CJCS RESPONSE TO ASPIN AND KENNEDY LETTER ON SALT II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCE
ATTACHED: PLEASE TRY NOT TO
REMOVE FROM DOCUMENTS THANKS...
4e_j_yV_X13_Z6
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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SUSPENSE 29 Aug 1986
Date
Remarks NIO/SP to prepare coordinated draft for
ADCI review/DCI signature as suggested if
appropriate.
Ex utive Secretary
21 Aug 86
On 29 Aug NIO/SP advised a letter would not be a
good idea and that he is scheduling meeting with
DCI (incl C/ACIS) week of 2 Sept todiscuss.
( Taken from ES C-Gram file)
STAT
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SECRET
1 Ezeccfi i Re~istr~
86. 3471/2
21 August 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: CJCS Response to Aspin and Kennedy Letter on SALT II
REFERENCE: Memo from NIO/SP, dtd 15 Aug 86, Same Subject
(NIC 03825/86)
Thanks for your memo about the CJCS response to the Aspin and Kennedy
Letter on SALT II. I share your reaction. I wonder if this would be an
appropriate opportunity to again raise the question of strategic significance
in the context of verification and safeguards. If you think so, try a draft
letter, probably to Poindexter. ^i
William J. Casey
C- 119-11f
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STAT
3637 (10-81)
Execut ie Secretary
22 Aug 86
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TED STEVENS. ALASKA JOHN C. STENNIS. MISSISSIPPI
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR.. CONNECTICUT ROBERT C. BYRD. WEST VIRGINIA
JAMES A. McCLURE. IDAHO
PAUL LAXALT. NEVADA
JAKE GARN. UTAH
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
MARK ANDREWS, NORTH DAKOTA
JAMES ABDNOR. SOUTH DAKOTA
ROBERT W. KASTEN. JR., WISCONSIN
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO. NEW YORK
MACK MATTINGLY. GEORGIA
WARREN RUDMAN, NEW HAMPSHIRE
WILLIAM PROXMIRE. WISCONSIN
DANIEL K. INOUYE. HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
LAWTON CHILES, FLORIDA
J. SENNETT JOHNSTON. LOUISIANA
OUENTIN N. BURDICK. NORTH DAKOTA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
JIM SASSER, TENNESSEE
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
ARLEN SPECTER. PENNSYLVANIA FRANK R. LAUTENBERG. NEW JERSEY
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO TOM HARKIN, IOWA
J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C, 20500
August 13,1986
86. 3 x/3.
We support your courageous and wise decision to stop complying
unilaterally with the fatally flawed SALT II Treaty that the Soviets
are systematically violating. We agree with the statements in your May
27,1986 SALT II decision:
"It makes no sense for the US to continue to hold up the SALT
structure while the Soviet Union undermines the foundation of SALT
by its continued, uncorrected noncompliance... In the future, the
US will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the
nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union,
rather than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements
unilaterally observed by the US...I intend at that time [i.e.
near the end of 1986] to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy
bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an
appropriate response without dismantling additional US systems as
compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty." (Emphasis
added.).
Now that we can rationally plan our strategic force modernization
programs to deter the relentlessly expanding Soviet strategic threat,
instead of merely planning to unilaterally stay within the SALT II
limits, we are concerned about the ability of the United States to
maintain a credible strategic offensive nuclear deterrent force under
current Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budgetary constraints. We believe that we
must urgently seek the most cost effective strategic'force options
possible as we try to modernize our forces and bolster deterrence. We
are at the unfortunate stage in our Department of Energy nuclear
weapons development and production complex where we must try to make
the best of our existing assets and accept budget limited
modernization. We are at the same unfortunate stage in our strategic
nuclear force options, in our view.
Accordingly, we request that the Air Force, the Navy, the Army,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
your National Security Council staff each make independent,
unclassified estimates of the cost effectiveness of all of the ~-~
following strategic force options:
1. a. Equipping the remaining 17 Poseidon C-3 MIRVed SLB
submarines with the Trident I C-4 MIRVed SLBM increasing
DCI
EXEC
REG
survivability. C ) ~ ~ - r
b. Upgrading the guidance of all the Trident I C-4 MIRVed
SLBMs on all 29 remaining Poseidon SSBNs to give them some hard target
accuracy.
united states senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
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2. Deployment of 100 stockpiled Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs, and
re-deployment of the 50 to 100 Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs replaced by
MX MIRVed ICBMs, in existing single warhead Minuteman II silos. This
option was authorized by Congress in FY 1981, and appropriated by
Congress in FY 1982. Deployment of 100 would have cost only $50
million then, increasing US ICBM warheads by 11% at the ridiculously
low cost of only $205,000 per deployed warhead. Deployment of 200
existing Minutemen Ills would increase US ICBM warheads by 22%, at the
low cost of about $100 million.(The Administration rejected this option
in 1983 because it would have put the US over the SALT II MIRVed
ICBM/SLBM ceiling in 1985.)
3. Re-deployment of 150 to 200 existing Minuteman II single
warhead ICBMs in a reserve, garrison-based, road-mobile mode.
4. Possible deployment of an additional 50 B-1B bombers until the
ATB Stealth bomber reaches its planned Initial Operational Capability
in 1991.
5. Deployment of more nuclear-armed SLCMs on all SSN-688 Los
Angeles Class SSNs.
6. Deployment of an additional increment of 100 MX MIRVed ICBMs
in a superhard silo mode, with an ABM point defense or an ERIS/HOE ABM
defense of all the 100 new silos, or in a mobile "Carry Hard" mode.
7. Evaluation of the relative cost effectiveness of the Midgetman
small ICBM program, currently estimated to cost about $44 billion, in
comparison with the above options.
Mr. President, we respectfully request that the separate service,
JCS, OSD, and NSC unclassified estimates on the cost effectiveness of
each of these options be made available to the Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee by November, 1986, so that we can make use
of them in considering your FY-1988/1989 Defense Request next January.
Copies To:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of the Air Force
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Army
Sincerely,
National Security Advisor to the President
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director,. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
Chm/NIC
C/ACIS
D/SOYA
IViO/ SP
h'I0/USSR
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INITIAL
STAT
E cutive Secretary
Aug 86
Date
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JACK KEMP
REA$E AESPONO
71ST 0-1111100 OF -4(w vooK 0 WASHINGTON OFFICE
2257 PAVSUPN OFFICE SWLOING
COFMNTTEES WASHINGTON. DC 20S1S
APPROPRIATIONS [phone]
11 (Zongcress of the lnited ~tatez WSTI6CT OFFICES
FOREIGN OPEPATIONS Q Q ^ 1101 FEOEPAL SUILOING
? ~ MNtl.1^ i?ouse of Representatives ?1 WEST HUPON 27PEE,
6UFFAlO, NT 1.202
BUDGET ()-- (' (716) S4S 123
iashmgton, BC 20115 ^ 404 S. MAIN STREET
GENEVA, NT 14456
July 28, ' 9 8 6 [phone]
S 3471X
Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are deeply disturbed by reports that you may have
directed that certain limits on U.S. strategic defenses may be
incorporated within our negotiating position at Geneva. Because
we believe this represents a grave threat to the integrity of
your SDI, and a departure from your previously well-defined arms
control objectives, we urgently seek a meeting with you to
discuss these concerns in full. Pending that meeting, we would
like to raise a number of points for your consideration.
First, as you know, we number among your strongest
supporters in the House and the Senate. And we must warn you, if
the U.S. pursues this new negotiating course, we fear for the
survival of SDI funding in Congress.
If we succumb to Soviet entreaties to extend the ABM treaty
or otherwise bargain away our right to near-term SDI deployment,
we will risk losing strategic defenses altogether. As we know
from our experience with the ABM treaty, when the United States
pledges not to do something -- such as deploy strategic defenses
-- the Congress will not appropriate funds to preserve that
option.
Secondly, we respectfully suggest that were you to commit
this country to abide by the American arms control lobby's
private interpretation of the ABM treaty, your Strategic Defense
Initiative would thereafter exist in name only -- and everyone
would know it. The advice you are receiving that such a
commitment would be gratis because we could not, in any event,
build respectable strategic defenses over the next five to ten
years, is technically wrong and politically too clever by half.
... uOJGL VGt.i, `~
there are things we can and must do by way of near-term SDI C-
deployment that we are not doing precisely because the ABM treaty
stands in the way of sensible planning.
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Honorable Ronald Reagan
July 29, 1986
page 2
For example, right now we could build an American equivalent
of the dual capable SA-12 surface-to-air missile system that is
now coming off Soviet assembly lines. Such a system would
provide insurance to great numbers of innocent people, and
complicate any attack on military targets.
In addition, because we have neglected near term options
available to us, the Soviet Union will soon have the first high-
energy laser in space while we have none. They won't call it an
anti-missile device, but it will be able to destroy U.S.
missiles. How many, we won't know. (You may wish to request an
update on how an object in space can be hidden, camouflaged,
and decoyed.) But there is no reason why the United States should
brook further delay in acquiring these powerful tools for
upsetting enemy attacks and protecting millions from their
consequences.
Another example, the ERIS rocket, the successor of the HOE
interceptor that destroyed a warhead above Kwajalein two years
ago, could be put into production. The Army's airborne optical
adjunct, a kind of infra-red airborne warning and control system
for warheads, could be produced and mounted on a Boeing 767.
Together, these two systems could reduce any attack just above
the atmosphere and provide broad area coverage.
Additionally there are near term surveillance capabilities
that would not only greatly enhance our warning capability but
would also multiply the effectiveness of new intercept
technologies. And there are other examples of present technology
we could exploit, if only the SDI program were designed to
include near-term deployment options.
Mr. President, if the Administration keeps on defining SDI
as a faraway dream for the next millenium, no one will support it,
including us. But if we begin now, as we must, to build the
anti-missile devices we can build, the American people would soon
enjoy real and growing protection.
We must caution you, however, that we will lose this
singular opportunity to strengthen stability and peace if the
course of arms control negotiations imposes limits on SDI
deployments.
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Honorable Ronald Reagan
July 29, 1986
page 3
Finally, there is a real question about the
s
sincerity of our arms Control compliance policy. Youohavess and
reported to Congress three times now that theSoviet uUnion is in
violation of the ABM treaty. Moreover, it is the judgment of our
intelligence community that the Soviet Union may be laying the
infrastructure for a nation-wide ABM defense -- precisely what
the ABM treaty was intended to prevent.
Given this irrefutable evidence, we cannot conceive how.the
United States could possibly agree to extend the ABM Treaty and
maintain any credibility in our efforts to put an end to Soviet
arms control violations. Nor in good conscience could we, as
elected representatives, ask the American
people treaty that the Soviets are blatantly violating evenfasmthey
put their signature to paper.
The fact of the matter is that the ABM treaty has only
served to constrain U.S. strategic defenses. The Soviet program
has proceeded apace. The ABM treaty was predicated on offensive
reductions that never materialized. Instead, the Soviet Union
has engaged in the greatest offensive military buildup in
history. The cumulative result has been a steady erosion of our
deterrent.
It would be a tragedy and a mistake of historical magnitude
to reaffirm this failed arms control path, verge of achieving a breakthrough in your magnificent as we visi on the are
a
defense based on destroying weapons and preserving gent human s lonives.
p
s.
We anxiously await the opportunity to meet with
discuss this new negotiating overture, and its impact on SDI and
the future security of our nation.
MALCOLM WALL.nv /L. ,."/..___!
Sena 1XZL11r -DAN U ?, for _ Q
_wS
JAMES MCCLURF
Member of Congress
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..?+?be or Congress U.S.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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I0/SP
/ACIS
SOYA
Ic/N
Sen. Kennedy and Cong. Ape27 May decision on SALT and the J;C Sresponse of 30 J
f use in the alcfast
1
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Remarks The attached, a 2 Ju lter tCrom
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STAT
Aug 2
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is provided. FIIt my with p, pscheduled for
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?+'' Adairil Milli J. Crowe. Jr.
Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff
_. The .tintaSas
Soon. 21173,V 0.k- ~`,..
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.- Dear Admiral, Caow.s., j -
Joly2. 19
Ex~cutiyl 1
3471 X/1
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As you ksae, the Administration's rroeat1asnouncennot that it ee lower,
intends to abide by the SALT II agreea^at, is a topic of cossiderabla cemearm
bare in Congress and arum the country. We " beard the sqpmenta of the i
civilian pelicy~shsrs in support of this.deci$ion. but we 1rw met M hose
fran our motion's military leaders. The decision to ab#ujon the SALT 11
is importamt for the-CongrMS and for the {A he __ ~ w %a= It
ptofsalamal ~ip^mts. I ry to r r fore Personal sad
To that and. we Mould be grateful if you
4wsti I '
1. ,de~iaistsation spokasaas.asy that th4
cations" to build their strategic 'forces above
coostraiats (e.g.. OR IM.d Missile laro@hsrs
missile laoncber). Ds you share this .saes,.n
dsvelelmamts in O.S. strategic forces -- such
or of a strategic dsfanss -- that Mould ch-a`a
2. Do you bellow that Soviet adhs~iswce the itativo ssttaiuts
of SALT II balls your ability to plan fire U.P. fort byyosv btiifyisg the
task of predicting the Tutors sirs -mat
forces? Do you bell." that the absence of II ro?visiar ftest"ic
fmilitot
!ml
verification will adversely affect -your abilJ'SALT
to Bathe information about
Soviet ft~es?
3. Now do the three Soviet area control ~iolati Mentioned Is the
President's decision -- developaeat of a second "mw" t of IC I. talentry
encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar -- affect,! U.S. ity? Do those
violations adversely affect our ability to data' a Sovis nuclear strife? be
they ad*e:a.ly affect strategic or crisis stability? do there violatisma
affect our ability to execute strategic our plais. shoal this be and./?
4. Will the conversion of sire.l Mori f
that will carry us ever the SALT II Baits --.:L
security? it. if any, military require--on- i,
carriage salability? Do we have suoegh ALGIs a
Stage sf this increased ALAI carriage capab,
I
Wald ra pond to the follwing .
Soviets as military
SALT II' qus^titative
and rasa "Melons per NU%A
t? Are future
s the at at Mule tMft
73ts to ALOE -- a menu -G _
creases if icantly our C- k
M served thi
s added ARAM
-ailable oday to tabs full
llity? -
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