SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP MEETING ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: February 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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D/ICS
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DDS8T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/OLL
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D/PAO
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D/PERS
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VC/NIC
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la
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SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
To 17: for your background at tomorrow's mtg.
3637 (to-81)
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Date
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$/8.8604623
thihmiStatesNputnemofftde
SECRET
Senior Interagency Group No. 54
TO:
Washington, D.C. 20520
OVP - M. Donald Gregg
NSC - Mr. Rodney B. mrniel
CIA
DOD - COL David Brown
JCS - MAJ Michael Emerson
February 11, 1986
Executive Registry
86-
0584
STAT
SUBJECT: Senior Interagency Group meeting on Humanitarian
Assistance for Nicaraguan Resistance Forces
An agenda and a copy of the 90-day Report on Nicaragua are
attached for use by your Principals at the February 13 SIG
meeting.
foriNicholas U.att
Executive Secretary
DECL: OADR
/5_,--/-
C,12.
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SECRET
Senior Inter-Agency Group Meeting
February 13, 1986
NICARAGUAN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
AGENDA
I. Review of Developments
A. Summary of 90-Day Report
B. New Program Activities of NHAO
Discussion of Ongoing Problems
A. Delivery of Supplies in Central America
B. GAO Audit
III. NHAO Operations after March 31
SECRET
DECL:OADR
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? II
THE WHITE HOUSE
REPORT ON NICARAGUA
February 4, 1986
(NOTE: Annex C classified "Confidential" attached.)
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EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT
IN CENTRAL AMEMICA AND IN NICARAGUA
Summary:
The only Contadora negotiations on a regional treaty
during this period were held November 19-21. Those talks,
involving all nine participating governments, reportedly
resulted in some progress on verification and related issues
and the five Central American delegations recommended that the
negotiations be continued. On December 3, however, Nicaragua
asked that they be suspended until May, 1986. The United
States, the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela), Contadora Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru
and Uruguay), and the four democratic Central American states
have publicly urged their resumption. On January 15, Nicaragua
endorsed a call by the Contadora Group and Support Group to
resume talks, but appeared the following day to condition
resumption upon a number of prior actions. At this writing,
there are unconfirmed reports that negotiations may resume
February 14-17. Whether Nicaragua merely takes a seat at the
negotiating table or negotiates seriously remains to be seen.
This period witnessed increased international recognition
of the fundamental importance of democratic national
reconciliation to a regional solution. On January 12, the
foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and Support Group,
meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela, issued a statement
emphasizing democratic pluralism and pledged their good offices
to "promote new steps" of national reconciliation. Recalling
our pledge to renew bilateral talks with Nicaragua if the
Sandinistas accepted a Church-mediated dialogue with the United
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the United States on January 17
expressed strong interest in the Caraballeda statement. To
explore possibilities for diplomatic progress Central American
Special Envoy Shlaudeman consulted with several Contadora Group
and Central American states January 19-23; Secretary of State
Shultz has invited the eight foreign ministers of the Contadora
Group and Support Group to a meeting February 10 in Washington.
* * *
Continuing attempts to circumvent Contadora that became
apparent in late 1983 and even more obvious in 1984 and
1985,1 Nicaragua during the last ninety days has tried
repeatedly to derail negotiations aimed at producing a final,
comprehensive Contadora treaty.
'See the November 6, 1985 Report on Nicaragua.
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Following two rounds of talks in October, on November 11
Nicaragua made public a letter from President Ortega to the
presidents of the eight Contadora Group and Support Group
governments setting forth objections to the September 12, 1985
draft agreement tabled by the Contadora Group governments.
Nicaragua argued that it could not assume the obligations of a
Contadora agreement unless it reached a prior accommodation
.with the United States. Among other demands, it insisted that
the United States sign a special protoco). to a Contadora
agreement pledging itself to a permanent policy of
non-aggression toward Nicaragua, in effect a pledge that we
would not respond to Sandinista actions regardless of what they
do. Nicaragua also objected to the September draft's provision
that one international military exercise per year2 could
be held until the parties to an agreement adjusted their
military inventories and troop levels to agreed limits.3
On November 19-21, plenipotentiary negotiators ofthe
Central American and four Contadora Group governments met
for a third round of talks. Progress reportedly was made on
verification and the question of when treaty obligations would
enter into effect, but the previously agreed 45-day
self-imposed period for completing negotiations expired on
November 20 without agreement. The delegates nonetheless
continued meeting for another day and unanimously recommended
to their governments that negotiations be extended indefinitely.
2The one exercise per year would be subject to the
following, additional restrictions: a ceiling of 3,000
combined national and foreign troops, with, foreign troops
not to exceed national troops; a maximum duration of 15 days:
90-days prior notice; and a prohibition on exercising within
50 kilometers of non-consenting states.
3The Nicaraguan letter of November 11 was released,
inexplicably, as the foreign ministers of the European
Communities, Spain, and Portugal met November 11-12 in
Luxembourg with the foreign ministers of Central America and
the Contadora Group. The ministers approved an EC-Central
American economic agreement that is intended to provide the
framework for increasing EC economic assistance to Central
America. The ministers' political communique supported the
Contadora process and emphasized democratic pluralism and,
significantly, in light of Nicaragua's suspension of civil
liberties on October 15, individual civil liberties. While
the EC-Central American meeting was seen as improving the
atmosphere for Contadora talks, the Nicaraguan letter
introduced a strong element of pessimism.
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On December 2, in Cartagena, Colombia, at the OAS General
Assembly, Secretary of State Shultz met with the foreign
ministers of the Contadora Group governments to review the
status of negotiations. At that time, it was assumed that
Contadora negotiations would resume, possibly before Christmas,
even though Nicaragua had the day before announced that it
would not take part in any Contadora meetings during the OAS
General Assembly. (Nicaragua sent a third-level foreign
ministry official to the December 2 meeting of OAS foreign
ministers.) On December 3, however, Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega formally requested a suspension in Contadora
negotiations until May, 1986. Nicaragua based its request on
the grounds that Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala were not in
a position to negotiate owing to their presidential elections.
Reserving the right to speak for themselves, Costa Rica,
Honduras and Guatemala joined 25 other OAS member states in
voting for a resolution at Cartagena that simply urged
continuation of negotiations. Only Nicaragua voted against.
Approval of the resolution followed submission of a status
report by the Contadora Group foreign ministers to OAS
Secretary General Baena Soares recording their view that talks
should continue. Nicaragua's refusal to resume Contadora talks
was a major factor in the failure, in the United Nations General
Assembly, to achieve consensus on a resolution of support for
the Contadora process.
Diplomatic activity during the month after the OAS General
Assembly consisted of informal consultations as to how the
negotiating process might be resumed. Several Contadora Group
foreign ministers, including Venezuela's Consalvi and Mexico's
Sepulveda, publicly regretted the suspension of talks and
expressed concern that a suspension in talks would create
a diplomatic vacuum.
Meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela, January 11-12, the
foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Support Group
issued a joint statement intended to get talks going again.
This "Message of Caraballeda" reiterated basic Contadora
principles; urged a series of actions to create a climate
in which negotiations could succeed (including, as the first
step listed, resumption of talks); and offered Contadora Group
and Support Group good offices both to "promote new steps of
national reconciliation" and to encourage resumption of
U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.
On January 15, at the inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo as
President of Guatemala, the foreign ministers of the five
Central American states, including Nicaragua, signed the
"Declaration of Guatemala," endorsing the Caraballeda Message.
(It was also agreed that the five Central American presidents
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would hold a summit in May in Esguipulas. Guatemala.) The
Sandinistas reportedly agreed to the Caraballeda message after
extended discussions with the foreign ministers of the
Contadora Groups, and with President Betancur of Colombia, as
to its precise meaning.
While its endorsement of Caraballeda was encouraging,
Nicaragua issued a press communique the next day that appeared
to hedge its acceptance. While noting its "total adherence" to
the Caraballeda Message, the January 16 statement characterized
the various actions suggested in the Caraballeda Message as
prerequisites to resumption of Contadora negotiations. It also
reaffirmed the Nicaraguan position of November 11 objecting to
the Contadora draft agreement. On the other hand, there are
now reports that a meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries will
be held February 14-17. The key question, assuming talks are
resumed, is whether Nicaragua is returning to negotiate in
good faith or is merely taking a seat at the table to escape
further blame for thwarting the peace process and to influence
international opinion.
The United States on January 17 welcomed the prospect of
renewed negotiations.4 Our statement noted that Sandinista
acceptance of Caraballeda, which emphasized "new steps"
to promote national reconciliation, was an interesting
development. We reaffirmed our public commitment to resume
bilateral talks with Nicaragua if the Sandinistas accept the
March 1985 dialogue proposal of the democratic resistance5
and stated our interest in exploring the possibilities
presented by the Caraballeda initiative. Special Envoy
Shlaudeman visited three of four Contadora Group countries
January 19-23 for that purpose and Secretary of State Shultz
has invited the foreign ministers of the eight Contadora Group
and Support Group governments to Washington for a meeting
February 10 for further consultations.6
4See Annex A.
5The principal provisions of the March proposal
called for Roman Catholic Church mediation, a cease-fire,
and suspension of the State of Emergency.
6A complete chronology of diplomatic events during
the period covered by this report is provided in Annex B.
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ANNEX A
January 17, 1986
Department of State Statement on Contadora
ON JANUARY 12 THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CONTADORA GROUP
AND CONTADORA SUPPORT GROUP, MEETING IN CARABALLEDA, VENEZUELA,
ISSUED A "MESSAGE FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL
AMERICA." THE AMBASSADORS OF THESE EIGHT GOVERNMENTS REQUESTED
A-MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO PRESENT THE
DOCUMENT AND THAT MEETING WAS HELD YESTERDAY, JANUARY 16.
IN THIS MEETING THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED OUR STRONG
SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE EFFORTS OF THE CONTADORA GROUPS AND SAID
WE WELCOMED CONTINUATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE
SECRETARY SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW NICARAGUA'S BEHAVIOR, IN
PARTICULAR ITS REPEATED FAILURE TO KEEP ITS WORD, IS THE
HEART OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT, FOR THIS REASON, WE LOOK AT
PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENTS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WORKABILITY.
THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD GIVE THE CARABALLEDA MESSAGE
VERY CAREFUL STUDY AND THAT IF THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH WE
THINK WE CAN CONTRIBUTE, WE WILL DO SO. IN THIS RESPECT,
WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE CONTADORA GROUP AND CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND WEEKS ABOUT THE
POSSIBILITIES CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE. AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN
WILL BE VISITING THE REGION NEXT WEEK FOR THIS PURPOSE.
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AS IS KNOWN, OUR POSITION ON RESUMING BILATERAL TALKS WITH
NICARAGUA HAS BEEN THAT WE WILL RESUME TALKS IF THE GOVERNMENT
OF NICARAGUA ACCEPTS THE MARCH 1985 PROPOSAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC
RESISTANCE FOR A CHURCH?MEDIATED DIALOGUE, CEASE?FIRE, AND
SUSPENSION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.
THAT COMMITMENT STILL STANDS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING
THAT NICARAGUA HAS ENDORSED THE CONTADORA COMMUNIQUE, WHICH
HEAVILY EMPHASIZES NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND WHICH PROMISES
"NEW STEPS" TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE ARE VERY
INTERESTED IN EXPLORING WHAT THIS MEANS.
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ANNEX B
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS
November, 1985 - January, 1986
1985
November 11-12: Foreign ministers of the nine Central American
and Contadora Group governments meet with the foreign ministers
of the EC-10, Spain, and Portugal, in Luxembourg. EC-Central
American economic agreement is signed; political communique
supports Contadora and stresses democratic pluralism and civil
liberties.
November 11: Nicaragua publishes letter to Contadora Group and
Support Group presidents detailing objections to the Contadora
Group's September 12, 1985 draft of a final agreement.
Nicaragua's position, in essence, is to insist on an
accommodation with the United States prior to a Contadora
agreement.
November 19-21: Third round of negotiations among Contadora
"plenipotentiaries" held in Panama. Some progress on
verification and related issues is achieved. All delegations
recommend extending 45-day deadline for final agreement.
November 22: U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Walters addresses the General Assembly on continued US
support of the Contadora process.
December 1: Nicaragua announces that it will not take part in
the Contadora meetings to be held on the margins of the OAS
General Assembly meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, December 2-5.
December 2: Secretary of State Shultz meets with Contadora
Group foreign ministers at the OAS General Assembly in
Cartagena.
December 3: Nicaragua submits formal request for suspension of
Contadora peace negotiations until May, 1986.
December 6: Contadora Group submits report to OAS Secretary
General expressing hope that negotiations will continue.
December 7: Nicaragua reiterates its request for suspension of
Contadora talks at a SELA (Latin American Economic System)
meeting in Caracus, Venezuela.
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December 9: OAS General Assembly Resolution, opposed by
Nicaragua only, urges continuation of Contadora talks.
December 10: venezuelan officials publicly oppose suspension
of talks.
December 17-18: Contadora Group governments consult informally
in Montevideo.
1986
January 8: Nicaragua publishes letter from President Ortega to
the presidents of the Contadora Group and the Support Group
proposing a scaled-down treaty of general principles (in lieu
of a comprehensive Contadora treaty) and a series of bilateral
talks, including U.S.-Nicaraguan talks.
January 11-12: Eight foreign ministers of the Contadora Group
and Support Group governments, meeting in Caraballeda,
Venezuela, issue the "Message of Caraballeda." It reiterates
basic Contadora principles; urges actions to create climate for
negotiations, including resumption of Contadora talks; and
offers Contadora good offices to "promote new steps of national
reconciliation" and renewal of U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.
January 14: Vice President Bush leads United States delegation
to inauguration of Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo.
January 15: Foreign ministers of the five Central American
states sign the "Declaration of Guatemala" endorsing the
"Caraballeda Communique."
January 15: Central American presidents agree to hold summit
in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in May.
January 16: Central American presidents issue statement
expressing satisfaction that their foreign ministers have
endorsed the Message of Caraballeda.
January 16: Nicaragua publicly reaffirms its position on
Contadora, as set forth in its November 11 statement, and
describes actions called for in the Caraballeda Message as
prerequisites to Contadora talks.
January 16: Secretary Shultz receives the Caraballeda Message'
from Washington ambassadors of the Contadora Group and Support
Group governments and promises to give it careful study.
January 17: US statement on Caraballeda announces visit of
Ambassador Shlaudeman to Central American and Contadora Group
countries to explore possibilities in the Caraballeda Message.
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January 17: President-elect Jose Azcona of Honduras visits
Washington for consultations. At National Press Club, Azcona
opposes resumption of U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks as
detracting from Contadora.
January 19-23: Ambassador Shlaudeman visits Panama, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Colombia and Venezuela.
January 25: Secretary of State Shultz invites foreign ministers
of the Contadora Group and Support Group governments to
Washington for February 10 consultations.
January 26-27: Vice President Bush leads United States
delegation to inauguration of Honduran President Azcona, meets
with several Contadora and Central American presidents and
foreign ministers.
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. .
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ARMED RESISTANCE
Since the submission to Congress of the previous report,
the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) has continued and
expanded its efforts to improve its forces' record on human
rights. Toward that end, UNO has established an autonomous
Human Rights Commission (UNO-CDH), based in Costa Rica; the
fundamental objective of this organization is the promotion,
protection, and defense of human rights in Nicaragua. The
central concern of UNO-CDH will be the observance by both
parties to the civil conflict of the basic principles of human
rights. UNO-CDH is currently processing information on charges
received concerning alleged abuses committed by both resistance
and Sandinista forces. The Commission and prosecutors from
various UNO armed elements are also reviewing cases
investigated by the prosecutors and the punitive measures
taken, where appropriate, against those responsible.
Ismael Reyes, former president of the Nicaraguan Red
Cross, presides over the new Commission's Executive Council,
other members of which are Santiago Anitua (a Jesuit priest),
Lucia Salazar -- the widow of slain private sector leader Jorge
Salazar --, and Wycliffe Diego of the Indian-Creole
organization KISAN. The Executive Director is Roberto Ferrey,
an attorney and founder of the Social Christian Youth Front,
which actively opposed former dictator Anastasio Somoza.
Following a period of exile from 1976-79, he served as a legal
advisor to the Minister of Justice in the post-revolutionary
period. He left the country again in 1983, disillusioned by
mounting repression inside Nicaragua. Antonio Ruiz, a human
rights activist and one of the original members of Nicaragua's
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), serves as
Assistant Executive Director. The Commission's Legal
Department will be headed by Alberto Gamez Ortega, a former
Vice Minister of Justice in the post-revolution government.
The Legal Department will supervise two subsections, one
responsible for investigations and one for publications. Mateo
Guerrero, former Executive Director of the Sandinista-sponsored
human rights commission CNPPDH, and Alvaro Baldizon, formerly
an investigator with the Ministry of Interior, will handle the
investigative duties.
Two other elements of the Commission will be an Education-.
and Training Department, directed by Fr. Santiago Anitua, who
was expelled from Nicaragua in 1985 by the Sandinista regime,
and a Refugee Department, the supervisor of which has not yet
been named.
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The new Commission is working closely with the prosecutors
attached to each of UNO's armed elements, who provide necessary
information to UNO-CDH and conduct investigations and
prosecutions within their respective jurisdictions.
During this period, UNO human rights officers continued
efforts to arrange a system for prisoner exchanges through the
good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and regional Red Cross Societies and to reach a
bilateral agreement with the Sandinistas, through the Red
Cross, for the mutual observance of human rights. UNO also has
continued to provide these organizations with information
concerning Sandinista casualties and prisoners. In order to
promote contact with ICRC, UNO in November opened an office in
Geneva. According to Dr. Carlos Icaza, prosecutor for the
Nicaraguan Democratic Forces, the Sandinista regime for the
last year has refused to cooperate in this endeavor, rejecting
any prisoner exchanges on Nicaraguan territory. This refusal
is attributed in part to a concern that such exchanges would
constitute an admission by the regime that the resistance
operates within the country and a tacit legitimation of the
resistance.
In November, UNO/FDN reported that sixty officers were in
training to assume responsibility as human rights officers with
the regional commands and task forces. Troops continued to
receive general human rights instruction as part of their basic
military training, and UNO/FDN plans to expand this instruction
to cover all members of the FDN military forces. UNO/CDH held
a seminar from January 15-18 on human rights and humanitarian
law with 23 leaders of KISAN and 18 civilian Indian leaders
from the Council of Elders.
UNO human rights officers have assumed responsibility for
monitoring the welfare of those captured during combat. Forces
reporting the capture of enemy troops are reminded by
headquarters of their responsibility to ensure the prisoners'
physical security and to observe internationally recognized
standards for their treatment in captivity. In one instance,
rather than abandon a 14-year old Sandinista combatant wounded
in a January engagement at Copernal, the boy was taken with the
FDN forces, given medical treatment by field personnel, and
released.
UNO's commitment to human rights has been set forth
unambiguously in a statement of principles and objectives
presented to the public on January 22, 1986. Undertaking in
that document "the unrestricted observance of the human rights
of all Nicaraguans without exception," UNO pledges to respect
the ethnic, cultural and religious values of Nicaragua's
people; to establish a rule of law which assures the equality
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of citizens and the full exercise and development of human
rights based on an independent judiciary: to guarantee all
basic freedoms: and to adhere strictly to the obligations
assumed under international agreements. UNO further pledges to
respect the activities within Nicaragua of human rights
organizations.
Abuses by Resistance Forces
Among the abuses attributed since November 1 to the armed
resistance by Sandinista authorities were the murders of 32
school children and the "assassination" of farmers, although no
number or details concerning the latter offense were offered.
We have no other evidence that those assassinations actually
occurred. Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto publicized the
alleged murder of school children while in Canberra, claiming
that resistance forces had opened fire on the students while
they were at school. When the issue was raised with Sandinista
officials in Managua, however, it was learned that the incident
in question actually involved an attack on a military training
center, in which 30 members of the Sandinista militia were
killed.
According to the Sandinista press, during this period the
armed resistance killed eleven civilians, injured 21, and
kidnapped at least forty-seven. It was also implied that 18-20
unidentified bodies found in a mass grave were victims of the
resistance, although that charge was not specifically made.
The press further reported that a total of 81 persons allegedly
kidnapped by the resistance had been "rescued" and had
requested and been granted amnesty by the Sandinistas.
Eighteen of those allegedly kidnapped admitted they received
military training with the resistance during their four months
of "captivity," and asserted that they had been forced to work
under duress. The granting of amnesty suggests that those
involved may have been deserters from the armed resistance or
persons captured during military operations. This suspicion is
strengthened by reports in the Sandinista press that 44 persons
granted amnesty in January were draft evaders and "contra
deserters."
In most cases, information provided by the Sandinista
press can be neither confirmed nor refuted by independent
information, either because of the areas in which the incidents
are said to have occurred or because of a lack of precise
details. In one instance, however, Embassy personnel visited
the site of a reported "contra" attack to determine the facts.
According to the FSLN daily Barricada, on January 25 the town
of San Pedro de Lovago was attacked by "hundreds" of contra and
the attack repelled by eight Sandinista soldiers. It was also
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claimed that the contra wounded two civilians, and one of the
attackers was killed. He was identified by Barricade as
"jefe," Felix Matus, a former resident of the town known to
residents as a cattle thief.
Embassy officers were unable to find any signs of the
heavy firing in the plaza described by Barricada; there was no
damage to the Church or houses in the vicinity of the attack.
Residents with whom the Officers spoke, including four
witnesses, stated that the attack began at about 10:30 pm, and
firing lasted about 30 minutes. In the morning, it was
discovered that a member of the resistance had been killed and
two civilians, including a ten-year old girl, had been
wounded. Of the people questioned, no one had any idea how
many persons had attacked, except for one Sandinista official
who stated that 100-150 were involved. Another Sandinista
official claimed that many of the attackers had been wounded.
The two wounded civilians could not be located, but neighbors
said that they lived in houses facing the site of the attack
and to the rear of the position held by the attackers where the
dead body was found. Both were said to have been wounded by
shrapnel from a grenade. The only person cited by witnesses
and the Sandinista press as having thrown a grenade was a
member of the Sandinista militia. Neighbors stated that the
man was wounded in the ankle, and no one knew the injuries of
the girl. Neither had been taken to the hospital.
Concerning the identity of the "jefe," residents,
including the two officials, denied any knowledge of the man.
All who were shown the Barricada article agreed that Felix
Matus was not from San Pedro de Lovago.
The distinction between civilians and military personnel
is increasingly blurred in the Nicaraguan conflict as the
Sandinistas continue their policy of arming persons in civilian
occupations and tasking them with military responsibilities.
FSLN coordinator Carlos Zamora, according to a December 28
Barricada report, announced that half of the 10,000 coffee
pickers in Military Region VI had been armed and had received
military training. Armed harvesters included members of the
Sandinista Youth described as occupying the "second defensive
echelon...after the irregular warfare troops...the permanent
territorial troops and the territorial militia." Newspapers
also have printed photographs of uniformed and
partially-uniformed members of "harvest brigades" who are
virtually indistinguishable from regular army troops. On
January 11, Daniel Ortega distributed land titles for communal
farms. At the same time, he distributed rifles to the
farmers. On January 12, El Nuevo Diario reported the formation
of the Manuel Escobar Shock Brigade, which will be sent to
build bridges and roads in Northern Zelaya. The youths
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pictured in the article were uniformed, and brigade members
were described as members of the Army reserve, militarily
experienced, and "ready to work with a rifle at their
shoulder." The sixty-one members were said to be prepared to
act as "soldiers" if necessary. By arming persons engaged in
what are normally civilian occupations and placing them in war
zones, the Sandinista regime compromises the protections
accorded civilians under internationally-recognized rules of
conflict. The Sandinista press does not explicitly acknowledge
the deaths of persons in this category in its reporting. Those
the Sandinista press reported killed by the armed resistance
between November 1 and January 31 included only the military,
the militia, the police, and civilians. The press did not
report how many of these alleged civilian casualties involved
persons acting in a military or paramilitary capacity.
The most highly publicized charge of atrocities during
this period was made by Maria Mercedes Obregon Rivas at a_press
conference in Managua on November 13. A member of the "50th
Anniversary Brigade" -- a group that provides basic education
in rural areas and that is also normally tasked with military
responsibilities, according to Sandinista publications --
Obregon and eight others were taken prisoner by the resistance
in late 1984. According to a report filed by a Reuter
correspondent present at the press conference, Obregon claimed
to have escaped at great risk from an FDN camp and to have been
raped and tortured during her captivity. She also reportedly
stated that she had "no idea" what had happened to the others
taken prisoner with her. Nevertheless, the Sandinista press
reported on November 14 that obregon charged the resistance
with the rape and murder of Ana Julia Cortes Martinez and the
"assassination" of three other companions in her group. She
claimed to have learned of their deaths only indirectly, having
been separated from the other prisoners immediately after her
capture.
Information provided to the ICRC by UNO/FDN in response to
a specific inquiry, well before Obregon's reappearance in
Managua, offered a different version. According to UNO/FDN,
Maria Obregon worked as a volunteer with the FDN after her
capture; operating in a task force commanded by "El Tigrillo."
After several months, she left the FDN and began living with
another ex-FDN combatant, "Gato Negro," in Danli, Honduras,
where she worked as a waitress in the El Rodeo restaurant. She
later legally departed Honduras, which departure was recorded
with Honduran Immigration.
While the question might arise whether Obregon, if she did
cooperate with the FDN, did so for fear of retribution, it
should be noted that another of those taken prisoner with
Obregon chose not to work with the FDN and remains in an FDN
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prison awaiting exchange or release. Obregon admitted to
having seen this woman, and made no claims that she was being
mistreated. Obregon did not mention another of the nine
prisoners, Marcia Chamorro, who has been active with the
resistance since being taken captive by the FDN, and who has
made several addresses on Radio 15 September.
UNO reports that it has eleven pending cases involving
various human rights abuses. One of the cases, involving a
task force commander charged with several counts of rape, has
resulted in conviction. He is currently under detention and
his sentence is due to be announced shortly. A denunciation of
these crimes by members of his own command was the initiating
cause for investigation.
In a second case, another task force commander is now
under restriction, charged with plotting the murder of one man
and then murdering the person whom he convinced to commit the
crime. The actual facts of the crimes, however, remain
unresolved, as another person has been denounced as the actual
perpetrator of the murders. The investigation of the case is
still underway.
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HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SANDINISTA REGIME
The human rights situation in Nicaragua, which has
steadily deteriorated during the period of Sandinista rule, has
worsened markedly since the promulgation of the renewed State
of Emergency on October 15. In an ominous series of tactical
moves against the civil opposition, the chief victim of which
has been the Catholic Church, the Sandinista regime has acted
forcefully to use the vastly expanded powers it assumed under
the decree to silence dissent and extend its control over all
sectors of the population. The following citation from an
interview with Tomas Borge, printed in Mexico's Excelsior
November 16, captures the Sandinista view of "political
pluralism":
"Our enemies have organized to disown the state
institutions and validate the counterrevolution.
Certain sectors have organized and are shielding
themselves behind religious organizations -- the
Catholic Church -- or some rightist institutions to
plant the position of the U.S. administration in the
conscience of our people as something natural...The
newspaper LA PRENSA was censored on various
occasions, but failed to comply with the censorship.
On many occasions, Mr. Bismarck Carballo, director of
a radio station which is linked to the country's most
reactionary religious sector, disobeyed numerous
orders from the Communications Media Directorate.
They met in churches and private places to justify
counterrevolutionary activity. Leaders of the
Council for Private Enterprise have repeatedly called
for identification with the counterrevolutionary
armed struggle. In the same vein, in the church,
some priests have openly proclaimed their
identification with the counterrevolution. That is,
the permanent drizzle on the conscience of the
people...confused a sector of the population. We
cannot afford to let the enemies of the people take
advantage of the weaknesses that are characteristic
of the revolution...to sow discord and distrust, and
to misguide and divide the people."
The intensified assault on the Catholic Church, begun in
September 1985, continued and sharpened during the past three-'
months. As the country's leading spiritual authority and
staunch defender against depredations on the basic rights of
the Nicaraguan people, both now and during the Somoza regime,
the Church constitutes the single greatest impediment to the
consolidation of Sandinista one-party rule. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the regime has focused its efforts
on the Church as the main target of oppression.
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Between November 1 and January 31, actions taken by the
Sandinista regime to undermine the Church included the
following:
??? MMO
MED
4=1,
- -
arrests, interrogations, and in some cases .
imprisonment of Catholic lay workers;
interrogation of priests, in at least two
instances involving physical abuse, and warnings
of possible expulsion of foreign priests;
censorship of Church-related news from La Prensa;
arrest and deportation of a Salvadoran
technician employed by the now-occupied Curia
Social Services Offices (COPROSA), on charges of
"counterrevolutionary activities" and
confiscation of his home;
declaration of COPROSA as "illegal" by the
Ministry of Justice;
closure of Radio Catolica;
denial of permission for Cardinal Obando to
deliver the traditional Christmas mass for
patients at a health center;
escalation of virulent media attacks on
Nicaraguan Church leaders and Pope John Paul II
by high-ranking Sandinistas, including Daniel
Ortega, Sergio Ramirez, Tomas Borge, Omar
Cabezas, and Miguel D'Escoto.
Based on actions taken to date and statements by
Sandinista leaders, the Sandinista strategy against the
Catholic Church appears to have two goals: decimation of the
ranks of traditional clergy and the isolation of the Church
from its worshippers. The forced draft of Nicaraguans studying
for the priesthood, continuing threats to expel foreign priests
loyal to the Church, and the regime's recently announced
decision to deny entry to "new foreign priests" to replace
those expelled clearly indicate the methods to be used to
implement the first element of the strategy.
The media campaign against other Church leaders, who fall
neither into the draft-age nor foreign-born groups, suggests
that other actions are intended to deal with them. The thrust
of the statements by Sandinista leaders is that the Pope,
Cardinal Obando, and such Church leaders as Monsignor Bismarck
Carballo are direct agents of the counterrevolution and the CIA
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??
and thus fall beyond the protection normally afforded members
of the Church. The latest salvo in this attack came in late
January. El Nuevo Diario on January 24 published several
articles condemning the Cardinal's January visit to the United
States and asserting that the purpose of the trip was to lobby
in favor of military assistance to the counterrevolution. The
newspaper also published a letter purportedly from a "voluntary
coffee picker" demanding to know why Cardinal Obando was being
allowed to reenter Nicaragua. This theme was repeated in the
following days, and a new suggestion raised that the Cardinal
had left himself open to arrest and trial by his actions in the
United States.
On January 25, Sandinista media announced the apprehension
of members of an "internal front" who allegedly were preparing
a series of terrorist incidents in Nicaragua. Of the
twenty-five persons arrested around the country, the
"ringleaders" were alleged to have links to various sectors of
the civil opposition: the independent trade unions, the Social
Christian Party, and the Catholic Church. Thus, Guillermo
Aguilera, who allegedly received his orders from Honduras, was
an "ex-director" of the Nicaraguan Workers Central Union who
acted in concert with Father Oswaldo Mondragon. Father
Mondragon is in charge of the seminary from which students were
forcibly drafted in September; his involvement in public
protests of the action has caused the regime considerable
embarassment. Father Mondragon on January 24 received a
summons to State Security. He was released after interrogation
with a warning that he would be watched.
The second element of the strategy, already well underway,
involves denial to the Church of the means of mass
communication, increasingly severe restrictions on permissible
Church activities, and expanded control over those activities
officially tolerated. Implementation thus far has been
initiated through the prohibition of the Church newspaper;
closure of Radio Catolica; censorship of Church-related news
from other media; declaration as illegal of traditional Church
services related to housing, health and education and seizure
of premises and records of the Church agency responsible for
those areas; prohibition of outdoor masses; imposition of
government control over the internal travel of Cardinal Obando
for the purpose of delivering mass; and the institution of
mandatory Marxist-Leninist indoctrination in Church-run schools.
The plight of the Church has been publicized and its cause
supported by, among others, Nicaragua's Permanent Commission on
Human Rights (CPDH), the Central American bishops, and Pope
John Paul II. The reaction from the Sandinistas was
predictable. Vice President Sergio Ramirez on November 3 told
Brazilian newsmen that the Pope's "policy in Central America
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greatly resembles that of Ronald Reagan...the Pope decided to
promote Bishop Obando to the post of cardinal to cause
discomfort to the government of Nicaragua." Ironically, he
flatly denied the existence of a Church-State confrontation.
This theme was repeated by Minister of Interior Tomas
Borge in a January 6 interview with Mexico's El Dia, in which
he ridiculed the Cardinal's masses in rural areas as
"applause-seeking se* not for evangelism and religious faith but
for a political project that coincides fully with that of
Reagan." Labeling Cardinal Obando "the spiritual guide" of the
armed resistance and comparing him to the infamous Borgias,
Borge declared him outside the "transcendental and
metaphysical" character of the Church. Daniel Ortega on
January 13 justified the regime's expulsion from Nicaragua of
ten priests by comparing its action to the alleged "expulsion"
from religious duties of 100 priests by Catholic authorities.
To our knowledge, only the four priests who held high-level
government positions were deprived of the right to offer the
sacraments while retaining their official status.
The attack on religious liberty was broadened with a
campaign of harassment against Nicaragua's Protestant
evangelical community. Although this group had been the victim
of earlier attempts at intimidation, such as refusal to allow
the use of meeting places and denial of entry to the country to
foreign evangelists, the attack intensified on October 30 when
many of the community's leaders and activists were arrested and
subjected to lengthy and threatening interrogations. Among the
most prominent of those arrested were Reverend Felix Rosales,
President of the National Council of Evangelical Pastors
(CNPEN), Dr. Jimmy Hassan of the Crusade of Students and
Professionals for Christ, Dr. Ignacio Hernandez, President of
the Nicaraguan Bible Society, Modesto Alvarez of the Alliance
for the Evangelization of Children, and Reverend Boanerges
Mendoza, pastor of the First Evangelical Church of Central
America.
According to censored La Prensa reports on the round-up
and information provided by-thaiiTiFvolved, the evangelicals
were stripped, searched, photographed, fingerprinted, and held
naked for several hours in a room maintained at an extremely
low temperature. They were then given prison uniforms and
questioned concerning their travels outside Nicaragua and
contacts with foreign evangelicals. Journalists in Managua
also reported that those interrogated were warned that under
the State of Emergency prayer meetings were illegal. After
interrogation, the detainees were taken to dark, cramped,
airless cells, where they were held for several more hours
without food or water before being released. All were warned,
when set free, to avoid all contact with the U.S. Embassy, and
to remain silent concerning their arrest and detention.
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On October 31, in an incident suppressed by the
Sandinistas until January 9, evangelical minister Juan Pablo
Pineda was murdered, ostensibly by two Sandinista soldiers whom
the regime claims to have tried and sentenced for the crime.
No details .of the murder have been provided, but its
coincidence with the round-up by State Security of other
evangelical leaders raises serious questions about the
reliability of the claim that the murder was a random act.
On November 1, State Security agents conducted an armed
search of Campus Crusade for Christ headquarters, seizing all
written and printed materials, as well as mimeograph machines.
Reverend Mendoza, having failed to observe the warning not
to discuss his incarceration, was again arrested by State
Security on November 11. His home was searched and his
personal and professional papers confiscated, as was his
automobile. Mendoza was released November 21, and has since
declined to divulge any details concerning his imprisonment.
In December Dr. Jimmy Hassan, of the Crusade of Students and
Professionals for Christ, elected to leave Nicaragua
permanently because of the severity of the harassment directed
against himself and his family.
As of November 12, according to a member of the
evangelical community, all those who had been arrested in
October were being kept under constant surveillance at home, at
work, and at church. Since the first wave of arrests on
October 30, twelve other evangelicals have reportedly been
arrested in Southern Zelaya.
As in the case of the Catholic Church, Sandinista
spokesmen have dismissed the complaints of their victims and
denied that the actions taken against them represent religious
persecution. In a November 28 press conference, Chief of
Internal Order Omar Cabezas (since promoted to Chief of the
Directorate of State Security) admitted the arrests of the
evangelicals, even citing their names. At the same time, he
declared that the National Council of Evangelical Pastors was
an illegal organization and charged all those arrested with
criminal activity for preaching "disobedience to the law,"
specifically alleging that they spoke against the draft.
Cabezas further accused them of being agents of the Institute
for Religion and Democracy ("the child of President Reagan and.;
the CIA") and of smuggling into Nicaragua large sums of foreign
currency and pacifist literature "based on the Bible." Cabezas
accused Dr. Hassan of operating a "clandestine printing shop"
in violation of the country's laws on printing presses; termed
Modesto Alvarez a "bad-mannered Salvadoran" seeking to export
"Salvador's system" to Nicaragua; and claimed that Reverend
Mendoza was rearrested for continuing to speak against the
draft. Cabezas also stated that Mendoza's imprisonment was
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extended because of his "frequent contradictioneand suggested
that Mendoza was mentally ill, a familiar charge against the
opponents of communist regimes.
Press Censorship
"The criticism from La Prensa, from Radio Catolica,
and the whole lot of propaganda from abroad is
intended to be destructive. Only constructive
criticism is acceptable in a revolutionary process."
- Tomas Borge, Pensiamento Proprio
June 1985
Censorship of Nicaragua's independent media increased in
the wake of the October 15 State of Emergency. During the
November 1-January 31 period, Radio Catolica was closed for
repeated "violations of law;" the Permanent Commission on Human
Rights was officially notified that henceforth all of its
letters, communiques, and reports must be submitted for
censorship review; "Conservatism on the Move," a radio program
of the Conservative Party, was suspended; publication Of an
irregularly-issued flyer "Prisma" was suspended and three of
its editors -- two of whom are also La Prensa reporters -- were
arrested for violating the "Law for TWe Maintenance of Order
and Public Security;" Solidaridad, the official monthly
magazine of the independent Confederation of Labor Unification
(CUS) was suspended; and attacks on independent La Prensa
escalated, bringing the conflict between the newspaper's
editorial board and State Security to open confrontation.
Stringent censorship of La Prensa continued, with most
news relating to the Catholic Church, aswell as reports of
attacks on evangelicals, deleted by censors. Despite regime
claims that only sensitive military and economic information
was subject to review, articles banned included reports on the
formation of a Church human rights commission, a meeting of the
Independent Liberal Party, the closure of a coffee plant due to
material shortages, public dissatisfaction with the conduct of
resident Cubans, the influx of migrants to Managua, arrests of
civil opposition leaders, and clarification of currency laws.
Censorship resulted in the gutting of the daily editions of La
Prensa, affecting approximately 80% of the paper's material. ?
On November 5, in response to the increasingly severe
censorship imposed on the paper, co-director Jaime Chamorro
sent a letter to National Assembly President Carlos Nunez
complaining of the failure of the Communications Media
Directorate to observe the limits to its authority as stated in
an amendment passed by the Assembly. Chamorro pointed out that
the Directorate had gone so far as to censor La Prensa's report
on the amendments made by the Assembly to the State of
Emergency.
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.?
In lieu of a response to La Prensa's complaint, on
December 2 the editorial board received notification from the
Directorate that the continued distribution of censored
articles -- regularly given to foreign journalists and members
of the diplomatic community -- would result in actions against
the paper's directors. Jaime Chamorro, to whom the letter was
addressed, was warned that "the next violation will be
rigorously sanctioned." La Prensa's board responded by
cancellinq the December 2?issue, and called a press conference
.to publicize the threats against the newspaper and its
editors. Chamorro also filed a sworn statement with Managua's
Appellate Tribunal rejecting the charges of illegal activity
and requesting an injunction against the chief officer of the
Communications Media Directorate. No action has yet been taken
on Chamorro's complaints, nor is any remedial action expected.
Instead, on December 6 the newspaper was prohibited from
publishing for 48 hours in retaliation for continued
distribution of censored articles.
Harassment of La Prensa personnel also continued.
Following the murder of a regional vendor of the paper in
September, who was killed by unknown assailants after several
days of surveillance and intimidation by State Security agents,
La Prensa's religion editor, Norman Talavera, was arrested on
Niiv?ib-Fi-en10. State Security raided his home and seized
Talavera's personal and professional papers, photographs of
Cardinal Obando, personal correspondence, and the family's
passports. The home was then placed under constant
surveillance. Talavera was taken to State Security prison El
Chipote and held until November 15.
Other Civil Opposition
The narrow space for political activity to which
Nicaragua's civil opposition has been confined diminished even
further over the last 90 days. While the Sandinistas have
continued to rely largely on arbitrary arrest and interrogation
as the primary means of intimidation, the use of overt force
and the threat of force to ensure compliance has become more
prominent. More important to the long-term success of the
totalitarian model being imposed by the regime is the use of
nearly unfettered state power to control or confiscate the
material resources essential to effective democratic dissent,
and the revision or promulgation of laws to provide the legal
basis for incapacitating it.
Included among the thirteen substantiated cases of
political murders reported to CPDH in 1985 was an incident
involving the brutal assault on two Social Christian Party
youths in November, in which one boy was severely injured and
the other tortured and killed. After resisting military
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impressment, the two boys were taken away by force in a
military vehicle. According to press reports and a complaint
filed with CPDH, the family inquired the following day about
the boys' whereabouts, and was told by military authorities
that they had been shot while attempting to escape. One of the
boys was later found, unconscious and badly beaten. Two days
later, on November 11, the decomposing body of the second boy
was discovered. His murderers had cut out his tongue, gouged
out his eyes, and slashed his stomach.
In another case, four men aged 22-29 were killed after
having been arrested on November 10 on what their families
insist were trumped-up charges of assault and possession of
illegal weapons. According to relatives, Ivan Enrique Garcia
Lopez, Denis Jose Sanchez Gutierrez, Julio Alberto Lopez Lopez,
and Wilmar Jose Navarro Garcia had refused induction prior to
their arrest. Although an attorney stated that he had visited
the lour at the Palo Alto Prison on November 22, and a morgue
employee claimed that the bodies were delivered on the evening
of November 22, a Ministry of Interior Communique issued
November 25 stated that all four had been killed that day in a
shoot-out.
The majority of the remaining incidents reported by
opposition sectors involved the use of arbitrary arrests,
detentions of varying lengths of time, and interrogation; the
conduct of armed raids on organizational offices and search and
seizure of documents and property; and the banning of
institutions and organizations as illegal.
In addition to the arrests previously mentioned, some
forty-five persons active in the civil opposition were arrested
or summoned for interrogation during this period. Among those
arrested were members or employees of the Social Christian
Party, Independent Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Superior
Council of Private Enterprise, Cattlemen's Association, Union
of Parents of Catholic School Children, Confederation of
Professionals, Nicaraguan Private Development Institute (INDE),
Nicaraguan Cotton Growers' Association, Social Christian
Workers Front, Nicaraguan Workers Federation, and Lidia
Maradiaga Peasants Trade Union. Lino Hernandez of the CPDH
estimates that over 300 members of the opposition were
interrogated between October 15 and mid-December.
The Sandinistas in November also summoned for
interrogation Nicaraguans employed at several foreign
missions. Included among those summoned to El Chipote's
interrogation center for intense and abusive questioning were
sixteen employees of the U.S. Embassy, and others from the
Embassies of Venezuela and Honduras. The employees were put
through what has now become the normal routine: weighing,
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measuring, fingerprinting, photographing, and confinement in
tiny, dark, airless cells for hours. Some were stripped; some
were videotaped. All of them were subjected to interrogations
lasting from 6-14 hours, during which they were probed
concerning intimate details of their lives, their religious
beliefs, and their political sympathies, and threatened with
further actions against themselves and their families. They
were also warned not to discuss with anyone the details of
their detention.
To reinforce psychological intimidation, the Sandinistas
have erected a legal structure -- prominent in which is the
State of Emergency -- that gives them the authority to carry
out virtually any action at will. Refinement of this legal
facade appears to be emerging as a favored means of effecting
the elimination of the opposition without having to resort to
visible force. The monopoly on legislative authority has
enabled the Sandinistas to pass laws stripping opposition
parties of their legal recognition, and to close down as
"illegal" organizations including the Curia Social Services
Offices, the Institution for Unity and the Promotion of
Democracy, and 12 affiliates of the Confederation of Labor
Unification (the Professional Agricultural Workers Union, the
Miskito Workers Union, the Dress Workers Union, the Casares
Fishermen's Union, the Faustino Martinez Union, an office
workers union, and six others not identified in the press
report). There are indications that the Nicaraguan Private
Development Institute is slated for similar treatment.
On January 27, the Ministry of Interior issued a
communique setting forth further restrictions on political
activity. Under the new regulations, political parties must
notify the police one week in advance of any political "event,"
giving the time, place, and date, which event will be subject
to authorization or denial by the police. All parties not
represented in the National Assembly are prohibited from
conducting any political activities or issuing any "propaganda"
related to the drafting of a new constitution. The new
regulations codified a situation already in effect: on January
26 the recognized faction of the Conservative Party,
represented in the National Assembly, was denied permission by
the police to hold an open meeting in the small town of
Caterina to discuss the constitution. Assembly President
Carlos Nunez, according to El Nuevo Diario, described the
action as an isolated incident, and promised to speak with
Interior Minister Borge.
The Sandinistas have also used FSLN-devised legislation to
expropriate enterprises and lands from political enemies. In
the latter case, existing legislation has proven inadequate to
the task of completely crippling the private sector. As a
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result, Daniel Ortega proclaimed on January 11 that the
Agrarian Reform Law had been substantially revised. Explaining
that the revisions had been made to avoid an appearance that
the regime was "disrespectful of the law," Ortega announced
that in future there will be no limit on the size of farms that
can be confiscated. (Under the old law, farms under 1500
manzanas were immune from confiscation.) Now, any farm can be
taken provided only that the confiscation is of some "social
utility" or is in the "public interest." While the earlier law
had made it possible to move against political opponents, even
those whose lands were highly productive, the new version
provides the regime unlimited powers of political retribution.
According to Ortega, however, not everyone need worry. Those
who "behave patriotically, who are not counterrevolutionaries,
and do not support the counterrevolution's activities" are not
at risk. Others are thus clearly forewarned, and it is
generally accepted within the private sector that the coming
months will see many in the opposition dispossessed of their
holdings.
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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
In its first five months of operation, the Nicaraguan
Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) has obligated $16.4
million of the $18 million made available to date for
humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. With
submission of this report, the final $9 million tranche of
funds approved through 3/31/86 becomes available. Expenditures
continue to be guided by the criteria set forth in the
legislation, as clarified by subsequent expressions of
Congressional intent (see below).
During the reporting period (November 1, 1985, through
January 31, 1986), NHAO has continued to conduct operations in
the same manner as described in the first Presidential Report
to Congress (dated November 6, 1985) and with only a slightly
increased staff. However, the pace of disbursements
accelerated as the staffs of NHAO and the United Nicaraguan
Opposition (UNO) first developed and then gained experience
with effective modalities for the provision of aid through NHAO.
NEW PROGRAMS
As indicated in the statistical summary, the overwhelming
percentage of assistance to the democratic resistance continues
to be in the form of food, medicine, clothing, equipment and
transportation. However, there are three new programs worthy
of special mention.
A. Human Rights Commission
NHAO began in December 1985 to fund UNO's newly-created
Human Rights Commission (UNO/CDH). The objective of UNO/CDH is
to defend and promote human rights, with particular emphasis on
their protection during armed conflict. UNO/CDH will train UNO
forces in a code of conduct, will investigate and monitor
punishment of derelictions, and will also monitor and expose
violations of human rights committed by the Sandinistas. This
program is being directed by one of UNO's principal leaders,
Arturo Cruz, assisted by Ismael Reyes, former head of the
Nicaraguan Red Cross.
UNO/CDH has submitted to NHAO a budget projecting expenses
of approximately $950,000 during the period January - June
1986. To date, NHAO has provided $125,000 in start-up money
for this undertaking.
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B. Medical Care Facilities
In addition to paying for pharmaceuticals and other
consumable medical supplies, NHAO is providing funding for
longer-term treatment in the United States of seriously wounded
combatants requiring restorative surgery. This assistance
takes the form of payment of hospital and doctors' bills and
maintenance of a hospice (capacity approximately 15 persons)
for patient lodging during the period of treatment and
rehabilitation. NHAO made a separate grant to the Fundacion de
Nicaragua, a Miami-based non-profit organization, to administer
this program.
NHAO has also funded the enhancement or expansion of
several UNO medical clinics within the Central American region,
where the vast majority of UNO's medical needs are met. These
funds cover construction costs, salaries of health-care
personnel, and the purchase of medical equipment such as X-ray
machines and refrigerators to store perishable pharmaceuticals.
C. Vehicles
During the initial phase of its operations, NHAO abstained
from funding the purchase of vehicles (trucks, boats and
aircraft) because the theoretical potential for dual use (to
transport both humanitarian and lethal supplies, for example)
could lead to controversy over compliance with the legislative
guidelines. NHAO recognized nonetheless that without effective
means of transport, NHAO-purchased supplies might not reach and
thus could not serve their intended recipients. In light of
this dilemma, the Department of State suggested to the Congress
in November 1985 that the Intelligence Authorization Act for
1986 specifically provide that appropriated funds could be used
for the purchase of vehicles. The conference committee chose,
instead, to clarify NHAO's authority in the following statement:
The conferees note that they considered authorizing
the intelligence agencies to provide transportation
equipment to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, but
determined not to authorize funds for such equipment
because the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
established by Executive Order 12530 of August 29, 1985,
pursuant to the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) and the Fiscal Year
1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act, already has the
authority to provide transportation equipment as part of
the humanitarian assistance program, and the provision of
such equipment is not precluded by the definition of
humanitarian assistance contained in those Acts sci?Tong as
no modifications are made to the equipment designed to be
used to inflict serious bodily harm or death. (Emphasis
added.)
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On this basis, NHAO has begun to consider requests for
funding the purchase and maintenance of small trucks, boats and
aircraft, provided their primary and predominant use is the
delivery of humanitarian assistance commodities or the
transport of the wounded, and provided no modifications
designed to inflict serious bodily harm are made to such
equipment. These conditions have been discussed in detail with
the UNO leadership, which has fully accepted them, and been
inserted in all grant documents pertaining to the purchase,
maintenance and use of such vehicles.
OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL
A. By the State Department's Inspector General
In October 1985, the Inspector General of the Department
of State initiated a two-week, informal audit of NHAO's
operations and procedures, culminating in a report on November
8, 1985. The audit concerned itself primarily with the
adequacy of NHAO's procedures for ensuring that assistance not
be diverted for unauthorized purposes.
The audit report approvingly noted NHAO's adoption of
operating procedures and controls similar to those used by AID
disaster relief programs. However, the report suggested a
number of refinements. Citing concerns about NHAO's ability to
verify the bona fides of off-shore suppliers and the ultimate
end use of supplies procured in both the United States and
Central America, the report suggested that NHAO recruit and
assign additional personnel to the monitoring function, while
continuing to make maximum use of U.S. resources within the
region to ensure proper use of NHAO-funded materiel. Finally,
the report suggested that NHAO request that UNO develop budget
projections for disbursing the balance of the funds
appropriated for humanitarian assistance.
On December 20, 1985, NHAO responded to the Inspector
General that NHAO concurred with all recommendations; as of the
date of this report, they have been fully implemented.
B. By the General Accounting Office
On November 5, 1985, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
notified the Department of State that at the request of the
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs, GAO was commencing a review and audit of
NHAO operations. Representatives of GAO, NHAO and the State
Department met on December 6, 1985, to discuss audit
procedures; the audit has been in progress since that date.
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TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS
In mid-October 1985, a flight from the United States
containing NHAO-purchased supplies was forced to return from
the region without discharging its cargo. (This episode was
included in the first report under the heading "Delivery
Incident.") From that time, UNO's previously existing
arrangements for the delivery of U.S.-sourced supplies to the
region were suspended. NHAO has worked with UNO to devise
alternate delivery arrangements, but to date has achieved only
limited success.
One result of this development is that UNO has been
obliged to rely more heavily on supplies purchased within the
region than would otherwise have been the case.
SUMMARY OF GRANTS
NHAO Grants
1. Program Grants (to be disbursed through
letters/memoranda of commitment, except Project Hope and
Fundacion grants [see below])
Grant 601 (UNO) $1,000,000
(issued 10/3/85)
Grant 602 (UNO) $1,500,000
(issued 10/15/85)
Grant 603 (UNO) $3,000,000
(issued 10/29/85)
Grant 604 (UNO) $3,000,000
(issued 11/11185)
Grant 605 $1,000,000a
(Fundacion de Nicaragua)
(issued 11/13/85)
Grant 606 (UNO) $3,000,000
(issued 12/23/85)
Grant 607 (Project Hope) $31750,000b
(issued 12/02/85)
2. Administration Grants
Grant 641-001 (UNO Washington) $ 50,000c
(issued 10/17/85)
Grant 641-002 (IDEA, Inc.) $ 50,675d
(issued 11/06/85)
3. Direct NHAO Obligations
Grant 632-001 (Butler Buildings) $ 28,000
(issued 12/23/85)
TOTAL $16,378,675
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_
NHAO Commitments
1. Against Program Grants through 1/31/86
Humanitarian Assistance $14,131,860
Medical
$5,111,180
(36.2%)
Food
$3,665,589
(25.9%)
Clothing
$3,064,254
(21.7%)
Equipment
$1,399,747
( 9.9%)
Transport
$ 766,090
( 5.4%)
Human Rights Program
$ 125,000
( 0.9%)
2. Against Administration
Administration Commitments
UNO Liaison Office
IDEA, Inc.
Grants through 1/31/86
$ 50,000
$ 50,675
$ 100,675
TOTAL NHAO COMMITMENTS $14,232,535
In-House NHAO Administrative Expenses through 1/31/86
NHAO Administrative Expenses
$ 66,953
Direct Personnel Costs
$ 33,286
Office Rent
$ 14,667
Travel
$ 14,000
Telephone toll calls
$ 3,000
Miscellaneous
$ 2,000
Notes
a. The program grant to the Fundacion de
Nicaragua funds longer-term care in the U.S. and
UNO's medical staff in the Central American region.
At least initially, support for UNO's human rights
program is also being channelled through the
Fundacion.
b. Using information provided by NHAO staff,
Project Hope produced a comprehensive program to meet
both emergency and on-going health care supply
needs. Pursuant to that program, the grant to
Project Hope funds the purchase within the United
States of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.
..;
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C. The administration grant to UNO's Washington
office stipulates that its activities must be
strictly limited to providing liaison between UNO and
NHAO so as to facilitate the flow of humanitarian
assistance. This grant permits UNO to receive a cash
advance to cover administrative expenditures, which
must be documented and justified to NHAO before
further cash advances are made.
d. The administration grant to IDEA, Inc. funds
administrative support services, including assistance
to the regional medical program and to KISAN (the
Indian/Creole component of UNO).
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CONIPIDENTIAL
'ANNEX C
Human itar ian ABSS i stance
for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
ITEMIZED PROGRAM COMMITMENTS THROUGH 1/31/86
Grant-Letter/Memo
of Commitment No. Item, quantity Value
I. Food and consumables
602-001 various foodstuffs $196,875
602-008 various foodstuffs $214,982
602-012 eggs $ 6,474
603-007 various foodstuffs $827,872
603-011 various foodstuffs $ 26,766
603-012 foodstuffs, sundries $ 15,907
603-021 various foodstuffs $ 43,939
603-022 various foodstuffs $ 98,950
603-024 various foodstuffs $ 39,000
sundries $ 6,536
603-027 various foodstuffs $497,471
604-002 various foodstuffs $901,034
604-004 various foodstuffs $ 19,997
604-008 various foodstuffs $ 20,627
604-019 various foodstuffs $ 65,000
604-023 various foodstuffs $ 11,991
604-025 various foodstuffs $ 57,919
604-026 various foodstuffs $ 59,173
604-030 various foodstuffs $ 16,342
CONFIDENTIAL
(DECL:OADR)
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604-031
604-033
604034
606-002
606-012
606-014
II. Clothing
601-001
601-002
601-003
601-004
601-005
602-003
602-005
602-006
602-009
602-010
602-011
various
various
various
various
various
various
CONFIDENTIAL
_7_77777_
foodstuffs
foodstuffs
foodstuffs
foodstuffs
foodstuffs
foodstuffs
Category Subtotal:
waterproof material
(21,000 yds.)
caps (10,000)
socks (2,000 dz. prs.)
boots (16,000 pr.)
shirts and trousers
(3,468 sets)
boots
boots
boots
(1,000 pr.)
(1,080 pr.)
(500 pr.)
shirts and trousers
(15,000 sets)
sewing labor costs for
manufacture of 6,351
sets of shirts and trousers
suspenders (6,000)
belts (10,000)
boots (10,000)
ponchos (20,000)
CONFIDENTIAL
$346,634
$ 32,810
$ 16,182
$126,603
$ 1,103
$ 15,402
$3,665,589
$ 32,970
$ 12,500
$ 17,000
$496,000
$ 55,408
$ 19,150
$ 22,200
$ 9,575
$243,750
$ 41,282
$ 19,500
$ 27,500
$305,520
$178,400
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602-017
603-001
603-002
603-010
CON?! DENT IAL
MD
underwear
2016 dz. sets
boots (15,000)
belts (6,120)
trousers (5,300)
suspenders (1,077)
boots (6,800)
???
603-019 boots (500 pr.)
socks (200 dz pr.
bandanas (200 dz. pr.)
603-023 socks (2010_dz. pr.) $ 18,808
604-004 various clothing $ 9,587
604-007 trousers (1,000 pr.) $ 14,300
shirts (1,000) $ 5,720
rubber boots (1,000 pr.) $ 6,200
604-012 shirts (1,600) $ 12,800
604-015 trousers (300) $ 13,604
shirts (300)
hats (300)
coats (348)
gloves (300 pr.)
604-016 boots (5,276 pr.) $166,194
604-023 various clothing $ 33,556
604-034 various clothing $ 7,567
606-004 uniforms (20,000) $325,000
606-007 boots (2,820 pr.) $100,970
uniforms (420 sets)
$ 34,272
$457,500
$ 18,972
$ 5,300
$ 700
$108,100
$ 12,425
606-011 boots (2,000 pr.) $ 81,656
socks (4,000 pr.)
t-shirts (4,000)
caps (2,000)
CONFIDENTIAL
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.1
CONFIDENTIAL
. -.4 -
606-012 various clothing
606-014 various clothing
606-020 pants (3,000 pr.)
shirts (3,000)
606-022 shirts (2,000)
pants (2,000 pr.)
Category Subtotal:
$ 7,012
$ 7,393
$ 79,118
56,745
$3,064,254
III. Medicine and Medical Care
601-007 _medical expenses for $ 4,350
wounded Nicaraguan
602-007 pharmaceuticals $ 38,540
602-018 pharmaceuticals $ 1,327
603-008 pharmaceuticals $ 18,269
603-013 pharmaceuticals $ 857
603-014 medical services (US) $147,200
603-015 refrigerators for $ 9,008
603-017
603-024
603-026
604-003
604-005
604-006
604-017
604-018
pharmaceuticals
(3)
pharmaceuticals
$ 61,494
pharmaceuticals
$ 1,250
pharmaceuticals
$ 5,252
pharmaceuticals
$ 4,770
pharmaceuticals
$ 5,647
pharmaceuticals
$ 14,079
pharmaceuticals
$ 23,109
pharmaceuticals
$ 26,545
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
1=1.
604-021 medical services $ 14,266
604-024 pharmaceuticals $ 16,112
604-028 hospital $ 52,583
604-035. pharmaceuticals $ 2,384
606-010 pharmaceuticals $ 16,624
606-013 pharmaceuticals $ 1,911
606-019 pharmaceuticals $ 20,603
Project Hope commitment $3,750,000
Fundacion commitment $675,500
(medical)
Category Subtotal: $5,111,180
IV. Equipment
601-001 backpacks (4,000) $ 45,400
large tents (7) $ 9,050
601-002 poncho liners (20,000) $230,000
601-009 mountain rescue equipment $ 970
canteen covers (10,000) $ 17,500
mess trays (100) $ 525
602-004 watches (1,000) $ 13,750
cargo straps (100) $ 600
flashlights (5,000) $ 14,905
602-009 pouches (4,000) $ 13,400
flashlights (8,0640 $ 24,192
bags (4,000) $ 8,400
canteen covers (6,000) $ 16,200
602-011 canteens (10,000) $ 5,800
fabric storage tanks (13) $ 9,750
602-013 farm tools $ 22,261
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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602-014 sanitary napkins (400 cs.) $ 16,445
candles (165 cs.)
603-003 canteens (6,120) $ 3,978
603-004 web belts (500 dz.) $ 6,000
603-005 spray paint (2,432 cans) $ 6,880
603-006 hammocks (20,000) $191,000
603-018 canteen covers (20,000) $ 33,000
603-020 cots, folding (332) $ 6,557
603-025 evacuation markers (500) $ 3,175
603-030 cargo parachutes (74) $ 4,440
604-013 canteen belts (10,000) $ 22,500
604-014 binoculars (260) $ 20,500
monoculars (190)
604-027 tents (2) $ 988
plastic canteens $ 12,000
604-036 break cords (30 rolls) $ 594
retainer bands (200 lbs.) $ 644
606-001 warehouse lease, 6 mos. $ 18,000
(for storage of NHAO-
purchased supplies)
606-003 utility motors (6) $ 19,894
corn grinders (4)
606-005 office supplies $ 2,289
606-006 field packs (20,002) $484,660
606-009 cargo parachutes (125) $ 15,000
606-018 belt pouches (15,000) $ 71,500
suspenders (5,000)
632-001 Butler Buildings (4) $ 28,000
Category Subtotal: $1,399,747
CONFIDENTIAL
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V. Transportation
601-006
602-002
603-007
603-009
603-016
603-024
603-028
603-029
604-001
604-002
604-009
604-010
604-011
604-020
604-022
604-031
604-032
606-008
606-015
CONFIDENTIAL
air charter service
air charter service
ground transportation
air charter service
ground transportation
petrol, oil and lubricants
air charter service
aircraft parts
air charter service
ground transportation
ground transportation
boat purchase
outboard motors and parts
air charter service
ground transportation
ground transportation
air charter service
air charter service
Land Cruiser
pick-up truck
Category Subtotal:
CONFIDENTIAL
$ 35,850
$ 35,850
$ 68,250
$ 33,100
$ 32,750
$ 147
$182,000
$ 5,834
$ 48,000
$ 75,100
$ 7,000
$ 2,860
$ 5,809
$ 44,129
$ 69,150
$ 2,631
$ 48,538
$ 7,070
$ 41,392
$ 21,449
$766,090
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