COMMENTS ON RSVP II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840041-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840041-8
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
D/OLL
D/PAO
D/PERS
C/ACIS
D/SOVA
SUSPENSE
STAT
3637 X10'8"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840041-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840041-8
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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Wsshingion, D.C. 70151 January 10t 1986
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DOD had a tough task: to identify militarily significant
and budgetarily feasible responses to the pattern of Soviet
violations. Even so, I believe that the report falls consider-
ably short. It does not provide sufficient justification for
the programs it recommends, some of which raise serious questions.
Nor do the recommended programs provide "incentives to the
Soviets to correct their non-compliance", "respond forcefully"
or "entail real penalties" -- even though these are, in
Secretary Weinberger's words, the standards to meet.
Any programmatic responses will cost us and that cost needs to
be weighed against long-term benefits. We need to examine a
much wider range of alternatives. We are actively looking at
such alternatives in ACDA.
In examining more options, we should not limit ourselves
solely to questions of the military significance of Soviet
violations. Rather, we should also examine the impact that
continuing Soviet violations -- and our failure to respond
effectively -- will have on arms control as an important
national security tool and on the future of US-Soviet relations.
This could be a study under your General Advisory Committee on
Arms Control or even an outside, high-level bipartisan panel
reporting to you like the Scowcroft Commission.
Besides that, we should also consider whether to alter our
SALT II interim restraint policy itself. Why? First, Soviet
violations have continued unabated for two-plus years. Arms
control cannot endure on a double standard. Second, SALT II
would have expired anyway on December 31st, and we have been
bound to it only as a matter of policy, not as a matter of law.
The longer we feel bound by it past that date, the more the
treaty becomes yours rather than President Carter's, and the
harder it will become to change your policy.
Therefore, we should consider deciding and announcing that
we will no loner consider ourselves bound by SALT II as
long as the Soviets continue to violate It -- adding that
the U.S. has gone the extra mile" (as you pledged last.
summer) but that the Soviet violations of SALT II continue.
We would need to come up with effective programmatic
responses to complement this approach, to avoid its being
a hollow gesture.
SBGR9T-
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-2-
Such a change in policy now would surely be exploited by the
Soviets and evoke considerable negative responses in Congress
and from our Allies. This might adversely affect some of our
defense programs on the Hill, but I believe Gramm-Rudman
will be the major determining factor there. The Allied
aspect weighs less heavily on not because the Allies so far
have given only lukewarm support to our concerns about Soviet
violations and the Allies fairly consistently tail-to support
us on major issues like Libya and Central America.
Kenneth L. Adelman
tannrr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700840041-8