GENESIS OF THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Introduction
By agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975,
the United States mounted a unique peacekeeping
watch in the Sinai Desert. The American role, as
Vice President Mondale phrased it, is to act as "the
eyes and ears of peace": to detect any movement
of military forces and thus to defuse any untoward
incident at the strategic Giddi and Mitla Passes.
The Washington-based headquarters of this
operation is the U.S. Sinai Support Mission (SSM);
its field arm is known as the U.S. Sinai Field
Mission (SFM).
On a plateau among the hills of the Sinai, a
chain-link fence encloses a compound of
buff-colored cubes fitted together in rectangular
patterns. Three smaller units, each in separate
vigil, stand at critical points above the Passes.
These buildings house the members and
sophisticated technical equipment of the SFM.
From the American camp, you need go no further
than P/2 miles east to reach Israeli-held ground; a
direct-line flight of 15 miles west would bring you
to Egyptian-controlled territory. In the area
between, the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) patrols a demilitarized buffer zone.
Within that zone, the SFM keeps watch over the
entrances to the Giddi and Mitla Passes and
monitors the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance
stations lodged on the heights at opposite ends of
the Giddi Valley.
The U.S. tactical early warning system has a
limited range and purpose. It complements
Egyptian and Israeli strategic surveillance stations,
which collect information about the movements of
the other's military forces and whose far greater
range provides a broader assessment of military
preparations.
In September 1975, at the invitation of Israel
and Egypt, and to facilitate the Sinai 11 Agreement
for Israeli withdrawal, the United States agreed to
assume this new fourth-party role in the Sinai.
That role is not to enforce the rules-the function
of UNEF-rather, the U.S. Sinai Field Mission
stands watch to alert all parties of any apparent
violation of the agreed interim peace terms within
its area of surveillance. The use of technological
devices enables the Mission to receive an accurate
and steady stream of information.
The speed with which the Sinai Support Mission
was established and the effectiveness of its
performance resulted from the extraordinary
combined efforts of the U.S. Government and its
contractors. The United Nations and the
Governments of Egypt and Israel willingly gave to
the Mission that assistance and confidence
essential to fulfilling its obligations.
At the request of SSM Director C. William
Kontos, Dr. Allen H. Kitchens, Office of the
Historian of the Department of State, prepared a
detailed history-"The United States Sinai
Support Mission, 1975-1977." The following
summary account is based largely on his work.
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Contents
Introduction .............................
i
Genesis of the U.S. Sinai Support
Mission
Prologue to September 1975 ......
1
The Sinai II Agreement ..........
2
Congressional Approval ..........
4
Shaping a Mission ................
5
Structuring ......................
6
Early Planning and Organization
6
Intensified Planning ............
7
Choosing a Staff ...............
8
Site Survey and Technology ....
9
Contracting With Private
Enterprise ....................
11
Final Selection .................
12
Building the Buffer City ..........
13
Phase I ........................
13
Phase II .......................
16
II. Keeping Watch
Staffing the Sinai Field Mission ....
21
Security ..................... ..
22
U.N. Role in the Buffer Zone .....
23
Monitoring the Surveillance
Stations ........................
23
American Early Warning System ..
24
Sensors and Monitoring
Equipment ...................
25
Visual Detection Devices ........
26
Research and Development ......
28
Communications Network .......
28
Operating the System ...........
30
American Role in the Sinai ........
31
III.
"Eyes and Ears of Peace"
Key Elements of Success ..........
33
Applicability of SSM Experience ...
34
Sinai II Phase Ends ...............
35
The New Mandate ................
35
Footnotes ..................................
37
Appendix A
Provisions of Executive Order 11896-
January 13, 1976 ......................
37
Appendix B
Chronology ..............................
39
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Introduction
By agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975,
the United States mounted a unique peacekeeping
watch in the Sinai Desert. The American role, as
Vice President Mondale phrased it, is to act as "the
eyes and ears of peace": to detect any movement
of military forces and thus to defuse any untoward
incident at the strategic Giddi and Mitla Passes.
The Washington-based headquarters of this
operation is the U.S. Sinai Support Mission (SSM);
its field arm is known as the U.S. Sinai Field
Mission (SFM).
On a plateau among the hills of the Sinai, a
chain-link fence encloses a compound of
buff-colored cubes fitted together in rectangular
patterns. Three smaller units, each in separate
vigil, stand at critical points above the Passes.
These buildings house the members and
sophisticated technical equipment of the SFM.
From the American camp, you need go no further
than 11/2 miles east to reach Israeli-held ground; a
direct-line flight of 15 miles west would bring you
to Egyptian-controlled territory. In the area
between, the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) patrols a demilitarized buffer zone.
Within that zone, the SFM keeps watch over the
entrances to the Giddi and Mitla Passes and
monitors the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance
stations lodged on the heights at opposite ends of
the Giddi Valley.
The U.S. tactical early warning system has a
limited range and purpose. It complements
Egyptian and Israeli strategic surveillance stations,
which collect information about the movements of
the other's military forces and whose far greater
range provides a broader assessment of military
preparations.
In September 1975, at the invitation of Israel
and Egypt, and to facilitate the Sinai II Agreement
for Israeli withdrawal, the United States agreed to
assume this new fourth-party role in the Sinai.
That role is not to enforce the rules-the function
of UNEF-rather, the U.S. Sinai Field Mission
stands watch to alert all parties of any apparent
violation of the agreed interim peace terms within
its area of surveillance. The use of technological
devices enables the Mission to receive an accurate
and steady stream of information.
The speed with which the Sinai Support Mission
was established and the effectiveness of its
performance resulted from the extraordinary
combined efforts of the U.S. Government and its
contractors. The United Nations and the
Governments of Egypt and Israel willingly gave to
the Mission that assistance and confidence
essential to fulfilling its obligations.
At the request of SSM Director C. William
Kontos, Dr. Allen H. Kitchens, Office of the
Historian of the Department of State, prepared a
detailed history-"The United States Sinai
Support Mission, 1975-1977." The following
summary account is based largely on his work.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Genesis of the U.S. Sinai Support Mission
?~ T-W ~ _~ ~~ '~:.?:.~^:: Z/!~ Inhospitable and
stark, the Sinai Peninsula bares granite mountains
and hard desert flats to a scorching summer sun,
to frigid winter nights, and to wind. Sudden rains
can flood wadis with impassable streams, but
water, when it falls, brings life again to the desert
and faint touches of green to the landscape.
Largely untamed space, the Sinai's northwestern
quadrant lies between ancient centers of
population, a natural buffer that has been crossed
by nomads, caravans, and armies since time
immemorial. The Giddi and Mitla Passes, which
traverse the highlands of the interior, traditionally
have served as invasion routes between Asia and
North Africa.
When, in 1948, Great Britain's Palestine
mandate ended after 28 years, the State of Israel
was declared in a portion of the mandate area.
Arab armies, including an Egyptian force which
moved through the Sinai into Palestine at Gaza,
challenged but failed to overcome the new state.
Israel emerged from the conflict with more
territory than it initially claimed. In 1956, British,
French, and Israeli forces invaded and briefly
occupied Egypt's Sinai territory. They withdrew at
the insistence of the United States and other U.N.
members. From that time until 1967, U.N.
observers monitored the uneasy armistice along
Israel's borders. Contained though festering, the
Arab-Israeli dispute burst again into warfare in
June 1967, a war triggered by the withdrawal, at
Egypt's request, of the U.N. presence in the Sinai.
Through the Giddi and Mitla Passes of the
highlands, an Israeli army poured westward to the
flats below, a vast and vacant terrain ideal for tank
warfare. The outcome of this June 1967 conflict
saw Egyptians retreat west of the Suez Canal,
leaving Israel to occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula
as well as other Arab lands. Military defeat and
territorial losses in 1967-added to pan-Arab
grievances over Israel's emergence and gains
in 1948-prompted Egyptians to project the
reconquest of the Sinai as a national goal. In the
atmosphere of continuing hostility, Israel built an
electronic surveillance station on the edge of an
escarpment near the western end of the Giddi Pass
to warn of Egyptian preparations for an attack.
The northwestern Sinai plains again erupted
with the sounds and scenes of battle when Egypt
launched an attack in October 1973. Israel's
possession of the Giddi and Mitla Passes, through
which ran support lines to its tank battalions, then
assumed vital importance. The initial cease-fire
arrangement of October 22, 1973, found Israel
still holding most of the Sinai. An Israeli force had
also penetrated an area west of the Suez Canal to a
point known as Kilometer 101, while some
Egyptian units remained deployed in the Sinai east
of the Suez Canal. A final cease-fire agreement,
signed by Egypt and Israel on November 11, 1973,
brought about a separation of the two armies and
positioned a United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) between them.
In the aftermath of the cease-fire, Israelis and
Egyptians for the first time in some 25 years of
belligerency engaged in direct discussions, albeit
the participants were professional officers
negotiating limited and specific details of military
disengagement. On the basis of these talks at field
quarters at Kilometer 101, the Governments of
Egypt and Israel reached an interim accord, the
Sinai I Agreement, in January 1974.
7iew from a watch station overlooking
the ',iddi Pass.
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Early in 1975, at a seemingly favorable
juncture, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
launched his intensive diplomatic effort to bring
about a second agreement between the two
governments which would sustain a more
far-reaching armistice and thereby advance the
possibility of resolving at least some of the larger
political issues. The Secretary mediated between
the parties for a period of 16 days, an effort which
involved him in flying back and forth between
Egypt and Israel and added the term "shuttle
diplomacy" to international vocabularies.
Both protagonists, however, held to inflexible
positions on a number of issues. Egypt insisted on
Israeli withdrawal from the northwest quarter of
the Sinai to a line east of the Giddi and Mitla
Passes and on the return of the oil field at Abu
Rudays. Israel recoiled at the idea of giving up the
Passes, so indispensable in time of war, and
claimed particularly the need to keep its electronic
surveillance station at Giddi. Israel also wanted
some concrete evidence of Egypt's peaceful intent.
Their respective positions remained basically
unchanged for a full year.
The impasse broke when, on March 29, 1975,
Egypt's President Anwar Sadat announced that he
would reopen the Suez Canal to international
traffic and would approve a 3-month extension of
the UNEF mandate beyond its April 1975
expiration date. To these overt gestures, Israel's
Defense Minister, Shimon Peres, replied that
Israel was ready to make "significant concessions"
provided the canal was in fact reopened.
Egypt officially reopened the Suez Canal on
June 5, 1975, the eighth anniversary of the June
1967 war. Before the end of June, the
governments of both countries agreed to resume
negotiations, again through the good offices of the
United States, based now on a greater willingness
to compromise. Arriving in Jerusalem on August
21, 1975, Secretary Kissinger confirmed that: "All
parties have had an opportunity to reconsider
their attitudes; sufficient progress has been made
in the discussions during the interim to warrant a
more intensive diplomatic effort in the days
ahead."
The Sinai I Agreement
of January 1974 served its purpose by narrowly
separating the military forces of Egypt and Israel
and providing a respite during which positions
could be reviewed and attitudes reconsidered.
Staff work on both sides continued during the
period from January 1974 to the summer of 1975,
and impetus toward renewing negotiations
accelerated after President Sadat's June statements
and Israel's response to them. The change in
attitude justified Secretary Kissinger's round of
shuttle diplomacy during the last 10 days of
August 1975. The objective of a second interim
agreement was to arrange a more extensive
military disengagement in the Sinai, while
encouraging political processes to move along
peaceful channels.
Egyptians and Israelis accepted the proposal of a
demilitarized buffer zone controlled by a United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The idea of
adjacent zones, where each party could deploy
only forces limited in number and weaponry,
aroused no serious dissent. Israel was prepared
now to relinquish most of the area of the Giddi
and Mitla Passes for inclusion in the proposed
U.N. Buffer Zone but declined to forgo its
strategic surveillance station at the western end of
the Giddi Pass. Accordingly, Egypt was allowed to
build a similar station at the eastern end of the
Pass. The United States agreed to conduct a
limited oversight of the two electronic observation
posts.
Israel, however, mistrustful of the Egyptians
and remembering the United Nation's withdrawal
of observers at the request of Egypt in 1967,
suggested that the United States establish and
maintain a tactical early warning system at the
Giddi and Mitla Passes. Egypt concurred, and as
negotiations proceeded, it became clear to
Secretary Kissinger that no agreement would
result without this explicit American role. He
commented later (September 1975) that the
United States agreed to build an early warning
system at the request of both parties and not as the
result of an American initiative. "In fact," he said,
"I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we
were not particularly anxious to play this role."
A Basic Agreement, known as the Sinai II
Agreement, was initialed by the two parties at
separate ceremonies in Jerusalem and Alexandria
on September 1, 1975. Secretary Kissinger
initialed the adjunct U.S. Proposal (for a tactical
early warning system) on the same day. Formal
signing of the Agreement took place in Geneva on
September 4. The Basic Agreement contains four
documents: the Agreement Between Egypt and
Israel; an Annex to the Agreement; the U.S.
Proposal; and a later Protocol to the Agreement,
signed on September 22.
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The provisions of the four documents which
related to the future Sinai Support Mission
included:
1 Creation of buffer zones entirely under
UNEF control (Zone 1 in the northwest quadrant
of the Sinai Peninsula; Zones 2A and 2B in the
southwest quadrant).
2 Redeployment of Israeli and Egyptian forces
by February 22, 1976: Israel withdrawing beyond
the Giddi and Mitla Passes; Egypt controlling
about 6 percent of the Sinai, including the Abu
Rudays oil fields.
3 Designation of limited arms and forces zones
on either side of Buffer Zone 1.
4 Provision for photographic reconnaissance
flights by the United States over the areas covered
by the Agreement, the resulting information to be
made available to both sides and to the Chief
Coordinator of the U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in
the Middle East, and also for aerial reconnaissance
by Egypt and Israel up to the median line of
Buffer Zone 1.
5 A Joint Commission of Egyptian and Israeli
representatives, under the chairmanship of the
U.N. Chief Coordinator, set up to consider
periodically any problems arising from the Basic
Agreement.
6 An American early warning system within
Buffer Zone 1, as set forth in the U.S. Proposal.
Buffer Zone 1 (hereinafter referred to as the
buffer zone) extends some 82 miles from the
Mediterranean Sea on the north to the Gulf of
Suez on the south. Just south of the zone's
midpoint, where its east-west dimension is the
widest (about 35 miles), lie the Giddi and the Mitla
Passes. Elsewhere the zone tapers to a 10-mile
breadth. The western edge is about 10 miles
distant from the Suez Canal.
A 2,000-foot escarpment dominates the
15.5-mile-long Giddi Pass. The Mitla Pass, 18.6
miles long, pierces hills ranging to 2,000 feet. Ten
miles of a serviceable north-south road connect the
two double-lane, east-west highways through the
Passes. The surveillance of these roads is the basic
U.S. responsibility. The total area monitored by
the U.S. Sinai Field Mission thus measures about
240 square miles.
Four unmanned sensor fields, one placed at
each approach to the two Passes, and three manned
watch stations overlooking the fields assist the
SFM in its work. The U.S. early warning system
serves the dual purpose of providing tactical early
warning, i.e., verifying access to the Passes, and
of checking the Israeli and Egyptian intelligence
facilities in accordance with restrictions contained
in the Basic Agreement. The U.S. role in the Sinai
was expected to continue for the duration of the
Basic Agreement, that is, until the Agreement was
superseded by a new pact or otherwise terminated.
It was generally understood that the United States
would maintain this role as long as the endeavor
proved useful to assure compliance with the
Agreement, furthered the progress of
negotiations, and while the United States
continued to enjoy the confidence and support of
both parties.
The full package of the Sinai II Agreement
relied upon an interlocking series of peacekeeping
arrangements: Israel and Egypt, each with its
respective surveillance station, would have
strategic early warning capability. The U.S. early
warning mission would provide tactical
surveillance, monitoring the approaches to the
Passes, and would verify operation of the two
strategic electronic stations to assure compliance
with limitation on numbers and kinds of
personnel, vehicles, and weapons. The U.N.
Emergency Force would enforce the prohibition
against military development and fortifications
within the buffer zone as well as monitor the
limited forces zones. No one party carried the full
burden of responsibility. Their integrated roles
within well-defined, limited, and manageable
geographic areas, despite some strains and
stresses, have resulted in a remarkably efficient
and satisfactory system.
With respect to the United States unusual watch
in the Sinai Desert, on September 9, 1975,
Secretary Kissinger said:
The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the
early warning system in the small area of the passes is a
limited-but crucial-American responsibility. It was not a
role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides
only when it became totally clear that there would be no
agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We
agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the
United States."
Later, on September 22, 1975, addressing the
U.N. General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger
added:
"The alternative [to the Basic Agreement] was a continuing
stalemate which would have led over time to another war,
creating a serious threat to world peace and the prospect of
broad global economic dislocation.
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"Neither fear of the future nor pride should obscure the fact
that an unusual opportunity for further progress on all issues
now exists. But opportunities must be seized or they will dis-
appear. I want to emphasize that the United States did not
help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the
process of peace, but to give it new impetus."
Mr. Kissinger's next exercise in diplomacy was to
persuade the Congress of the United States to
approve the U.S. Proposal-a commitment to send
American citizens into the Sinai Desert between
two armies recently at war.
On the day the Sinai II
documents were initialed in Jerusalem and
Alexandria (September 1, 1975), President Gerald
R. Ford sent a letter to the Congress enclosing the
texts of the U.S. Proposal, the Agreement between
Israel and Egypt, and the Annex to the
Agreement. The President's requests for approval
and authorization of the U.S. Proposal were
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and to the House Committee on
International Relations.
Both congressional committees held hearings on
the U.S. Proposal during September. Their
discussions centered on the various assurances and
understandings given to Israel and Egypt. Neither
committee seemed inclined to act quickly on the
U.S. Proposal. In the aftermath of the Vietnam
experience, the committees were reluctant to court
any remotely potential U.S. military involvement
or any commitment that might appear to lead
toward involvement, such as risking American
civilian lives in a notably volatile region. In the
meantime, the date-October 4, 1975-neared for
the first redeploying of troops to implement the
Sinai II Agreement.
Further delay in approving the U.S. Proposal
chanced an upset of the Egyptian-Israeli
agreement's 5-month-long timetable for the
military redeployments. To do so could mean a
return to the hazards of renegotiation. On
September 29, 1975, President Ford wrote to the
leaders of Congress urging them to "understand
the consequences of further delay in acting. on this
important matter" and to complete action on the
U.S. Proposal by October 3.
The House International Relations Committee
on October 3 ordered House Joint Resolution 683
favorably reported to the House of
Representatives.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
however, queried Secretary Kissinger at a public
hearing on October 7 on the need for a solely
American operation, seeking reassurance of
minimal risk. The Secretary recommended prompt
and sympathetic action on the "President's request
for approval of the stationing of up to 200
Americans in the Sinai-a request that has now
been before the Congress for more than four
weeks." He noted that the proposed American
presence in the Sinai would be a limited but crucial
American responsibility. The U.S. civilian
volunteers would be charged solely with operating
an early warning system in the small area of the
Sinai Passes within the U.N. Buffer Zone. Neither
combat personnel nor advisers to one side or the
other, they would serve both parties impartially.
They were to complement the UNEF military
contingents-drawn from such countries as
Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland,
Senegal, and Sweden-whose responsibility it was
to patrol the U.N. Buffer Zone.
To allay congressional fears, Secretary Kissinger
stated that a vote in favor of the specific, limited
U.S. role in the early warning system would not
"thereby commit the Congress to a position on any
other issue ...... Congress was asked solely to
approve the U.S. Proposal.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved the text of House Joint Resolution 683
on October 7 and reported its action to the Senate.
The House of Representatives adopted the joint
Resolution (341-69) on October 8; the Senate
approved it by a vote of 70-18. President Ford
signed the legislation on October 13, 1975, as
Public Law 94-110: "Joint Resolution To
Implement the United States Proposal for the
Early-Warning System in Sinai."
The Congress wrote certain caveats into the
authorization. It specifically stated that P.L.
94-110:
? Did not signify congressional approval of any
other agreement, understanding, or commitment
made by the executive branch.
? Registered concern for the security of the
American civilian volunteers by providing for their
immediate evacuation should hostilities resume in
the area or if the Congress by concurrent
resolution determined their safety jeopardized or
their presence unnecessary.
? Required the President to report to the
Congress at least once every 6 months on the Sinai
Mission's operations and on the feasibility of
reducing or eliminating U.S. personnel by
substituting foreign nationals or by making
technological changes in the early warning system.
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P.L. 94-110 of October 13, 1975, authorized the
executive branch to proceed with the formidable
tasks of organizing and implanting an operational
complex in a distant desert.
While Congress deliberated
the U.S. Proposal, Secretary Kissinger, as Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, took
the first step toward shaping an organization to
field the early warning system in the Sinai. He
issued a National Security Study Memorandum
(NSSM 230, dated September 15, 1975) proposing
an analysis of the nature, organization, and
management of the projected mission. Copies were
sent to the Departments of State and Defense
(DOD), to the Agency for International
Development (AID), and to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under Secretary of
State Joseph Sisco invited representatives from
these departments and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to form an ad hoc working
group.
As a basis for discussion, Robert Oakley of the
National Security Council (NSC) and Frank
Wisner of the State Department drafted a
response to NSSM 230. They made three basic
proposals:
1 The field mission in the Sinai should report
to a single official in Washington responsible for
management and logistical support, who would
receive policy guidance from the Department of
State.
2 The organization should possess sufficient
authority and flexibility to draw upon U.S.
Government resources across departmental lines
and to contract for services from the private
sector.
3 The field mission should not exceed 200
people and be manned exclusively by American
civilians not presently assigned to DOD, CIA, or
National Security Agency (NSA). About 75 people
would actually be on duty at the field stations at
any one time, while the balance would be
operating from a base camp in an inhabited area in
Israel or Egypt.
The Oakley-Wisner draft suggested that
appropriations for the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of the Mission could legally be
drawn from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended. Either Security Supporting Assistance
funds or the Middle East Special Requirements Fund
or a combination of the two might be used.
An annex to the draft study proposed other
operational criteria. Dependence upon Egypt and
Israel for logistical support should be minimized.
The Mission in the Sinai should function as a
self-contained entity with logistics, transport,
maintenance, communications, and other services
contracted to the private sector. An independent
communications network should link the Sinai
with Washington, Egypt, Israel, and the U.N.
headquarters in Jerusalem. The draft's timetable
suggested that a site survey be completed in
October and that construction teams be in place by
December 1975.
The study raised two major management
questions: (1) whether responsibility for managing
the new organization should be assigned to an
interagency group or to a single agency and, if the
latter, to which one; and (2) the extent to which
field operations might be contracted outside the
government. Management responsibility could
reasonably be assumed by State, AID, or ACDA if
the single agency choice were made. Neither the
Department of Defense nor the CIA was a likely
candidate, although both possessed the technical
capability and experienced personnel, because of
the restrictions imposed by P.L. 94-110 and by the
War Powers Resolution of November 7, 1973,
forbidding U.S. military personnel to enter a
foreign zone of hostilities.
The alternative to a single agency would be an
interagency management group that included
representatives from State, AID, ACDA, and
perhaps others.
Contracting for services to meet governmental
needs when and where possible is a longstanding
U.S. Government policy. There were compelling
reasons to do so in the case of an early warning
system in the Sinai. First, no agency of the U.S.
Government, other than the DOD and CIA
(excluded from participation in the field),
possessed the necessary resources and expertise,
whereas many well-known private firms were
equipped to handle most aspects of the proposed
Sinai Mission. Secondly, the U.S. early warning
system had to be fully operational by February 22,
1976, when the final redeployment of Egyptian
and Israeli forces would take place. Given this
extremely tight schedule, the speed with which
private industry can move when necessary argued
persuasively in favor of contracting. Moreover,
Secretary Kissinger preferred that a U.S.
Government presence in the Sinai be kept to a
minimum consonant with congressional intent.
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On September 19, Mr. Sisco convoked the first
meeting of the ad hoc working group' to discuss
the Oakley-Wisner draft, i.e., the organizational
concept of what was now dubbed the Sinai Support
Mission. Two more meetings of the working group
and further revisions produced a final draft,
forwarded to Secretary Kissinger on October 6,
1975.
Secretary Kissinger thought that vesting policy
determination in the Department of State would
too clearly create the appearance of the Mission as
a U.S. political instrument and tend to negate the
neutrality of its purpose. Further, he was
convinced that interagency participation in
determining policy would ensure prompt
cooperation from the various government
departments whose resources would be tapped. He
therefore recommended to the President that an
interagency board preside over the creation of the
SSM and thereafter be available for guidance as
needed, while the future SSM director should
report to the President through the National
Security Council.
With this revision, the response to NSSM 230
went forward to the National Security Council on
November 1, 1975. It reemerged on November 14
with the President's approval as National Security
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 313-
"Establishment of the U.S. Sinai Support Mission."
As described in NSDM 313, a Sinai Interagency
Board was to provide overall management
assistance, coordination, and advice. Its member
agencies were the Departments of State and
Defense, AID, ACDA, and the CIA. Board
meetings would be called by a Board
Chairman-the SSM Director. Beyond the initial
organizing stage, the Board's close participation
could be expected to diminish.
Holding the additional title of Special
Representative of the President, the SSM Director
in Washington reports to the President and
receives policy guidance from him through the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. He also receives general direction from
the Secretary of State.
The Oakley-Wisner response to NSSM 230
determined that authority to establish and fund
the proposed Sinai Support Mission could be
derived from Section 531 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. An estimated
$10 million would be required in startup costs;
annual operating costs would be about $10 million.
Thus, $20 million was requested in the FY-1976
Congressional presentation to establish and
operate the U.S. Sinai Mission for 1 year. This
funding was provided from the Middle East
Special Requirements Fund of the Security
Supporting Assistance portion of the Foreign
Assistance Appropriations Act.
Early Planning and Organization
The study commissioned by NSSM 230 outlining
the nature, scope, and size of the future Sinai
mission went to the White House for approval on
November 1, 1975. Under Secretary of State Sisco,
General Alexander Scowcroft of the NSC, and
Deputy Under Secretary of State Lawrence S.
Eagleburger then began preparations for
constructing such a mission. To direct the
planning efforts of the ad hoc working group, Mr.
Eagleburger appointed Clayton E. McManaway,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Management.
The U.S. Proposal prescribed the geographic
limits and the purposes to be served by the
Mission, specifying installation of manned watch
stations and remotely controlled sensor fields. The
Mission's technological nature required skills and
equipment uncommon to U.S. civilian agencies.
Given this handicap and no more than 5 months
lead time (October to February 22, 1976), some
contractual arrangement with a U.S. private firm
appeared the most feasible option. The Sinai
undertaking, however, was an immediate U.S.
Government responsibility. Government personnel
therefore had to direct the Mission.
Mr. McManaway's planning group distinguished
three personnel categories for the field operation:
1 A small management staff of the Department
of State, AID, and U.S. Information Agency
(USIA, later U.S. International Communication
Agency, USICA) employees equipped with
political skills and area experience to coordinate
the Mission's activities and to act as liaison officers
with Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. authorities. Their
role would include occasional inspection of the
nearby Israeli and Egyptian surveillance stations
and a check on access to them.
2 About 75 contract technicians to operate and
maintain the U.S. early warning system.
3 A supporting force of about 50 persons
contracted to handle procurements, maintenance,
personnel services, and other administrative
matters.
Mr. McManaway's planning group drew up a
staffing pattern for both the Washington staff and
the Sinai Field Mission and for the latter outlined
specific duties, functions, and contingencies. One
of the personnel questions-whether or not
military or intelligence officers could be assigned
in any capacity to work with or on the SSM-was
answered by the Department of State's Acting
Legal Adviser, George Aldrich, on November 10,
1975. To be consistent with the War Powers
Resolution, the legislative debates preceding the
Joint Resolution (P.L. 94-110) approving the U.S.
Proposal, and with statements by executive branch
spokesmen, active military, intelligence
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
community, or Defense Department personnel
could not be sent to the Sinai as participants in the
operation of the early warning system. A
distinction might be drawn, however, between
"participation in" and "establishment of" the
system which would permit active duty personnel
to be sent to the Sinai until the Mission's activities
officially began. Retired military or intelligence
personnel could be employed by the SSM in the
field provided they had not retired for that
purpose and provided their retirement occurred
before October 13, 1975, when P.L. 94-110 was
adopted.
Many of the planning details on equipment and
budget estimates had to await the results of an
on-site survey. Early decisions had to be made,
however, either to use a single contractor or
multiple contractors; to negotiate a single source
contract or award a contract on an open
competitive basis. One of the initial planners,
Major Marshall Carter of AID, had suggested in
early October that dealing with a single contractor
would confer the advantage of clarity and ease the
problems of coordination and authority for the
field mission director, even though certain
portions of the firm's functions might be
subcontracted. In addition, the time was too short
to prepare specifications and a statement of work
for more than one Request for Proposal, and the
February operational deadline was more likely to
be met by means of a single contract. Based on
these arguments, the decision was made in
mid-November to enter into a single contract.
Six to 8 months are normally needed to
complete competitive procurement for a contract
of comparable magnitude and complexity.
Adequate authority, however, existed under
procurement regulations and statutes to negotiate
a single source contract as a time-saving option.
Nevertheless, the SSM planning group concluded
that the competitive procurement process could be
compressed into about 6 weeks-largely because
the number of firms that could qualify for the
Sinai venture was limited and could be identified
within a short time. Several firms whose
qualifications and capabilities were generally
known already had expressed interest in the
project.
Intensified Planning The SSM planners
intensified their activities when they received the
National Security Council's decision (NSDM 313)
on November 14. Experts assembled from various
agencies to staff specialized working groups and
addressed questions of communications,
surveillance systems, and contracting procedures.
Everyone occupied with the project devoted long
hours of dedicated work to move the SSM
successfully toward operational status by February
22, 1976, only 3 months away.2
To meet the February deadline Mr. McManaway
now considered it necessary to augment the
working groups and to invoke interagency
assistance for that purpose. He therefore
recommended to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Eagleburger
on November 18 that a Sinai Interagency Board3
convene to stimulate the additional backing
needed to launch the Mission. In the absence of a
Mission director, Mr. McManaway suggested that
Mr. Sisco chair the meeting to emphasize the
political importance and priority given to the
Mission and the State Department's leading role.
At the Board's meeting on November 24, Mr.
Sisco described the organizational decisions taken
thus far and the measures proposed to realize a
Sinai Support Mission. He also announced the
appointment of Nicholas G. W. Thorne, a Foreign
Service officer and former Marine Corps colonel,
as Director of the Sinai Field Mission. The Board
discussed a prospective ground survey in the Sinai,
operational and contractual concepts for the SSM,
the composition of working groups and of future
Washington and field staffs, support requirements
from each member agency, and the need for high-
level technical advice. The members of the Board
approved the projected operational and
organizational concepts as developed and agreed
that their respective agencies would assign
additional personnel to the working groups.
By the end of November, the shape of the Sinai
Support Mission had emerged. The projected
early warning system had passed congressional
scrutiny to be embodied in P.L. 94-110. It enjoyed
Presidential sanction through the National
Security Council's Decision Memorandum 313. A
Sinai Interagency Board ensured the attention and
cooperation of government agencies concerned. A
dedicated work force of borrowed specialists and
one SSM appointee, the director of its field
branch, labored to fulfill the terms of the U.S.
proposal. SSM had entered into an arrangement
with AID-through a Participating Agency
Services Agreement-for that organization to
provide administrative support.
But the emerging Mission possessed no
independent legal standing. Larry G. Pendleton,
Jr., from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), suggested to Mr.
McManaway on December 3 a formal
incorporation of the SSM as an independent entity
by means of an Executive order. Mr. Pendleton
argued that without such a formal designation, the
SSM lacked the requisite legal authority to proceed
with outside contractual arrangements.
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Prepared by Mr. Pendleton and a working
group, a draft Executive order was approved by
members of the Sinai Interagency Board and was
forwarded to General Scowcroft at the NSC. A
covering letter explained that only an Executive
order could confer on the SSM Director the
combination of authorities (contractual, financial,
and personnel management) required to carry out
the Mission's objectives. The President was also
asked to waive in the Executive order the
application of certain statutes governing
contractual arrangements between U.S. agencies
and the private sector. The waiver would permit,
for instance, SSM to let a contract without
competition.
Approved by the Office of Management and
Budget and the Attorney General of the United
States, the proposed order was submitted to the
White House for signature in the second week of
January 1976. On January 13 President Ford
signed Executive Order 11896, "Establishing the
United States Sinai Support Mission." (See
Appendix A, page 37.)
Choosing a Staff On January 15 President Ford
announced the appointment of C. William Kontos,
a senior AID officer with experience in
management, foreign diplomacy, and interagency
relations, as Special Representative of the
President and Director of SSM.
The appointment of Mr. Kontos concluded
several months' search. Initially, a person of
recognized stature from outside government had
been sought, but as publicity given to the Mission
during congressional hearings faded, the
desirability of a public figure seemed less pressing
while the urgency of time increased. Recruitment
then shifted to knowledgeable candidates from
within government.
Mr. Kontos had previously served as Director of
the AID Mission to Pakistan, Director of the Joint
State/AID Office for Nigerian Affairs, Director of
Program Evaluation for AID, Director of the 1974
Cyprus Task Force, and was at this time a member
of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff.
For up to 5 months, personnel involved in the
organizing effort had been on loan, an
arrangement which could not be continued
indefinitely. The SSM now required a permanent
staff. Most of the State-AID experts in foreign
affairs, administration, and financial management
who had been associated with the project from its
inception were now detailed to SSM on a
reimbursable basis. Clerical personnel were
similarly assigned. Others, e.g., technical experts
in fields not normally part of the staffs of foreign
affairs agencies, were transferred from NASA and
the Department of Defense to positions in AID
and then detailed to SSM. These arrangements
enabled the Mission to avoid creating new
positions and to operate as a temporary agency, its
lifespan linked with the duration of the Sinai II
Agreement.
The size-28 positions-and composition of the
U.S. Government field component was to be
determined by the scope of U.S. Government
responsibility for management, secure
communications, and oversight of the two
surveillance stations. Some of these functions
would require round-the-clock, 7-day-a-week
staffing. The field staff would consist of volunteers
from the State Department, USICA, and AID. The
State Department's Bureaus of Personnel and of
Administration drew up a set of comprehensive
proposals to govern the specific conditions and
entitlements of U.S. Government employees at this
special overseas post. Implementation of these
proposals was approved by State, AID, and
USICA.
Two possible approaches to staffing the
Washington headquarters were considered: to use
government personnel entirely or contract certain
functions to consultants. A staffing pattern of 23
positions, including supervisory personnel to
oversee prime contractor performance during the
building of facilities and the installation of
equipment, characterized the first alternative.
Under the second option, technical oversight of
the prime contractor performance might be
contracted out to a firm specifically organized to
provide technical advice and management
expertise to the U.S. Government and industry,
leaving other key supervisory functions-contracts
officer, budget and fiscal, etc.-in government
hands. Adopting the second alternative would
result in nine fewer (23 to 14) staff positions at
headquarters. This option offered the double
advantage of reducing SSM dependence on the
Department of Defense and the intelligence
community for essential technical expertise and of
allowing SSM to secure the services of qualified
people almost immediately (a doubtful possibility
under alternative one in view of the relative
slowness and difficulty of obtaining appropriate
U.S. Government personnel from other agencies
on a long-term basis). The arrangement would also
permit the government to end the consultancy
when the construction and installation phases were
completed and the need for consultative oversight
ceased.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Despite the disadvantage of a higher initial price
tag-$500,000 for the year over and above the cost
of an all-U.S. Government staffing-Mr. Kontos
and Mr. McManaway recommended the
consultancy choice. Mr. Sisco and General
Scowcroft approved and SSM signed a contract
with the nonprofit MITRE Corporation on
January 16, 1976. A headquarters staff ceiling of
14 was increased by one more government
position-an engineering director to provide
overall technical direction of the program,
including technical guidance of the consultants,
and analyses to determine any required changes in
the early warning system.
Site Survey and Technology Without specific
knowledge of the physical characteristics of the
early warning area, the several groups working to
organize the Sinai Support Mission could not
complete documents describing the requirements
of the job to prospective contractors. A survey
team of technical specialists and officers familiar
with the terms of the U.S. Proposal left for the
Sinai in the first week of December 1975.
The members of the team were to survey the
area of the Mitla and Giddi Passes, ascertaining
technical and logistic requirements. The team
would determine exact locations for the three
watch stations, the supporting base camp, and the
four sensor fields. It would collect data on which
to base the selection of appropriate equipment and
would designate routes for communications links.
In addition, the team was to brief American
Embassy officials in the region and solicit the views
of Israeli, Egyptian, and UNEF authorities toward
working relationships with the field mission.
The survey team headed by Field Director
Nicholas Thorne reached Cairo on December 3.'
It included NSA and DOD technical specialists
because of their relevant experience and
immediate availability-considerations important
to the urgent need for data to prepare contract
specifications. Their participation rested on the
legal distinction made earlier that Defense
personnel could assist prelim inarywork on.the
early warning system, but not on its later
operations. Nevertheless, as a courtesy, Chairmen
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the House International Relations Committee were
told of the survey team's composition and
purposes.
The team was divided into two groups-a
management/logistics group led by Mr. Thorne
and a technical group headed by Charles L. Stiles
of NSA. The management/logistics group
considered administrative aspects of the SSM's
responsibilities, operations, and requirements in
the field. These included personnel questions such
as passport and visa requirements, buffer zone
entry/access permits, privileges and immunities,
logistic problems such as transport and road
conditions, the clearing of mine fields, and
physical security.
The technical group spent 3 days surveying the
area of the Passes by air, vehicle, and on foot.
They considered the technical aspects of
establishing a communications network, an
electronic warning system, and the locations of the
base camp, watch stations, and sensor fields. They
determined distances between all these points as
well as between the base camp and the
Israeli/Egyptian surveillance stations, line-of-sight
paths for communications, proximity to existing
roads and airfields, soil characteristics, and-not
least important-the availability of water.
At Cairo, Ismailia, Rabah (in the Sinai), Tel
Aviv, and Jerusalem, the survey team met with a
large number of American, Egyptian, Israeli, and
U.N. officials.5 All were prepared to cooperate
fully.
The U.N. Emergency Force based at Ismailia
assumed responsibility for maintaining the roads.
Limited administrative and logistical services were
offered to the Mission as needs arose. The latter
included major vehicle subassemblies and critical
repair parts; wrecker and towing services; truck
deliveries of liquid and bulk cargo, fuel, water,
food; and emergency medical facilities.
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) offered to
provide water for base camp and watch stations via
existing IDF pipelines in the Passes. The location
of this waterline became a major determinant in
siting the base camp. Two nearby airfields at
Rafadim and Bir al-Thamada would be available to
the Sinai Field Mission. The IDF also agreed to
clear mines from designated areas and to turn
over for SFM use an antenna tower and water tank
in the Mitla Pass.
Egyptians offered the use of an airfield at
Ismailia. They were willing to construct a new
water pipeline to the watch stations in the Mitla
Pass. Both Egyptians and Israelis made medical
facilities in their countries available to SFM
personnel.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
LAYOUT OF THE U.S. EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: Mitla and Giddi Pass Area
Giddi
East
----- Unsurfaced road ) /
or vehicle track
i Jabal
.-' amra'
Egypt asked for a link between the SFM and the
Ministry of War in Cairo to match the Israeli
request for a direct communications channel with
its Defense Ministry Liaison Office in Jerusalem.
Egypt suggested Ismailia as the site of the base camp
but, recognizing that supplies and other support
would have to come from both Egypt and Israel,
General Muhamad al-Gamasy, Minister of War,
assured the survey team of Egypt's full
cooperation at whatever site was chosen.
The survey team selected a high plateau on an
escarpment in the northern part of the early
warning area for SFM headquarters. Near the
Giddi Pass road, between the Israeli and Egyptian
surveillance stations, the site lies less than a mile
from a landing strip and close to a paved access
road that leads from the Giddi road to Jabal umm
Khushayb (i.e., the Israeli station). Road
construction, therefore, could be kept to a minimum.
Moreover, the base camp would be about 3 miles
from a future U.N. checkpoint and would have
line-of-sight communications capability to UNEF
headquarters at Ismailia.
AC: feet ~~ LV m~1O'
GJ I i ? ~
_i 1 .rte ~^
Under the U.S. Proposal, the United States is
required to report on troop or other military
movements into the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Watch
stations and sensor fields for monitoring the
approaches to the two passes were so placed as to
maximize their capabilities. Surveillance would be
limited by the range of the sensors and the
line-of-sight observation from watch stations.
The Egyptians accepted the survey team's site
choices for base camp, watch stations, and sensor
fields. The Israelis raised no objections to the first
two but asked that the sensor fields at the
western approaches to Giddi and Mitla be moved
farther west. They argued that the fields should
be placed along the eastern side of the
intersections where each road through the Passes
crosses the main north-south road. The
north-south road lies about 3 miles west of both
Passes. The Israelis asserted that, since they had
agreed to the presence of an Egyptian surveillance
station virtually on the Israeli edge of the buffer
zone, moving the SFM sensor fields west to the
nearest road junctions would provide tactical
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
symmetry and a somewhat earlier warning,
important to Israel in the event of a UNEF
withdrawal.
Acting on instructions, Mr. Thorne informed
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres that the
areas and coordinates surveyed by the U.S. team
had been designated by the two parties at Geneva.
The site survey, therefore, proceeded on the
assumption that the locations for the sensor fields
had been settled, subject to minor adjustments for
technical reasons. No technical rationale justified
moving the western sensor fields from their
proposed locations at the Passes, nor did there
seem any substantive technical or military
advantage to be gained from the change proposed
by Israel. The suggestion would, however, have
altered the U.S. role in the early warning system
from a tactical to a strategic one. The U.S. Proposal
did not allow for a strategic early warning system.
While still in the Middle East, the survey team
sent a preliminary report to the SSM working
groups preparing the document inviting contract
proposals. The team's report provided precise
coordinates for all of the sites identified and most
of the information and specifications needed.
With the data available SSM planners turned to
considerations of equipment, procurement, and
cost estimates. The only practical way to meet the
February 22 deadline-it was now
mid-December-and the surest technical route to
procuring the sensor and communications systems
needed was to obtain the equipment and accessory
training from government sources, particularly
from the Departments of Defense and State.
SSM planners compared DOD's inventories of
sensor devices and related read-out equipment
with the survey team's analyses of terrain, soil,
fauna, and seismographic tests for each of the
watch stations and sensor fields and selected the
most appropriate combination of available sensors.
In December the SSM through NSC asked the
Department of Defense to supply specific kinds of
sensors and related equipment and to train
operators to use and maintain them. The latter
tasks were assigned to the U.S. Army Mobility
Equipment Research and Development Center
(MERDC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. By the end of
January 1976 the needed equipment had been
assembled from Army depots across the United
States as well as from various civilian contractors
and readied by the Mission's prime contractor for
shipment to the Sinai.
Most of the sensors chosen had been used in
Southeast Asia, with the exception of a strain
sensitive cable device developed by MERDC. The
MERDC sensors, originally designed for 60-day
batteries, were modified to operate with long-life
batteries of up to 18 months' duration. The SSM
and MERDC designed a system that would limit
maintenance to replacing batteries and electronic
modules. SSM stocked a year's supply. During
February training to use and care for the
equipment was scheduled at Fort Belvoir for
technicians employed by the prime contractor.
The State Department's Office of
Communications organized SSM's administrative
communications system. Two plans were drawn up
in November 1975: a "Quick Reaction Plan" and a
"Long Range Permanent Plan," with the latter put
into use on July 1, 1976. The "Quick Reaction
Plan" included a "Can-Do" kit of
radioteletype/cryptographic equipment available
from the State Department and easily
transportable, as well as a self-contained,
transportable tactical communications system
consisting of high-frequency (HF) transmitters,
antennas, emergency power, and vans which could
be borrowed from the U.S. Army or Air Force.
The "Quick Reaction Plan" served the Sinai Field
Mission from its February inauguration until, on
schedule, the permanent equipment went into
operation.
Contracting With Private Enterprise To safeguard
the integrity of the government's procurement
process, open competition in choosing a private
firm to perform contracted work for a government
agency is generally required. Although the SSM
was authorized to make certain exceptions under
Executive Order 11896, SSM planners preferred
and time just allowed the usual competitive route.
Accordingly, a notice of an intent to contract was
published in Commerce Business Daily on December
5, 1975.
Such a public notice contains a synopsis of the
proposed contract, its requirements and schedule,
and invites firms to express interest in bidding and
to cite their qualifications. The SSM notice, asking
for response from interested firms by December
15, outlined the project as follows:
The contractor will be required, with U.S. Government
coordination and guidance, to install, operate and maintain
the intrusion detection systems and watch stations in the
Giddi and Mitla Passes. The contractor will be required to
provide the necessary manpower and logistic support for the
installation of the necessary facilities-including housing for
as many as 150 persons-and to assure that the continuing
mission functions are performed at all times.
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While the survey team collected on-site data, a
procurement working group began drafting a
Request for Proposal (RFP).6 This formal
document describes the proposed project and the
requirements anticipated. The site survey team
provided the specifications and RFP No.
ST-76-21 was ready for review by the Sinai
Interagency Board on December 19. The package
contained an explanation of the RFP, specific
instructions for preparing the proposal or bid, a
pro forma contract, technical and business
management proposal requirements, evaluation
factors, and general provisions for complying with
such national goals as equal employment
opportunity and fair labor standards. To qualify
for consideration, an offeror had to present
previous recent experience in systems and logistics
management and experience at installing,
operating, and maintaining electronic sensors. The
terms of payment offered a combination fixed
rate and cost plus fixed fee to reflect the fact that
not all costs could be accurately determined.7
The RFP cited a two-phase timetable: full
operational surveillance capability by February 22,
1976, and full contract implementation by July 1,
1976.
SSM provided the RFP on December 20 to the
46 firms which had expressed an interest in the
basic support contract or in subcontracting
opportunities. Industry representatives were
invited to a preproposal conference at the
Department of State, set for December 23, at
which they would have an opportunity to seek
further information on any aspect of the project or
contract.
Following the preproposal conference, SSM
planners made appropriate revisions to the RFP
and completed a source selection plan. SSM
adopted a two-phased work schedule that gave
priority to achieving full operational capability by
the February 22 deadline and secondary
importance to completing permanent facilities by
July 1, 1976. The first phase included selecting the
contractor, negotiating and awarding the prime
contract, installing sensor and communications
equipment, and constructing temporary quarters.
The second phase called for completing the
permanent base camp and three watch stations.
SSM modeled its procedure for selecting a con-
tractor on the basis of the NASA Source Selection
Board Manual and on Department of Defense
source selection procedures. A meticulous SSM
Source Selection Plan, approved by its Interagency
Board on December 30, described the organization
to be set up to do the selecting; the process for
evaluating proposals; rules of conduct for
evaluators; a schedule for the entire procurement
process; a detailed numerical scoring plan; and a
narrative description of evaluation factors to be
used.
Eighteen specialists from 10 different
government agencies8-6 from the SSM task
force, 12 recruited from other agencies-were
divided into three completely independent groups
to evaluate the technical, management, and cost
factors of the proposals submitted. Using
well-established NASA and DOD procedures, the
three teams analyzed, scored, and ranked assigned
sections of each proposal by a predetermined
weighting system, i.e., degrees of acceptability
measured against the requirements of the RFP.
The Technical Evaluation Team dealt with
technical acceptability in communications,
operations, facilities, plans to meet deadlines for
full surveillance capability, and for full contract
implementation, logistics, and surveillance
systems. The Management Evaluation Team
reviewed the overall management plan-
responsiveness to RFP requirements, key
management and technical personnel proposed,
company resources, capability, experience, and
past performance. The Cost Evaluation Team
evaluated each proposal to establish: (1) the firm's
fixed price and price realism for personnel, and
(2) the realism of the cost plus fixed fee portion of
the contract relating to materials and services.
Final Selection The teams started work on
January 5 when six proposals were received from
industry. By January 10, their preliminary
findings had been submitted to the Source
Evaluation Committee which, after further
consideration, eliminated three of the proposals.
To the remaining three bidders-the BDM
Corporation, E-Systems, Inc., and Kentron
Hawaii, Ltd.-the Committee addressed additional
questions. Based on, their responses, oral
presentations, and discussions and after receiving
"best and final" offers, the Committee combined
the assessments of the evaluation teams with its
own review and recommended on January 13 that
the contract go to E-Systems, Inc., of Dallas,
Texas.
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E-Svstems, Inc., is an international electronics
and aircraft systems co-npanv engaged principally
in developing and producing electronic systems
and products and in furnishing related technical
services. Its six domestic divisions and three wholly
owned subsidiaries employ about 10,000 persons
in 10 States and 49 countries. Sales in 1975
approximated $250 million.
SSM's Evaluation Committee concluded that the
E-Systems proposal met the requirements of the
RFP at a reasonable cost and with the lowest risk of
failing its commitments. In addition, E-Systems
proposed to use no major foreign subcontractors,
thereby reducing the risk of complications; in
contrast, the other proposals included some
foreign subcontracting. Another important factor
in the selection of E-Systems was its choice of the
H.B. Zachrv Company of San Antonio, "Texas, as
principal subcontractor. Zachrv is a major
construction company with 5(1 years' experience on
varied and worldwide construction projects.
The key to meeting SSM's deadlines of February
22 and July 1 lay in the ability to construct
buildings quickly. Zachrv proposed to use "Kelly
Klosures" for temporary housing. Moreover,
in San Antonio Zachry had in stock fully equipped,
pre-cast, reinforced concrete modules for
permanent housing. Originally intended for a
motel in Florida, they were self-contained units to
which could be added screened porches and
interconnecting roofs and walkways. The modules
could be transported without serious difficulty
despite their weight of 35 tons each.
In addition to the Zachrv subcontract, E-Systems
planned to subcontract with World Airways to
transport critical equipment and materials to Israel
to be moved to the Sinai. Zachry planned to
subcontract its responsibilities for food, janitorial
and laundering services, and supplies with the
ITG/Manpower Corporation. E-Systems assigned
responsibility for the Sinai Mission's program
management to its Greenville Division at
Greenville, Texas.
Following review of the prospective contract
award by the Sinai Interagency Board, contracting
officer Gerald John concluded final negotiations
with E-Systems. On the ceremonial day of his
appointment (January 15, 1976), SSM Director
Kontos sent word of the impending contract award
to the Chairmen and ranking members of the
Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations
Committees and/or the House International
Relations and Appropriations Committees, as well
as to members of the 'T'exas Senate and House
delegations. The SSM Director and E-Systems
President, John W. Dixon, signed the contract at
the Department of State on January 16, 1976.
The January 16 contract was a letter contract
based on the E-Systems proposal; that is, a
preliminary contractual agreement on the total
estimated cost and fee including the cost of startup
work. Both industry and government personnel
conversant with the project lacked experience and
reliable cost data for what was a unique
undertaking. To enter a firm contract at the
beginning might expose the government to
understandable, but nonetheless insupportable,
cost contingencies. Later, after experience gained
during the intial months, an audit of the
contractor's proposal by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency, and intensive negotiation by SSM
and E-Systems, the letter contract was replaced by
a formal contractual document, signed on June 15,
1976, for performance through September 30,
1976. Subsequently, this was extended through
March 31, 1977.
E-Systems' total estimated cost, as revised in
June 1976, amounted to $16,004,599, covering the
period from January to September 30, 1976. SSM
had obligated $21 million for all services during
the startup and construction phase through the
month of June ($18.9 million for construction,
engineering, equipment, transport and operation;
$2.1 million for U.S. Government administration).
During the transition quarter, July 1-September
30, additional expenses of $9 million were
anticipated ($7.8 million for construction and
operations; $1.2 million for U.S. Government
administration). Actual total obligations from the
inception of the SSM through September 30, 1976,
were $29.7 million. Of this amount, $25 million
funded the contract with E-Systems through
March 1977.
the contract signing on January 16, 1976, the State
Department's Directors of Egyptian and Israeli
Affairs briefed U.S. Government and E-Systems
personnel on the Middle East scene. Twenty-eight
persons from State and AID had already been
chosen for duty at the Sinai Field Mission. On
January 18, communication specialists in the
group started training to use DOD equipment.
Two SFM liaison officers flew to Tel Aviv on
January 10 to make arrangements for the arrival
and immediate quartering of an advance party at
Israeli camps in the Giddi Pass, for landing cargo
planes at Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, and
for Israeli assistance in coordinating the unloading
of planes and movements of personnel and cargo.
Movement into or out of the Sinai had to be
cleared with Israel and accompanied by an Israeli
military escort. Until redeployment on February
22 in what later became part of the U.N. Buffer
Zone, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) controlled
the Passes and adjacent territory.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
/or
On January 20, 10 U.S. Government and 21
contractor members of the advance party reached
Tel Aviv. The first of seven Boeing 747 charter
flights from Greenville, Texas, delivered 187,000
pounds of cargo the next day. Included in the first
shipment were earthmoving equipment painted a
characteristic yellow and trucks, jeeps, and trailers
painted white with the Sinai Field Mission initials
"SFM" boldly lettered in black on the sides. There
were electric power generators, construction
materials of all kinds, a mobile field kitchen, and
packaged foods.
A convoy of carriers with 21 Americans and an
IDF escort traveled to the Sinai base camp site. It
was met by the advance party from Washington,
which had been flown to a nearby airstrip in two
small IDF aircraft. This team came to confirm
preliminary details, such as those of site locations
and immediate housing for the American
construction crews at the headquarters of an
Israeli tank battalion in the Giddi Pass area. (Some
lived in tents on location.) The advance team chose
to place the Phase I temporary base camp near the
battalion headquarters and adjacent to what would
become U.N. Checkpoint Bravo. Work began as
soon as they arrived in the desert on January 23,
1976. Grading and leveling earth at the camp site
were well underway before the coordinating team
moved on to Cairo for talks with officials.
Construction proceeded thereafter at a breakneck
pace, often at night under floodlights.
By February 2, four more Boeing 747 cargo
flights had arrived at Tel Aviv. In addition, two
U.S. Air Force C-141 flights arrived carrying
communications personnel along with nearly 50
tons of equipment-vans, generators, and
instruments borrowed from the Air Force.
Although military technicians were eligible to
enter the Sinai, the Department of Defense
ordered the Air Force men not to do so. They
remained in Tel Aviv and relayed instructions
through an emergency hookup to the civilians
readying the system at camp. The equipment,
borrowed from the U.S. Readiness Command,
included three TRC 136 transportable
communication centers equipped with
transmitters, receivers, and appropriate antennas,
one M-4 "expando" van, two portable, 60-kw
power generators, and two truck-mounted
air-conditioning units of 35,000 BTU each.
One week later, a 100-foot antenna tower had
risen alongside the cluster of Air Force vans, voice
links between the SFM, the UNEF, and Tel Aviv
were in use, and the link with Cairo was almost
ready. A radioteletype circuit with the U.S.
Embassy at Athens supplied a direct, secure,
telegraphic hookup between SFM and
Washington. Secretary Kissinger inaugurated the
circuit by sending a congratulatory message to the
advance teams in the Sinai on February 9.
Between January 23 and February 9, the site for
the base camp, upon which more than a hundred
people-supervisors, secretaries, technicians, and
construction and maintenance workers-had
begun to converge, was transformed from bare,
rocky ground into a habitable, if austere,
community. Two barracks were occupied; two
more were almost completed; and a mess hall
replaced the field kitchen. An administration
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
7'ernporary base camp in the
Siam.
building as well as the Mitla East and Giddi East
watch stations were in use. All of the buildings
were temporary structures erected from Kelly
Klosure panels. Zachry Company chose this form
of construction for the simplicity of its basic
structure (prefabricated steel frames supporting
fiberglass panels), the ease of shipment and
assembly, its fire-resistant qualities, and flexible
uses. Water, a treasured commodity in the desert,
flowed into a 1,500-gallon storage tank through a
hookup with an Israeli pipeline. Two storage
bladders of 2,000-gallon capacity contained fuel.
During the first week of February, 30 E-Systems
technicians selected to staff the watch stations
began a course in sensor operation at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. State Department communications
specialists went to MacDill Air Force Base in
Florida to learn maintenance and repair of the
communications equipment on loan from the Air
Force. The Foreign Service Institute held an
orientation seminar on the Middle East February
9-10 for SFM members.
In the Sinai, February was a month of occasional
bad weather. Nights were frigid but not so cold as
to eliminate ever-present flies. Constant winds
swept soil loosened by bulldozers into clouds of
clogging, choking dust. And there were other
problems: some delays in shipping spare parts and
trouble in finding enough moisture for
electronically grounding the communications
equipment. But the work went steadily forward.
Four sensor specialists from MERDC's Counter
Intrusion Laboratory followed in the wake of
Israeli mine detectors and demolition squads to
install the four sensor fields, an accomplishment
which took 4 days. The third watch station at Mitla
West went up. The communications network now
included an operations center at base camp linked
with all three watch stations and the Egyptian and
Israeli surveillance stations, as well as with Cairo,
Tel Aviv, and UNEF at Ismailia.
The Sinai Field Mission achieved full
operational surveillance capability at 5:00 p.m.
local time on February 19, 1976, 28 days from the
start of construction, 3 days ahead of the deadline.
Teamwork within government agencies, the
resources of private enterprise, long hours of
work, and the dedicated efforts of everyone
engaged in the project since its inception in
September 1975 produced the extraordinary feat
of a fully operating early warning system in the
distant waste of the Sinai barely 6 months after the
idea was first proposed. One million pounds of
equipment, vehicles, and housing materials
accumulated from all over the United States had
been flown to the Middle East. Out of this mass of
material emerged a coherent functioning
community and the early warning system.
Officially, the SFM commenced its operations on
February 22, when the Israelis withdrew to the
eastern end of the Passes, the Egyptians moved
forward from their previous positions, and the
UNEF arrived to control the buffer zone. On that
same day the SFM Director made his first
inspection of the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance
stations to ensure that no unauthorized personnel,
vehicles, or weaponry were at the stations. Several
weapons considered to be in violation of the Sinai
II Agreement were found at the Israeli site; they
were removed before a followup inspection 3 days
later.
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The procedures to govern the reporting of
intrusions or violations and the verification and
monitoring of all movements into and out of the
surveillance stations had been agreed upon
between the SFM and Israeli, Egyptian, and U.N.
authorities prior to February 22. Verification and
reporting procedures were identical for both
stations. The credibility of the SFM operation
hinged in large part on a scrupulously fair and
even-handed performance. A principle of
"symmetry," as it was called, underlay all SSM
policies, procedures, and relations with Egyptians
and Israelis. It extended beyond functional
operations to local procurement of supplies and
services and to rest havens for SFM personnel in
both countries. It was decided, for instance, that
the SFM Director's family would live in Cairo,
while the Deputy Director's family would be
housed in Jerusalem.
In practice, the all-important detection and
inspection activities of the SFM met the symmetry
requirement. On the less central issue of support
services, SFM spending tended toward Israel. The
sums involved, however, were insignificant.
Petroleum products for the most part came from
Egypt; most fresh food was purchased in Israel, as
well as some spare parts and maintenance services,
since they were more readily available there.
Phase 11 From the outset, the SFM temporary
facilities were intended to be an expedient means
of shelter adopted for Phase I in order to meet the
February deadline. A Kelly Klosure, however
transportable and easily assembled, provides just
what its name implies-an enclosure. The
permeability of the walls, which allowed sand and
dust through, was its most serious deficiency. Even
additional insulation proved unavailing. Intestinal
and respiratory ailments followed. The fiberglass
walls and roofs also achieved a greenhouse effect,
giving rise to interior temperatures in some
buildings of 105? F on several days and, in the
kitchen, of 120? F on one occasion.
Barracks became overcrowded and cramped, as
did office space. Initially there were no shower
and indoor toilet facilities. Later, after plumbing
had been installed, the water supply proved
unreliable because of occasional pipeline breaks.
Work schedules were intensive; recreation
activities few. No nearby town offered a
momentary diversion. Mess hall food was plentiful
and nutritious, but menus were only of the kind a
field kitchen can produce.
In spite of hardships, morale was high. Toward
the end of the construction phases, Zachry workers
started sporting, with justifiable pride, "We Built
the Buffer City" T-shirts.
Some construction continued at the temporary
base camp and watch stations and sanitation
facilities were improved after February 22. The
center of activity, however, shifted to work at the
permanent site. During the first week of March,
Zachry Company surveyors, engineers, and
construction workers, in consultation with SSM
representatives, finished staking out the
perimeters of the permanent base camp and watch
stations, located access roads, and started grading
and filling the sites.
Base camp buildings were oriented to avoid
surface rock. Grading was designed to
accommodate a site for the sewage treatment plant
that would allow proper sewer system fall and
avoid bedrock and boulders over most of the
length of the sewer lines. Jackhammers
nevertheless had to be used to dig out some of the
trenches for these and other utility lines. Electrical
distribution and communications lines were
similarly buried in conduit. Two 5,000-gallon
bladder-type tanks for water and fuel were in
place by mid-March. At the end of the month most
preliminary excavation work was done, forms were
set, and concrete poured for the steel-reinforced
footings and piers on which Zachry's prefabricated
modules would stand. Construction was about 6
days ahead of schedule by the end of March.
The transportation crisis which arose at this time
threatened to delay the remaining construction
schedule. Zachry Company had in stock
prefabricated concrete modules ready to ship.
These units came fitted with electric wiring,
plumbing, and some built-in furnishings. They
could be shipped like containers, piled one on
another. Zachry contracted with the Garth
Shipping Company, Ltd. of London for the
transport of a shipload of the modules from
Corpus Christi, Texas, to the Middle East aboard
the M/S Garthnewydd. The crisis arose from a
change in the ship's destination from Port Said,
Egypt to Ashdod, Israel. Much of the Garth
Company's shipping called at Arab ports, and the
company risked retribution from the Arab Boycott
Office. The company wanted a guarantee against
blacklisting.
An initial February survey of facilities at Port
Said had found them suitable, whereas a later
survey revealed inadequacies, including the fact
that the only crane capable of lifting the heavy
modules was out of service. Further, an updated
survey of existing road beds from Port Said across
the Suez Canal and in the Sinai revealed that some
had been virtually destroyed in the fighting during
the 1973 war or by the movement of heavy vehicles
during the recent redeployment. Trucks bearing
modules, with combined weights up to 75 tons, ran
a high risk of damaging the few remaining roads
as well as the modules. If road repairs had to be
done, delays to the construction schedule and
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
,:'odule is loaded onto thr? 2 ,.Ny;_a (to)u) and but
lido ,Vure of file Ititla .'?usl watch station (above); aerial
; 'u' of the nearhr completed h '1/ base came (right).
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
substantially increased costs were certain. None of
these problems affected transport to the Sinai
Passes via the Israeli port of Ashdod, hence the
Garthnewydd's rerouting. Although the Arab
Boycott Office replied that giving a guarantee of
the kind requested lay beyond its jurisdiction, a
Zachry Company representative persuaded the
Garth Company that the risk of retaliation in this
instance was slight. The Garthnewydd docked at
Ashdod.
The S/S Thompson Lykes, a U.S. merchant ship
chartered for a second load of equipment, reached
Ashdod during the last week of March. Between
them, the two ships carried 124 modules, cranes
for handling the modules, a substantial portion of
the SFM vehicle fleet, and equipment of diverse
dimensions and kinds.
The Garthnewydd affair proved to be the only
potentially serious crisis of the second construction
phase between February and June, although the
demanding work and living conditions took their
toll of men and machines. Equipment broke down,
power sometimes failed, roads were poor and
deteriorating, and health and morale suffered
from the heat, dust, flies, and occasional fouled
water. Violent sandstorms also occurred-one of
several days' duration. Winds gusted to 75 miles an
hour, collapsing panels and ripping strips off the
Kelly Klosures, depositing drifts up to 14 feet high
on some major roads. Throughout this period of
physical discomfort and hectic construction
activity, the SFM performed its surveillance
operations effectively.
In any such intensive endeavor, especially one
involving three parties-the U.S. Government
(SSM/SFM), E-Systems, and Zachry-some
misunderstandings might be expected and some
occurred, e.g., a decision taken by one without
consulting the other two parties, and
disagreements over technical or construction
matters or over contract changes. To resolve such
difficulties and to assure continuing adherence to
the tight construction schedule, daily contacts
between the SSM/SFM, E-Systems, and Zachry
personnel were augmented by periodic 1- or 2-day
program reviews attended by key members of the
three organizations.
By April 27, 1976, the last of 119 modules had
been installed at the base camp. Two modules each
were placed at the Mitla West and East watch
stations and the final unit went to Giddi East on
April 30. With all buildings in place, interior work
intensified to connect or complete plumbing,
wiring, insulation, heating, air-conditioning, etc.
The complex expanded with interconnecting roofs
and walkways, a sewage treatment plant, water and
fuel storage, roads, parking lots, recreational
facilities, storage and maintenance facilities, and
antenna towers. Chain-link fences surrounded the
base camp and watch stations, marking the
boundaries between the isolated islands of
American life and the vast wilderness of Sinai.
Transfer from the temporary to permanent
quarters began and,. although some finishing and
cosmetic work on service buildings remained to be
done, all major facilities were occupied and
operating by July 1, 1976, precisely on schedule.
Many visiting journalists since have described
SFM's base camp as resembling a stateside motel.
This is not surprising inasmuch as its modules
were originally intended for a motel in Florida,
rather than for an outpost spread across 13 acres
of an escarpment overlooking the Giddi Pass. In
view of its isolation, the base camp was designed as
a self-contained community, supplying its own
"municipal" services: water treatment and
distribution, power generation, waste and sewage
disposal, transport and telecommunications, health
services, and fire protection. Its prefabricated
concrete modules set on concrete footings were
grouped in differing configurations to form
clusters to house government communications,
administration and operations, contractor
administration, a community facility, a
maintenance/fire station, a power station, a sewage
treatment unit, and living quarters consisting of
one complex of 4- and 6-person units and another
of 1- and 2-person units. Outdoor recreation areas
included a softball field and a combined tennis,
basketball, and volleyball court.
The community center contains a kitchen and
dining hall, a theater available for movies,
meetings, or religious services, and a recreation
area for table tennis, pool, and other games, or
television. The building also houses the
laundry/drycleaner's, a library, lounge, store, and
a barber/beauty shop which doubles as the post
office. The dispensary too is located here, where
one of three paramedics is always available to treat
minor ailments.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
SFM has no full-time physician. The
Department of State's Medical Division
recommended against assigning one, in view of
adequate medical facilities available at the Israeli
surveillance station or at Israeli battalion
headquarters 2 miles away. For emergencies, the
Israeli Defense Force offered the services of its
hospital at Rafidim Air Base, only 25 miles away,
and helicopter transportation. SFM possesses a
fully equipped ambulance which, in an
emergency, is authorized to drive unimpeded and
without escort to any of these facilities or to major
cities in Egypt or Israel.
A fire station and maintenance building houses
firefighting equipment and a room for on-duty
firemen. Other areas provide space for electronic
maintenance, vehicle repair bays, work benches,
and spare parts storage, as well as space for
plumbing and electrical and carpentry work.
The power station contains diesel-driven electric
generators and water distribution and storage
facilities. Three primary generators and one
backup generator provide SFM with continuous
power, drawing fuel from underground tanks next
to the building. Water is stored in underground
and aboveground tanks from where it is pumped
throughout the camp.
The startup cost incurred by the U.S.
Government in establishing permanent quarters in
the Sinai was $21 million. This figure included the
cost of all materials and services during the
construction period, operating costs to June 30,
1976, and the cost of E-Systems outlays to
September 30, 1976. It also included costs for
communications and sensor/surveillance
equipment provided by the Departments of State
and Defense.
With SFM's move into permanent quarters,
about 80 percent of the Kelly Klosures and other
temporarily needed materials became excess
property which the UNEF wished to purchase.
(Excess property could be sold under the
provisions of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and Executive Order
11896.) These items originally cost the Sinai
Mission approximately $400,000. A price of
$125,000 was negotiated with the United Nations,
along with some restrictions on their use-for
UNEF's peacekeeping activities in the Sinai
Peninsula and not for resale before expiration of a
6-month period after purchase.
July 4, 1976, marked a double occasion, the
Bicentennial of the United States and the official
dedication of the completed facilities of the United
States Sinai Field Mission. Receptions and dinners
for U.N. officers from nearby checkpoints and for
officers from Israeli and Egyptian stations
celebrated these events. SSM Director C. William
Kontos, coming from Washington, and John W.
Dixon, President and Chairman of the Board of
E-Systems, arriving from Texas, joined the
festivities. Congratulating the assembled on a job
well done, Mr. Kontos said: "You have not only
accomplished the operational task at hand in
remarkable time, but you have transformed this
small section of arid and inhospitable desert into a
livable community, displaying those attributes
which have brought our nation to a 200th
anniversary worthy of celebration." Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger wired these words:
"The successful operation of the Early Warning System
is an important element of the Sinai disengagement
agreement between Egypt and Israel. Perhaps even
more important, it underscores our determination to
continue our efforts to resolve the difficult and tragic
conflicts in the Middle East. The celebration today of
the official opening of the permanent camp facilities in
the Sinai is a fitting moment to reaffirm our determi-
nation to pursue these efforts until our ultimate goal, a
durable and just peace, has been attained."
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 rnvarl Fnr R .e,.2 07LQ5115 ('.IA-RDP88.BQ085 _Q
8000300530005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Keeping Watch
' The number of
people permanently assigned to the Sinai Field
Mission's complex is limited by Congressional Joint
Resolution (P.L. 94-110) to 200. The American
contingent in the Sinai exceeded that level only for
a period of about 6 weeks-from mid-May
through June 1976-when the construction
schedule compelled the use of a sizable work force
of contractor personnel. At the time of formal
dedication on July 4, 1976, SFM numbered 172
Americans; this figure had dropped to 162 by July
1977. The reduction resulted from the improved
facilities available in the permanent base camp,
from combining some functions, changing
operational procedures, and introducing new
technology. For example, the completion of
permanent communications facilities permitted a
50-percent decrease in the number of government
communications technicians.
The U.S. Government's responsibility for the
Mission and its operations requires that top SFM
management positions be filled with government
personnel. Nicholas Thorne, SFM Director
from December 1975, was succeeded in July 1977
by Leaman R. Hunt, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Operations. Mr. Hunt, in
turn, was replaced in January 1979 by Kenneth A.
Hartung, former Executive Director of the
Foreign Service Institute. Similarly, the sensitive
role of liaison officer to the Egyptian or Israeli
surveillance stations is assigned to a government
employee. The secure communications system
linked with the U.S. worldwide network is also
operated by government technicians. The U.S.
Government group includes some personnel
occupied with administrative and secretarial
support.
About 150 Foreign Service employees of All),
USICA, and State applied for duty in the Sinai in
response to a second call for volunteers in July and
August 1976, and there has been no shortage of
candidates since then to replace those who have
been transferred. The attrition rate has been
minimal.
E-Systems met with much the same response;
applications for employment greatly exceeded the
number of positions available, and its attrition has
averaged below 3 percent per month. The basic
tour of duty for contractor personnel is 18
months, with an extension possible by mutual
agreement. About half of the original staff
(numbering 146) chose to extend their tours. By
1978 the full complement at SFM amounted to
160-22 U.S. Government and 138 E-Systems
personnel. Of the latter, 34 were directly involved
in operations-staffing the watch stations on a
rotating schedule, checking the sensor fields, and
the like. About 104 were engaged in support and
maintenance tasks. Small support offices in Tel
Aviv and Cairo handle the logistic needs of local
purchase, shipment, etc.
The E-Svst.ems organization at SFM, headed by a
contractor Program Manager, includes a
management and technical staff of executives;
communications/sensor operators and specialists; a
maintenance staff of driver/mechanics,
electricians, carpenters, painters, plumbers, and
power plant specialists; and a personal services
staff which runs the post office, barbershop,
dining facilities, housekeeping, laundry and
sanitation, security and fire protection, recreation,
and paramedical services.
From the outset, SSM planners recognized that
various personnel and recreational services would
have to be provided to boost morale, minimize
attrition, and relieve the monotony of living and
working in so isolated a place. Morale rose
substantially following the move to permanent
quarters and has remained high, as reflected in
employee performance and minimal staff
turnover. Leave policy allows contractor personnel
to be off base 1 week in 4, and an active
recreational/educational program provides
opportunities for varied individual interests.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
E-Systems, as part of its contractual obligation,
recruited a highly qualified social and educational
specialist to organize and direct the recreation
program. Since his arrival in June 1976, he has
organized a number of programs: correspondence
and extension courses; foreign language studies,
particularly Arabic and Hebrew; excursions to
resorts and clubs along the Suez Canal and
Mediterranean coast; live entertainment by UNEF
units and groups from Israel and Egypt; visiting
lecturers who speak on history, religion,
archeology, and meteorology; publication of an
informal newsletter for SFM employees, the Sinai
Sensor; sports and games (softball, volleyball,
tennis, basketball, pool, Ping-pong, darts, chess,
checkers, bingo, etc.); and the operation of an
amateur (ham) radio station (W7LXE/SU).
The U.S. Congress in approving the creation of
the Sinai Mission asked that every effort be made
to reduce, if possible, the size of the American
staff. Improved technology contributed to some
cutbacks, but an irreducible minimum staff is
required to operate and maintain the equipment.
Prospects for further staff reductions are unlikely
in view of the necessity to provide a full range of
municipal and support services to this
self-contained community.
SSM considered the possibility of employing
residents of the buffer zone, for the most part
Bedouin, who might qualify for custodial or
unskilled labor. To do so, each person would have
to obtain a health certificate from the United
Nations and background security checks and
documentation from both Egypt and Israel. These
requirements, plus considerations of security,
made this course impractical.
In April 1977, the SSM Director discussed with
senior Egyptian and Israeli officials the feasibility
of employing third-country nationals in certain
SFM support positions. Both parties opined that
the success of the SFM-with which both sides
were fully satisfied-was due in no small part to its
wholly American composition. They foresaw no
advantage and only serious problems arising from
a change in the arrangements. Israelis and
Egyptians alike suggested that, in addition to many
administrative and possible security problems, a
series of complex new arrangements on the status
of other nationals would have to be negotiated
with each government concerned. Moreover,
officials of both Egypt and Israel maintained that
employing third-country nationals would, in
effect, alter an element of the Sinai II Agreement
itself, thereby establishing a precedent for other
changes which neither side might want. Egyptians
and Israelis have not altered their views on the
subject and the SFM staffing pattern remains
unchanged.
`acIn its deliberations prior to approving
the concept of the Sinai Support Mission, the U.S.
Congress showed great concern for the safety of
Americans placed in a potentially dangerous
position between two former belligerents. The
Congress was reluctant to risk either American
lives or the possibility of holding the United States
hostage by interfering with SFM operations.
Security for the field mission, therefore, has been
of continuing concern.
In July 1976, the SSM put into effect a
comprehensive and detailed "Emergency and
Evacuation Plan for the Sinai Field Mission,"
which had been prepared in close collaboration
with the joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S.
Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR). The
SSM based its plan on general guidelines and
established procedures, in particular the
"Emergency and Evacuation Manual:
State/Defense Policies and Procedures for the
Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and
Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in Time of
Emergency."
The SSM plan provided for withdrawal of U.S.
personnel from the Sinai Peninsula in the event of
hostilities. Withdrawal could be ordered by the
President or the Congress by concurrent
resolution; by a combination of officials, including
the Presidential Assistant for National Security
Affairs, the Secretary of State, and the Director of
SSM; or by the SFM Director in case of an
imminent threat to the safety of SFM personnel.
Evacuation of the Sinai camp could follow: (1) a
request from both the Governments of Egypt and
Israel, (2) a unilateral U.S. Government decision
based on policy evaluation, or (3) a unilateral U.S.
Government decision based on evidence of a
serious threat to the safety of American personnel.
The emergency evacuation scheme consists of a
basic plan with 17 separate annexes. The basic
plan sketches a three-phase general scenario (e.g.,
conditions for three possibilities-standby, partial
evacuation, and full evacuation); supplementary
information (e.g., minimum times to evacuate SFM
site locations and designated evacuation routes);
the safe havens to be used by the evacuees; and the
tasks of emergency and evacuation officers at the
SFM. The annexes contain detailed information
and instructions on numbers and location of all
personnel, procedures for marshaling of
personnel and vehicles, alternative routes of
evacuation, maintenance of emergency supplies,
and destruction of classified equipment and
material.
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Various aspects of the emergency and
evacuation plan have been rehearsed regularly at
the SFM to ensure that each staff member is fully
acquainted with his or her responsibilities, that
equipment is operational, and that required
emergency supplies are available. By April 1977,
the SFM was able to notify, assemble, and evacuate
in about 40 minutes from receipt of order.
The last major construction project-completed
in May 1977-was the installation of a perimeter
security system at the SFM base camp, designed to
guard against acts of terrorism. The base camp
complex is enclosed with concertina wire and chain-
link fencing. An inner ring of sensors had been
embedded by December 1976, but sensors for the
outer ring were not available in the Defense
Department inventory and had to be procured by
contract. The complete security system consists of
physical barriers, sensors, imaging devices, and
searchlights. UNEF soldiers guard the base camp
and watch stations. The SFM staff is also equipped
with light arms for self-defense. However
seemingly improbable, a terrorist raid cannot be
ruled out.
T lic _ The United
Nations acts in the Sinai as a neutral observer
overseeing compliance with the Sinai II
Agreement and as a guardian of the buffer zone.
It operates through two organizations: (1) the
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), a force
of over 4,000 troops from seven nations, which is
responsible for maintaining the inviolability of the
buffer zone, and (2) the United Nations Truce
Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), which
observes compliance with the restrictions imposed
within the adjoining Limited Forces Zones.
Authorized access to the buffer zone is
controlled by the UNEF through checkpoints at
the buffer zone boundaries where main east-west
roads cross the boundaries. Prior permission from
U.N. authorities in Jerusalem or Ismailia is
required to enter the buffer zone, and U.N.
escorts, assigned at the checkpoints, accompany
Egyptian, Israeli, and some SFM personnel and
visitors to and from their destinations in the zone.
An exception allows SFM staff to move freely
within the SFM area of operation. Additionally,
two U.N. roadblocks stand at the western
entrances to the early warning area to ensure that
vehicles do not diverge from authorized routes. A
Ghanaian battalion, based in the zone not far from
the SFM camp, patrols and supplies guards for
base camp and watch stations.
UNEF headquarters in Ismailia receives SFM
radioteletype reports of intrusions or violations.
Similar reports go to Egypt and Israel and to the
office of the Chief U.N. Coordinator in Jerusalem.
The UNEF, although prepared to do so, has not
been asked to assist in medical emergencies. Its
primary logistical contribution to SFM has been
road maintenance and disposal of unexploded
ordnance, duties assigned to the UNEF's Polish
Logistics Command. During the first 5 months of
SFM operations, road maintenance became a
persistent and vexatious problem. UNEF had
neither the equipment nor the manpower to
maintain adequately the estimated 300 miles of
roads in the buffer zone. The Polish road crews
were unable to cope with the rapid road deterioration
common in a desert environment. SFM mended
potholes and removed sand drifts in its own area
for about a year. By the spring of 1977, however,
additional engineers and equipment had been sent
to the Polish unit, enabling repairs to be done with
greater despatch and efficiency.
The
disengagement agreement of 1975 permitted both
Israeli and Egyptian surveillance stations to be
used for strategic early warning but limited their
operations to the capabilities of the visual and
electronic surveillance equipment in the stations. A
personnel ceiling of 250 technical and
administrative employees was set for each station.
Each complex (called J-1 and E-1, respectively)
occupies an area of about 2 square miles and
houses surveillance and communications
equipment, vehicles, and light arms. No more than
18 vehicles for administrative and maintenance
use are permitted, and only light arms for
self-defense are allowed.
To verify access to the surveillance stations and
the nature of their operations, SFM liaison
officers, occupying control buildings at the
stations' entrances, monitor all movements in and
out of them. The SFM Director, the Deputy, or the
Operations Chief, leading a party of up to four
persons, conducts occasional inspections of the
stations to verify compliance with the limitations
and rules of the Sinai II Agreement. Any
divergence from these limitations or from the
authorized role of visual and electronic
surveillance is immediately reported by the SFM to
both parties and to the United Nations.
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Although SFM inspections are usually
announced 1 or more days in advance, a spot
check may be made without notice. As desired by
the SFM, a part or the entire station may be
inspected. Inspection may touch on all provisions
of the Agreement, or focus mainly on one aspect.
There is no fixed time limit for the inspection.
The inspection group informs the station
commander on arrival of what is to be examined.
The daily SFM situation report sent to its
Washington headquarters records the results of
each inspection tour. Should a violation be found,
however, a report is sent immediately to the
Governments of Egypt, Israel, and the United
States and to the U.N. commands in Jerusalem and
Ismailia.
SFM liaison officers, who alternate assignments
at the stations with duty at base camp as watch
officers, occupy the liaison buildings at the
entrance to each surveillance station. Each office is
equipped with radio and teletype communications
that permit continuous, instant, direct access to the
SFM operations center. The office also provides
living quarters which the U.S. liaison officer shares
with an Israeli or Egyptian counterpart. The
liaison officer's principal duties are to inspect and
log all arriving and departing vehicles, personnel,
and arms; to ensure that no unauthorized entries
go unnoticed; and to report any violation or
unusual activity. The criteria for verification are
based upon inventories made during the first
inspections of E-1 and J-1 on February 22, 1976,
and updated subsequently to reflect acceptable
changes of inventory. The liaison officer is also
responsible for routine communications checks
and housekeeping.
Israeli and Egyptian traffic entering or
departing the U.N. Buffer Zone is inspected by the
UNEF at its checkpoints to determine the number
of passengers and whether unauthorized weapons
are carried. Egyptian and Israeli vehicles enter via
the Alpha and Bravo checkpoints, respectively.
The United Nations notifies the SFM operations
center of-such movements, and the watch officer
in turn informs the liaison officer on duty at the
surveillance station of all vehicular traffic destined
for a particular station, including any SFM
vehicles, and the purpose of the visit. On arrival at
the surveillance station, the liaison officer,
accompanied at all times by an English-speaking
officer of the country concerned, inspects and
counts vehicles, personnel, and weapons. The
liaison officer may also be asked to verify other
occurrences, e.g., whether a nighttime medical
emergency really exists, since the Sinai II
Agreement prohibits nighttime movements except
in emergencies and after coordination between
UNEF and SFM.
There have been few discrepancies recorded at
the surveillance stations since operations began in
February 1976. The most common problem has
been late-arriving convoys. These have been
turned back by the UNEF and SFM if their
projected arrival time exceeded the hour set for
the last entry or departure. During the early
monitoring, a verification problem arose
concerning the interpretation of the Protocol to
the Sinai II Basic Agreement allowing Egypt to
send a construction team into the buffer zone to
build the E-1 station. Construction personnel and
vehicles then exceeded stated limitations. The two
parties, however, agreed to modify the personnel
limitation to allow up to 100 entrants at each
surveillance station during daylight hours. By and
large, such problems have been few and have been
settled by mutual agreement.
The early
warning system keeps watch over the Giddi and
Mitla Passes-traditional invasion routes-and
reports immediately to Egypt, Israel, and the
UNEF any unauthorized movement into the
Passes, or any observed preparation for such
movement.
SSM's initial site survey envisaged a system
consisting of unattended ground sensors at the
eastern and western ends of both Passes-four
sensor fields in all-and of visual coverage by
personnel at three watch stations which overlook a
portion of each field except that at Giddi West.
The Mitla East and Mitla West stations lie roughly
20 and 30 kilometers, respectively, from SFM base
camp; the Giddi East station is about 10 kilometers
east of camp.
Each watch station contains sensor monitoring
equipment, visual detection devices, power
supplies, and radio and teletype communications
equipment directly linked to the operations center
at base camp.
Each station is manned continuously by two
contractor personnel who are rotated in 12-hour
shifts. They keep a constant visual watch and
monitor sensor-receiving equipment to register
and identify all movements through the Passes.
Ground sensors at Giddi West, which is not within
sight of a watch station, are monitored at the Giddi
East Station.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Sensors and Monitoring Equipment Several
kinds of unattended ground sensors have been
developed for route and border surveillance, and
to a lesser degree, for surveillance of a large area.
They are based on the detection principles of
seismic, acoustic, infrared, magnetic,
electromagnetic, pressure, electric, and earth
strain disturbances. Optical and electro-optical
devices for improved day and night detection also
have been developed. Unattended ground sensors
and visual devices complement each other.
Ground sensors can be used as cueing devices
which tell an operator when and where to look for
an intruder. By incorporating equipment from a
variety of unattended ground sensors and
night-vision devices, it is possible to design a
surveillance system that will be highly effective for
most parts of the world. For the Sinai Passes, it was
necessary only to draw upon four types of sensors
to meet the needs of the U.S. Sinai early warning
West-southwest view of the Giddi East watch station
(left); Strain Sensitive Cable Sensor (above).
system. The following sensors were selected:
-SSCS. The Strain Sensitive Cable Sensor is a
miniature coaxial cable buried in the soil. The
cable can be extended several hundred meters to
form an invisible "fence" which registers any
personnel or vehicular movement across the
cables.
-MINISID III. A Miniature Seismic Intrusion
Detector senses earth vibrations produced by
moving personnel or vehicles. Typically, in the
sandy soil of the passes, the MINISID III will
detect vehicles at a range of about 500 meters and
a person at about 50 meters.
-AAU. The Acoustic Add-on Unit is an
auxiliary device which, when used with MINISID
III, detects and transmits sounds within the sensor
field back to the watch station. Transmission of
acoustic information occurs only when the
MINISID III detects earth vibrations produced by
an intruder. The watch station operator is trained
to identify the type of intruder from the sound
pattern registered.
-DIRID. A Directional Infrared Intrusion
Detector senses temperature differences between
an intruder and the background. This is a passive
optical device with two fields of view. The DIRID
reports both an intruding presence and the
direction of movement.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
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Each of the four sensor fields within the U.S.
early warning area contains two or more strings of
sensors, usually several thousand meters long,
placed across the Passes and along the roads and
trails through the Passes. Any movement detected
by one of the sensors activates a signal, which is
transmitted by radio to the nearest watch station
where it is automatically received and displayed on
a recording device. From the pattern displayed, an
operator can determine the location of an intruder
traveling through the sensor fields, the direction
and speed, and the approximate weight and
number. The watch station operator identifies the
intruder and reports the event to the SFM
operations center.
Visual Detection Devices Identification is an
especially important task for the U.S. early
warning system. About 6,000 vehicles pass through
the sensor fields each month. Every vehicle is
scrutinized, and since many are built by the same
manufacturer, identity is derived largely from
visible markings.
Each watch station is equipped with high-power,
wide-angle binoculars and a terrestrial telescope
for daytime use and a high-power, wide-angle
image intensifier for nighttime use. With these
devices, vehicles can be identified at distances of
up to 20 kilometers during daytime, depending on
atmospheric conditions, and up to 5 kilometers at
night. Even at night, a person can be discerned
easily at 1 kilometer. When a watch station
operator cannot identify a suspicious intrusion, the
nearby UNEF unit is immediately alerted. A
UNEF patrol is then dispatched to intercept,
identify, and take appropriate action.
The night observation devices collect starlight,
moonlight, or sky glow reflected from the area
under observation, intensifying a faint image
50,000 times so that it may be seen by the human
eye. The large number of clear nights over the
Sinai ensures the utility of these devices. The field
model Questar telescope employed at the watch
stations is a high-quality, lightweight device
serving the need for daytime, long-range visual
surveillance. Its optimum usefulness is hampered
by limitations in adjusting and focusing, the effect
of heat haze on visibility, its narrow field of vision,
and lack of adaptability for scanning moving
objects. These difficulties are largely compensated
by the use of powerful Zeiss 15 x 60 prism
binoculars of high optical quality.
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Dust and ground fog are two of the most
frequent problems affecting observational ability.
They at times preclude optimum use of optical and
electro-optical instruments. To overcome these
adverse weather conditions, a passive infrared
confirming sensor, basically a remote-controlled
infrared camera with a remote readout, was
initially employed. It performed well but was later
removed because of maintenance problems. In
1978 SFM tested two newer thermal imaging
devices, which detect infrared energy emitted by
objects within the field of view and which are
insensitive to visible light. These devices greatly
enhance an observer's night vision capability. They
were not procured, however, because they would
not be available much sooner than the Mission's
completion date as projected in the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979.
During the first 2 years of operation, a strip
chart at the appropriate watch station recorded
signals radioed from the sensor field. In February
1978, SSM introduced an improved method of
display whereby signals from the sensor fields are
relayed directly to the operations center at the
SFM headquarters as, well as to the watch stations.
Signals from all fields appear instantaneously on a
scaled map of the early warning area. As sensor
activations light up small bulbs on the map, an
operations officer can locate an intruder at a
glance and, by observing the pattern of sensor
reports, can determine the nature of the object
involved and the direction in which it is moving.
The heavier the object, the more sensors are
tripped and the more lights flash.
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A second change, fully operational by June
1978, introduced a remotely controlled day and
night television camera to overlook the Giddi West
sensor field where there is no watch station for
direct visual observation. Earlier reports of
intrusions in the Giddi West field had not been as
accurate or timely as those in the other sensor
fields where there are manned watch stations. The
U.S. Army's Night Vision Laboratory at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, was asked to develop, test, and
install an imaging system for the Giddi West
sensor field. The direction and focus of camera
and lights are controlled remotely from the Giddi
East station. TV pictures are relayed to the display
terminal there and to the SFM operations center,
providing almost the same visual coverage for the
Giddi West field as that obtained by observers of
the other fields. Television entailed a relatively
expensive initial outlay for equipment and
development but operating costs promised to be
minimal. Overall expenditure for 1 year was
estimated to be no greater than the cost of
building and staffing a fourth watch station.
Thereafter the cost for maintenance would be
lower.
The centralized sensor display and the remote
controlled TV camera were changes stemming
from a 1977 study to improve the effectiveness of
the early warning system.
Research and Development The majority of the
unattended ground sensors in the Sinai operation
are the "detection only" variety. They
automatically detect an intruder and transmit an
alarm. A significant research and development
effort is underway to increase the capability of
unattended ground sensors beyond the "detection
only" mode to one of classification. A classifying
sensor will not only detect intruders but will
automatically identify them by class, e.g.,
aircraft-rotary-wing aircraft or fixed-wing
aircraft-personnel, wheeled vehicle, tracked
vehicle. Such a classifying sensor requires a
memory for storing the characteristic features or
signatures of objects and comparing one set of
signature characteristics with others. Until now,
the classifying capability of unattended ground
sensors has been limited by the large size, cost, and
power consumption of available hardware for
information storage. However, with recent
advances in computer technology, especially in the
microprocessor and information storage area, it is
now possible to package the electronics of 'a
classifying sensor in a much smaller, cheaper, and
low-powered unit. These developments have
brought the classifiers from the realm of
conceptual design to feasibility.
Advancements are also continuing in imaging
sensors and radar. Improved night observation
and remotely controlled imaging devices and
ground surveillance radars should make it possible
to replace most manned observation posts with
instrumented surveillance stations. Remote
surveillance stations will have an all-weather, day
and night. capability to detect and classify
movements of a military nature at distances of 10
to 20 kilometers from the surveillance station. The
imagery from day and night observation devices
can be relayed back to a central monitoring point
where the nature of the movements can be
identified and assessed. These advances should
significantly improve the effectiveness and reduce
the costs of surveillance operations associated with
peacekeeping.
Communications Network A rapid and
dependable communications network is the heart
of an early warning system. From its forward,
isolated post, the Sinai Field Mission needed the
means for immediate reporting to all participants
in the Sinai's peacekeeping scheme. Teletype,
which produces an instant written record of
messages, was the preferred mode of
communication because it minimizes the chance of
misunderstanding in a multinational undertaking.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
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Until the permanent communications center was
built and equipped at base camp, SFM depended
largely upon radio links established via its mobile
vans borrowed from the U.S. Air Force. By July 1,
1976, the permanent system functioned with
efficiency, flexibility, and reliability. This system
includes the following elements:
1. A secure, high-frequency single sideband
radioteletype circuit tied into the U.S. Government
telecommunication network. It is operated and
maintained by U.S. Government personnel, and its
terminal is located in the Department of State,
Washington. It is used to handle operational and
administrative messages between SSM
headquarters in Washington and the field and to
communicate with other addressees on the
worldwide government network.
2. A data-reporting network, largely within the
early warning area, of independent two-way voice
circuits using very high frequency (VHF) radio
links SFM base camp and the following points: the
three watch stations, the two surveillance stations
(E-1 and J-1), UNEF Checkpoints Charlie on the
east and Alpha on the west, and, at longer range,
UNEF headquarters at Ismailia. Field telephones
also connect SFM base camp with UNEF
Checkpoint Bravo and with an Israeli liaison office
near the camp. Teletype facilities provide record
copy of transmissions at all terminals except at the
U.N. checkpoints. The system is used by watch
station operators for reporting, by UNEF to
inform SFM of authorized movements in and out
of the buffer zone, and by the SFM watch officer
to report violations to Egypt, Israel, the UNEF in
Ismailia, and the United Nations in Jerusalem.
3. Teletype circuits link SFM with the office of
the U.N. Chief Coordinator and the Israeli
Ministry of Defense Liaison Office in Jerusalem,
with the Egyptian Ministry of War in Cairo, and
with the UNEF headquarters in Ismailia. These
circuits provide for instant and simultaneous alert
to the Governments of Egypt and Israel and to
U.N. officials.
4. A network of vehicle-mounted and
hand-held two-way radios connects the
data-reporting system with SFM vehicles in transit
and with personnel working outside the base camp
or watch stations.
5. A base telephone exchange links all sections
of the base camp and is tied into the commercial
telephone system in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tel
Aviv.
6. A high-frequency, two-way radio initially
connected U.S. Government and contractor liaison
personnel in Tel Aviv and Cairo with the SFM. It
has been retained in the event telephone contact
with these two cities should be interrupted.
When in the planning stage SSM considered the
question of an alert, it was presumed that
communications between the base camp and the
E-1 and J-1 stations, as well as the UNEF at
Ismailia, would meet adequately the requirement
of notifying both governments and the United
Nations. The Egyptians and Israelis, however,
insisted on direct teletype communications
between SFM and their respective ministries of
defense. SSM preferred that all field
communications with Israel and Egypt remain
within the buffer zone and terminate at J-1 and
E-1, where operators could transmit an SFM
message in their own languages. Nonetheless,
discussions revealed that both parties and the
United Nations wanted a simultaneous
transmission capability with their ministries and
U.N. headquarters, as well as with E-1 and J-1, to
provide the added assurance of rapid and effective
contact, an especially important consideration
during times of tension.
After considerable discussion, the United States
agreed to provide independent direct
communications for alert purposes. The system
chosen included teletype circuits for record
communications, which were to be used only for
an alert, and voice circuits to be used only for
maintaining the teletype and for administrative
purposes. A teletype report of violation can reach
Egypt, Israel, and the United Nations within 5
minutes of its occurrence.
A radio channel backs up the teletype
communications with Cairo. Occasional power
failures at an Egyptian-controlled radio relay site
disrupted the Egyptian alert link. To supplement
Egyptian power sources and ensure reliability, two
wind-driven generators were eventually installed
by SFM at a mountain relay site.
A telephone line to Cairo, supplementing the
teletype and radio whose use is more restricted,
permits fast communication with Egyptian officials
on operational matters. A similar line to Tel Aviv,
furnished by Israel, affords an additional
commercial link with SFM's logistics coordinator
there.
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While not a specified function, the SFM on
occasion has served as a conduit for exchange of
messages between Egyptian and Israeli military
forces on scheduled activities, the nature of which
might be misconstrued. Both the Egyptian and
Israeli military commands have shown a
willingness to advise each other, through the
auspices of the SFM, of artillery practice, small
arms firing, and other training maneuvers
planned to take place near the buffer zone. Such
advance notice, coupled with the confirmation
capability of the SFM, reduces the tension and
doubt between the two commands and defuses
potential confrontation before it reaches a crisis
stage.
Operating the System On a typical day some 200
vehicles or other objects are detected by the sensor
fields, registering as "blips" across a monitoring
tape. They are identified and their passage
recorded by SFM operators. Sensors are triggered
by vehicles, natural seismic disturbances, or by
aircraft overflights. The vast majority of the
activations are caused by vehicles and aircraft
authorized to enter or overfly the early warning
area. Under the terms of the Sinai II Agreement,
each side is permitted escorted vehicle convoys as
well as daily reconnaissance flights over the
median line of the U.N. Buffer Zone. Violations
are reported when unescorted or unauthorized
vehicles, aircraft, or personnel enter the early
warning area or when an aircraft deviates from the
median line or makes more passes over the zone
than scheduled.
As of January 24, 1980, a total of 90 violations
had been reported to Egypt, Israel, and to the
United Nations. Of these, 67 were attributed to the
Israelis, and two violations involving prohibited
weapons were attributed to the Egyptians. The
remaining 21 violations included 19 unidentified
aircraft overflights and two unauthorized
personnel intrusions. All of these incidents were
minor, with no indication of hostile intent.
The numerous and usually innocent causes of
sensor activity render correct identification a
crucial function of the early warning system.
SFM's consistent accuracy in reporting intrusions
and violations has earned it credibility and the
trust of all parties concerned.
During the early period of operations, the
boundaries of the buffer zone were not clearly
marked, and accidental overstepping was an
occasional hazard. The proximity of the early
warning system to Israeli lines contributes to the
higher incidence of Israeli intrusions. While the
eastern edge of the U.S. early warning area is
contiguous with the J-line which marks the Israeli
Limited Forces and Armaments Zone, the western
edge of the SFM-monitored area is approximately
5 miles from the E-line, the comparable boundary
of the Egyptian Limited Forces Zone. Because of
this proximity, Israeli crossings of the J-line
brought them immediately into the U.S. early
warning area, triggering the sensors. Similar
Egyptian movements across their E-line possibly
infringed the U.N. Buffer Zone but occurred
beyond range of the U.S. early warning system.
The chance of Israeli incursion is greater also
because the eastern and western boundaries of
Israel's Limited Forces Zone virtually coincide at a
point near the Giddi East watch station, making a
very narrow zone.
Each month thousands of sensor activations take
place and are recorded at the watch stations.
Almost all are caused by authorized traffic moving
through the passes (SFM and UNEF vehicles
abroad on their respective rounds and Egyptian or
Israeli vehicles en route to and from the
surveillance sites) or by earth tremors (the Sinai
Peninsula is an active seismic region); sonic booms
or sound waves from overflying aircraft and
helicopters; military exercises and live artillery
firing practice outside the buffer zone; blasting,
road maintenance, and other construction; UNEF
troops who sometimes jog down the roads through
and adjacent to the Passes; and the ever-present
Bedouin with their camels, who filter through the
early warning area.
A nomadic people whose population in the Sinai
is estimated at about 80,000, the Bedouin have
slight regard for prohibited areas and follow their
traditional migratory routes, some of which cross
the early warning area. They are accustomed to
letting their camel herds wander and graze
without restraint. They carry firearms and can be
dangerous if an effort is made to compel them to
keep their camels out of the sensor fields. Of more
serious concern is the possible use by terrorists of a
Bedouin disguise. From the beginning of SFM
operations, Bedouin movements have been a
persistent and thorny problem. The UNEF is
responsible for apprehending and removing them
from the early warning area; SFM cooperates with
UNEF in reporting sightings but takes no further
action.
Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-R DP88B00838R000300530005-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
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In handling the Bedouin presence, UNEF was
handicapped by poor radio communications and
an understandable reluctance to move off safe
roads onto ground possibly sown with undetected
mines or unexploded ordnance. Progress toward
overcoming these shortcomings has led to greater
success in coping with Bedouin incursions. The
task for the UNEF, and for the Israelis when
Bedouin wander into their zone, is the more
sensitive because Egypt considers the Bedouin to
be citizens of Egypt and maintains an
administrative service center for the nomads in the
northern area of the buffer zone near the
Mediterranean.
The United States
responded to requests from both Egypt and Israel
in agreeing to establish an early warning system in
the Sinai. Since the beginning, both countries have
respected the terms of the agreement and have
supported and cooperated with the Sinai Support
Mission. While the reason for its existence is
essentially political, the Mission performs a
technical function that is narrowly and clearly
defined. This fact makes it easier for the Mission
to adhere to the operating principles enunciated
by U.N. Chief Coordinator in Jerusalem, Lt.
General Ensio Siilasvuo, during his tenure as the
UNEF Commander (October 1973-August 1975).
These were to be "Firm, Fair, Friendly, and Fast."
The Mission applies a strict interpretation of the
Sinai II regulations, including subsequent
modifications. Any transgression of specific
boundaries is noted and violations are reported
immediately. A violation either occurs or does not
occur; a discretionary judgment is seldom invoked.
In the delicately balanced situation that exists in
the Sinai, even the slightest incident could be
exaggerated and thus court an unwarranted
response. Reliable, almost immediate, and
simultaneous notice to all concerned can avoid
these dangers. The high standard of
professionalism set by the SFM system and its
demonstrated capability consistently to detect,
identify, and report promptly is basic to the
impartiality which has earned the confidence of
Egypt, Israel, and the United Nations.
SFM Liaison Officers assigned to the
surveillance stations developed an easy rapport
with their Egyptian and Israeli counterparts.
Problems occasionally arise, such as late convoy
arrivals, but no serious difficulties have been
encountered. Numerous exchange luncheons and
dinners have taken place between SFM staff and
the personnel at these stations, as well as with U.N.
personnel from the checkpoints and various
headquarters and outposts. Ranking officials of
the two governments and the United Nations have
visited SFM on several different occasions. SSM
Director Kontos, who visits the area periodically,
confers with American Embassy, U.N., and
Egyptian and Israeli Government officials on their
respective concerns and views.
On one occasion Egyptian Foreign Minister
Fahmy, who had initially been opposed to and was
skeptical of the early warning system and the
presence of Americans in the Sinai, spoke of his
interest in the system and lauded the work of the
SFM. Another visitor, General al-Gamasy,
Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, complimented
Mr. Kontos on the SFM performance. He praised
the high degree of impartiality and credibility that
had been achieved by the field mission, as well as
the professionalism with which the operation had
been conducted.
During a visit by Mr. Kontos to Tel Aviv,
Defense Minister Peres commented that, in his
view, no other single element of the Sinai II
Agreement had done as much as the SFM to
reduce tensions in the Sinai. He felt that the
interposition of U.S. personnel was an important
precedent and he speculated that the SFM might
serve as a model for future peacekeeping
undertakings, as for instance, along the Golan
Heights. It was largely at his insistence, Minister
Peres said, that the stationing of U.S. technicians
in the Sinai was included in the arrangements of
the Sinai II Agreement. He had been viewed by his
colleagues then as having become the father of a
very unwelcome baby, but most critics have since
changed their opinions and now appreciate the
value of the Sinai Field Mission.
 Approved For 5-1
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
"Eyes and Ears of Peace
The U.S. early
warning system formed an integral part of the
disengagement arrangements spelled out in the
Sinai II Agreement. It was a tactical supplement to
the strategic early warning stations of Israel and
Egypt and was charged with verifying compliance
by both parties to certain other aspects of the
Agreement. SFM cooperated closely with the U.N.
forces which exercised the broader responsibilities
of the disengagement. The U.S. role, therefore,
was one portion, though a crucial one, of the
entire complex of safeguards set up in the region
to maintain the disengagement arrangements and
an interim peace. The purpose and functions of
the Sinai Field Mission were well defined, clearly
understood, and welcomed by all parties.
In creating an organization to fulfill this role in
the Sinai, a key decision was made to set up a new
management structure rather than to assign
responsibility to an existing government agency.
This enabled SSM to assign a small group of
experts to concentrate on a single project, free
from the competing demands encountered in
larger bureaucratic settings. Administrative
support was provided through existing
government agencies, thus allowing SSM to remain
small. Decisions could therefore be made and
implemented quickly, unencumbered by
organizational layers. The basic staff components,
assigned to SSM for the life of the Mission rather
than borrowed on temporary details, provided a
combination of continuity and stability.
Although this separate organization had
authority to act autonomously in day-to-day
operations, it was created as an interagency effort
and received a large measure of commitment from
each of the participating agencies to ensure its
success. SSM called upon various agencies for
equipment, administrative services, and,
particularly in the early stages of operation,
priority attention to SSM needs. These interagency
commitments enabled SSM to move expeditiously
to begin its operations, and their continued
support has been an important ingredient in
carrying out SSM's objectives during the entire
period of its existence.
In recognition of the unique nature of the
Mission's requirements, some unusual contracting
authorities were granted by the Executive order
which established the SSM. These authorities
permitted SSM to tailor its contract terms to the
unprecedented circumstances of its role. Most of
these were used by SSM when the contract was
awarded and are still in use. Others, however,
were not found to be necessary but remain
available in the event of sudden changes in
requirements.
Another critical decision was that of contracting
with private industry for the bulk of the work
involved in establishing and operating the early
warning system. Faced with an extremely
compressed time schedule for implementing the
U.S. Proposal and with a variety of U.S.
Government constraints, the quick response
capability of private enterprise was invaluable. The
outstanding performance which followed-site
construction by the H.B. Zachry Company;
operation and maintenance of the early warning
system by E-Systems, Inc. justified the decision.
With SSM management and diplomatic
responsibility, the combination of private
enterprise and government worked successfully to
achieve desired results.
A significant factor in the ability of SFM to
become operational on schedule was the capability
of the Department of Defense to provide the
necessary surveillance equipment from its
reserves. The equipment had a history of
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
outstanding performance and a very low
maintenance requirement; its performance in the
Sinai strengthens that reputation.
Staffing of the field mission in general
presented remarkably few problems. Widespread
interest in the SFM stimulated large responses
both to the contractor and to the U.S. Government
recruitment efforts, making it possible to select
highly qualified U.S. civilian personnel. In view of
strong congressional interest in employing
third-country nationals at the field mission, the
SSM raised the question formally in April 1977
with senior Egyptian and Israeli officials. Both
governments, however, staunchly opposed such a
change, and the staff has remained entirely
American.
Foremost among the circumstances favoring the
effectiveness of the disengagement has been the
determination of the Governments of Egypt and
Israel to honor the terms of the Sinai II
Agreement while persisting in further
negotiations. From the beginning and throughout
its existence, the U.S. Sinai Field Mission has
enjoyed the cooperation and support of both
governments. A senior Foreign Service officer
coordinated the field mission's activities with both
parties and the United Nations. Inherently, the
U.S. role in the Sinai had to be carried out with
impartiality. All of the SFM's procedures relating
to its contacts with Egyptian and Israeli authorities
were drafted accordingly. This principle of
symmetry also underlay all SFM policies with
regard to local expenditures for supplies and
services.
Egyptian and Israeli officials on numerous
occasions expressed their confidence in the U.S.
role and on the fair manner of the system's
operation. Officials on both sides also commented
that the U.S. presence contributed significantly to
a decline of tensions in the area. Some suggested
that the interposition of U.S. personnel was an
important precedent which might serve as a useful
model for similar arrangements elsewhere.
The broad range
and diversity of international conflicts requires the
international community to seek creative and
ingenious solutions. What Vice President Mondale
calls "the eves and ears of peace" can be effective
tools if there is determination to allow them to be
used to foster relaxation of tensions and give the
peace process time to evolve.
Drawing upon its 4 years' experience in the
Sinai, the SSM believes that the basic operational
concepts employed there can be applied to many
other border or buffer areas, provided the parties
directly concerned want and are willing to support
them. An early warning/alert system can be
designed to monitor a border or disengagement
line, possible invasion routes, or even a
predetermined sizable area, using a combination
of unattended ground sensors, advanced
observation devices, and observer personnel. Such
a surveillance system could detect hostile
movement of ground forces or clandestine
infiltration and provide sufficient alert to allow an
interdiction force to react.
The traditional approach to the problem of
monitoring a border or a restricted area usually
involves wide-scale use of a combination of fixed
observation posts and roving patrols. To be
effective, this approach needs a comparatively
large number of people. Now, however, by using
modern surveillance technology, one person
located at a central monitoring facility can "watch"
a border or area that would normally require a
substantial force to patrol. When an apparent
intrusion is detected, a small reaction team can be
dispatched to investigate the incident. Where large
areas or long borders are concerned, the
surveillance and interdiction force of a
peacekeeping operation using advanced
surveillance technology may be reduced by 50 to
75 percent below that needed to accomplish the
task by traditional means.
It is not difficult to envisage how these general
operational surveillance concepts could be applied
to cease-fire and armistice lines in other regions,
including other areas of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
For example, a network of ground sensors, watch
stations, remotely controlled imaging equipment,
and river or border crossing checkpoints
monitoring a demilitarized zone along the Jordan
River Valley could effectively detect and provide
adequate alert of any attempted clandestine
movement by terrorist bands or unauthorized
individuals. Such a system, supplemented by
strategic surveillance sites and long-range
detection mechanisms, could also provide warning
of any ground movement exhibiting potentially
hostile intent beyond the demilitarized zone.
The application of concepts now in use at the
SFM could, under many circumstances, make a
valuable and cost-effective contribution to easing
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
tensions and improving the climate for political
negotiations. The technology employed is not
prohibitively expensive, and it can replace
substantial numbers of international peacekeeping
forces who are not similarly equipped. Whenever
contending parties believe early warning and
surveillance can contribute to peacekeeping efforts
and they are prepared to support such an
undertaking, the concept merits careful
consideration.
Some 500 guests crowded
into the compound of the U.S. Sinai Field Mission
on April 25, 1979-a day of great ceremony.
Honor guards and brass bands of the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel attended
this gathering, come to witness an exchange of
documents that would ratify the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty signed in Washington earlier, on
March 26, 1979. Ratification formally marked the
end of the state of war prevailing between the two
nations for almost 31 years.
Under the Peace Treaty, Israeli forces will
withdraw in successive stages from the Sinai and
return it to Egyptian control. On January 25,
1980, Israeli forces left the area of the Giddi and
Mitla Passes. Until that date, the U.S. Sinai Field
Mission continued to operate the early warning
system, as it had done over the past 4 years.
Initially, the United States expected to begin
dismantling its facilities immediately after the
Israeli withdrawal from the Passes. Plans for
removal were well advanced when trilateral talks
in Washington September 18-19, 1979, changed
those plans. The outcome of these talks among
officials of Egypt, Israel, and the United States was
to give the United States and its Sinai Mission a
new mandate.
In the phased redeployments
by which the Sinai is returned to Egypt, the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty continues to use the
concept of buffer and limited armaments zones
between the two forces monitored by an impartial
third party acceptable to both sides.
The United Nations Emergency Force, which
had fulfilled this responsibility during the period
covered by the Sinai 11 Agreement, was not
authorized by the United Nations to remain in the
Sinai after July 1979. In the absence of a U.N.
contingent, the United States at the September
talks agreed to extend the life of its Sinai Field
Mission beyond January 25, 1980. The Mission's
purpose, however, would change from that of
operating an early warning system to one of
monitoring the compliance of both parties with the
terms of the Peace Treaty.
As of February 1, 1980, the SFM became
responsible for verifying force levels and
armaments at Egyptian military facilities in the
Sinai's Zones A and B and at the four Israeli
technical sites allowed to operate in the new buffer
zone, as set forth in Annex I of the Peace Treaty.
From its present base near the Passes, the SFM will
conduct aerial patrols and on-site inspection of
allowable military installations within the newly
designated zones.
Because of its greatly enlarged geographic area
of responsibility (about two-thirds of the Sinai) and
a continuing staff limitation of no more than 200
persons, the SFM intends to employ helicopters
extensively. While maximum use is to be made of
existing personnel and facilities, some minor shifts
in staffing will be needed to meet the SFM's
redirected functions, and the necessity for aircraft
will raise the Mission's cost.
The successful past performance of the SFM has
helped to demonstrate the constructive
possibilities of such a mission. With staff and
facilities already in place, it can easily convert to a
closely related, if altered, purpose. The Sinai Field
Mission has served usefully the interests of peace
and, after 4 years' experience, can be expected to
carry out with enhanced professionalism the tasks
now assumed by the United States in the Sinai over
the next 2 years-February 1980-April 1982.
 6
I/VAI Ma}ary
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Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
1 The members of the ad hoc working group on the NSSM
included the following officials: Captain David G. Wilson
(DOD), H.F. Hutchinson and Sam Hoskinson (CIA), Edward
Sanders (OMB), Major Marshall N. Carter (U.S. Marine
Corps officer serving as a White House Fellow with AID),
Brig. General Charles D. Youree (JCS), Albert M.
Christopher (ACDA), Robert B. Oakley (then serving with
NSC, subsequently with State), Granville S. Austin (State),
Donald J. Bouchard (State), Alfred L. Atherton (State),
Kempton B. Jenkins (State), Frank G. Wisner (State), and B.
Keith Huffman (State).
2 Special note should be made of the contributions of
Charles Stiles of NSA and James Wallen of DOD whose
technical expertise and experience were key factors in setting
up SSM and its early operations. Contributions were also
made by Gary Bisson (AID), Charles Richard Bowers (State),
Major Marshall N. Carter (AID), Stephanie Dibble (State),
Gerald John (State), Barry Knauf (AID), Colonel Donald
Layne (Defense), Larry Pendleton (NASA), Elinor Green
(USICA), and Lorice Bider (State), most of whom joined
working groups after the Sinai Interagency Board meeting of
November 24, 1975.
3 Members of the Sinai Interagency Board attending the
first meeting were: Arthur Day, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Charles
Mann, Assistant Administrator of AID for Program and
Management Services; Amrom Katz, Assistant Director of
ACDA for Verification and Analysis; James Hirsch, Director
of Electronic Intelligence, CIA; James Noyes, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, Near East and South Asia.
4 Site survey team members included: Morris Draper,
State, political adviser; Arthur Houghton, NSC, political
advisor; Charles Stiles, NSA, technical program management
and surveillance specialist; Colonel Donald Layne, U.S.
Marine Corps, tactician and operations specialist; James
Wallen, Department of the Army, electrical engineer and
sensor specialist; Gerald John, State, contracting and
procurement officer; Thomas McCay, State, communications
engineer; and Major Marshall N. Carter, AID, operations and
logistics planner.
5 These officials included, among others, Ambassadors
Eilts and Toon; Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of War General Muhammad al-Gamasy; Egyptian
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Mohammed Ali
Fahmy; Chief of the Egyptian Ministry of War Liaison Office
Maj. General Taha al-Magdoub; Egyptian Second Army
Commanding General Fawzi Gahli; Israeli Defense Minister
Shimon Peres; Israeli Maj. General Harzl Shafir; Chief of the
Israeli Defense Force Liaison Office Colonel Shimon
Levinson; U.N. Chief Coordinator Lt. General Ensio
Siilasvuo.
6 Procurement working group: Barry Knauf and Gary
Bisson (AID), Larry Pendleton (NASA), Mark Saunders
(Department of the Navy), Frank Lane (GSA), and Marie
Alexander (State).
7 Under a "fixed rate" type of contract, the contractor is
required to deliver specific items of material or carefully
detailed specifications of services, the cost of which can be
accurately identified and agreed upon in advance of
performance. Under the "cost plus fixed fee" type of
contract, the work is described in general terms, since it is
impossible to describe exactly in advance. Once a Statement
of Work is completed, describing generally what the
contractor will be bound to do, the contractor and the
government agree on a total estimated cost for the work,
because the lack of specificity in the Statement of Work
precludes agreement on a fixed price. Subsequently, a fixed
fee for the work is negotiated and agreed upon. During
contractor performance, the contractor is paid actual costs of
performance whether or not actual total costs are less or
greater than the total estimated cost.
8 These organizations included AID, CIA, NASA, and
the Departments of State and Defense. Organizations within
the Department of Defense included the Office of the Chief
of Engineers (Army), Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps,
MERDC (Army), and Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Provisions of Executive Order 11896 -
January 13, 1976
By Executive Order 11896 the President formally
established the SSM as an independent unit of government.
In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law
94-110), SSM would carry out the duties and responsibilities
of the U.S. Government to implement the U.S. Proposal for
the early warning system in the Sinai, "subject to broad policy
guidance received through the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, and the continuous supervision
and general direction of the Secretary of State...... The
Order also created formally the Sinai Interagency Board
composed of senior representatives of the Departments of
State and Defense, ACDA, AID, and the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Board would be chaired by the Director of
SSM who would be appointed by the President as Director
and would be a Special Representative of the President. The
Director would exercise immediate supervision and direction
over the Mission; the Sinai Interagency Board would assist,
coordinate, and advise the Director on Mission activities.
The Order provided that the SSM, to the extent permitted
by law, could employ such staff as necessary, enter into
contracts and procure services of experts and consultants
necessary to carry out its functions, and call upon the
agencies of the executive branch to provide required services
and facilities. The Order also authorized, if determined to be
necessary in writing by the Director, the waiver of certain
statutory authorities in order to permit the SSM, consistent
with regulations prescribed by the Department of Defense,
(1) to indemnify contractors against unusually hazardous
risks; and (2) to utilize more flexible contract procedures
than normal contracting agencies. The Order prescribed that
the Secretary of State would provide from funds made
available to the President the funds necessary for the
activities of the SSM.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
Lines and zones effective for the
period Jan. 25, 1980-Apr. 25, 1982
when Israeli forces are on the
El Arish-Ras Mohammad line
and the U.S. Sinai Field Mission is
conducting verification operations in
Zones A and B
and at four Israeli T-sites in the
Interim Buffer Zone
M
U.S. Sinai Field Mission area
of verification operations
W. BANK
 Approved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP88B00838R000300530005-1
SFM Communications System
sends first message
MERDC installs sensor fields
February 9, 1976
February 13-17, 1976
Chronology
Basic Sinai II Agreement signed
September 4, 1975
SFM achieves full operational
surveillance capability
SFM begins normal operations
S/S Thompson Lykes arrives at
February 19, 1976
February 22, 1976
March 26, 1976
National Security Study
Memorandum 230
September 15, 1975
Ashdod
M/S Garthnewydd arrives at
March 30, 1976
Public Law 94-110 (94th
Congress, H.J. Res. 683)
October 13, 1975
Ashdod with modules
Privileges and immunities for
April 22, 1976
National Security Decision
Memorandum 313
First meeting of the Sinai
November 14, 1975
November 24, 1975
SFM personnel formally
recognized by Egypt
Final module emplaced
April30, 1976
Interagency Board
U.S. Government and
June 18, 1976
Site survey team departs
Commerce Business Daily article
Site survey team returns
Request for Proposal (RFP)
released
First preproposal conference
December 2, 1975
December 5, 1975
December 12, 1975
December 20, 1975
December 23, 1975
contractors begin operation at
permanent base
U.S. Government
communications transfer to
new base completed
Basic construction phase
July 1, 1976
Bids submitted
Bid evaluation by Source
January 5, 1976
January 5-9, 1976
completed
Permanent facilities dedicated by
July 4, 1976
Evaluation Committee
Recommendation of Source
January 9, 1976
Director C. William Kontos
Temporary camp surplus
October 29, 1976
Evaluation Committee
Bid selection (Sinai Interagency
January 10-15, 1976
property sold to the U.N.
Water treatment system installed
April25, 1977
Board)
President signs Executive Order
January 13, 1976
at SFM
SFM perimeter security system
May 15, 1977
11896
completed
Swearing in of C. William
January 15, 1976
Centralized display system
March 1, 1978
Kontos as Director, SSM
Contract with E-Systems, Inc.
January 16, 1976
installed at SFM
Remote imaging surveillance
June 20, 1978
signed
Contractor and U.S.
Government personnel briefed
on Middle East
Communications training for
government personnel
Advance party departs
Washington, D.C., for
Tel Aviv
First Boeing 747 arrives Tel Aviv
with construction equipment
Five-day intensive sensor
training for E-Systems
personnel begins at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia
Department of State personnel
begin training on Air Force
communications equipment at
McDill Air Force Base, Florida
January 17, 1976
January 19, 1976
January 20, 1976
system (RISS) installed at SFM
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
ratifying documents
exchanged at SFM
Washington trilateral talks result
in ad referendum agreement
giving SFM new mission
beginning in early 1980
SFM closes down early warning
system and activates new
verification system
April25, 1979
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