
1986, most recently Treasury Secretary Baker to China, and the
Vice Premier Yao Yilin to the United States.
o our economic relations are expanding significantly. Total
trade amounted to $8.1 billion in 1985. The U.S. is China's
third largest trading partner and second largest foreign
investor. At the end of 1985, U.S. investment commitments
totaled slightly over $2 billion, including $270 million in
139 equity joint ventures, $900 million in 39 contractural
joint ventures, and $905 million in offshore exploration.
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o A number of senior U.S. and Chinese military officers have
exchanged visits in the past year. These visits and future
ones demonstrate the limited, but important cooperative
relationship which has developed with the goal of
strengthening our mutual defensive capabilities. Congress was
notified in August 1985 of the first sale of defensive
equipment to China.
o In 1983, the U.S. liberalized export controls on high
technology products, such as computers and laboratory
instruments to China, and sales of these items have
skyrocketed. Improvements in COCOM procedures in the past
year have further facilitated this high-tech trade.
o The bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement was
brought into force on December 30, 1985.
o Our military cooperation with China is proceeding cautiously
and prudently, and is focused on strengthening China's
defensive capabilities with respect to the USSR, without, at
the same time, improving China's offensive capabilities
against Taiwan, or threatening our other friends and allies in
the region.
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EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASIN
Issue:
What should the United States do to facilitate the growth of
secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations, closely
associated with U.S. principles and goals, in Korea, Southeast
Asia, and the Pacific Basin?
Objectives:
o Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin development
strategy that will enhance regional cooperation with the U.S.
throughout the area.
o Support the bilateral strengthening of U.S. economic,
political, and security ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
o Pursue a policy toward Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that
firmly backs ASEAN's proposals for negotiated settlement.
o Especially maintain our close security and economic ties with
treaty ally Thailand.
o Work closely with the Government of the Philippines to improve
their economy, revitalize their political institutions and
combat the security threat.
o Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide a U.S.
force presence and a close alliance relationship with the
Republic of Korea.
o Encourage the resumption of direct talks between North and
South Korea, while discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in
any direct negotiations with North Korea which might deflect
adversity on the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, or
undermine the structure of the armistice.
o Resolve the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue as a matter of the
highest national priority.
o Work with regional countries and other resettlement nations to
manage the flow of Indochinese refugees.
o Maintain our historically close ties with Australia, and
encourage New Zealand to reverse its policy with respect to
port access ships which might be nuclear-powered or
nuclear-armed so that our traditional alliance cooperation can
be restored.
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o Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific
Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S.
interests.
Accomplishments:
o The President's trips to Indonesia and Japan in 1986, to
Japan, Korea and China in 1983 and 1984, the Vice President's
trip to Japan and Indonesia in 1984, and to China in 1985,
Secretary Shultz's four visits to ASEAN and Oceania, and
Secretary Weinberger's trip to Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia, clearly affirmed our
commitment to a policy of close cooperation with the countries
of the region.
o The relatively peaceful transition to power of a new
government in the Philippines improves the prospects for
resolution of that nation's urgent political, economic, and
security problems.
o Numerous policy level and technical level talks have secured a
Vietnamese pledge to resolve the POW/MIA issue within two
years: have begun joint crash site excavations in both Laos
and Vietnam, have seen the return of more remains in the past
twelve months than anytime since the end of the war, and have
established two-way dialogue on the issue of live prisoners.
Talking Points:
o The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most dynamic
and fastest-growing economies in the Free World. As President
Reagan has said, "I see America and our Pacific neighbors as
nations of the future going forward together in a mighty
enterprise to build dynamic growth economies and a safer
world."
o We have strongly supported the ASEAN's economic and political
activities, and have simultaneously increased our security
cooperation with the individual member states. We have
encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their
forward-looking economic policies based on free trade. We are
encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the region.
President Reagan met with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bali,
Indonesia in April 1986.
o We will continue to support ASEAN's nations' efforts to forge
a Pacific Basin development concept at a pace with which they
are comfortable.
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o The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated
settlement in Cambodia. At the same time, we have continued
to stress that the POW/MIA matter remains the most important
bilateral issue between ourselves and Vietnam. We have made
it clear to the Vietnamese that this issue is separate and
humanitarian, but the American people would not permit us to
move forward to normalization without substantial progress.
They also know that real progress would improve the atmosphere
between our countries and pre-position them for a settlement
in Cambodia.
o The Ray report provides a basis for examining our efforts to
manage the Indochinese refugee problem, in conjunction with
the efforts of other resettlement countries, countries of
first asylum, and international organizations.
o The United States will maintain its security commitments to
the Republic of Korea. In order to ease tension, it is
important that North Korea responds positively to the Republic
of Korea's call for a resumption of North-South bilateral
negotiations.
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SOUTH PACIFIC
Issue:
What should the United States do in the South Pacific to
facilitate the growth of secure, stable nations supportive of
U.S. principles and goals?
Objectives:
o Successfully conclude ongoing negotiations of a regional
fisheries agreement.
o Obtain United Nations approval to terminate the Micronesian
Trusteeship and implement the Compact of Free Association for
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
Palau.
o Respond to the newly-established South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) in a manner that protects U.S. interests,
and is perceived as responsive to Pacific concerns.
o Maintain access to the region's ports for U.S. warships.
o Minimize Soviet influence in the region by providing the
island nations with alternatives to economic and political
relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet-influenced powers.
Accomplishments:
o We have established a bilateral assistance program for Fiji in
recognition of its long history of support for the U.S. on
issues of vital national interest.
o We have maintained an active ship visit program in the South
Pacific, with nuclear-powered warships having called in
Western Samoa and Tonga in 1985, and in Fiji in 1986.
Conventionally-powered ships have called at Papua New Guinea
and other areas.
o We have obtained Congressional approval of the Compact of Free
Association for the Marshall Islands and the Federated States
of Micronesia. The Trusteeship Council of the U.N. has
adopted a resolution supporting termination of the
Trusteeship. The conclusion of a Compact with Palau has not
yet been accomplished awaiting at the moment a decision by the
Appeals Division of the Palau Supreme Court.
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Talking Points:
o The Administration is committed to conclusion of the Compact
for Palau, and its passage by Congress; to termination of the
Trusteeship by the U.N., and implementation of the new
political status arrangements at the earliest possible time.
o We are vigorously pursuing negotiation of a regional fisheries
agreement that would guarantee American fishermen access to
the region's tuna stocks, while at the same time bringing
economic benefit to the island states.
o The President and Secretary Shultz have publicly acknowledged
Fiji's contribution to regional security through its open port
policy. We are equally pleased with the contributions to the
region's security of Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and Western
Samoa in welcoming the visits of U.S. warships.
o our biggest problem in countering growing Soviet influence in
the region is our inability to provide greater funds for
economic and military assistance and for support of a regional
fisheries agreement.
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ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANON
Issue:
How can the United States effectively improve prospects for a
lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors and assist
Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?
Objectives:
o Support efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict through
direct negotiations among the involved parties, including the
Palestinians.
o Encourage the improvement of relations between Egypt and
Israel in accordance with their peace treaty.
o Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and recognized
international borders.
o Expand U.S. relations with Arab states, and continue to
demonstrate U.S. resolve to maintain our security assistance
relationships.
Accomplishments:
o The United States took the lead in setting up the
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The success
of this venture made it possible to return the Sinai to Egypt.
o The President's peace initiative of September 1, 1982 set
forth a balanced set of positions which the parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon as
negotiations are resumed.
o our contacts with all factions in Lebanon have allowed us to
be an important force for restraint at critical moments.
o The presence of our Embassy in Beirut and our continuing
economic and military assistance programs are important; are
concrete indications of our support for the central
government, and of our continual interest and engagement in
Lebanon.
o We have been engaged with Egypt and Israel in intensive
efforts to achieve a resolution of the Taba dispute and other
issues affecting their bilateral relationship. We are
committed to help the parties bridge their differences if we
can.
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o In 1984, at the request of the Government of Egypt and in
cooperation with other nations, we assisted in mine-clearing
operations in the Gulf of Suez following the mining of this
vital waterway by an unknown party. We also assisted the
Saudi Government in like manner in their waters near Jidda and
Yanbu.
o We reached agreement with Israel in late 1983 to set up a
Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate
strategic cooperation, and the group now meets on a regular
basis.
o The U.S. Navy has agreed to help Israel search for its missing
submarine "Dakar," lost off the coast of Egypt in 1968. Egypt
has agreed to a search in their waters by the U.S. Navy, with
Israeli observers, to begin this summer.
o on the economic side, we have concluded a free trade area
agreement which went into effect on September 1, 1985.
Negotiations are currently underway for the establishment of a
VOA/RFE/RL transmitter in Israel.
Talking Points:
o A formal state of war has existed between Israel and its Arab
neighbors since the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Ever
since that time, it has been our policy both to help Israel
survive and defend itself, and to work with all states in the
region to help them resolve their differences peacefully.
This Administration has reaffirmed and reemphasized these two
key aspects of our overall Middle East policy while attempting
to enhance our security cooperation with all parties as an
essential element in achieving our mutual goal of peace in the
region.
o We have invested a great deal in working for peace in the
Middle East. Although not all these investments have yet paid
tangible dividends, they serve to demonstrate our deep
interest in helping bring peace, freedom, and prosperity to
all the peoples of the region.
o American-Israeli relations, always close, are at an especially
high level. JPMG and the FTA are examples of our deepening
relationship.
o Israel faces serious economic problems that only it, through
serious efforts of economic discipline, can solve, but we back
those efforts. In this regard, we strongly support the
economic measures that have been introduced by the government,
and we look forward to their continued and effective
implementation.
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o We support the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
We favor agreed-on arrangements in South Lebanon as the best
means of assuring stability in the South and security for
Northern Israel.
o Recognizing that Lebanon's political problems cannot be solved
by force, we support efforts to end fighting and reestablish a
dialogue that could lead to political reform.
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IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Issue:
How can the United States contribute to international efforts to
improve the security of the Persian Gulf region and find a
solution to end the six-year old Iran-Iraq war?
Objectives:
o Support diplomatic efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and
prevent its spread to the Persian Gulf and other countries.
o Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate
self-defense needs in the event that the Iran-Iraq conflict
expands.
o Reduce Soviet opportunities to exploit the conflict and
further destabilize the region.
o Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to international
shipping.
o Within the framework of U.S. neutrality, continue to develop
our political and economic relationship with Iraq in support
of its nonaligned status.
o Maintain our current state of military readiness to deter, and
if necessary, defend against possible escalation of the
conflict, thereby reducing the threat to non-belligerent oil
and shipping interests.
o Continue to urge our Allies and regional states to cooperate
in the event of a crisis to avoid panic oil-buying and
subsequent oil price increases and shortages.
Accomplishments:
o By encouraging restraint by both combatants, by not supplying
arms to either side, and by discouraging sales of military
equipment to Iran, we have helped prevent a widening of the
war.
o By providing U.S. AWACS and surface-to-air missile systems to
Saudi Arabia, we have demonstrated to our friends in the Gulf
that we are committed to helping them meet their legitimate
self-defense needs.
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o In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. led a
process within the International Energy Agency to improve
international energy emergency preparedness. An IEA decision
(July 1984) calls for a coordinated stock draw in the event of
a crisis, coupled with other measures (demand restraint,
increases in indigenous production) to avoid a rush to the
spot market. In addition, all nations which do not have
adequate stocks have agreed to make best efforts to increase
them.
o The Soviets have not yet improved their position in this
important region.
o In November 1984, we reestablished normal diplomatic relations
with Iraq after a 17-year break.
Talking Points:
o The United States is and has been concerned about this
six-year old conflict because it threatens the security of the
other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of Gulf oil to
the West, and may create opportunities for Soviet meddling.
o We have continued our efforts to prevent a widening of the
Gulf War and to bring about a negotiated settlement, working
closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the conflict and
to prepare for any temporary disruption of the flow of oil
from the region. We also have been working with the U.N. to
try to develop a formula for restraint leading to a
comprehensive settlement.
o We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet their
legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the Gulf open
to the shipping of non-belligerents.
o We are attempting -- so far successfully -- to avoid direct
Soviet or other external involvement that would further
destabilize the region.
o We have made it absolutely clear to the Iraqi Government that
we abhor its use of chemical weapons against Iran, and we have
reminded both sides of our neutrality, as attacks on shipping
and Iranian visit-and-search efforts have increased.
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AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
Issue:
What should the United States do to help end the Soviet military
occupation of Afghanistan, enhance Pakistani security against
external aggression, and encourage peaceful relations among all
South Asian nations?
Objectives:
o Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
o Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's neutral
and non-aligned status, self-determination for the Afghan
people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to return home
in peace, freedom, and honor.
o Help project the international image of the Afghan resistance
as a national liberation movement.
o Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian countries.
o Promote regional stability by supporting regional dialogue and
cooperation, particularly in matters of commerce, trade,
narcotics control and anti-terrorism. Support dialogue
between India and Pakistan to reduce potential for nuclear
proliferation in the region.
o Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure, despite the threats
posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
o Strengthen relations with the potential world power in the
region -- India -- building on positive dialogue begun with
Rajiv Gandhi in June, 1985.
o Maintain good relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka; encourage a
peaceful settlement of the communal conflict in Sri Lanka.
Accomplishments:
o We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan before world public opinion; there remains
overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior
there.
o The United States has contributed heavily to the support of
the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their homeland;
we are the largest contributor to the refugee relief effort in
Pakistan.
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o We have also participated in a program of cross-border
assistance designed to help the Afghan civilian population
better sustain itself inside Afghanistan.
o We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging a
political settlement that would allow the Soviets to withdraw
from Afghanistan.
o Thanks largely to the provision of $3.2 billion in American
aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
o Pakistan's confidence to defend itself has been furthered by a
follow-on six-year aid program of $4.02 billion in 1988.
o We have responded to India's desire for increased access to
advanced technology, and are working toward broadening
cooperation in several other areas, including anti-terrorism,
narcotics control, and trade.
o We have continued high-level discussions with the Indian
government to increase understanding of U.S. policies.
o The U.S. has encouraged sustained dialogue between India and
Pakistan to reduce regional tensions, including the nuclear
issue.
Talking Points:
o U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening Pakistan's
security against potential Soviet aggression, improving
relations with India, strengthening democratic institutions,
and promoting regional South Asian peace and understanding.
o President Reagan has made clear our support for the Afghan
freedom fighters -- it is clear where we stand.
o The Afghan national liberation movement, like others which
struggle against regimes imposed by Soviet imperialism, cannot
be defeated by force of arms. Like the colonial powers
earlier in this century, the Soviet Union must recognize that
the tide of history is against them in Afghanistan.
o Our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 121 other
nations that voted for last November's U.N. General Assembly
resolution on Afghanistan. This was the largest number (in
six years of strong votes) ever to call for Soviet withdrawal.
We have also helped to promote the search for peace by
supporting Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to
the Afghan dilemma through the offices of the U.N. Secretary
General.
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o We have underscored our strong commitment to help Pakistan
protect itself by negotiating a new multi-year program of
economic and security assistance valued at $4.02 billion as a
follow-on to the $3.6 billion program which runs out in 1987.
o We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State and Head of
Government levels with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Bangladesh in the last four years. Our contacts have also
continued at other levels.
o The United States has encouraged sustained bilateral
discussions between the Governments of Pakistan and India to
narrow their longstanding differences.
o We have worked to reduce chances of nuclear weapons
proliferation in the area, and have also encouraged India and
Pakistan to include this issue in their bilateral discussions.
o We have improved relations with India through a continued
high-level dialogue -- resulting in stronger ties in the areas
of trade and technology transfer, broader cooperation against
terrorism and illicit narcotics traffic, and better
consultation on international issues.
o We have supported Prime Minister Gandhi's efforts to promote a
political resolution of the communal conflict in Sri Lanka.
o Recognizing that South Asian stability requires stronger
regional cooperation, we have also supported efforts to
develop the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation as
an effective forum for promoting stronger ties among South
Asian nations.
o We have strongly encouraged the efforts of Pakistan and
Bangladesh to develop enduring democratic institutions.
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SOUTHERN AFRICA
Issue:
How can the United States best use its influence to help
establish racial and political democracy in southern Africa and
avoid bloodshed, revolution, and susceptibility to extremist
solutions?
Objectives:
Our policy approach is regional and has the following goals:
o Eliminate apartheid.
o Promote the need for dialogue and negotiations between the
South African Government and representative black leaders.
o Lessen regional violence and promote diplomatic resolution of
regional conflicts.
o Achieve Namibian independence.
o Enhance U.S. influence and reduce Soviet and Soviet-proxy
influence in southern Africa.
Accomplishments:
o Despite recent backsliding by South Africa, a framework has
been established for the reduction of cross-border violence in
the region. The Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South
Africa, and the Lusaka Agreement between Angola and South
Africa -- both reached with facilitative efforts by the U.S.
provide the basis for contact among the parties aimed at
lessening cross-border tension. Renewed efforts by all the
parties are, of course, necessary to make the agreements work.
o Limited, and now apparently stalled progress has been made on
Namibian independence, including all parties' commitment to
U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 as the basis of
settlement, and Angolan acceptance in principle of the need
for Cuban troop withdrawal.
o On September 9, 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12532, which formalizes the U.S. rejection of apartheid. As
President Reagan stated, the Order "puts in place a set of
measures designed and aimed against the machinery of apartheid
without indiscriminately punishing the people who are victims
of that system." Under the Order, U.S. loans and credits to
apartheid-enforcing agencies of the South African Government
are banned.
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Talking Points:
o On July 22, 1986, President Reagan delivered a major policy
address on South Africa, urging the Pretoria government to end
apartheid, and outlined components of progress toward a
political settlement. These components included setting a
timetable for the end of apartheid, releasing all political
prisoners, unbanning black political movements, and releasing
Nelson Mandela. The President warned that time is running out
in South Africa, and that the government must act now to
prevent further deterioration of the political and social
climate.
o We remain convinced that our current U.S. policy offers the
best opportunity for us to help foster racial and political
justice, minimize bloodshed, and protect U.S. security
interests throughout the region as a whole.
o The President has determined that our policy of active
engagement in South Africa and the region is correct, and that
we are to stay the course.
o President Reagan's Executive Order of September 9, 1985
underlines our abhorrence of apartheid and violence in South
Africa. It puts into effect a series of measures structured
to avoid economic damage to the region, while sending the
appropriate signals. It targets apartheid and
apartheid-enforcing agencies.
o Our diplomatic efforts to foster change are bolstered by an FY
1986 $33.5 million assistance program directed exclusively at
the South African black community. It is aimed at furthering
education and training, promoting human rights, and assisting
the black private sector.
o We continue to work closely with the business community in
encouraging adherence to the Sullivan Principles of fair
employment practice, and these principles, (or more stringent
ones), are applied to the South African employees of all U.S.
Government agencies. Further, the Executive Order requires
U.S. firms in South Africa employing at least 25 persons to
implement these principles, or face loss of U.S. export
assistance.
o The U.S. business community engaged in South Africa has formed
a corporate council under GM's Roger Smith and Burroughs' Mike
Blumenthal, which is designed to actively promote efforts to
end apartheid and speed racial reform.
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AFRICA: SECURITY
Issue:
How can the United States respond most effectively to requests
from friendly African states for help in resisting outside
aggression, and promoting peaceful solutions to local conflicts?
Objectives:
o Increase security assistance on a selective basis to those
countries under threat of external aggression.
o Promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional
conflicts through diplomatic means.
o Attack the root causes of instability through economic
development assistance, and promotion of local private sectors
which create growth and jobs.
o Continue working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from the southern African region as part of our multifaceted
initiative to create a security framework under which all
states of the region can live in peace.
Accomplishments:
o We have blunted the Soviet projection of power in Africa. No
sizeable new influx of Soviet or surrogate forces has
occurred, and Moscow has gained no new African allies since
1981. Mozambique and other African governments allied with
the Soviets in the 1970's have begun dialogues with us, and
have begun moving away from Soviet influence toward genuine
non-alignment.
o We have been a catalyst facilitating the peaceful resolution
of local disputes. Specific examples include the improvement
in relations between Kenya and Somalia, Somalia and Ethiopia,
the March 1984 non-aggression pact between South Africa and
Mozambique, and the February 1984 Lusaka agreement providing
for disengagement and withdrawal of South African forces from
Angola. (Recent events in southern Africa nevertheless show
that there are continuing problems in maintaining regional
accords).
o Faced with deteriorating economic situations, a number of
African governments have signalled the U.S. their displeasure
with Marxist/socialist economic models, and their willingness
to move toward more privately-oriented economies.
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o Timely U.S. security assistance and military air deployments
helped counter Libyan agression in Chad in 1983, and again in
1986. U.S.-made equipment, such as C-130 transport aircraft
permitted Zaire to quell rebel attacks in the eastern part of
the country in late 1984.
o We have obtained agreement by all parties on implementation of
the U.N. plan for Namibia, pending only Angolan agreement on
Cuban troop withdrawal. We have established a reputation as
an honest broker in our diplomatic work on this most difficult
of Africa's problems.
Talking Points:
o The late 1970's saw Africa become increasingly exploited by
the Soviet Union and its allies. Violence in southern Africa
and the Horn of Africa was escalating, insurgencies were
growing in eight African countries, and cross-border armed
raids by opposition groups were occuring elsewhere on the
continent. Feeding on these conflicts, the Soviet Union
poured almost $5 billion in arms into Ethiopia, Angola, and
Mozambique, and fielded almost 5,000 military "advisors" in
Africa. Two Cuban expeditionary forces totaling almost 40,000
combat troops were garrisoned in Ethiopia and Angola.
Libyan-sponsored subversion against neighboring African states
was on the increase, and in 1980-81, a Libyan military force
of 8,000 occupied Chad.
o Thanks in large part to U.S. policies and efforts in the area,
the Soviets have added no new national converts in Africa
since 1981, nor have they dispatched new surrogate troop
contingents to Africa. Several African governments which were
counted as Soviet allies in 1980 have moved closer to real
non-alignment.
o U.S. military assistance to Africa has increased slightly from
$94.7 million (FY 81 actual) to $111.5 million (FY 85
estimated). The bulk of the program has been converted to
grant aid in recognition of the difficult economic situations
of the recipients. We have maintained a 5:1 ratio of economic
assistance to security assistance in Africa in recognition of
the fundamental security role economic stability and
progress plays. This ratio favors non-military assistance
even more when emergency fund aid is taken into account.
o There has been a significant increase in dialogue among
neighboring states in southern Africa. Despite recent
backsliding, this process has led, with the U.S. acting as a
catalyst, to a non-agression pact between South Africa and
Mozambique in March 1984, and a landmark force disengagement
agreement between South Africa and Angola formalized in Lusaka
in February 1984.
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o We have undertaken a special regional security initiative for
southern Africa. Specific components include a complex
diplomatic initiative to lead to an internationally recognized
settlement of the Namibia problem and Namibian independence;
support for regional economic development; withdrawal of
foreign forces from the area; and support for peaceful
progress in ending apartheid in South Africa.
o There is a growing dynamic for change in South Africa, and
the last few years have seen important, fundamental changes:
institutionalization of black trade unions, legitimization of
black residence in urban areas, the enfranchisement of
coloreds and Asians, a major increase in expenditures for
black education, and the beginning of black municipal and
local self-government. We have played a quiet but real part
in encouraging and facilitating such constructive forces for
peaceful, positive change.
o We are concerned about recent increased Soviet military
assistance to Angola and the violence this fuels in Angola and
the region. Our policy is to continue efforts to promote
national reconciliation in Angola, and as a matter of
principle, to support UNITA's efforts to resist Soviet designs
in Angola.
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AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT
Issue:
What should the United States do to help the African countries
most severely affected by economic crisis and famine, and how can
we assist in coming to grips with their critical economic and
developmental problems?
Objectives:
o Work with other nations and organizations to combat famine by
providing food relief assistance and follow-on recovery and
rehabilitation programs.
o Induce African governments to make serious and sustained
substantial structural reforms which provide incentives to the
indigenous private sector, so that broad-based, equitable
growth can be attained.
o Persuade African governments that economic development goals
can best be pursued through mechanisms and incentives which
incorporate the principles of private enterprise and free
trade.
o Support the IMF's successful use of Structural Adjustment
Facility.
Accomplishments:
o We are providing over $540 million worth of food aid in
regular and emergency programs this year.
o We remain the primary donor of humanitarian aid to African
refugees.
o Our regular non-food economic assistance leveled off at $649
million this year, of which over half supported economic
reform, particularly in agriculture.
o We are a member of the African Development Bank and support
the African Development Fund.
o Both the African Policy Reform (AEPRP) Initiative and the Food
for Progress program support efforts by African governments to
make the transition from centrally-controlled economies, to
ones based on freer markets and private initiative.
o Our AEPRP Program was a precursor and stimulated the creation
of the IBRD's Special Facility for Africa, which we have now
joined.
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o African leaders have learned from their bitter experience, and
are now adopting economic policy changes which should lay a
more solid basis for sustained economic growth.
o Major economic reforms have been successfully implemented in
several African countries in the recent past. Ghana, Guinea,
Madagascar, Zambia, and Senegal have shifted their priorities
to emphasize their respective agricultural sectors.
o Zimbabwe and Malawi have undertaken successful, substantial
pricing reforms, which resulted in national grain surpluses.
o At the OAU Heads of African State meeting in Addis Ababa in
July of 1985, African leaders approved a program of action
entitled "Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery,
1986-1990," (APPER). In this document, they pledged to take
measures to strengthen incentive schemes, review public
investment policies, discipline and efficiency in the use of
resources, and encourage domestic resource mobilization.
o At the initiative of the OAU, a UN Special Session on the
Critical Economic Situation in Africa was held May 27-June 1.
At this Session, despite opposition from the non-African G-77
countries, the African states and the international community
committed themselves in a "spirit of genuine and equal
partnership" to a "United Nations Program of Action for
African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-90." The
framework of that understanding required that the African
states undertake necessary reform, encourage the private
sector, and ensure the productive use of scarce resources.
For its part, the international community agreed to improve
its quality of external assistance, to make every effort to
provide sufficient resources to support and supplement the
African development effort, to shift the emphasis from project
to program support, to increase the concessionality of
development assistance, to improve donor coordination methods,
and to urge the speedy replenishment of IDA.
Talking Points:
o Virtually all 46 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
combined population of over 400 million, continue to face an
economic crisis of stark proportions. Per capita food
production has fallen twenty percent in the last twenty years;
six percent in the last ten years. For the poorest of the
countries, per capita income has fallen over the last twenty
years. Refugees number over two million. The recovery from
the 1981 recession has yet to reach Africa.
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o While last year's rains broke the drought and related famine
in most of Africa, recovery and rehabilitation will require
years of effort, reform, and international assistance.
Pockets of famine remain, requiring continued vigilance by all
donors. Early warning systems are being devised which will
allow us to detect at much earlier stages the decline into
nutritional emergencies and famines and the corresponding
increased need for emergency interventions.
o The economic crisis has many causes: drought, the
flow-through effect of recession in the developed world, the
impact of the 1979 oil price increase, and civil wars. But
virtually all observers -- including the Africans themselves
-- agree that a major cause has been government economic
mismanagement. Many African governments have held too long to
failed policies which stifle domestic production, with the
chief among them being the rigid hewing to central planning
and control precepts and practices.
o The unprecedented economic crisis in Africa threatens U.S.
interests. Economic malaise breeds political instability that
opens opportunities for Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan meddling.
o The African debt problem, though small compared to other
areas, adds to the strain on the international financial
system and thwarts African recovery and development.
Unchecked crisis could lead to greater famine and civil
strife. The U.S. is working with the IMF and the World Bank
to ease Africa's debt situation and to stimulate economic
growth.
o we remain committed to indigenous private sector development
in Africa, and Western private investment and trade, as the
long-term answer to the continent's development needs. We see
agricultural self-reliance as the first order of economic
recovery and development there. We fully support the
international financial organizations in requiring structural
reforms in return for renewed financial assistance.
o The efficiency and success of our efforts so far may be
measured by the fact that nearly all the centrally-planned
economies in Africa have undertaken positive change in the
direction of providing incentives to the private sector.
o We view the UN Special Session on the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa as a vindication of our policy thrust. At
that Session, the Africans committed themselves to undertake
major structural adjustment reforms, to provide increased
emphasis to the agricultural sector, and to encourage private
sector activity.
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CENTRAL AMERICA
What should the United States do to eliminate Nicaraguan, Cuban,
and Soviet subversion and military adventurism in the region and
promote democratic and economic development efforts?
Objectives:
o Encourage consolidation of new democracies in Central America
and cooperation among them to promote democratic values
throughout the region, especially in Nicaragua.
o Improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of the
area.
o Help friendly Central American countries to defend themselves
against Nicaraguan, Cuban, and other outside-supported
aggression and subversion.
o Support diplomatic efforts to achieve comprehensive, fully
verifiable regional political solutions.
Accomplishments:
o The President has proposed, and the House of Representatives
has approved a $100 million aid program to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance. This humanitarian and military aid is
intended to help the Nicaraguan freedom fighters maintain
pressure on the communist Sandinista regime to negotiate with
it democratic opponents.
o The United States has worked diligently through regular and
special diplomatic channels to pursue realistic solutions to
Central America's problems. Our efforts have included several
trips to the region by the President, Vice President, and
Secretary of State, and the consecutive appointments of three
Special Envoys to Central America. We have also consistently
supported the goals of the peace-seeking process initiated by
the Contadora countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and
Venezuela).
o The United States actively supported the recent elections in
Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica with technical and
financial aid, Presidential election observer missions, and
strong public statements. The Vice President's participation
in all three inaugurations also was a concrete manifestation
of our commitment to democracy.
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o The Administration took the lead in formulating a major,
comprehensive regional assistance and development plan for the
area in January 1984. Called the President's Central America
Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative, the program
implements the January 1984 recommendations of the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We are continuing
these efforts and are seeking to obtain the full amount of
resources recommended by the Commission.
o Central America is a major recipient of U.S. financial and
other economic assistance, which comprises 74 percent of all
U.S. assistance to the region. We have worked closely with
all of the governments to use these resources to implement
comprehensive stabilization programs.
o Our defense assistance to El Salvador has been modest, ($669.4
million for FY 80-86), but crucial in helping that country
turn the tide against the anti-democratic guerrilla
insurgency. Democracy in El Salvador has continued to grow,
and our defense assistance is vital in helping nourish it.
o U.S. military exercises in Honduras and provision of U.S.
military training and assistance to Honduran forces have
helped limit aggression by Nicaraguan forces, which number
120,000 troops -- including reserves and militia -- and which
possesses much more sophisticated equipment than the Honduran
border forces.
Talking Points:
o Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Soviet-assisted subversion and
communist aggression have created a crisis in Central America,
particularly within Nicaragua and in El Salvador. Should
communist gains continue unchecked, we could face the threat,
as the President has stated, that "100 million people from
Panama to the open border on our South would come under the
control of pro-Soviet regimes." We are countering this threat
by helping those people to defend themselves.
o In addition to our modest military assistance to the region,
our contribution in economic and developmental assistance is
substantial. Through the President's Central America
Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative, our commitment
to help the free peoples of the area in speeding their
economic growth has already achieved considerable results.
o Our support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is
crucial to the future of democracy in Central America.
Nicaraguan freedom fighters provide the military pressure
necessary to convince the communist Sandinista regime to make
democratic reforms and to negotiate seriously with its
neighbors and its own opposition. The $100 million aid
program proposed by the President and approved by the House of
Representatives will provide this important support.
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o We have consistently supported the efforts of the Contadora
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) to arrange
a comprehensive, verifiable and peaceful solution to Central
America's security problems. National reconciliation and
democratization are key objectives of the Contadora
negotiators, and are essential for any lasting peace.
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LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively assist Latin American
and Caribbean democracy, economic improvement, and ability to
resist outside aggression and subversion?
Objectives:
o Support democratic governments where they already exist and
encourage the few non-democratic governments remaining to make
the transition to democracy.
o Help improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
o Encourage the adoption of sound market-led economic policies
in order to establish the basis for long-term growth.
o Assist friendly, democratic governments and governments making
the transition to democracy in the region to defend themselves
against externally-supported communist subversion and
aggression.
o Ensure that the historically close U.S.-Latin American
relationship continues.
o Support democracy by encouraging respect for human rights and
improvement in the administration of justice.
o Encourage regional cooperation among the democracies.
Accomplishments:
o We have provided consistent support and encouragement for
democratic institution building: today 27 of 33 countries
with over 90% of the Latin American population are democratic.
Since November 1980, there have been over 45 free national
elections in 27 countries, virtually all with very high voter
participation, including El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala,
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Dominica, Costa Rica, and Peru. The Administration
has provided tangible support for democratic labor unions and
democratic institution-building through programs, such as the
new National Endowment for Democracy proposed by President
Reagan in 1982, and passed by the Congress in 1983.
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o We have been working with the area's public and private
sectors and the International Monetary Fund to encourage
involved parties to work effectively to resolve the $380
billion Latin American debt problem.
o We have also worked actively with our hemispheric neighbors to
address a growing and pervasive threat: production and
trafficking in illegal narcotics. Our efforts are beginning
to show positive results. Recent successful actions by the
Governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Jamaica,
Mexico, and others in eradicating crops, disrupting shipments
and destroying processing facilities show that the region is
actively involved in the effort.
o Under the leadership of this Administration, U.S. economic
assistance to the Latin America-Caribbean region has more than
doubled. In addition to our major Central American
development program, we devised and are implementing another
innovative regional assistance and development plan, the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which offers participating
countries increased access to the U.S. market for 12 years and
can create many jobs and sources of income.
o Our most dramatic Caribbean accomplishment was to join, in
October 1983, with the East Caribbean democracies at their
request, to rescue their and our citizens in Grenada, remove
the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence from Grenada, and facilitate
the restoration of democratic institutions in that island
nation. Since that time, the U.S. and other military forces
have left, free elections were held, and Grenada has joined
the Regional Security System that the U.S. is helping area
nations to build.
o In South America, we have consistently supported democratic
governments politically and economically, as they have worked
to strengthen their institutions and generate economic growth.
Our assistance has helped assure that no country that was
democratic six years ago has lost its freedom.
o We are supporting an orderly transition to democracy in Chile
through such means as endorsing reasonable proposals put
forward by responsible civilian groups, and by urging its
present military regime to accomodate popular demands for
reinstitution of democratic processes.
o In Haiti, we are assisting the new government to deal with the
country's urgent economic problems as it prepares for
elections which will establish democratic government there for
the first time.
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Talking Points:
o The United States is linked by history, proximity, and special
ties of friendship with the 33 independent countries and 380
million people of Latin America and the Caribbean. Objectives
of this Administration have been to encourage democracy,
support economic improvement, use active diplomacy to solve
disputes, and provide security assistance so that governments
threatened by Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion
can defend themselves.
o For the region as a whole, a highly encouraging recent trend
has been the return of several countries to democratic
government -- today, 28 of 33 countries. These account for
90% of the area's population. The Administration has
consistently encouraged the process of democratic
institution-building in the area.
o Actions by the United States played a key role in ending the
28-year Duvalier family rule in Haiti. Although serious
problems lie ahead, we are assisting the provisional
government's transition to democracy.
o In addition to our modest military assistance to the region,
our contribution in economic and developmental help has been
substantial. Through the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
President's Central American Democracy, Peace, and Development
Initiative, our commitment to help speed the process of
economic growth in those areas will become even larger and, we
believe, more effective.
o We are continuing to work with friendly governments in the
region to help them cope with their severe debt problems.
o We are also working with friendly governments to bring drug
traffickers to justice and destroy their production facilities
and transport networks.
o In Grenada, the United States and the Caribbean democracies
rescued a nation from Soviet bloc, and Cuban control, and
internal repression and helped it return to a democratic
course. Free elections were held there in December 1984, and
the last troops from the U.S. and other regional countries
helping Grenada to rebuild its own security forces were able
to leave.
o In South America we are helping governments strengthen their
democratic institutions and generate economic growth. The
result -- no country that was democratic six years ago has
lost its freedom.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Issue:
What should the United States do to help sustain and extend world
economic recovery; better coordinate international economic
policy; help debtor nations help themselves; assist developing
countries to realize substantial, lasting, economic growth, and
promote free and fair trade?
Objectives:
o Formulate and implement sensible economic policies at home
aimed at promoting growth, holding down inflation, and
reducing the federal budget deficit by controlling
government spending.
o Develop a Free World consensus on policies designed to achieve
enduring, non-inflationary economic recovery, financial
stability and liberalized trade.
o Encourage an effective economic adjustment process for debtor
nations, including sufficient private and public financing,
selective reschedulings to ease the debt service burden on
LDC's and create conditions for sustainable economic growth.
o Heighten Allied attention to the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations, including the forging of common
objectives in NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM.
o Obtain global progress toward free trade, including reversing
protectionist pressures here and abroad, eliminating unfair
trade practices, and initiating a GATT round on reducing trade
barriers.
Accomplishments:
o This Administration has succeeded in rebuilding a strong
domestic economy which has led the world out of recession and
into recovery: U.S. GNP has grown at a 4.1% average annual
rate over the last three years; average consumer price
inflation of 13.5% in 1980 was cut to 3.6% last year; almost
10 million new jobs have been created, which reinforces the
economic policies espoused by President Reagan:
market-oriented adjustment in the domestic and global
economies.
o Our approach to LDC debt management has been successful in
broad terms. We have averted threats to the integrity of the
international financial system. Many LDC's have improved
their external positions and rekindled economic growth.
Successive Economic Summits have voiced support for this
approach.
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o The Program for Sustained Growth, proposed by Secretary Baker
in Seoul in October 1985, builds on this approach. The
Program is already showing results in terms of economic policy
reforms in various LDC's and new, higher-quality World Bank
lending.
o Administration leadership on the trade agenda has included:
Presidential statements warning of veto action against
protectionist legislation; self-initiation of several Section
301 cases against the unfair trade practices of foreign
governments; and our participation in the September 1985
meeting of Allied finance ministers, in which a substantial
realignment of exchange rates occurred, better reflecting
fundamental economic conditions.
o The U.S. has been leading the effort to open a new round of
trade negotiations in the GATT; agenda would include such
issues as services, agriculture, intellectual property rights,
and a comprehensive new round of multilateral negotiations.
o Substantial progress has been made in domestic and
international energy emergency preparedness through the
accelerated buildup of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR), and an agreement among IEA members for early use of
petroleum stocks and demand restraint to avoid unnecessary
volatility in the spot market.
o Falling oil prices, which owe much to the President's decision
to decontrol U.S. oil prices, and to the cooperative energy
policies pursued by the industrial countries over the past
decade, will result in large net economic benefits in growth,
employment and inflation.
o An historic Allied consensus on East-West economic relations
has been achieved which has led to: elimination of
preferential credit terms for the USSR; reduction of the risk
of Western European dependence on Soviet energy resources; and
strengthened measures in COCOM to reduce Soviet access to
strategically important Western technology.
Talking Points:
o The President inherited a fractious and deteriorating
international economic order characterized by record
inflation, high unemployment and severe recession.
o From the outset, the President emphasized the importance
of sensible, market-oriented economic policies. These
policies were designed to promote non-inflationary growth and
stem the tide of visionary leadership in advancing a common
Allied approach to key economic, trade, financial and security
objectives through bilateral discussions in Washington and
abroad, annual Economic Summit meetings, and multilateral
organizations such as OECD, IEA, NATO and COCOM.
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o The President first put forward his economic policies at
the Ottawa Economic Summit in 1981. By the time President
Reagan hosted the Williamsburg Summit two years later, it was
clear that his policies were moving the U.S. and the Free
World down the path to full economic recovery. Under the
President's leadership, the Summit leaders agreed to
coordinate policies to promote sustainable, non-inflationary
growth, and to forge a consensus on the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations which had proved elusive in the
past.
o Later Summits reemphasized the importance of pursuing
non-inflationary, growth-stimulating fiscal and monetary
policies, free and fair trade, and comprehensive,
growth-oriented strategies for managing the debt problem.
o At the 1986 Tokyo Summit, the participants noted the need to
maintain appropriate medium-term fiscal and monetary policies,
but also stressed the need to implement effective structural
adjustment policies across the whole range of economic
activities to promote long-term growth, employment, and the
integration of domestic economies into the world economy.
They also agreed to consider additional measures to further
strengthen procedures for effective coordination of
international economic policy.
o Working with our NATO Allies and Japan, we have made major
gains in correcting past imbalances between the advantages of
trading with the USSR, and our common security requirements.
We have reached agreement with the Allies on eliminating
preferential credit terms to the USSR and reducing the
substantial risk of West European dependence on Soviet energy.
In cooperation with the COCOM countries, we have met head-on
the challenge of stopping the flow of Western military
technology to the USSR through the upgrading of the COCOM
review process, the harmonization and tightening of national
licensing and enforcement procedures, and the monitoring of
the potential military application of emerging technologies.
A,
o The President has taken significant steps to ensure that we
can manage the impact of any temporary energy disruption. Our
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) continues to grow, and IEA
member countries have agreed to coordinate the use of their
stocks in an energy emergency.
o Our case-by-case approach to managing LDC external debt and
other economic problems has been successful in averting
threats to the international financial system, more reliance
on private investment, and closer cooperation between the
World Bank and IMF.
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o The Program for Sustained Growth, first proposed by Secretary
Baker at Seoul in October 1985, and endorsed during the Tokyo
Economic Summit, strengthens this approach. It encourages
LDC's to adopt comprehensive, growth-oriented macroeconomic
and structural adjustment policies. It also calls upon the
international community to support and encourage such economic
reforms by providing new net private and official lending. We
are already seeing an increase in world Bank lending tied to
policy reform.
o The President has initiated a major effort to meet the urgent
problem of world hunger by providing help to build a new
infrastructure where needed, and by taking other steps to
speed up the impact of relief measures.
o Through the leadership of President Reagan in the Summit
process, the Allies have dedicated themselves to the expansion
of international trade by the reduction of trade barriers.
o The Administration is conducting a vigorous trade policy based
on four principles: free trade and fair trade are in the best
interest of the citizens of the U.S.; the U.S. plays a
critical role in ensuring and promoting an open trading
system; our trading partners have an important stake in
efforts to improve the trading system which has benefited us
all; and the U.S. will fight unfair trade practices.
o Stemming the tide of protectionist actions is of paramount
importance. Rising protectionism threatens the effectiveness
of the multilateral trading system, fosters retaliatory
measures which will reduce global growth and welfare, and
stymies LDC efforts to service their debts with increased
export earnings.
o The improvement in the world economy and Allied agreement to
resist protectionist trade policies have begun to restore
economic and financial stability to a number of Third World
countries. We are encouraging the developing country debtors
to help themselves by adopting economic adjustment policies,
which promote private sector financing and investment.
o The President has given new emphasis to U.S. economic ties
with the economically dynamic nations of the Pacific Basin.
The result has been significant improvement in our bilateral
relations with China, South Korea and other countries of this
vital region.
o In our own hemisphere, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
Central American Peace Initiative have helped open up markets
for the exports of our closest neighbors. Our efforts to help
Grenada rebuild its economy, and our active support of U.S.
private sector initiatives to expand Grenadian investment and
trading potential are demonstrating the benefits of a return
to democracy.
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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
Issue:
How can the United States best guarantee a reliable and adequate
supply of the energy resources needed for national and
international security and economic well-being?
Objectives:
o Reduce government intervention in the energy sector, and in
energy trade through deregulation and increased reliance on
market mechanisms.
o Improve the energy security of the U.S. and its Allies by
action to reduce both the probability of future disruptions
and the impact such supply interruptions might have on our
economies.
c Urge Allies to hold adequate strategic oil stocks and be
prepared to participate in an early coordinated stock draw in
the event of an oil supply disruption.
o Promote free energy markets in response to lower oil prices.
o Urge key Allies to diversify their energy resources, so that
they are not dependent on single supplier nations,
particularly in the case of gas imports from the Soviet Union.
o Promote a balanced and mixed energy resource system that
avoids undue dependence on any single energy source.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration's decision to deregulate oil prices has
stimulated domestic production and reduced oil imports to less
than 30 percent of oil needs in 1985.
o The partial decontrol of natural gas prices on January 1, 1985
has helped maintain gas production without causing a price
increase. More than one-half of U.S. gas production is now
sold at market prices.
o The Strategic Petroleum Reserve contains 500 million barrels
of oil, the equivalent of 110 days of net oil imports.
o The U.S. has led initiatives within the International Energy
Agency (IEA) to limit Western European reliance in Soviet
natural gas, including Ministerial decisions in 1983 and 1985
to avoid undue dependence on any one source of gas imports,
and to emphasize indigenous OECD sources.
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o In June 1986, Norway announced the conclusion of a contract
for the development of the Troll and Sleipner gas fields,
thereby limiting the prospects of increased Soviet gas sales
for the foreseeable future.
o President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed in
November 1983 to a program to increase energy trade between
the United States and Japan. Over the long run, this effort
can create thousands of new jobs for Americans and greater
efficiency for both our nations.
o In March 1985, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney of
Canada signed the Quebec Summit Declaration, directing both
governments to take steps to strengthen a market approach to
energy trade by reducing regulatory barriers and extending
open access to each other's energy markets. Volume and price
controls were subsequently removed on crude oil trade, and
both governments are actively working to deregulate their
natural gas sectors. Thanks to cooperative efforts,
U.S.-Canadian bilateral energy trade is now characterized by
higher volumes, less regulation, and lower prices.
o Ministers at the July 1985 IEA Ministerial agreed to "pursue
expeditiously a common approach whereby they would maintain or
create conditions such that imported refined products could go
to the markets of different IEA countries and regions on the
basis of supply and demand as determined by market forces
without distortions." As a consequence of this agreement,
Japan began to import gasoline and other light petroleum
products in 1986.
o In response to a steady loss in market share, the OPEC cartel
in late 1985 gave up its goal of trying to maintain oil prices
at artificially high levels, and moved toward a more
market-oriented approach, which resulted in a significant, and
beneficial, drop in world oil prices.
Talking Points:
o U.S. Administrations since the 1973-74 oil embargo had seen
energy supply as a constraint on economic systems. The
present Administration sees energy supply as an opportunity to
promote economic growth and prosperity.
o Action to deregulate oil and gas prices has encouraged
domestic production and conservation, and the increased use of
coal and nuclear energy have reduced oil consumption. As a
result, U.S. net oil imports declined to 4.4 million barrels
per day in 1985, or less than 30% of our total oil
consumption.
o With the maintenance of oil and gas production as well as
nuclear power, we now produce about 87 percent of the energy
we use.
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o We have urged our Allies in Europe and the Pacific to consider
buying more U.S. coal, thereby reducing their dependency on
more uncertain supplies of energy. Prime Minister Nakasone
and President Reagan have endorsed increased energy trade
between the United States and Japan, which can mean jobs for
citizens and greater security for both nations.
o In addition, we have led a process in the IEA to improve
cooperation in more efficient use and supply of energy, and in
special arrangements for emergency sharing among key
industrialized countries, to ensure that we can minimize the
effects of any future oil shortage. We will continue to press
for improvements in the IEA emergency preparedness system.
o The SPR would be our first line of defense in an oil supply
disruption, and we are committed to its early use in large
quantities in coordination with other IEA members, whom we
ex'pect to take complementary actions.
IEA members at the May 1983 Ministerial agreed that member
countries should avoid undue dependence on any one source of
gas imports, and obtain future gas supplies from secure
sources, with emphasis on indigenous OECD sources. This
emphasis on natural gas security was reaffirmed at the July
1985 IEA Ministerial and contributed to the 1986 agreement to
develop the Norwegian Troll and Sleipner gas fields.
o As a result of cooperative efforts between the United States
and Canada to reduce regulatory barriers and extend open
access to bilateral energy trade, the value of two-way trade
in energy products in 1985 was over $15 billion -- higher than
our total bilateral trade with most countries of the world.
o At the July 1985 IEA Ministerial, member states agreed to
pursue a common approach to maintain or create conditions so
that refined products go to markets on the basis of supply and
demand as determined by market forces, without distortions.
o At the April 1986 IEA Governing Board, member governments
reaffirmed the validity of existing energy policies despite
falling oil prices. The Governing Board also stressed the
importance of maintaining adequate stock levels, and noted
that the current oil market situation affords an advantageous
opportunity to increase stock levels.
o The U.S. is working actively in the IEA to encourage adherence
to the spirit as well as the letter of the stockholding
obligation. We are urging all members to maintain
government-controlled stocks equal to 90 days of imports.
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TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
How can the United States and its Allies resolve their own
disparate views and devise a comprehensive means of preventing
the Soviet Union and their allies from acquiring sensitive
technology?
Objectives:
o Reach agreement with our Allies and other friendly nations on
the nature of the threat posed by the uncontrolled transfer of
militarily significant technologies to the Warsaw Pact.
o Introduce new countermeasures and constraints on a
multilateral basis, whenever possible, to impede, if not
prevent such losses.
o continue to improve our intelligence on technology transfer
matters.
o Curb the loss of militarily-sensitive technology, without
slowing down the development of new technologies in the West,
and without bringing undue hardship to U.S. and Allied
economic interests.
Accomplishments:
o The Reagan Administration is the first to fully recognize the
security risk posed by technology transfer, and has taken many
steps toward stemming the flow of militarily sensitive
know-how and hardware to the Soviet bloc.
o Domestic U.S. procedures in both intelligence-gathering and
export control have been strengthened and made more
effective.
o Through a government-wide outreach plan, U.S. industry has
been made more aware of the threat, and has been encouraged to
institute its own technology security measures.
o Under U.S. initiatives, COCOM procedures have been made more
effective, and the list of multilaterally controlled items has
been brought up to date.
o Bilateral arrangements are in place, or being negotiated with
a number of non-COCOM countries for the protection of U.S. and
indigenous technologies.
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o The effectiveness of our technology security program has
increased dramatically. The results are being seen in court
cases and convictions for diversion and espionage.
o Both U.S. Customs and the Commerce Department have
significantly increased their enforcement work, and since
1980, technology security has become an area of priority in
our intelligence effort. Good relationships with Customs'
counterparts abroad have resulted in the foiling of large
number of diversion attempts.
o The security services of our Allies have uncovered and had
expelled many Soviet bintelligence collectors of militarily
sensitive technology, a result partially attributable to U.S.
efforts to highlight this issue. Also, the U.S. has closed
down many means previously used by the Soviets to acquire
technical information.
Talking Points:
o The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies, using espionage as
well as legal and illegal trade channels, have sustained a
large-scale effort for some time to obtain Western technical
information and hardware to improve their weapons and their
military's supporting industrial base. The Soviets are well
behind the U.S. in many technologies having military use --
computers and microprocessor technology -- and thus require
Western, and especially U.S., information to meet weapons
requirements.
o Europe and Japan are, like ourselves, innovative and
scientifically advanced. Our Allies have a vested common
concern in stemming technology loss, as this loss leads to
higher defense budgets for all, while concurrently weakening
deterrence. On the other hand, each ally has its own view of
its economic relationship with bloc countries; there is,
therefore, a tension of competing interests among our Allies
over economic gain versus the provision of technology to the
bloc. At issue is how to resolve these disparate views.
o Despite progress, a problem so complex as the loss of
technology cannot quickly be remedied. The Soviets are very
skilled in their collection techniques. Acquisition of
technical information has been a long-standing campaign, with
numerous avenues'of collection. Awareness of Soviet methods
and their effects is the cornerstone of our response to their
campaign.
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o The U.S. is an open society with a heritage of free
expression. This freedom of expression is exploited by the
Soviets in their collection program; the U.S. Government must
ensure proper protection of militarily sensitive information,
while not impeding the rights and traditions of free
expression.
o The effort to slow or stop the loss of strategic technology
must be a persistent, long-term undertaking. It is essential
both for ourselves and our Allies that the threat continue to
be highlighted and exposed for the danger that it poses, and
that unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral countermeasures
be kept in place and supported by the highest levels in the
Administration. A great deal of progress has been made, and
this progress must be sustained and enhanced by
organizational, legal, and technical means.
o At the same time that we have been working to slow or stop
technology losses, we have been working to reduce the delays
imposed on the private sector when export licenses are
reviewed as part of our control efforts. This has won the
increased support of U.S. industry for the Government-wide
technology security program.
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TERRORISM
Issue:
How can the United States improve its ability to deter, protect
against, and respond to terrorist attacks?
Objectives:
o Improve international cooperation to detect, deter, and combat
terrorism bilaterally with allies, and multilaterally in
groupings of like-minded states and other international fora.
o Enhance operational capabilities and inter-governmental
coordinating mechanisms to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks.
o Continue refinement of legal instruments and agreements to
counter terrorism, including steps for the extradition and
prosecution of persons involved in terrorism.
Accomplishments:
o The Tokyo Economic Summit in May promulgated an important
statement condemning international terrorism and pledging
maximum Allied cooperation to combat it.
o The United States responded militarily to Libyan-sponsored
terrorism by striking terrorist-related targets in Libya after
the West Berlin disco bombing, and reports of other ongoing
Libyan-directed terrorist acts.
o The EC and the Summit Nations agreed to ban arms shipments to
Libya, and to discourage their nationals from filling in
behind the American firms and workers who left Libya.
o The Tokyo Summit also accepted the American-originated
proposals for restricting Libyan diplomat missions and
tightening up visa requirements.
o Western European countries expelled more than 100 Libyan
"diplomats" and "businessmen" since the bombing of the Berlin
disco in April, and the subsequent U.S. military operations
against Libya, throwing off balance the Libyan terrorist
network.
o Many potential terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens or
facilities abroad were identified and thwarted by the end of
1985 by improved intelligence and stronger security and
cooperation with other governments.
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o Quick and decisive action to intercept the Egyptian airliner
carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers resulted in their capture
and trial. The hijackers have been convicted and sentenced to
prison by Italian courts.
o Some 2700 officials from 33 countries have been brought to the
United States for specialized counter-terrorism training under
the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.
o U.S. initiatives and/or support at the U.N. obtained passage
of a Security Council resolution condemning the taking of
hostages; Security Council Presidential statements condemning
specific attacks, and a broad U.S. General Assembly resolution
condemning terrorism as a criminal act.
o At U.S. initiative, two U.N. specialized agencies, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), are drafting
improved security guidelines.
o The Public Diplomacy Working Group established under the joint
sponsorship of the IG/T and the International Information
Committee, has helped coordinate public affairs activities
related to Libya, including "white papers" and media
appearances.
o A major program to enhance the physical and operational
security at diplomatic posts abroad has been initiated; a
follow-up to implement the program is being acted on by
Congress this year.
o A protocol to the U.K. extradition treaty which narrows the
political offense exceptions has been ratified by the Senate.
Similar treaty modifications are being negotiated with other
countries.
o As authorized under 1984 legislation, rewards of up to
$250,000 have been offered for Abu Abbas for the Achille Lauro
hijacking, the TWA 847 and Kuwait 221 hijackings, and the
murders of six Americans in El Salvador.
o We have established a system of coordinated threat alerts from
all members of the U.S. intelligence community to provide more
timely and accurate information on terrorist threats to our
overseas missions, reducing the problem of duplicate warnings
and reporting.
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o Implementation has begun of a number of important
anti-terrorism provisions in the Foreign Aid Authorization
bill for 1986 and 1987, which Congress passed and the
President signed into law in August of 1984. These provide
for additional sanctions against countries supporting
terrorism or maintaining unsafe airports and authorize
additional funds for the ATA program and research and
development on equipment to detect explosives.
Talking Points:
o Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon which is becoming
increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported.
Terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the
international political landscape for the rest of the century.
It directly attacks our democratic values and interests and
our diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions to conflict.
o The nature of the international terrorist threat is evolving.
Recent developments include the rise of state-supported
terrorism through the use of surrogates.
o The number of terrorist attacks has been increasing. There
were more than 800 terrorist incidents last year, compared
with an annual average of about 500 in previous years. During
recent months, we have seen the bombing of TWA 840, and a
discotheque in West Berlin. However, the raid on Libya has
sent an unmistakable signal to terrorists and sponsors of
terrorism that the U.S. will not stand idly by in the face of
attacks or threats against Americans.
o Terrorist attacks are likely to become increasingly violent --
the number of casualties and fatalities generally has grown
with the number of incidents.
o A broader spectrum of citizens is likely to fall victim to
terrorism, as exemplified in the Rome and Vienna airport
attacks in December 1985.
o This is not solely an American problem; terrorism has been
directed against a broad range of countries. Nonetheless, the
U.S. is a prime target of terrorist acts overseas due to our
extensive official and commercial global presence. Our
citizens and facilities are readily accessible, our democracy
and freedoms are directly opposed to the interests of many
terrorist groups.
o U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocable: we will make no
concessions to terrorists. We will pay no ransoms, nor will
we permit releases of prisoners or agree to other acts which
might encourage additional terrorism. We will make no changes
in U.S. policy because of terrorists' threats or acts. In
countering terrorism, we are prepared to act unilaterally or
in conjunction with other nations in a wide range of options
appropriate to the situation at hand.
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o The preemption of terrorist attacks on American targets in
France and Turkey, and the decisive action against Libya after
their sponsorship of the terrorist bombing of the West Berlin
discotheque, demonstrated the increasing effectiveness of the
current U.S. policy on terrorism.
o The Department of State is assigned the lead interagency role
in combatting terrorism outside the United States. The State
Department's Office for Counter-Terrorism deals with the
problems of international terrorism on two levels: in its
coordinating role within the Department of State, and in its
similar role as head of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism.
o In February, the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism published its public report endorsing U.S. policy
against terrorism and recommending additional measures to
improve the national program. A Presidential directive was
signed to implement all of the recommendations.
o Efforts to counter international terrorism include a major
effort within the U.S. Government and with friendly
governments to improve our intelligence on the identity,
objectives, plans, capabilities, and locations of terrorist
organizations. We have increased efforts to inform the
public, both here and abroad, about the international
terrorist threat, and the need to be alert in helping to
combat it.
o Additional unilateral efforts to counter terrorism include
continuing to improvements to the security of U.S.
installations overseas, stepped-up training for U.S employees,
and improvements in the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence information. Laws passed in
recent years, such as the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, (which provides for the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, the Air Marshall program,
and Foreign Airport Security procedures), have also
strengthened the anti-terrorism effort.
o Multilateral steps include the Tokyo Summit declaration
against terrorism; U.N. conventions against attacks on
diplomats and the taking of hostages, and the Summit Seven's
Bonn Declaration, which provides for concentrated action
against states that fail to take appropriate legal action
against hijackers.
o International cooperation in countering terrorism is
imperative. We cannot succeed alone when the threat
originates, and is carried out abroad where other governments
have the principal responsibility for security and law
enforcement.
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o We continue to encourage other countries to take an active
stand -- through diplomatic, legal, and economic means --
against terrorism. They are, after all, frequently as much
the victims of such attacks as we: citizens or installations
of 90 countries were hit by terrorist attacks in 1985.
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NARCOTICS
Issue:
How can the United States reduce the flow of illicit narcotics
from foreign drug-producing and transit countries?
Objectives:
o Increase the awareness of our young people and others of the
dangers of drug use.
o Continue to promote and fund crop eradication and interdiction
operations in source countries.
o Promote and improve international and regional cooperation in
combatting drug trafficking.
o Enhance the enforcement and operational capabilities of drug
law enforcement agencies to counter the growing sophistication
of the drug industry.
Accomplishments:
o Successful crop eradication programs have been carried out in
several producing countries, and aerial surveys -- a necessary
first step toward future eradication programs -- have been
completed in others.
o Carefully targeted and U.S.-supported interdiction operations
in Latin America have resulted in unprecedented seizures of
cocaine and destruction of processing laboratories.
o President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD), announced by Vice President Bush in June, 1986, which
states that the narcotics issue is a threat to our national
security, and which recommends greater involvement of our
Defense Department in battling the flow of narcotics into the
United States.
o The President's establishment of the National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System has greatly improved the collection,
assessment, and sharing of narcotics information, and has
resulted in improved interdiction operations in the Caribbean.
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o The Congress significantly strengthened U.S. narcotics
enforcement efforts when it enacted the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act. Among its important drug-related provisions, the
law establishes a Cabinet-level board to develop
Government-wide drug enforcement programs and coordinate the
efforts of the various Federal agencies; increases the
penalties for drug offenses to include up to 20 years of
imprisonment and fines of $250,000 for offenses involving even
small amounts of heroin, cocaine, and certain hallucinogens;
revises criminal and civil forfeiture laws to permit
forfeiture in all felony drug cases and allows the Government
to seize more property; and strengthens the Government's
efforts to detect and deter drug money-laundering.
o Two First Ladies' Conferences here on drug abuse in April and
October 1985 have helped to raise awareness of the growing
internationalization of the drug trade, and have resulted in
many first ladies becoming actively involved in promoting drug
control and awareness in their own countries.
o A number of countries have become actively involved in the
United Nations effort to call attention to the global
dimensions of the drug abuse and trafficking issue; a World
Conference on Narcotics has been scheduled for June, 1987 in
Vienna.
o Narcotics activities across national borders are stimulating
bilateral and regional cooperation against it. Several Latin
American countries have already dealt setbacks to growers and
traffickers by staging joint operations against them.
o Cooperation on drug trafficking was an item which was
discussed and agreed upon at the Economic Summit in Tokyo this
year.
Talking Points:
o Despite more successful U.S. and foreign drug interdiction
efforts, the amount of drugs entering the United States
continues to rise. The criminal trafficking organizations
behind this increase are using the wealth acquired through
narcotics to subvert drug control and economic, political, and
security institutions in many countries.
o Drug crop production is expanding in several countries and is
spreading to others not equipped to halt it. Growers are
developing more scientific techniques and obtaining higher
yields than ever before.
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o Several countries have initiated successful crop control and
eradication programs that have substantially reduced harvests.
In some cases, these gains have been offset by resurgent
narcotics activities in countries whose once-successful
control programs were subverted by graft, violence, and other
countermeasures, and in countries whose governments have
little or no control over the countryside.
o The immense profits realized by the drug trade have prompted
criminal trafficking organizations to resort to violence to
protect their industry. These organizations strike at U.S.
and foreign symbols of law and order at all levels to
intimidate governments and thwart control programs.
o Governments also face threats to their security from terrorist
and insurgent involvement in drug trafficking. These groups
use narcotics as a lucrative and usually non-traceable method
of obtaining funds to further their anti-government goals.
o Rising drug abuse has now affected many Western and other
consuming countries, prompting them to seek international
solutions. Although an effective and coordinated worldwide
strategy is still several years away, the increased attention
devoted to the narcotics issue has already led to tougher laws
and more effective enforcement in many countries.
o Two First Ladies' Conferences on drug abuse hosted by Mrs.
Reagan during 1985 helped to raise awareness at home and
abroad of the growing internationalization of the drug trade,
and the dangers it poses to the world's young people. Mrs.
Reagan also travelled to Southeast Asia in late 1985, focusing
attention on the international parents movement which has
expanded dramatically during the past few years.
o Effective drug control will require patience and a long-term
commitment, and its goals will sometimes be affected by
competing foreign policy objectives. Because those who
traffic in drugs are so adept at exploiting weaknesses and
vulnerabilities, gains in one country will frequently be
offset by setbacks in others. Unless we persevere despite the
inevitable setbacks, the international drug trade will have
the potential to undermine our society, and that of other
friendly governments.
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ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
The United States is seeking to negotiate meaningful, effectively
verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that
reduce the arsenals and risks of war and enhance U.S. security.
Objectives:
o Reduce the risks of war between East and West, particularly
nuclear war, while maintaining our freedom and that of our
Allies.
o Negotiate arms reduction agreements which, in the President's
words, provide for "deep cuts, no first-strike advantages,
defensive research -- because defense is much safer than
offense -- and no cheating."
o Ensure that arms control remains an integral component of a
comprehensive, coherent security policy that includes the
maintenance of credible deterrent forces.
o Promote compliance with existing arms control accords.
o Ensure that the panoply of arms control efforts deals with the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
systems.
o Support expanded membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to
additional countries.
Accomplishments:
This Administration has the most far-reaching arms control agenda
in U.S. history. Arms control issues were extensively discussed
when President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva in November 1985.
Even though our two nations still profoundly disagree over the
relationship between strategic offense and defense, we made
progress at the Geneva Summit on many arms control issues. Both
sides agreed in principle on 50 percent reductions in U.S. and
Soviet nuclear weapons, on accelerating our work at the Geneva
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, and on seeking an interim agreement
on limiting Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) missile
systems. We also agreed in principle on the need for progress in
other arms control-related areas, as explained below.
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When the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed in January 1985 to
resume arms reduction negotiations at Geneva, the Administration
developed a three-phased strategic concept as the heart of its
approach to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: (1) near-term
significant reductions in nuclear arms and the stabilization of
the offense-defense relationship; (2) a period of transition to a
more stable world, with a reduced reliance on nuclear arms and
greater reliance on non-nuclear defenses against nuclear arms;
and (3) the eventual complete elimination of nuclear arms.
START: The highest U.S. priority stemming from this long-term
goal remains to strengthen stability through substantial,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic forces below
the levels set in SALT II, focusing on the most destabilizing
elements (the ballistic missiles and their warheads). The U.S.
position, which builds on the approach of the Soviets calling for
50% reductions, calls for 4500 ballistic missile warheads of
which no more than 3000 would be on ICBMs, a 50% reduction in
ballistic missile throw-weight, and limits on ALCMs to 1500. The
U.S. is also prepared to accept limits of 1250-1450 on ballistic
missiles, and 350 heavy bombers. U.S. proposals reflect
carefully considered objectives for a stable relationship with
the Soviet Union, and U.S. negotiators keep these objectives in
mind in evaluating any Soviet counter-proposals. U.S.
negotiators have unprecedented flexibility to explore alternative
methods of reduction, to explore tradeoffs which would not
dictate Soviet or U.S. force structure, and to discuss Soviet
proposals in areas where differences exist.
INF: We proposed far-reaching arms control accords in the
negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces prior to the
Soviet walkout in November 1983, and reiterated those proposals
when INF talks resumed in March 1985. We further made a major
proposal in November 1985, for an interim agreement reducing
LRINF missiles approximately 50% and another in February 1986, to
eliminate LRINF missiles world-wide in three phases by the end of
1989. There are now nearly 600 Soviet longer-range INF missiles
(LRINF) -- including 441 SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three
highly accurate warheads. As of December 1985, the United States
had deployed 236 of the 572 Pershing II and ground launched
cruise missiles envisioned in the 1979 dual-track decision. We
have continued at Geneva to seek an effectively verifiable
agreement on the elimination of all LRINF missiles, or the
reduction to the lowest possible equal global levels of warheads.
We are also prepared to explore different approaches leading to a
zero-global ceiling and to consider serious Soviet proposals that
meet U.S. and Allied security concerns.
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Defense and Space: In the Defense and Space negotiations,
we are examining ways to strengthen deterrence by moving away
from sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation, and
toward greater reliance on defenses which will threaten no one.
We also have been discussing our view of the offense-defense
relationship, Soviet actions which are eroding the ABM Treaty,
and Soviet non-compliance with this and other existing agreements
with respect to both offensive and defensive forces. We will
continue to press for Soviet compliance and corrective action in
cases where there is non-compliance. While some issues posed by
SDI are for the future, we are nonetheless prepared now to
discuss defense and space arms and the broader question of
strategic defense, including existing Soviet defenses and systems
based in space, as well as systems based on earth which can reach
space. We have proposed, as a confidence-building measure,
reciprocal site visits by U.S. and Soviet governmental experts to
facilities in both countries where strategic defense research is
being conducted.
MBFR: In December 1985, the West propsed a major new initiative
designed to break the 13-year deadlock at the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) in Vienna. In drafting the
proposal, the West accepted portions of the East's February 1985
proposal. In particular, we proposed to proceed directly to a
first-phase reduction of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops from
Central Europe without prior agreement on data, which the East
had claimed was the primary obstacle to an agreement. The West
also proposed a three-year, no-increase commitment for the
remaining forces of each alliance. Thirty annual inspections (of
which 5 could be by air and 25 on the ground), would be allowed
to verify that the terms of the agreement were being complied
with. so far, the east has not responded adequately to the
western proposal. in April, Secretary General Gorbachev proposed
a new conventional arms control zone stretching from "the
Atlantic to the Urals," a principle repeated on June 11, 1986, in
the "Budapest Appeal" following a Warsaw Pact summit meeting.
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CDE: At the 35-nation conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) that
opened in Stockholm in January 1984, the U.S. and other Western
Nations proposed a package of concrete measures that would make
military activities in Europe more open and would make it more
difficult to launch a surprise attack or intimidate others by
using military force. In June 1984, the President announced that
we would consider a Soviet proposal on non-use of force in Europe
if the Soviets would seriously negotiate with us on the Western
package of confidence-building measures. in May 1985, the
president repeated this offer in his address to the european
Parliament in Strasbourg. Also in 1985, the U.S. and NATO
presented their complete package of confidence and
security-building measures in language appropriate for a final
agreement. These measures, if adopted by the conference, would
give concrete, new meaning to the non-use of force principle
enshrined in the u.n. charter and the helsinki final act. at the
November 1985 Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet union agreed to
work with the other CDE participants toward an early and
successful conclusion of the conference. The CDE participants
began drafting a concluding document in January 1986, although
progress has been slow due to Soviet delay in addressing key
issues of thresholds for notification of military activists and
inspection provisions. The CDE will conclude its work on
September 19, 1986, and report its results to its parent CSCE
review conference beginning in Vienna this November.
cw: in april, 1984, the u.s. proposed to the 40-nation
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a comprehensive treaty
banning development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling
of chemical weapons, to be monitored through far-reaching
challenge inspection procedures. The Soviets have yet to make a
serious, detailed response to the U.S. draft treaty, but they
agreed at the Geneva Summit in November 1985 to join us in
accelerating work to conclude an effective and verifiable
international convention on this issue and to intensify bilateral
discussions at the experts level on all aspects (including
verification) of such a ban.
Nuclear Testing: While we are actively investigating
technologies that may one day make the U.S. less dependent on
offensive nuclear weapons for our security, nuclear weapons will
remain for the foreseeable future the key element of our
deterrent. In such a situation, where both the U.S. and our
Allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression,
nuclear testing will continue to be required.
The U.S. places its highest priority in the nuclear testing area
on finding ways of ensuring effective verification of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty (PNET). The U.S. has made several specific
suggestions to the Soviet Union in this regard.
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-- In 1983, the U.S. Government sought to engage the Soviet
Union in a discussion of essential verification
improvements on three separate occasions.
-- In September 1984, President Reagan proposed an exchange of
Soviet and U.S. experts to measure directly the yields of
tests of nuclear weapons at each other's test sites.
-- In July 1985, President Reagan invited Soviet experts to
observe a U.S. nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site,
bringing with them any instrumentation devices they deemed
necessary to measure test yield.
-- In December 1985, President Reagan proposed to General
Secretary Gorbachev that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuclear
testing limitations meet in February 1986 to discuss our
respective verification approaches and to address initial
tangible steps to resolve this issue.
-- On March 14, 1986, the President urged the Soviet Union to
join the U.S. in discussions on finding ways to reach
agreement on essential verification improvement of the TTBT
and PNET. In this respect, he provided details to the
Soviet Union on the U.S. "CORRTEX" hydrodynamic measurement
system, and proposed that General Secretary Gorbachev send
Soviet scientists to our Nevada Test Site in April to fully
examine CORRTEX. At that time, the Soviets could also
monitor a U.S. nuclear test. Finally, the President
indicated that if the Soviet Union would join us in an
agreement for effective verification, including the use of
CORRTEX, the U.S. would be prepared to move forward on
ratification of the TTBT and PNET.
o On July 25, 1986, exports from the U.S. and the Soviet Union
began discussions on nuclear testing limitations. The
President remains convinced that our two nations can find
common ground on the nuclear testing issue.
o The U.S. has also supported discussion, but not negotiations
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, of verification
and compliance issues related to a comprehensive test ban
(CTB). A CTB remains a long-term objective of the United
States in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms
reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities,
expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in
conventional forces, and at a time when a nuclear deterrent is
no longer as essential an element for international security
and stability. The U.S. is currently involved in discussions
with the Soviet Union in these areas.
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Non-Proliferation: We continue to seek strengthened
international safeguards to prevent further proliferation. The
NPT review conference that met in Geneva in September 1985
produced a consensus document strongly endorsing the Treaty, an
action that serves to strengthen U.S. non-proliferation efforts.
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed both
countries' commitment to the Treaty at the Geneva Summit in
November 1985. They also agreed to additional measures to
enhance the Treaty's effectiveness, including enlarging its
membership and strengthening the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Other Confidence-Building Measures: In June 1984, the U.S.
renewed the U.S.-Soviet agreement to prevent incidents at sea.
In July 1984, a new agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to
improve the Direct Communications Link, or "Hot Line," by adding
a facsimile capability; an agreement on the transfer of U.S.
upgrade equipment to the Soviets was signed in September 1985.
In June 1985, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a "Common
Understanding" to the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement
clarifying their obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear
incident involving unknown or unauthorized parties, including
terrorists. President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev agreed at
the Geneva Summit in November 1985 to study the concept of
establishing nuclear risk reduction centers to further reduce the
chances of conflict between us. Subsequently, exploratory talks
were held with the Soviet Union in May 1986, and follow-up
discussions on this idea are scheduled for late summer.
General Talking Points:
Nuclear War: The President and his Administration have no higher
priority than reducing the risks of war. Nuclear war in
particular, and as both he and General Secretary Gorbachev
explicitly agreed at Geneva, "cannot be won and must never be
fought." We seek arms control agreements that truly enhance
stability and security.
Arms Control: Although we and the Soviets still profoundly
disagree over the relationship between strategic offense and
defense, we did make some progress at the Geneva Summit on arms
control issues. The Administration has a broad arms control
agenda involving far-reaching proposals for arms reductions,
constraints, and confidence-building measures. We are seeking
agreements that are militarily significant, equitable, and
effectively verifiable. In each of our efforts, including a
number of major negotiations, the U.S. and our Western Allies
have made forthcoming new proposals in an effort to achieve
progress.
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Geneva Negotiations: Both sides agreed at the Geneva Summit to
accelerate work at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks. We
still have a long road and tough issues ahead. Patient and
persistent dialogue will continue to be required. We hope that
through this dialogue, we can eventually translate the Summit
agreement in principle on an equitable, verifiable 50% reduction
in both sides' nuclear weapons into agreements that will pave the
way for further deep cuts.
o We have a number of proposals on the table, including the
concept of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear
arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a manner
both equitable and responsible; a detailed, phased approach
for eliminating an entire class of weapons -- the longer-range
intermediate range weapons -- by 1990; and an offer of an
"open laboratories" exchange of visits to facilities
performing strategic defense research. Our negotiators have
presented these proposals in the spirit of the agreement
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last
November in Geneva. Until recently, the Soviet response has
been disappointing.
o Recently, the Soviet negotiators at Geneva have placed on the
table new proposals to reduce nuclear weapons. These new
proposals may signal the beginning of a serious Soviet effort
to seek real arms control. If both sides now genuinely want
progress, this could represent a turning point in our efforts
to build a safer and more peaceful world.
o In the negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet Union agree that
there is a relationship among the different types of arms to
be addressed. Offensive and defensive systems are closely
related and cannot be considered in isolation from each other.
However, progress in any of the three Geneva forums should not
be held hostage to progress in another. A vital task before
us is to strengthen stability by moving over time to a
different kind of strategic relationship, one less dependent
on the threat of nuclear devastation, and more dependent on
defensive systems that threaten no one.
o Other Negotiations: In addition, we are actively involved in
a number of other serious arms control efforts. These include
the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR), the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE),
and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations in Geneva
on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as well as
discussions at the CD on limits on nuclear testing, on outer
space, and in other areas of bilateral and multilateral
concern. Both sides agreed at the Geneva Summit to increase
their efforts to reach effective agreements in these areas.
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o Verification: Verification and compliance are the pacing
elements of arms control today. The primary systems of
verification are the National Technical Means of each side.
U.S. verification capabilities have improved since the late
1970s. In the future, arms control accords will continue
relying on National Technical Means as the primary
verification tools, but they will also require on-site
inspection, a form of verification of proven value which both
Governments have long accepted.
o Compliance: The U.S. is seriously concerned about Soviet
noncompliance with existing agreements. The three key
strategic arms violations are the Krasnoyarsk radar (ABM
Treaty), the SS-25 and telementry encryption (SALT II). The
President's December 1985 Report to the Congress on Soviet
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements states that past
and present U.S. Government studies support its conclusion
that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. The Soviet
Union has violated its legal obligation under or political
commitment to the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk radar); the SALT I
Interim Agreement (use of "remaining facilities" at former
SS-7 sites); the SALT II Treaty (SS-25, telemetry encryption,
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle limits, concealment of
missile/launcher association); the Limited Test Ban Treaty
(nuclear test venting); the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons
(offensive BWC program and use in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan); and the Helsinki Final Act (exercise
notification provisions). In addition, the USSR has likely
violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (150 kt
limit). Of eighteen issues studied in the unclassified
report, there were nine clear violations, including four
involving the SALT II Treaty. In addition, we are concerned
about possible Soviet preparations for a prohibited
territorial ABM defense. The compliance picture was found to
have improved in two cases -- SS-16 and Backfire bomber
production rates. We must insist that the Soviets rectify
those areas where they are in violation, as their failure to
do so has serious consequences for the arms control process.
For our part, we are continuing to carry out our own
obligations and commitments, and will continue to seek
effective verification and compliance measures in all arms
control efforts we undertake.
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o U.S. Interim Restraint Policy: The U.S. will continue to
exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic
deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere
for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both
sides. With the dismantlement of two Poseidon SSBNs in May
1986, the U.S. will remain in technical compliance with SALT
until late in 1986, when the 131st heavy bomber is equipped
for ALCMs. If the U.S. undertakes additional dismantlements
of strategic weapons, it will be on the basis of an assessment
of U.S. national security interests, judged in light of Soviet
actions and our military and economic requirements, and not on
the basis of SALT. If there is no significant change in the
threat we face as we implement the strategic modernization
program, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads
than does the Soviet Union.
o Confidence-Building Measures: The U.S. has raised and will
continue to pursue with the Soviet Union a wide range of CBM
proposals at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, at the
MBFR negotiations, and at the CDE, as well as in other fora to
help to ensure that war does not erupt because of accident,
miscalculation, or misunderstanding. In July 1984, the Soviet
Union signed what we hope will be the first of several
agreements to this end: an agreement to upgrade the
U.S.-Soviet hotline. At the Geneva Summit, both sides agreed
to study the concept of establishing nuclear risk reduction
centers to further reduce the possibility of conflict between
us. We hope that, over time, the Soviets will work with us to
improve the framework for ensuring against accidental nuclear
war.
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DETERRENCE
Issue:
How can we maintain our ability to deter attack on the U.S. and
our allies, while moving toward a more stable world with lower
levels of nuclear forces?
Objectives:
o Maintain our ability to deter war today and to reduce the risk
of war or coercion by the threat to use force.
o Move away from deterrence based exclusively on the threat of
nuclear retaliation, to an enhanced deterrence based on the
increasing contribution of defensive systems; primarily
non-nuclear systems, that threaten no one.
Accomplishments:
o Through our strategic, intermediate-range nuclear, and
conventional forces modernization programs, we have begun to
remedy the significant vulnerabilities in those forces --
which were inherited in 1981. This will permit us to maintain
deterrence today and into the near future.
o The Strategic Defense Initiative, a broad-based research
program, will provide future options for moving away from
deterrence based on nuclear retaliation and toward a safer,
more secure and more stable deterrent.
Talking Points:
o Deterrence is the cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy. We deter by ensuring that the leadership of all
potential aggressors is aware of our policy to maintain forces
adequate to deny an aggressor his basic war aims and, through
retaliation, make the costs of aggression far outweigh any
potential benefits.
o The President has emphasized that a nuclear war "cannot be won
and must never be fought." Our recognition of this fact is
not sufficient to prevent nuclear war; we must be certain that
the Soviet leadership understands it as well.
o Deterrence based on nuclear retaliation has worked for over 30
years. However, Soviet improvements in both their offensive
forces and their own strategic defenses, if unanswered, will
erode deterrence.
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o Our strategic modernization program is designed to ensure our
ability to deter today. The SDI program seeks to create a
better basis for deterrence in the future.
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STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States close the gap between its strategic
capabilities and those of the Soviet Union?
Objectives:
o Redress the most serious weaknesses in our current strategic
posture.
o Provide incentive to the Soviets to negotiate meaningful arms
reductions that promote strategic stability.
Accomplishments:
o In 1981, the President recognized the need for strategic
modernization, and as a result, proposed a five-part,
mutually-reinforcing program to restore the strategic
balance.
o The five-point program directed the Department of Defense to:
Improve U.S. strategic defenses; design and deploy
improvements to our command-and-control system to ensure
positive control to further reduce the risk of war; design and
produce a cost-effective Peacekeeper intercontinental
ballistic missile; refine and improve the basic design of the
B-1 strategic bomber and place it into series production;
select a design and develop an Advanced Technology Bomber
(ATB), and an advanced cruise missile (ACM), to complete the
basic modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force
of the 1990s and beyond; deploy a Trident submarine, and
develop an improved Trident II/D-5 submarine-launched
ballistic missile system and a nuclear-armed SLCM.
o A major change to the President's program was incorporated
after its initiation: at the recommendation of the Scowcroft
Commission, work was initiated on a Small ICBM for deployment
in the 1990s in addition to the Peacekeeper.
o Significant progress has been made on all five of the
Strategic Initiatives.
o Improvements to the Strategic Command-and-Control system are
being implemented.
o The B-1 is now being deployed to operational bases months
ahead of schedule and below cost. Research on the ATB is on
or ahead of schedule. The advanced cruise missile has been
placed into production.
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o The first 42 Peacekeeper missiles are in production, and the
Peacekeeper missile has had twelve successful test launches,
including the first test from a silo.
o Research on the D-5 missile is on schedule and the
nuclear-armed SLCM has been deployed.
o Improvements to our strategic air defenses are being
implemented.
Talking Points:
o Strategic modernization is required to redress the serious
weaknesses in our strategic posture caused by the massive
Soviet build-up of strategic forces over the past 10 to 15
years -- a period of U.S. restraint in deployment of strategic
systems. It is also needed to restore our deterrent strength,
and to provide strong incentives to the Soviets to negotiate
genuine arms reductions.
o Under President Reagan's leadership, a five-part, mutually
reinforcing strategic modernization program has been
initiated. Significant progress has already been made in a
number of areas.
o Strategic communications-and-control systems are being
improved to ensure that we could employ our nuclear forces
effectively, which is essential to a credible deterrent.
o Bomber modernization is underway to reduce the risks
associated with the aging and potentially vulnerable B-52
force.
o Sea-based forces, currently the most survivable leg of our
strategic Triad, are being modernized and a new Trident has
been deployed.
o Our land-based missile force is being modernized to remedy an
important part of the strategic imbalance. This modernization
is critical because of the important contributions of the ICBM
which include: prompt hard target capability; secure
command-control-and-communications; rapid re-targeting; high
alert rate; and low operations and support costs (only 12
percent of the total cost for the entire Triad).
o The President's strategic modernization program is an
essential element in helping us meet our arms control
objectives. We have stated that we are willing to negotiate
trade-offs in each side's advantages and a build-down of
strategic systems leading to significantly lower and more
stable strategic forces. We seek to reach an equitable and
verifiable arms control agreement in the talks under way in
Geneva.
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ICBM MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States maximize the effectiveness of the
ground-based portion of the strategic Triad in support of
credible deterrence?
Objectives:
o Modernize the aging U.S. ICBM force through the deployment of
100 Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a new small
mobile ICBM.
Accomplishments:
o The Peacekeeper test program has been an outstanding success:
All test objectives have been met or exceeded, and
accuracy/reliability results have been excellent.
o 50 Peacekeeper missiles have been approved for silo deployment
in Minuteman silos. Research is underway for a more
survivable basing mode for an additional 50 missiles, pursuant
to the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Act.
o Production has been approved and initiated on the first 42
Peacekeeper missiles, and work in connection with the
deployment of the first 50 missiles in existing Minuteman
silos at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, is progressing
on schedule. All other requirements for an operational
deployment of Peacekeeper in 1986 are on schedule.
o Development of the small ICBM has begun, and is on schedule
for a possible deployment in the early 1990's.
Talking Points:
o ICBM modernization is essential to the viability of the
strategic Triad of bombers, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and ICBMs that has kept the peace for well over two
decades.
o The President has endorsed the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission to deploy the Peacekeeper
missile as soon as possible and develop a small ICBM, while
vigorously pursuing arms control.
o Peacekeeper is the only near-term ICBM that can help restore
the strategic imbalance that developed as the Soviets
modernized during a period of U.S. restraint.
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o In the late 1970s, the Soviets modernized their ICBM force
through the deployment of a new generation of MIRVed ICBMs,
150 SS-17 missiles, 308 SS-18 missiles and 360 SS-19 missiles.
More recently, they began deployment of the mobile SS-25 and
are continuing preparations to deploy the MIRVed mobile SS
X-24. The U.S. has deployed no new systems during this
period.
o Peacekeeper deployment is an important element in
demonstrating U.S. resolve to maintain its modernization
program consistent with national security objectives, while
pursuing deep reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals at
the Geneva talks. Failure to deploy Peacekeeper would remove
no incentive for the Soviets to undertake serious negotiations
aimed at limiting and reducing strategic systems.
o Peacekeeper deployment is a vital first step in a logical,
comprehensive, and progressive approach toward permitting us
and encouraging the Soviets to move toward smaller,
survivable, and more stable systems at lower levels of forces.
Without Peacekeeper, the Soviets have little incentive to move
in this direction in the near term. With ICBM modernization,
stability and deterrence will be enhanced well into the
twenty-first century.
o A new single warhead small ICBM is also required. Each of
these ICBMs represents a low-target value from a Soviet
attack-plan perspective. A flexible and survivable basing
mode is being developed as a complement to a small ICBM.
(Current emphasis is on a hard mobile concept).
o The Secretary of Defense will be reporting to the President at
the end of the year on the best basing mode and missile
configuration for the small ICBM. The small ICBM will begin
full-scale engineering development in December 1986.
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STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Issue:
How can the United States attain its long-range goal of making
ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete?
Objective:
o Continue intensive research into the potential of advanced
defensive technologies to support a future U.S. decision on
whether to develop and deploy an effective defense against
ballistic missiles.
Accomplishments:
o On March 23, 1983, the President directed that research within
the limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty go forward on
neutralizing all ballistic missile threats.
o Early feasibility studies determined that advanced
technologies showed promise for providing an effective
anti-ballistic missile defense and that such defenses could
enhance deterrence, stability, and prospects for offensive
nuclear arms reductions. The studies recognized that
uncertainties could only be resolved through further research.
As a result, defense experts recommended a vigorous research
program designed to answer the remaining questions as to
whether an effective defense is feasible.
o After consulting with key military and civilian advisors, the
President directed that an accelerated research effort be
conducted. The objective is to provide answers that will
permit us to make an informed decision in the early 1990's on
whether to proceed with developing and ultimately deploying
such defensive systems. All research is fully compliant with
our treaty obligations.
o In recognition of the importance of SDI both to the United
States and our Allies, the U.S. extended an offer to our
Allies to participate in SDI research. Agreement on such
participation has been reached with the U.K., West Germany,
and Israel, and may be reached with additional ALLIES AS WELL.
Talking Points:
o The President's Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to explore
the potential of emerging defensive technologies to enhance
deterrence and improve stability by significantly reducing the
military effectiveness of ballistic missiles.
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o The pace of Soviet offensive and defensive strategic military
programs has upset the balance in the areas of greatest
importance during crises. Their modernization of offensive
nuclear forces has been particularly striking.
o When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, it was agreed that a
comprehensive treaty reducing offensive nuclear forces should
parallel it. It was hoped that such a treaty could be
concluded in two years, and certainly within five years. The
U.S. still has not been able to obtain Soviet agreement to
such reductions.
o SALT I and SALT II codified major arms buildups, and allowed
inequalites and ambiguities with respect to verification.
They counted launchers, and limited weapons only indirectly.
Since SALT I was signed in 1972, the Soviets have nearly
doubled their strategic ballistic missile warheads from about
5000 to about 9000. The SALT structure has not reduced the
Soviet buildup.
o The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its strategic
ballistic missile forces has steadily eroded the survivability
of our land-based retaliatory forces.
o The President's Strategic Defense Initiative addresses his
deep conviction that "certainly, there should be a better way
to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away from a
future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and
massive retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive
systems which threaten no one."
o On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced his decision to
take an important first step toward this goal by directing the
establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative research
program.
o The Soviets have long been engaged in an intense strategic
defense research program, including the world's only existing
ABM system in Krasnoyarsk, deployed around Moscow; violating
the ABM treaty.
o The Soviet offensive nuclear build-up has eroded the
foundation on which deterrence has long rested. In concert
with their massive and newly modernized offensive forces and
already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, the
possibility of a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty -- which
the Soviet Union is already violating -- poses a serious new
threat to U.S. and Allied security.
o At a minimum, the SDI program is a prudent response to the
very active Soviet research and development activities in this
field, and it provides insurance against Soviet efforts to
develop and deploy unilaterally an advanced defensive system.
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o The U.S Strategic Defense Initiative research program is fully
consistent with the ABM treaty, emphasizes advanced,
non-nuclear defensive technologies with the aim of finding
better ways of deterring aggression, strengthening stability,
and increasing the security of the United States and its
Allies.
o The research will provide to a future President and a future
Congress, possibly in the early 1990s, the technical knowledge
required to support a decision on whether to develop and later
deploy advanced strategic defensive systems.
o SDI offers us, our Allies, and the world in general the
possibility of radically altering today's dangerous trends by
moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence. It would
allow us to move away from reliance on the threat of nuclear
retaliation to deter aggression, and towards an enhanced
deterrence based upon defensive capability that threatens no
one.
o In the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks,.our priority is in
obtaining Soviet agreement to significant reductions in
offensive nuclear weapons and in reversing the erosion of the
ABM Treaty. We also seek to engage the Soviets in discussion
of the offense-defense relationship and our view of how a
transition to increased reliance on defense could enhance
mutual security and strategic stability.
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ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
How can the United States best protect its interests in space and
strengthen deterrence?
Objectives:
o Ensure that we have a full range of options for protecting our
military and civil systems deployed in space.
o Deploy a U.S. anti-satellite capability (the MV - Miniature
Vehicle System), and develop other space systems and
capabilities, as well as negotiate agreements that maintain
and strengthen deterrence in these areas.
Accomplishments:
o U.S. National Space Policy, announced by the President on July
4, 1982, states that the United States will consider
verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban
or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons
systems, should those measures be compatible with U.S.
national security.
o With U.S. support, a specialized ad hoc committee to consider
issues relevant to space arms control, without a negotiating
mandate, was formed in the forty-nation Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva. The mandate for this Committee is
largely that proposed by the U.S. and its Allies over a year
ago, and focuses on legal and verification issues.
o In March 1984, the Administration submitted a comprehensive
report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control,
which pointed out factors that impede identification of
effective ASAT arms control measures. These include
verification difficulties, diverse sources of threats to U.S.
and Allied satellites, and threats posed by Soviet targeting
and reconnaissance satellites. The report also indicated that
the U.S. would continue to study selected limits on specific
types of systems or activities.
o The U.S. ASAT Program under development has made significant
technical progress: the ASAT Boost System and its miniature
vehicle have been tested in space; and a successful test has
been made against a satellite target in space.
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o Research continues on technologies with potential for ASAT
use, including directed energy weapons and space tracking
technology.
o Survivability of U.S. space assets is being upgraded through
the development of measures which reduce or eliminate the
effectiveness of Soviet ASAT systems.
o On March 12, 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union began
talks on space and nuclear arms with the objectives of
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth,
at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening
strategic stability.
Talking Points:
o The Soviets introduced their ASAT system over a decade ago.
Today it is the world's only operational ASAT system.
o Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational
orbital interceptor system; ground-based test lasers with
probable ASAT capabilities; possibly the nuclear-armed Galosh
ABM interceptors (if modified); and the technological
capability for electronic warfare (jamming) against space
systems.
o The operational Soviet ASAT system threatens U.S. low-altitude
satellites.
o The 1978-1979 ASAT arms control talks'revealed major
U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought
space arms control issues into sharper focus. Problems in
space arms control include: verification difficulties; high
risk of Soviet break-out due to existing Soviet ASAT
capabilities and research; difficulties in defining space
weapons, since many ground-based systems have space capability
and manned space systems have extreme flexibility; and the
fact that the Soviets have deployed ASAT systems, whereas we
have not.
o The Soviets' proposal in the 1983 UNGA for an ASAT arms
control treaty lacked provisions for effective verification,
was unclear with regard to Soviet targeting satellites, and
did not deal with residual ASAT capabilities. This moratorium
proposal seemed clearly designed to block tests of the U.S.
ASAT, while allowing the USSR to maintain its monopoly with
the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system. The
Soviets essentially reiterated these same proposals in June
1984, in connection with their proposal for talks in Vienna in
September 1984, and again in March 1986, at the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
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o The U.S. is prepared in the Defense and Space Negotiations
Group in the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to consider Soviet
proposals, and to present ideas of its own on this complex
subject. So far the Soviet proposal for a ban on ASAT testing
and deployment suffers from the same defects as their earlier
proposal.
o The U.S. Congress has imposed a unilateral ban on testing the
U.S. ASAT against a target in space. This ban leaves the
Soviets with a monopoly in ASAT capability and should be
lifted as soon as possible.
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SPACE
Issue:
How can the United States capitalize on the full potential of the
medium of space in satisfying overall national interests?
Objectives:
o Strengthen the security of the United States.
o Maintain U.S. space leadership.
o Benefit economically, politically and scientifically by
exploiting space.
o Expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil
and commercial space-related activities.
o Promote international cooperative activities in space that are
in the national interest.
o Work with other nations to preserve the freedom of space for
all activities that enhance the security and welfare of
mankind.
Accomplishments:
o On July 4, 1982, President Reagan signed the National Space
Policy to guide the conduct of our space program. The policy
states that our space program will be conducted according to a
set of principles.
o We are committed to the exploration and use of space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind.
o We reject any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer
space, celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and reject
any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data from
space.
o We consider the space systems of any nation to be national
property, with the right of passage through, and operations in
space without interference.
o We encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities, technology, and systems for national economic
benefit.
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o We will conduct international cooperative space-related
activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political,
economic, or national security benefits for the Nation.
o Our space program will be comprised of two separate, distinct,
and strongly interacting programs -- national security and
civil security.
o The Space Transportation System (STS) is the primary space
launch system for both national security and civil government
missions.
o We will pursue activities in space in support of our right of
self-defense.
o We will continue to study space arms control options.
o Our Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy, which was issued
on August 6, 1982, promulgates broad U.S. objectives in
international space cooperation, and provides policy on space
launch and technology assistance.
o The President has directed the maintenance of orbiter
production through manufacturing structural and component
spares.
o In May 1983, the President established a policy to facilitate
the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). A
Senior (Space) Interdepartmental Group study subsequently led
to establishing procedures for licensing commercial space
launches and giving lead-agency responsibility to the
Department of Transportation.
o Following the completion of an interdepartmental study, the
President announced in his State of the Union Address on
January 25, 1984, that developing the frontier of space, would
be one of the four major goals for the U.S. in the 1980s. He
announced that: the U.S. will develop a permanently-manned
space station and place it in orbit within a decade; our
friends and Allies are invited to join us, we have now
included Allied scientists in the program; and we would
implement a number of initiatives designed to promote private
sector investment in space.
o At the Bonn Economic Summit in May 1985, we received positive
responses from the European Space Agency, Canada, and Japan to
participate in the U.S.-Manned Space Station program.
o On July 20, 1984, the President announced 13 initiatives to
encourage commercial activity in space.
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o On August 15, 1984 the President approved a National Space
Strategy. The Strategy implements the National Space Policy
by providing 17 priorities for the U.S. Space Program in the
STS, Civil Space, Commercial Space, and National Security
Space areas. Seven follow-on efforts to further implement the
policy are directed.
o On February 25, 1985, the National Security Launch Strategy
was issued. It authorizes the Department of Defense to
procure a limited number of ELVs in order to maintain assured
access to space. It also directs a joint Defense-NASA study
on the development of a second-generation space transportation
system that would be a follow-on to the Shuttle.
o On July 30, 1985, the President approved a plan for
implementing full cost recovery of foreign and commercial
Shuttle flights occurring after October 1, 1988. In approving
this plan, the President directed that the price charged to
DOD for Shuttle flights would be negotiated separately from
that charged under the foreign and commercial policy, and
would include appropriate compensation for DOD services
rendered in connection with Shuttle flights.
o On January 28, 1986, the Shuttle orbiter Challenger was
destroyed shortly after lift-off, killing all seven astronauts
on board. On February 3, 1986, the President established an
accident investigation commission to determine the cause of
the Challenger loss. On February 5, 1986, the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs directed a study
to determine what measures to take to reconstitute the U.S.
space launch capability. On May 15, 1986, the President was
briefed on reconstitution of space launch capability findings.
On June 13, the President instructed the Administrator of NASA
to report back in 30 days as to how he would implement
commission findings. On June 20, the Congress passed an FY 86
urgent supplemental funding bill which provided DOD and NASA
sufficient funds to begin reestablishing the U.S. space launch
capability. On July 7, 1986, the Economic Policy Council was
tasked to take 60 days to develop a plan that would determine
when and how to transition commercial launch capabilities into
operation.
Talking Points:
o A vigorous and forward-looking space program is one of the
most highly visible and tangible demonstrations of world
leadership.
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o Few other national endeavors have equaled the potential of the
U.S. Space Program to: perform functions in the national
security, domestic and private sectors that either cannot be
performed any other way or cannot be performed as economically
or as well; advance the state-of-the-art in high technology;
elevate the human spirit, capture our imaginations,
demonstrate our pioneering initiative, and hold out hope for a
progressive future for our Nation and all mankind.
o since announcement of his National Space Policy in July 1982,
President Reagan has issued approximately eight directives and
made numerous decisions that will help implement this broad
policy. The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for Space
was established to coordinate the implementation.
o Much remains to be done to set the U.S. Space Program on a
course that ensures U.S. leadership in the decades ahead. By
the President's direction, a National Space Strategy has been
completed, which establishes broad priorities for the U.S.
Space Program and identifies potential issues to be resolved
through follow-on studies.
o Several actions are underway to reestablish the U.S. space
launch capability. They include procuring additional medium
expendable lauch vehicles (MELVs), and larger complementary
expendable launch vehicles (CELVs), requiring satellites to be
dual compatible with either the Shuttle or ELVs, repairing
faulty NASA shuttle launch systems to preclude future failures
similar to the Challenger accident, and preparation of a
transition plan that integrates U.S. commercial launch systems
into the U.S. space launch capability. The President has
indicated his support for a fourth replacement orbiter, but
funding its procurement remains to be resolved.
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MILITARY CAPABILITY/READINESS
Issue:
Are our armed forces more "ready" than in 1980?
Objectives:
o Continue to improve training and skill levels of U.S. forces.
o Reduce longstanding shortages in combat sustainability,
including stock levels of critical consumables.
o Provide modern equipment to enhance combat effectiveness and
survivability.
o Provide better capability to deploy and support forces over
long distances.
o Blend equipment, sustainability, logistics, and manpower
improvements into more combat-capable armed forces.
Accomplishments:
o In force readiness (the ability of forces, weapons systems, to
deliver outputs -- without unacceptable delay -- for which
they were designed), substantial progress has been made in the
past three years, and steady improvement is projected for the
future.
o Since FY 1980, there has been an almost 16 percent increase in
the number of enlisted personnel with four or more years of
service, and the percentage of recruits with high school
diplomas has increased from 68 percent to 93 percent.
o While trends in average training hours/flying days/steaming
days have been steady, or have improved slightly since 1980,
the quality of training has improved considerably.
o Trends in the material condition (mission-capable rates) of
most major weapons categories have been steady or slightly
improving since FY 1980. Now, however, we are supporting
larger numbers of more sophisticated and complex weapons,
operating them for longer periods, and still realizing
readiness improvements in some areas.
o In force sustainability, (the staying power of our forces in
combat), because of the long lead times involved in
procurement, our increased funding from FY 1982-84 for
sustainability has not yet been fully translated into
significantly increased inventories. However, we have
increased the budget allocation by 100 percent over the 1980
level, which will result in increased sustainability.
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o In force structure, (the numbers, size, and composition of our
forces), we have provided for significant increases in the
numbers of some units (divisions, battalions, tactical fighter
wings, Navy aircraft squadrons, and ship battle groups) over
the past four years. The need to provide balance among the
components of military capability within finite resources has
required, however, that revisions in force structure receive a
somewhat lower priority than modernization, readiness, and
sustainability.
o In strategic mobility, we can deliver 25 percent more tonnage
to Europe by air. We have done more to improve sealift since
1981 than in all the years since WW II.
o In force modernization, we have obtained appropriations of
over $27 billion for construction of 34 new major combat
ships. We have funded a substantial increase for procurement
of modern weapons systems for the Army and Marine Corps, e.g.,
for some 3,769 M-1 Abrams tanks; 2,855 Bradley Fighting
Vehicles; 315 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters; 720 Light
Armored Amphibious Vehicles; and 11,057 Stinger missiles. We
can provide 62 percent more air sorties in Europe -- sorties
whose individual effectiveness is improved because they are
flown by newer aircraft carrying more accurate weapons.
o The introduction of more modern, capable, and effective
weapons systems has in some cases been accompanied by a period
of lower apparent readiness, in terms of equipment fill,
during the period of transition when not all of the ancillary
support equipment has been delivered, and there are no
suitable substitutes to offset the shortage. This apparent
reduction in readiness, however, is only temporary and is more
than offset by modernization improvements that enhance overall
capability.
o The Bottom Line: In the professional judgment of each U.S.
Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief, his command is
indeed far more ready "by every measure of common sense" than
it was four years ago.
Talking Points:
o This Administration inherited several acute defense problems
which required immediate attention: There was no
comprehensive plan for strategic modernization; production
rates for many important procurement programs were grossly
inefficient; war reserves were extremely low; and there was an
ongoing "hemorrhage" of skilled manpower. The commitment to
address and resolve these problems appeared to have been
woefully inadequate.
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o This Administration's primary objectives have thus been to
improve near-term training, readiness, and manpower problems;
integrate the modernization of strategic forces; increase
conventional force modernization; and make inroads in the
longstanding deficiencies in combat sustainability.
o Overall, substantial progress has been made in many aspects of
these problems in the past four years, and gradual but steady
improvement is projected in the future. We have more and
better people, they are better trained, and our men and
materiel are better supported.
o We have shown that it is possible to set defense priorities
and to make balanced progress in improving overall military
capabilities.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN NATO
How can the United States best advance the process of modernizing
NATO's weapons to provide an effective and credible deterrent
which supports NATO strategy while preserving the Alliance's
unified approach to modernization?
Objectives
o Continue, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to
deploy long-range intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF) in
accord with the 1979 NATO Decision.
o Maintain an effective and credible nuclear deterrent in NATO
which supports NATO strategy and objectives at the lowest
reasonable inventory level.
o Enhance the utility, survivability, and safety of nuclear
weapons in NATO.
Accomplishments
o The NATO nuclear weapons inventory has been reduced to its
lowest level in twenty years. Following a withdrawal of 1,000
warheads in 1980 as part of the 1979 Dual-Track Decision, we
reached further agreement in 1983 to withdraw 1,400 additional
weapons.
o Alliance unity has been maintained through extensive
consultations throughout INF negotiations. We agree on
negotiating positions and on adherence to measured deployment
of 572 LRINF weapons in the absence of a verifiable, equitable
arms control agreement. Deployment has proceeded on schedule
in the U.K., the FRG, Belgium, and Italy.
o Following Belgian Prime Minister Martens' visit here in
January 1985, followed by a letter to the Prime Minister from
President Reagan, the Belgian Government decided to proceed
immediately with the scheduled deployment of 16 cruise
missiles on its soil. The Belgian Government has agreed to
accept another 32 missiles in late 1987 or 1988.
o In November 1985, the Dutch Government agreed to NATO's
request that it deploy 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands.
The Government announced that deployment would occur in 1988,
and construction of the cruise missile base in the Netherlands
has begun.
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o We continue to explore ways to reach the lowest inventory
level and weapons mix consistent with a credible and effective
nuclear deterrent.
o We have obtained Allied recognition of and support for
improvements in conventional defense capabilities to permit
less reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. U.S.
defense improvements have led the way in reducing the need for
early resort to nuclear weapons.
o A limited but effective modernization program for
shorter-range systems has been developed, to provide needed
capabilities at reduced inventory levels. Modernization also
enhances the accuracy, flexibility, and security of stock-pile
warheads.
Talking Points
o Over the last four years, progress in NATO nuclear weapons
modernization has been substantial. We have reduced the
overall weapons inventory to the lowest level in twenty years,
and in 1983 we reached agreement in the Alliance to withdraw
another 1,400 warheads, plus an additional warhead for each
Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile deployed.
o we have maintained Alliance unity in pursuit of both tracks of
the 1979 Dual-Track Decision. We have negotiated
constructively and flexibly on INF, with full Alliance accord
on our position; we have adhered to a limited and gradual
deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles
in the absence of an equitable and verifiable INF arms control
agreement.
o We have pursued a limited modernization program for other
short-range nuclear warheads, which will allow us and NATO to
maintain a credible, effective theater nuclear deterrent at
the lowest possible inventory level.
o We have led the way in conventional defense improvements in
NATO, and there is Allied agreement on the wisdom of improving
conventional forces and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons
if deterrence fails.
o The United States has undertaken a sustained, expanded, and in
some cases unprecedented, level of consultations with its NATO
Allies. Following recent high-level consultations, the United
States presented a new INF proposal at Geneva that would
permit an "interim" accord reducing INF systems as part of a
longer-term goal of global elimination of such weapons.
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o The NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG), chaired by the
United States, meets regularly and often to review and
coordinate our INF negotiating efforts.
o The NATO High-Level Group (HLG), also chaired by the United
States, also meets frequently to examine critical nuclear
issues facing the Alliance, providing the analysis on which
NATO decisions on these issues have been based.
o The Ministerial-level Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), of which
the United States is a participant, meets semiannually to
discuss nuclear issues in the Alliance.
o The United States also has participated in a series of
bilateral High Level Defense Group meetings with various NATO
partners which have resulted in improved understanding of
defense matters.
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NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Issue:
How should the United States respond to pressures to renounce the
first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict?
Objectives:
o Support NATO strategy of not being the first to use force of
any kind.
o Protect our ability to deter attack by avoiding categorical
assurances that we will never be the first to use nuclear
weapons.
o Deflate the claims that a declaratory policy forswearing the
first-use of nuclear weapons is verifiable or militarily
meaningful, or that it enhances rather than undercuts
stability and security.
Accomplishments:
o The Administration has reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the
principle, embodied in both the U.N. Charter and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter, that we will not be the
first to resort to force of any kind.
o In consultation with our NATO Allies, we also have revalidated
the strategy of flexible response as first and foremost a
deterrence strategy, not an aggressive strategy.
o The U.S. has offered to discuss, in CDE, a reaffirmation of
the principle of non-use of force if the Soviets will enter
serious negotiations about taking concrete steps toward
substantive and verifiable confidence-building measures which
enhance security and lessen the possibility of an outbreak of
war.
Talking Points:
o America's policy on how to promote world peace has
consistently been more inclusive -- and thus potentially more
productive -- than any one declaration on a specific kind of
weapon: we are pledged not to be the first to use force "of
any kind." We are also seeking agreements on major reductions
in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, in limiting conventional
forces, and in banning chemical weapons.
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o Our policy on this issue has been developed in close
consultation with our Allies, especially the other NATO
members. We approach this issue in concert.
o A declaration about non-first-use of nuclear weapons would
undermine the credibility of our deterrent strategy, which is
designed to prevent an aggression, nuclear or conventional,
against the Western democracies, especially in view of the
Warsaw Pact's preponderance in non-nuclear forces.
o Over the last four years, we have devoted considerable energy
and resources to improving conventional defense capabilities.
This will allow us to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons
and maintain a credible overall deterrent -- but from a
posture which enhances overall security rather than placing it
at risk.
o signaling in advance to a potential aggressor who clearly
enjoys a substantial advantage in conventional and chemical
forces how we might -- or might not -- respond to his
aggression could encourage him to see how far he might be able
to go. This would undercut NATO's longstanding deterrence
strategy, thereby actually increasing the chances of nuclear
war.
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