SOVIET ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
TG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
NIO/USSR
X
18
19
20
21
22
Executive ecre ary
17 Oct 86
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88GO1116R001202290001-5
NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Analysis
1. I continue to worry that we are not being creative enough in the
way we are analyzing internal Soviet developments. It seems to me we are
looking at Soviet domestic (social) and economic issues in terms of
relatively straight line projections, based on the methodologies and data
sources that have dominated our analysis in the past, without opening new
lines of inquiry , askin new questions and exploiting previously
underutilized sources.
For example, with respect to new questions,
From talking to people who are
in touch with middle level Soviet officials in one way or
another, I sense that there is a great deal more turbulence and
unhappiness in the Soviet Union than we are conveying in anything
we have written. I am hearing that there is growing restiveness
over Gorbachev's demand that people work harder and drink less
and yet his failure to provide any additional compensations or
measures to ease daily living. If this is true popularly, then
to what degree is it reflected also at lower levels of the Party,
where these demands are joined by the campaign against corruption
and the removal of job security? While I do not disagree with
our analysis that his leadership is not threatened directly, to
what degree may his effectiveness as a national leader and his
internal and foreign policies be affected by a growing and
perceptible undercurrent of resistance and unhappiness both in
the Party and in the population as a whole. Is his honeymoon
over? I just sense from what I hear and read that there is a
great deal more turbulence under the surface in the Soviet Union
than we have conveyed to anyone and that it has potentially
important ramifications for both Gorbachev and us. I just don't
sense that we're digging into this enough.
SEgRET C1 By Signer ,,, n /, ? ? 'n
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88GO1116R001202290001-5 '""'
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5
-- Similarly, with the economy. It seems to me that our work on the
economy still is very traditional. It strikes me that it is less
important that Gorbachev raise the level of GNP growth than the
kind of growth that he is achieving -- that is, the imperative
for modernization. What kind of success is he having here?
Again, this ties back into the first point. How long can he
sustain any improvement with an increasingly disillusioned public
that expected change and doesn't feel that its getting it. In
this connection, I continue to believe that we have not paid
enough attention to emigre Soviet economists and others because
some of the things they say don't square with our economic models
or perceptions -- and this doesn't have to do simply with defense
spending.
-- To what degree, if at all, have we failed to give adequate
attention to what Gorbachev actually has done? While we have
talked about tinkering with the system, has he actually done a
great deal more than that and set in motion even more to create
the possibility of qualitative change in the Soviet system over a
several year period. We seem to be focusing on changes in the
party and government -- what about the economy? Are we missing
some significant changes underway? I am concerned that we are so
caught up in the day to day tactical and discrete changes he is
making and measuring them against some larger objective called
"reform," that we may not be pulling together all the strands in
such a way as to identify the cumulative scope of what he is up
to.
-- I was intrigued when some SOVA analysts told we about the changes
at both the writers and cinematographers congresses. Using these
as a base line, has Gorbachev set in motion a "thaw" in the
Soviet Union, which will be difficult for the Soviet leadership
3. In sum, I am worried that there are a lot of questions that one
hears from Soviet analysts and in discussions with various people that we
are not doing any publishing on. I am concerned that we are in a rut and
may not be recognizing significant change in the Soviet Union even as it
is taking place. I'm not arguing that all these things are true. I just
don't see the issues being addressed in our publications. Everything
seems too pat.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201 1/07/05 :CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88GO1116R001202290001-5
o er Gates
cc: DCI
NIO/USSR
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05 CIA-RDP88G01116R001202290001-5