WHILE THE TWO OF YOU WERE OUT OF THE CITY OVER THE HOLIDAY, THE WASHINGTON POST RAN A VERY LONG THREE-PART SERIES ON SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000901050006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 7, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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5
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Registry
NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
While the two of you were out of the city
over the Holiday, the Washington Post ran a
very long three-part series on South Africa.
Because of its likely wide readership in the
Administration and on the Hill, I asked both
ALA and Fred Wettering to evaluate the article.
The texts of the article and the two evaluations
are attached. I think all three are worth
skimming.
Attachments:
As Stated
Deputy Director for Intelligence
CONFIDE 1TIAL Cl By Signer
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhingtao, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council 6 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: South Africa: The Washington Post Articles
and DI/ALA Analysis
1. 1 do not have strong differences with ALA's analysis of last
week's three-part Washington Post series on South Africa, but I have some
nuanced differences in how we view it.
2. 1 was rather less impressed by the series for two reasons:
first, because the authors, after some dramatic leads, then watered their
conclusions down to pap; and second, because the articles contained some
explicit and implicit assumptions which are challengeable.
3. Specifically, the first article leads with the eye-catching
thesis that the foundations of white minority rule are starting to crack,
then proceeds to explain in the fine print that in fact "most whites`
believe they can hold on (to power) indefinitely." Second--as ALA
noted--the authors suggest that the SAG is adrift without a plan as to
how to go forward, but then go on to cursorily describe and dismiss the
successor plan to apartheid, termed neoapartheid, which promotes a middle
class alliance with black urban elites. This gives short shrift to the
SAG plan of reform and cooption, and 1, like ALA, see no indication that
the Botha Government will do anything but plod ahead with its reformist
scheme. While the SAG has certainly not effectively articulated this
scheme to either South Africans or the world, I believe they have a
definite vision and have not been deterred from it by last year's
violence.
4. There are two implicit assumptions in the series that I take
issue with: first (as in the recent State/INR series) is the assumption
that black rule is inevitable and that the only ways it will come about
are through a prolonged, violent revolutionary struggle or a quicker,
negotiated turnover of power. While these are both arguable scenarios,
they are not the only ones nor in my view even the most likely. Second,
DECLY OADNER
1
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CONFIDENTIAL
there is the assumption that the middle ground for blacks--a black
leadership which would negotiate with the SAG on power sharing but accept
the SAG gradualist approach and not insist on a total and revolutionary
role reversal--has disappeared forever due to confrontation and
intimidation. The authors--and I suspect many in this Agency--see only
an increasing racial polarization and confrontation. Again, while this
is an arguable scenario, I contend that there remain possibilities for
clacks with sufficient followings to deal with the SAG and accept and
participate in government reforms just as elements of the Indians and
Coloureds did (Inkatha/Buthelezi being the most noteworthy current
example, but I suspect others may well emerge). I find the Algerian
scenario a bad analogy.
5. In sum, I agree with DI/ALA that the series is better than most
appearing in the popular press and conveys some useful thoughts--the most
useful perhaps being the phrase "blacks have created an enduring crisis,
not a revolution." Nonetheless, as a serious professional analysis (as
opposed to popular journalism) the series is flawed by questionable
assumptions, overdramatic assertions at the beginning, and wishy-washy
conclusions.
Fre ick L. Wettering
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: South Africa: The Washington Post Articles and
DI/ALA Analysis
NI 0/ AF/ FLWetteri ng
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC (Ford)
1 - VC/NIC (Fuller)
1 - ALA/AF/DI
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/AF Cnrono
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DIRECT`:'RATF. OF INTELLIGENCE
7 January 1986
SOUTH AFRICA: COMMENTS ON THE WASHINGTON POST SERIES
Summary
The recent series in The Washington Post, 'Black Power, White
Control: South Africa's Year of Struggle," gives a generally well-
balanced description of the major dynamics shaping the South African
situation. We agree with most points made in the series, particularly
that blacks 'have created an enduring crisis, not a revolution,' even
though a new and more radical fervor is gripping urban blacks, especially
youths. We also agree that events have shaken many South African
whites and that most plausible scenarios for the country's future include
intensified-violence and repression.
The recent series of articles in The Washington Post, "Black Power,
White Control: South Africa's Year ofuggle," is well-written and a
cut above most analyses on the topic by journalists or scholars. Drawing
on relevant current events as well as historical background, Glenn Frankel
paints a vivid portrait of an intransigent white regime besieged by
restive blacks showing unprecedented political consciousness and an
increasingly hostile international community.
* See the series in The Washington Post, 29-31 December 1985, written by
Post correspondent Glenn Frankel (a US citizen) with the assistance of
AT -lister Sparks (a South African journalist). (U)
This paper was prepared for the DCI b South Africa Branch,
Office of African and Latin American Analysis men queries may
be directed to the Chief, South Africa Branc
C O N F I D E N T T A I
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? V V 1\ 1 1 V L 1\ 1 1 Il L
Frankel correctly points out that the unrest and international
pressure have exposed some vulnerabilities of South African whites:
-- Declining economic conditions have hurt white morale.
-- Many whites have been shaken by the sporadic attacks against
members of their community and by the ferocity of the
fratricide in black townships as the number of victims with
even remote ties to the government increases daily.
-- The ability of blacks to unite behind and sustain protests
such as consumer boycotts of white-owned stores does not augur
well in the view of many whites who fear further flexing of
black economic muscle.
-- Many skilled white workers and professionals are leaving South
Africa.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Frankel deserves credit, in our judgment, for putting the last 16
months of violence in a context that bucks the trend established by many
journalists who have seasoned their reports with cataclysmic language. He
writes, and we agree, that:
"while blacks have succeeded for the first time in a
generation in seriously damaging white South
Africa, they remain far from their goal of toppling
white rule. The dream that many youths believe is
around the corner remains elusive. And because
white military power remains intact, there is no
clear path to get there. Black created an
enduring crisis, not a revolution."
We believe that Frankel correctly emphasizes the importance of white
reactions to growing pressures from the black populace and the
international community. White resolve and unity, in our view, are the
most important factors affecting South Africa's political future, as
evidenced by their central position in the various scenarios outlined in
the series. As one South African expert on black politics is quoted by
Frankel, "in the end, the (white) regime will collapse from within, when
the groups whose support it enjoys withdraw." Frankel skillfully, and
correctly in our view, explains why pressures from the black populace and
the international community are likely to continue to build. He also
gives the reader an appreciation of the diverse factors, such as the
2
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v v na u . a n y
unique history of the Afrikaners, that one must consider when assessing
potential white responses to those pressures.
We believe Frankel is strongest in his analysis on trends in the
black community. He offers some poignant insights into the causes and
effects of a growing nihilism among young urban blacks. He also describes
vividly the dramatic phenomenon of attacks on black collaborators and the
losing battle that black moderates are waging to retain credibility among
their dwindling constituencies. Departing from the romanticism that
frequently characterizes other journalists' work on the topic, Frankel
depicts the African National Congress as a two-faced group--sometimes
moderate in appearance, other times radical--that is heading toward
full-fledged urban terrorism, but faces almost insurmountable obstacles to
overthrowing the white regime.* This is consistent with our own views.
Our criticisms of the series are relatively minor:
Frankel occasionally overstates his case; e.g., he writes that
"there is virtually no one in the black community who expects
to be ruled by whites in the year 2000." Even some
influential black leaders, including Colored activist Allan
Boesak and ANC head Oliver Tambo, have stated
that it may be several decades before the white
regime falls.
Frankel dismisses the rightwing threat to the National Party
too quickly without explaining its constraining influence on
the government's attitude toward reform. Similarly, he does
not adequately address the trauma that the reform issue has
generated within National Party ranks and the larger white
community.
We believe that Frankel's observation that the government is
"unsure of its direction after decades of certainty" is
somewhat off the mark. This has become a familiar theme of
critics of the government, and a growing lament among even
* Frankel quotes analaysts who believe, as we do, that the ANC "is still
far from developing the disciplined clandestine networks that could launch
a sustained guerrilla war or endure a long-term tit-for-tat campaign with
the South Africans... rural warfare is unlikely because of South Africa's
vast barren spaces and the long distances between its borders and
population centers."
3
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(. U N r t u t N I 1 A L
some of its supporters. The government, nonetheless, has
continued to stick to a course of reform roughly hewn by
senior officials. Although seemingly blind to the unviability
of some of its plans, the government has partially unveiled
them in the past year while continuing to work out the details
behind the scenes.
Frankel writes that, "for the first time, there is a tension
and contradiction between the state's military and economic
power..Unbridled use of the former... causes direct, measurable
harm to the latter." There is no question that heavyhanded
security actions have contributed to the institution of
international sanctions against South Africa and the
introduction of black economic protests at home. This is not,
however, unprecedented; South Africa went through the same
experiences during outbreaks of violence in 1960 and
1976-77. Moreover, the government to date has eschewed the
option of an all-out, unbridled security response to the
unrest. Its reluctance to do so, in our view, is tied more
closely to lingering hopes it can succeed in coopting blacks,
rather than to fears of the economic consequences of its
actions.
Open-Ended Outcome
Frankel shies away from making a specific prediction on the most
likely outcome of the racial tensions in South Africa, ending the series
by laying out some of the best-known scenarios with little indication of
his own thoughts on which is the most probable. However, he seems
attracted to an Algerian-type scenario in which increasingly repressive
measures by the government would only steel the resolve of blacks to
perpetuate violence. In his defense, each cycle of violence in South
Africa's modern history has spawned a multitude of predictions about the
country's future (as Frankel himself notes, a cottage industry of
forecasting on South Africa has developed recently). His reluctance to
select one future scenario as his personal favorite probably reflects a
healthy respect for the fast pace at which events are unfolding and the
host of factors that could affect both the nature and timing of the
eventual outcome.
4
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APPENDIX
Major Points in
"Black Power, White Control: South Africa's Year of Struggle"
Black Threat
1. The "comrades," angry young urban blacks, now control many townships.
2. Unrest has spread even to rural, traditionally conservative black
areas.
3. Blacks have refined their protest tactics, including consumer
boycotts, and these are likely to continue.
4. The political middle ground has all but vanished.
5. Nonetheless, the black movement at times seems leaderless and without
direction, is not united, and remains far from toppling white rule.
6. Young urban blacks believe liberation is one or two years away; their
elders speak of 5 or 10 years; virtually no blacks expect to be ruled
by whites in the year 2000.
7. Black students may boycott schools to commemorate the 10th anniversary
of the Soweto riots.
8. A new black labor federation may become more politically active.
The African National Congress
1. The group has gained stature and is perhaps the biggest winner in the
unrest.
2. Usually one step behind events, the ANC's role has been mainly
inspirational.
3. The group has two faces: one moderate, the other radical and violent.
4. ANC attacks--widely applauded by blacks--are up significantly but do
little damage to the country's energy infrastructure or white morale;
attacks unite whites behind retaliatory strikes.
5
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v n r a u L. 11 I L M L
5. The ANC shows signs of developing into a more hardline, terrorist
group, but it is still far from developing capability to launch
sustained guerrilla war or endure all-out effort by South Africa to
wipe it out.
Government Program and Plans
1. Apartheid is no longer viable, because it is too expensive and
unwieldy.
2. The white regime is losing its grip, unsure of direction after decades
of certainty.
3. Both liberal businessmen and the right wing lack adequate leverage to
coerce the National Party.
4. The pace of reform is glacial; reforms are not mollifying the blacks
as intended.
5. Attacks on black moderates undermine the deal the government had hoped
to forge with the black urban middle class, but Pretoria is likely to
continue to pursue measured reform while cracking down hard on
dissidents. It probably hopes that after black radicals have been
subdued by security measures, black moderates will come to bargain.
6. Botha may call for a snap election before support for the ruling
National Party erodes further, and may hold a referendum for whites on
new constitutional proposals.
Scenarios
1. Analysts at a multinational firm believe South Africa might hobble
into the next century under a rightwing white regime that responds
fiercely to increasing black unrest and international sanctions by
taking extreme measures against the black opposition, repudiating
South Africa's foreign debt, seizing foreign assets, and stopping
foreign currency flows.
2. The Rhodesian scenario: an intractable guerrilla war wears down white
resolve and ends in a political settlement with major concessions to
blacks.
3. The Algerian scenario: increasingly repressive measures by the white
regime only steel the resolve of blacks to perpetuate violence;
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security forces always maintain the upper hand, but their actions also
swell the ranks of blacks bitterly opposed to any compromise; a crisis
among whites over government tactics eventually results in complete
victory for blacks.
4. Following intensified black unrest, the white regime averts an all-out
race war by reaching lasting compromise with blacks (this scenario is
based on the belief that Afrikaners are "survivors": once they see
the choice is between survival under black rule or destruction, they
will seek a settlement).
7
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SUBJECT: South Africa: Comments on The Washington Post Series
Distribution:
Original
-- NIO/Africa to forward to the DCI
1
-- NIO for Africa
1
-- National Intelligence Council
1
-- DDO/Africa
1
-- PDB Staff
1
-- Intelligence Liaison Staff
1
-- Chief, DDI/PES
1
-- Director of African and Latin American Analysis
1
-- Research Director, ALA
2
-- Production Staff, ALA (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
4
-- OCPAS/IMD/CB
5
-- Africa Division, ALA
2
-- ALA/AF/S
4
--
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ALA/AF/SI
I
(6 January 1985)
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THE WASHING m, PosT
SIPtDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1985
BLACK POWER, WHITE CONTROL
SOUTH AFRICA'S YEAR OF STRUGGLE
ASSOGA I F U PRESS
Black youth takes aim with a stone in township near Cape Town in August.
Unrest Pierces Cocoon
On R Minority
Political, Fiscal Vulnernability Exposed
First of three articles damaged this country's economy,
By Glenn Frankel
%aAngton Post Foreign Service
JOHANNESBURG-It is morn-
ing in the largest city in South
Africa, a country torn by racial
strife that has claimed about
1,000 lives during the past 16
months. But the scene here looks
a lot like St. Louis or Cleveland,
not at all like Beirut or even Bel-
fast.
Blacks and whites share the
sidewalks. They carry briefcases,
newspapers and shopping bags,
not pistols or rocks. The trains
are on time. Traffic lights are
working. Tine ba::ks are opt::,, is
the stock exchange. The o:,iy po-
'ice in sight are on traffic duty, not
riot patrol.
This portrait of tranga?ility can
ae Viewed every working morning
:u the business districts of every,
r city in South Africa. It is
tTing, puzzling-and in many
ways misleading. For below the
mace. out of the sight of most of
!Ae 5 million whites who rule this
son ft. South Africa's founda-
tions are beginning to crack.
bck unrest and protest have
done permanent harm to its stand-
ing abroad and threatened its vital
links to the West. They have de-
railed, and very likely destroyed,
the white government's carefully
constructed strategy of limited
political change. At the same time,
they have helped build the confi-
dence of blacks that time is on
their side and that three centuries
of white rule may be coming to an
end.
But the main achievement of
the black unrest and protest thus
far has been more subtle: they
have managed, for the first time in
a generation, to pierce the protec-
tive cocoon of power, privilcgr.
and silence that the apartheid sv,-
tent has built around South Afri-
ra's whites. They have exposed an
t1ro11o11lic aid political vulnerabil-
ity that this society had long man-
aged to conceal-and in the pro)-
cess have damaged white morale
and shaken one of the world's
most entrenched governments.
The damage at this point is
mostly economic; the state's for-
naidabTe military and police power
remains entirely intact. The se-
curity forces have managed to
%YI:MA
White., blacks share cseaia--r in .Johannesburg shopping center in October.
confine almost all of the unrest tv
the bleak, segregated [o u sflips
that : ing `;ou:?t Africa's cities like
a noose. By any measure, the guv-
erumeut looks virtually immune to
violent overthrow.
But for the first time, there is a
tension Ind contradiction between
the state's military and economic
power. Unbridled use of the for-
mer-whether it be the deaths
from police fire of 20 blacks in the
eastern Cape Province township
o' Langa last March or the exer-
cise of extraordinary powers un-
t?.et the five-ntonth-old state of
emergency-causes direct, mea-
surable harm to the latter.
"When you look at the basic
power equations and at the hard
core of state power, probably
nothing much has changed," said
Hermann Giliomee, one of the
country's most noted political sci-
See SOUTH AFRICA. A24, Col. 1
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The Washington Post
29 December 1985
entists. "But what makes 1985 dif-
ferent. is it spelled out for whites
what. may be in store the longer
they hold out."
- 1111tris three-part series, written by
a correspondent who has witnessed
fi nithand the conflict between black
power and white control, seeks to
took back at South Africa's year of
struggle to define what has changed
aid sift for clues about the future.
k was a year when the young
blacks of this country's segregated
townships challenged the _ white
.government for control of their
streets. In the process, western
banks, corporate board rooms. and
even the White House joined in ac-
tions that shook the government.
It was also a year of increasing
polarization in which the middle
ground between the government
and its radical foes shrank dramat-
kelly. Political moderates on both
sides found their constituencies and
credibility eroded along with their
ability to influence events.
South Africa now seems to have
stepped down a long, twisted road.
An older generation of leaders of
both the government and its main
black opposition is soon to step
down, and a younger one looks all
too ready to continue their war.
Although the death toll remains
-.comparatively low, a process of
self-destruction has. set in that could
lead to a tragedy as large and con-
vulsive as the liberation war that
claimed as many as 1 million lives in
Algeria a generation ago.
-._ This series begins with South
Africa's whites, who first came to
these shores 333 years ago and
gradually developed their own Af-
rican-tinged culture and vernacular.
-'These Afrikaners, who were the
first white settlers on the African
continent, who consider themselves
as much a part of Africa as black
natives and comprise 60 percent of
South Africa's whites, have man-
ageQ to cling to. power long after
whites in the rest of the African
continent have relinquished it and
moved on.
Earlier Crises Overcome
They have overcome political
crises before. After the mass pro-
tests of 1960 and the Soweto riots
of 1976, many believed white rule
was on the verge of collapse or dra-
matic change. But as Oxford histo-
rian Richard W. Johnson noted after
the Soweto uprising. "The most
striking feature of the demise of
white South Africa is that it has
constantly been prophesied and that
it has not come about."
This year has not brought about
the demise of white rule, but it has
s en new holes in the once solid
facade of white power. After -dec-
ades of knowing exactly who they
were and where they were going.
South Africa's white rulers now
sees[ to have lost their sure grip.
Tbey are trapped in a crisis that
--took them by surprise and each
:-move they make seems only to en-
scare them further. - i now have recanted. As Anthony
The July 21 state of emergency. Bloom, chairman of the Premier
designed to restore order and rally I Group, a major holding company,
:.white - support; led to - more- deaths
and, considerable international crit- put it, most are "unwilling to stand
e on up and be seen in open conflict with
l f
ti
reez
1 par
a
w icism. The Sept. debt repayments, designed to sta-
bilize the country's plummeting
currency, the rand, and keep for-
eign capital inside the country, un-
dermined investor confidence and
failed to strengthen the rand.
Charges of police torture * and
brutality and the recent dismissal of
treason charges against leaders of
the opposition United Democratic
"Front have exposed the govern-
ment to further international con-
demnation.
Pretoria's plan for converting its
military domination of the southern
:Africa region into new diplomatic
ties has collapsed following reve-
lations that its military clandestine-
ly aided Mozambican rebels in vi-
olation of 'its peace accord with the
'Maputo government. Even its once
ironclad relationship with a sympa- - the Afrikaners' most feared oppo-
tbetic Reagan administration has nent. By establishing a huge, bloat-
veered toward collapse. ed bureaucracy to administer itself,
- Faced with this reality, some apartheid offered economic deliv-
whites have drawn radical conclu- erance to Afrikaners, awarding
-sions and begun to contemplate the them the incomes and job security
prospect of a black-majority govern- they had never enjoyed under Eng-
ment, perhaps even one led by the lish rule-an estimated 46 percent
outlawed African National- Con- of white workers are employed di-
gress, the main black resistance rectly or indirectly -by the govern-
movement. Some white business i ment. -
leaders and liberal politicians openly
defied President Pieter W. Botha by Structures of Apartheid
journeying to Lusaka, Zambia, to
-?ieet with ANC leaders. By establishing independent tn -
But most whites still appear to bal "homelands" where blacks the-
believe they can hold on to power oretically could enjoy full political
indefinitely. Recent surveys indi- rights, apartheid provided an elab-
cate that more than 80 percent of orate, although transparent, moral
Afrikaners still support laws pre- justification for its cruelties.
serving segregated schools and res- But, like the political party that
idential areas and that more than 60 ? created it, apartheid has run out of
percent of whites believe black rule steam. The costs of the bureaucra-
is not inevitable. cy, bearable during the boom years
Most whites are totahy oblivi- of the 1960s and early '70s, have
ous," said the Rev. Nico Smith, a grown too burdensome for an econ-
Dutch Reformed minister whose omy. under stress. The need for
m,?n pia[ t tht yNl in oS;Jka skilled labor to service the sophis-
ticated economy of 1985-South
with a group of church leaders was Africa is estimated to be short as
blocked by the government. "The . many as 500,000 skilled workers-
more intelligent ones are aware has grown too great - for a system
something is wrong but they don't expressly designed to smother
know what. They have become cap- black achievement, not nurture it.
Wes of their own structures."
Others have sought to fill the
leadership gap with little success.
White conservatives, who formally
broke with the ruling National Par-
ty in 1982 to take an even tougher
si xl, made some gains in recent
Vartiamentary by-elections, but few
analysts believe they will pose a
major threat to the government by
when the next general,elec-
tions are likely to occur.
Page Z of L
The business community, frus-
trated by the growing economic
crisis, also has sought greater in-
fluence. But business, which is dom-
inated by the English-speaking
white minority, lacks both the lev-
erage and the will to challenge the
government. Most business spokes-
men supported Botha's new consti-
tution in 1983 and welcomed the
state of emergency although many
government."
White politics look unglued pri-
marily because the radical ideology
that held it together for two gen-
erations is dying-and the new ide-
ology designed to replace it is still-
born.
Apartheid was more than a set of
laws enforcing racial segregation. It
was a total system, designed by the
Nationalists, who came to power in
1948, to enshrine South Africa as
an Afrikaner nation by preserving
for them permanent political dom-
ination: It became for Afrikaners
what Israel, founded the same year,
was for Jews-a homeland and the
fulfillment of a biblical dream.
By fettering blacks in laws lim-
iting their mobility, employment
and education, apartheid weakened
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'hack unrest and protest
aave pierced the cocoon
{pvwer, privilege and
dente that the
:purtheid system has
wilt around South
Ifrica s whites.
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Similarly, the party's visionaries
and true believers of the '50s, who
gned the apartheid ideal with
missionary zeal, have been suc-
sseded by gray men widely viewed
by wtdtd critics here as more inter-
sated in retaining power and prty-
bge than in furthering a mythol-
4P76 iese are practical men, and the
Soweto riots of 1976 and further
- dents of unrest in 1980 convinced
them 'that urban blacks would never
At into the homelands scheme. In-
stead they devised a plan to forge a
Pew middle-class alliance with the
black urban elite, bringing it into a
stem , that would grant it privi-
leges yet preserve Afrikaner con-
trol. The first step was to be a new
unicameral parliament with separate
souses .for whites, mixed-race "Col-
oreds' and Indians-but not for
blacks,. whose exclusion was to be-
ck'me one. of the issues triggering
the unrest.' Later urban blacks
would be included as well in some
'broader-national structure. .
. Viewed ..through - the .peculiar
ism of Afrikanerdom, the changes
dramatic. Black trade unions
were legalized and outdated ap-
reservation of certain job cat-
g es of apartheid, such as the
egories to whites, were abolished.
!tie permanence of urban blacks,
previously considered temporary
aoiourners in "white" cities, was
acknowledged.
Critics called the plan "neoapart-
b id" because it entrenched
Atiikaner rule even as it expanded
its base. But its architects called it a
"process," and themselves "reform-
ers." The injustices of apartheid,
inadvertent and otherwise, would
be identified and ; eliminated-one
at a time, in a painstakingly slow
process that would have the twin
"tales of being defensibly pro-
gressive yet totally under white
''Apartheid is dead," they . pro-
claimed, a statement belied and rid-
iculed by'the profusion of laws and
customs that keep South Africa's
suburbs, bedrooms, classrooms and
swimming pools strictly segregat-
ed. What they meant was that
apartheid no longer was necessary,
that like a political Ice Age it would
gradually, over decades, be thawed.
- lee of Acceptable Change
die pace of acceptable change is
ltustrated in the government's de-
cision to begin opening all-white
downtown shopping districts to
V wk businessmen, first announced
i Feb. 28, 1984. Nearly two years
beer, applications from local com-
munities are mired in red tape by an
unwieldy and conservative bureau-
cracy and not a single district has
been desegregated.
- The new reform concept reached
its apogee in November 1983 when
whites approved by 68 percent an
intricately designed new constitu-
tion. But there was a missing ele-
ment in- this political game, one
whose absence went largely unno-
ticed by whites even though it cast
a shadow over the entire proceed-
What was missing was the ap-
proval of any of the ethnic groups to
be affected. The idea of Colored and
Indian referendums on the new con-
stitution was scrapped when it be-
came clear that neither group was
likely to vote yes. The idea of a
black referendum was never con-
sidered.
In effect, the white reformers
had fallen victim to the ideology
they, said they were discarding.
Apartheid had taken urban blacks
out of white areas, deposited them
in townships or distant homelands,
dehumanized and . depoliticized
t`;: ice, leaving in white eyes strictly
economic units-cheap, disposable
labor. When black leaders arose,
they generally wound up in jail or
exile. So when the time came, not
only was there no one to consult,
but the very concept of consulta-
tion, of enlisting black support, was
radical and alien.
New local governing bodies in the
townships were supposed to win
black support. Instead they gener-
ated wrath. Taking office following
elections with minuscule turnouts,
they lacked legitimacy, yet pro-
ceeded to assert their authority by
seeking rent and utility rate in-
creases. Those became the fuse to
ignite a storehouse of explosive an-
ger-The unrest began in the Vaal
townships south of Johannesburg on
Sept. 3, 1984-the same day the
new constitution took effect. From
then on, the two were inextricably
linked: As the unrest continued and
spread, the reform process began
unraveling, then fell apart.
With its undertrained and under-
staffed police force-its 45,000
members nationwide are not much
more than that of New York City-
and its lack of reliable intelligence
in the townships, the government
found itself trapped between half-
hearted reform and halfhearted re-
pression. Each township shooting,
every case of police overreaction
exacerbated the problem, recruit-
ing new black opposition, making ,it;
impossible for black moderates to
be seen talking -.to the govern ment.
The state of emergency, .originally
declared in 36 cities and towns; was
an official admission that the situ-
ation was out of control. .
At first officials argued that noth-
ing had changed, that .the - reform
process was still on track. A few
thugs and militants wereterrorizing
the townships, keeping, moderates
from the bargaining -table: Once
they were removed from the-scene,
ad would return. to twrmal,. they
said: But more than .7,000 arrests
under the emergency :have failed to
achieve the. goal. Even some of the
homeland leaders, the 'most collab-
orationist of all blacks;' told Pres-
ident Botha at a recent meeting in
Pretoria that they cannot -be _ seen
negotiating with the-government.--
As a, result, some white officials
are now conceding publicly that
something has gone badly wrong.
"There certainly has- arisen a-very
strong frustration "and- bitterness
Amongst-black leaders," said-Gerrit
ViIjoen, the Cabinet minister- in
charge of education and black eco-
nomic development, in'a' recent in-
terview. `Viljoen not -only`blam'es
manipulation by-radicals; but'also
what he calls the "wrong . percep-
tion" that the new tricameral par-
liament meant the permanent ex-
clusion of. blacks from national po-
litical rights. He . - concedes .that
South Africa is in a political crisis
and that getting blacks to the table,
as he put it, "is perhaps our biggest
problem."
Good Life in Suburbs
Still, for a long time most whites
felt no impact.. Perhaps the maid
didn't come- to work one day. But
the unrest was out of sight and out
of mind. The. good life of the white
suburbs was untouched. -
But if apartheid protects whites,
it also isolates them and leaves
'them dependent for knowledge on a
government-whose -own sources.-4f
-information' are:-less' than xrliable.
-When' the shock came, both were
unprepared. It hit where they were
most vulnerable-the economy.
It is one of the world's most top-
"heavy and unbalanced economic
systems; an inverted pytimict-dda
fragile base.At the top'is?a=luxuiy,
consumption-oriented economy,
whose spending patterns reflect
those of the United States, the so-
ciety- white South' Africans most
$eek to emulate. The old Boer War
image of the' Afrikaner as spartan
commando carrying all his posses-
sions on horseback is as outdated as
the American plainsman. South Af-
rica until recently boasted 11 au-
tomobile manufacturers, including a
Mercedes=Benz plant and the only
BMW factory outside Germany.
There are swimming pools in most
white backyards and even many of
the poorest households keep black
servants. .
This aspiring version. of Beverly
Hills sits atop a Third World society
of nearly 25 million blacks-, whose
average income,. birth' and., infant
mortality rates. reflect th6se.7of its
African neighbors. They . have. pro-
vided the reservoir of cheap labor
that for generations has - kept the
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system functioning, but at the same
Time-fhei~ own needs and-deniiands
4sve -, increased. geometrically
.South-AfA+'h black education bud-
;/et alone. has : increased more than.
f - , Q per :aver- the "last decade;
aftou capita expenditure fore
t la ks.: is; silt only one-seventh the
Amount.for whites.... ?
South . Africa has. Africa's most
highly industrialized economy, but
:1 remains. dominated by minerals
;such as gold, diamonds and coal,
.which comprise 75, percent of its
.export earnings. During the 1970s,
dramatic -increases ?iw the price of
Sold . papered ` over ~ cracks in the
economy. But -gold' and-vther min-,
era[ prices generallyhave stagnated
in the 1980s . while-South' Africa's
once-.robust- farming . sector has
cane to resemble -some of its wea k-
er African neighbors due to drought
and.a decline in govAment sub-
sidies:
Diverse deniands from urban
blacks, middle-class-whites and,the
apartheid bure ucracy lave ':also
caused ec 'be T rams. Despite a
25 to30 I y increase for
civil servants'l . ear, white living
standards in -real'-terms have fallen
every year since 1981.
Foreign' investment capital built
South Africa, but it has been quietly
Oowing out -of the couflfry since. the
Soweto uprising 9t,2976. To fill the
investment gap and finance its def-
icit, Pretoria has=-looked mainly
overseas for loan capital, borrowing
to. the_.point where short-term for-
eign debt hit $14 billion earlier this
year. South :Africa, critics. warned,
was mortgaging its future.:
Still, .the: debt., posed no--immedi-
ate problem so long as international
bankers. ; were . willing to rollover
the,-,loans. But . fast- August, they
_abruptly stopped... -.:. _
_ Chase Manhattan, engaged in a
kiad campaign to' reduce its lend-
ing exposure overseas, led the way,
Botha's emergency declara-
t6onas its rationale in attempting.to
calf in $350. million. in outstanding
loans. Others lagged,' waiting for
,acme ;signal , that- the". government
was 4warg:of the depth of .the crisis
"and':piepared tolaunch dramatic
reforms. Instead' Botha. -delivered
-his -Durban speech, a- message of
cold defiance. The banks suspended
new loans, investment capital began
a headlong flight and the govern-
ment was forced to declare a debt
Breeze and institute strict foreign
exchange controls.
No one knows how many billions
have-fled =much of the loss will be
al tfufly concealed- em corporate bal-
ance sheets-but Reserve Bank
Governor Gerhard de Kock has sug-
gested the loss may approximate
the size of South Africa's large cur-
rent account trade surplus, which
amounts to at least $2.5 billion this
.ear. The loss, and the accompa-
nying plunge of the South African
rand-it has fallen farther and fast-
er than..even the, devalued curren-.
cies ' of African economic basket
+ssssa such as Zambia and Tanzan-
i .'-reAZcts a stunning drop in both
foreign and, local business confr
'The barks accomplished in just
two weeks what the entire interna-
tional disinvestment movement
couldn't do in five years,", said Pre-
mier Group's Bloom.
Economic Pain
Whites have begun to feel the re-
sult. The fall of the rand has meant
steep price increases in imported
goods-South Africa in essence is
exporting capital and importing in-
'flation. A recent business seminar
here was ? told the country 'is losing
1,000 jobs per week, and the gov-
ernment is even contemplating lay-
offs inside the formerly sacrosanct
white civil service. For the first
time in decades there are reports of
hunger among white schoolchil-
dren. - The apartheid system, de-
signed to guarantee white comfort,
now inflicts economic pain on some
whites.. _ -
The net result has seriously dam-
aged white morale. Official emigra-
tion statistics remain low, and many
whites are trapped here by the
sharp-decline of the rand. - If they
left now,' their assets would be
worth less than half what they could
buy only two years ago. Were the
rand to regain even a fraction of its
-former value, _ many believe white
emigration wouktsoar.
The -whites who can afford to
leave now-'are those the . economy
can ? least afford to` lose. They in-
clude recent college graduates who
have yet to accumulate assets yet
have needed, marketable skills, and
I older specialists being recruited by
overseas corporations willing to
make up the potential loss of mov-
ing. In the past 18 months one es-
timate is that at least eight of the
?30 best 'investment analysts on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange have
quit and` moved abroad.
Companies were also leaving-
the American Chamber of Com-
merce here estimated at least 20
American firms pulled out in the
first eight months of 1985-until
the government's Sept. 1 debt
freeze made it prohibitive to pull
out their assets. Many multination-
als instead are said to be using
bookkeeping maneuvers such as
ii "transfer pricing," which involves
the parent firm's overcharging for
goods it sells to its South African
subsidiary, to quietly move their
money out of the country. De Kock
has publicly conceded there is little
he can do to prevent such practices.
The financial crisis also has long-
term implications for blacks, for it
comes at a time when South Afri-
ca's economy desperately needs to
grow if it is to meet black aspira-
tions without destroying white life
styles. Most analysts believe the
economy must grow at 5 percent
annually just to stay even with the
estimated 300,000 new job seekers
each year. Black unemployment,
according to University of Cape
Town researchers, already has
passed 25 percent and in depressed
areas such as Port Elizabeth it ex-
ceeds 50 percent. Yet this year the
gross national product is projected
to decline nearly 2 percent.
Faced with these stark economic
realities, an increasing number of
businessmen are calling for a return
to strict government controls on
imports, an artificially fixed rand
price and even tighter restrictions
on foreign exchange. Others argue
convincingly that such measures
would be a first step toward a siege
economy. South Africa could come
to resemble Africa's largest eco-
nomic..sick man, Nigeria, which
-boasts huge loan defaults, declining
agricultural productivity, a thriving
black .'market in currency and
chronic corruption in its massive
bureaucracy.
Government supporters point out
that while white morale may be
down, white will to rule remains, as
does the military and police power
to enforce that will. "We've had tur-
bulent times but the government is
still firmly in control," said Carl
Noffke, a former South African dip-
lomat who now heads the Institute
for American Studies at Rand
Afrikaans University here. "There
may even be' a drastic decrease in
our standard of living and in social
services for blacks-but South Af-
rica can survive."
Other observers do not dispute
South Africa's ability to hang on,
but contend that the price of exclu-
sive white control will continue to
rise.
`Period of Attrition'
"What we're looking at is not an
economic collapse," said one ana-
lyst, "but a long period of attrition
where the economy is eroded
steadily and irrecoverably. It's very
likely that those who leave, compa-
nies and people, will never come
back."
But whether whites, swathed in
protective layer$ of privilege and
complacency, recognize how much
is at risk is an unanswered question.
Outside of business and liberal cir-
cles there still appears to be little
sense of urgency.
"They are prepared to change,"
said Afrikaner political scientist An-
dre du Toit, "but only as far and as
fast as absolutely necessary. The
danger is that it will always be too
little and too late."
Special correspondent Allister
Sparks contributed to this article.
NEXT.- Conflict among blacks
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29 December 1985
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29 December 1985
- Page Z of Z
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Second of three articlas
'1 of u ,,Illu:nr~ l'(,%!
MONDAY'.1-ECEit ER 30.
Own Campaign
At the same time, many black moderates have
found themselves trapped between their often
radicalized children and a police force many of
them see as brutal and unyielding.
The political middle ground has all but van-
ished. Those who have been perceived as coop-
erating in any way with the white authorities
have lost credibility, support and, in some cases,
theirlives.
Still, while blacks have succeeded for the first
time in a generation in seriously damaging white
South Africa, they remain far from their goal of
toppling white rule. The dream that many youths
believe is around the corner remains elusive.
And because -white military power remains -in-
tact, there is no clear path to get there. Blacks
have created an enduring crisis, not a revolution.
By Glenn Frankel + "We have tested the regime to some extent, but we
Wai,uigtnn Post F.wcign ScrvKC I -
- 'have failed to realize our potential," said the Rev. Joe
JOHANNESBURG-They are called the - Seoka, an Anglican cleric and deputy president of the
"comrades," and in this year of struggle, burning Azanian People's Organization, a radical group whose
and death they have emerged as the young loot Black Consciousness philosophy sets it apart from the
soldiers of a largely leaderless, faceless move- multiracial stance of the ANC and the UDF.
ment that has challenged the power of Africa's , "It is worrying to us," said a young activist, known as
last white bastion. Lucas. in Crossroads, the bleak squatter community
In their angry passion, their certainty and outside Cape Town that has been the scene of periodic
their self-destructiveness, young urban blacks spasms of violence and police roundups for the past
have set their own communities aflame-but year.
they have also plunged white South Africa into "The power of the people is very strong, but we lack
its most severe political and financial crisis since the means of confronting the regime. The regime is the
the Boer War of 1899. one that does the shooting and the people do the dying."
Aided by a government whose police tactics 1 To a great extent, Lucas and his fellow "comrades"
consistently have undercut its expressed desire have become the heart and soul of the challenge to
for "reform," they have succeeded in sustaining white rule, and there are groups who identify them-
16 months of civil unrest. They have discredited selves as "comrades" in virtually every major black ur-
Pretoria's strategy of limited change, damaged ban center. Through inspiration and intjmidation-and,
its economy and done permanent harm to its on occasion, through public killings-they have com-
standing abroad. pelled fellow blacks, many of whom already support
Unrest has spread from traditional urban (Heir goals, to acquiesce in their tactics.
flashpoints like Soweto, Port Elizabeth and Cape The "comrades" are a mixed bag of militants, street
Town, into townships and rural areas once noted thugs and bored teen-agers. In black communities like
for their tranquility and conservatism. In the Soweto and Crossroads, many come from the long-or-
g"anized network of street gangs that operate like little
cpafias among the squalor and the poverty of the town-
Elsewhere they are groups that have spontane-
BLACK POWER WHITE CONTROL
SOUTH AFRICA'S YEAR OF STRUGGLE Qus;y risen from early episodes of unrest. Massive un-
employment among young blacks-it exceeds 50 per-
process, blacks have revived and refined eco- t e. stifu inferiority of South Africa's segregated
nomic weapons such as consumer boycotts that la-& 5,
have jolted segments of-the whites mufllty in?r'"'fiietr politiirk,.as suggested by the name they have
a way they never h~i.bae~3ouchesi before.u... b. _ for tlvemselve a ten,an amorphous .bie91d,0L
The unrest also has helped revive the standing Ague socialism, black nationalism and, increasingly,
of the organisation-wit .whieit many blacks:iden- 4ti-Americanism. But mostly they, define themselves-:
tify most closely, the outlawed African National *r .their enemy-the "system" in all its hated manifes-
Congress. Tbe.:ilaited Democratic .Froa4..the ?ons: the .schools,..police, soldiers and those blacks.
internal politieal-movement that most nearly re- mho "collaborate" by working `for the -government-and-
Elects the congress' concept of a future South - iI various agencies.
Africa, survived?a year of harsh repression. - .
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Comrades' in- Townships Lead
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Trough a process of
alienation and polarization,
black youths have lost their
"sensitivity for lire," a white
minister says.
the "Necklace" Becomes a Symbol
&:,Those who defy the will of the comrades face retri-
liittion. Shoppers who buy goods from boycotted white
Mores have been forced to drink liquid detergent or eat
bw meat. A 20-year-old man was stoned and then
irned to death in Soweto two weeks ago for holding a
use party in violation of a "people's ban" on Christ-
pastinte festivities. A young student nurse accused of
freaking a strike at a Soweto hospital last month was
ablaze.
?a The "necklace"-a tire filled with gasoline, placed
sound the neck of a "traitor" and set on fire-has be-
& me the macabre symbol of a generation that believes
K has nothing to lose. Of the nearly 1,000 blacks who
$ve died since the unrest began in September 1984,
Ilmost one-third have been killed by other blacks, with
Most of the remainder shot by police or soldiers.
"We have gained the power," said Scipho, a teen-aged
ctivist in Crossroads. "Everybody now is prepared to
e. for his rights. People no longer feel threatened by
e bullets. When they see soldiers and police they are
eager.:=to confront then. They [the government[ have
arrested our leaders but the situation just goes from
bad to worse."
Consumer boycotts of white businesses have been a
key element in the rise of black power in perhaps a-doz-
en urban areas. -In areas.-like eastern Gape Province,
boycotts fonaeci.the-white mainess:ooaxenunity to ern.-
cede with the governtneat lor. the release of local black
leaders and for.the withdrawal of the Army from black
townships.
While organized by community groups linked to the
United Democratic Front, the boycotts-have been most
effective witaraiirmeak?by!~dhe-eomrades.` oftett-.roper
ating with the taeit-cottaent of UDF leaders. in siany
townships the comrades have used the boycotts to con-
solidate their own hokl.
Those blacks perceived as
cooperating in any way with
the white authorities have
lost credibility, support and,
in some cases, their lives.
A year ago, Manielodi, a black satellite town on the
outskirts of Pretoria, the seat of white rule, was a quiet,
model community with a -well-defined and compliant
black power structure:.Today it is under the de facto
control of the comrades.
School boycott committees decide when children go
to school and when they stay home. A business boycott
committee determines when and where people shop. A
"people's court' even decides, in some cases, who lives
and who dies.
The government lost control of Mamelodi through a
now familiar combination of hiack grievances and police
repression. A school boycott organized by the UDF-af-
filiated Congress of South African Students turned into a
running street battle between stone-throwing youths and
armed police when authorities tried to force students
back to the classrooms. A black policeman was killed.
Some children died and others were beaten by black po-
lice, who seemed to residents to be out of control.
Adults who intervened found themselves under as-
sault. The car of Louis Khumalo. a pharmacist who or-
ganized a parents' association. was blown up last May.
n4 tober he wwraetamed without charge for a?weeic
Last month, .IChunrato ,aid.. he was clubbed repeatedly.
by a black police lieutenant on a Mamelodi street and
later arrested and beaten while- in -custody by police
who accused him of instigating unrest. Last week he
was detained once more, along with the president of the
town's chamber of commerce and-five-other-business-??
men and clerics, accused of helping to organize a boy-
cott of white businesses.
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A target of blaek-violence in Kwazakele Township Pert kU"-iR a "Recklaee" buming-Jaktahme _st
top, youths in uniform wield wooden rifles at a-funeral for blacks kiNed at Queenstown-in ea*. December. -
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....y::.tfri~~~~Rf-ii~2'--~ii~uiry'~$~''YB,~~?~'3:~1YN3~E.
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The bitterness and the alienation came to a head Nov.
21 when a peaceful protest rally of nearly 50,000 resi-
dents outside township offices dissolved into a bloody
showdown. Rocks were thrown and police opened fire
with shotguns and tear gas. At least 13 blacks died. The
radicalization of Mamelodi was complete. -
What happened in Mamelodi has been repeated in
variations throughout South Africa's urban townships.
It has been a process of alienation and polarization,
Black youths, said the Rev. Nico Smith, a sympathetic.
white butch Reformed minister who lives on the out-
skirts of Mamelodi and leads a black congregation
there, have "lost their sensitivity for life. They have
reached the point of no hope."
Smith recalled a recent meeting he had with some of
the comrades in which he argued that they should return
to school because, as he put it, "education is power.
"They said it indicated how little i knew," said Smith.
One youth described how his father, a high schooi pru,
cipal with two university degrees, had been stopped at a
police roadblock and hauled off to jail in front of his son
because he had left at home his "pass," the identity book
that all urban blacks are required to carry. The lesson,
the youth told Smith, was that "even the most educated
black man is treated like dirt-the schools are there to
make us better trained slaves."
In this charged and bitter atmosphere, the ties bind-
ing parents and children have been tested and strained.
If they hold, it is often because the parents recognize in
their children the same discontent they carry in them-
selves.
"Young people are driven by the same anger and
frustration that I feel," said Zodwa Mabaso, a UDF sup-
porter and Soweto mother of four who spent four-....
"
months without charge in detention last year.
But they
are more bitter. I can still feel sorry for the policeman,
but that's not the same for young people.
"Our children are no longer children. They become
adults and we ourselves become the children. Even a
10-year-old will tell you there's no time for play and no
time for school, only time to think about what you do if
the policeman comes tonight." '
The discontent that underlies the unrest had sat like
unfused dynamite in the pit of black souls since the
Soweto uprising of 1976. Ironically, it took an act of
government "reform" to set it off again.
The uprising was one of a series of events that grad-
ually pushed Pretoria's planners away from classic
apartheid, South Africa's system of white domination,
toward a new concept that would include an alliance
between the white government and an identifiable black
urban elite.
Whites would remain the senior partners, but the
right of local self-government, home ownership and
even a form of citizenship would be bestowed upon a
black middle class. Give them a stake in the system, the
argument went, and a network of conservative black
professionals, businessmen and local officials would
arise that would defend the status quo.
The government's black foes quickly recognized the
strategy as a threat to their efforts to build a united
opposition. When Pretoria announced the first
phase-a new constitution granting limited political
rights to Indians and r'ilxed-race "Coloreds" and a new
plan for local government in black townships-oppo-
nents mobilized. Activists took advantage of a loosening
of the state's usually tight grip on political dissent to
form the United Democratic Front. Moderates such as
Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi also mounted a strong cam-
paign against the new "dispensation."
They failed to defeat the constitution at the -ballot
i box-a whites-only referendum approved it by a--re-
sounding margin. But the activists were more success-
ful in the streets of black townships. -
The wave of violence began Sept. 3, 1984r in Shar-
peville, the sane township where 69 blacks had been
cut down by police fire in a famous incident 24 yearn
earlier, and one of the first victims was the black deputy.-
mayor. After police opened fire on -demonstrators, . a
mob descended on Sam Dlamini s house, hacked him to
death at his front door; then dragged his body to-his car y
and set it ablaze. Five other kcal councilmen died in
similar fashion in other townships in the region.
The pattern was set. From then on; as the unrest
spread from town to town, the targets almost. always
included blacks identified with "the system." Black po-
licemen, town councilmen, alleged police informers-
all were singled out, their houses burned, their shops
looted, their lives put at risk.
The idea, as a young activist in the-'East Rand town-.
ship of KwaThema put it, was to make them "feel the
same pain that we are feeling." The effect was to un-
dermine and wreck the incipient deal South Africa's
white rulers had hoped to forge with an urban black
middle class.
- Perhaps the biggest winner in the unrest is an organ-
ization that had little role in initiating it-the African
National Congress.
Leaders of the congress have been in jail or exile
since the organization was outlawed in 1960 after the
Sharpeville Massacre. The low-level sabotage campaign
they have been waging against the government seemed
to reach a dead end in early 1984 when South Africa
signed a nonaggression pact with Mozambique, the
black Marxist state that had provided the main spring-
board for ANC attacks. With its main operatives ex-
pelled from Maputo and with President Pieter W. Botha
received as a reformer on his June tour of Europe, the
ANC appeared to retreat into a sullen shell.
Drfodion to the ANC
But even at its lowest moment, the ANC had a crucial
weapon in its depleted armory -black devotion. Many
looked to it as the only organization willing to mount a
military challenge, however small or ineffective, against
white rule. Older blacks based their loyalty on the
memory of the organization's mass protests in the
1950s, while the young idealized a movement they had
never seen and leaders they had never heard.
"Where are you, Oliver Tambo?" go the words to one
of the many freedom songs that resound at funerals for
victims of the violence. It goes on to plead with the
ANC leader for machine guns and bazookas to kill white
soldiers. "We are waiting for you to lead us to freedom."
The congress was quick to react to the unrest with
calls for youths to attack "enemy personnel" and render
the black townships "ungovernable." In some areas,
mostly around Cape Province, the ANC's traditional
stronghold, congress operatives have played a major
role in planning attacks on policemen and organizing
actions such as boycotts.
Elsewhere its role has been mostly inspirational, its
calls for insurrection usually at least one step behind
events. Recent South African visitors to Lusaka, white
businessmen and liberal politicians, have come away with
the impression that the:ANC's leadership fears that the
anarchy on township streets is out of its control.
There are at least two contrasting sides to the ANC as
seen from South Africa, and the organization is consid-
ered to have `lternated smoothly between them this
year.
The side the businessmen saw in Lusaka is that of
moderation and reasonableness. It is the same one Ol-
iver Tambo presented to Cape Times editor Anthony
Heard in the interview Heard published here in Novem-
ber in defiance of South African law.
Tambo stressed the movement's hopes for a nonracial
South Africa where "everybody's property is secure."
Violence could be suspended and negotiations with the
government could begin, he said, as soon as Pretoria de-
monstrates its readiness by releasing imprisoned ANC
leader Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, lift-
ing the state of emergency, pulling troops out of the
townships and ending the ban on-the-ANC. : .-
"There is always the possibility- of a truce," said
Tambo. "It would be very, very easy if, for example, we
started negotiations."
Those deftly wordedsfatements have helped'to drive
a new wedge into the once rock-solid white community
here and to nurture doubts among some whites about
their government's ironclad refusal to release M ndela
or talk to the ANC until it denounces violence, cuts all
ties to-Comtttunists and submits, in Botha's words, to
"constitutional means."-
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Page 6 of 7
ANC's Violent Side .
The other side of the ANC is more radical and more
violent. Its voice can be heard on Radio Freedom,
broadcast from Ethiopia. Tanzania and Zambia, urging
blacks not only to "eliminate enemy agents within our
community," but to take the struggle into white sub-
urbs. "Let them feel that the country is at war," in-
structed an Aug. 2 broadcast from Addig Ababa. Other
broadcasts encouraged black maids to attack the homes
of their white employers.
The ANC's military wing has dramatically stepped up
the number of its attacks inside South Africa-this past
year-122 as of Dec. 15 compared to only 44 for all of
1984, according to the Institute of Strategic Studies at
the University of Pretoria. Among them was the recent
land-mine explosion that took the lives of six white wo-
men and children in a northern farming community near
the Zimbabwean border.
Such attacks are too infrequent to terrorize the white
community into submission or to do major economic dam-
age. They tend instead to have the opposite effect-unit-
ing whites behind retaliatory raids into neighboring states
and the government's no-talks policy.
Among blacks, however, the attacks are widely ap
plauded as one of the few ways whites can be made to
feel some of the same despair that permeates the town-
ships. "There is a greater respect for the ANC," says
Lucas, the young Crossroads activist. "Wherever you
hear the word ANC, people listen."
There is evidence that even blacks in more conser-
vative rural areas believe the violence is justified in
fighting white rule. A recent survey of 120 school
teachers and civil servants in Lebowa, a nonindepen-
dent "homeland" in the northern Transvaal, found that
78 percent approved of student boycotts and other ac-
tions even when they lead to violence.
"Even damage to buildings, injuries to people and oth-
er forms of physical violence are mostly described as the
inevitable consequence of apartheid," wrote Johan
i Malan, a white anthropologist who conducted the survey.
"The general contention is that if less boycotts and vi-
olence occur, the government will not be embarrassed
enough to consider the dismantling of apartheid."
The Soviet Bloc provides the ANC with most of its
military hardware, and analysts estimate there are
about a dozen members of the small South African
Communist Party on the ANC's 30-member National
Executive Council. .lBut Tambo, himself a noncommu-
nist, centrist figure, has been careful to keep the move-
ment broad-based and flexible, emphasizing his prag-
matism to western governments and businessmen at
events such as the private dinner he held with Amer-
ican corporate leaders in New York earlier this year.
Again, the politically moderate tones of Tambo con-
trast with the strident Marxism displayed by such in-
formation organs as Sechaba, the ANC's monthly mag-
azine published in East Germany. As the struggle con-
tinues and Tatnbo and other older nationalists are re-
placed, many analysts believe the congress inevitably
will shift farther to the left.
While the ANC has gained stature this year, political
moderates identified to any extent with the government
have been the biggest losers. The Labor Party, once
the foremost political movement of mixed-race or Col-
ored South Africans, is widely believed to have lost
much of its urban constituency because of its partici-
pation in the new constitution's tricameral Parliament.
When Colored students in Cape Town stepped up a
series of schoolboycotts in September, the-party's min -;:
ister of education closed. the schools for nearly a month _.
and fired dozens of activist teachers. As a result, the -
party has been-note closely: identified with the-govern-
ment it once bitterly opposed. _
Similarly, Zultt.Chief Buthelezi, whom many white-,:--:--
moderates seeae-the black leader they can most readily
bargain with, found himself at war with the -ANC and?
supporters of. the Uniited Democratic Front, who -ac-
cused him of being a "puppet" of the government. ?
Buthelezi preaches nonviolence, but members of his
Inkatha cultural movement formed vigilante commit-.
tees and participated in the factional fighting that
rocked Durban's townships in August with at least 70
deaths. The Zulu groups, armed with traditional clubs
and spears, operated with the tacit consent of white-
police, who stood aside while they restored 'order.'
His critics contend that Buthelezi someday will be
enticed into playing the same collaborationist role that
Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa played in preindepen=
dence Zimbabwe. But Buthelezi has held back, strongly
criticizing the Botha government and refusing to be'
seen negotiating until a minimum set of conditions, in?
cluding the release of Mandela, is met.
He is seen as more likely to end up in the same role's
as another Zimbabwean nationalist, Joshua Nkomo, who.
could not expand his strong regional following into a
national power base.
Even white liberals have begun to have second
thoughts about Buthelezi. The trips to Lusaka to meet
the ANC, the arch-rival of Buthelezi's Inkatha organ-
ization, were considered a blow to the chief's stature.
So too was the failure of a much publicized alliance for a--
national constitutional convention launched by Buthe-
lezi and the white Progressive Federal Party.
The movement failed to enlist black support outside
Inkatha after the ANC reportedly sent word that it be
lieved the alliance "premature." Buthelezi's supporters
eventually resigned from the steering committee of the
alliance, which is still searching for black moderates. -
The failure of the movement was another indicatioa.
of how thin the political middle ground has become here
for both whites and blacks. It also illustrated the control
the ANC can wield.
But while the ANC-UDF phalanx may be ascendant,
blacks are still far from united. The battles between the
UDF and Buthelezi, between the UDF and supporters,
of Black Consciousness, and the endless search for
"traitors" and "collaborators" have had a corrosive ef-
fect. Even older UDF leaders have found themselves at
times under attack from the young comrades for
preaching an unacceptable brand of moderation.
The result is a movement that at times seems lead-,
erless and directionless, a weakness some black stra-
egists themselves acknowledge.
"We have gotten caught up too much in our political
differences and weaknesses," says Seoka of the Azanian'
People's Organization. "Organizations become ambu-.
lances. They go into an area after people start dying
and they leave as soon- as things calm down. We still
have a long way to go."
Special correspondent Allister Sparks contributed to this
report
NEXT: Scenarios for an uneasy future
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30 December 1985
Page Z_ of 7
BLACK POWER, WHITE CONTROL
Blacks have revived such economic weapons as consumer boycotts. Above, a parch in Johannesburg SYG"
in June.
At least six protesters were killed and scores injured when marchers clashed with police Nov. 21 in Maamelodi.
i
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31 December 1985
T11E WASHINGTON Post
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1985
Page I of G
Grim Scenarios for Future
Last of three articles
By Glenn Frankel
Wxhington Pmt Foreign service
JOHANNESBURG-On a sunny Friday
afternoon in late October a pickup truck
pulled up beside a bus stop in downtown Jo-
hannesburg. Several black youths jumped
out and joined a small band gathered there.
They grabbed bags of rocks and bricks from
the back of the truck and headed for nearby
shops.
It was over in a matter of minutes. About
20 white-owned stores were hit, windows
BLACK POWER,
WHITE CONTROL
SOUTH AFRICA'S YEAR OF STRUGGLE
smashed, goods in a few cases looted. By the
time police arrived, the youths had melted
away into the crowds on the sidewalks.
In the 16 months of rifts, burnings and
killings that have descended upon South Af-
rica, the incident was little more than a foot-
note. one of a handful this past year in which
Vmc k violence briefly spilled over into white
areas. But in its premeditated organization
and swift execution, it seemed like some-
thing more-perhaps a prelude, a warning
of things to come and of a day when blacks
might take to the streets of white South Af-
rica armed with guns and explosives, not
just rocks.
Urban terrorism, as reflected in that in-
cident and in last week's bomb blast that
killed seven whites at a shopping center
south of Durban, is one of the likely direc-
tions that analysts believe the struggle for
South Africa could take if it is not resolved
peacefully within the next few years.
There are many scenarios; indeed, pre-
dictions about the fgture have become al-
most a cottage industry here, reflecting the
deep anxiety of whites and the great expec-
tations of blacks.
There is no agreement on a timetable.
The young "comrades" on the streets of
Mack townships believe their liberation is
only a year or two away. Their elders speak
.,dj pows, or rn Tbeeeiavirtwillyno one
? is the Mack community who expects to be
t!rWby w16tes in the year 2660.
Anzmg whites, tlr firture is more hazy,
although there is general agreement that
So" Africa will not remain the same. Many
be !eve the unrest may be a chronic phe-
sernenon and that the economic slide that
has begun, and thert9E-toreign firms and
innextinent - capital, is irreversible. Many
Soath African firms Have begun making
glens to cope with further economic sanc-
tions, which they beieve are inevitable
albuld liberal governments come to power
Urban Terrorism, Economic Decline Likely to Continue
in the United States, Britain and West Ger- ment falls. but it is succeeded not
many. by black-majority rule but by a re-
But the majority of the country's 5 million = gime composed of extreme right-
whites do not seem ready to accept the idea wing elements of the ruling Nation-
that black rule is inevitable. Many believe ;,l Party with strong support from
the military and police.
they can hold out indefinitely, albeit with a
reduced standard of living and a higher, but Unfettered by the need to placate
tolerable, level of violence. western critics, the new govern-
ment proceeds to imprison, even
The attitude among many whites toward execute, the country's internal "en-
South Africa's approximately 22 million emies." It authorizes new and larger
blacks, says political columnist Ken Owen, is military incursions into neighboring
that "we're giving up the notion we can rule states to eliminate South African
them, but they won't rule us." Much of that insurgents based there. It also
attitude stems from the privileged economic strikes out against the West by re-
and social position whites enjoy in South Af- F pudiating the country's debt, seiz-
rica and their fear of losing their status and ing foreign assets and stopping for-
their property under black rule. But for the eign currency flows. South Africa
Afrikaners, who make up 60 percent of the hobbles into the 21st century under
whites here and who control the govern- economic and political. siege-but
ruent there is another, deeper
fear-that of forfeiting their des-
' tiny as a nation, of becoming just
another minority group in a country
that is no longer theirs.
'Afrikaners believed they had a
divine right to nationhood and that
they would'always be vulnerable to
hostile forces around them until
they had a homeland of their own.
The apartheid system of racial dom-
)nation was designed to preserve
*d justify that homeland. To dis-
sriantle it now is to surrender a
dieam and to risk survival as a ped-
.-pleand a culture. Many Afrikaners
',would rather partition the country
?nd seal themselves off in a small
enclave than face such a prospect.
:4 "Afrikaners are not ready to en-
xertain the notion of giving up pow-
'er," said political scientist Hermann
'Giliomee. "The game is not about
.apartheid, it is about power. If you
lose power, everything is up for
;grabs. In. the end, whites will keep
ion shooting to protect their way of
fife, or they will pay others. to do it."
Assuming white intransigence
.,will prevail, planners for one major
'multinational firm have drawn op a
;grim but perhaps plausible scenario:
- ; The noose of international Banc-
-tons slowly tightens around a de-
Iiant government, the economy con-
tinues to deteriorate and the result-
ing growth of black unemployment
feeds township unrest. Black insur-
gents step up attacks on whites and
? an increasing number with market-
able skills or liberal beliefs flee
w"seas. Eventuatlp, the govern-
sull under white rule.
Searching for Alternatives
A small but growing number of
white moderates, believing they are
faced with such a nightmare, are
desperately searching for alterna-
tives. They have bowed to the in-
evitability of black rule, even under
? the outlawed African National Con-
gress, the main black resistance
movement, but many see no path
short of a bloodbath to get there.
Their conversations often are !aced
with apocalyptic visions.
The Rev. Nico Smith, a Dutch
Reformed minister, spoke of "a ca-
tharsis that will purify the entire
cotfntry." Hennie Bester, one of the
Afrikaner students at Stellenbosch
University who, like Smith, was
prevented by the government from
traveling to Zambia to meet with
the ANC, said he longs for "some-
thing dramatic" within the next
year or two, something that would
shock and alter white thinking.
"Otherwise," Bester warned, "we
are looking at a -protracted age of
darkness, a civil war in which the
whites,-the Afrikaner and the Eng-
lish, will lose whatever they have."
One reason the future is so un-
certain is that both the government
and the ANC are nearing a gener-
ational change of leadership. South
African President Pieter W. Botha
is 69; ANC President Oliver
Tambo, 68: and Nelson Mandela.
the congress' impriwined leader.
67.
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rrll. nu ~Il III' '..V11 UVJI.
31 December 1985
Page 7. of G
While Botha stays in office, the
government is likely to continue its
two-pronged strategy of cracking
loam harshly on unrest and on po-
ideal dissidents while pursuing its
} of messered change. The
state of emergency, which Botha
first declared July 21, may be
dropped, but many analysts expect
same of its more stringent provi-
sions to be retained, including the
lRw - immunity for police and
military actions taken to quell un-
rest and the ban on unauthorized
press coverage.
When Parliament reconvenes at
the end of January, Botha is likely to
offer a legislative package that
could include the restoration of
black citizenship, changes in the
eountry's restrictions on black
movement, a legalized end to forced
I removals and new black property
rights, all of which he unveiled in a
series of double-edged, semantically
dense speeches this year.
He is also expected to give some
indication of his plans for a new con-
stitution that would finally give
blacks a political role in the nationa!
government, although probably as
part of a racially based confedera-
Uon that virtually no black leaders
outside the nominally independent
"homelands" would find acceptable.
Botha: Angry Politician
Botha is a visceral politician,
tough, angry and at times unpre-
dictable. Some analysts believe he
may call a snap election next
year-he doesn't have to hold one
antlt 1989-in an attempt to hold a
solid parliamentary majority for his
National Party before its support is
eroded further by a worsening
economy and black violence. He
may even call a white referendum
to ask white support for whatever
new constitutional plan Pretoria
devises.
Once an election is out of the
way, Botha could then retire grace-
fully, without appearing to have
been hounded from office by the
critics he so clearly despises.
He is unlikely to make the kind of
dramatic concessions that most
black leaders believe are necessary
to defuse the crisis. Those would
include releasing Mandela and oth-
er longtime ANC political prisoners,
legalizing the organization and invi-
ting its exiled leaders to return
home for talks.
Botha has said he will not make
awl a move until the ANC leader-
ship denounces violence, disowns
Its ties to South Africa's small Com-
munist Party and submits to"con-
attMutional means." Others believe
w-canaot afford a dramatic gesture
because the government would risk
losing control and the political ini-
tiative to the ANC-and control is
crucial 'to the cautious, iiicremental
process Pretoria is wedded to.
UNITED PRESS I' i ERNATIONAL/REU f LR
Black nationalist Winnie Mandela, right, argues with South African police as they arrest her for
defying an order banning her from her home in the Johannesburg suburb of Soweto. Story, A13.
More likely is that the govern-
ment will continue down its present
path and hope that at some, point,
after the radicals have been sub-
dued by the police, black moderates
will shed some of their natural dis-
trust and come to Pretoria's bar-
gaining table.
Gerrit Viljoen, the Cabinet min-
ister in charge of black affairs and
education and one of those tapped
as a likely contender for power
when Botha retires, conceded in an
interview that even the govern-
ment's white constituents were
"impatient."
"They want dramatic steps," said
Viljoen. "They want to know what's
going to happen. There is definitely
an impatience and a readiness 'on
the part of the majprity of the elec-
torate to get [on with] reform."
Viljoen said he believes that "in
the really short-term future," blacks
will occupy "positions of power."
Nonetheless, he added, the govern-
ment is still committed to preserv-
ing "group rights and group secu-
rity," which he defined as "differ-
entiated residential areas, educa-
tion and some form of group rep-
resentation in political structures."
That means the presercttion of
race class cation statutes. which
define "groups" and specify their
members, and of the Group Areas
Act, which enforces segregation in
housing and schools. It also means
rejection of the principle of one per-
son, one vote.
Viljoen insists that all these mat-
ters can be discussed with blacks
and perhaps altered at the bargain-
ing table. Everything is negotiable,
be says, except for a commitment
to nonviolence. But Botha himself
ioc sent out different signals, tell.
ing the Nationalist faithful at party
ewpesses Mis year that Group
t as and segregated schools were
inviolable.
Boycotts Likely to Go On
None of this is acceptable to the
vast majority of urban blacks, es-
pecially to the hard, young "com-
rades" who serve as the shock
troops in the low=level insurrection
that continues to boil in black and
mixed-race townships. They have
plans to make 1986 a "no-go" year
for township schools in honor of the
10th anniversary of the Soweto ri-
ots. It is also likely that blacks will
continue to use and refine economic
weapons such as the boycotts
against white businesses that
proved devastatingly effective in
the, eastern Cape Province and
parts of Cape Town this past year.
The "comrades" and the black
community organizations that fall
under the umbrella of the United
Democratic Front may have an ac-
tivist ally in the newly formed Con-
gress of South African Trade
Unions, whose leadership has
pledged a new era of labor activism.
If so, it could mean an increase in
strikes, even a coordination be-
tween work absences and store
boycotts that could further weaken
South Africa's economy by with-
holding the two most important
contributions blacks make-their
labor and their buying power.
The ANC, convinced Pretoria is a
long way from the bargaining table,
appears determined to step up its
insurgency. After vowing to con-
duct a "people's war" at a consul-
tative conference last June, the
movement is beginning to hit at
"soft" targets. Last week's shopping
center bomb, planted in a wastebas-
ket outside an ice cream parlor, was
one of the first to have been aimed
exclusively at white civilians. While
the ANC has yet to either claim or
deny responsibility for the blast, the
incident suyVests a new mood of
angry militancy following a South
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Page 1 of G
African as.assuwtion raid on refu-
gees in Lesotho. That raid, in turn,
followed a land mine explosion in
the northern Transvaal that killed
six whites.
Malysts believe the ANC is still
far from developing the disciplined
*ftVkstiae --aetworks that could
frtnnch a sustained guerrilla war or
eboure a long-term tit-tor-tat [m-
paign with the South Africans. Ru-
ral warfare is unlikely because of
South Africa's vast barren spaces
and the long distances between its
borders and population centers. But
ti+e ANC is clearly moving in the
direction of urban terror, with con-
gress radio broadcasts from Ethi-
opia and Tanzania calling for blacks
to organize and expand a network of
small military cells. The recurring
theme is that blacks must begin to
bring the struggle into white areas,
to pierce the protective veil around
the white community.
"The whole country must go up
in flames," said an August ANC
broadcast from Addis Ababa. "Let
l there be no peace in all areas."
i The rhetoric suggests a future in
which Afrikaner and-black nation-
alists are locked in a death, grip that
destroys them both and takes down
several of South Africa's black
neighboring states as well. But
where most see intransigence and
attrition, a few analysts see a glim-
mer of hope in the psychology of
the Afrikaner.
Afrikaners are above all sur-
vivors, who withstood years of
hardship on the high, hostile pla-
teaus of southern Africa. Once they
see that the choice is between sur-
vival under black rule or destruc-
tion, this argument goes, they will
settle.
"There may be occasional epi-
sodes of organized violence against
Wbites, but I don't see the ANC sus-
taining a major expansion of guer-
rilla activity," said political scientist
Tom Lodge, an academic authority
on black resistance movements. "In
the end, the regime will collapse
from within, when the groups
whose support it enjoys withdraw."
The Rhodesian Example
When considering the future,
many South Africans look north to
bababwe, the former Rhodesia,
14icb went through a seven-year
struggle in which nearly 30,000
people died before blacks took pow-
er.
Like most historical analogies, it
is imprecise and in some ways mis-
leading. Landlocked Rhodesia's
white population was tar smaller
'than South Africa's, as was its econ-
omy. But in some ways it was less
vulnerable to economic sanctions
than South Africa, where 40 per-
.sent of the gross nation l product is
tied in some way to foreign trade.
The international trade embargo
on Rhodesia, which South Africa
helped break, encouraged an eco-
nomic boomlet for nearly, a dec-
ade-tmtd gradually, combined
with the assaults of black guerrillas,
it began to wear. the country down.
Nonetheless, the similarities be-
tween these two white bastions still
echo. One of white Rhodesian prime
minister Ian Smith's top security
aides, who still lives in Zimbabwe
and insists upon anonymity, has
some pertinent advice to offer
white South Africa.
He recalled that at one stage
Rhodesian troops were killing
1,000 black guerrillas a month and
were assuming they would quickly
win the war. Bat at the same time,
he said, black recruits were signing
up with the guerrillas at the rate of
2,000 per month. "The measure cf
your success is not the number you
kill but by the number of recruits
your enemy is getting," -said the
aide. "For every guerrilla ' we killed
we made- at least two new ene-
mies."
The aide had another piece of
advice for South Africans: "You're
better off settling it while you're
ahead. We could have gotten a
much better deal in 1971 than we
got in 1979. Once things start going
downhill you're in no position to
negotiate anything except as a los-
er."
Analogy in Algeria
But South Africans pondering the
--future might also look much further
to the north to Algeria, where Af-
rica's most bitter and brutal inde-
pendence war was fought.
Again the parallels are imprecise.
Algeria was a French colony, while
South Africa is an independent na-
tion, and there is no mother country
to pull the plug on the Afrikaners
the way the government of Gen.
Charles de Gaulle finally put an end
to French rule there. Before he did,
as many as I million people died in
eight years-1,000 times the num-
ber killed so far in South Africa.
But in other, less tangible ways,
the Algerian nightmare has many
frightening lessons to teach-and
both sides in the South African
struggle have gone there to learn.
Before independence, South African
police and soldiers were sent to Al-
geria for training in combating ur-
ban guerrillas and in the brutal in-
terrogation techniques that the
French refined. In recent years,
ANC insurgents have received
guerrilla training in camps outside
Algiers.
Heavy-handed repression, includ-
ing the widespread use of police
torture, was as common in Algeria
as it is in South Africa. So, too. was
the brutal response of the rebels to
those branded as collaborators. Per-
haps ene-third of all the deaths in
- the -.war were Algerians killed by
fellow Algerians-a statistic that
grimly parallels South - Africa,
where the same rough proportion of
deaths in political violence has been
the result of blacks, killing other
blacks.
The nature of the struggle also
has eerie echoes. By any measure,
France won the shooting war, grad-
ually eliminating the guerrillas from
urban centers and isolating them in
small rural pockets. But it could
never win the war for the loyalty of
Algerians and, as in modern South
Africa, every police or military op-
eration that took civilian lives be-
came a tool of radicalization and
recruitment for the rebels.-
. struggle finally triggered a
crisis in French society similar to
the one black activists hope to trig-
ger in white society here.
Lesson Learned Late
The French found out too late
what some whites in South Africa
are just learning-that the elimi-
nation or imprisonment of opposi-
tion leaders may not crush a free-
dom movement so much as remake
it into a faceless and even more un-
controllable force.
When white businessmen in the
eastern Cape region sought to ne-
gotiate an end to this year's crip-
pling economic boycotts, they found
to their dismay that the black lead-
ers they needed to approach were
being held incommunicado. Until
they were released there was no
one to talk to.
In his book, "A Savage War of
Peace," British historian Allistair
Horne described a process of cruel
inevitability that began to grind
away at Algeria, destroying any
middle ground between the warring
sides.
"Once it took hold, there seemed
no halting the pitiless spread of vi-
olence," wrote Horne. "It seemed as
if events had escaped all human
control; often, in Algeria, the essen-
tial tragedy was heightened by the
feeling that-with a little more
magnanimity, a little more trust
moderation and compassion-the
worst might have been avoided."
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- .. I.V .
31 December 1985
Although the killing is still at a
btv level. the same process of hu-
man erosion appears to be taking
hold in South Africa. Its shadow was
evident earlier this month at two
f .erals in widely different settings.
llse first was the mass rally of
30.M ,gathered to bury 12 blacks
?~ by police in ' Mamelodi, a
township on the outskirts of Pre-
toria. South Africa's capital. There
were emotional displays of anger,
ANC banners and slogans and vows
of revenge.
But the most poignant moment
came when a young father carried
the small white coffin of his 2-
month-old .baby. She had suffocated
to death from the fumes of tear gas
Fired by the police.
Two weeks later, two almost
identical white coffins were buried
in Tzaneen, a small Afrikaner farm-
ing town in the northern Transvaal.
Inside were the bodies of an 8-year-
old girl and her 2-year-old brother,
who were among six whites killed
when an ANC land mine blew up
their pickup truck. Their mother
was buried nearby. The ceremony
was more subdued than at Mame-
lodi, but the anger and the longing
for revenge ran just as deep.
It is likely that few participants at
either ceremony could sense the
invisible lines that ran from one fu-
neral to the other, could see that
the children buried at each had
been the victims of the same war or
that in death black and white were
now, finally, equal. Nor would many
at these funerals see that the war
that claimed these small martyrs
could be ended tomorrow if the will
and the political nerve to do so
could-be found.
Until that happens, only one
thing is certain: There will be many
more funerals, more small white
boxes, more victims of the struggle.
!or South Africa.
Special correspondent Allister
Sparks contributed to this report.
AGENCE FRANCE?PRESSE
In a September speech, South African president Pieter W. Botha
rejects negotiations with the outlawed African National Congress. He
is viewed as unlikely to make the dramatic concessions that most
black leaders believe are necessary to defuse South Africa's crisis.
AeW471D PAM c.gTOS
Sock violence briefly spilled over into Johannesburg twice in October.
Tip, a white man flees a mob protesting the execution of Benjamin
Meloise.above, an unidentified man- it aided after being beaten when..
he tried to stop looters in another outbreak later in the month.
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The Washington Post
31 December 1985
Page S of G
Above, angry youths at a mass funeral this month for 12 black residents of Mamelodi, township near Pretoria
killed by police during a demonstration in November, below, grieving family at funeral in Tzaneen for
Jacobs van Eck and her two children, among six whites killed when an ANC land mine blew up their truck.
Although the killing
is still at a low level,
a process of human
erosion appears to be
asking hold.... Its
shadow was evident
at these two funerals
in widely different
settings. Possibly, few
participants at either
ceremony could sense
the invisible lines
that ran from one to
tie other.
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Page C of
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