WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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A Executive Secretary
27 Oct 86
3637 (10-81)
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October 16, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN
FROM: TOM GIBSON' 5
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: White House Talking Points
Exnufi ie Registry _
86- 4967X
Attached for your information and use are talking points on the
President's Iceland meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev,
arms reduction, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Also
included is the text of the President's address to the nation on
October 13, 1986.
If you have any questions concerning these materials, please
contact the Office of Public Affairs at 456-7170.
oc-
EXEC
REG
11
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
October 16, 1986
THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
Executive Summary
The President went to Iceland to pranote the main objectives of American foreign
policy: true peace and greater freedan in the world. He met with General
Secretary Gorbachev for 10 hours of frank and substantive direct talks. We
achieved our objectives.
The President focused on a broad four point agenda for improved U.S.-Soviet
relations: Human Rights; Arms Reductions; the Resolution of Regional Conflicts;
and Expanding Bilateral Contacts and Communications.
Increasing and Overwhelming Public Support
Private media polls immediately following the Iceland meeting found overwhelming
support by the American people for the President.
o The Wall Street Journal/NBC News and the New York Times/CBS News polls
registered 71% and 72% (respectively) approved of the President's handling of
the Iceland meeting.
Building Upon Iceland Meeting
o Never before in the history of arms control negotiations has so much progress
been made in so many areas, in so short a time.
o The U.S. and Soviet Union came very close to an agreement that would secure
massive reductions of the most threatening weapon systems: offensive
ballistic missiles.
o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet
missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is
involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
o SDI was a main inducement for the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in
offensive arsenals. SDI remains the best insurance policy that any future
arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the
Soviets.
o Notwithstanding the disagreements on SDI, the President is calling upon the
Soviet leadership to follow through on arms reduction accamplishments at
Reykjavik and continue to discuss our differences on strategic defense, which
have been narrowed.
o We will vigorously pursue, at the same time, progress in other areas of the
agenda, especially human rights.
For additional information, call the White House Office of Public Affairs: 456-7170.
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
October 16, 1986
ARMS REDUCTION AT IC EL ND -- HISTORIC PROGRESS
Unlike the past, the U.S. is now dealing from a position of strength and
confidence. General Secretary Gorbachev suggested the Iceland meeting, and the
President accepted in an effort to further the US/Soviet dialogue in all four
areas of the agenda.
o Because of U.S. strength and confidence, and the inducement of SDI to
negotiate, unprecedented progress was made toward dramatically reducing
offensive nuclear arsenals.
o Mr. Gorbachev held progress in all areas, including arms reduction, hostage
to his non-negotiable demand that the U.S. cut back and effectively kill SDI.
The President insisted that SDI remain viable under the terms of the 1972 ABM
Treaty, which, unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has complied with.
o To break the deadlock, the President offered: A 10 year caimitment not to
deploy any future strategic defense system, coupled with 50% reduction in
U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the next five years and mutual and total
elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missles over the following five
years.
o Mr. Gorbachev rejected the President's offer, refusing to allow SDI testing
-- the heart of any research program.
Current Impasse; Future Opportunities
o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on SDI would have perpetuated America's
vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people
and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
o The USSR wants to continue to base global security on the threat of mutual
annihilation. President Reagan seeks a safer world with peace and deterrence
based increasingly on defensive means.
o In 1984, when the Soviets failed to achieve their objectives to weaken NATO's
defensive capability in Europe, through negotiating intransigence and
continuing SS-20 deployments, they walked out of all nuclear arms
negotiations. In 1985, they were back at the table and, in 1986, for the
first time, dramatic progress has been made toward mutual reductions.
o The President believes that additional meetings can build on the major
progress toward arms reduction and achieve final breakthrough agreements.
The President's invitation for a U.S. Summit -- the objective that Iceland
was intended to prepare for -- remains open.
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
(Iceland Continued)
SDI Not the Problem: It's the Solution
o In SDI, we are investigating defensive systems to enhance future security for
America and our Allies by being able to destroy attacking missiles. It will
have no offensive function. There is no rational reason to oppose SDI research.
o Insurance -- Why should the Soviets, in opposing SDI, insist that America and
its Allies remain vulnerable to Soviet missile attack? Strategic defenses
would help underwrite arms reduction agreements against cheating or
abrogation, while defending against attack from other countries.
o By denying a potential attacker hope of gaining meaningful military benefit, SDI
is the best lever to achieve real arms reductions. SDI deters use of offensive
systems, thereby rendering future investments in offensive systems imprudent.
o The Soviets have longstanding and massive strategic defense programs of their
own, going well beyond research, and have the only operational anti-ballistic
missile system in the world, a system they are steadily improving.
o By refusing the President's far-reaching arms reduction offer and making his
own non-negotiable demand on the United States, Gorbachev refused an historic
opportunity for progress toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
o Nonetheless, the ideas and progress for radically reducing and ultimately
eliminating nuclear weapons presented at Reykjavik can be built upon at the
table in Geneva.
Human Rights
Respect for human rights is as important to peace as arms reductions because peace
requires trust. The President told Gorbachev the Soviets' human rights performance
is an obstacle for improved relations between our two countries.
o A country that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep
faith with foreign powers.
o The Soviet Union signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Soviets should abide
by them -- allowing free emigration and the reunification of divided
families, and religious and cultural freedans -- instead of throwing those
who monitor the Soviet compliance (e.g. Yuri Orlov) in jail.
o We will continue to press for improvements in the caning weeks and months.
o The Soviets, for the first time, agreed to regular bilateral discussions on
humanitarian and human rights issues.
Expanded cultural exchanges -- The President reaffirmed his catmitment to continue
to broaden and expand people-to-people exchanges -- where Soviet citizens and
Americans may see first hand more of each other's country and culture.
Regional Conflicts -- The President raised the serious problems caused in the
world by Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, and continued military support
of the regimes in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, that are waging war on their
own people. We cannot take seriously the token troop "withdrawals" fran
Afghanistan which they have announced.
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
October 16, 1986
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)
The U.S. and her Allies are defenseless against a deliberate or accidental nuclear
attack.
o The U.S. presently deters nuclear attack by threatening retaliation. SDI
offers a safer and more moral alternative: employing technology to protect
people instead of threatening their annihilation.
Challenge for the Present and Insurance for the Future
o SDI is a broad-based program to demonstrate the feasibility of effective
strategic defenses. Like the Apollo Project, SDI is a revolutionary program
that merits a full-scale national effort.
o SDI taps the finest scientific minds in the U.S. and other countries to
investigate a range of defensive technologies. This research will lead
toward an informed decision on defensive options in the early 1990s.
o SDI has induced the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals.
It is the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements
will be implemented and canplied with by the Soviets, and it guards against
ballistic missile attack by third countries.
SDI Progress
o Some in Congress would cripple SDI with short-sighted budget cuts giving the
Soviets a key concession they have not been able to win through negotiations.
Sustained research has already produced major technical advances:
-- June 1984 -- a non-nuclear interceptor destroyed an unarmed warhead in
space;
-- Fall 1985 -- successful laser tests canpensate for atmospheric distortion
while tracking rockets in flight;
-- Spring 1986 -- A high-power laser destroyed a static
target;
-- June 1986 -- a self-guided missile intercepted a target moving at three
times the speed of sound;
-- September 1986 - Successful Delta launch, track, and
intercept in space of target vehicles.
SDI: Also a Prudent Hedge Against Existing Soviet Strategic Defense Programs
o The Soviet Union has upgraded the world's only deployed Anti-Ballistic
Missile defense system, which protects Greater Moscow, and is constructing a
large missile tracking radar in Siberia, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
o The Soviets have deployed the world's only operational weapon for destroying
satellites.
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
October 15, 1986
The media and political opponents of SDI have found it convenient to present SDI
in caricature, as the "so-called 'Star Wars' proposal." It is no wonder that many
Americans are confused about the President's proposal and think the U.S. currently
has a defense against missiles!
o An Associated press-Media General poll released in August found that 60
percent of Americans felt that the U.S. had either a good or an excellent
defense against a Soviet missile attack.
o In fact, the U.S. is utterly defenseless against Soviet rockets.
Americans Want Enhanced Security
When the American people are asked to evaluate concepts, rather than the labels
such as "Star Wars," they support SDI. Evidence:
Two days after the President's return from Iceland, polls taken by major news
organizations showed the public supports President Reagan's refusal to surrender
his Strategic Defense Initiative.
-- A New York Times/CBS News poll shows 68 percent support.
-- Nearly 60 percent polled by the Washington Post/ABC News poll said Reagan
should retain his com i.tment to SDI.
-- According to the Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, only 15 percent of the
American people think SDI is a bad idea.
Penn + Schoen Associates (9/27/86)
Question: SDI is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming
nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S.
going ahead with the research and development phases of SDI?
Favor - 81% Oppose -- 13%
Question: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it
in the United States?
Favor -- 78% Oppose -- 13%
ABC News (1/4/85 - 1/6/85)
Question: Do you favor or oppose developing such defensive weapons (which use
lasers and particle beams to shoot down enemy missiles), or what?
Favor -- 49% Oppose -- 44%
Heritage Foundation/Sindlinger & Co. Poll (5/27/85)
89 percent of the American people would support a Strategic Defense program if it
would make a Soviet Missile attack less likely.
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WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
(SDI Support Continued)
SDI -- Enhance Peace/Safer World
Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)
Question: In your opinion, would developing this system (Star Wars or space-based
defense against nuclear attack) make the world safer fran nuclear destruction or
less safe?
Make world safer -- 50% Make world less safe -- 32%
Decision making/Information (2/8/86 - 2/9/86)
Question: SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase
the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war.
Others say that SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power,
accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Is SDI research a good
idea or a bad idea?
SDI -- Technical Feasibility
CBS News/New York Times (1/2/85 - 1/4/85)
Question: Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defensive nuclear system in
space that would destroy incaning missiles before they reach the United States, a
system some people call Star Wars. Do you think such a system could work?
SDI -- Arms Reduction
Louis Harris and Associates (3/2/85 - 3/5/85)
Question: Agree or disagree... Once the Russians knew we were successfully building
a new anti-nuclear defense system, they would be much more willing to agree to a
treaty that would halt the nuclear arms race.
Agree -- 52% Disagree -- 44%
Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)
Question: Would the United States' developing this system Star Wars, a
space-based defense against nuclear attack, increase or decrease the likelihood of
reaching a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union?
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For Immediate Release October 13, 1986
ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. As most of you know, I
have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the
Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I
returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few
moments tonight to share with you what took place in these
discussions.
The implications of these talks are enormous and only
just beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and
generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete
elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from
the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this
American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to
agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.
But first, let me tell you that, from the start of my
meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American
people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none
of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of
American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued.
And it is for.these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.
Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the
stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our
talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles
which we are trying to develop. Now you've heard their titles a
thousand times -- the ABM Treaty and SDI. Those letters stand for,
ABM, anti-ballistic missile, SDI, strategic defense initiative.
Some years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the
emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of
missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear
missiles, thus leaving our real defense -- a policy called Mutual
Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack,
the other side could retaliate. And this mutual threat of
destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side
striking first.
So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads
targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries.
The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as
the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because
the threat of nationwide annihilation made such a limited defense
seem useless.
For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets
may be developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large
modern radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a critical part of a
radar sytem designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic
missiles protecting the entire nation. Now this is a violation of
the ABM Treaty.
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Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and
slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our
military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical
way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they
can reach their targets rather than to just destroy people. Well,
this is the goal for what we call SDI and our scientists researching
such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years
down the road we, can have such a system ready to deploy. Now,
incidentally, we are not violating the ABM Treaty which permits such
research. If and when we deploy the treaty -- also allows withdrawal
from the Treaty upon six months' notice. SDI, let me make it clear,
is a non-nuclear defense.
So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting.
In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to
reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the
Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a
mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons.
And so far, no success.
On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and
his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George
Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to
just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human
rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate
from Russia so they can practice their religion without being
persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and
wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite.
In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another
agreement -- the Helsinki Accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri
Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing
out to his government its violations of that pact, its refusal to let
citizens leave their country or return.
We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan,
Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main
subject was arms control.
We discussed the emplacement of intermediate-range
missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could
be drastically reduced. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to
reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at
each other. This then brought up the subject of SDI.
I offered a proposal that we continue our present
research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would
sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests.
And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our
offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced
defenses. I explained that even though we would have done away with
our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect
against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to
create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make
them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the
nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.
We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry
although the General Secretary was registering opposition to SDI and
proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day
was ending.
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Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our
note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective
teams and let them work through the night to put them together and
find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated
us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you those teams worked
through the night till 6:30 a.m.
Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our
foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our
two.teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a
10-year delay in the deployment of SDI programs.
In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concerns
while protecting our principles and security, we proposed a 10-year
period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear
arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the
weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first
five years. During the next five years, we would continue by
eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all
ranges. And during that time we would proceed with research,
development and testing of SDI -- all done in conformity with ABM
provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles
eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same
time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.
And here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted
wording that, in effect, would have kept us from developing the SDI
for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And unless
I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go
down the drain -- cancelled.
I told him I had pledged to the American people that I
would not trade away SDI -- there was no way I could tell our people
their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction.
I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except
two things: our freedom and our future.
I'm still optimistic that a way will be found. The door
is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat
is within reach.
So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will
continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and,
above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest
days of our administration, this has been our policy. We made it
clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate
intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral
distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the
principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the
prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our
commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic
institutions around the world. And that's why we assisted freedom
fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And,
finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to
negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength,
reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning
work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
And yet, at the same time we set out these foreign policy
goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major
objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the
Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.
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Now, this policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of
this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For
the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the
area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction
-- not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.
But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we
must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues
that are fundamental.
As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As
President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last
analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"
I made it plain that the United States would not seek to
exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But
I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human
condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement
in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that
will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith
with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik
as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the
words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds
that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet
intentions, we're all from Missouri -- you got to show us.
Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at
the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America.
This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make
the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the
peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in
these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will
have the support they need.
Finally, there was a fourth item. And this area was that
of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last
year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we
saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now
the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that
could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of
everyday citizens from both our countries.
So I think, then, that you can see that we did make
progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our
four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we
probed again some old areas of disagreement.
And let me return again to the SDI issue. I realize some
Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's
demand? Why not give up SDI for this agreement?
Well, the answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is
America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the
commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee
-- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past
-- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is what brought
the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is
the key to a world without nuclear weapons.
The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more
resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own. SDI. The
world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the
capital of the Soviet Union.
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What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United
States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the
Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those
kinds of deals in the United States.
How does a defense of the United States threaten the
Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that
America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of
today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet
missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet
Union insist that we remain so -- forever?
So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any
President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future
discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great
breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.
We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to
Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement
to the United States.
And on this point, I know you're also interested in the
question of whether there will be another summit. There was no
indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel
to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I
repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to
believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision
the Soviets must make.
But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that
I'm ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit
and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process
is very different from that-of previous decades; it's different
because the world is different; and the world is different because of
the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past
five and a half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our
economic might; your support has restored our military strength.
Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have
given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired
the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are
revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to
democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because
the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has
gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.
So, if there's one impression I carry away with me from
these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing now
from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within
our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more
breakthroughs.
Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go
away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are
heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward whenever and
wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there's reason -- good reason
for hope.
I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the
talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left
Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our
naval installation at Keflavik -- a critically important base far
closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline.
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As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them
and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They
represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our
own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far
more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of
the United States.
"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has
been...unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and
her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our
destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we're honored by history,
entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream
of lasting peace and human freedom.
Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century
had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The
supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in
peace and harmony."
It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago
and to Iceland last week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal that I
thank you now for all the support you've given me, and I again ask
for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a
world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.
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