LETTER TO JIM COURTER FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001001890013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 30, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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tOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCE
ATTACHED: PLEASE TRY NOT TO
REMOVE FROM DOCUMENTS THANKS...
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
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The Director of Central intelligence
30 September 1986
The Honorable Jim Courter
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Jim,
Thanks very much for sending me copies of your
summer output about Star Wars, contras, Angola,
terrorists and Yugoslavs. They are very good and
you should have more people speaking out on these
issues.
Keep up the good work and if I can help you
let me know.
Yours,
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Central Intelligence Agency
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Congress of the 'United states
douse of Representatks
Washington, BT, 20515
ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING
fxcnl~ire '?, ;`,
86- 4159 X
September 15, 1986
The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear The Honorable Casey:
Over the summer I continued work on a variety of national security
issues which may be of interest to you, and I want to take a moment to send
you a selection of new articles.
A number of the enclosures concern two public issues which have much
absorbed our attentions, strategic defense and aid to the freedom fighters
of Nicaragua and Angola. These remain causes of strong interest to the
American people which we have a clear duty to advance during the precious
last years of the Reagan Presidency. Other articles concern another subject
of much past work in this office: terrorism. The long-deserved respite won
by the President's air raid on Libya on April 14 may have come to an end
with the events in Pakistan and Turkey. Now there may be other crimes
against innocent people, and America may again be required to take harsh
action against the states and individuals which are responsible.
If you wish to set aside time to discuss these issues, or others in the
national security area, I would be glad to have you call Kathy Kish at my
office and arrange an appointment.
IM COURTER
Member of Congress
JAC/ch
Enclosures
2422 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING . WASHINGTON, DC 20515 . [phone]
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HumaOEventt
While Soviet `SDI'Moves Ahead
U.S. Contemplates
Surrendering `Star Wars'
By REP. JIM COURTER (R.-N.J.)
Not too long ago, the chief of the
Soviet General Staff, Gen. Nikolai
Chervov, arrived in London to tout the
latest Soviet arms control proposal.
At a press conference and an appear-
ance before the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, Chervov
announced that "on 'Star Wars,' the
Soviet Union has actually made a very
specific compromise." While the pre-
vious Soviet position had been that
"everything was to be banned, includ-
ing research," Chervov said, the new
Soviet position says "let's limit it to
research in laboratories." -
It should be noted that the. 1972 -
ABM treaty already permits SDI-type`
research and even some testing, so the
"new" Soviet proposal is, in a very real
sense, more than 14 years old. Even so,
Chervov's announcement carries with'.
ittheimplirstinn that the Soviet Union
is doing nothing more sinister than SDI
research, and it is the U.S.. that must
rein in. its ambitious strategic defense
program if an arms control agreement
is to be reached.
Unfortunately, the Soviet SDI pro-
posal is evoking murmurs of interest
and even approval from certain quar-
ters within the Reagan Administration.
Specifically, Secretary of State George
Shultz and arms control adviser Paul
Nitze -have reportedly been urging a
positive U.S. response to the Soviet
scheme, either in a presidential letter to
Mikhail Gorbachev or in Geneva when
the arms control talks resume in Sep-
tember. Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger is strenuously opposed.
Apparently the prospect of deep
strategic offensive reductions,
even at the alarming cost of a erip-
Rep. Courser. o ranking member of the House
Armed Services Committee, is one of Congre s'
feeding experts on U.S. and Soviet defense
sysrnms.
WAIN Secretary of State Shultz (1000 sPill Mts wUting to sstlowlY consider sunwndsr-
MFMtt ann Nnw deployawat nt an Ansarleaa- "Stir - Wan" or the Stritiole
ONense Initiative in exchange for a Soviet pledge to cut bock oNeasiw nuclear
arsenals, Defense Secretary Weinberger (right) is rigorously opposed to such a:
proposal
pled SD! program, is so irresistible
that some senior. Administration
Almost 20 years later, it is enlight-
ening to review the strategic.defense ad-
officials are losing their apprecia- vances the Soviets have made, and the
One of the real dangers Involved. ones that they-are likely to make before
In conjunction with their campaign the end of the century.
against our SDI program, the Soviets Soviet SDI efforts can be divided
have become noticeably more modest into three general categories: activities
about their own strategic defense related to the- Moscow ABM system;
accomplishments. But as early as 1%7, deployed systems, for possible nation-
Soviet official publications were brag- wide ABM defenses; and work on ed-
ging about having already licked the
most nettlesome strategic defense chal-
lenges.
"The USSR has far outstripped the
United States not only in the creation of
intercontinental and other rockets, but
also in the area of anti-missile de-
fense," said the authoritative military
publication Soviet Rocket Forces. "In
our country, we have successfully solved
the problem of destruction of rockets
in flight."
How One Man
vanced systems, most notably directed
energy weapons.
All of this work is driven by Soviet
military doctrine, which holds that stra-
tegic defensive forces are to be used to
destroy any incoming strategic offen-
sive weapons which may have survived
the Soviet first strike. The protection
provided by strategic defensive systems
is not expected to be total; only essen-
tial leadership, military and core indus-
trial centers are to be defended on a
left to fend for itself.
The flagship of the Soviet SDI system
is the ABM interceptor system de-
Fought Anti-Business played around Moscow. A major
system upgrade was initiated in 1978
Media. Bias and is due to be completed by 1987. The
completed system will consist of 100
See page 1
0
., .. 16
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In this
issue...
? Court Shreds Reagan's
Civil Rights policies ........ 3
n. ? Will Kerry Filibuster
Aid to Contras? ........... 3
? Grace Reforms
4 Being Blocked ......... .. 3
Pushed In High Schools ..... 4
? Pornography Commission
Issues Final Report ........ 5
? Commissioner Dobson
Blasts the ACLU ........... 6
Adult Bookstores
United to AIDS 6
? Who Made Ted Turner
Secretary of State?
By Howard Cosec 8
"Racial Balance"
Turns Law-Inside-Out
By M. Stanton Evans
Glamorizing Drugs Played
Part in Athletes' Deaths
By John Lotion .
How One Man Fough!
Anti-Business Media Bias
9
10
By Allan C. Brownteld . 1 0
Who Will Succeed
Stroessner in Paraguay?
By Smith Hempstone
Pro-Sandinista
Professor at UCLA
By Les Csorba Ili
Will Yalie Fight
Disciplinary Probation?
By Jeffrey man ............... .. 12
Equal Time for
Evolution and Creation?
By James J. Kilpatrick ....... .. 16
Capital Briefs ............... 2
This Week's News
From Inside Washington ....... 3
Politics '86 ... . ............. 13
Races of. the Week:
Dunn vs. Carr,
Traywkk vs. On .......... 14
BaUengsr vs. Roark ........ 15
Conservative Forum .......... 18
Book Review: Goodbye
To the Low Profile
By Heran schwert= ............ 10
Ral ales:
Senate: REA Loans ........ 18
House: SALT II Limits ...... 19
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S. TO SURRENDER `STAR WARS'? / From page 1
tors at ballistic missile warheads outside the
rth's atmosphere. The GAZELLE launchers
l deploy interceptors designed to stop warheads
thin the atmosphere.
Because only launchers and not the actual inter-
tors are limited by the ABM treaty, the possibil-
exists for the launchers to be reloaded and fired
tin. In fact, two advanced atmospheric ABM
erceptors have been fired from the same test
ncher in less than two hours.
the launchers are supported by a sophisticated
augment, guidance and battle management
far network, designed to maximize the potential
successful warhead intercepts. The new early
rning radar at Pushkino will be the
ell-ringer" for the Moscow ABM system; the
)G HOUSE and CAT HOUSE radars will track
incoming warheads; and the 24 TRY ADD
lars will have actual battle management respon-
ilities.
the Soviet party elite are evidently quite pleased
.h the Moscow ABM system. They awarded one
only three senior military promotions in 1985 to
atoly Konstantinov, the commander of the
)scow Air Defense District, whose primary
ponsibility includes maintenance and improve-
nt of the Moscow ABM system.
4rraved at more than a thousand locations
)und the Soviet Union are the more than 10,000
face-to-air (SAM) missiles and associated
Fars which constitute the Soviet "air defense"
tem. But true "air defenses" are intended to
wart attacks by "air breathing" systems.-such as
atcgimmv`errand eruise missiles. Ow. Chu-
and his colleagues have never explained why,
example, between 1973 and 1975, SAM missiles
re tested 50-60 times at altitudes as high as
),000 feet, when it is well known U.S. bombers
1 cruise missiles fly at much lower altitudes. It
s also never been explained why SAM radars
re used in ABM-related testing activity, which is
trobable violation of the ABM treaty.
Like the Moscow ABM system, the territorial
ense SAM systems and radars are being ex-
uded and modernized. The new SAM missile,
SA- 12, is projected to have the capability to in-
cept shorter-range ballistic missiles, as well as
ne submarine-launched and land-based inter-
itinental ballistic missiles.
Of particular concern is the reported deploy-
-nt of the SA-12 to defend SS-25 mobile
BMs. Consistent with Soviet military doctrine,
SA- 12 could greatly augment the survivability
a mobile ICBM "strategic reserve" force,
mreby enabling the Soviets to execute a second
ike after absorbing a U.S. retaliatory attack.
Incidentally, the deployment of mobile radars to
operate the SA-12 in an ABM mode and the de-
ployment of the SS-25 itself are violations of the
ABM treaty and the SALT II treaty respectively.
A great deal of attention has focused upon the
six new large phased-array Pechora-class radars,
five of which are deployed around the periphery of
the Soviet Union. These radars are intended to pro-
vide early warning of U.S. and Chinese ballistic
missile launches, as well as missile tracking data.
Because five of the radars provide little or no
coverage for the Soviet interior, they are judged to
have little or no ABM capability.
The same cannot be said of the sixth radar, de-
ployed near the town of Krasnoyarsk in the mid-
dle of the Soviet Union. This radar complex is
located 3,700 kilometers east of Moscow and 750
kilometers north of the Mongolian border. But it
is aimed toward the extreme northeastern tip of
the Soviet Union, more than 4,000 kilometers
away.
The Soviets claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar
serves the same early warning function as the five
other radars, but the ABM treaty requires that ear-
ly warning radars be located on the Soviet border
and pointed outward. Consequently, the Kras-
noyarsk radar is widely acknowledged by most
Western observers to be the Soviet Union's most
blatant ABM treaty violation.
More importantly, the location and capabilities
of the Krasnoyarsk radar present the threat of an
evolving ABM battle management radar network.
The Krasnoyarsk radar is located in the vicinity of
deployment area. The radar's coverage "fan" may
include potential U.S. ICBM attack corridors.
The laser weapons program appears to be the
largest of the Soviet exotic SDI efforts. More than
10,000 top scientists and over $1 billion per year
are devoted to laser activity, which is conducted at
six major centers. The largest center, at Sary
Shagan, already boasts two ground-based lasers
which could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites
in low earth orbit. Work is also proceeding on
three kinds of gas lasers, excimer lasers, nuclear
weapon-driven X-ray lasers and argon ion lasers.
These efforts could culminate in a space-based
laser deployment by the year 2000.
The other exotic weapons efforts appear to be
smaller and even.more closely guarded than the
laser program. Particle beam weapons, for in-
stance, have been tested at laboratories in Sarova
and Leningrad. Research on radio frequency
weapons for damaging fragile missile and satellite
electronic components may lead to tests in the
1990s. Guns for firing kinetic energy weapons, or
"smart rocks," were developed in the I960~ and
could be deployed on space platforms in the
mid-1990s.
The military significance of the total Soviet SDI
program is considerable. Successful development
and deployment of increasingly effective SDI
systems, in conjunction with the continued deploy-
ment of sophisticated and mobile strategic offen-
sive forces, would represent the fulfillment of the
Soviet strategic military doctrine; that is, to inflict
maximum damage on the imperialists' offensive
forces and then provide maximum protection for
important military and political assets in the face
of the imperialists' retaliatory strike.
As Mikhail Gorbachev put it recently, "The
interrelationship between offensive and defensive
arms is so obvious as to require no proof."
Gen. Chervov is, no doubt, aware of this inter-
relationship, as well. No one expects the Soviet
Union to abandon its vast and multifaceted SDI
research, development and deployment program.
Similarly, no one should expect the U.S. to aban-
don its embryonic SDI program.
The success or failure of U.S. efforts to build a
defensive system will depend upon the Administra-
tion's ability to resist the siren's song of deep
reductions in exchange for SDI limits.
Certainly, there are those who recall the inviting
-promise of the ABM treaty: strict limits on ABM
activity, in exchange for deep reductions in stra-
tegic arsenals. Those same officials now know the
cost of this treasured belief: The Soviets, through
deceit and strategic arms violations, greatly ex-
arsenal, leaving this nation vulnerable to a Soviet
first strike. The question left unanswered is: Will
the mistakes of the past be repeated? It is a ques-
tion only the President can answer.
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Misguided allies
Op-ed Page
Monday, August 11, 1986
Page 13-A
...and lock who is aiding Managua
By Rep. Jim Courter
Not many Americans would be
sho - ked to learn that Czechoslovakia
boasts of giving the Sandinistas 5100
million in aid since 1979. After all,
Czechoslovakia is a member of the
Warsaw Pact and a colonial posses-
sion of the Soviet Union. Americans
are well aware that Soviet bloc
spending on Managua's Marxists is
immense, indicative of an invest-
ment as important to the Kremlin as
is Cuba.
What most Americans do not know
is that Sweden, a gentle democracy
that most frequently makes the news
because of Soviet submarine espio-
nage, has provided or pledged S100
million to the Nicaraguan regime
since 1979.
This disturbing parallel between
Czech and Swedish assistance illus-
trates the degree to which many of
our Western European friends are
For them, it would seem. Washing-
ton has not gone far enough by aban-
douingthe Monroe Doctrine and per-
mitting the construction of two
communist states - Cuba and Nica-
ragua - a few hundred miles from
U.S. borders. Instead, Americans are
expected to endure the financial sup-
port of one of those governments by
our democratic allies across the At-
lantic-
Sweden is only one offender
among many. Norway. which has its
proper doubts about the growth of
Soviet power, is nonetheless increas-
ing assistance to Managua. This year
S11 million in government money
will be spent to send fertilizer, paper,
machines and direct technical assist-
.
ance
Finland, with a geopolitical posi-
tion that condemns it to continual
and wary study of the Soviet bloc,
increased its contribution to Nicara-
gua to S20 million this year. And
Denmark granted Nicaragua S9 mil-
lion in soft loans last October for
agricultural development. Most such
aid goes to state collectives.
Spain gives more aid to Nicaragua
than to any other Central American
nation and is increasing its assist-
ing to the Sandinista daily Nuevo
Diario. Agriculture, cooperative
housing and health sectors are the
scheduled beneficiaries. It is trou.
bling indeed to see Spain, which has
only recently put the fear of military
juntas behind it, actively aiding the
success of a junta in Central Amer-
ica.
The European aid is of "nonlethal"
kinds, of course. That makes it less
offensive to friends of freedom for
Nicaraguans, but no less helpful to
the Sandinista communists. Any aid
permits them to reallocate indige-
nous resources to "lethal" realms. If
butter comes free, there is more to
spend on guns
Second. the ultimate effect on the
political opposition and besieged in-
dependent labor activists is no less
discouraging than would be direct
donations of weapons to the Sandi-
nistas.
The Spanish foreign minister dis-
covered this in January. After sign-
ing the new aid agreement in Mana-
gua, he ventured to balance Spanish
policy by meeting with opposition
parties. But the secretary general of
the Social Democratic Party, Luis Ri-
vas Leiva, told him, that Spain, is
ment to promote inter-Nicaraguan
dialogue because, in his opinion,
Spain supports the Sandinistas.
Other financial contributions have
come from the governments of Aus-
tria, France and Holland and from
private interests like the Federation
of Social Workers of Denmark, a free
labor union that delivered a small
sum to a non-free Sandinista "trade
union" on May Day this year.
In all, Western European nations
are expected to send $100 million to
Nicaragua in 1986. That is the same
amount President Reagan and mem-
bers of the House fought long and
hard to obtain for the enemies of
Sandinista rule, the contras. (And
they do not have it yet).
Under American pressure and re-
lentless Sandinista thievery of the
freedoms, properties and dignities of
the Nicaraguans, France, Germany
and Italy, at least, are decreasing
their economic assistance. But even
as these countries close down bilat.
eral aid, they are yielding Up gifts
from another pocket; the European
Economic Community has just prom-
ised the Sandinistas half of all EEC
food aid to be allocated to Latin gov-
ernments this year.
Lamentably, the EEC has been
nearly this generous to Nicaragua
ever since the 1979 revolution. But it
is still unfathomable that this year's
EEC food consignment should not go
to the hungry in Haiti, where demos
racy has its first opening in decades
instead of Nicaragua, where the San-
dinistas have been closing cell doors
on democrats for years.
Failing that, could not the aid go to
the troubled democracies of Central
and Latin America? And if it must go
to Nicaragua, why not at least to the
dwindling private sector, as against
government entities which benefit
only the Sandinistas? In short, why
are our European friends not re-
warding free enterprise and democ-
racy instead of collectivist repres-
sion?
There is irony in these free na.
tions' aid programs for revolution-
geopolitical problem. Ours is a time
when the shift in the correlation of
forces makes the United States un-
sure of its ability to defend Western
Europe against Soviet attack.
Yesterday our weakness and lack
of vision allowed Cuba to become a
direct and immediate danger to
American defenses and American
plans for the resupply of Europe in
the event of war. Today Europe is
witlessly helping the Soviet Union
build a second Cuba, another plat-
form from which Soviet bloc air and
sea power could interdict American
air or seaborne assistance to Euro-
pean armed forces.
The answer is not in any renewal
of discussion about decreasing the
American commitment to Europe
We can permit that no more tban can
the Europeans. However, we can do
that which our ambassador to the
EEC is now attempting: ratchet up
the diplomatic pressures against our
allies for their contributions to our
enemies.
(Rep. Jim Courter, who represenu
New Jersey's 12th Congressional Dis
trict, is a member of the House Arme4
Services Committee.)
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In the first paragraph of his open "Letter
from the Ambassador of Nicaragua to the
U.S." [June 1986], Carlos Tunnerman de-
picts the Sandinista revolution as aimed at
independence and liberty, a revolt akin to
the American one of two centuries ago. I
wish that it were. Certainly other Central
American republics such as Costa Rica and
the renewed El Salvador have demonstrat-
ed that constitutional democracy needs no
United States imprimatur to work well. Its
principles are as universal as our founders
declared them to be.
But the principles of Marxism-Leninism
are also held to be universal, and it is they
which guide certain modern revolutionar-
ies, the Sandinista chiefs among them.
Members of the junta bared their true alle-
giances at celebrations in Cuba a few days
after the triumph over Somoza in 1979.
The irony of the visit was that Cubans had
Mr. Tunnerman extols the battle against
Somoza because he imagines that Ameri-
cans will remember their own rebellion and
believe, adapting Gertrude Stein, that a
revolution is a revolution is a revolution.
But some revolutions make men free, and
others make men the subjects of new dicta-
tors. The difference is in the revolutionar-
ies' principles: either they base govern-
ment on the principle of equality and limit
the powers of their own governorship, or
they base government on the principle that
history anoints some to rule others, and to
rule with irresistible means. Washington
and Madison did the former. The Bolshe-
viks, the Castroites, and now the Sandinis-
tas have done the latter.
Jim Courser
Member of Congress (R)
12th District, New Jersey
Regarding your July 1986 article on Mor-
gan Fairchild by Bruce Brady: Please, give
us a break. Your characterization of Mor-
gan Fairchild as the actress-activist "at
war" with the Hollywood stereotype, but
nonetheless willing to buck the system in
pursuit of her "ideals," is really too much.
In fact, the ideals that Ms. Fairchild es-
pouses are exactly those which Hollywood
holds nearest and dearest. First, Ms. Fair-
child is "pro-choice". This is not surpris-
ing, in view of the fact that the entertain-
ment industry as a whole endorses the idea
that men and women should be able to do
pendence and democracy. Within a few
years Cuba had neither, and Castro, who
spoke in 1959 of an "olive-green revolu-
tion, as Cuban as the palm trees," admit-
ted that his guide was the ideology of
Marxism-Leninism.
Look at Nicaragua. As early as 1981 La
Prensa's Pedro Chamorro declared that
the new rulers "practically idolize Cuba.
They say that someone needs to teach us
'the Cuban way' . . . There are moral and
ideological ties that cannot be broken with
Cuba, Russia, East Germany. Bulgaria,
Hungary, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia."
Today the Nicaraguan revolutionaries are
counterrevolutionaries whose powers are
concentrated in the East German-advised
secret police, the militias, Cuban-style
block committees, Red Guard-style youth
mobs, state socialism, and the quiet death
of the last independent presses and radios.
The Sandinista-run elections of 1984 of
which Tunnerman makes so much did no
more to protect and preserve democracy in
Nicaragua than did the elections of 1948 in
Czechoslovakia.
September 1986
what they want, when they want and how
they want without regard to the conse-
quences, particularly in matters of sex.
Ms. Fairchild is obviously no exception.
Second, Ms. Fairchild is anti-censor-
ship, and if it means allowing pornogra-
phers to distribute films, magazines, vid-
eos and what-have-you through the mass
media, who is she to say it's wrong? Third,
Ms. Fairchild is anti-school prayer. Yep,
school is for reading Thoreau, Emerson,
Jefferson and Franklin. Let's just make
sure that we avoid those portions of their
works which refer to God, the Almighty,
the Creator, etc.-or would we be flirting
with possible censorship? Obviously the
reading, of such highly moral and instruc-
tive works presents a knotty problem for
%Ms. Fairchild, who doesn't like fundamen-
talist Christian-type ideas.
That's all right, because kids in school
are smart enough to make their own
"choices" about what constitutes right
and wrong, good and evil, moral and im-
moral. They don't need religion, they can
listen to their inner voices. Or to shows
such as Falcon Crest.
Bruce Brady's article would have put
Ms. Fairchild in a kinder light had he stuck
to the more basic things we are all just
dying to know about Morgan-her weight,
true age, dress size and make-up tips. I can
believe she cares deeply about those.
Mrs. Kern' Carter
Alexandria, VA
Copyright, 1986. Austin American-Statesman.
Reprinted with permission of Universal Press
Syndicate. All rights reserved.
AMERICAN POLITICS
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THE WALL STREE1 JOURNAL. t--rUIDAY, JUNE 6. lfl86
European Rdition
A Look at the Yugoslavia-Libya Link
By Jim COtntTER the war ended. The Soviets and Libyans
WASHINGTON - A week after American both wanted closer relations, and may have
warplanes struck at Libya. the foreign been rewarded for their efforts. The Soviets
secretary of Yugoslavia amved in Tripoli to had set precedents for rue -with minimal
denounce the United States' "unprovoked restrictions-of Yugoslav ports and air-
aggression." The characterization of the fields. Soviet military personnel have been
long overdue retaliatory act was part of a reported at bases on more than a few
Joint declaration issued by visiting foreign occasions, and a standing agreement per-
ministers of a small delegation from the mits Soviet surface ships and submarines to
Non-Aligned Movement countries, among come to Yugoslav ports for service and
them Cuba. ' repairs.
The United Nations Security Council Belgrade's relations with the Libyans
debate in New York followed, and the remain strong despite the death of Tito in
Non-Aligned Movement sent a delegation
as a show of support for Libya. Five foreign
ministers were expected, but Ghana and the
Congo withdrew, leaving three hardier
arrivals: Cuba. Senegal and Yugoslavia.
In the meantime, word escaped of
Colonel Qadhaft's deep displeasure at the
ineffectual performance of his military
forces during the American raid. Czechoslo-
vakta and Yugoslavia were the two friendly
countries to which he turned for analyses of
his nation's military deficiencies.
Tripoli-Belgrade Axis
These details, so inconspicuous within
the mass of press stories on the Libyan
affair, are Indicators of something almost
unnoticed: the strategic alliance between
Libya and Yugoslavia. Over the past
decade, events in the Mediterranean and
business in the Non-Aligned Movement, of
which both Libya and Yugoslavia are
members, have often taken a turn around
the Tripoli-Belgrade axis.
The reasons for this are several Both
Perhaps we should ask
if Yugoslavia hasn't made
too much of holding Mos-
cow at a distance while
indulging Moscow's closest
anti-American allies.
1980. Staff Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud. who
today appears to be the second most
powerful man inLlbyan politics, visited and
made undisclosed agreements with both
Moscow and Belgrade In July 1981. Libya
and Yugoslavia announced an agreement on
military cooperation that October. Within
the space of the next year alone, there were
visits to Tripoli by the Yugoslav president,
the Yugoslav federal secretary for national
defense and the vice president of, the
Yugoslav federal executive council.
Libya and Yugoslavia are self-described Development of L lbyan-Yugoslav rela-
revolutionary has been paralleled by development of
nary socialist powers. Both com- military relations with Warsaw Pact mem-
monly adopt anti-American positions vote hers. Libya's tight -relations wth Lust
foreign policy issues and routinely vote Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose per-
against the U.S. in the U.N. Libya is a sonnet work to Libya and to the Libyan
hard-line and consistent Soviet ally: Yugo- slavia - while more independent- holds ob- army and security services in enormous
t CWrll=, isle Sovi
nomic bloc. Both countries are reliable
political supporters of radical Soviet allies
who hold fast to their certificates of
nonaligned status: countries like Cuba.
Nicaragua and Syria. Both have military
relations with North Korea, which inclines
increasingly toward the Soviets. Both
openly support Palestinian terrorist organi-
zations, the Namibian South West Africa
People's Organization and the Salvadoran
communist FMLN.
The origins of this strategic axis, this
Mediterranean marriage of geopolitical
interests, seem to lie in the Mideast Wars.
Libya turned against Israel and the
West after 1969 when Colonel Qadhafl
unseated King ldris in a coup. By then
Yugoslavia's Tito had long favored Egypt's
Interests. He assured President Nasser's
ambassador to Belgrade during the 1967 war
that "as far as Egypt is concerned. I am not
non-aligned." Tito proved it by granting
overflight and refueling rights to Soviet
transports and fighter aircraft.
Yugoslavia's generosity with its air-
space - a beneficence which has never been
extended to American warplanes-was
even more pronounced in the Yom Kippur
War of 1973. By one report. 1,000 Soviet
planes used Yugoslav corridors during a
two-week period in October of that year.
According to another, the Red Air Force
airborne unit which had been the vanguard
of the 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia was
readied for possible use in the Middle
East.
Soviet Premier Aleksel Kosygin had
spent a week in Belgrade immediately
when Colonel Qadhan signed new military
and economic agreements with Soviet
leader Gorbachev In Moscow last October.
But there were other state visits In 1985.
Subsequently, when the E1-vptAtr airliner
was hijacked to Malta, Greek police were
said to believe that the leader and sole
survivor of the pro-Libyan Abu Nidal team
bought his ticket in Belgrade. The other two
members of the troika had come from Libya
to meet him in Athens.
There have been three other recent
incidents involving Arab or Palestinian
terrorists operating from or passing
through Yugoslavia. Given the repeated
declarations by Tripoli and Belgrade of
support for Arab and other Mediterranean
liberation movements, news of a Feb. 20
agreement promising "closer cooperation
on security matters" between the two
countries Is of no small concern.
Americans are no longer surprised by
the machinations of Cuba and Libya and
Syria and other rigorously aligned "non-
aligned" countries. They are less aware of,
and, when cognizant, more delicate about
Yugoslavia. This is not without reason.
Yugoslavia is more independent, and less
directly cooperative with the Soviet Union.
than is Cuba. Its leaders, unlike Fidel
Castro, do not speak of the American
president as a "legitimate heir of Hitler."
The government has received American
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. and
American warships do call on Yugoslav
ports a few times a year.
This small, bright corner in the big
Picture Is partially the result of an immense
and expensive American commitment to
Yugoslav independence after the 1948 break
between Tito and Stalin. Aid slowed drasti-
cally In the -mid-1960s, but Belgrade still
Possesses most favored nation trading
status. A decade ago. Laurence Silberman.
the former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade,
dared to suggest "that Washington should
reexamine its relations according to the
United States' true interests" because
"Yugoslavia had consistently sided with
America's enemies in the world." The
State Department disassociated itself from
Mr. Silberman's views. But he had argued
and it is still true, that Belgrade's voting
reecord in the U.N. beats out his judg-
ment
Ending Some Alignments
All the Preceding is an attempt to
adumbrate some much neglected realities
of Yugoslav foreign policy. They do
not accord easily with the opinions of those
who have few second thoughts about Yugo-
slavia's conventional designation as non.
aligned. Perhaps American policy makers
should ask whether Yugoslavia has not
publicly made too much of holding Moscow
at a distance while simultaneously Indulg.
ing Moscow's closest anti-American al-
Iles.
Once that question is answered, there is
another, more difficult one: Given the
Yugoslav penchant for courting the West's
totalitarian enemies, and according them
support they'd never dream of lending to
the U.S. democracy, should America reduce
Its slender ties to Belgrade? Or. as with
China, should it labor to make the best of
an awkward relationship whose future will
always be uncertain?
I believe the answer is that in a world
where Soviet military power is the supreme
fact, the latter is the better course.
But America should make better use of what
Influence it has. A good beginning would be
to let Belgrade know that what it gains from
American relations-including most fa-
vored nation trade status, markets for its
compactcars, and government assistance
In rolling over Yugoslavia's 120 billion
debt -could become contingent. upon abate-
ment of certain of the more Insufferable of
Yugoslavia's foreign alignments.
One dimension of Yugoslavia's interest
In Libya is military hardware sales. Libya
already possesses Yugoslav Galeb aircraft,
and once sent air force cadets to Yugoslavia
for training. Now Libya has reportedly
ordered four P400-class missile corvettes
from the Yugoslav yard at Kraljevfca,
These are "splendid little ship killers,
packing a frigate punch in 525-ton bullsl"
writes the privately published periodical
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
And then there are Yugoslavia's well-
crafted midget submarines, the sort of
weapon and reconnaissance vehicle that
Soviet frogmen and commando teams have
used repeatedly in Sweden's coastal waters.
The submarines' capabilities include sabo-
tage actions such as the laying of mines in
harbors, torpedo launching, and Infiltration
of commandos. According to the publication
Jane's Fighting Ships, two of the R-2 Mats
class midgets have been transferred to
Libya. There's also an unconfirmed report
that Yugoslavia may have already trained
Libyan nations and Palestine Liberation
Organization personnel In midget sub opera-
tion.
Such cooperation, with all Its implica-
tions for terrorism in Europe and the
Mediterranean. would not be outside the
realm of normal Yugoslav relations with
either Libya or the PLO. In the wake of last
fall's Achille Lauro Incident. I detailed in
these pages Belgrade's practice of arming,
Mr. Courier, a Republican congressman
from New Jersey, is a fourth-term member
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f Daily Recortl rvonr.?es: N , S;:10ar Apn, 6 t9E6-O5
POINT OF VIEW
Ortega and Khadafy are comrades in arms
By JIM COURTER
Ste_ai to ire :a
: b:e photo-
g: arrived in the
Am cif past week amidst
a:::he debate on aid to
the Nicaraguan con-
tras, It showed cca of the world's
bet-known dictators. Commandante
Daniel Ortega :nd Colonel Muam.
mar Khadafy tr.ding together in
L1Dya With c!er,!wd f.,ts upraised,
they saluted the Libyan military
farces which trio, ered beneath
tsar gaze
H the photugra,.i aas remarkable,
the meeting that made it possible
was leas so c Libyan connec-
tions to Nicaracua have been evident
at.least since tC the first year al-
teC the Sand:nin o assumption of
p c4'gr President Ortaga dispatched
trs Interior M.-..tier Tomas Borge to
LZya that tear discuss joint agri-
cdltural arrarg"'nents and to final-
ize a $100 mil in !,,ar from Tripoli
to Managua ti more aid was to
jploW Acc 'o one estimate.
Nicar,gua certed$400million
in econorn. a. _ L . m Libya during
th last fear ears
Nor has a- . an.r :,tin iimited to
the economic i arieties In Septem-
ber cf 1981.61 heavily armed Nicara-
guan .miiiuamer. were discovered
pas-ning through (--is R,ca en route
to Tripoli for ra -.ng Some 40 Liby-
tins are beliesed to work in Nicara-
gua with the police Libyan allies
like Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany have also helped train the
Sandinista internal security forces
Covert arms shipments from
Libya have been discovered on sev-
eral occasions. the most impressive
of which seized in 1983 by Brazilian
authorities puzzled by irregularities
on the cargo manifests of four Lib-
yan transport aircraft loaded with
"medical supplies." The planes
turned out to hold 84 tons of arms
destined for Nicaragua. Included
were bazookas, multiple rocket
launchers. wire-guided missiles. 600
light rockets. and two dismantled
fighter aircraft
Colonel Khadafy no longer hide,
this comradeship in arms with a
country in Central America. In 1984
when Tomas Barge made another
trip to the desert domain. Khadafy
publicly lauded the Sandinistas with
these words: "Libyan fighters, arms.
and backing to the Nicaraguan peo-
ple have reached them because they
fight with us. They fight America or.
its own ground " Burge answered
"Our relationship with Libya is eter-
nal-.
Why? Why should a Central Amer-
ican nation lock hands with a radical
Arab nation halfway around the
globe' The reasons are idelogicaI.
military, and geopolitical, but they
boil down to something which some
Americans still wish to ignore. the
profound differences between the
tutah!anan internationalists and the
practitioners of self-government
Like forms are drawn towards like
forms America's bond to a distant
parliamentary nation like Israel or
Costa Rica is politically natural. So
too are the Sandinista bonds to other
revolutionary, socialist, pro-Soviet
powers like Libya, the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. and Iran.
That is the simplest and truest
explanation for the trips Ortega and
Barge make to Tripoli. and for the
three conferences Commandants
Ortega has held with the Prime Min-
ister of Iran, Mir Hoseyn Musavi It
explains why someone with as mane
troubles in the Middle East as Yasir
Arafat would take the time to meet
Sandinista officials in Managua. Tu-
r,i;, and elsewhere And it explains
why Borge? went to North Korea in
June~.f 1980 to proclaim that "Nica
ragt:an re%olutionaric?s will not be
cc:: e until the imperialists have
been overthrown in all parts of the
rld
It is therefore of no small interest
to see Nicaraguan and Libyan armed
force, in the attack in the same few
days The timing of the attacks may
or may not be a coincidence What
matters is that. in Tripoli and Mara
gua. bath attacks will be teen as
blows against the same enemy, the
forces of 'imperialist reaction
Such is the name dictators gn e to
democracy, and to its strongest pro-
ponent, America And it is to Amer-
ica that the free, the self-governing.
and the anti-totalitarian should be
able to look for inspiration and as-
sistance in the struggle against the
enemies of freedom.
Congressman Jim Courter, R-New
Jersey, is fourth-term member of the
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( rc
rc
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iJl
Z
,
~
,
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Daily R.cad/R L REBACH
House Armed Services Committee
and a congressional observer of the
Geneva arms talks
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Section One: Page 46
THE SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER, August 31, 1986
JERSEY ON THE POTOMAC
Courter and Chevron debate
politics of oil in war-tort Angola
By J. SCOTT ORR
Star-Lodger Washington Bureau
fence Department's ability to readily what is necessary for our security.
WASHINGTON-Rep. Jim obtain essential petroleum supplies "This is much more than a busi-
Courter (R-12th Dist.) is taking on one around the world," Keller added. ness question. It is a moral and geopo-
of the nation's major oil companies in a Keller's letter went on to point out litical question. Your concern is profit-
dispute over oil fields in war-torn An. that the company has operated in Ango- ability, while mine must be the Ameri-
gola. la for 30 years and that the company can taxpayers' subsidization of our ene-
The dispute centers on an amend- "has always maintained a position of mies.
ment sponsored by Courter that would strict neutrality with regard to political "Your corporate officers' eyes are
prohibit the Department of Defense matters in Angola and has acted in ac- fixed-not improperly-on the bottom
from buying oil from any company that cordance with the expressed foreign line; mine are fixed upon the struggle
pumps oil in or sells oil from Angola. policy of the U.S. towards Angola." against the Cuban, Angolan and Soviet
Courter's amendment is intended Courter responded earlier this forces which are the enemies of Ango-
as a slap at the Communist government month that he would be "surprised" if lan freedom and American security,"
of Angola and its use of Cuban troops Chevron has maintained neutrality and Courter wrote.
and Soviet officers to protect itself pointed to an editorial distributed at Beside Chevron, Texaco Inc. also
against resistance fighters. the company's annual stockholder has a significant investment in Angola.
- "While at this very-moment the meeting, Stan Oil C? has n _._ .
democratic resistance is battling a "The article was a veritable dia- and Conoco has a plant there but would
major offensive by the Cuban, Soviet, tribe against the Angolan resistance not be affected by the amendment be-
East German and Angolan Communist and what it called the 'radical right in cause it doesn't pump Angolan oil, ac-
forces, private American companies the U.S.' which has the temerity to find cording to Courter staffers.
are indirectly underwriting that offen- virtue in (the) struggle for Angolan in- Mobil Corp. divested itself of its
sive," Courter said in June when the dependence," Courter wrote. holding in Angola about three months
House Armed Services Committee ap- He went on to point out that the ago and got out, the staffer said, adding
proved the amendment as part of the American general manager of Chev- that the company has said it is making
Department of Defense authorization ron's Cabinda Gulf Oil corporation, Will a conscious effort not to buy Angolan
bill. Lewis, has been quoted as criticizing
The bill, with the amendment, the Reagan Administration's support oil.
Though Courter has heard little
later passed the House and was sent to for Jonas Savimibi, leader of the resist- from Chevron in recent weeks, staffers
the Senate. ance group UNITA, the national union said they don't believe they have heard
The action set off an exchange of for the total independence of Angola. the last of the company's objections to
letters between Courter and George M. Permit me to inquire whether the amendment
Keller, chairman of the board of Chev- Your office has remembered to give Mr.
ron Corp.-the correspondence was not Will Lewis the same guideline you have
exactly friendly. described to me concerning Chevron's
"You should be aware," Keller strict neutrality on political matters,"
wrote, "that driving Chevron and other the letter said.
U.S. companies out of Angola will not I Courter said in the letter that he is
appreciably harm the Angolan oil in- concerned about what would happen to
dustry nor affect government revenues Angolan oil sales if U.S. companies
there. leave, "but I am more concerned that I,
"Furthermore, this amendment as a representative of the U.S., do not
could pose a potential threat to our na- begin making decisions based on what
tion's security by restricting the De- is good for our corporations rather than
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A10
WASHINGTON TALK,
NEW YORK TJMI' 'r i_~3ay
Briefing
A Letter to Reaga'rl
even conservative Republicans
E in the House of Representa-
tives have urged President
Reagan to promote talks on power-
sharing between, Sc Government of
South Africa and "nonviolent South
African groups representing blacks."
In a letter to the President this
week, the lawmakers suggested
specifically that the South African
Parliament be expanded from three
to five chambers, with one of the two
new bodies elected by blacks. The ex-
isting three chambers are elected by
whites, people of mixed race and ,n-
dians. The second new house would be
a Senate, with equal representation
for each province and homeland in
the country, to be elected by their
residents. Legislation could be passed
by three of the five houses.
"We are not recommending that
the United States dictate a constitu-
tion to South Africa," the letter said.
"Rather we urge you to propose some
constitutional plan in order to begin
the process of negotiations, making it
unmistakably clear that what we seek
is any reasonable form of democratic
black power-sharing."
"There is no reason to insist on the
pcinciple-of one-Rerson;- one mete--in-
scantly, which few on any side of the
debate think is realistic in the current
context and should be allowed to
evolve once black power-sharing has
come about."
The appeal was initiated by a e
tiv of New ersey
an signed by Representatives Dick
Armey of Texas, William F. Clinger
Jr. of Pennsylvania, Bob Dornan of
California, Newt Gingrich of Georgia,
John Hiler of Indiana, Robert J.
Lagomarsino of California, Tom
Lewis of Florida, John G. Rowland of
Connecticut, Barbara F. Vucanovich
of Nevada and Robert S. Walker of
Pennsylvania. No response has been
received from the White House.
The Calico Question
eports from the California
White House that one of the
three newest members of the
Reagan let family is it m de call >
cc
piobably not. According to experts in
this arcane area, it is genetically all
but imposs;hle fir a orate offspring of
any feline union, However checkered,
to early a color calico coat.
Reached in Santa ltarbarr, Elaine
t rispen, Mrs. Reagan's press secre-
tary, reported that the two other new
cats, Cleo and Sara, had been esfab-
lished as female c dice kittens. But
since the i it st' r1' til'oke earlier this
week. no one has v''n1Ureii ofi to the
Reagan ranch to ntak, a closo?, in
spectiori of ^.lorris's n1arkuigs, nor
has he of she her-~r ph~~I~ pi aplied. Ms.
Crisp'n said Cleo, Sat a ini Mur-
i"is, of whatever color or configura-
tion, were cn- xtsnni, pete fully' with
the considerulaic Reagan dog-pack at
the ranch: Lucky, A'iclot vv, Millie,
I mope anti I'aka.
Money', Money, Money
Prom the Democratic point of
view, the bad news is that Re-
publican political committees
raised 5.3 tones as mu,,Ji money as
their Democratic equivalents ($186.1
million to $35.1 million) from January
of 1985 through last June The good
news is that the disparity was Netter
than it was in 1981-82, when, accord-
sion, the Republicans raised 6.5 times
as much as the Democrats ($161.2
million to $24.8 million).
Public Opinion for Sale
he American Enterprise Insti-
tute, a Washington-based con-
servative research group that
has recent iv been experiencing finan-
cial problems, is offering its bi-
monthly magazine, Public Opinion,
for sale. The principal prospective
buyer so far is Dow Jones & Compa-
ny, which publishes The Wall Street
Journal and has been seeking the ac-
quisition for some time.
Sources close to the negouaIions re-
port that the staff of the magazine
would probably continue to work out
of offices at the institute but that Dow
Jones would assume management of
the magazine. Wall Street Journal
editors are said to be interested in ob-
taining direct access to the poll!ug in-
formation that snakes tip the "()pin-
ion Roundup" section that hits been it
feature of Public Opinion.
Established in the late 1970's, Pub-
lic Opinion now has it press 1-111, of
about 7,800 copies, of \k,jjl(.jj it little
snore than half is paid ciitcd;ition and
the rest is complimentary copies
given to Government ofticial'-, jour-
nalists and the like
cat named Morris appear to he im- Waytle Kill,),
nrecise Morris. cm,. --o- ,.., i;.,, 1x1.......... \A7....-- 7
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TUESDAY, JUNE 24,1986 ~hC laggitigrost (~jmQ$ PAGE 1
JIM COURTER
Ex-Im's
pipeline.
to Angola
When a government looks
Communist, acts Com-
munist, declares itself
to be Communist, and
depends for its survival upon "inter-
nationalist" troops from Communist
countries, is it Communist?
That deceptively simple question
is likely to be raised in the House of
Representatives this afternoon
when Republican Rep. Bill McCol-
lum of Florida moves his amend-
ment to the Export-Import Bank Re-
authorization Act. Scores of millions
of dollars in loans and loan guar-
antees by our Ex-Im Bank are still in
the pipeline to Angola, and Mr.
McCollum would have the flow
sharply reduced, at least until the
35,000-man Cuban occupation army
goes home.
It hardly seems too much to ask.
The Ex-Im Bank's charter specifi-
cally forbids expenditure of aid dol-
lars in Communist couhtries. But it
is the Department of St to which has
the authority to decid what "Com-
munist" means, and th it word is re-
sisted in the case of ola, since it
"does not share the c racteristics
common to the countrisuch as the
Warsaw Pact member ...:'
That is not the point. It is the 1962
Foreign-Assistance Ac to which the
bank's charter points or a proper
definition of "Comm st;' and that
act does not say anything about the
Warsaw,pact: "The ph se'Commu-
nist country' shall in ude specifi-
cally, but not be limited to the follow-
ing ...:' All the pact uhtries can
be found on the list, but can China,
Yugoslavia, Cuba, and eir like.
Mr. McCollum, an Republican
Rep. Duncan Hunter f California,
who introduced a bill this matter
in February, must be forgiven for
thinking that Angola at least as
Communist as Yugosl via or Cuba.
And if Angola is not ii the Warsaw
Pact, does it matter th the Warsaw
Pact and its Cuban artn are in An-
gola?
I have found suffic nt evidence
of Angola's Communist in a rather
obvious place: the first ,aragraph of
the State Department's own Country
Reports on Human Rig is Practices.
Angola permits the exi tence of but
one political party. It is the "Marxist-
Leninist Popular Movelment for the
Liberation of Angola:' All major de-
cisions are made by the party's Cen-
tral Committee. And President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos heads both the
party and the government.
'Ib that one might add any number
of indicators of Angola's politics.
Streets in that remote African coun-
try are named for Karl Marx. Cuban
experts in the workings of that tool
of totalitarian organization, "the
block committee;' just finished a
working visit in which they shared
their "battle and ideological exper-
ience" with reliable Angolan coun-
terparts. The party has marked its
10th year of rule by changing the day
of national celebration from Nov 11,
when Portugal granted the Angolans
We could quit
subsidizing the regime
with Ex-Im loans that
expand the
production of oil
which, when sold,
generates the pay of
the Cuban soldiers.
their independence in 1975, to Dec.
10, the day in that year on which the
MPLA was formed. New agree-
ments, signed April 4 and April 6
this year, "strengthen ties"- includ-
ing military ties - between Luanda
and Havana.
The Cubans are in Angola be-
cause "solidarity" is more than a
word, and because the MPLA needs
them to protect the regime against
its own people and Dr. Jonas Savim-
bi's UNITA. What is more, if Mr. dos
Santos decided one day that the Cu-
ban troops, the Soviet generals, and
the East German security special-
ists should leave, there are good rea-
sons to believe that the praetorian
guard might find itself a new em-
peror.
If the Angolans are all but unable
to make their friends leave, surely
the U.S. State Department's negoti-
ators can not expect to do so. But we
could quit subsidizing the regime
with Ex-Im loans that expand the
production of oil which, when sold,
generates the pay of the Cuban sol-
diers. The McCollum amendment
would do that.
Republican Rep. Jim Courter of
New Jersey is a fourth-term member
of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee.
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POINT OF VIEW
A tour of Camelot on the Moskva River
By JIM COURTER
Special to the Daily Record
Acclaim for the new open Soviet leadership of Mi-
khail Gorbachev and his stylish wife Raisa, has
filled the last two years. Comparisons with the secretive
Josef Stalin are gone. The glamorous Gorbachevs have
the star quality of a John and Jacqueline Kennedy. Is
Moscow a new Camelot? On my trip there three weeks
ago, I did not find it so.
We flew from the harried bustling of JFK to the
Onpty, grey colossus of Moscow Airport. My party, in-
eludjng Congressman Dean Gallo and several New Jer-
reyans, went on a private mission to meet with a group
Of refuseniks, divided spouses and relatives of prisoners
of conscience. One observation we made speaks volumes
about the type of society we were visiting: the ordinary,
cheerful smile which is so much a part of American life
was almost nowhere to be seen on the faces of Soviet sub-
jects
Nearly every waiter, hotel official, storekeeper or
other worker we met tended to be unpleasant, slow, sul-
len, surly and apparently unhappy. This behavior is ut-
terly unlike the generous hospitality the Russian people
were always famed for. It's as though human friendliness
were illegal in Gorbachev's Camelot.
There is a dull, foglike oppressiveness about Moscow
which is unnerving because it is so diffuse, so subtle. Un-
like other dictatorships, public places in Moscow are not
awash with military uniforms. Police are visible but usu-
ally keep their distance. Two presences, though, help
sustain the somber atmosphere: the omnipresent
bureaucracy and the KGB.
Alexis de Tocqueville described 150 years ago how a
societ enmeshed in a cobweb of petty rules and mean-
one was not permitted to move bettyFen hotel room and
lobby, or lobby and the outside without standing on some
line to exchange a passport for a form, a form for a card,
a card for a key, a key for a pass. Every floor is guarded
by a bureaucrat who keeps track of tour comings and
goings. You can't use the hotel rests rant without exhib-
iting your guest pass.
Standing on lines for every conceifvable service is part
of Moscovites' daily life. There are lines-in the food shops
for the little available food - huge lines in the alcoholic
beverage stores - lines for restaurant service. Soviet
housewives are estimated to spend an average two hours
daily on shopping lines, and often return home disap
pointed.
Moreover, I was surprised to learn that ordinary Rus-
sians simply expect the elite to move to the front of lines
to be recognized first. One evening i1 had the embarrass-
ing experience of joining a restaurant line and being es-
corted to the front, where those who were ahead of me
not only did not protest, but even helped clear up some
confusion over a name in my partypo that we could be
seated instantly. I could just imagine what would have
happened on a similar line in the United States. Capital-
ist America is, by Marxist definition, class ridden, but the
"classless society of the workers' paradise" has priv-
ileges all its own.
Bureaucracy permeates every possible niche of Soviet
society. Seeing the smothering effect of this meaningless
regulation at close range as I did, I:believe the Commu-
nist leaders designed the bureaucratic system with one
purpose In mind: to convince the Russian people that the
socialist state is literally everything, their family and
companions are nothing. There is no one else to be thank-
ful to for your daily bread - when bread is available -
but the new socialist order. Once gratitude is monopo-
y
ingless regulations can smother the humanity of personal lized by the Soviet state, human relationships are de-
relationships. The Soviet authorities have brought prived of significance. The undermining of personal loy-
bureaucratic pettiness to state-of-the-art levels. In my alty, love and friendship is of the a Bence of the totalitar-
hotel, supposedly one of the finest in the Soviet capital, ian order.
For the same reason the Soviet rulers encourage an
insidious fear of the KGB. The secret police, of course,
wear no uniforms, but they are, or are thought to be, ev-
erywhere; mingled in every street crowd, in the subway,
in stores, in your apartment lobby, at the theater. Our
Jewish refusenik contacts told us of their weekly social
gatherings in front of Moscow's only synagogue, where
they exchange news about friends and relatives. KGB
agents have also infiltrated here. Even at synagogue you
Once gratitude Is monopolized by the
Soviet state, human relationships are
deprived of significance.
can never be too cautious.
Because of the secret police, Moscovites in public
places shun Westerners. It was difficult to secure help
even on the strange Moscow subway where the clerks are
reluctant to speak to Americans for fear of suspicious
KGB eyes.
Nothing was more pathetic than the realization that of
all the Russians, the refuseniks, many of whom have
been fired, interrogated, tortured and jailed, appear to be
the only optimists. These people have decided they can
no longer live the Soviet lie; they apply to emigrate to
Israel, the United States, or elsewhere; they are refused
(hence their name); they are punished; they apply again.
Some have tried a dozen times. Yet they, almost alone,
still smile. They are sustained by the hope of leaving and
by their faith in the God of their fathers. Most of their fel-
low subjects have neither.
From Lenin to Gorbachev, the Soviet leaders' deepest
wish is to extend this "Camelot" across the world. Natu-
rally, their emigration problem would disappear. It is
hard to understand why a few men can only be happy
when the rest of mankind has lost every reason to smile.
Jim Courter, a Republican, represents New Jersey's
12th District in the U.S. House of Representatives.
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1 HE GIIRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1986
Pentagon-watching one awry: over 45 committees
By Jim Courter
B URIED deep within the recently passed Senate bill
reorganizing and streamlining the military bu-
reaucracy were the first seeds of real, fundamen-
tal military reform.
While most of the public attention was focused upon
the landmark changes mandated in the military com-
mand structure, the Senate also took the unprecedented
step of lopping almost 18,000 employees off the Penta-
gon's defense agencies and headquarters staffs. In addi-
tion, a critical eye fell upon the heretofore sacrosanct
domain of congressional defense oversight: More than
250 congressional reporting requirements were allowed
to expire, and the wheels were set in motion to reduce
further the burden of congressional micro-management
of, the Defense Department.
These small stirrings were driven by a growing real-
ization that the multi-layered, green-eyeshaded "Mill-
tary-Congressional Complex" (a term coined by a former
Wall Street Journal editorial writer), intended to keep a
sharp eye on every imaginable aspect of defense pro-
curement, has begun to betray its original purpose.
The sheer size and complexity of the "complex" are
its most striking features, as well as its most basic flaws.
By the Pentagon's own count, more than 200,000 people
are involved in some aspect of defense procurement.
They use as their bible 32 volumes of defense procure-
ment regulations that consume six feet of shelf space.
They have at their disposal an army of 8,600 auditors to
enforce 44,000 procurement specifications.
These bureaucrats are layered in a dizzying hierarchy
that towers more than 40 levels above the typical mili-
tary procurement program manager.
Indeed, Congress has repeatedly weighed in to ensure
that every conceivable avenue for procurement disasters
has been sealed off, but the result has only been more
auditors auditing the auditors and, paradoxically, fewer
weapons, of lower quality, reaching the troops in the
field. But the paradox should not be surprising.
There are now more than 45 congressional commit-
tees and subcdtnmittees overseeing the Pentagon. They
employ more "than 300 aides and, in a typical year,
receive testimony from 1,500 Pentagon officials, request
more than 450 studies, change 700 budget line items,
generate 150-page defense bills, tie up the House and
Senate floor !`~r almost three weeks, and still deliver
defense appro riations bills to the President an average
of 45 days 1 , or, as is often the case, not at all.,
The whole ituation would be comic, were it not so
tragic. The " mplex" was erected and is Inhabited by
well-meaning patriotic Americans who want nothing
more than for your military forces to have at their dis-
posal sufficient numbers of advanced weapons systems
-~hY1 ~4. to (TAB' txR1 )
L~E1jICES ,riving,5or~, c ne rar -, o
&TeClianal..;,,blli~~__cirwmotational,rai c tic,
to a-
to defend our 9ountry and our allies.
But while the procurement "horror stories" featuring
the $700 toile; seat and the $7,000 coffeemaker may
make good copy, they do not explain how the "complex"
has undermined Its own promise. Constructed for the
purpose of eliminating fraud and inefficiency, the "com-
plex" has only aggravated inefficiency by raising pro-
curement costs and lengthening acquisition time.
The real story is found in the weapons depots, air-
fields, and ship magazines of America's military forces.
We do not hav available the numbers of sophisticated
weapons to fulfill our present obligations. The weapons
that are in the ventory may not work. System costs are
rising, product n rates are falling, and our adversaries
are beginning tb erode our technological edge.
No major category of weapons system is immune from
this process. For example, in the 1950s and '60s, the Air
Force had 3,400 fighters and was building 1,000 more a
year. We now have only 600 fighters and barely 300 a
year being built. Congressionally reduced production
rates increased the costs of the F-15 fighter by $10
million per plane. In general, wildly fluctuating and
uneconomical weapons production rates increase weap-
ons costs by more than $300 million a year.
The "complex" also imposes unnecessary production
and delivery delays. With 2,000 congressionally man-
dated "competition advocates" in place, the Air Force
Logistics Command now takes 260 days to process even
small spare-parts orders and two more years to deliver
the parts. In one defense plant, with 300 Air Force
oversight personnel in residence, it now takes 17 days to
deliver a standard military aircraft engine; a similar
commercial engine can be delivered in 26 hours.
It is this procurement "gridlock' which, in part,
prompted the Senate to vote 95-0 to simply chop away
18,000 Pentagon bureaucrats.
I applaud the Senate's boldness and have proposed
the elimination of the 50,000-member Pentagon buying
agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the central-
ized audit bureaucracy, the Defense Contract Audit
Agency. The military services can and should handle
their own procurement and audits, and they can do with
fewer bureaucrats.
The Senate's cancellation of 265 congressional report-
ing requirements Is another landmark step, but I propose
going directly to the source of the problem. Under my
legislation, the number of congressional defense over-
sight bodies would be cut dramatically, from 45 to 17.
The defense budget would undergo only two instead of
three reviews in the Congress each year, thereby stream-
lining the Pentagon funding and procurement process.
The Senate has planted the seeds of future fundamen-
tal defense procurement reforms. It now falls to the
House to demonstrate a similar boldness.
In a very real sense, America's future security hangs
in the balance.
Rep. Jim Courter (R) of New Jersey is a member
of the House Armed Services Committee.
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%,.l): 11VU91j1111jWit {unicU PAGE 21) l TUESDAY, APRIL 29,1986
JIM COURTER
According to Murphy's Law,
if everything appears to
be going well, you must
have overlooked some-
thing.
So it must have seemed to the sup-
porters of the single-warhead small
ICBM, affectionately known as the
"Midgetman." Until last year the
program had basked in a relatively
quiescent, uncritical atmosphere.
But with the jarring release of a
critical General Accounting Office
report on the small ICBM program,
serious questions about the system
began to emerge. As a result, the
small ICBM program may be in
jeopardy of losing support from
both ends of the political spectrum.
In the present austere budget en-
vironment. the projected
Midgetman-system cost of $44
billion-$49 billion is exorbitant.
(This works out to S98 million for
each of 500 deployed warheads.) The
undersecretary of defense, Don
Hicks, has proposed buying the
same number of warheads deployed
on 170 Midgetmen, with three war-
heads per missile, for $22 billion.
Five hundred warheads on 50 MX
missiles in virtually indestructible,
superhardened silos would cost S8
billion. Highly accurate, survivable
Trident t( weapons based on subma-
rines cost $13 million apiece.
T he daily task of operating 500
mobile missile launchers
would also be almost incom-
prehensible in terms of sheer effort
and complexity. Fletween 4,000 and
28,000 square miles of real estate
would be needed to ensure Midget-
man survivability under attack.
Nearly 34,000 trained personnel
would be required to operate and
protect the missiles.
The missile launch crews will
have to possess superhuman cour-
age, for they will be asked to drive
their unwieldy vehicles through ac-
tual detonations of high-yield Soviet
weapons. Communications will be
virtually impossible, due to electro-
magnetic interference, and it is
likely that most of the launchers will
not be able to withstand the cyclonic
winds and searing radiation. Quite
simply, we will be asking brave men
to undertake a suicide mission.
As was the case with the Carter
administration's mobile MX missile
proposal, the potentially adverse en-
Rep. Jim Courser, a New Jersey
Republican, serves on the House
Armed Services Committee and is
an official House observer to the Ge-
neva arms-reduction negotiations.
Midgetman missile under the
vironmental effects on the deploy-
ment area will come under intense
scrutiny. The GAO reported that
"most of the installations (under
consideration for Midgetman de-
ployment) are biologically or ar-
cheologically sensitive, and impacts
could be large."
If recent history is any guide, we
din also expect protracted litigation
ajnd anti-nuclear activism to compli-
cdte small-missile basing decisions.
I Perhaps the most heated argu-
ments erupt over the potential mili-
t`ry effectiveness of a single-
s ancead small ICBM. During the
course of this debate. Washington
has been introduced to the curious
notion that the weapons system that
threatens best is the one that
threatens least. "We would have to
expend 24111 Midgetmcn in order to
knock out only 100 Soviet missiles;'
said Democratic Rep. Les Aspin of
Wisconsin. "Mat's the reverse of
something like the MX with 10 war-
heads where one of ours can knock
out five of theirs. Midgetman, in
other words, provides real stability."
But for Midgetman to be stabiliz
ing it must be militarily effective. Tb
be effective, it has to survive a Soviet
first strike in sufficient numbers to
threaten its assigned Soviet targets.
Even assuming that the Soviets have
not precisely targeted individual
launchers, they can certainly mount
a barrage attack covering virtually
the entire Midgetman deployment
area, the boundaries of which will be
well-known to the Soviets long be-
fore the first missile is deployed. A
barrage attack will disrupt commu-
nicationa,disable in' *1 crews, and
destroy many launchers, leading to
a low percentage of surviving oper-
ational missiles. This problem could
be mitigated. by deploying three
warheads on each missile, but Mid-
getman supporters insist on a single
warhead missile, as ineffective as it
would be.
The Soviets are developing and
deploying mobile missiles, and they
face many of the same survivability
problems that we face. But look at
how they solve them:
Their"small"toad-mobile missile
weighs nearly three times as much
as the Midgetman, and may have the
capability of carrying three war-
heads, and will probably be deployed
on railroad cars. In this deployment
scheme, the Soviets need not fear a
barrage attack, since the essentially
unrecognizable launchers will have
the capability to roam the entire So-
viet rail network and be Invulner-
able to counterforce attack. If
America were a police state and
Midgetman could roam the inter.
state highways, we might have rea-
son to follow the Soviet lead in devel-
oping mobile missiles. But this type
of deployment, which would be re-
quired to make the Midgetman sur-
vivable, is neither sensible nor de-
sirable in our society.
There is no denying that this
renewed discussion of the small
ICBM system has touched a raw
nerve among the missile's support.
ers. But they only have themselves
to blame; with each passing day the
accumulating weight of critical evi-
dence threatens to crush the single-
warhead Midgetman - the least of-
fensive weapons system ever
contemplated for an offensive mis-
sion.
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Should Navy Build New Nuclear Attadubs?
.
By JIM COURTER
S; ac.ai to Na', T,mes
IIF N'A%'Y'S RECENT request for
almost S8(X) million in additional start-
up funds fora ne , class of nuclear.
powered attark submarines is reviving an old
question in the Congress Should we con-
t,aue to buy large, expensive nuclear attack
submarines, when smaller, cheaperdiesel-
electric suhniannrs could handle the attack
mi,, mmnsjust as well
The question has been based on a com-
mon misconception: that the United States
does not have any diesel-electric subma-
ri nes at her disposal. In fact, the U.S. and her
allie, have just as many( approximately
dicscl-electric submarines as the Soviet
Union and her allies. What's more, several
U S allies (most notably, West Germany and
The Netherlands) have active diesel-elec-
tric submarine construction programs; by
contrast, none of the Soviet allies builds
diesel-electric submarines, preferring in-
stead to obtain them from their Soviet
benefactors.
Nevertheless, in an era of unfortunate
'gold-plating"ofweapons systems, U.S. law-
n akers and taxpayers are well justified in
closely examining the rationale for fundingg a
new class of submarine that will cost more
than $1 billion per vessel, when advanced die-
sel-electric designs can be obtained in the
S2iiX million range The key question in this
examination should be: Can diesel-electric
submarines perform the same missions as
their nuclear-powered counterparts at
loss er cost'
The primar% mission of the U.S. attack
submarine is the detection and destruction of
Soviet submarines, both ballistic missile
and attack varieties. The Soviet fleet deploys
approximately 375 submarines, including
more than 65 ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). The U.S. attack submarine fleet
numbers approximately 100 vessels. Accord-
ingly, superior technology and tactics are
required to overcome this vast numerical
disadvantage
Detection and destruction of the Soviet
SSBN fleet will bean extremely challenging
and time-sensitive task Already respectful
oft' S. attack submarine capabilities, the So-
viet SSBN fleet could be expected to
launch its missiles from protected sanctuar-
ies. either close to home ports or from un-
dertheArctic ice pack Increased missile
ranges and accuracies permit the Soviets
this luxury.
Navy Photo
Diesel-electric submarine Blueback (SS 581) underway. It is a
misconception that the United States does not have any diesel-electric
sub
i
mar
nes at her disppsal.
Attack submarines attempting to pene-
trate home port sanctuaries require great
speed, quietness, endurance and large
numbers of advanced weapons to do maxi-
mum damage in the shortest Hmount of
time. In stalking Soviet SSBNs under the ice,
one of the most critical requihements is the
ability to "hold one's breath",for days or
weeks at a time, while searchngforthe
telltale contact from a Soviet iessel.
In both of these mission scenarios, die-
sel-electric submarines are at a disadvantage..
Slower speeds, fewer and les advanced
weapons, and the need to " snorkel" to re-
charge batteries detract from the diesel-
electric submarine 'suflity forthe anti-SSBN
mission. In fact, even the diesel-electric
submarine's most ardent proponents do not
envision using this kind of'vessel for strate
gic anti-submarmine warfare. It is, neverthe-
less, important to note that nufclear-
powered attack submarines ($SNs) are
especially suited to this mission.
Destruction of the Soviet attack subma-
i
rine fleet will likely be a more free-wheeling,
wide-ranging affair than attacks on SSBNs.
Ideally, in a crisis, most Soviet SSNs would be
caught at key "choke points" as they at-
tempt to reach the open ocean. One such
"choke point" is the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Diesel-electric
submarines currently deployed with allied
navies could serve a useful role in such a sce-
nario, by making the relatively short tran-
sit from their northern European homeports
and acting as "floating mines" or "fixed
barriers" against Soviet submarines. Allied
diesel-electrics now participate in this
fashion in NATO naval exercises.
Once again, however, nuclear-powered
attack submarines are superior to diesel-
electrics in the various attack roles. In ad-
dition to being able to perform the "fixed bar-
rier" missions, SSNs can search for Soviet
SSNs during high-speed transits, and after
reaching their deployment area, can
search large ocean areas while remaining
continuously submerged Once a target is
acquired, SSNs can bring to bear a far greater
numberand variety of advanced A.SW
weapons than can their diesel-electric
counterparts.
A key attack submarine mission. which
has gained even greater prominence under
Navy SecretaryJohn Lehman, is that ofac-
tual land attack against the Soviet Union and
her allies, using long-range con-, entional
and nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched
cruise missiles(SLCMs). Submarine-de-
ployed SLCMs are a tremendous offensive
force multiplier, requiring the Soviet
Union to treat each SSN as a potential strate-
gic reserve weapon which may come into
play during a crisis. Diesel-electric subma-
rines, due to theirsmall size and other lim-
itations, are not able to perform this mission.
Thus, in answering the question ofdie-
sel-electric submarine utility, it must be said
that these vessels are demonstrably inca-
pable of performing the vast majority of mis-
sions assigned to SSNs. This is not to say
that diesel-electrics do not have a place in
U.S. and NATO maritime strate,- . their ex-
treme quietness while operating on batteries
and their relatively low cost are pusserful
arguments forcontinuing to depend upon
them to do the jobs that they do best.
But, with only two active submarine-
buildingyards (the Soviets have at least five),
the U.S. attack submarine fleet will have to
depend upon newer, larger, more advanced
nuclear attack submarines, like the SSN-21
Seauolf. The Soviets certainly recc-ni7e the
value of such submarines they have three
new, large (6,40O8,000 metric ton) SSN class-
es undergoing sea trials. By contrast, their
diesel-electric submarine fleet is at it-; lowest
numerical level (83 boats) since 1933
The laws of physics require larger ves-
sels to insulate noisy equipment from the
acoustically sensitive sea water, the laws
ofwardictatethat each platform deploy the
maximum possible number ofsophisticat-
ed weapons systems. To comply with both sets
of laws, the U.S. attack submarine program
must proceed along its present path. U.S. die-
sel submarine construction would repre-
sent a critical point in ourdrive for a modern-
ized attack submarine fleet
Representative Courter, a former Chair-
man of the Congressional Military Reform Cau-
cus, serves on the Research and Develop-
ment and Procurement Subcommitrees of the
House Armed Services Committee. The Re-
publican from New Jersey is also an Ofzcial
House Observer to the Geneva arms reduc-
tion negotiations.
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