UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution- Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL. . .- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .. .
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhin`ton, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
16 October 1986
Copy
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Lawrence K. Gershwin
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
SUBJECT: Unclassified Statement on Soviet Strategic Defense
1. This memorandum responds to your request for advice on how to augment
the material already available for public release on Soviet strategic defense
programs. As such, it updates the memorandum we sent to you on 8 August which
is at attachment A; that memorandum is still valid. In this memo, we have
also sought to offer some observations on the prohlem at hand. (S NF)
2. The US effort to publicize Soviet strategic defense programs has been
a general failure, but not because of any paucity of unclassified materials;
to the contrary, there is a considerable amount already out there. Moreover,
the material already released to the public is quite good and is largely fully
descriptive of what the Soviets are doing. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION IS SIMPLY NOT USING THAT MATERIAL; THEY ARE EITHER NOT USING IT
AT ALL OR DOING SO ONLY HALF HEARTEDLY. For example, the President's speech
on Monday night, 13 October in which he attempted to explain that US SDI was
important because of Soviet strategic defense programs did little more then
cite the Krasnoyarsk radar as justification. Much more could have.been used
from the already declassified stockpile of materia s. As an example, at
attachment B is the State Do pamphlet on Soviet de ensive programs that is
really quite good. The President's staff could have used any of the materials
in that to buttress his case--but they didn't. Another outstanding piece is
the 1985 speech by Paul Nitze (at attachment C)--the most effective
presentation I have read. Why didn't the White House get the Nitze speech on
tape, or have Nitze do it for the media? (S NF)
3. With respect to the State/DoD pamphlet, that went over with a dull
thud when first released and has virtually never been heard of again. The way
the Administration handled the press campaign on this publication is sort of
akin to Gray and Company showing a major ad, like the "Where's the Beef"
commercial, just once and wondering why it wasn't a success. I myself was a
witness to the lousy job they did in giving copies to the Congress in
conjunction with my classified briefings. In short, from where we sit, the
Administration's effort to publicize what the Soviets are doing in the field
of strategic defense appears puny! (S NF)
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Soviet Strategic Defense
4. There are probably several ways to turn this thing around. First and
foremost the White House Staff needs to do a better job of publicizing what
the Soviets are doing. As part of this effort the Administration would
probably want to issue another State/DoD pamphlet, rather than face the fact
that they have failed to take advantage of the existing material. There is
some danger in generating a new pamphlet, because some in the policy world
will use this as an opportunity to force the release of additional
declassified material of marginal value including in areas where it would be
best to hold the line. Moreover, simply issuing another pamphlet is not a
prescription for success; in part because the Pentagon just doesn't have the
credibility needed. The real problem is to get the Administration to
effectively and persistently sell the story contained in the wealth of
material already released. (S NF)
5. Another possibility is a Presidential address--one like the
President's first televised foreign policy speech in which he described the
Soviet military threat. He did this aided by the use of computer generated
bar charts and airborne photography. He could easily do another such
presentation in which he explained to the nation why SDI was important in
light of Soviet strategic defense. The material in the State/DoD pamphlet
could serve as a basic text from which his speech writers could work. Should
the Administration decide to go this route, the State/DoD pamphlet could be
auuamented with the piece we have done for you
and graphics could be constructed to support tnat. in LdDS A dna
D, you will find still other material that can be considered for release.
(S NF)
6. Still another possibility is a second Gates/Gershwin unclassified
presentation to the Congress. This one, of course, would be on Soviet
strategic defenses. The first Gates/Gershwin presentation got considerable
attention and continues to be cited by the media, including in publications
such as Foreign Affairs, as well as on the Hill as an authoritative piece.
There has been no challenge to its credibility. The danger is that we might
not do such a good job the next time, or that we could be hit hard,
unjustifiably, for politicizing intelligence by selective unclassified
release. (S NF)
2
TOP SECRET
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Soviet Strategic Defense
7. At attachment (), you will find one item prepared by OSWR on the tech
transfer issue which you might consider for unclassified release. In my view,
this item is good but not yet ready for release; it needs a tougher tone, -a
much better introductory paragraph
Regardless, as I have tri
to indicate the best way out of this mess is for the Administration to make
Attachment
As stated
Downgrade to SECRET NOFORN
when removed from attachment
3
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Iur JtLKtI
SUBJECT: Unclassified Soviet Strategic Defense
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI (w/att)
2 - nDCI (w/att)
3 - Chm/NIC
4 - ADDI
5 - D/SOVA
6 - D/OSWR
7 - C/ACIS
8 - C/CRES
9 - N I 0/S P
NIO/SP:I I (160ct86)
4
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Iq
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Soviet Strategic Defense Programs
p. 4, line 8 "both in near term" should read "both in the near term".
p. 18, caption "look-down-shoot-down" should read "look-down/shoot-down".
p. 25, col. 2, 1. 44 "12 million kilograms" should read "12 million pounds".
p. 26, graphic BACKFIRE bomber was inadvertently omitted from depiction of Soviet
strategic forces. It was introduced in 1974.
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SOVIET
STRATEGIC
DEFENSE
PROGRAMS
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Released by the Department of Defense and Department of State, October 1985
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SOVIET
STRATEGIC
DEFENSE
PROGRAMS
The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps are not
necessarily authoritative.
The illustrations of Soviet strategic defense facilities and systems included in this publication
are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic
as possible.
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Preface
In March 1983, President Reagan presented a dramatic new vision of a world in
which we would no longer have to depend on nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear
conflict. He presented that vision, and that challenge, in this way:
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their se-
curity did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter
a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic
missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the President announced that night,
marks the first, essential step toward the realization of his ultimate goal. The SDI
is a research program, designed to examine the promise of effective defenses against
ballistic missiles based on new and emerging technologies. If such defenses prove
feasible, they would provide for a more stable and secure method of preventing war
in the future, through the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses which
threaten no one.
The Strategic Defense Initiative has been the subject of much discussion within
the United States and allied countries since its initiation. Such exchanges are essen-
tial in our free societies and can only help ensure that the vision behind the research
program can be achieved. There has been comparatively little public discussion, how-
ever, about the trend in Soviet defensive as well as offensive forces which provides
the essential backdrop to the SDI. Indeed, the Soviet Union has intentionally tried
to mislead the public about its strategic defense activities.
As this publication documents, Soviet efforts in most phases of strategic defense
have long been far more extensive than those of the United States. The USSR has
major passive defense programs, designed to protect important assets from attack. It
also has extensive active defense systems, which utilize weapons systems to protect
national territory, military forces, or key assets. Soviet developments in the area of
active defenses fall into three major categories: air defense; ballistic missile defense
based on current technologies; and research and development on advanced defenses
against ballistic missiles.
Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:
? Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) system around Moscow;
? Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar
that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
? Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic mis-
siles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;
? Maintenance of the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system;
? Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and
? Improvements in their passive defenses by maintaining deep bunkers and blast
shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive
systems through mobility and hardening.
The following pages examine in detail Soviet programs in defenses against bal-
listic missiles, air defense, and passive defense. A summary of key Soviet offensive
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force developments is presented in the annex to this document, since those are crit-
ical to an understanding of the impact of Soviet strategic defense programs. Soviet
offensive forces are designed to be able to limit severely U.S. and allied capability
to retaliate against attack. Soviet defensive systems in turn are designed to prevent
those retaliatory forces which did survive an attack from destroying Soviet targets.
Given the long-term trend in Soviet offensive and defensive force developments,
the United States must act in three main areas to maintain security and stability
both in near term and in the future.
First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear forces in order to ensure the es-
sential military balance in the near term, and to provide the incentives necessary
for the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant, equitable, and verifiable
nuclear arms reductions.
Second, we must act now to start constructing a more reliable strategic order for
the long term by examining the potential for future effective defenses against bal-
listic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent and necessary response
to the ongoing extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing
Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI provides a necessary
and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM
capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. The overriding importance
of the Strategic Defense Initiative, however, is the promise it offers of moving to a
better, more stable basis for deterrence in the future and of providing new and com-
pelling incentives to the Soviet Union to agree to progressively deeper negotiated
reduction in offensive nuclear arms.
The third approach is one of negotiation and diplomacy. We are even now looking
forward to a transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear
arms and enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of
non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. Toward those ends, we are
endeavoring at the negotiations in Geneva to achieve significant, equitable, and
verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviets the
relationship between offensive and defensive forces and the possibility of a future
transition to a more defense-reliant deterrence.
g C4,
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of Defense Secretary of State
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Introduction
In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive
technology at the time, the United States came
to believe that deterrence could best be assured
if each side were able to maintain the ability
to threaten retaliation against any attack and
thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were
clearly beyond any potential gains. That con-
cept called for a reduction by both the Soviet
Union and the United States in their strategic
defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance
between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces,
and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which
would maintain the balance at progressively
lower levels.
In accordance with those principles, the
United States exercised great restraint in of-
fensive nuclear arms and at the same time dra-
matically lowered its defensive forces. Thus,
we removed most of our defenses against Soviet
bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited
civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed
strict limits on U.S. and Soviet defenses against
ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one
ABM site which we were allowed under that
Treaty. The basic idea that stability and de-
terrence would be maintained if each side had
roughly equal capability to retaliate against
attack also served as the foundation for the
U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.
The Soviet Union, however, failed to show
the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive
and defensive forces, that the United States
hoped for when the SALT process began. The
USSR has consistently refused to accept mean-
ingful and verifiable negotiated reductions in
offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s,
the Soviets have greatly expanded and mod-
ernized their offensive nuclear forces and in-
vested an approximately equal sum in strategic
defenses. The USSR has an extensive, mul-
tifaceted operational strategic defensive net-
work which dwarfs that of the United States
as well as an active research and development
program in both traditional and advanced de-
fenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet non-
compliance with arms control agreements in
both the offensive and defensive areas, includ-
ing the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very seri-
ous concern. The aggregate of current Soviet
ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that
the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense
of its national territory precisely what the
ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.
Soviet offensive and defensive force develop-
ments pose a serious challenge to the West. If
left unchecked and unanswered, they would un-
dermine our ability to retaliate effectively in
case of Soviet attack. The situation would be
even more severe if the Soviet Union were to
have a monopoly on advanced defenses against
ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable of-
fensive and defensive forces. In that case,
the USSR might come to believe that it could
launch a nuclear attack against the United
States or our allies without fear of effective
retaliation. At the very least, it might see a re-
alistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail.
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Soviet Strategic Defense Programs
The Soviet Approach
The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is
firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine and
strategy, which call for the following actions in
the event of nuclear war:
? destruction and disruption of the West's
nuclear-associated command, control, and
communications;
? destruction or neutralization of as many
of the West's nuclear weapons as possible
on the ground or at sea before they could
be launched;
? interception and destruction of surviving
weapons aircraft and missiles before
they reached their targets; and
? protection of the Party, the State, military
forces, industrial infrastructure, and the
essential working population against
those weapons that survived attacks by
Soviet offensive forces.
In pursuit of these goals the USSR puts consid-
erable stress on a need for effective strategic
defenses as well as offensive forces. In the So-
viet view, the USSR could best achieve its aims
in any nuclear war if it attacked first, destroy-
ing much of the U.S. and allied capability for
retaliation. Defensive measures, both active
and passive, would in turn prevent those en-
emy forces that survived a Soviet first-strike
from destroying targets in the USSR.
Marshall V. D. Sokolovskiy, in Military
Strategy -- the basic Soviet strategic treatise,
originally published in 1962 defined the aim
of Soviet strategic defenses in this way: "They
have the task of creating an invincible system
for the defense of the entire country. ... While,
in the last war, it was sufficient to destroy 15-
20 percent of the attacking air operation, now
it is necessary to assure, essentially, 100 per-
cent destruction of all attacking airplanes and
missiles."
Soviet offensive and defensive force develop-
ments over the past 25 years demonstrate that
the strategy articulated by Sokolovskiy still ap-
plies. The following pages present a detailed
description of the actions undertaken by the
Soviets in the area of strategic defenses. In or-
der to explain the totality of the Soviet strate-
gic military effort, a description of offensive
force developments is provided in the annex to
this document.
Defensive Forces
Over the last 25 years the Soviets have in-
creased their active and passive defenses
in a clear and determined attempt to blunt the
effect of U.S. and allied retaliation to any So-
viet attack. Passive defenses are non-weapons
measures such as civil defense and harden-
ing - which protect important assets against
attack. Active defenses utilize weapon systems
to protect national territory, military forces, or
key assets.
Evidence of the importance the Soviets at-
tach to defensive damage-limitation can be
traced back to the beginning of the nuclear age.
National Air Defense became an independent
service in the late 1950s and since 1959 has gen-
erally ranked third in precedence within the
Soviet Armed Forces, following the Strategic
Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces.
By the mid-1960s, two new mission areas
antisatellite defense and anti-missile defense
-- were added to the National Air Defense mis-
sion. As a result, the Soviet Union has the
world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT)
system, which has an effective capability to
seek and destroy critical U.S. satellites in low-
earth orbit. In addition, Soviet efforts to attain
a viable strategic defense against ballistic mis-
siles have resulted in the world's only opera-
tional ABM system and a large and expanding
research and development program.
The Soviet emphasis on the necessity of re-
search into defenses against ballistic missiles
was demonstrated by then-Minister of Defense
Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM
Treaty in 1972, when he told the Soviet Pre-
sidium that the Treaty "places no limitations
whatsoever on the conducting of research and
experimental work directed towards solving
the problem of defending the country from nu-
clear missile strikes."
Ballistic Missile Defense
The Soviets maintain the world's only oper-
ational ABM system around Moscow. In 1980,
they began to upgrade and expand that system
to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The original single-layer Moscow ABM system
included 64 reloadable above-ground launchers
at four complexes and DOG HOUSE and CAT
HOUSE battle management radars south of
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Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense
0 ? Pushkino
Phased-Array Radar
ABM
Radar
ABM
Radar
15 30
KM
ABM Silo Sites Under Construction _9
Roads
The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in map at right include the Pushkino ABM
radar, above, GALOSH anti-ballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-
acceleration interceptors, top right.
Moscow. Each complex consisted of TRY ADD
tracking and guidance radars and GALOSH
interceptors (nuclear-armed, ground-based mis-
siles designed to intercept warheads in space
shortly before they reenter the Earth's atmo-
sphere).
When completed, the modernized Moscow
ABM system will be a two-layer defense com-
posed of. silo-based, long-range, modified GA-
LOSH interceptors; silo-based, high-acceler-
tion interceptors designed to engage targets
within the atmosphere; associated engagement,
and guidance radars; and a new large radar
at Pushkino designed to control ABM engage-
ments. The silo-based launchers may be reload-
able. The new system will have the 100 ABM
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Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management
launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty and
could be fully operational by 1987.
The Soviet system for detection and track-
ing of ballistic missile attack consists of a
launch-detection satellite network, over-the-
horizon radars, and a series of large phased-
array radars.
The current launch-detection satellite net-
work can provide about 30 minutes warning of
any U.S. ICBM launch and determine the gen-
eral origin of the missile. Two over-the-horizon
radars directed at the U.S. ICBM fields also
could give 30 minutes warning.
The next operational layer of ballistic mis-
sile detection consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE
ballistic missile early warning radars at six lo-
cations on the periphery of the USSR. These
radars can distinguish the size of an attack,
confirm the warning from the satellite and
over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide
target-tracking data in support of anti-ballistic
missile forces.
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The 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, at left, at six locations on
the periphery of the USSR provide warning and target-tracking data in support of the Soviet
ABM system. The DOG HOUSE radar, at right, provides battle management for the anti-ballistic
missile interceptors around Moscow.
The Soviets are now constructing a network
of six new large phased-array radars that can
track more ballistic missiles with greater accu-
racy than the existing HEN HOUSE network.
Five of these radars duplicate or supplement
the coverage of the HEN HOUSE network,
but with greatly enhanced capability. The
sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in
Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early
warning radar coverage against ballistic mis-
sile attack. Together, the six new large phased-
array radars form an arc of coverage from the
Kola Peninsula in the northwest Soviet Union,
around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the south-
west.
The United States is now constructing new
ballistic missile early warning radars, known
as PAVE PAWS, that are located on the periph-
ery of our territory and oriented outward. Both
the U.S. and the USSR, in signing the ABM
Treaty, recognized the need for ballistic missile
early warning radars. At the same time, they
recognized that ballistic missile early warn-
ing radars can detect and track warheads at
great distances and therefore have a significant
anti-ballistic missile potential. Such an ABM
capability would play an important role in a
nationwide ABM defense, which the Treaty
was designed to prevent. As a result, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed that future
ballistic missile early warning radars must be
located on a nation's periphery and oriented
outward. In that way, the desirable and legiti-
mate goal of early warning could be advanced
while minimizing the danger that an effective
nationwide battle management network could
result.
The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for bal-
listic missile detection and tracking, includ-
ing ballistic missile early warning, and vio-
lates the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is not located
within a 150-kilometer radius of the national
capital (Moscow) as required of ABM radars,
nor is it located on the periphery of the So-
viet Union and pointed outward as required
for early warning radars. It is 3,700 kilometers
from Moscow and is situated some 750 kilo-
meters from the nearest border - Mongolia.
Moreover, it is oriented not toward that bor-
der, but across approximately 4,000 kilometers
of Soviet territory to the northeast.
The Soviet Union has claimed that the Kras-
noyarsk radar is designed for space tracking,
rather than ballistic missile early warning, and
therefore does not violate the ABM Treaty. Its
design, however, is not optimized for a space-
tracking role, and the radar would, in any
event, contribute little to the existing Soviet
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space tracking network. Indeed, the design and acknowledged by the Soviets to be for
of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially iden- ballistic missile detection and tracking, includ-
tical to that of other radars that are known - ing ballistic missile early warning. Finally, it
The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation and capability
of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.
The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking
radar at Pechora. The design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora
radar. Unlike the Pechora radar, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not meet the ABM Treaty
requirement that early warning radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be
oriented outward.
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closes the last remaining gap in Soviet ballistic
missile detection coverage. The Krasnoyarsk
radar, therefore, is being constructed in direct
violation of the ABM Treaty.
The growing Soviet network of large phased-
array ballistic missile detection and tracking
radars, of which the Krasnoyarsk radar is a
part, is of particular concern when linked with
other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take
years to construct; their existence might al-
low the Soviet Union to move rather quickly
to construct a nationwide ABM defense if it
chooses to do so. The Soviets are also de-
veloping components of a new ABM system
which apparently are designed to allow them
to construct individual ABM sites in a mat-
ter of months, rather than the years that are
required for more traditional ABM systems. So-
viet activities in this regard potentially violate
the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the devel-
opment of a mobile land-based ABM system
or components. We estimate that by using
these components, the Soviets could undertake
rapidly-paced ABM deployments to strengthen
the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets
in the western USSR and east of the Urals by
the early 1990s.
In addition, the Soviets have probably vio-
lated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air
missile (SAM) components in an ABM mode by
conducting tests involving the use of SAM air
defense radars in ABM-related testing activi-
ties. Moreover, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 SAM
systems may have the potential to intercept
some types of strategic ballistic missiles.
Taken together, all of the Soviet Union's
ABM and ABM-related activities are more
significant - and more ominous - than any
one considered individually. Cumulatively,
they suggest that the USSR may be preparing
an ABM defense of its national territory.
Advanced Technologies for Defense
Against Ballistic Missiles
In the late 1960s, in line with its long-stand-
ing emphasis on strategic defense, the Soviet
Union initiated a substantial research program
into advanced technologies for defense against
ballistic missiles. That program covers many
of the same technologies involved in the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative, but represents a
far greater investment of plant space, capital,
and manpower.
Laser Weapons
The USSR's laser program is much larger
than U.S. efforts and involves over 10,000 scien-
tists and engineers and more than a half dozen
major research and development facilities and
test ranges. Much of this research takes place
at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where
the Soviets also conduct traditional ABM re-
search. Facilities there are estimated to in-
clude several air defense lasers, a laser that
The directed-energy R&D site at Sary Shagan proving ground includes ground-based lasers that
could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a ballistic missile defense role in the
future.
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may be capable of damaging some components
of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be
used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile
defense applications. A laser weapon program
of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost
roughly $1 billion per year in the U.S.
The Soviets are conducting research in three
types of gas lasers considered promising for
weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser;
the electric discharge laser; and the chemi-
cal laser. Soviet achievements in this area, in
terms of output power, have been impressive.
The Soviets are also aware of the military po-
tential of visible and very short wave-length
lasers. They are investigating excimer, free-
electron, and x-ray lasers, and have been de-
veloping argon-ion lasers for over a decade.
The Soviets appear generally capable of sup-
plying the prime power, energy storage, and
auxiliary components needed for most laser
and other directed-energy weapons. They have
developed a rocket-driven magnetohydro-
dynamic generator which produces over 15
megawatts of electrical power - a device that
has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets
may also have the capability to develop the
optical systems necessary for laser weapons to
track and attack their targets. Thus, they pro-
duced a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an as-
trophysical telescope in 1978 and claimed that
this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror that
would be constructed in the future. A large mir-
ror is considered necessary for a space-based
laser weapon.
Unlike the U.S., the USSR has now pro-
gressed in some cases beyond technology re-
search. It already has ground-based lasers
that could be used to interfere with U.S. satel-
lites, and could have prototype space-based
antisatellite laser weapons by the end of the
decade. The Soviets could have prototypes for
ground-based lasers for defense against ballis-
tic missiles by the late 1980s, and could begin
testing components for a large-scale deploy-
ment system in the early 1990s.
The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper-
Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs
Deployment phase
Laser
Particle Beam
ABM
Treaty
President's
SDI
Speech
1955 1965 1975 1985
Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space based weapons, were in place prior
to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, U.S. ABM/Space Defense
research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested.
'Potential capability of the Moscow ABM system.
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ational system will require still more develop-
ment time. An operational ground-based laser
for defense against ballistic missiles probably
could not be deployed until the late 1990s, or
after the year 2000. If technology developments
prove successful, the Soviets may deploy oper-
ational space-based antisatellite lasers in the
1990s, and might be able to deploy space-based
laser systems for defense against ballistic mis-
siles after the year 2000.
Particle Beam Weapons
Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been
involved in research to explore the feasibility
of space-based weapons that would use parti-
cle beams. We estimate that they may be able
to test a prototype particle beam weapon in-
tended to disrupt the electronics of satellites
in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy
satellites could follow later. A weapon capa-
ble of physically destroying missile boosters or
The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor is launched from the Tyuratam Space Complex,
where two launch pads and storage for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available.
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The Soviet orbital antisatellite (ASAT) weapon is operational and designed to destroy space
targets with a multi-pellet blast.
warheads probably would require several addi- on Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and
tional years of research and development.
It is still uncertain whether ground-based
charged particle-beam weapons are feasible
that is, whether the beam will propagate in
the atmosphere. A space-based neutral particle
beam weapon, however, would not be affected
by the atmosphere or by the earth's magnetic
field.
Soviet efforts in particle beams, and par-
ticularly on ion sources and radio frequency
quadrupole accelerators for particle beams, are
very impressive. In fact, much of the U.S. un-
derstanding as to how particle beams could be
made into practical defensive weapons is based
early 1970s.
Radio Frequency Weapons
The USSR has conducted research in the use
of strong radio frequency signals that have the
potential to interfere with or destroy critical
electronic components of ballistic missile war-
heads. The Soviets could test a ground-based
radio frequency weapon capable of damaging
satellites in the 1990s.
Kinetic Energy Weapons
The Soviets also have a variety of research
programs underway in the area of kinetic en-
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ergy weapons, using the high-speed collision of
a small mass with the target as the kill mech-
anism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an
experimental "gun" that could shoot streams
of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten
or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilome-
ters per second in air and over 60 kilometers
per second in a vacuum.
Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy
systems for defense against ballistic missiles
probably could not be developed until the mid-
1990s or even later. The USSR could, how-
ever, deploy in the near-term a short-range,
space-based system useful for satellite or space
station defense or for close-in attack by a
maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in
guidance and control systems probably are ad-
equate for effective kinetic energy weapons for
use against some objects in space.
Computer and Sensor Technology
Advanced weapons programs including
potential advanced defenses against ballistic
missiles - are also dependent on remote sensor
and computer technologies which are currently
more highly developed in the West than in the
Soviet Union. The Soviets are therefore devot-
ing considerable resources to improving their
abilities and expertise in these technologies.
An important part of that effort involves an in-
creasing exploitation of open and clandestine
access to Western technology. For example,
the Soviets have long been engaged in a well-
funded effort to purchase U.S. high-technology
computers, test and calibration equipment, and
sensors illegally through third parties.
Antisatellite Developments
The USSR has had for more than a dozen
years the world's only operational antisatellite
system, a co-orbital device which enters into
the same orbit as its target satellite and, when
it gets close enough, destroys the satellite by
exploding a conventional warhead. In addition,
the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM interceptor
deployed around Moscow may have ASAT ca-
pability, and Soviet ground-based lasers could
possibly damage some sensors on some U.S.
satellites.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Soviets
are engaged in research and, in some cases
development, of weapons which ultimately may
serve as ballistic missile defense systems,
but probably will first provide antisatellite
capabilities.
Air Defense
Although the United States began disman-
tling most of its defenses against Soviet bomb-
ers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has con-
tinued to invest enormous resources in a wide
array of strategic air defense weapon systems.
Taken together, the Soviet strategic air defense
network is a potent and increasingly capable
force which would attempt to limit the retal-
iatory capability of our strategic bombers and
cruise missiles.
The Soviets have deployed numerous strate-
gic air defense systems with excellent capabili-
ties against aircraft flying at medium and high
altitudes. They are now in the midst of a major
program to improve their capabilities against
aircraft and cruise missiles that fly at low alti-
tudes. That effort includes partial integration
of strategic and tactical air defenses, the up-
grading of early warning and surveillance ca-
pabilities, the deployment of more efficient data
transmission systems, and the development and
initial deployment of new aircraft, associated
air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and
airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft.
Interceptor Aircraft Bases
Strategic SAM Concentrations
Radars (BM D, EW, OTH types)
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Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 additional 2,800 interceptors assigned to So-
SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites, 10,000 air viet Air Forces (SAF) could also be employed
defense radars, and more than 1,200 intercep- in strategic defense missions. In contrast, the
tor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An U.S. has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft
The new 11-76/MAINSTAY aircraft is illustrated
as configured for its Airborne Warning and
Control Systems mission.
METERS
30
0
based in the U.S. dedicated to strategic defense,
118 strategic air defense warning radars, and
no operational strategic surface-to-air missile
launchers. These figures do not include tac-
tical air defenses deployed by NATO and the
Warsaw Pact in Europe.
The newest Soviet air defense interceptor
aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a look-
down/shoot-down and multiple-target engage-
ment capability. More than 85 FOXHOUNDS
are now operationally deployed at several loca-
tions from the Arkhangelsk area in the north-
western USSR to the Far East Military
District. Two new fighter interceptors, the
Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM,
also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities
and are designed to be highly maneuverable
USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
Tu-128
FIDDLER B
MiG-25 Su-15 Su-27
FOXBAT A/E FLAGON E/F FLANKER
MiG-29 MiG-31
YaK-28 MiG-23 FULCRUM FOXHOUND
SPEED (KTS)
1,625
1,200
1,350
950
1,080
1,350
1,350
1,375
RADIUS (KM)
1,450
1,000
1,500
1,500
900
1,300
1,150
2,100
ARMAMENT
4 AAMs
2 AAMs
6 AAMs
4 AAMs
2 AAMs
6 AAMs
6 AAMs
8 AAMs
WINGSPAN (M)
14
9
14
18
12
8 (swept)
12
14
US Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
F-106A F-4C/D F-15A
DELTA DART PHANTOM II EAGLE
SPEED (KTS)
1,150
1,200
1,450
RADIUS (KM)
925
825
1,000
ARMAMENT
5 AAMs
8 AAMs
8 AAMs
WINGSPAN (M)
12
12
13
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The MiG-29/FULCRUM all-weather, air superiority fighter-interceptor reflects the USSR's
continuing drive to produce new generations of tactical and strategic aircraft. The FULCRUM
is fitted with AA-10 missiles and the USSR's most modern look-down-shoot-down radar.
USSR Strategic Surface-to-Air Missiles
0
RANGE (KM)
MEDIUM-
TO-HIGH
LOW-TO-
HIGH
in air-to-air combat. These three aircraft are
equipped with two new air-to-air missiles - the
long-range AA-9 (for the FOXHOUND) and the
medium-range AA-10 (for the FULCRUM and
FLANKER) that can be used against low-
flying targets.
LOW-TO-
HIGH
The USSR is also deploying the MAINSTAY
airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
aircraft, which will improve substantially its
capabilities for early warning and air combat
command and control, especially against low-
flying aircraft and cruise missiles.
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The Soviets maintain the world's most ex-
tensive early warning system for air defense,
composed of a widespread network of ground-
based radars linked operationally with those of
their Warsaw Pact allies. As previously noted,
more than 10,000 air surveillance radars of var-
ious types provide virtually complete coverage
at medium to high altitudes over the USSR, and
in some areas well beyond the Soviet Union's
borders. Three over-the-horizon radars for bal-
listic missile warning could provide additional
warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft.
The USSR also has an active research and
development program to improve its air surveil-
lance network. In 1983, it began to deploy
two new types of air surveillance radars which
will enhance Soviet capabilities for air defense,
electronic warfare and early warning of cruise
missile and bomber attacks. The Soviets are
also continuing to deploy improved air surveil-
lance data systems that can rapidly pass data
from outlying radars through the air surveil-
lance network to ground-controlled intercept
sites and SAM command posts.
Soviet strategic surface-to-air missiles pro-
vide low-to-high-altitude barrier, area, and ter-
minal defenses under all weather conditions.
Five systems are now operational: the SA-1,
SA-2, and SA-3, and the more capable SA-5 and
SA-10. The recent Soviet air defense reorgani-
zation permits efficient integration of strategic
and tactical SAM systems. While most tactical
SAMs have a shorter range than their strate-
gic counterparts, many have better capabilities
against targets flying at low altitude.
Over the years the Soviets have continued
to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have repeat-
edly modified the system. Further deployment
The mobile version of the SA-10 SAM will soon be operational.
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The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high-
performance aircraft, will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles, and
may have a potential against some strategic ballistic missiles as well.
and upgrading of the SA-5 to enhance its capa-
bility to work in conjunction with low-altitude
systems like the SA-10 are probable.
The SA-10 can defend against low-altitude
targets with small radar cross-sections, like
cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site was op-
erational in 1980. Over 60 sites are now op-
erational and work is progressing on at least
another 30. More than half these sites are lo-
cated near Moscow; this emphasis on Moscow
and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites
suggest a first priority on terminal defense of
command and control, military, and key indus-
trial complexes.
In keeping with their drive toward mobility
as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are
developing a mobile version of the SA-10 which
could become operational late this year. This
mobile version could be used to support Soviet
theater forces and to permit periodic changes
in the location of SA-10 sites within the USSR
so as to counter U.S. retaliatory forces more
effectively.
The Soviets are also flight-testing another
important mobile SAM system, the SA-X-12,
which is able to intercept aircraft at all al-
titudes, cruise missiles, and short-range bal-
listic missiles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may
have the potential to intercept some types of
strategic ballistic missiles as well. This is
a serious development because these systems
are expected to be deployed widely through-
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out the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They could,
if properly supported, add a significant point-
target defense coverage to a nationwide Soviet
ABM deployment.
Passive Defenses
Soviet military doctrine calls for passive de-
fenses to act in conjunction with active forces
to ensure the wartime survival and continu-
ity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, mili-
tary command and control units, war-related
industrial production and services, the essen-
tial work force, and as much of the general
population as possible. The U.S. passive de-
fense effort is far smaller and more limited;
it is no way comparable to the comprehensive
Soviet program.
Physical hardening of military assets to
make them more resistant to attack is an im-
portant passive defense technique. The USSR
has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities,
and key command and control centers to an un-
precedented degree. Much of today's U.S. retal-
iatory force would be ineffective against those
hardened targets. To maintain effective deter-
rence, the United States must be able credi-
bly to threaten prompt retaliation against the
full spectrum of Soviet targets, including those
which have been greatly hardened.
Soviet leaders and managers at all levels
of the government and Communist Party are
provided hardened alternate command posts lo-
cated well away from urban centers - in addi-
tion to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in
Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redun-
dant system, patterned after a similar system
for the Soviet Armed Forces, provides hardened
alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key
party and government personnel throughout
the USSR.
Elaborate plans have also been made for
the full mobilization of the national economy
in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital
materials are maintained, many in hardened
underground structures. Redundant industrial
facilities are in active production. Industrial
and other economic facilities have been equip-
ped with blast shelters for the work force, and
detailed procedures have been developed for
the relocation of selected plants and equip-
ment. By planning for the survival of the essen-
tial work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute
vital production programs using those indus-
trial components that could be redirected or
salvaged after an attack.
In addition, the USSR has greatly empha-
sized mobility as a means of enhancing the
survivability of military assets. The SS-20 and
SS-25, for example, are mobile. Rail-mobile de-
ployment of the SS-X-24 is expected before the
end of the decade. The Soviets are also develop-
ing an extensive network of mobile command,
control, and communications facilities.
Soviet Statements on the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative
These extensive Soviet activities in strate-
gic defense, combined with the large Soviet
buildup in offensive forces over the past two
decades, have been eroding the retaliatory ca-
pabilities of U.S. strategic forces on which de-
terrence has long rested. If the USSR in the
future were unilaterally to add an effective ad-
vanced defense against ballistic missiles to its
offensive and other defensive forces, it would
pose a very serious new threat to U.S. and
allied security.
The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is de-
signed to counter the trend in the Soviets'
favor. It is thus not unexpected that Soviet re-
actions to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
have been strongly negative. Through an in-
tensive, worldwide propaganda campaign, the
USSR evidently hopes that it can dissuade the
United States from pursuing this research pro-
gram, thereby preserving the possibility of a
Soviet monopoly in effective defenses against
ballistic missiles - a monopoly that could give
the USSR the uncontested damage-limiting
first-strike capability that it has long sought.
Thus, Soviet statements on the SDI must be
seen in light of the extensive, long-term growth
in Soviet offensive and defensive forces and
of their major research effort to develop ad-
vanced weapons for defense against ballistic
missiles. They should also be viewed in light
of comparable Soviet propaganda campaigns
on other issues. The USSR engaged in a ma-
jor propaganda effort in the late 1970s and
early 1980s to preserve its monopoly in longer-
range intermediate-range nuclear forces, and
has adopted many of the same tactics to pre-
vent the United States from acquiring an oper-
ational ASAT system to balance its own.
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On April 22, 1983, a month after the Presi-
dent's announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, a published letter signed by more
than 200 senior Soviet scientists denouncing
the initiative appeared in the New York Times.
It is interesting and instructive to note that a
number of the signatories have been instrumen-
tal in the development of both traditional and
advanced ballistic missile defensive systems:
Petr D. Grushin, Vladimir S. Semenikhin, Fe-
dor V. Bunkin, Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, Vsevolod
S. Avduyevskiy, Aleksandr M. Prokhorov, and
Nikolay G. Basov. Velikhov, for example,
was for several years the director of the Insti-
tute of Atomic Energy laboratories at Troitsk,
Dr. Y.P. Velikhov has been a central figure in
the development of the USSR's high energy
laser weapons. As Chairman of the committee
of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and
Against Nuclear War, Dr. Velikhov is also the
leading Soviet scientific spokesman against
the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.
where lasers for strategic and tactical appli-
cations are being developed. Avduyevskiy has
long been involved with strategic weapons re-
search and now has responsibility for a num-
ber of projects concerned with the military
use of space, including a space-based laser
weapon. Other signatories have spent their
careers developing strategic offensive weapons
and other military systems: Vladimir N. Ch-
elomey, Valentin P. Glushko, Aleksandr D.
Nadiradze, and Viktor P. Makeyev in ICBMs
and SLBMs; Oleg K. Antonov and Aleksandr S.
Yakovlev in military aircraft; Nikolay Isanin
in nuclear submarines; Yuliy B. Khariton in
the Soviet military nuclear energy program;
and Martin I. Kabachnik in chemical warfare.
The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative offers
the possibility of a better, more stable de-
terrence based increasingly on defenses that
are survivable, militarily effective, and cost-
effective relative to offensive forces. If our
research shows that such defenses against bal-
listic missiles are feasible, they would allow us
to move from deterrence based solely on the
threat of nuclear retaliation, toward enhanced
deterrence characterized by greater reliance
on defensive capabilities that threaten no one.
The Strategic Defense Initiative is also a pru-
dent and necessary response to the very active
Soviet efforts in offensive and defensive forces.
It responds directly to the ongoing and exten-
sive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, includ-
ing the existing Soviet deployments permitted
under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research pro-
gram provides a necessary and powerful deter-
rent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand
rapidly its ABM capability beyond that con-
templated by the ABM Treaty. It also provides
insurance against an eventual Soviet attempt
to deploy an effective advanced system for de-
fense against ballistic missiles unilaterally.
SDI research complements our efforts to
achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable re-
ductions in nuclear forces. In the near term,
we are seeking reductions of strategic and
intermediate-range nuclear forces, and discus-
sing defensive and space arms, in the U.S.-
Soviet negotiations which opened in Geneva in
March 1985. The United States and the Soviet
Union have agreed that there is a fundamental
relationship between offensive and defensive
systems and that neither can be considered in
isolation.
In the longer term, if we were to deploy ad-
vanced defenses against ballistic missiles, such
defenses could increase significantly the incen-
tives for further negotiated deep reductions in
offensive nuclear forces because they could re-
duce or eliminate the military utility of ballis-
tic missiles. Such significant reductions would,
in turn, serve to increase the effectiveness of
defensive systems.
The SDI research program emphasizes ad-
vanced non-nuclear defensive technologies. It
will provide to a future President and Con-
gress, possibly in the early 1990s, the technical
knowledge required for a decision on whether
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to develop and later deploy advanced defensive
systems. Extensive discussions with our allies
would take place prior to any future decision
to move beyond research to development and
deployment.
Any future deployment would also be a mat-
ter for discussion and negotiation as appropri-
ate with the Soviet Union, as provided in the
ABM Treaty. Even now we are seeking to
engage the Soviets at Geneva in a discussion
of the relationship of offensive and defensive
forces and of a possible future transition to
greater reliance on defensive systems.
While we could not allow a Soviet veto over
a decision which would have such a major
impact on U.S. and allied security, it is our in-
tention and hope that - if new defensive tech-
nologies prove feasible - we and the Soviets
would be able both to move to a more defense-
reliant balance. What we envision is thus just
the opposite of an arms race or a search for mil-
itary superiority. We seek instead an approach
that would serve the security interests of the
United States, our allies, the Soviet Union, and
the world as a whole.
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Annex
Offensive Forces
Soviet military doctrine and strategy call for
superior offensive forces capable of executing
a successful first strike. The Soviet buildup in
offensive forces over the last two decades has
been designed to move in that direction.
Soviet strategic offensive forces introduced
since 1971 include:
? four new types of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) - the SS-17,
18, 19, and 25. In addition, the USSR
probably has deployed the SS-16 in
violation of the SALT II Treaty;
? five new types of ballistic missile-carrying
submarines;
? four new types of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
? five improved versions of existing SLBMs;
? long-range cruise missiles; and
? a new variant of the BEAR bomber
carrying strategic air-launched cruise
missiles.
That buildup is all the more striking when
compared to the relative restraint exercised by
the U.S. in its acquisition of nuclear weapons
systems during the same period. The number of
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in the
U.S. stockpile peaked in 1967. We had one-third
more nuclear weapons then than we have now.
Moreover, the total explosive power (measured
in megatonnage) of our nuclear weapons was
four times greater in 1960 than it is today.
Our latest B-52 bomber was built in 1962.
Although we modernized the missiles our sub-
marines carried with the POSEIDON C-3 in
1971 and TRIDENT I C-4 in 1979, we did not in-
troduce a single new ballistic missile-carrying
submarine from 1966 until 1981, when we be-
gan deploying the TRIDENT submarine at the
rate of about one a year. In fact, our ballistic
missile submarine force declined by one-fourth
between 1966 and 1981, from 41 boats to 31.
During the time we were decreasing the num-
ber of our SSBNs, the Soviet Union deployed
62 new ballistic missile-carrying submarines.
Similarly, the U.S. began deploying its new-
est ICBM, the MINUTEMAN III, fifteen years
ago; today, we have fewer ICBMs than we did
in 1967. By contrast, the Soviet Union has
added about 800 ICBMs to its arsenal since
that year. Of greatest concern for strategic
stability has been the development and deploy-
ment of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. Since the
late 1970s, the USSR has deployed more than
300 SS-18s, each twice as large as the U.S.
PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying ten war-
heads, and 360 SS-19s, each approximately the
size of the PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying
six warheads. The Soviets already have enough
hard-target-capable ICBM warheads today to
attack all U.S. ICBM silos and launch con-
trol centers and will have a larger number of
hard-target capable warheads in the future. (A
weapon with hard-target capability has suffi-
cient accuracy and yield to destroy targets that
have been hardened to withstand the effects of
a nuclear detonation.)
In addition to the rapid growth in its ICBM
force, the Soviet Union is engaged in a major
modernization and expansion of its strategic
bomber and submarine forces. The bulk of So-
viet strategic offensive nuclear warheads has
traditionally been on ICBMs, while the U.S.
has maintained a balanced force, with fewer
than one-quarter of our strategic weapons on
ICBMs. The growth in modern Soviet strate-
gic offensive forces of all types is thus not only
exacerbating the imbalance between U.S. and
Soviet ICBMs, but also steadily eroding the
traditional countervailing U.S. advantage in
SLBMs and strategic bomber systems.
When the SALT I Interim Agreement on Of-
fensive Arms was signed in 1972, the USSR had
roughly 2,300 strategic ballistic missile war-
heads, and the throw-weight of its ballistic
missile force was about 3 million kilograms.
(Throw-weight is a basic measure of ballistic
missile destructive capability and potential.)
By the time the SALT II agreement was signed
in 1979, the Soviet strategic arsenal had more
than doubled to roughly 5,500 strategic bal-
listic missile warheads with a ballistic missile
throw-weight of about 4 million kilograms. To-
day, the Soviet Union has over 8,000 strate-
gic ballistic missile warheads and a ballistic
missile throw-weight of about 12 million kilo-
grams.
Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that
the USSR's offensive nuclear force buildup con-
tinues unabated, with a large number of new
systems at or nearing deployment. For exam-
ple, the Soviets are:
? continuing production of the BEAR H
bombers which carry the AS-15 long-range
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Introduction of Strategic Forces
Systems by Year
USSR
SALT I and SALT 11
ABM Treaty
.N M a
f g g ~
W W pp W
N N N N
W WW
W'~yW
N{+1N W ~Q, W y
yNyW WW yW 7
Wyy222 '
ETHAN
GE ALLEN
EORRGE
G
WASHINGTON
W a
r2 WW W'^y
xa^r"u~xpx ..
TYPHOON
2
I-
f
PEACE-
KEEPER
1960 1972 1979 1985 1987
'Available information on the SS-16 is inconclusive, but indicates probable deployment
air-launched cruise missile. They are also
developing a new strategic bomber, the
BLACKJACK, which, when deployed
before the end of the decade, will be
larger than either the U.S. B-1B or B-52;
? completing development of the SS-X-24
and have announced deployment of the
SS-25 ICBM. The SS-25 violates the SALT
II agreement, since it is a prohibited
second new type of ICBM;
? deploying two new classes of nuclear-
powered ballistic missile-carrying sub-
marines (SSBNs), the DELTA IV and the
TYPHOON, and associated SLBMs. They
are also testing a new sea-launched cruise
missile, the SS-NX-21.
SS-NX-24
a
ALCM SLCM
Q F s M V }
The combination of U.S. restraint and Soviet
expansion and modernization of its strategic
offensive forces means that U.S. forces are be-
coming increasingly obsolete. We are therefore
modernizing our strategic nuclear forces to en-
sure the balance necessary for continued de-
terrence. That program includes development
of the PEACEKEEPER/MX ICBM, a smaller
single-warhead ICBM (popularly known as
MIDGETMAN), the B-1B bomber, an advanced
technology bomber, and the TRIDENT II
SLBM. We are also deploying long-range air-
and sea-launched cruise missiles and TRIDENT
SSBNs. Our strategic modernization program
is essential not only for the military balance,
but also to induce the Soviets to agree to nego-
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tiated offensive force reductions which would
enable us to maintain the balance at far lower
levels of armaments.
The Soviet Union has also greatly expanded
its nuclear forces of less-than-intercontinental
range, which primarily threaten our friends
and allies. The USSR has developed an en-
tirely new generation of nuclear short-range
ballistic missiles. Of gravest concern has been
the creation and subsequent rapid expansion
of the SS-20 longer-range intermediate-range
missile force, which threatens our friends and
allies in Europe and Asia. NATO had no equiv-
alent systems when the USSR began to field
this modern, mobile, highly accurate, triple-
warhead missile. As of September 1985, the So-
viets had deployed 441 SS-20s, with over 1,200
warheads. Not only is the SS-20 force continu-
ing to grow, but the Soviets are also testing
a modified version of the SS-20 which is ex-
pected to be even more accurate. In contrast,
NATO plans to deploy 572 single-warhead PER-
SHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles
and stands ready to reduce or reverse those de-
ployments if we can reach an equitable, verifi-
able arms reduction agreement with the USSR.
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Current
Policy
No. 717
Paul H. Nitze
SDI: The Soviet Program
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Ambassador
Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State on
Arms Control Matters, before the Chau-
tauqua Conference on Soviet-American
Relations, Chautauqua, New York,
June 28, 1985.
Soviet commentary on the U.S. Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI) research
program has been strongly negative.
The Soviets have accused us of expand-
ing the arms race into a new area by ini-
tiating "the militarization of space." In
Geneva, they have demanded a ban on
research, development, testing, and de-
ployment of what they call "space-strike
arms" and have conditioned progress in
the negotiations on offensive nuclear
force reductions on prior U.S. accept-
ance of this ban.
One might conclude from this Soviet
commentary that the Soviet Union has
no program comparable to our SDI.
Such a conclusion would be far from
correct.
Soviet Strategic Defense Efforts
Soviet military doctrine stresses that of-
fensive and defensive forces must inter-
act closely to achieve Soviet aims in any
conflict. Accordingly, the Soviets are
heavily involved in strategic defense,
with programs that go far beyond re-
search. In fact, over the last two dec-
ades, the Soviet Union has spent
roughly as much on strategic defense as
it has on its massive offensive nuclear
forces. As part of this huge effort, the
Soviets have deployed around Moscow
the world's only operational antiballistic
missile (ABM) system, a system they are
currently upgrading with a projected
completion date of about 1987. They also
have an indepth national air defense
force, a vast political leadership survival
program, and nationwide civil defense
forces and programs.
Further, they have been conducting
a number of activities that are inconsist-
ent with and tend to undermine the
ABM Treaty. For example, their deploy-
ment of a large phased-array ballistic
missile tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk
in Siberia constitutes a violation of the
treaty. We are concerned that, in the
aggregate, Soviet ABM-related activities
could provide them the basis for deploy-
ment of an ABM defense of their na-
tional territory, which would also violate
the treaty.
Soviet strategic defense programs
are not restricted to the more traditional
approaches. The Soviets have also been
pursuing, since the 1960s, research into
advanced technologies for strategic de-
fense. These technologies include high-
energy lasers, particle-beam weapons,
radio frequency weapons, and kinetic
energy weapons. These are the same
types of technologies being researched
in the U.S. SDI program. Moreover,
during this same period, the Soviets
have had an active and expanding mili-
tary space program.
The Soviet version of SDI has been
overlooked in the recent public debate:
Indeed, taking advantage of the closed
nature of Soviet society, Soviet strategic
defense efforts have proceeded com-
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pletely free from debates of the sort
that are occurring now in the West over
the utility and implications of our
program.
Let me address the Soviet version of
SDI in some detail. While some of the
material I will cover is quite technical, I
hope it will give you a better apprecia-
tion of the extensive efforts the Soviets
have been conducting for years.
Soviet Progress in
Advanced Defense Technologies
High-Energy Laser Research. The
Soviet Union's high-energy laser pro-
gram began in the mid-1960s and has
been much larger than the U.S. effort.
The Soviets have built over a half-dozen
major research and development
facilities and test ranges, including some
at the Sary Shagan missile test center
where they also do traditional anti-
ballistic missile work. They have over
10,000 scientists and engineers
associated with the development of
lasers for weapons.
The Soviets have conducted research
on the three types of gas lasers that the
United States considers promising for
weapons applications: the gas-dynamic
laser, the electric discharge laser, and
the chemical laser. They have also been
working on other types of lasers that
the United States had not seriously con-
sidered for weapons applications until
very recently. These include excimer and
free-electron lasers.
The Soviets are also pursuing
related laser weapon technologies, such
as efficient electrical power sources and
high-quality optical components. U.S. ex-
perts believe the Soviets are generally
capable of supplying the necessary prime
power, energy storage, and auxiliary
components for most laser and other
directed energy weapons. As evidence of
this capability, the Soviets have de-
veloped a very powerful rocket-driven
generator, which has no counterpart in
the West. The Soviets may have also
achieved the capability to develop the
necessary optical systems for laser
weapons.
The Soviet program has now pro-
gressed beyond technology research, in
some cases to the development of proto-
type laser weapons. For the antisatel-
lite-or ASAT-mission, the Soviets
already have ground-based lasers at the
Sary Shagan test site that could be used
to interfere with U.S. satellites at low
altitudes. Soviet programs have reached
the point where they could begin con-
struction of ground-based laser ASAT
facilities at operational sites. These
facilities could be available by the end of
the 1980s and would greatly increase
Soviet ASAT capabilities. Moreover,
they could test prototype space-based
laser ASAT weapons by the early 1990s,
and, if their technology developments
prove successful, they could deploy
operational space-based lasers for ASAT
purposes in the mid-1990s.
For the ballistic missile defense-or
BMD-mission, the Soviets could have
prototypes for ground-based lasers by
the late 1980s. Testing of the com-
ponents for a large-scale operational
system could begin in the early 1990s.
With high priority and some significant
technological risk, the Soviets could skip
some testing steps and be ready to de-
ploy a ground-based laser BMD system
by the early to mid-1990s. The many dif-
ficulties associated with fielding an
operational system would normally re-
quire much development time, however,
and initial operational deployment is not
likely in this century. The Soviets can be
expected to pursue development of a
space-based laser BMD system for possi-
ble deployment after the year 2000.
The Soviets have also begun to de-
velop several high-energy laser weapons
for air defense. These include lasers in-
tended for air defense of high-value stra-
tegic targets in the Soviet Union, for
point defense of ships at sea, and for air
defense of theater forces. Following past
practice, they are likely to deploy air
defense lasers to complement, rather
than replace, interceptors and surface-
to-air missiles, or SAMs. The strategic
air defense laser is probably at least in
the prototype stage of development and
could be operational by the late 1980s. It
most likely will be deployed in conjunc-
tion with SAMs in a point defense role.
The shipborne laser will probably not be
operational until the early 1990s. The
theater air defense laser may be opera-
tional sometime sooner and is likely to
be capable of structurally damaging air-
craft at close ranges and producing
electro-optical and eye damage at
greater distances.
Finally, the Soviets are developing
an airborne laser. Such a laser could
have several missions, including ASAT
operations, protection of high-value air-
craft, and protection against cruise
missiles. Assuming a successful develop-
ment effort, limited initial deployment
could begin in the early 1990s.
Particle-Beam Weapons. Since the
early 1970s, the Soviets have had a re-
search program designed to explore the
technical feasibility of a particle-beam
weapon in space. For the ASAT mission,
they may be able to test a prototype
space-based particle-beam weapon in-
tended to disrupt satellite electronic
equipment in the mid- to late 1990s. One
designed to destroy satellites could be
tested by the year 2000. Early in the
next century, the Soviets could have a
prototype space-based BMD system
ready for testing.
Radio Frequency Weapons. The
Soviets have conducted research for
decades on sources of high-power radio
frequency-or RF-signals and the
antennas that would be required to
direct and focus the signals on distant
targets. These signals have the potential
to interfere with or destroy components
of missiles, satellites, and reentry
vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could
test a ground-based RF weapon capable
of damaging satellites. A space-based
RF antisatellite weapon will probably
not be tested until after the year 2000.
Kinetic Energy Weapons. In the
area of kinetic energy weapons, the
Soviets have a variety of longstanding
research programs underway. These
weapons use the high-speed collision of a
small mass with the target as the kill
mechanism. As early as 1966, the
Soviets had an experimental gun that
could shoot streams of particles of a
heavy metal, such as tungsten, at
velocities of over 60 kilometers per sec-
ond in a vacuum. Current Soviet efforts
include research and development of
electromagnetic railguns to accelerate
projectiles to ultrahigh velocities,' as well
as other advanced systems. These piv-
grams could result in the near term in a
short-range space-based system useful
for satellite or space station defense or
for close-in attack by a maneuvering
satellite. Longer range space-based
systems could be developed as early as
the mid-1990s.
The Soviet Military Space Program
In addition to their huge and compre-
hensive program of research into ad-
vanced strategic defense technologies,
the Soviets have the world's most active
military space program. This program
dominates the Soviet Union's overall
space effort. For example, in 1984 the
Soviets conducted about 100 space
launches. Of these, some 80% were
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purely military in nature, with much of
the remainder serving both military and
civil functions. By way of comparison,
the total number of U.S. space launches
in 1984 was about 20.
The Soviets believe in the combined
arms concept of warfare in which all
types of forces are integrated into
military operations to achieve the
desired goals. Space systems play a ma-
jor role in this equation. Soviet space
systems dedicated to military missions
include satellites that perform recon-
naissance, missile launch detection and
attack warning, command and control,
and ASAT functions. Dual-purpose satel-
lites that perform some civilian functions
are used for communications, naviga-
tional support, and weather prediction
and monitoring.
In the reconnaissance area, the
United States has no counterpart to the
Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites,
the EORSAT [electronic intelligence
ocean reconnaissance satellite] and the
nuclear-powered RORSAT [radar ocean
reconnaissance satellite]. These Soviet
satellites have the mission of locating
and identifying U.S. and allied naval
forces in open ocean areas and targeting
them for destruction by Soviet antiship
weapons. Four such satellites were
launched in 1984.
In the ASAT area, the Soviets have
had the capability since 1971 to attack
satellites in near-earth orbit with a
ground-based orbital interceptor. Again,
the United States has no comparable
operational capability. Using a radar
sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the in-
terceptor can attack a target in orbit at
various altitudes during the interceptor's
first two revolutions. An intercept dur-
ing the first orbit would minimize the
time available for a target satellite to
take evasive action.
The interceptor can reach targets
orbiting at altitudes of more than 5,000
kilometers, but it is probably intended
for high-priority satellites at lower alti-
tudes. It is launched from the Tyuratam
space complex, where launch pads and
storage space for interceptors and
launch vehicles are available. Several in-
terceptors could be launched each day.
In addition to the orbital interceptors,
the Soviets could also use their opera-
tional ABM interceptors in a direct-
ascent attack against low-orbiting
satellites.
Should the Soviets decide to deploy
in space extremely large payloads, in-
cluding components of a space-based
ballistic missile defense, they would re-
quire space boosters capable of placing
in orbit thousands of tons per year. The
two new boosters they are developing-a
medium-lift vehicle comparable to our
Titan and a heavy-lift vehicle com-
parable to our Saturn V-will meet this
requirement. These boosters should be
available as early as the late 1980s.
Finally, the Soviets have ambitious
plans for their manned space programs.
They plan to replace their current
Salyut space 'stations with large space
complexes, which could support 20 or
more cosmonauts on a permanent basis.
Such a complex would enhance their
space-based military support and war-
fighting capabilities. Missions could in-
clude military research and develop-
ment, reconnaissance, imagery interpre-
tation, ASAT support operations, and
BMD support operations. To ferry
cosmonauts to this complex, as well as
to place large payloads in orbit, the
Soviets are developing their own version
of the U.S. shuttle orbiter. They are also
experimenting with a test vehicle that is
apparently a scale model of a large,
manned space plane. This plane's possi-
ble missions include reconnaissance,
crew transport, and ASAT operations.
It also could be used as a manned space
station defender.
Soviet Disingenuousness
Considering all of the foregoing, it be-
comes apparent just how preposterous
Soviet criticisms of the U.S. SDI pro-
gram are. The United States is not ex-
panding the military competition into
new areas; the Soviets have been re-
searching the same technologies for two
decades. Likewise, the United States is
not initiating "the militarization of
space"; space has been militarized for
many years, primarily by Soviet systems
and programs.
This Soviet disingenuousness
becomes even more evident when one
considers those who are taking advan-
tage of our open society by leading the
attack in the Western public arena on
the U.S. SDI program. Within a month
of President Reagan's 1983 speech that
initiated SDI, a letter signed by a large
group of Soviet scientists was published
in the New York Times denouncing the
program. A number of the signatories of
this letter have, in fact, been instru-
mental in Soviet programs researching
both conventional and advanced ballistic
missile defense technologies. Among
these are Mr. Y. P. Velikhov, the Depu-
ty Director of the Kurchatov Atomic
Energy Institute, who is a central figure
in Soviet laser and particle-beam weapon
efforts; Mr. N. G. Basov and Mr. A. M.
Prokhorov, who are both scientific ad-
visers to laser weapon programs; and
Mr. Avduyevskiy, who is responsible for
a number of projects researching the
military use of space, including a space-
based laser weapon. Other signatories
have spent their careers developing
strategic offensive weapons and other
military systems.
Soviet Motives
Why are the Soviets conducting this
propaganda campaign? Clearly, they see
the potential applications for advanced
defensive technologies; otherwise they
would not be investing so much effort
and so many resources in this area. It is
not unreasonable to conclude that they
would like to continue to be the only
ones pressing forward in this field. At a
minimum, they want to keep the United
States from outstripping them in such
technologies.
In this vein, the Soviet propaganda
line against SDI is as predictable as it is
hypocritical. The Soviets hope to foster
a situation in which we would unilater-
ally restrain our research effort, even
though it is fully consistent with existing
treaties. This would leave them with a
virtual monopoly in advanced strategic
defense research; they see this as the
most desirable outcome.
Such a virtual monopoly could be
most dangerous for the West. Both sides
have recognized for many years that of-
fense and defense are vitally related to
each other, that it is the balance be-
tween the offense-defense mixes of the
sides that is essential to keeping the
peace. Unilateral restraint by the United
States in the defense area would jeopar-
dize this balance and could, therefore,
potentially undermine our deterrent
ability.
If the United States proves unwill-
ing to restrain itself unilaterally, the
Soviets are prepared to impose an
agreed ban on research "designed to
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create space-strike arms." At worst, a
mutually observed ban would leave them
where they are today, unthreatened by
potential U.S. technological advances
and maintaining the only operational
ABM and ASAT systems. The Soviets
are already positioning themselves, how-
ever, to avoid having such a ban apply
equally to the research of both sides.
They currently deny that any of their ef-
forts fall within their definition of re-
search "designed to create space-strike
arms," while asserting that all of the
U.S. SDI program fits within that defini-
tion. Moreover, even were a research
ban to be applied equally to the sides,
given its inherent unverifiability and the
closed nature of the Soviet Union-and
particularly its scientific community
compared to ours-the Soviets very well
might be able unilaterally to continue
their research on a clandestine basis.
Conclusion
We can expect the Soviets to continue to
protest strongly and publicly about SDI
and alleged U.S. designs to "militarize
space," all the while denying that they
are conducting similar programs. We
must recognize this propaganda for
what it is-the key element of an overall
strategy to divide the United States
from its allies and elicit from us uni-
lateral concessions. By making clear to
the Soviets that we have the political
will to maintain the necessary military
capabilities effectively to deter them-
that is, that their propaganda campaign
will not succeed in causing us to exercise
unilateral restraint-we can establish
the necessary conditions for the Soviets
to consider a more forthcoming ap-
proach to the negotiations in Geneva. In
that event, the United States will be
prepared, as it is now, for a serious
discussion of how-should new defensive
technologies prove feasible-our two
sides could move jointly to a more stable
strategic relationship, building upon the
research efforts of both. ^
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? July 1985
Editor: Cynthia Saboe ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
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