LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN FROM JESSE HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: July 29, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Aug 86
Dote
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"~r71 CLAIBORNE PELL RHODE ISLAND
ARYLAN0 JOSEPH It BIDER J0. DELAWARE
NANCY L KASSESAWy KANSAS
RUDY SOSCHWRL MINNESOTA
LARRY PRESSLER. SOUTH DAKOTA
FRANK H. MURKOWSKL ALASKA
PAUL S. TREBLE. JR. VIRGINIA
DANIEL J. EVANS. WASHINGTON
PAUL S. SAIIBANES, MARYLAND
EDWARD ZORINSKY. NEBRASKA
ALAN CRANSTON. CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER J. 0000. CONNECTICUT
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MISSOURI
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
united states senate
Exne re Registry
JEFFREY T. BERGNER. STAFF DIRECTOR
OIRYLD L CHRISTIANSON. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
July 29, 1986
86- 3492X
Dear Mr. President:
When the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks
began in 1969, the U.S. had. two fundamental objectives:
preventing the Soviets from deploying an offensive-first
strike capability, and preventing the Soviets from deploying
a nationwide Anti-Ballistic Missile defense, These two
objectives were integrally linked in the Preambles to the
1972 SALT I ABM Treaty, the 1972 SALT I Interim Offensive
Agreement, and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. But we have
completely failed to achieve our two fundamental SALT
objectives, after almost two decades of the SALT negotiating
process. This is because the Soviets now have a first strike
capabi l itv and are about to have a nationwide ABM defense.
Thus supreme U.S. national interests should require America
to withdraw from the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty, rather than to
pledge to Soviet Dictator Gorbachev to abide by it for
another seven years.
I believe that the U.S. should withdraw from the ABM
Treaty partly because of the following U.S. Unilateral
Statement to SALT I ABM Treaty, of May 9, 1972, expressing
American policy:
"...The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of
the follow-on [i.e. SALT II] negotiations should be to
constrain and reduce on a long term basis threats to he
surv vai 1 i ty of o u_r respective strategic re .al i atory
fo c ...If an agreement providing for more complete
strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved
within five years, U.S. supreme national interests could
be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute
a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty."
But the Soviets now have deployed a first strike
counterforce capability which threatens the survivability of
our deterrent retaliatory forces, according to authoritative
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Administration statements. Moreover, after fourteen years of
negotiations there are no permanent, or even interim
constraints on Soviet offensive forces: the SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreeient expired in 1977 and the fatally flawed
SALT II Treaty was never ratified and expired in 1985.
Therefore, under the two conditions of the 1972 U.S.
Unilateral Statement, U.S. supreme national interests require
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
There is another criterion available to judge the
failure of the SALT process. Under the Brooke amendment to
the SALT I resolution of approval of 1972, the Senate itself
stated that SALT I and the SALT II negotiations would be
based upon:
"the preservation of longstanding U.S. policy that
neither the Soviet Union or the United States should
seek unilateral advantage by developing a first-strike
potential."
The Brooke Amendment thus posited that the success of SALT I
and SALT II depended on the prevention of a Soviet first
strike potential.
But according to authoritative Administrative
statements, the Soviets have a first strike capability. You
have stated that:
"Modern, accurate ICMs carrying multiple nuclear
warheads -- if deployed in sufficiently large numbers
relative to the size of an opponent's force structure,
as the Soviets have done with their ICBM force - could
be used in a rapid first strike to undercut an
opponent's ability to retaliate effectively...(Strategic
Defense Initiative Presidential White Paper, January,
1985)
Your National Security Advisor stated in January 1935:
"... American land-based missiles have become even more
vulneralbe to Soviet first strike attack over the past
few years."
And in your May, 1935 Victory in Europe Day Speech, you
yourself also described the Soviet "first strike" capability,
and alarmingly warned that the Soviet threat now emerging
jeopardizes "deterrence itself."
In your Strategic Modernization Statement of June 3,
1986, you again stated that there is a:
"growing strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.... In calculating what they call 'the
correlation of forces,' the Soviet political and
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military leadership are ever mindful of the state of the
nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union... any weakening of our nuclear deterrent, leaving
the Soviet Union with superior nuclear forces... could
invite the Soviet Union to rely on such an advantage...
this loss in survivability of U.S. strategic forces,
coupled with the magnitude of the Soviet buildup, had
begun to erode seriously the stability of the strategic
balance..."
Moreover, Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, testified to the Senate on June 19, 1986, that:
"The strategic nuclear balance has shifted
dramatically. The Soviets now enjoy superiority in
ICBMs..."
ICBMs are the key element in a first strike capability, and
the Soviets have over a six to one advantage against U.S.
hard targets in ICBM warheads. Finally, the CIA testified to
the Senate on June 26, 1985, that:
"The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable
ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all U.S. ICBI?I
silos and launch control centers...In such an attack
today, they would stand a good chance of destroying
Minuteman silos."
In sum, it is clear that the Soviets have a first strike
capability.
What about preventing a nationwide Soviet AB14 defense,
the second and integrally linked fundamental U.S. SALT
objective? Last November, Defense Secretary Weinberger
testified to the Senate that the Soviets already have "some
nationwide ABM capability." Of course, even a base for a
nationwide ABM defense is banned by Article I of the ABM
Treaty. According to the authoritative, official,
unclassified intelligence estimates, the Soviet Moscow ABM
system modernization and upgrade will be operational in 1987,
as will the illegal Krasnoyarsk Radar. The ABM-capable SAM-10
and SAI4-12 mobile systems will be widely deployed by next
year, and are already being internetted with the ABM-capable,
already widely deployed SAM-5. The Soviet mobile ABM-3,
already in mass production for deployment around Moscow, may
also be deployed nationwide by next year. The SAI?t-5, SAM-10,
and SAM-12 are also all being internetted with-the Moscow ABM
system. These ABM deployments will connect the Moscow A614
system to the illegal Krasnoyarsk ABM radar, where SAM-5s,
SAM-10s, and SAM-12s are deployed, making a nationwide ABM
defense for the Soviets. As the Defense and State Department
White Paper on Soviet Strategic Defense Programs, of October,
1985, confirmed:
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"The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related
activities suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing
an AB!1 defense of its national territory--precisely what
the AB'?1 Treaty was designed to prevent."
Mr. President, I agree with your statement of June 3,
1986: "We come to one of those unique crossroads of history
where nations decide their fate. Our choices are clear.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe that it is a
grave concession undermining world peace, American security,
and strategic stability for the U.S. to agree to extend
compliance with the ABM Treaty, especially on the eve of
Soviet ABM Break out. Instead, we should withdraw from the
ABM Treaty ourselves, not only because of Soviet nationwide
ABM defense Break Out violations, but also because of the
fourteen year failure of the SALT process to prevent a Soviet
first strike capability jeopardizing American supreme
national interests. It is clear that the U.S. is being
subjected to nuclear blackmail by the Soviets in agreeing to
extend our compliance with the ABM Treaty, against our
supreme national interests. As Secretary of State Shultz has
correctly stated, "Arms control is impossible in conditions
of inequality."
I respectfully request that you provide me with your
recent response to Soviet Dictator Gorbachev on arms control,
as you have the NATO allies, together with your reasons for
this response.
Sincerely,
e se Helms
U.S. Senator
Copies to: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
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