SOUTH KOREA: THE TIME BOMB IS TICKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000901160003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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5489X
25 November 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of East Asian Analysis
SUBJECT: South Korea: The Time Bomb is Ticking
1. Action: No action required, for your background use only.
2. Background. The political dialogue between president Chun's ruling
Democratic Justice Party and the opposition led by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young
Sam has broken down. Within the next few months Chun appears prepared to ram
through a constitutional revision to create a parliamentary system to replace
the current presidential system when his term expires in February 1988. Chun
intends to handpick the Prime Minister.
3. My recent discussions in Seoul (31 October - 8 November) with
representatives from the government and opposition left me with the following
strong impressions that I would like to share with you before your impending
visit.
a. President Chun is widely perceived as determined to continue to
manipulate the political process from behind the scenes after he
steps down from office in February 1988; should Chun attempt to
do so--and I believe he will--his efforts are likely to provoke
political violence either in the form of a military coup or
student/labor led popular uprisings.
b. Both popular cynicism toward the effectiveness of a "military-
dominated" government and various societal forces at work
(including rising middle-class expectations and resentment over
unequal distribution of the fruits of economic success) make it
highly unlikely that Koreans will accept with equanimity yet
another coup imposed leadership.
c. Left entirely to their own devices, the Koreans are unlikely to
forge a compromise providing for some form of equitable power
sharing between the current ruling party and the opposition. At
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the same time, all sides view the US as the key source of
legitimacy for any post-Chun political arrangement.
Consequently, the possibility that the US can sit on the
sidelines during the turbulent period between now and February
1988 is remote. Merely echoing our support for a peaceful
transition and a government "supported by all the Korean people"
is likely to be distorted by President Chun as endorsing his
efforts to preserve "stability" by creating a parliamentary
system over the objections of a "naive" and obstinate
opposition. In sum, we need to avoid the tendency to
underestimate our influence over the Korean political process,
and we need to develop a game plan that takes account of the
necessity for the US to actively fashion an effective compromise
solution to South Korea's political imbroglio.
4. There are, as always, no easy answers. My impression of President
Chun is that he is isolated from mainstream political opinion and overly
confident that he can manage to manipulate the system to preserve himself as a
"kingmaking" Korean-style Deng Xiaoping. Chun has enormous funds to buy
delegates in the National Assembly and has handpicked followers in the
military who owe him personal loyalty as a counterweight to the ambitions of
his designated successor (presumably his hand-picked Prime Minister).
Critical to Chun will be the continued perception that he has US support for
his actions; his recent statement to Assistant Secretary Sigur that he would
like to visit the US as "a private citizen" is an indication that he wants to
create the impression that he will be personally favored by the US for
carrying out a "peaceful" transition even as he attempts to wield behind the
scenes power in a successor government. Conversely, should Chun not be able
to maintain an appearance of US endorsement, his followers are likely to shift
to whoever else appears to be gaining US support.
5. In contrast to Chun's determination to retain a key political role
for himself, the opposition appears to be floundering. Apart from
articulating the widespread public opprobrium for Chun's role, they have no
firm game plan nor any leader more acceptable as an interlocutor with the
ruling party and the military than either of the two Kims--Kim Dae Jung and
Kim Young Sam. The opposition's decision to opt out of discussions on
consitutional revision is testimony both to the bankruptcy of their ideas and
their fear that some among their numbers might still be willing to sit down
with some among the ruling party to hammer out a compromise that eliminates
Chun while modifying the opposition's more extreme demands. The opposition,
in short, is not a cohesive whole and appears inhibited from proposing
compromise by the current "hang together or hang separately" mentality of the
two Kims.
6. In my view, the opposition's call for a direct presidential election
is a non-starter. The ruling party and its key military constituency assume
such an election would be won by the opposition which in turn would seek
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severe retribution for the injustices perpetrated by years of military
government. A parliamentary system also may well not be durable in a country
with no tradition of decentralized power. Nevertheless, a renewed dialogue
focusing on a cabinet style government and fairer electoral laws may be the
best vehicle to facilitate compromise between the two sides. If this
supposition is valid, recent events do not bode well for further compromise.
Chun appears determined to enact a constitutional revision calling for a
parliamentary system without the opposition's endorsement--perhaps as early as
February. The opposition is sticking to its call for a direct presidental
election--or, at least, a national referendum--and is planning to take its
campaign back to the streets. The government, in turn, is preparing to crack
down more harshly for the sake of preserving "stability." In such a charged
atmosphere, the prospect for increasing student-led violence and growing anti-
Americanism is high.
7. In the short term, it does not matter whether the game plan I believe
Chun is pursuing will work. The near term danger is that Chun's perceived
efforts to remain a key political player will act as a brake to genuine
efforts at compromise and precipitate either popular violence or yet another
coup by some general wrapping himself in the mantle of stability and national
security. The window of political vulnerability in South Korea is very narrow
and 193/ will be the critical year. Given the shortness of time, it is
imperative for the US to fashion its own game plan and seek to influence the
ruling party and the opposition back toward a dialogue of compromise.
8. The worst case scenario for the US in South Korea would be to stand
idly by while Chun rammed through his own version of constitutional revision
which would leave him as a dominant voice over a handpicked successor
government. In my view there are elements within the ruling party--perhaps
even both No Tae Woo and Chang Se Dong--who would be willing to conduct a
dialogue with the opposition and distance themselves from Chun provided it was
clear the US was not going to endorse Chun's efforts to cling to power. I
also believe there are credible elements in the opposition who would prefer
renewed dialogue over Kim Dae Jung's continuation of a confrontational
strategy.
9. The foregoing are admittedly impressionistic views, and I have no
ready answers for fashioning US policy. At minimum, however, I believe we
should consider the merits of encouraging the opposition to reenter a dialogue
while, at the same time, signaling US disapproval for Chun's efforts to crack
down harder on the opposition and unilaterally press a constitutional
amendment. In any event I believe it would be salutary to convene a meeting
following your visit to determine if there is some consensus among the various
Directorates involved and yourself as to how we should approach the South
Korea problem.
10. A final thought. Seoul is a dynamic city and bears clear testimony
to South Korea's economic success. Unfortunately, I had the impression that
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political and economic tensions beneath the surface are potentially volatile
enough to offset a strong economic base as a continuing guarantor of
stability. The path to the top in Korean society is relatively narrow and
egalitarianism is an exceptionally vibrant issue. The discontent of the so-
called "have-nots" with corruption is so strong as to raise the real prospect
of some segments of society imploding if existing political and economic
discontents are not ameliorated.
11. From our perspective reason would seem to dictate that the South
Koreans will pull themselves back from the political brink if only to preserve
their real economic gains. Based on my conversations, however, I gained the
distinct impression that economic gains have both fueled rising expectations
of political participation among those who are making it in the present system
and heightened the despair of those (e.g. textile workers) who perceive
themselves as having little stake in a system they see as both inegalitarian
and politically repressive. Against this backdrop, any notion that the South
Koreans will somehow muddle through to a political resolution acceptable to
themselves and the US conveys a misplaced optimism. A potentially large time
bomb is ticking away in South Korea and a more assertive US role is going to
be required to defuse it.
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SUBJECT: South Korea: The Time Bomb is Ticking
Original -- DCI
1 -- DDCI
1 -- D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADDI
1 -- DI Registry
2 -- D/OEA
OEA:I 25 November 1986
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