THE SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILD-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00831R000100210055-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMIREX FILE COPY
The Sandinista Military Build-up
I Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense
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Department of State Publication 9432
Inter-American Series 119
Revised May 1985
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The Sandinista Military Build-up
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Contents
Introduction 1
The Sandinista Military: 1979-1985 3
Guerrilla Origins 3
The Build-up Begins 3
Ground Forces 3
Air Force and Air Defense 17
Navy 29
Cuban and Soviet Assistance 29
Assistance from ? and to ? Terrorists 34
Recruitment and Conscription 35
Implications 36
Domestic 36
Regional 37
Strategic 39
Postscript 40
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Introduction
In July 1984 the Departments of State and Defense released a study entitled
Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-up and Support for Central
American Subversion. That study described the growth of the Sandinista military
and documented the extent and sophistication of Sandinista export of subversion
and support for Marxist-Leninist guerrillas elsewhere in Central America,
especially in El Salvador.
Since the publication of that study, the Sandinista arms build-up has
accelerated. Between mid-1984 and early 1985, the active-duty force grew nearly
30 percent, from 48,000 to more than 62,000, and the tank and armored person-
nel carrier inventory increased from 240 to more than 340. Moreover, the,addi-
tion of a radar air defense system and the Mi-24/1-IIND D, one of the world's
most sophisticated attack helicopters, has further increased the military capability
of the Sandinistas. This study describes this build-up and supplements the infor-
mation on Nicaragua published in The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central
America and the Caribbean, released in March 1985.
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The Sandinista Military: 1979-1985
Guerrilla Origins
In July 1979, a broad and popular coalition led by the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista
de Liberacion Nacional?FSLN) overthrew the govern-
ment of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. Op-
position to the Somoza dictatorship had become
widespread during the mid-1970s, and the assassination
in January 1978 of Somoza's leading critic, La Prensa
editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, triggered demonstra-
tions of popular outrage, including a lengthy general
strike. The Sandinistas capitalized on this mounting
resentment of Somoza, and Eden Pastora's (Comandante
Cero) seizure of the National Palace that August cap-
tured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people. The
ranks of the FSLN swelled; by late 1978, it had nearly
1,000 combatants,' and by the following summer, this
figure had risen to about 5,000.2 While numerically
smaller than Somoza's 14,000-strong National Guard, at
that time the Sandinistas had the support of the
Nicaraguan people and received large amounts of
materiel from abroad. In contrast, the National Guard
was isolated from the people and faced increasing dif-
ficulties in obtaining supplies. In June 1979, the
Organization of American States took the unprecedented
step of calling for the "definitive replacement" of the
Somoza regime., With no hope of external support and
having lost control of much of the nation's territory,
Somoza fled Nicaragua on July 17. The National Guard
disintegrated literally overnight; many Guardsmen, in-
cluding most of the higher ranking officers, fled into
exile, while thousands of others, mostly enlisted men,
were imprisoned by the new government.4
When the Sandinistas marched triumphantly into
Managua on July 19, 1979, there was great hope for
Nicaragua's future. The leaders of the FSLN had public-
ly pledged themselves to the principles of political
pluralism, a mixed economy, and a nonaligned foreign
policy. Although dominated by the Sandinistas, the new
Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) included
many others who had participated in the anti-Somoza
"Rebels Train to Overthrow Somoza," Washington Post, Oc-
tober 15, 1978, p. Al.
2"Nicaragua Junta Assumes Rule in Jubilant Managua,"
Washington Post, July 21, 1979, p. Al.
'The United States suspended military assistance to the Somoza
regime in 1977. It participated in the OAS mediation effort in the fall
of 1978 to resolve the growing crisis in Nicaragua, and in early 1979
the United States announced the suspension of other assistance pro-
grams to demonstrate its displeasure with Somoza's intransigence. The
United States fully supported the June 1979 OAS resolution calling for
Somoza's replacement.
4The Sandinistas held more than 7,000 political prisoners in 1979,
most of them former National Guardsmen. See Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1979, Department of State, February 1980.
revolution.' The GRN also enjoyed broad international
support, and the United States took the lead in the
assistance effort, authorizing $118 million of economic
aid and humanitarian assistance during the following 18
months.
The Build-up Begins
Once in power, the Sandinistas quickly set about
building their armed forces and transforming their rag-
tag guerrilla army into a well-equipped professional
military. The comandantes realized from the outset that
they would need a large, politicized military to pursue
their revolutionary objectives and to maintain themselves
in power once the bloom of the revolution had worn off
and their true political orientation was exposed.6 In the
fall of 1979, they initiated a military build-up without
precedent in Central America. In less than 6 years, the
Sandinistas have developed a military establishment with
firepower and mobility unmatched in the region. This
expansion has been made possible only with massive
assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Indeed,
only the militarization of Cuba itself in the 1960s is com-
parable to what has occurred in Nicaragua since 1979.
The Sandinistas' plans called for a steady increase in
the number of men under arms, first through
"voluntary" enlistment and later through mandatory con-
scription. By early 1985, they had amassed an active
duty force of more than 62,000. The Sandinistas' total
strength, including all regular, reserve, and militia units
and security forces, now exceeds 119,000.
Ground Forces
The Sandinista Popular Army (Ejercito Popular San-
dinista?EPS), the full-time, regular army of the FSLN,
has grown to 30,000. The EPS has systematically moved
'The original junta included Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the
widow of slain La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and
Alfonso Robelo. Both resigned in April 1980. Mrs. Chamorro has
become a vocal critic of Sandinista policies, particularly censorship of
La Prensa. Robelo has become a leader of the opposition Democratic
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE). The first Defense Minister of the new
government, Bernadino Larios, was a National Guard colonel who had
defected during the revolution. At the end of 1979, he was replaced by
Humberto Ortega, a member of the FSLN National Directorate. Larios
was subsequently imprisoned for alleged subversive activities. Even
after his release from jail in March 1984, he was kept under virtual
house arrest. In March 1985, he escaped to Costa Rica.
'The top leadership of the FSLN held a secret meeting Septem-
ber 21-23, 1979 (barely 2 months after coming to power), to set forth
plans for consolidating the revolution. The report from this meeting,
formally titled "Analysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista
Peoples' Revolution" but commonly referred to as the "72-Hour Docu-
ment," candidly revealed the Sandinistas' intentions to build a large
politicized armed force despite their acknowledgement that "at present
there is no clear indication than an armed counter-revolution by
Somocista forces beyond our borders is going to take place and jeop-
ardize our stability."
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Sandinista troops passing in review. The militarization of
Nicaraguan society has led to the building of armed forces nearly half
the size of those of Mexico, a country with more than 25 times the
population of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas now have an active duty
force of 62,000 and total military/security forces of 119,000.
toward developing a combined arms capability, augment-
ing its conventional infantry forces with mechanized in-
fantry, armored, and artillery brigades. The Sandinistas
also have emphasized the formation of reserve and
militia forces; currently, these units total some 79,000
men, of which over 27,000 are on active duty at any one
time. Dozens of new military bases have been con-
structed throughout Nicaragua, and the Sandinistas now
have some 40 major garrisons and numerous smaller
posts throughout the nation.
Infantry. The EPS has formed 10 regular infantry
battalions. A special airborne battalion was inaugurated
in 1982. The following year, special counterinsurgency
battalions (Batallon de Lucha Irregular?BLI) were
trained and equipped to engage anti-Sandinista forces.
Units along Nicaragua's frontiers were organized as a
special border guard force (Tropas Guarda
Fronteras?TGF). The bulk of the Sandinistas' infantry
forces consists of the roughly 160 reserve and militia bat-
talions. These infantry units are equipped primarily with
Soviet-bloc arms, such as the AK-47 assault rifle.
The Interior Ministry, which controls the Sandinista
Police (Policia Sandinista?PS) and the General Direc-
torate of State Security (Direccion General de Seguridad
del Estado ?DGSE), the Sandinista secret police, has
direct command of its own brigade of 2,000 highly
trained infantry troops (Tropas Pablo Ubeda).
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The bases pictured here and on the following page are examples of the military garrisons the Sandinistas have built. Several have facilities of Soviet and
Cuban design.
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VEHICLE
EQUIP
STORAk
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Armor. The Sandinista army has adhered closely to
Soviet-Cuban military doctrine in the development of its
armed forces.7 When the Sandinistas seized power in
July 1979, they inherited the hodgepodge collection of
armor that had belonged to Somoza's National Guard,
including some obsolete World War II vintage tanks,
only three of which were operational. The remainder of
Somoza's armor consisted of 25 antiquated Staghound
armored cars.
The Sandinistas set about building an armored force
of a size and firepower without precedent in Central
America. Crews and mechanics for tanks and other
vehicles were sent to Cuba for training. Facilities to sup-
port the forthcoming arsenal were built. The first Soviet-
built T-55 tanks arrived in mid-1981. The T-55,
weighing 36 metric tons and armed with a 100-millimeter
gun, can outgun any tank previously seen in Central
America. Formerly the Soviets' main battle tank, it is
still being used by Warsaw Pact armies. The Sandinistas
used the T-55s to form a new armored battalion sta-
tioned near Managua.
Over the next 3 years, ships from the Soviet bloc
continued to transport tanks to Nicaragua. By 1982, the
Sandinistas had obtained a sufficient number of T-55s
to organize another armored battalion. By the end of
1984, they had acquired a total of more than 110 T-55
tanks, enough to form five armored battalions of 22
tanks each.'
'Soviet military doctrine emphasizes the use of massed armor. In
terms of size and organization, Sandinista armored units are modeled
after their Cuban counterparts.
8In a February 1985 interview with CBS News, Sandinista Army
Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra tacitly acknowledged that the EPS had
110 tanks and added that it planned to acquire up to a total of 150.
In 1984, the Soviets provided the Nicaraguans with
about 30 PT-76 light tanks. This amphibious tank,
armed with a 76-millimeter gun, fords rivers easily and
can maneuver in some of the difficult terrain found in
parts of Nicaragua.
The Soviets, through their allies, have also equipped
the Sandinista army with more than 200 armored
vehicles, mostly BTR-60 and BTR-152 armored person-
nel carriers. These vehicles are armed with a machinegun
and can carry a squad of infantry. The first BTR-60s
began arriving in mid-1981. The EPS has also received
Soviet-made command vehicles and BRDM-2 am-
phibious armored reconnaissance vehicles. The San-
dinistas have now formed at least one mechanized infan-
try brigade.
The terrain in certain parts of Nicaragua is well
suited to armored operations, while in other parts of the
country, the terrain imposes some constraints. Tanks can
operate easily in the flat plains of the west, which en-
compass the principal population and economic centers
of the nation. On the other hand, the mountains and
rugged terrain of the northern departments limit off-
road maneuverability. Nevertheless, the EPS has
deployed armored units in the north, particularly in such
missions as escorting convoys and guarding fixed in-
stallations. The lowlands of the Atlantic Coast region in-
hibit off-road use of the heavy T-55s, but the San-
dinistas could deploy the amphibious PT-76s in this
region. While some observers have argued that the ter-
rain in Central America renders tanks of only marginal
military value, the Sandinistas?and their Soviet sup-
pliers? do not share this view; indeed, they have con-
tinued the rapid increase in the size of their tank force,
doubling it in 1984 alone.
The Soviet-made T-55 tank weighs 36 metric tons and has a 100-millimeter gun. Formerly the Soviet Union's main battle tank, it is far superior to any
other tank in Central America. The Sandinistas have more than 110 T-55s. In comparison, Somoza had three operational World War II
vintage U.S. tanks.
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El Tempisque near Managua is the Sandinistas' principal transit storage base. The first T-55 tanks arrived there in mid-1981, long before the
Sandinistas faced any serious armed opposition.
La Quebradita, in southern Managua, is another Sandinista base for T-55 tanks.
8
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The PT-76 weighs 14 metric tons and has a 76-millimeter gun. This fully amphibious tank uses water jets for propulsion when in water. The Soviets
provided the Sandinistas about 30 of these light tanks in 1984.
Art /1 AIL
The Sandinistas can use some of their armor in the mountainous region of northern Nicaragua. These PT-76s are deployed in the town of Ocotal.
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The BTR-60, an armored personnel carrier, can transport a squad of infantry. It is armed with a machinegun and is fully amphibious.
The BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicle is fully amphibious and
armed with a machinegun. The Sandinistas have dozens of these
vehicles which, like the PT-76 light amphibious tanks and the BTR-60
armored personnel carriers, are well suited to the rough terrain in parts
of Nicaragua.
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The BTR-152, an armored personnel carrier capable of transporting up
to 17 infantry troops, is armed with a machinegun. Somoza had 25
antiquated armored cars; the Sandinistas now have about 200 armored
vehicles, most of which are BTR-60s and BTR-152s.
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Artillery. The growth of EPS's artillery force has
been equally dramatic. During the revolution, the San-
dinistas' fire-support weapons consisted of nothing larger
than mortars. When they defeated Somoza's National
Guard, they inherited three 105-millimeter howitzers.
During their first year in power, the Sandinistas
began receiving ZIS-2s, Soviet-made 57-millimeter
antitank guns. By 1981, they were obtaining D-30s,
Soviet-made 122-millimeter howitzers far surpassing in
range and firepower all other artillery in Central
America. That same year, they began acquiring D-20s,
Soviet-made 152-millimeter howitzers, which represented
a further qualitative increase in their artillery capability.
In 1982, Soviet-made BM-21s, capable of launching a
barrage of 40 122-millimeter rockets, arrived, greatly in-
creasing the Sandinistas' area bombardment capability.
In 1983, the Sandinistas formally inaugurated a special
artillery brigade, based in Managua. Currently, the
EPS's inventory includes 24 D-30s, 24 D-20s, 24 BM-21
multiple rocket launchers, and scores of antitank guns,
as well as hundreds of mortars.
Somoza's artillery consisted of three 105-millimeter howitzers. As early
as 1981, the Sandinistas began to acquire D-30 122-millimeter
howitzers. The Soviet-made D-30 can fire a 48-pound shell nearly 10
miles. The Sandinistas have 24 D-30s.
The D-20 152-millimeter howitzer is the largest artillery piece in Central America. It can fire a 96-pound shell nearly 11 miles. The Sandinistas have 24
D-20s. These D-20s are being towed by Soviet-made KRAZ-255 trucks.
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lip. 44'
The BM-21 multiple rocket launcher is a modern version of the World
War H "Stalin's Organ." It can fire a barrage of 40 122-millimeter
rockets more than 12 miles. Each rocket carries a 42-pound warhead.
The Sandinistas have 24 BM-21s.
Support Units. The Sandinistas have begun to build
an elaborate infrastructure to support their combat
forces. They have created a special engineering battalion
and commmunications units. The East Germans alone
have provided the Sandinistas with more than 1,000 IFA
W-50 trucks since 1980. Large numbers of other vehicles
have been delivered by the Soviet Union and its allies.
These include more than 800 jeeps, 40 flatbed trucks
capable of transporting T-55 tanks, 6 tank ferries to
shuttle the T-55s across rivers, numerous communica-
tions vans, and about 75 tanker trucks for fuel. The
Soviets and Soviet-bloc states have also provided a
multitude of other materiel ranging from mobile
maintenance workshops and field kitchens to chemical
warfare decontamination equipment. In 1982, they fur-
nished the Sandinistas with the equipment to build a
communications intercept facility at Santa Maria near
Managua. Subsequently, additional intercept facilities
have been built at Puerto Cabezas, San Francisco, and
Santa Rosa.
12
These Sandinista soldiers are firing a Soviet-made 120-millimeter
mortar. This weapon can fire a 35-pound shell more than 3 miles.
East Germany has provided the Sandinistas more than 1,000 IFA W-50
trucks. These trucks form the logistical backbone of the Sandinista
army.
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Roughly 130 IFA trucks were transported on a single East German-
chartered ship in mid-1983.
These TMM-3 scissors bridges can be used to cross smaller rivers. The
acquisition of these bridges and the GSP amphibious ferries as well as
large numbers of amphibious vehicles has given the Sandinista army
unprecedented mobility.
These Sandinista PMR-3 minelayers are towed by ZIL-131 trucks.
The Soviets have provided the Sandinistas more than 800 jeeps.
The Soviets have provided the Sandinistas with electronic gear, in-
cluding communications vans such as this.
These ZIL-131 trucks, when equipped with decontamination tanks,
can be used for chemical warfare.
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The Sandinistas have six GSP amphibious ferries which can carry heavy vehicles, including T--55 tanks, across rivers.
The Sandinistas have acquired about 75 fuel tanker trucks to provide logistical support for their growing army.
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The Soviets provided the Sandinistas this communication intercept facility in 1982.
Three additional communications intercept facilities (above and on following page) have been built in the last 2 years.
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The Sandinista air force began with the remnants of Somoza's air
force, which included a few of these AT-33A jets. The Sandinistas
placed a high priority on developing a more powerful air arm. They
made plans to expand existing airfields and to build new ones, and, by
1980, were sending personnel to Soviet-bloc countries to be trained as
pilots and mechanics.
This photo shows Cuban commandos deploying from a Soviet-built
Cuban air force AN-26 transport plane during training exercises. In
1983, the Sandinistas acquired two of this type of aircraft, significantly
increasing their air transport capabilities.
The Mi-8/HIP is one of the Soviets' principal combat helicopters. It
can be armed with a machinegun, rocket pods, and antitank missiles.
The Mi-8 also serves as a transport helicopter for Sandinista troops
and their equipment. The Sandinistas have received more than a dozen
Mi-8s.
Air Force and Air Defense
The 2,000-troop Sandinista Air Force and Air Defense
Force (Fuerza Aerea Sandinista/Defensa Anti-
Aerea?FAS/DAA) has been undergoing substantial im-
provements since 1979. The Sandinistas began with the
remnants of the National Guard's small air force, which
included a handful of AT-33A jets, Cessna 337 push-
pull aircraft, transport aircraft, trainers, and helicopters.
The Sandinistas placed a high priority on developing a
more powerful air arm. Early on, they sent personnel to
Cuba and Soviet-bloc countries to be trained as pilots
and mechanics, and they made plans to expand existing
airfields and to build new ones.
Because of the long lead time associated with the ac-
quisition of aircraft ?i.e., the need for lengthy pilot
training and the construction of airfields ?the FAS grew
slowly in its early years. The first fixed-wing aircraft
added to the inventory were older and unsophisticated
models such as Soviet-made AN-2s. In 1982, they
aquired four Italian-made SF-260 trainer/tactical sup-
port aircraft from Libya. Two Soviet-made AN-26
medium transports added in 1983 significantly improved
the Sandinistas' logistics support capabilities.
The Sandinistas' helicopter inventory has grown
more rapidly. Some of these helicopters have been ob-
tained from Western nations, such as two Alouettes
received from France in 1982. The great majority of
these craft have been obtained from the Soviets and their
allies, however. In 1981, the first two Soviet Mi-8/HIP
medium-lift helicopters arrived. The following April, the
Soviets formally donated the Mi-8s to the Sandinistas,
alleging that they were to be used to help develop the
Atlantic Coast region of Nicaragua. In fact, the Mi-8 is
one of the Soviet Union's front-line combat helicopters
and can be armed with a machinegun and rocket pods.
The Sandinistas have received more than a dozen Mi-8s
and have used them extensively in military operations. In
1982, the Sandinistas also acquired Polish-built
Mi-2/HOPLITE cargo helicopters.
In late 1984, the Sandinistas received the first of a
new generation of helicopter gunships, the Mi-24/HIND
D. This is the Soviets' principal attack helicopter, and it
has been used extensively by the Soviets in Afghanistan.
One of the most highly sophisticated attack helicopters
in the world, it holds the helicopter speed record and can
be armed with a multiple-barrel machinegun, guided
missiles, rocket pods, and bombs. The HIND's heavy ar-
mor, coupled with its high speed, greatly reduces its
vulnerability to small arms fire.9 Acquisition of the
HIND D adds a new dimension to warfare in Central
America. Key targets in Honduras, Costa Rica, and El
Salvador are all within the reach of this flying "tank."
Some five to eight Mi-24s had been delivered to
Nicaragua by early 1985.
9For further information on the Mi-24, see John F. Guilmartin,
Jr.'s, "Nicaragua is Armed for Trouble," Wall Street Journal, March
11, 1985, p. 28.
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The Mi-24/HIND D (above and below) is one of the world's most advanced attack helicopters. It has a nose-mounted Gatling-type machinegun and can
carry up to 4 pods containing nearly 130 57-millimeter rockets as well as antitank missiles or bombs. This is the same helicopter being used by the Soviet
Union against Afghan rebels. The Sandinista air force now has five to eight of these flying "tanks."
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Augusto Cesar Sandino International Airport in Managua is the principal base for the Sandinista air force. The western portion of the
airfield (left in photo) is the military area.
Examples of the many types of Soviet-bloc aircraft provided to the Sandinistas.
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MI-24/
HIND D
HELICOPTER
The initial shipments of Mi-24s arrived at Sandino Airport in
November 1984. The helicopters are shipped in crates and assembled at
the airport, probably with the assistance of Soviet or Cuban techni-
cians.
The Sandinistas have three AT-33A jets, and in
1984 top FSLN leaders repeatedly proclaimed their desire
to acquire additional jet fighters. Nicaraguan pilots and
mechanics reportedly have been undergoing training in
Cuba and the Soviet bloc since the early 1980s. In 1982,
with Cuban and Soviet assistance, the Sandinistas began
constructing the Punta Huete airfield in an isolated area
northeast of Managua. The principal runway at Punta
Huete is 10,000 feet in length, making it the longest
military runway in Central America. When completed, it
will be able to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-
bloc inventory. Sixteen revetments of the size and design
appropriate for jet fighters already have been con-
structed. In addition to Punta Huete, the Sandinistas
have been upgrading their principal airbase at Sandino
Airport in Managua as well as other airfields at
Montelimar, Puerto Cabezas, Esteli, La Rosita, and
Bluefields.
The Sandinistas could soon have the Punta Huete runway operational. It is in an isolated region
ideal for military use. Its planned 10,000-foot runway, the longest military runway in Central
America, could accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet inventory.
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gUTE AIR
raft Revetments
Punta Huete (above) is designed for jet aircraft. In the revetments are clearly visible the blast deflection walls used for jets. These revetments are similar
to those at the Kawama airfield in Cuba (below), which accommodates MiG fighters.
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New facilities have been added to the Montelimar airfield.
The Sandinistas are upgrading the airfield at Puerto Cabezas and lengthening the runway by more than 1,500 feet.
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The runway at Esteli has been lengthened considerably. On the runway are two SF-260 aircraft
believed to have been given to the Sandinistas by Libya's Colonel Muammar Qadhafi.
The Sandinistas are constructing an airfield at La Rosita to increase their ability to operate in the
Atlantic Coast region.
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A new runway at Bluefields, more than one-third already paved.
Soviet air warfare doctrine calls for aircraft to
operate in a "controlled air environment," that is to say,
the aircraft are controlled by command elements on the
ground which monitor their actions via radar. In 1983,
the first Soviet-made Early Warning/Ground Control-
Intercept (EW/GCI) facility in Nicaragua was assembled
near Masaya. During 1984, additional radar sites were
established at Toro Blanco and Esteli. Early in 1985, a
fourth radar system was emplaced at San Juan del Sur.
A temporary site at El Bluff has provided coverage of
the Atlantic Coast as well. A coastal surveillance radar
was emplaced at El Polvon in late 1984. The Sandinistas
now have radar coverage over most of Nicaragua and
can monitor aircraft movements deep into Honduras, El
Salvador, and Costa Rica as well. There is no other
comparable radar system anywhere in the region.
The early warning capability of the radar net also is
associated with the Sandinista air defense forces. As
early as 1980, the Sandinistas began acquiring ZPU-4,
ZU-23, and M-1939 antiaircraft guns and SA-7 surface-
to-air missiles. The S-60, a 57-millimeter cannon with
fire control radar, was added in 1984. Nearly 200 pieces
of antiaircraft artillery and over 300 SA-7 missile
launchers now ring major installations.
24
Soviet-built radars give the Sandinistas a radar capability without equal
in Central America. This system now covers most of Nicaragua and
can monitor aircraft movements deep into neighboring countries.
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The Masaya early warning/ground control-intercept capable radar facility was assembled in 1983.
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A coastal surveillance radar facility recently constructed at El Polvon.
26
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The SA-7 is a surface-to-air missile with an infrared guidance system.
The Soviets have provided the Sandinistas more than 300 SA-7
launchers, such as this one held by a Soviet soldier.
The ZU-23 is a 23-millimeter antiaircraft gun. Each of its two barrels
can fire at the rate of 800-1,000 rounds per minute. It has an effective
range of more than 8,000 feet.
The M-1939, a 37-millimeter antiaircraft gun, can fire at the rate of 160-180 rounds per minute. It has an effective range of more than 8,000 feet.
There are nine M-1939 sites in the Managua area alone. Notice that in the bed of each truck, a soldier holds an SA-7 missile launcher.
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This is one of several S-60 antiaircraft gun
sites in the Managua area.
The S-60 is a 57-millimeter automatic antiaircraft gun which can operate with a fire control radar system or through optical sighting. It can fire
105-120 rounds per minute, and has an effective range of nearly 20,000 feet. It was added to the Sandinistas' arsenal in 1984, further enhancing their
antiaircraft capabilities.
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Navy
The 1,000-troop Sandinista Navy (Marina de Guerra
Sandinista? MGS) has similarly undergone both a
qualitative and quantitative transformation since 1979.
Somoza's "navy" consisted of a handful of old patrol
boats. The Sandinistas set out to acquire a fleet of more
modern vessels. In 1983, they acquired two French
Vedette patrol boats and two Soviet ZHUK patrol boats.
In 1983-84, North Korea supplied two KIMJIN and two
SINHUNG patrol boats. In 1984, Cuba delivered a third
ZHUK and two YEVGENYA inshore minesweepers. In
November 1984, the Soviet merchant ship Bakuriani
delivered four Polish-built K-8 minesweeping boats.
Cuban and Soviet Assistance
The Sandinista military build-up would have been im-
possible without massive assistance from Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Castro provided the Sandinistas shelter
and training during their struggle against Somoza, and
he supplied them with weapons for their final offensive
in 1979. The Cuban official who commanded the sup-
port network based in Costa Rica, Julian Lopez Diaz,
was appointed Cuba's ambassador to Nicaragua as soon
as the Sandinistas were in power.
Within a week of the fall of Somoza, Cuba had
placed about 100 military and security personnel in
Nicaragua. By early 1985, the number of Cuban
military/security advisers in Nicaragua had grown to
some 3,000.10 These Cubans permeate the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, operating at all levels of the armed
forces from the General Staff in Managua down to the
battalion and, in some cases, even company levels. They
are prominent in military training facilities and in areas
where technical expertise is required, such as aviation
and telecommunications. An additional 30 to 40 Soviet
and more than 60 East German military/security advisers
also operate in Nicaragua.
These Cuban and Soviet-bloc advisers have strongly
affected the organization and tactics of the Sandinista
military. The units of the Sandinista army and militia
are modeled after their Cuban counterparts; in 1980, the
Nicaraguans even copied the Cubans' four-digit unit
identification system. Some Nicaraguan military bases
are modeled after similar facilities in Cuba.
'The Sandinistas' decision to turn to the Cubans was one of
choice, not necessity. For example, immediately after its July 1979 vic-
tory, Panama sent military advisers and trainers to Nicaragua to help
in converting the Sandinista guerrillas into a regular army. By the end
of 1979, however, the preeminent position of the Cubans was firmly
established, and the Panamanians returned home.
This Soviet-made ZHUK patrol boat is one of more than
a dozen vessels provided to the Sandinista navy by the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea.
Until recently, the Soviets used surrogates to mask
the extent of their own involvement in the military build-
up. Cuba was the first to make substantial deliveries of
Soviet-made arms, and later Algeria and Bulgaria took
on this role. Direct Soviet shipment of military-
associated goods occurred by 1981, but not until late
1984 did a Soviet ship deliver major weapons
systems ? Mi-24s and K-8s? directly to the Sandinistas.
The details of the agreements that led up to these
assistance programs remain secret. Nevertheless,
documents captured in Grenada in 1983 (and available
for review at the U.S. National Archives in Washington,
D.C.) reveal the method employed by the Soviet bloc to
arm a surrogate." In the case of Grenada, Maurice
Bishop's regime signed five secret military agreements ?
three with the U.S.S.R., one with Cuba, and one with
North Korea. Military equipment began arriving in
Grenada within a few months of the signing of these
documents. Since Soviet military hardware began arriv-
ing in Nicaragua in early 1980, it is likely that the initial
secret arms agreements between Nicaragua and Cuba
and the Soviet Union were concluded shortly after the
Sandinistas seized power in 1979. (At that time, the San-
dinistas were receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of
economic aid from the United States and other Western
sources.) The influx of military aid from the Soviet
Union and its allies has risen steadily. In the past 3
years, the number of Soviet-bloc ship deliveries of
military equipment has risen from 6 in 1982 to 25 in
1983 to 37 in 1984. The total value of the tanks,
helicopters, and other war materiel shipped to Nicaragua
was approaching $500 million by early 1985.
"See Department of State/Department of Defense publications,
Grenada: A Preliminary Report, December 16, 1983, and Grenada
Documents: An Overview and Selection, September 1984.
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The two main ports used for arms deliveries are El Bluff/Rama on the Caribbean and Corinto on
the Pacific.
Most of the Sandinistas' heavy arms have been delivered to the Caribbean port of El Bluff.
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Smaller ships such as the Nicarao transport the military equipment from El Bluff up the Rio Escondido to Rama.
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At Rama, the arms are unloaded and then transported overland to Managua.
Corinto is Nicaragua's principal port, and large quantities of military cargo are delivered there.
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In November 1984, the Soviet merchant ship Bakuriani delivered war materiel to Nicaragua, including this Mi-24/HIND D attack helicopter.
SOVIET-BLOC MILITARY DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA
METRIC
TONS
18000
15000
12000
9000
6000
3000
0
18,000
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
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Assistance from?and to?Terrorists
The FSLN has long maintained close ties with numerous
terrorist organizations and radical states. During the
1970s, a number of Sandinistas trained and fought with
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After the
Sandinistas took power, the PLO opened an "embassy"
in Managua and assigned pilots and mechanics to assist
the Sandinista air force. Libya has provided the San-
dinistas with both equipment, such as SF-260 aircraft
and helicopters, and personnel, including pilots and
mechanics.
The Sandinistas not only receive assistance from ter-
rorists, they also provide assistance to terrorists. They
have collaborated closely with Marxist subversives
throughout Central America, particularly the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Working with the Cubans, the FSLN provides
these groups with training camps, command and control
bases, and safe houses. The Sandinistas support a
logistical system for the transport of arms through
Nicaragua to guerrillas in neighboring countries.
The Sandinistas' ties are not limited to groups in
Central America, however, for they also have links with
groups such as the Montoneros of Argentina, the 19th of
April Movement (M-19) of Colombia, the Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile, the Tupamaros
of Uruguay, the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)
separatist movement of Spain, the Baader-Meinhoff
gang of Germany, and the Red Brigades of Italy:2 (In
February 1985, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi
complained in a public statement before the Italian
Parliament that Nicaragua had become a safehaven for
fugitive Italian terrorists.) Some of these groups have
been implicated in terrorist attacks against the San-
dinistas' opponents carried out in third countries:3
'2For additional information on the FSLN's connections with in-
ternational terrorist organizations, see Juan 0. Tamayo's "Sandinistas
Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists" and "World's Leftists Find a
Haven in Nicaragua," Miami Herald, March 3, 1985, p. Al.
'3See Department of State/Department of Defense publication,
Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-up and .Support for
Central American Subversion, July 1984.
In May 1984, Eden Pastora (Comandante Cero) was wounded in an assassination attempt in which four people?including an American reporter?
were killed and 27 people injured. Pastora had been a Sandinista hero during the revolution lut broke with the FSLN because of its efforts to im-
plant Marxism in Nicaragua and its close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. In June 1983, Pastora and former Nicaraguan Junta member Alfonso
Robelo, the principal leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), were targeted for assassination by the Nicaraguan General Direc-
torate of State Security (DGSE). The attempt failed when the bomb detonated prematurely and killed the two would-be assassins. In November 1984,
Robelo was injured and his fiancee crippled in yet another assassination attempt.
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Libyan aircraft (above and right) transporting large quantities of
weapons to Nicaragua (falsely manifested as medical supplies) were de-
tained in Brazil in April 1983.
Recruitment and Conscription
The Sandinistas initially had no difficulty in finding
recruits for their military. The Nicaraguan people had
supported the revolution against Somoza, and many
youths eagerly joined the ranks of the EPS. Gradually,
however, voluntary enlistment declined as disillusion-
ment with the FSLN became widespread. To meet the
goals for their military build-up, the Sandinistas began
using a variety of coercive measures at schools and
workplaces, as well as the Sandinista Defense Commit-
tees (Comites de Defensa Sandinista?CDS), the in-
famous "block committees" modeled after the Cuban
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, to com-
pel men and women to enlist in the army, the reserves,
or militia units.
When these tactics failed to provide sufficient man-
power, the Sandinistas resorted to the draft. In July
1983, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega proclaimed
that the government would adopt mandatory conscrip-
tion. Despite widespread opposition, the Sandinistas
enacted the draft law in September, calling it Patriotic
Military Service (Servicio Militar Patriotico?SMP).
Technically, the law made males aged 18 to 40 eligible
for the draft, with those in the 18 to 21 age bracket sub-
ject to being called up effective January 1, 1984, and
those over 21 subject to subsequent callups. It also pro-
vided deferments for those in special categories, such as
government workers with key jobs. In practice, the San-
dinistas began inducting youths by late 1983, and six
rounds of callups had taken place by early 1985. The
Sandinistas have claimed that 30,000 Nicaraguans have
been drafted, but many Nicaraguans believe that the real
number is far higher. Thousands of youths were simply
summoned by their local Sandinista draft boards, while
many others were captured in house-to-house sweeps,
roadblocks, and roundups at public places such as movie
theaters, dance halls, and ball parks.
The Sandinistas have been indiscriminate about the
age of those they impress, often seizing youths in their
mid-teens ? below the official draft age. While most of
those drafted do enter the army rather than go to jail,
thousands of youths have gone into hiding, and many
others have slipped across the borders into exile."
Many Nicaraguans have protested forced induction
into the Sandinista military, which they perceive as the
political army of the FSLN party and not the national
army of Nicaragua. Also, there is broad resentment over
the inadequate training given SMP recruits. Often
draftees without adequate military skills are sent to the
front to face the forces of the armed opposition. In-
creasingly, many Nicaraguan parents believe that the
Sandinistas are using their children as cannon fodder. As
a result of this resentment, spontaneous anti-draft
demonstrations have sprung up throughout Nicaragua.
For example, for 3 days in September 1984, hundreds of
students in Chinandega marched in protest. In
December, the residents of Nagarote clashed with San-
dinista troops who had come to sweep the town for
draft-age youths. Similar acts of protest have occurred in
other locations.'5
"See June Carolyn Erlick's "Draft Dodgers Flee Nicaragua for
Honduras," Miami Herald, January 4, 1985, p. 12; Steven Kinzer's
"Nicaraguan Men Fleeing Draft Fill Honduran Refugee Camp," New
York Times, April 11, 1985, p. 1; and Edward Cody's "Nicaraguans
Choosing Exile to Avoid Draft, Uncertainty," Washington Post,
April 12, 1985, p. Al.
"See "Nicaraguan town fights recruiters," Chicago Tribune,
December 29, 1984, p. 5, and Steven Kinzer's "Town Battles Military
Draft in Nicaragua," New York Times, January 2, 1985, p. 9.
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Implications
The steady pattern of the Sandinista military build-up
demonstrates that the FSLN has been intent on forming
the largest armed forces in Central America ever since it
seized power in 1979. Contrary to Sandinista assertions
that their military build-up has been the result of
"counterrevolutionary activities" and "foreign
aggression," the blueprint for the creation of a powerful
combined arms force?infantry, armor, and artillery
supported by airpower and naval units?was drawn at
least 2 years before significant armed opposition arose.' 6
The Sandinistas planned the build-up at a time when the
National Guard had been routed, the revolution had
broad popular support, and the international community
was highly supportive?with the United States leading
the efforts to provide economic assistance. While the rise
of armed opposition forces has led the Sandinistas to
make some adjustments in their plans, such as the for-
mation of special counterinsurgency battalions, it has
not significantly affected the basic outline of an over-
sized military force laid out in 1979-80.
Why did the Sandinistas choose to develop such a
huge military establishment? In Nicaragua, as in Cuba
and other countries which have fallen to Marxist-
Leninists guerrillas, the new regime placed as its top
priority the formation of a large armed force which
could ensure the consolidation of its power. The San-
dinistas recognized that the "honeymoon" period they
initially enjoyed would not last. As FSLN National
Directorate member Bayardo Arce said in 1984, the San-
dinistas never had had any intention of honoring their
commitments to pluralism, a mixed economy, and
nonalignment; they had merely espoused these policies in
1979 as a tactical ploy.'7 The Sandinistas realized that,
as they proceeded with their secret agenda of fostering a
Marxist-Leninist regime and exporting revolution
throughout the region, they would encounter growing
resistance from the nations of the region and from the
Nicaraguan people themselves. The Sandinistas sought to
develop a powerful military force which could intimidate
their neighbors and suppress domestic opposition,
thereby providing them with a secure base for their
subversive activities.
'6Nicaraguan Ambassador Carlos Tunnermann wrote in a letter to
the Washington Post that prior to November 1981, "there were only a
few hundred ex-GN [Somoza's National Guard] soldiers staging
sporadic raids on farms along the border. Their principal occupations
were cattle-rustling and extortion." See "We Will Never Negotiate With
the Contras," Washington Post, March 30, 1985, p. 21.
'7Joaquim lbarz, "El Comandante Bayardo Arce afirma que se va
a implantar el marxismo-leninismo y el partido unico" ("Comandante
Bayardo Arce affirms that they are going to establish Marxism-
Leninism and a single party"), La Vanguardia (Barcelona, Spain),
July 31, 1984. For English translation, see Comandante Bayardo Arce's
Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), Depart-
ment of State, March 1985.
36
Domestic
The Sandinistas have militarized Nicaraguan society. Up
until 1978, Somoza's National Guard normally had some
7,000 men. It never exceeded 14,000, even at the height
of the fighting. The Sandinistas now have a total armed
force?regular army, air force, navy, reserves, militia,
and security forces?of some 119,000. Nicaragua has a
higher percentage of its population on active duty than
any other nation in the region. Under the guise of na-
tional mobilization, the Sandinistas have drawn nearly 1
out of every 14 Nicaraguans aged 16 and above, in-
cluding women, into their military/security structure. As
noted above, many of the members were recruited
through coercion, first by FSLN pressure tactics and
since late 1983 by forced conscription.
The Sandinistas have used this militarization to
tighten their control over the Nicaraguan people. The
military itself is highly politicized; key positions are held
by members of the FSLN, and recruits are indoctrinated
with Marxist ideology. The concept of state security has
become a cloak to protect the dominance of the FSLN.
Civil and human rights have been subordinated to the
security of the state (read: party), and all those who
legitimately challenge Sandinista actions and
policies?including politicians, business and labor
leaders, church officials, and journalists?are vilified as
traitors and counterrevolutionaries. The government, the
2+2+2 = 6
3 veces 2 es Igual a 6
3 x 2 = 6
3 + 3 . 6
2 veces 3 es lama a 6
2 x 3 = 6
?
Grade-school arithmetic books use pictures of Soviet-made AK-47
rifles and hand grenades to teach children to count.
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ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE
THOUSANDS
a NICARAGUA
20
15
10
19 3
0
1977
HONDURAS
4.9
1984
7.8
GUATEMALA 4 EL SALVADOR
Nicaragua has a higher percentage of its population on active military duty than any other country in Central America.
armed forces, and the FSLN (including its multitude of
associated organizations such as the CDS "block com-
mittees") have become parts of the same repressive
entity. The Sandinistas' possession of an extensive securi-
ty network and a large military force equipped with
tanks intimidates those who have become disillusioned
with the regime and inhibits popular dissent. As this
militarization of the society has progressed, the vestiges
of political, economic, and social pluralism in Nicaragua
have been eroding.
The military build-up has greatly exacerbated
Nicaragua's economic crisis. Resources needed for social
programs and economic development have been diverted
to military purposes. The construction of the Punta
Huete airfield, for example, has consumed a large
percentage of Nicaragua's total production of cement
over the last 2 years. President Daniel Ortega has
acknowledged that 40 percent of the 1985 budget is
being allocated to the military. Even this figure conceals
the true extent of the build-up, however, since much of
the arms and ammunition is obtained from the Soviets
under long-term credits and therefore do not show up in
the budget. Moreover, the mobilization has cut deeply
into Nicaragua's work force, taking tens of thousands of
people out of the productive sector. The latest harvests
of coffee and cotton were reduced significantly because
of the shortage of labor, and this will result in a sharp
drop in Nicaragua's already reduced foreign exchange
earnings.
Regional
The flow of arms into Nicaragua since 1979 has pro-
vided the Sandinistas with the largest military force in
the region. This unilateral build-up has been totally out
of proportion to the capabilities of Nicaragua's
neighbors. In tanks and armored vehicles, Nicaragua
now surpasses all the other countries of Central America
combined. This build-up has had a seriously destabilizing
effect on the region, and it is creating pressures for a
costly arms race.
Costa Rica, Nicaragua's southern neighbor with a
population of 2.4 million, has no army. Its 8,000-troop
Civil Guard and Rural Guard are essentially con-
stabulary organizations. They do not have heavy equip-
ment such as tanks and artillery, and they could not pro-
vide an effective defense against a Sandinista attack.
Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbor with a
population of 4 million, has a military of about 18,000,
less than one-third the size of the Sandinistas' active duty
forces. The Honduran army has about 20 regular bat-
talions, of which fewer than 15 are actual maneuver
units, compared to the Sandinistas' 34. Honduras has no
tanks comparable to the T-55s. It does have a small
force of British-made Scorpion armored reconnaissance
vehicles, but they are outnumbered more than 2 to 1 by
the Sandinistas' PT-76 amphibious tanks alone. Faced
with this growing imbalance, in 1984 the Hondurans ac-
quired 72 reconditioned armored cars. They are keenly
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400
300
200
100
0
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TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES
350
NICARAGUA
100
HONDURAS
65
45
GUATEMALA
Nicaragua has more tanks and armored vehicles than the other four countries of Central America combined.
aware that the Choluteca Gap, which stretches from
western Nicaragua into southern Honduras, could pro-
vide an avenue of attack for a Sandinista armored thrust
into their nation.
Honduras' primary deterrent to a Sandinista attack
is its air force. The Honduran air force is considered one
of the best in Central America. The Hondurans' defen-
sive plans have rested in large part on the ability of their
aircraft to destroy an attacking force and launch
retaliatory strikes. Over the past few years, the credibili-
ty of this deterrence has steadily eroded as the San-
dinistas have developed a nationwide radar system and
deployed hundreds of antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air
missiles. The Sandinistas' procurement of jet fighter air-
craft would effectively neutralize the Honduran air
force, as its aging Super Mysteres would be no match
for such jets. Thus, the creation of a Sandinista force of
jet fighter aircraft would further skew the balance of
military "power in Central America and would be
dangerously destabilizing for the whole region.'8
The people of Central America perceive that the
leftist dictatorship that has developed in Nicaragua now
"The U.S. Government has made clear that the introduction of jet
fighter aircraft into Nicaragua would be a serious development which it
would view with the utmost concern.
38
EL SALVADOR
poses a real as well as a psychological threat. A 1983
Gallup International Poll showed that Nicaragua's grow-
ing military strength and support of subversive
movements in other countries was a source of concern
throughout the region. In Honduras, for example, about
80 percent of the respondents saw Nicaragua as the prin-
cipal cause of instability and as the primary military
threat faced by their country.' 9 In early 1985, an af-
filiate of Gallup released the results of a poll conducted
in Costa Rica in which 87 percent of those polled be-
lieved that the Sandinistas represented a threat to Costa
Rica. In October 1984, the commander of Panama's
Defense Force, General Manuel Noriega, said that the
Sandinista arms build-up was a danger to the entire
region. In reporting Noriega's views, the principal
newspaper of San Jose, Costa Rica, La Nacion, noted
that "Sandinista militarism has to be halted before it
produces a holocaust in the entire region." 20
Nicaragua's military build-up has complicated the
search for peaceful resolution of the crisis in Central
America. Because of their military power, the San-
dinistas have felt no need to enter into a meaningful
'9For a more complete analysis of this poll, see La Nacion Inter-
nacional (San Jose, Costa Rica), November 20-24, 1983.
z?"Noriega's Statement," La Nacion (San Jose, Costa Rica), Oc-
tober 16, 1984, editorial.
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IMAGE OF NICARAGUA
PERCENT IN EACH COUNTRY DESCRIBING NICARAGUA AS A
MILITARY THREAT
PERCENT
OF PUBLIC
III COSTA RICA
O HONDORAS
EL SALVADOR 0
GUATEMALA
100
90
80
70
60
50,
40
30
20
10
80
A Gallup International public opinion poll shows that the people in the four other countries of
Central America see Nicaragua as a military threat. (The Sandinistas have outlawed public opinion
polls in Nicaragua.)
dialogue with their domestic opponents or to negotiate
seriously with their neighbors in the Contadora process.
Nicaragua's military strength, coupled with its will-
ingness to use subversion and terror, makes it an ex-
tremely formidable adversary in Central America and
serves to intimidate the other nations in the region.n
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America, chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger, noted:
. . . the existence of a political order on the Cuban
model in Nicaragua would pose major difficulties in
negotiating, implementing, and verifying any Sandinista
commitment to refrain from supporting insurgency and
subversion in other countries.22
21Eduardo Ulibari, director and editor of Costa Rica's largest daily
newspaper, La Nacion, referred to the impact of Nicaragua's military
buildup on the other nations of Central America in his article "Costa
Rica and Honduras Find Washington an Unreliable Ally," Wall Street
Journal, January 25, 1985, p. 21. Ulibari concluded that, absent strong
support from the United States, a likely consequence of the growing
power of the Sandinistas would be the "Finlandization" of Costa Rica
and the militarization of Honduras. He added that "faced with an
enemy as formidable as Soviet-backed Nicaragua, Honduras has no
choice but to follow a pragmatic course of appeasement with a
totalitarian government it profoundly mistrusts."
22Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America, January 1984, p. 114.
Strategic
Consolidation of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is a
serious concern to the United States, for the Soviet
Union can and does use Nicaragua to carry out Soviet
policies in Central America. In return for their invest-
ment of about a half-billion dollars in military aid? and
hundreds of millions of dollars more of economic
aid?the Soviets have obtained an additional center of
influence in a region which, because of its proximity to
both the U.S. mainland and the Panama Canal, is vital
to the United States. Moreover, they could gain for the
first time a beachhead on the American Continent. Cuba
has served as Moscow's surrogate in Nicaragua; the ap-
proximately 7,500 Cubans there, including some 3,000
military/security advisers, are helping the Sandinistas
consolidate a regime closely aligned to the Soviet bloc
without arousing the alarm that the presence of a similar
number of Soviet personnel would create. As the Soviets
seek to foment further instability and revolution in Cen-
tral America, they now have a willing accomplice in
Sandinista-controlled Nicaragua. The growing crisis in
Central America compels the United States to shift at-
tention and assets from other critical areas of the world.
To the extent that the Soviets succeed in tying down the
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39
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Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operate out of Cuba to fly missions along the Atlantic Coast of the United States. Nicaragua's Punta Huete runway is
long enough to accommodate this type of aircraft, giving the Soviets a potential facility for reconnaissance flights along the Pacific Coast of
the United States.
United States in Central America, they hope to gain
greater freedom of action elsewhere.
The presence in Central America of a nation tied
closely to the Soviet Union poses concrete military prob-
lems for the United States. Nicaragua has the potential
for becoming a center for Soviet military and intelligence
activities, as has Cuba. As noted above, the Soviets have
already supplied the Sandinistas with four communica-
tions intercept facilities. When completed, the runway at
Punta Huete will be able to accommodate any Soviet
military aircraft. Soviet reconnaissance planes flying out
of Punta Huete would be able to fly missions along the
U.S. Pacific Coast, just as they now reconnoiter the
U.S. Atlantic Coast from Cuba. Soviet ships, including
surface warships, submarines, and spy ships, could use
Nicaragua's Pacific ports, such as Corinto, just as they
now use Cuban ports when operating in the Caribbean.
The very potential for the Soviet military use of
Nicaragua complicates U.S. defense planning, for in a
crisis situation the United States would be compelled to
divert resources to counter such possibilities.
Postscript
To promote lasting peace, economic development, and
democracy in Central America, the United States policy
toward Nicaragua has four objectives:
40
(1) Severance of Nicaraguan military and security
ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc;
(2) Reduction of Nicaragua's military strength to
levels that would restore military equilibrium in the area;
(3) An end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla
groups in neighboring countries; and,
(4) Fulfillment of original Sandinista promises to
support democratic pluralism and to respect human and
civil rights.
Only when Nicaragua frees itself of its military ties
to Communist states, reduces the size of its military to
levels commensurate with its legitimate defense needs,
ceases to subvert its neighbors, and allows genuine
democracy and national reconciliation for its people can
peace prosper in the region. These same objectives are
reflected in the 21 principles adopted in September 1983
by the participants in the Contadora process, including
Nicaragua. The United States has consistently made its
position clear in frequent meetings with the Nicaraguan
Government, and it has worked for the achievement of
these objectives both directly in its bilateral discussions
with Nicaragua and by supporting the regional peace
process.
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