SIG MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN FEBRUARY 19, 4:15 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
MCI
x
3
EXDM
4
DPCS
5
DDI
x
6
DDA
7
DDO
x
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
.
13
D/011
)4
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
C/NE/DO
X
18
D/NESA/DI
Y
19
NIO/NESA
X
20
ES
x
ai)-.40
22
SUSPENSE
19 Feb 86
Dot.
Remarks
STAT
Executive Secretary
19 Feb 86
Dote
3637 (10.81)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Senior Interagency Group. No. 50
TO:
OVP
NSC
AID
CIA
DOD
JCS
USIA
8605267
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Executive Registry
86-
0670/2
February 18, 1986
Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel
Mr. Richard Meyer
- COL David Brown
- MAJ Michael Emerson
- Mr. C. William LaSalle
SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on Afghanistan
February 19, 4:15 p.m.
In connection with the subject SIG meeting, attached are
papers on Short-Term Humanitarian Assistance (agenda Item 4A), and
Opening of Resistance Offices Overseas (agenda item 3A).
Nicholas Platt
Platt
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Short-Term Humanitarian Assistance
2. Opening of Resistance Offices Overseas
-SECYMT---
DECL: OADR
25X1
a'fr
e-100-TA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2913/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
CONFIDENTIAL
February 14, 1986
SUBJECT: Short-term Humanitarian Assistance for the Afghans
A program of short-term humanitarian assistance for the
Afghans has been underway for over a year, designed to help
sustain the Afghan population in place. For this purpose, a
fund of $8 million was assembled in late 1984 and '85 consisting
of $2 million designated by Congress for medical assistance and
$6 million from funds previously appropriated for other pur-
poses.
Following discussions with Pakistan voluntary agencies, Congress
and Afghan representatives, programs were conceived and implemented
in the following categories:
A. Support of medical clinics inside Afghanistan and
medical facilities which treat sick and wounded Afghans
($2,509,000).
B. Medical training of Afghans to serve inside
Afghanistan ($1,495,000).
C. Cash-for-food for deficit areas inside Afghanistan
($2,462,000).
D. An initial contribution for educational assistance
inside Afghanistan ($75,000).
As preparation for the longer-term humanitarian program,
we also funded three project design efforts by AID contractors
($302,000).
Attached is a budget summation of projects and expenditures
thus far.
On the basis of reports received thus far, the short-term
humanitarian program has achieved a number of important
objectives:
-- Voluntary agencies (largely European) active inside
Afghanistan have been fully funded.
-- The ICRC has maintained its first-aid stations along
the frontier and its hospitals and training programs in
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Pakistan. These are the main sources of emergency medical
assistance for wounded Afghans.
-- Through the provision of cash grants, sufficient food
has been provided to Afghans in deficit areas to sustain the
population through the winter. The voluntary agencies con-
ducting the programs have done an excellent job of implementing
the program and documenting their activities.
-- In part because of our participation in these various
programs, voluntary agencies have been able to obtain sub-
stantial matching funds from European sources. In addition,
several U.S. voluntary agencies have become active in
important programs.
-- Major training programs in medical skills now are
underway which should in the course of 1986-87 enable Afghans
better to treat their own wounded.
Next Steps
There is approximately $1.15 million left in the short-term
program which must be spent by the end of May 1986. The inter-
agency group managing the program will convene soon to discuss
how best to use the remaining money. A notional budget for future
expenditures follows:
-- Further support for medical clinics inside Afghanistan
($650,000).
-- Cash-for-food for internally displaced Afghans ($151,000).
-- Start-up funding for para - veterinary and agricultural
training and assistance ($356,000).
Note that the proposal forsees undertaking two additional
activities, paravet and agriculture training. Both will involve
participation by American voluntary agencies with good records
in developing countries. The committee will also at several
proposals to establish a voluntary agency research office to gather
and analyze information on humanitarian conditions and needs inside
Afghanistan.
Attachment:
As stated.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2913/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
CONFIDENTIAL
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE AFGHANS
BUDGET - AS OF FEBRUARY 14, 1986
I. Funds Committed
A. Initial Medical Assistance
B. Food Assistance - first tranche -IRC
AfghanAid, Guilde du Raid, AFRANE,
and second tranche - IRC - AfghanAid
C. Medical Training - Americares/SA, AMI, SCA
D. Medical Training - IMC and FM
E. Ambulances - AfghanAid
F. Food and Medical Assistance - Americares/SCA
G. Medical Assistance - Americares/MDM
H. Education - Americares/AfEducCommittee
I. Project Design
$2,000,000
2,039,000
270,000
1,195,000
120,000
150,000
312,000
75,000
302,000
sub-total $6,463,000
II. Funds to be Committed in Few Days
A. Food Assistance - second tranche
cash-for-food IRC/Guilde du Raid
B. Medical Training/Americares/SA/AMI
(grant increase for more field training)
C. Medical - Palm Beach Clinic
$ 335,000
30,000
15,000
sub-total $ 380,000
III. Funds for Projects in Preparation
A. Food Assistance - second tranche
cash-for-food IRC/AFRANE
B. Medical Assistance - second tranche
Americares/MSF
C. Medical Assistance - second tranche
Amer icares
D. Medical Assistance - Bonner Afghan Komittee
E. World Concern - paravets, livestock, agric
F. Mercy Corps - transport, medical clinics/trng
sub-total
Grand Total
Funds Allocated by Activity
Food Assistance
Medical Assistance
Medical Training
Other Projects:
(Ambulances, Education)
(start-up - Agric, Paravet, Livestock, etc.
Project Design
151,000
150,000
100,000
400,000
203,000
153,000
$1,157,000
$8,000,000
$2,613,000
3,039,000
1,495,000
195,000
356,000
302,000
Grand Total $8,000,000
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL2 OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
SECRET
OPENING OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE OFFICES AROUND THE WORLD
1. Background
The alliance of Afghan resistance parties has had some
successes over the nine months of its existence but needs
offices around the world if it is to enhance its present, very
limited international status. Offices would give the alliance
bases from which to strengthen its position in regional and
international organizations such as the OIC, the NAM, and
eventually the UN itself. Also, the act of establishing and
developing alliance offices would help bring the resistance
parties closer together, and the experience alliance operatives
would gain from running these offices would be invaluable.
Most important, the existence of alliance offices would help
build the resistance's image as a coherent and modern movement.
There are at least four obstacles which stand in the way of
opening alliance offices. First, the Afghan leadership is in
fact disunited, and without sustained pressure from Islamabad
and other quarters, the parties are unlikely to be able to
agree on permanent alliance representation abroad. Second, the
Pakistanis are ambivalent about resistance unity. Their
policies on the ground have tended to perpetuate divisions
amongst the Afghans who the Pakistanis contend cannot be forced
by outsiders to unite. The formation of the alliance last May
reflected an evolution, ratherjthan a reversal of the Pakistani
position, and the new Prime Minister, like the martial law
government, is keeping the offices idea "on hold." Third, the
resistance parties are perenially short of funds for political
action uses. To give alliance offices overseas any chance of
success, they would meed a regular source of operations funds.
Fourth, the alliance would be hard pressed to find good people
to staff what would in effect be a resistance diplomatic
service.
2. Action Plan
Our immediate goal is the opening of offices in New York
and Jeddah which, as the seats of the UN and the OIC, should
have first priority. This limited effort may be easier to sell
to the Pakistanis, will put less pressure on a fragile
alliance, and will need less financial and personnel
resources. Other long- term efforts will also begin.
Our medium-term goal should be to encourage establishment
of resistance offices in key capitals in the Muslim world with
a view to reinforcing Islamic support for the resistance. We
suggest concentrating particularly on non-Arab influentials
SECRET
DECL: OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2913/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
? ?
SECRET
-2-
such as Senegal, Nigeria, Turkey, Bangladesh and Malyasis, in
order to create a bloc of lobbyists who can help overcome sone
of the ambivalence of certain Arab countries to focus on
"non-Arab" issues. With a strong diplomatic base in the
Islamic world, the resistance could push for formal OCI
membership, and subsequently move on to gain OAU endorsement as
a prelude to a march on the UN.
We propose to take the following immediate steps:
A. Approach to the Pakistanis: Embassy Islamabad should
continue to raise the issue whenever possible, our Mission
to the UN should discuss it with the Pakistanis there, and
high- level U.S. visitors to Islamabad should be thoroughly
briefed so that they can bring it up with their Pakistani
interlocutors. We intend to raise the matter up with
Pakistani Foreign Ministry Additional Secretary Najmuddin
Shaikh when he visits Washington later this month.
B. Approach to the resistance: Despite the Pakistani
"hold" on the issue, Embassy and Consulate officals should
continue to underscore the importance we attach to opening
overseas resistance offices in the course of their
continuing contacts with the alliance.
C. Approach to the Saudis: Embassy Riyadh should
recommend that the Saudis ask the resistance leadership to
merge the various resistance party offices in Jeddah (all
seven parties are represented there) into a single alliance
representation. The formal head of the office could rotate
in the same way as the alliance spokesman in Islamabad.
D. Finances: Once the GOP agrees to the idea of opening
offices, Embassy Islamabad should explore the question of
finances with Pakistanis. Embassy Riyadh should discuss
financing of the New York and Jeddah offices with the Saudi
Government and the Muslim World League in Jeddah. The
Embassy could also ask whether the Muslim World League
would give office space to the alliance in New York as it
did during the 40th UNGA.
E. Personnel: USIA should explore the possibility of
offering English-language and more extensive diplomatic
training to resistance operatives. Embassy Islamabad
should approach the alliance both to describe what training
we could offer and to ask the alliance for information on
its needs. AID should assess the possibilities for aiding
in the education of Afghan diplomats in the context of its
Afghanistan program. Finally, Embassy Riyadh should ask
whether Afghans would be acceptable as trainees in the OIC
Secretariat and/or in Muslim World League offices.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24 : CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4
, . . .
SECRET
-3-
F. Making interim use of existing resistance 'offices: If
it chose, the resistance could authorize some or all of the
offices run by the various parties around the world to
represent it in their present form until more
representative alliance offices could be established. This
procedure would presumably be agreeable to the Pakistanis.
We will ask all NEA and selected other Embassies for
updated information on Afghan resistance representation in
their countries. Embassy Islamabad should discuss the idea
with the Pakistanis, and if it is acceptable, we will
examine ways of raising it with the alliance.
February 17, 1986, 015113
-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380004-4