LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM CHARLES Z. WICK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 616
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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,,,6r
International \ Office of the Dreg
Communication
Agency
Unified States of America
July 30, 1982
It has been nearly a year since President/Reagan authorized me to direct
and coordinate a vigorous overseas publ c affairs campaign to accurately
project our society and policies and counter Soviet propaganda. The
implementation of the President's ma date for Project Truth has provided
us with practical experience in dr ing together the best contributions
of the White House, State, the NS , Defense, CIA, ACDA, and USICA in this
initiative.
I have prepared this progress report to document the activities under
USICA's chairmanship of the Project Truth effort. You will see that our
traditional resources have been refined and refocussed to support this
endeavor. We have prepared a binder of representative products described
in the report to give you a firsthand look.
We now have what we think is an effective structure for introducing the
strategic public affairs dimension into the U.S. foreign policy process.
The success of our efforts has been due in no small measure to the
continuing support and encouragement we have received from our colleagues
in the various agencies participating in this effort. We look forward to
Project Truth's second year with anticipation of working closely together
to realize our mutual goal of a harmonious and efficient foreign policy
operation drawing on the best contributions of the participating agencies.
This report is being sent to the principals of the agencies involved as
well as to all the Cabinet Secretaries. Any comments or suggestions you
may have from time to time will be welcomed.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
les Z. Wick
The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMO M OF ATTACHMENTS
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REPORT ON
PROJECT
TRUTH
USICA
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U ~~~ FLuut
..a successful strategy must have diplomatic, political, economic,
informational components built on.,a.foundation of military strength."
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University, May 21, 1982
PROJECT. TRUTH
Undertaken pursuant to President Reagan's Directive of September 9, 1981
Progress Report as of July 20, 1982
The Honorable Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
The Honorable Edwin Meese III
The Honorable James A. Baker III
The Honorable Michael R. Deaver
The Honorable William J. Casey
The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Vice President George Bush
General John W. Vessey, Jr. USA
The Honorable William French Smith
The Honorable John R. Block
The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
The Honorable Terrel H. Bell
The Honorable James B. Edwards
The Honorable Richard S. Schweiker
The Honorable Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.
The Honorable James G. Watt
The Honorable Raymond J. Donovan
The Honorable Andrew L. Lewis, Jr.
The Honorable Donald T. Regan
1 r!? ' C,7,?p I n
Y g MLJ a ma . o? ~~
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BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF PROJECT TRUTH PRODUCTS UNDER FOLLOWING TABS:
A. Presidential Directive
B. Project Truth Members
C. Schedule of Meetings
D. Agenda Topics
E. "Fall Initiative"
F. Soviet Propaganda Alert
G. Countering Soviet Mis-Statements
H. Soviet Distortions and Fabrications
I. Dateline America
J. Satellite
K. Speakers and Briefing Teams
L. Foreign Press Center
M. Films and Videotapes
N. Wireless File
0. Special Publications
P. Magazines
Q. Voice of America
R. Exhibits
S. Special Guidance
The blue binder "Project Truth Examples" which accompanies this report
contains sample public affairs products under tabs corresponding to those
listed above.
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I. Introduction
On August 17, 1981, at President Reagan's invitation, USICA Director
Charles Z. Wick presented to the President, his top White House aides, and the
National Security Council a proposal for the establishment of a committee on
information policy coordination to arm the United States for effective battle
in the war for men's minds to which this administration is committed. On
September 9, 1981, President Reagan approved this proposal and directed that
"USICA should take the lead in the interdepartmental process, with cooperation
of all participating agencies." (See Tab A, Presidential Directive)
Thus emerged a vigorous overseas campaign, "Project Truth," for
projecting an accurate image of the policies and ideals of the United States,
and to counter Soviet Propaganda. National security data developed by the
departments of State and Defense, the NSC and CIA could hence be coordinated,
declassified (as practical) and disseminated worldwide through the existing
USICA apparatus, in the context of a coherent public affairs program.
Less than one year later, through the supple mechanism provided by
Project Truth, the USG can for the first time plan strategically in public
affairs. The "informational component of national strategy, which Judge
Clark emphasized in his Georgetown CSIS speech in May, can thus be said
finally to have the priority to which it is entitled. Public affairs is,
today, at the heart of the substance of foreign policy.
This report highlights the various activities of the Project Truth
interagency overseas public affairs campaign.
II. Refinement of the Project Truth Process
The underlying rationale of Project Truth has been to forge from the
coordinated arsenals of the USG the principal weaponry in the war of ideas.
To further this objective, there has been a meeting of a Project Truth
executive body several times each month since the Executive Committee was
established in November, 1981. (See Tab C, Schedule Meetings and Tab D, Agenda
Topics)
The experience of coordinating public affairs support during 1981
facilitated the introduction of two major operational refinements in 1982:
the establishment of the Project Truth Policy Group and a reconstitution of
the Project Truth Executive Committee. (See Tab B, Project Truth Members)
The Policy Group, at which each of the participating entities is
represented by an officer charged with overseas public affairs, was
established in January, 1982. It provides the Project Truth operation with
its own "think tank" focussed on long-range public affairs strategy with which
to guide the activities of the Executive Committee.
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A prime example is the public affairs strategy paper forwarded to Judge
Clark on April 23 to support President Reagan's European trip. This document
demonstrated Project Truth's potential to contribute a strategic dimension to
overseas U.S. public affairs campaigns. We have, accordingly, pursued this
approach by preparing strategy papers on the public affairs follow-up to the
President's trip. These documents are being forwarded under separate cover.
The second major structural innovation was the reconstitution of the
existing Project Truth Executive Committee into an operational mechanism for
the implementation of public affairs initiatives. This Committee now consists
of representatives of the various State Department-chaired interagency working
groups dealing with the Project Truth priority public affairs agenda
(Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador, Chemical Biological Warfare, Nuclear
Issues). The Executive Committee also includes representatives from the State
Department's Bureaus of Public Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, as well as the entire Project Truth Policy Group.
Telegraphic communications between Washington and our overseas missions
carry a special slug for Project Truth Executive Committee messages; PAXCOM
(for Public Affairs Executive Committee).
The Project Truth Executive Committee has become a clearing house for
the government's overall public affairs implementation of foreign policy
initiatives. Indeed, this forum is the only one where views are exchanged
across agency--as well as geographic and thematic--lines, providing the
Administration the means truly to "speak with one voice" on key issues.
III. Project Truth Products
Products have been introduced to counter Soviet propaganda (Tabs F, G,
H) and to project an accurate image worldwide of the United States' policies
and ideals (Tab I). The various public affairs materials traditionally
produced by USICA have been refined and targeted to reinforce foreign policy
initiatives coordinated by Project Truth. A series of brief descriptions of
these USICA contributions to the interagency effort follows under the
following tabs:
K. Speakers and Briefing Teams
L. Foreign Press Center
M. Films and Videotapes
N. Wireless File
0. Special Publications
P. Magazines
Q. Voice of America
R. Exhibits
S. Special Guidance
The blue binder labelled "Project Truth Examples" which accompanies this
report encloses representative samples of USICA products, and those of
participating agencies, under tabs which correspond to the tabs in this binder.
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-3-
IV. Project Truth Plans Currently in Progress
As noted above, one extremely important Project Truth innovation of
recent months was the successful establishment of the first mechanism for
interagency coordination of the public affairs aspects of priority foreign
policy initiatives. This development, with far-reaching implications for the
strategic planning process, represents the culmination of this Agency's
efforts to direct and coordinate the project's interagency activities.
Project Truth plans a "Fall Initiative" in public affairs, in which will
be launched a multi-dimensional campaign showing the U.S. to be the "peace
party", with its defensive and deterrent-oriented military strategy; and the
Soviet Union the party threatening world peace, with its offensive doctrine
and deployment. (See Tab E, "Fall Initiative") In coordination with the NSC,
State, ACDA, DOD and CIA, USICA through Project Truth is preparing new
exhibits (based on the one for the US Mission to the UN, See Tab R, Exhibits),
commissioning articles, sending speakers and briefing teams to target
countries abroad, preparing special public affairs guidance, and undertaking
extensive and innovative research to demonstrate graphically and credibly
America's vocation of peace. Research already underway will show, to the
highest scholarly standard, for example, the respect the U.S. already elicits
as the "Peace Party", so that policy can be targeted in specific countries
accordingly; and will show that the "arms race" is almost solely a product of
the Soviet military building program.
We are planning a publication on the broad "correlation of forces,"
which will show the world power balance in its various (political, economic,
military) dimensions: on all but one, the Soviet Union will be found gravely
deficient. As an example, American economic aid will be compared with the now
almost non-existent Soviet aid in the Third World. The Soviet overhang of
strategic nuclear capability (the 308 SS-18s, for example) will protrude the
more glaringly in this analysis. We will thereby generate important support
for our peace initiative by showing that our claim to be the "Peace Party" is
more than a matter of words: indeed that it is inherent in our interests in a
plural world.
During this first year of Project Truth's establishment, we have learned
much about the need for public affairs coordination within the U. S.
Government. The evolution of the project has clearly demonstrated throughout
the official foreign affairs community the essentiality of USICA's
contribution to the policy process, as the locus of public affairs
coordination.
Certainly the effectiveness of this operation from Moscow's point of
view may be gauged by the unprecedented volume and vehemence of Soviet attacks
on Director Wick and the entire Project Truth initiative. The chief Soviet
propagandist Leonid Zamyatin, after a lifetime devoted to Anti-American
propanganda, has unprecedentedly accused ICA of raising "'ideological war' to
the level of government policy". The USSR has reason for concern: Project
Truth has forged a truly effective government-wide weapon for the war of ideas.
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Presidential Directive
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THE WHITE HOUSE
September 9, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Following the August 17, 1981 briefing by Charles Z. Wick,
Director of the International Communication Agency, the
President directed that the program proposals presented by
the Director be subsumed under the National security Council
process, including interdepartmental meetings.
USIA should take_the,lead in the interdepartmental process,
with the cooperation of all-?participating agencies. Policy
decisions will be made within the framework of the NSC.
.The.President requests the assistarice?of all agencies in
implementing this decision.
Richard V. Atlen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
CC: The Director
International Communication Agency
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1. ?
International
Communication
"Agency
ed Stares of Amerce
` ? +ngton, D. C. 20547
October 2, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
.The Secretary of Defense
The Counsellor to the President
The Director of Central Intelligence
Chief of Sta'ff to the P sident
Deputy Chief of Staff tithe
President
The Chairman, mint Chiefs of Staffs
FROM: Charles Z. Wi
The attached Presidential directive through Richard V.
Allen, dated September 9, 1981, designates USICA to take
the lead in the interdepartmental process for a coor-
dinated program to counter Soviet propaganda and
disinformation.
In preliminary and informal discussion with you and
members of your departments and Agencies, we have been
setting up the operational machinery to implement Project
Truth. Coordination of the release of the D.O.D.'s Soviet
Military Power report together with Secretary Weinberger's
satellite transmission was, in effect, Project Truth's
initial undertaking.
Please let me have the name of the person you select to
be your permanent representative on the Project Truth
Coordinating Committee so we can move forward as quickly
as possible in response to the President's directive.
US1CA
Director
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ATTACHED LETTER SENT TO:
The Honorable
George Bush
Vice President
Executive Office Building
The Honorable
Edwin Meese, III
Counsellor to the President
The White House
The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
The Honorable
-Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President
The White House
The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Counselor of the Department
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
CIA Headquarters Building
The Honorable
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
The Honorable,
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
The Honorable
James A. Baker, III
Chief of Staff
to the President
The White House
The Honorable
Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense
.for Policy
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
The Honorable
.Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
The Honorable
General David C. Jones, USAF
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
STAT
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Project Truth Members
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COORDINATING COMMITTEE
The following individuals were officially designated as representatives by
their principals:
STAT
Bud MacFarlane
Department of State
General Robert Schweitzer
National Security Council
Michael Ledeen
Department of State
Dr. Fred We
Department of Defense
Mark Palmer
Department of State
Lt. General Philip Gast
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Carnes Lord
National Security Council
David Gergen
White House
Lyndon Allin
White House
Joe Lehman
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
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POLICY GROUP
STAT
Central Intelligence Agency
Richard Hechlinger
Department of State
Lewis Libby
Department of State
Lt. Col. Patrick Letellier
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joe Lehman
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Carnes Lord
National Security Council
Mark Palmer
Department of State
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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Prior to its reorganization in May, 1982, the members of the Executive
Committee were:
Elliot Abrams
Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs
(State)
Mark Palmer
Bureau of European
Affairs (State)
Lyndon Allin
The White House
Carnes Lord
National Security Council
Francis Gomez
Bureau of Public
Affairs (State)
Central Intelligence Agency
Edward Harper
ICA Liaison Officer
(DOD)
Lt. Col. Patrick Letellier
Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)
Michael Ledeen
Special Advisor to the
Secretary (State)
Jon Thomas
Policy Planning Staff
(State)
John Lenczowski
Bureau of European
Affairs (State)
? STAT
STAT
Central Intelligence Agency
Joe Lehman
Public Affairs (ACDA)
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THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
In May, 1982, the Executive Committee was reorganized to include
representatives from each of the following State Department - chaired
interagency groups on issues of major concern to Project Truth planning:
- Shaping European Attitudes
- Nuclear Issues
- Afghanistan
- El Salvador
- Chemical Biological Warfare
- Poland
Representatives from two Department of State bureaus have also been added:
- Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
- Bureau of Public Affairs
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Schedule of Meetings
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SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS
Executive Committee
Policy Group
November 4, 1981
January 13, 1982
November 18,
1981
February 24, 1982
December 2,
1981
March 10, 1982
December 9,
1981
April 7, 1982
December 16,
1981
April 15, 1982
January 6, 1982
April 19, 1982
January 13,
1982
April 20, 1982
January 20,
1982
May 26, 1982
February 3,
1982
June 9, 1982
February 17,
1982
July 7, 1982
March 3,
1982
March 17,
1982
March 31,
1982
May 5, 1982
May 19, 1982
June 16, 1982
June 30, 1982
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Agenda Topics
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November 9, 1981
PROJECT TRUTH
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: Tuesday, November 10, 1981, at 4 o'clock
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Conference Room
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20547
AGENDA
1. Afghanistan materials -- status report and strategy
Mark Palmer, State
Sam Wunder, ICA
2. Central America / Caribbean material -- status
report
Ed Harper, DOD
Michael Ledeen, State
3. Chemical and Biological Weapons project -- status
report
Jim Dobbins, State
Bill Keal, ICA
CIA
4. Presidential speech -- November 1981 -- public
relations strategy _
.Mike Schneider, ICA
Mark Palmer, State
- 5. Future PROJECT TRUTH initiatives
analysis of neutralism/pacificism groups
possible Presidential trip to Europe,
June 5-6, 1982
NATO document
Crime and punishment in the Soviet Union
STAT
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, November 18, 1981, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Office
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
UPDATE ON PROJECT TRUTH ACTIVITIES
Afghanistan, List of experts - Mike Ledeen, State
Central America/Caribbean/Cuba materials
Ed Harper, ICA
Mike Ledeen, State
Chemical and Biological Warfare
General Review and Assessment
-- Crime & Punishment
Status Report - Gifford Malone, ICA
-- Tag/logo for PROJECT TRUTH field traffic
-- TNF speech - Follow-up strategy
Mike Schneider, ICA
Mark Palmer, State
-- Preparation for November 30 Arms Control talks
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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0 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the November 18 Executive Committee meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
Afghanistan
Provide ICA with list of experts on Afghanistan (Palmer)
-- Identify cross-section of Afghani guerrilla leaders for January
presentation of pamphlet (Palmer)
-- Look into British efforts worldwide to place their films on Afghanistan
(Shirley)
-- Update ICA chronology on Afghanistan (Hughes staff)
Central America
-- Provide ICA with INR chronology of loss of freedoms in Nicaragua (Ledeen)
-- Consider distribution to posts of Hammond's Anatomy of Communist
Take-Overs and travel of author as Ampart (Hughes staff)
-- Coordinate declassification of material on Cuba and controlled release of
such information (Ledeen, Harper)
-- Invite Elliott Abrams to future Project Truth meetings to cover human
rights issues (Hughes)
-- Secure report of Inter-American Press Association on press situation in
Nicaragua (Hughes staff)
Chemical-Biological Warfare
-- Identify non-American experts, moral leaders, defecting Soviet scientists
with CBW expertise to document and express outrage at Soviet use of CBW
(Ledeen,
-- Provide collage of foreign press clippings on Soviet use of CBW
- Consider translations of Problems of Communism, and commissioned article'
on CBW (Hughes staff)
USG Spokesmen
Renew efforts to provide ICA with USG officials for VOA and Wireless File
interviews on above topics (Project Truth ExCom members)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STAT
STAT
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MJ
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, December 2, 1981, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
The Director's Office
Seventh Floor
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
Follow-up on Tasking Memo from November 18 EXCOM Meeting (attached)
Update on Project Truth Activities
--Discussion of designation by participating agencies of officer in
charge of fast response to Soviet misstatements
-Discussion of Afghanistan pamphlet and its release
-Discussion of material on Central America/Caribbean/Cuba
=Discussion of ways to use foreign press reaction clippings on Soviet
CBW, review "Yellow Rain" program activities
--Discussion of response to Soviet document on military power
--Discussion on release of "Crime and Punishment"
--Report on public diplomacy aspects of Geneva Arms Control talks
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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I .?. uIrILI&IJ %JU L? Lv4 %L. UJC.
During the December 2 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
I Afghanistan
a) Provide Executive Committee with list of experts on Afghanistan
(Palmer)
b) Check with PAOs to see if they can help local Grenada Films
representatives place Afghanistan films (Wunder)
c) Draft paper for NSC consideration of policy on declassification
of satellite photos (Ledeen)
II Central America/Caribbean/Cuba.
a) Contact Public Policy Private Sector Committee (Heritage
Foundation, et. al.) to request preparation of annotated
bibliography on Communist take-overs (Wunder)
b) Consider the preparation of a document`on communist take-over
culled from "Problems of Communism"articles (Schneider)
c) Secure ILO report on Nicaragua for Executive Committee (Abrams)
III CBW
a) Explore possibility of persuading leading European or Israeli
Socialist to examine the evidence of Soviet use of CBW in Asia
(Ledeen)
a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response
to Soviet document (Gillespie)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
on "Yellow Rain" and Soviet use of CBW for VOA
b) Provide Executive Committee with collage of foreign press clippings
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
STAT
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y . LIMITED UrFLULAL u5i 1$
V Crime and Punishment
a) Review "Crime and Punishment with CSCE representatives to include
their input (Schneider)
VI Project Truth Cable Identification
a) Draft cable for field on use of "PAXCOM" to identify cables
dealing with Project Truth (Chikes)
VII US Peace Initiatives
a) Draft public affairs plan to focus on historical US concern for
peace and arms control (Schneider)
VIII Soviet Diplomatic Behavior
a) Compile data on history of Soviet diplomatic "bullying" (Palmer)
IX Militarism and Communist Societies
a) Explore possibility of Problems of Communism article on
militarism as an inherent aspect of Communist societies (Schneider)
X Soviet Use of Proxies
a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group
monitoring activities of Soviet proxies (Thomas)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
Wednesday, December 9, 1981, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories.
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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;'
`/ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the December 9 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
I Afghanistan
a) Look into possibility of briefing on details of Soviet military
situation in Afghanistan (Harper) using Secretary Haig visit to
Peshawar as peg (Harrod)
II Nicaragua, Cuba, Central America
a) Draft memorandum requesting declassification of satellite photos
(Ledeen)
a) Explore possibility of producing ICA pamphlet on CBW based on
briefings and official compendium on "Yellow Rain" (Wunder)
b) Follow-up Seagrave suggestions on "Yellow Rain" scientific and
press contacts, photo sources, etc. (Hughes Staff)
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
...a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response
to Soviet document (Gillespie)
V Proiect Truth Cable Identification
a) Send cable to field requesting use of "PAXCOM"designation for all
Project Truth cables (Ledeen, Harper,
VI Soviet Diplomatic Behavior
a) Compile data on history of Soviet diplomatic "bullying" (Palmer)
VII Soviet Use of Proxies
a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group
monitoring activities of Soviet proxies for February 3, 1982
Executive Committee Meeting (Thomas)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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STAT
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, December 16, 1981, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
1. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the December 16 Executive Committee meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
I Afghanistan
a) Look into possibility of briefing on details of Soviet military
situation in Afghanistan by Secretary Haig for December 27, the
first anniversary of the invasion (Ledeen)
II . Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Draft memorandum requesting declassification of satellite photos
for January 6 Executive Committee Meeting (Ledeen)
a) Memo from ICA Director Wick to Secretary Haig requesting close
coordination of PM with Executive Committee on Project Truth (Chikes)
A
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
a) Provide Executive Committee with special working group response to
Soviet document (Gillespie)
V Project Truth Cable Identification
a) Send cable to field requesting use of " " designation for all
Project Truth cables (Ledeen, Harper,
VI Soviet Use of Proxies
a) Prepare unclassified version of report of State working group
monitoring activities of Soviet proxies-for February 3, 1982
Executive Committee, Meeting (Thomas)
VII Polish Crisis
a) Explore possibility of a prominent aon-government figure such as
Dave Abshire or Leonard Marx making public protest against
communications black-out imposed in Poland (Hughes, Kaminsky)
VIII "The Price of Peace" by Brian Crozier
a) Report to Executive Committee on possible use of Crozier
publication (Malone)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STAT
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, January 6, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the January 6 Executive Committee meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
I Afghanistan
a) Invite Ambassador Helman to the January 20 Executive Committee
Meeting to brief on his group's activities (Palmer)
b) Secure articles from Le Monde and Nouvelle Observateur on Soviet
bombing of hospitals in Afghanistan for Elliott Abrams (Chikes)
II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Geographic bureaus will be asked to identify targets for special
briefings using highly classified materials, especially photos
(Thomas)
b) A memorandum from Director Wick to Director Casey suggesting the
release of classified material for special briefings of selected
media, political leaders, etc. (Chikes)
III CBW
a) PM should consider contacting scientists Meselson and Robinson before
releasing Burt testimony to pre-empt press skepticism (Thomas)
b) USICA should look into using Dr. Rose from ABC Documentary "Rain of
Terror" as AmPart and translating the script (Chikes)
c) Check with DoD (Ikle and Perle) about decision on announcement re: US
binary weapons (Harper)
d) Look into CBW "Truth Squad" tour of Asian countries (Palmer)
e) VOA should secure material on CBW from Burt, also record discussion
between Seagrave and Meselson (Courtney)
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
a) Agency should check into programming AmParts in Tokyo to speak on the
Soviet military threat (Chikes)
V Project Truth Cables: PAXCOM
a) Send cable to field identifyi " designation for all project
Truth cables (Thomas, Palmer, STAT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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0
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
VI Soviet Use of Proxies
a) Final report, focussing on Libya and Cuba, still on February 3
schedule (Thomas)
VII Polish Crisis
a) Explore possibility of filming interviews with members of "Solidarity
in Exile" during Brussels January 8 meeting (EU)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, January 20, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITI:I) OFFICIAL USC
During the January 20 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
of select foreign audiences (Ctukes)
Afcanistan
Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Prepare memo from Director Wick to Director Casey requesting the use
of highly classified materials on a "not leave" basis for briefings
III CSUi
a) Secure from DOD material on Soviet deployment, stockpiling,
specialized troops, etc., of ci&,.emical biological weapons in Europe
F3
(
arPer b) Prepare guidance, interviews, WF articles, etc., on the deterrent
nature of US production of binary weapons, US desire for
negotiations, etc. (Thurber) .
c) Kook into possibility of briefing team on CEW to tour Asian countries
-pegged to release of "all-source" compilation of material on Soviet
use of CEW (Kiehl)
d) Secure transcript of Burt Foriegn Press Center' briefing and contact
Seagraves and Robinson for series on CEW (Harrod)
Soviet Publication on Military Power
Project Truth cables (Thomas)
Soviet Use of Proxies
a) Check into State Department cable designating use of PAXCCM tag for
a) Consider possible uses of Najda'film "Man of Iran" (Thurber)
MI-MTED OFFICIAL USE
Project Truth Cables: PAXCC.'11
VII Polish Crisis
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PROJECT TRUTH
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, February 3, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the February 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following
assignments were agreed upon:
I Afghanistan
a) Request Ambassador Helman to make available to the Executive
Committee public affairs material from the Afghanistan Day organizers
(NDlone)
b) Relay to V. top management the Executive committee's endorsement of
broadcasting to Afghanistan in Pushtu (Courtney)
II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Send letter from ICA to Director Casey requesting use of highly
classified materials for special briefings (Chikes)
b) Consider arranging background briefing by St. Agnes Sisters on
repression of Indians in Nicaragua (Thomas)
c) Consider background briefing for European journalists on Sandinista
repression touching on human rights, refugees and genocide themes in
light of French agreement to provide weapons (Gomez)
d) Request CIA material to show journalists during upcoming briefing on
situation in El Salvador (Ledeen)
e) Place on agenda for Policy Group consideration of Salvador as project
Truth topic in context of strategic implications-of,UUG public
diplomacy efforts (i.e., perhaps advisable to concentrate on areas
within Soviet sphere of influence: Poland, Afghanistan, CBW, etc.)
(Chikes )
f) Consider possibility of pamphlet (c.f. Afghanistan pamphlet) on
Nicaragua and/or "loose packet" of visuals for State use domestically
on, f.x. theme of militarization (Thurber) -
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
a) Ascertain if the Pentagon plans to respond to the Soviet document and
secure from Pentagon talking points to refute factual errors in the
publication (Harper)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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W
LIMITED OF'F'ICIAL USE
Soviet Use of Proxies
VI Polish Crisis
V
a) Consider possible follow-up of "Let Poland Be Poland" in pamphlet
format (Thurber)
VII New Theme
a) Consider as a theme the revival of Stalinism and the weakening of
Moscow's grip on foreign communist parties (Thurber)
LII.2TED .OFFICIAL USE
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PROJECT TRUTH
EXECUTIVE-COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, February 17, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories.
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIi SITED 0M-- CIAL USE
During the February 17, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following
assignments were agreed upon:
Afghanistan
a) Consider advisability of White House screening of ICA film on
Afghanistan for diplomatic corps (Thurber)
b) Consider possibility of increasing VGA broadcast time to Afghanistan
on March 21 to mark Afghanistan Day (in conjunction with BBC
broadcasting) (Grabell)
II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Determine objectives to be served by possible coverage of situation
in Nicaragua by Spanish TV and best means of facilitating such
coverage (Besom, Henze, Mathes)
b) Prepare catalogue of visual material on militarization in Nicaragua
and situation of Meskito Indians to offer European TV (Harper,
c) Transmit catalogue of visual materials when completed (above) to PAD
. Madrid to offer with 'facilitative assistance to Spanish TV (Henze)
d) Consider Foreign Press Center briefing on situation in Nicaragua by
.ARA experts for selected European journalists (Thomas, Steiner, Gomez)
e) Consider participation of appropriate Nicaraguan emigres in briefings
for European journalists (Thomas,
f) Solicit advice of AmEmbassy San Salvador about what Washington can do
to help assure balanced coverage upcoming elections (Besom)
g) Prepare guidance cable for AR and EU on "Caribbean Basin Initiative"
themes (Mathes)
a) Prepare joint State/ICA cable encouraging missions to support public
affairs program on CBW as a priority item (Steiner, Thurber)
IV Soviet Publication on Military Power
a) Prepare guidance cable on Soviet pamphlet, "Shence the Threat to
Europe" (Steiner)
V Soviet Use of Proxies
STAT
STAT
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VI Polish Crisis
a) Coordinate with EUR during preparaticn of ICA pamphlet cn Poland
(Thurber)
VII Soviet Propaganda Alert
a) Suggest that PQI/R cite sources as appropriate throughout Soviet
Propaganda Alert (Chikes)
VIII Problems of Communism
a) Consider publication of Spanish language editicn (Malone)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, March 3, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547-
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
During the March 3, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following assignments
were agreed upon:
Afghanistan
a) Determine restrictions governing domestic screening of ICA film on
Afghanistan (Chikes)
b) Attempt improvement of publicity for appointment of former Secretary
Rogers to head private sector effort on Afghanistan Day (Steiner,
Gomez)
II Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Obtain declassified photos of burned Miskito villages for release in
coordinated fashion t British and Italian TV, and perhaps by Jean
STAT
Kirkpatrick
~ 7
b) Develop plan for most effective release of declassified photos
(above) (Steiner, Henze, Mathes)
c) Contact Moravian Church for appropriate Nicaraguan emigres to brief
European journalists; also Nicaraguans who attended Caracas meeting
of Committee for Defense of Democracy in Nicaragua (Thomas)
d) Contact PAO San Salvador to alert U.S. press to story of Salvadoran
terrorists captured by Costa Rican police; also to send list for PA
of foreign journalists in Salvador (Besom)
.e) Consider most effective release of captured Salvadoran guerrilla
documents on plans to disrupt upcoming elections - perhaps to be
released by Assistant Secretary Enders (Gomez)
III Soviet Publication cn Military Power
a) Develop guidance on overall thrust of Soviet propaganda line of which
"Whence the Threat to Peace" is one manifestation (Gillespie,
Hursh-Cesar, Steiner, Lenczowski)
Dateline America
a) Develop themes for a series of articles stressing American ideals,
i.e., ("what do we stand for?") for inclusion in the "Dateline
America" feature service, among other outlets (Lenczowski, Schneider)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, March 17, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
'II. New items not reviewed during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED'OFFICIAL USE
During the March 17, 1982 Executive Committee Meeting the following
assignments were agreed upon:
Afghanistan
a) The sense of the committee was that requests for Congressional
exemption from the ban on'domestic dissemination of ICA products
(i.e., the film on Afghanistan) should come from outside the USG
(i.e., former Secretary Rogers)
a) Advise DOD (Perle) of desirability of postponing DOD testimony on
resumption of binary weapons production until yellow rain story has
had time to develop fully (Harper)
b) Discuss with members of CBW briefing team desirability of briefing
Perry Robinson and other "doubters" on yellow rain during overseas
tour (Kiehl)
c) Check with PM about arranging briefings on contents of new report for
Rosen and other US scientists (Thomas)
III Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America
a) Check into availability for press of Costa Rican judge's
interrogation of captured gun-runners to Nicaragua (Ledeen)
b) Check with ARA on captured Salvadoran guerrilla documents re:
availability, quality and possible release to press (Ledeen)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, March 31, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COIQIUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Review of tasking memo (attached) with introduction of new items under
listed subject categories
II. New items not reviecred during review of tasking memo categories
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, May 5, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Brief discussion of new directions for the Project Truth Executive
Committee
II. Report from Shaping European Attitudes group on public affairs plans on
"Poland" topic
III. Discussion of public affairs strategies for "Nuclear Freeze," "UN SSOD,"
"CBW" and "Afghanistan"
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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ACTION IOTA
May 7, 1982
) RANMI FOR: See Distribution
rpm: Gifford D. Nalor ,
SULTECT: Project Truth Executive Committee Meeting of May 5
She following sur-gestions for Agency action resulted from the May 5 meeting of
the Project Truth Executive Committee:
Poland: Pacuest EU posts to collect and send in material published by
Solidarity. Action: EJ - -
Nuclear Freeze: Determine if there is a good article the Agency can use to
put the U.S. nuclear freeze movement into perspective. Action: ?(3,1/P
C3F7: Maintain contact with PM to keep track of forthcoming articles on
mycotoxins; determine if September 5 Vienna conference on mycotoxins
will be useful public affairs event for U.S. case against Soviet use of
CBW; recuest posts worldwide to redouble efforts to show ABC "Rain of
Terror. " Action: PG1/PAC O
Request posts worldwide to submit articles from local media on Soviet
use of CEW. Action: PG4/R
Afghanistan: Accuire early copy of forthcoming report from Iii to prepare
policy guidance and alert Wireless File to material or. human rights
violations in Afghanistan; determine availability of declassified
material on Afghanistan from P:SA. Action: PQI/G
Arrange screening of Agency VTR on Afghanistan for members of Executive
Committee. Action: PGI/PA D
For clarification of any of these items please contact PCsi/PAOD: Mr. Chi?ces.
DISTRIBUTIONS: EU - Mr. Henze
PW/P - Mr. McGinley
PGM/PADS - Mr. Chikes
PCM/R - Mr. Hursh-Cesar
P I/G - Mr. Thurber
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PROJECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, May 19, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Discussion of Agency memo following up May 5 Executive Committee meeting
II. Update reports on activities of interagency work groups
III. Contacts with US religious groups
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROJECT TRUTH
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DATE: Wednesday, June 16, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL 001.2 UNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547 .
I. Discussion of public affairs implications of previous meeting's
presentation on Poland (Herspring)
II. Update reports on activities of interagency working groups:
Shaping European Attitudes (Steiner)
Nuclear Issues (Pernick)
Afghanistan (Sir ns)
El Salvador (Moser)
CBW (Celec, Kiehl)
III. Discussion of follow up to President's European visit as part of an
overall public affairs strategy: a promising case for interagency
coordination (Schneider)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PROTECT TRUTH
DATE: Wednesday, June 30, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTF 2NATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
1. Update reports on activities of interagency working groups:
Shaping European Attitudes (Steiner)
Nuclear Issues (DeBuck)
El Salvador (Besom)
II. Discussion of promising public affairs opportunities: the
Initiative" (Scott Thompson)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, January 13, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COUMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 25047
1. Purpose and Function of Policy Group and its Relationship to Executive
Committee
II. Discussion of Current Project Truth Initiatives and Suggestions for New
Projects
a) Afghanistan
b) Nicaragua/Cuba/Central America (Declassification)
c) CBW,
d) Soviet Military Threat
e) PAXCOM
f) Soviet Use of Proxies
g) Polish Crisis
III. Relationship to Other Inter-Agency Foreign Affairs Working Groups
a) EUR/EU Group on "Shaping European Attitudes
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V
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PROS] TRLMi PCLICY GROUP METING
LATE: Wednesday, February 24, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTEPNATICNAL COiMMJNICATICN AGUNCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Discussion of Memoranda on Ways to Strengthen and Improve Inter-Agency
Coordination of Foreign Affairs Public information programs
II. Relationship of Project Truth Executive Committee to other Inter-Agency
Foreign Affairs Working Groups (i.e., EUR/EU Group on "Shaping European
Attitudes")
III. Discussion of Current Project Truth Initiatives on El Salvador in
Context of Strategic Implications of Overall USG Public Diplomacy
Efforts (on Poland, Afghanistan, CEW, etc.)
LIMITED OFFICIAL UM
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PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, March 10, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE : INTERNATIONAL COM111UNI CATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Discussion of Memoranda on Ways to Strengthen and Improve Inter-Agency
Coordination of Foreign Affairs Public Information programs
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, April 7, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 600
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Discussion of strengthened structure for interagency coordination of
information policy.
II. Discussion of mechanics of tasking interagency working groups to carry
out assignments issued by Executive Committee.
III. Discussion of public affairs issues which should be addressed by the
Executive Committee during the next three months.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Thursday, April 15, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Presentation and Discussion of Paper on Public Affairs Strategy to
Support Objectives of President's European Trip.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Monday, April 19, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. Briefing on US Economic Policy Objectives of President's European Trip.
II. Discussion of Memo to Heads of Departments Participating in Project
Truth to Implement Proposed Public Affairs Strategy Supporting
President's European Trip.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT 7TUM POLICY GROUP "1EETING
DA:E: Tuesday, April 20, 1982, 4:00 P.M.
PL E: INTERNATIONAL CI JNICA'"ION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Briefing on US Economic Policy Objectives of President's European Trip.
II. Discussion of Memo to Heads of Departments Participating in Project
Truth to implement Proposed Public Affairs Strategy Supporting
President's European Trip.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, flay 26, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE : fl PNATIONAL O41JNICATION AGENCY
Roam 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue,' N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
I. President Reagan's Iiropean Trip: Public Affairs Follow up
II. SSOD - Anticipating Soviet Surprises
III. Project Truth Executive Committee: Critique and observations on New
Directions
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, June 9, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Perspectives on Poland: Implications for Public Affairs Strategy
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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J ....
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PROJECT TRUTH POLICY GROUP MEETING
DATE: Wednesday, July 7, 1982, 3:00 P.M.
PLACE:. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Room 709
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
AGENDA
I. Discussion of Public Affairs Strategy on Gas Pipeline (Schneider)
II. Discussion of Interagency Tasking Assignments to Implement "Fall
Initiative" (Thompson)
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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"Fall Initiative"
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"FALL INITIATIVE"
As the centerpiece of Project Truth's "Fall Initiative," USICA is
undertaking an analysis of US-USSR strategic nuclear forces. The
comparison extends the analysis of Albert taohlstetter ("Is There An
Arms Race") of US-USSR strategic capabilities from the early 1960s to
the mid-1970s.
The project will bring up-to-date Uohlstetter's analysis (which stopped
at 1972) of the relationship between U.S. estimates and actual numbers
(estimates after deployment) of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles
(ICBti, SLBM, LP.B); as well as U.S. strategic capabilities:
megatonnage, warhead numbers, equivalent megatonnage, and strategic
force budgets.
The purpose of this project is to compare U.S. and Soviet deployment in
order to provide data that will he used worldwide to:
counter widespread public ignorance of the extent and pace
of U.S. efforts to prevent an arms race;
develop a greater appreciation of the U.S. commitment to
peace; and
demonstrate that U.S. nuclear strategies are based on a
reality threat, not overestimation of Soviet strength.
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Soviet Propaganda Alert
a)
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SOVIET PROPOGANDA ALERT
The single Project Truth product most familiar to U.S. government officials is
the widely-read Soviet Propaganda Alert which is published monthly by ICA's
research office. Inaugurated in October of 1981, this service is a summary
and analysis of the Soviet propaganda medium which provides government
officials, VOA, 200 overseas posts, and non-government audiences with a
general overview of Soviet public affairs attacks. Soviet Propaganda Alert
has proven a valuable background document calling attention to Soviet
propaganda principles and techniques and is a respected example of a
successful Project Truth initiative.
The ICA Office of Research is also responsible for a number of other
contributions to the Project Truth process. Among them are:
Reports
- a guide to countering Soviet forgeries of U.S. documents
- a study of Soviet elites and their perceptions of the U.S.
- a study of Soviet cultural and information activities in third countries
Special Services
- supplied the raw-data for the "Soviet Distortions and Fabrications"
series
- public opinion surveys of West European attitudes on arms control and
the President's peace initiatives
Special Research Memoranda
- Poland
- Falkland Islands
- Yellow Rain (CBW)
- direct Soviet attacks on USICA and the VOA
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample products.
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Countering
Soviet Mis-statements
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This service is designed to provide field posts with immediate guidance to
assist them in refuting Soviet or Soviet-sponsored propaganda and
disinformation. Responses are initiated by specific post requests for
guidance, are not limited to unclassified material, and are usually sent to
particular posts where such allegations may arise in the future. The
Department of State handles requests for guidance on Soviet "active measures,"
and our policy guidance staff works closely with State to coordinate responses
to post requests for guidance.
Fast-response guidances provided to our posts have included advice on how to
deal with such issues as:
- claims that the U.S. has developed and used Chemical-Biological warfare
in South and Southeast Asia and in Latin America
- the World Peace Council
- disarmament and arms control
- U.S. military activities in El Salvador
- U.S. military exercises around the world
- allegations about U.S. Government officials.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample product.
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Soviet Distortions
and Fabrications
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"SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS"
At the end of April, USICA began a new unclassified service to expose current
Soviet mis-statements about the U.S. and U.S. policies ("Soviet Distortions
and Fabrications"). This new service is designed to supplement the broader
analysis of themes contained in "Soviet Propaganda Alert" by rapidly giving
our overseas posts an idea of the extent of current Soviet efforts in this
field. The service is carried about three times a week to 200 overseas posts
on our UNINFO telegram channel. Posts are able to distribute this product
selectively as they deem best suited to local conditions.
Each issue of the service gives several examples of propaganda on a common
theme and suggestions on how officers in the field can respond to the
allegations. Over twenty issues of the service have been sent to the field
since its commencement. Among the subjects discussed have been Soviet
mis-statements on:
- the Falkland Islands crisis
- the situation in Poland
- the crisis in Lebanon
- the President's speeches at Versailles, the British Parliament, the
German Bundestag, and the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament
- Chemical/Biological Warfare
- attacks on USICA officers and programs.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample products.
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Dateline America
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One Project Truth product geared to actively counter misleading impressions
about the United States generated by Soviet propaganda is Dateline America.
Designed to project a positive image overseas of American ideals, people,
society, and institutions, Dateline America is a bi-weekly illustrated news
feature service aimed at a mass audience via placement in the popular press by
USICA Public Affairs Officers at more than 200 posts around the world. Each
issue consists of approximately a dozen articles of 600 words or less from
magazine, newspaper, USICA and other government agency sources. Thus far,
eleven issues of Dateline America have been sent overseas, since its inception
on January 22, 1982.
Nearly 132 articles or short news briefs have appeared in Dateline America, 36
of which were adapted from government agency contributions. To encourage
increased participation in Dateline America, meetings have been held with
representatives of 15 executive branch departments and agencies since the
first of the year.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample products.
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Satellite
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SATELLITE TELEVISION PROGRAMS
"Let Poland Be Poland," perhaps the most ambitious satellite program ever
transmitted by USICA, was produced on behalf of the Polish people following
the imposition of Martial Law. In addition to the estimated 172 million
people in 42 countries outside the U.S. who viewed the television program, we
estimate that another 100 million people worldwide listened as "Let Poland Be
Poland" was broadcast by both VOA and Radio Free Europe facilities in 15
languages. In the United States, PBS reports that at least 142 of its
affiliated stations carried "Let Poland Be Poland" either live or in delayed
broadcast.
The Video Dialogue is USICA's newest and most effective public affairs medium
for satellite programming. A Video Dialogue is a televised satellite link-up
between Cabinet level officials in Washington and key electronic and print
media journalists in selected countries on major policy issues. Video
Dialogues provide access for the Spokesman to explain our foreign policy on
major overseas networks in prime time to large audiences.
Since September 1981, ICA has utilized the Video Dialogue seven times to bring
leading spokesmen in touch with overseas audiences.
VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Dr. Murray Weidenbaum U.S. Economic Recovery With TV-2 Swedish
Chairman, CEA Program Radio; technical
Sep 8, 1981; Sweden problems hampered
our judging final
outcome of interview
Caspar Weinberger U.S. Security Policy With ZDF-TV
Secretary of Defense in Europe (TV-2);live program seen
Nov 4, 1981; W Germany by approx. 8 million
West Germans with
additional spillover
into E. Germany,
Austria, and
Switzerland; program
replayed by both ZDF and
ARD-TV following day
during noontime to
additional audience;
resulted in large amount
of press play as well.
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VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN
SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Caspar Weinberger U.S.-Japan Security
Secretary of Defense Issues
Dec 16 1981; Japan
Malcolm Baldrige US-Japan Trade and
Secretary of Commerce Economic Issues
Mar 30 1982; Japan
Thomas Enders US Policy toward Cen-
Assistant Secretary of tral America
State for Inter- Apr 21 1982;Belgium
American Affairs
NHK-TV; viewed by 10
million;coincided with
the climax of the
Japanese Parliamentary
Defense Budget debate;
elicited great deal of press
comment; thought to have had
a positive impact on
Parliament's decision to
increase the percentage of
money spent on Defense in
1982 beyond expected amount.
NHK-TV; 12 minute
segment shown on prime
time NewsCenter 9
to an estimated 15 million
viewers.
RTBF-TV; this panel show
was broadcast in prime
time to approximately
250,000 Belgians and resulted
in additional commentary by
the Belgian press.
Beryl Sprinkel U.S. Economic Policy ZDF-TV; shown on
Under Secretary and its impact on biweekly Bilanz
of Treasury Germany (Balance) program to 7
Apr 28 1982; W Germany million viewers.
(Sprinkel was a last-minute
stand-in for Secretary
Regan.)
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VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Lawrence Eagleburger U.S.- West German ZDF-TV; Live dialogue
Under Secretary Relations: The Presi- between Mr. Eagleburger
of State dent's Visit and his counterpart in
June 2 1982; W Germany the West German Foreign
Ministry Dr. Hildegard
Hamm-Bruecher; broadcast on
ZDF Magazin. 8 million
viewers. This Video Dialogue
originated at the request of
ZDF-TV.
The following additional satellite transmissions were not considered to be
Video Dialogues:
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
President Reagan President Reagan's Address on Foreign
Foreign Policy Address Color VTR and live multi-
Nov 18, 1981 Europe country satellite transmission
on 18 Nov 81, President Reagan
delivers his first major
foreign policy speech before
an audience at the National
Press Club in Washington. He
proposes mutual U.S.-Soviet
reductions of nuclear weapons
in Europe, and elimination of
the risk of surprise nuclear
attacks.
Caspar Weinberger Announcement of DOD Announcing release of DOD
Pamphlet, Sept 29, 1981 "Soviet Military Power"
Europe pamphlet, transmitted on
closed circuit to NATO
Headquarters, viewed by over
100 European journalists.
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VIDEO DIALOGUES CONDUCTED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981
Secretary Haig
President Reagan
Director Wick
Assistant Secretary
Elliot Abrams
Under Secretary
Walter Stoessel
President Reagan
President Reagan
Secretary Haig
Secretary Haig
Secretary Haig
SUBJECT, NOTES
DATE, COUNTRY
Versailles Summit Color satellite feed to Europe
May 24, 1982, Europe on 24 May 82.
Pre-Summit Interview Color satellite transmission
June 1, 1982, Europe to Europe on 1 Jun 82.
BBC Facilitative Color satellite transmission
Satellite, Jan 21, 1982 to London on 21 Jan 82.
Facilitative RAI Italy Satellite transmission
April 26, 1982 Transmitted 26 Apr 82.
Policy Toward Poland Interview deals with sanctions
Dec 30, 1981, Poland against the Soviet Union and
Poland. While portions of
interview used by BBC and
French television through
their own correspondents,
PGM/T satellited an edited
version of the key segments
to Italian television.
Reagan's Address on Color satellite transmission
Caribbean Basin Policy, on 24 Feb 82.
Feb. 24, 1982
Pre-Summit Interview Color satellite transmission
for European TV to Europe on 1 Jun 82, areas
Networks, June 1, 1982 except EU which has only non-
commercial CCTV or direct
projection.
Press Conference
Feb. 5, 1982
Arms Limitation
Nov. 30, 1981
Interviewed by RAI-TV
March 24, 1982
Color satellite transmission
to the Middle East - Arabic -
Transmitted 5 Feb 82.
Color satellite feed -
English, Spanish, Portuguese -
Transmitted 30 Nov 81.
English - Facilitative
satellite feed to Rome -
Completed 24 Mar 82.
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TELEPRESS CONFERENCES
The TelePress Conference is an international conference call placed between a
USG spokesman in Washington and a small group (5 maximum) of radio or print
journalists in a particular country. The TelePress Conference spokesman is
most frequently the highest level substantive policy-making official on a
particular issue. (Office Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary is the norm;
higher ranking officials have also used this medium.) The TelePress
Conference is for tactical situations and has proven especially effective in
clarifying issues in bilateral relations. They can be conducted at our VOA
studios (to assure high quality sound) or at any office or residence where a
conference phone outlet can be installed. These TelePress Conferences have
uniformly resulted in front page coverage.
U.S. views on Project Truth themes have been the subject of some of our 19
TelePress Conferences thus far:
TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Myles Frechette US-Cuban Relations Articles in El
Director, Office of Dec 14, 1981; Colombia Espectador,
Cuban Affairs, State El Tiempo and La
Department Republica
Myles Frechette US-Cuban Relations Article in El Comercio
State Department Feb 11, 1982; Peru
Craig Johnstone US Central American Articles in CANA, The
Director, Office of Policy Daily
Central American and Feb 18, 1982; Jamaica Gleaner, The News;
Panamanian Affairs, broadcast by Radio
State Department Jamaica, Jamaica Broadcasting
Company
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TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Amb. Robert Ryan, Caribbean Basin
Articles in The News-
Director, Office of Initiative
Advocate, The Nation,
Regional Economic Mar 3, 1982; Barbados
CANA;broadcast by
Policy,
Caribbean Broadcasting
State; Stephen Lande,
Co., and Rediffusion
Asst. Special Trade
Radio
Representative, USTR
John Penfold Caribbean Basin
Broadcast by Radio Reloj,
Deputy Director, Office Initiative
Radio Colombia and Radio
of Regional Economic Mar 4, 1982; Costa Rica
Monumental
Policy, State
John Penfold Caribbean Basin
Articles in El Teimpo,
State Department Initiative
Tribuna; broadcast by
Mar 8, 1982; Honduras
Radio America and
Honduras Radio
Nacional
John Penfold Caribbean Basin
Articles in Ultima Hora,
State Department Initiative
El Nacional de Ahora, La
Mar 9 1982; Dominican
Noticia and
Republic
TV Channel 2
Stephen Lande Caribbean Basin
Article in El Nacional
USTR Initiative
Mar 10 1982; Venezuela
Don Holm, Office of Caribbean Basin
Broadcast by Guyana
Regional Econ. Policy, Initiative
Broadcasting
State Department; Mar 26 1982; Guyana
Corporation and Guyana
Bennett Marsh, Director
News Agency
for Caribbean-Central
American Affairs, USTR
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TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
Myles Frechette US-Cuban Relations
State Department Apr 22 1982; Honduras
NOTES
Used by: El Tiempo,
Tribuna, Heraldo, La
Prensa,
Honduras Radio Nacional
Donna Alvarado, Counsel Status of Immigration
Used by: The
,Subcommittee on Immi- Legislation
News-Advocate,
gration and Refugee
Apr 23 1982; Barbados
The Nation, Caribbean
Policy, Senate
Broadcasting
Committee on Judiciary
Corporation, CANA
Marc Leland
U.S. Monetary Policy
AFP, Vereinigte
Assistant Secretary,
Apr 29 1982; USEC
Wirtschaftdienste
International Affairs,
Economic News Service,
Treasury Department
Financial Times, Reuter,
The Guardian, European
Report Agence Europe,
The Times
Dr. Carlton Turner,
U.S. International
Caretas magazine
Director,White House
Narcotics Policy
Office of Drug Abuse
May 11 1982; Peru
Policy;
Dominick DiCarlo,
Assistant Secretary of
State for International
Narcotics Matters
Donna Alvarado
Pending Legislation
The Daily Gleaner,
Senate Staff
on Immigration Policy
The News, CANA, Radio
May 14 1982; Jamaica
Jamaica, Jamaica
Broadcasting Corporation
Current Status of CBI
The Daily Gleaner,
State Department
Proposal
Jamaica Broadcasting
May 26 1982; Jamaica
Corporation, The News,
CANA, Financial
Times/Economist, Radio
Jamaica, IPS
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TELEPRESS CONFERENCES CONDUCTED AND SCHEDULED SINCE DECEMBER 1981
SPOKESMAN SUBJECT,
DATE, COUNTRY
John Penfold Current Status of CBI
State Department Proposal
May 27 1982; Barbados
Leo V. Mayer, US Food Trade Policy
Deputy Director, Jun 16 1982; Japan
Foreign
Agricultural Service,
Agriculture Department
NOTES
The News Advocate, The
Nation, CANA, Caribbean
Broadcasting Corporation
(TV and radio)
Used as backgrounder by:
four leading newspapers
- Asahi, Nihon Keizai,
Yomiuri, Sankei, one
news service -Kyodo,
and NHK TV.
Eugene V. Rostow, U.S. Arms Control Questioned by The Sydney
Director, U.S. Arms Policy Morning Herald , The
Control and Disarmament Jun 22 1982; Australia Australian, Bulletin.
Agency Covered in 3-column
headline article in The
Australian.
Lionel H. Olmer, U.S. Policy on the Questioned by 5 Belgian
Under Secretary of Soviet Gas Pipeline and 6 EC-accredited
Commerce, Jul 2 1982; Belgium European journalists.
International Trade and USEC TelePress Conference
tape later played for
major wire services.
Articles appeared in
British and Belgian
papers. Story picked up
by Hobart Rowen in
7/3/82 Washington Post.
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aiE
CO
Y
Speakers and
Briefing Teams
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USICA's speaker program has consistently supported Project Truth themes by
providing authoritative speakers to the most demanding and vital of foreign
audiences.
The following subjects have been addressed by USICA-sponsored speakers:
- Afghanistan
- U.S. Peace Initiatives
- Yellow Rain
- Four top speakers held programs in Western
Europe, Argentina, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
(March - May 1982)
- A select group of 12 speakers is scheduled to
cover Western Europe, Japan, Latin American and
several individual countries (Summer 1982)
- Sterling Seagrave, author of Yellow Rain became
a "media event" in four Western European
countries (Fall 1981)
In addition agency officers have been members of special briefing teams, or
"truth squads," made up of officials from various U.S. Government agencies
sent to selected countries (mostly in Western Europe) to meet with government
counterparts, academics, and the press in a coordinated effort to press home
the administration's policy on key issues. Themes addressed by these briefing
teams have been:
- Soviet Active Measures
- Chemical Warfare
- El Salvador
Reaction to the teams' visits has been very positive. On Yellow Rain,.for
example, the team's trip generated extensive press coverage and, most
importantly, a public statement of agreement with the U.S. position from the
British government.
Since January 1, 1982 the following topics supporting U.S. foreign policy
initiatives have been addressed by USICA sponsored speakers:
Soviet Military Power
29
Europe
President Reagan's Zero
Option Proposal
23
Europe
Martial Law in Poland
12
Europe
Pipeline/Sanctions
3
Europe
American Foreign Policy
in the Middle East
12
NEA, EA
Cuban Hemispheric
interference
3
Latin America
Caribbean Basin Initiative
4
Latin America
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Foreign Press Center
c m
rnC
LL
.J ~
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FOREIGN PRESS CENTERS
Programming at the New York and Washington Foreign Press Centers has focused
to a great extent on Project Truth themes. Special briefings for foreign
correspondents provide coverage not otherwise readily available in leading
foreign newspapers and magazines. During the past year the following themes
have been addressed:
-
International economic problems (fifteen briefings)
-
U.S. policy towards Latin America (four briefings)
-
Yellow Rain (briefing by Richard Burt)
-
Afghanistan Day (briefing by U.S. Afghanistan Day coordinator,
Secretary of State William Rogers)
former
-
U.S.-Soviet relations (briefings by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and
Helmut Sonnenfeldt)
-
Soviet pipeline (briefing by Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Lawrence Brady)
-
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (briefing by USICA's W. Scott Thompson)
The Foreign Press Centers also arrange programs for visiting journalists and
excursions outside Washington and New York for the resident corps. For
example, Project Truth-related themes (mainly security issues such as arms
control) were the main interests of a group of NATO journalists as well as a
separate group of Norwegian security writers.
Since September 23, 1981 the following officials participated in special
briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center:
James A. Baker, III, Chief of
Staff and Assistant to the
President
State of the Union:
Where We Go from Here
1/27/82
David R. Gergen, Assistant to
the President and Staff
Director
White House perspective
one year after the
election
11/4/81
Jerry Jordan, Member
President's Council of
Economic Advisors
International Trade and
Monetary Policy,
Interest Rates
2/18/82
Donald Regan, Secretary
of Treasury
Preview of Upcoming
Versailles Summit
Meetings
5/25/82
Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary
Purpose/Results - Trip
11/12/81
of Commerce
to Japan and Korea
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Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S.
Representative to U.N.
U.S. and the United
Nations
3/1/82
Fred Ikle, Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy
MX Program
10/2/81
Clarification of U.S.
Position on Nuclear
War
6/4/82
Beryl Sprinkel Under
Secretary of Treasury for
Monetary Affairs
Upcoming annual IMF
Meeting
9/23/81
Beryl Sprinkel
Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks and
Interest Rates
2/25/82
Beryl Sprinkel
U.S. - European
Economic Relations
4/30/82
Beryl Sprinkel
Follow-up to the
Versailles Summit
Meetings
6/14/82
Ambassador Edward Rowny,
Special Representative
for ACDA
Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks
6/24/82
James P. Wade, Principal
Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense
Enhanced Radiation
Weapon
10/5/81
Henry Nau, National
Security Council
Caribbean Basin
Initiative
2/25/82
James Rentschler, National
Security Council
European Summit
Meetings - Emphasis
on NATO Meetings
5/28/82
Senator William V. Roth
Weapons Commonality
and Interoperability
5/13/82
Senator John Heinz
International Trade
Issues
2/9/82
Senator Henry M. Jackson
U.S. - Soviet
Relations
12/3/81
Henry C. Wallich, Governor
Objectives for
3/16/82
of Federal Reserve Board
Monetary Policy
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Dr. Alice Rivlin, Director
of Congressional Budget
Office
Economy and the Budget
4/6/82
Mayor Ed Koch of New York
General - from New
2/8/82
York FPC
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Films and Videotapes
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FILMS/VIDEOTAPES
Following the agenda of the Project Truth Executive Committee, the USICA
Television and Film Service has acquired or produced visual materials on such
key themes as Afghanistan, Yellow Rain, Soviet Military Power and Poland.
These materials have been placed extensively on third country television and
used by our Foreign Service Officers overseas in small group discussions
following private screenings. Some examples:
- "Afghanistan: The Fight to Regain Freedom Continues" is an Agency production
based on the best available footage from virtually every available film source
on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Producers then added interviews with
former Afghan government officials, French doctors with experience in
Afghanistan, and Soviet experts to produce a hard-hitting, highly credible
program. This film/videotape was completed in time for use overseas in March
1982 in connection with Afghanistan Day, and became the centerpiece of many
Afghanistan Day observances around the world. It has also been shown on
television in many countries.
- The Agency acquired the ABC Close-Up program "Rain of Terror," and
distributed copies of the program to our posts in over 50 countries, where it
has been used in small-group showings with highly placed contacts. In at
least two instances, showings to local TV station managers sparked commercial
interest in acquiring the videotape directly from ABC for local showing. At
present, the Television and Film Service is producing its own program on
Yellow Rain which will highlight U.S. charges, scientific proof and third
country statements in support of our position.
- Poland: The Television and Film Service is currently completing production
of a major film on Poland which will feature visual material only--no
dialogue-designed to illustrate the continuing Soviet oppression in Poland
since World War II. This film will be used overseas in conjunction with the
Agency's Academy Award-winning film "Czechoslavakia 1968" which also used the
news footage/no dialogue technique.
Additional films produced on Project Truth themes:
- SOVIET MILITARY POWER
- RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE
The latter has proved especially useful in Arab Middle Eastern countries to
illustrate the United States' commitment to protection of its interests in
that area.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
list of Agency film and VTR productions and acquisitions with Project Truth
related items underlined.
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Wireless File
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WIRELESS FILE
The Wireless File is a key tool in communicating with our 200 field
posts, and through them to our foreign audiences, on Project Truth
themes. Of the hundreds of items carried on the five geographical
branch files since January 1982, for example, well over 20% resulted
from Project Truth inter-agency coordination. Several examples will
illustrate:
- El Salvador - USICA formed a special task force to develop
materials for the Wireless File on the elections in El Salvador. This
task force worked closely with the State Department's working group on
El Salvador, which was in turn represented in Project Truth
deliberations. The result was a flood of material in the weeks leading
up to the Salvadoran elections. Over 100 items ran on the file in the
five weeks leading up to the Salvadoran election, most targeted
specifically for use in Europe.
- Yellow Rain - The Wireless File has carried virtually every
newsworthy item on Yellow Rain since the issue first surfaced in late
1981. By working through the Project Truth process with the Department
of State and the inter-agency group on chemical warfare, USICA planned
wireless file coverage for the release of the Department of State's
Special Report No. 98 on March 22, 1982. The file has also acquired
rights to outstanding foreign and domestic reporting on the use of
chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and run this material
for possible reprinting by third country press. Special interviews and
staff-written pieces round out the comprehensive coverage given this
issue by the file.
- Afghanistan - Every two months the Wireless File updates a
comprehensive Afghanistan chronology documenting the Soviet invasion.
In addition to news items, the File frequently runs feature articles
paraphrasing the Embassy Kabul situation report (which is designed for
use in briefing the foreign press). This piece often provides more hard
news than otherwise would be available and is an invaluable source of
information to our posts.
- Peace Initiatives - In line with Project Truth Executive Committee
decisions, the file began to run numerous items on U.S. arms control and
peace initiatives beginning in April 1982. These items included an
edited version of a USICA-produced "Peace Initiatives Chronology" which
documents U.S. flexibility and Soviet intransigence on this issue.
Obviously, concentration on this issue will continue during the START
talks, especially for the Western European audiences.
In addition, the Wireless File has been running "VOA editorials" (see
following pages).
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth
Examples" for sample products.
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VOA editorials carried world-wide on the Wireless File:
Disarmament
UNSSOD 6/1/82.
US has presented framework for genuine disarmament 6/17/82.
President's European Trip
Reagan pursues economic & arms Reduction talks 6/2/82.
Falklands Crisis
Urges end to war & beginning of negotiations 6/3/82.
Poland
Blaming external scapegoats will not solve Poland's economic & political
problems 6/4/82.
Growing Polish Resistance to martial law is evident 6/14/82.
Terrorism
Deplores terrorist attacks against diplomats 6/7/82.
UN Security Council
Isreali withdrawal should be linked to end of PLO attacks from Lebanon
6/8/82.
MBFR
Reagan rekindles MBFR talks 6/10/82.
USSR
NATO sends strong message to Soviets on arms control & security 6/11/82.
Arms Control
US needs to negotiate from position of strength 6/21/82.
Nuclear Weapons
USSR tests weapons in secret while discussing arms control in public 6/22/82.
Reagan's START proposal provides fresh beginning for arms control
negotiations 6/28/82.
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Lebanon
Resolution of war requires ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign press &
strengthened Lebanese government 6/24/82.
US joins Lebanese government in seeking peaceful solution to conflict
6/30/82.
Technological Exchanges
US pipeline sanctions related to Soviet militarism 6/24/82.
US says pipeline decision is "matter of principle" 7/2/82.
Haig Resignation
Smooth transition from Haig to Shultz ensures continuity in US foreign
policy 6/29/82.
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Special Publications
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The Agency has made a concerted effort to produce or distribute special
publications designed to highlight specific information about Project Truth
themes. Although the Agency produces pamphlets on a range of issues, these
Project Truth-related publications represent the culmination of close
inter-agency planning. Many include information specifically declassified at
the request of the Project Truth Executive Committee.
Two good examples are the Department of State's Special Report No. 98 on
"Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan" released March 22, 1982,
and our Agency's pamphlet "Afghanistan: The Struggle to Regain Freedom.". The
latter was done at the request of the State Department for presentation to
high-level audiences throughout the world. The full-color pamphlet used
government and non-government supplied photos and a text fully approved by the
State Department. Copies were produced in five world languages and released
simultaneously worldwide on Afghanistan Day, March 21, 1982. In all, our
posts have distributed over 50,000 copies in five languages in over 60
countries.
The special report on chemical warfare came about in response to a Project
Truth Executive Committee request for a basic, comprehensive public document
on the subject. Since it was important to have this report available for
release in the U.S. as well as overseas, the inter-agency group on chemical
warfare decided to use the State Department Special Report format (USICA
program materials cannot be released in the U.S.). An inter-agency team
worked for several weeks to produce the declassified version of the report,
while we made plans to carry the text of the report to the field on our
Wireless File, cover the release on VOA and pouch copies to all posts on the
day of release. The result was a coordinated release in Washington and
overseas which resulted in considerable press play worldwide. We are now
producing a pamphlet on Yellow Rain, designed for general audiences, which
will summarize in an easily understood manner much of the evidence detailed in
the special report.
Other examples of coordinated publication efforts are:
- Poland pamphlet - A full-color, prestige pamphlet on martial law in
Poland is now being distributed worldwide in language versions.
- State Department Special Report No. 88 on Soviet Active Measures - This
report appeared in-the Wireless File and USICA pouched numerous copies to all
our posts.
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- Soviet Military Power - USICA participated in the drafting of this DOD
report, acquired 12,000 copies and distributed them by air freight to over 40
key posts worldwide. In addition, USICA field posts have worked with local
publishers to assure commercial translations in German, Korean, Turkish,
Spanish, Japanese and several other languages.
- In Search of Peace - This multi-language Agency publication was offered
to the field just before the President's trip to Europe and the opening of
START talks and is intended to illustrate the historic U.S. dedication to
achievement of nuclear arms control.
- NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons - USICA worked closely with State
and DOD on planning the release of this report. We produced copies in English
for our posts, and key quotes from the text were transmitted worldwide on the
Wireless File on the day of release.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample products.
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Magazines
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MAGAZINES
Several of our regular USICA publications, particularly Problems of Communism,
have supported many of the Project Truth themes by featuring articles to
enlighten their readers and to encourage fresh analysis. For example,
articles on the following Project Truth themes have appeared in Problems of
Communism over the last several months:
Afghanistan (two articles)
Poland (five articles)
Soviet Military Power (five articles)
Soviet use of Proxies (three articles)
Refer to matching tab in accompaning blue binder, "Project Truth Examples" for
sample copy of magazine.
The following USICA magazines are produced in Washington and distributed
world-wide:
Where I
Frequency
Principally
Distributed
Language
(Issues
Per Year)
Circulation
Per Issue
America Illustrated
U.S.S.R.
Russian
12
66,600
al-Majal
North East &
North Africa
Arabic
12
19,200
Economic Impact
Worldwide
English &
Spanish
4
63,000
Dialogue
Worldwide
English &
15 others
4
220,000
Problems of Communism
Worldwide
English
6
20,000
Topic
Sub-Saharan
Africa
English &
French
6
52,000
The following USICA publications are produced in the field and distributed
locally:
Trends
Japan
Japanese
6
15,100
Span
India
English
12
79,125
Interlink
Nigeria
English
4
9,000
Boletim Comercial
Brazil
Portuguese
10
6,500
Trade USA
East Asia
English
6
16,775
Vocero Comercial
Latin America
Spanish
6
19,350
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Voice of America
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VOICE OF AMERICA
The Voice of America is an integral part of all Project Truth deliberations,
and Project Truth themes and programs have included a VOA program component.
Broadcasting over 954 hours a week in 41 languages to an audience estimated at
over 104,000,000 persons, the VOA is the U.S. Government's most effective
medium for communicating rapidly and directly to mass foreign audiences.
Project Truth has been particularly valuable in providing VOA with support
material for editorial treatment of such major issues as Poland, Afghanistan,
"yellow rain", and the Administration's arms reduction initiatives.
Discussion.in the Project Truth forum has led directly to editorials on Soviet
exploitation of Vietnamese laborers and on Soviet and East German double
standards with respect to the peace movement.
VOA editorial coverage of the President's historic European trip was also the
direct beneficiary of advance coordination through Project Truth.
A good example of VOA's involvement in Project Truth is coverage of the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. VOA covered Afghanistan as a news item beginning
with the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Programming also included numerous
commentaries, editorials and news analyses as well as features. However,
planning for Afghanistan Day, March 21, 1982 included a new facet; VOA
announced the establishment of Pushtu language service on Afghanistan Day in
recognition of the need of the Afghanistan people for more outside news in
their most prevalent language. This announcement was the result of a Project
Truth initiative and represented a major highlight of the U.S. Government's
Afghanistan Day program. (See memorandum from Project Truth Executive
Committee to VOA included under this tab on following page.)
A recently instituted editorial procedure at VOA strengthens VOA's advocacy of
the Administrations foreign policy and eliminates any ambiguity about VOA's
responsibility to support our national interest as well as to report the news.
The daily "VOA editorials" are intended to communicate the USG position on
international issues and to persuade listeners of the validity of our point of
view.
The Wireless File regularly carries VOA editorials to 200 posts in 124
countries. (See samples in accompanying blue book "Project Truth Examples"
under Tab N, Wireless File)
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March 5, 1982
1-01ORANDUM FOR: VOA - Mr. Charles E. Courtney
FROM: John Hughes
SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Afghanistan
As Chairman of the Project Truth Executive Committee, I wish to relay the
sense of the Committee on two matters related to VOA broadcasting to
Afghanistan.
The Executive Committee,, during its February 3, 1.082 meeting warmly endorsed
the suggestion of one of its members that VOA begin broadcasting to
Afghanistan in Pushtu at the earliest opportunity.
In addition, the Executive Committee on February 17, endorsed a second
proposal that VOA consider an increase in broadcast time to Afghanistan on
March 21 -- ideally in conjunction with the BBC - to mark the international
observance of Afghanistan Day. Perhaps Pushtu broadcasting could commence on
that day as part of this special treatment..
As you know, the Project Truth Executive Committee consists of representatives
'w. of the Department of State, the Department of Defense (as well as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff), CIA, ACDA and the National Security Council. The Committee
serves the Project Truth Coordinating Committee, chaired by Director Wick,
which has been charged by President Reagan with coordinating the inter-Agency
overseas public affairs campaign known as Project Truth.
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Exhibits
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Since the inception of Project Truth, USICA's exhibits program has been guided
by Project Truth's objectives in determining the content of its products.
Exhibit content in our shows (which range from poster series to full-scale
exhibitions) counters Soviet stereotypes of American society and American
achievements. In addition, our long-standing program of providing "political
presence" exhibits for international fairs has served effectively to balance
Soviet presence at these events.
The Project Truth effort has also spawned extraordinary efforts on the part of
our Exhibits Service, which, with only a few weeks lead-time, designed and
produced a major exhibit contrasting U.S. and Soviet disarmament initiatives
for showing at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations during the Second
Special Session on Disarmament. We are currently elaborating plans to produce
and circulate a similar exhibit abroad, as well as a poster show on the same
theme.
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample products based on the disarmament exhibit.
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Special Guidance
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Central to the Agency's contributions to Project Truth are the public affairs
strategy papers and policy guidances developed by our policy guidance staff.
In the past year they worked closely with NSC, State and Defense Department
officers in shaping U.S. public posture on:
- Soviet military strength
- chemical weapons -- both Soviet use and supply and the rationale for
U.S. production
- U.S. approaches to the presentation of the U.S. position on arms
reduction issues and East-West relations
- the U.S. public response to Soviet/Cuban intervention in Central
America and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Poland.
The Policy staff prepared:
- the Project Truth sponsored public affairs strategy for the President's
trip to Europe
- public affairs proposals regarding responses to the anti-nuclear,
pro-freeze movement and the U.S. position on the United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament.
They are now preparing followup proposals for U.S. public affairs strategy to
maintain the momentum of the President's trip to Europe, and in particular:
- to support U.S. economic goals after Versailles
- security objectives after Bonn
- to implement the President's proposal for strengthening democratic
institutions throughout the world.
In recent months, the guidance staff has prepared for USICA posts abroad and
Agency Washington elements a number of guidances on:
- the anti-nuclear movement -
- the President's trip to Europe
- the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.
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A number of guidance cables were sent to the field on various issues on:
- arms reduction
- East-West relations
- Poland
- Afghanistan
- chemical/biological warfare
- El Salvador and Central America
- the Pipeline issues
- Soviet military expansion.
The guidance staff also researched and wrote the Agency "Chronology of U.S.
Arms Reduction Initiatives," and edited and helped coordinate the Agency
pamphlet "In Search of Peace.11
Refer to matching tab in accompanying blue binder "Project Truth Examples" for
sample product.
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PROJECT
TRUTH
EXAMPLES
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tONF1OENT1AL
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF PROJECT TRUTH PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATERIALS ARE ENCLOSED
UNDER THE FOLLOWING TABS WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE TABS IN THE BLACK BINDER,
"REPORT ON PROJECT TRUTH":
F. Soviet Propaganda Alert
G. Countering Soviet Mis-Statements
H. Soviet Distortions and Fabrications
I. Dateline America
M. Films and Videotapes
N. Wireless File
0. Special Publications
P. Magazines
R. Exhibits
S. Special Guidance
CONFIDER
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Soviet Propaganda Alert
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No. 8
Summary
Soviet Propaganda Alert
June 8,1982
In May, Soviet external propaganda stressed:
Arms Control and Disarmament. Attacks on proposals made by
President Reagan in his Eureka College speech comprised a
major portion of Soviet external propaganda. President
Brezhnev's proposals in his speech to the Communist Youth
Organization Congress were lauded as reasonable and fair in
contrast to those of the U.S. The U.S. was accused of trying
to force the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally and of
seeking military superiority. The antinuclear movement in
the U.S. was portrayed as strong and growing. The U.S. was
charged with stalling at the Geneva INF talks.
Falklands Crisis. Soviet propaganda carefully avoided
supporting t a Argentine regime per se, but came out strongly
against the British, accusing them of aggression and colo-
nialism. The U.S. came under attack for allegedly stalling
while pretending to be neutral in order to give the British
fleet time to get in position. The U.S. was also accused of
desiring military bases in the Falklands. Soviet commen-
tators emphasized the damage done to U.S.-Latin American
relations, and predicted the collapse of the OAS. Soviet
Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America were especially
tendentious.
Chemical and Biological Warfare. Although attention to CBW
remained at a high level, wit the main emphasis being on
alleged U.S. preparations for CBW, few new themes were
developed.
Moscow Conference of Religious Workers. Commentary thus far
has been low-key, stressing peace and disarmament themes.
NATO S rin Session. Soviets came out swinging as they
attacked Secretary Haig for demanding further build-ups in
all fields and for allegedly pressuring the NATO allies to
get in line with the U.S.'s "aggressive course."
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.
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Soviet propaganda in May concentrated on arms control and
related issues. While Soviet propaganda always pays great
attention to this topic, President Reagan's Eureka College
and President Brezhnev's Young Communist League Congress
speeches raised the salience of arms control and disarmament
themes. With new arms control talks a real possibility, a
major part of the increased attention can also be attributed
to Soviet Party and government use of their media to justify
their positions before their own and the world public.
U.S. Build-Up Real, Soviet "Threat" A Myth
Two standard and long-time themes form the background against
which Soviet arguments on arms control are made. The first
is that the U.S. is engaging in a relentless--although ulti-
mately futile--attempt to achieve military superiority which
can be used to blackmail politically or perhaps even annihi-
late physically the Soviet Union. A typical example is a may
10 Radio Moscow English broadcast taking the U.S. to task for
refusing to agree to a total nuclear test ban suggesting that
the U.S. plans for "unprecedented" nuclear rearmament in the
next few years and is making "energetic preparations for
nuclear war."
On the other hand, Soviet propaganda dismisses the idea that
the USSR constitutes a nuclear or conventional threat to the
West. A Yurii Soltan commentary on Radio Moscow English (May
12) innocently asserted:
The Soviet Union has never initiated an arms race,
including a race in nuclear armaments. The Soviet
Union has never spent on defense a single ruble
beyond what is absolutely necessary to guarantee
its own security and that of its allies. The same
can be said about the future.
Implicitly contrasting Soviet and U.S. policy, an April 29
S. Vishnevskii Pravda article entitled ". . . Pot Calling
The Kettle Black"--somewhat more aggressively spoke of:
. the strictly defensive nature of Soviet military
doctrine which rules out preventive wars and the first-
strike concept. And, of course . . . the Soviet Union
has never blackmailed anyone with the threat of the use
of military force, and still less that of nuclear weapons.
(over)
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President's Eureka Speech Dismissed As Propaganda
Apart from the occasional grudging acknowledgment that Presi-
dent Reagan's Eureka College speech signaled a new willing-
ness on the part of the U.S. to negotiate, Soviet commentaries
were totally negative--some vociferously so. A Vladislav Koz-
iakov Radio Moscow English commentary on May 13 was typical:
There are two major points in President Reagan's
speech . . . . One is the repetition of numerous
slanderous accusations against the Soviet Union
. . and the other is the assessment-of proposals
aimed at achieving unilateral military superiority.
Koziakov went on to call the U.S. proposals "insincere and
intended to conceal the large-scale nuclear rearmament pro-
gram planned by Washington." He concluded by saying that
this "propaganda trick invented by American policy-makers"
will not work.
The Soviets make it clear that while they:do not view the
START proposal as a new or particularly positive development,
they regard the Reagan offer to begin START talks as"a "step
in the right direction."
Leonid Brezhnev's May 18 speech to the Young Communist League
Congress provided the first official high-level reaction.
Brezhnev reiterated many of the themes in gentler, more subtle
terms than those used by media commentators. He also relied
heavily on bland, general statements on the Soviet-desire for
peace, the importance of negotiations, and similar subjects.
In general, Soviet media emphasized the following points:
o Arms limitation agreements between the U.S. and; the USSR
must be based on "equality and undiminished security,"
principles to which the START proposal does not adhere.
o The U.S. is seeking unilateral advantage: the Reagan
proposal tries to exploit force asymmetries, requiring
the USSR to reduce its ICBMs considerably while the U.S.
makes only symbolic reductions in its missiles.?
o The START proposal is encountering strong criticism from
prominent figures in the U.S. and from "the public."
Soviet media highlight critical statements from Western
sources.
o "Some critics" of the Reagan proposal see it as "part
of a secret plan by advocates of a tough course to sab-
otage disarmament so that the United States can continue
the rearmament programs without hindrance." (Soviet
commentators generally promote this theme by carefully
citing Western media sources.)
J
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Antinuclear Movement Highlighted
Almost every commentary on the subject of arms control and
disarmament took note of the antinuclear movement in the U.S.
and West Europe. The impression given was that the Pentagon
and the White House were virtually besieged with demonstra-
tions and protests against present U.S. policy and plans for
building up nuclear and conventional forces.
Speaking on Moscow domestic radio's "International Observers'
Roundtable" program on May 3, Vitalii Kobysh gave his account
of the antiwar movement:
I was in America recently and can say as an eyewitness
that America is literally on the boil and gripped by
the antiwar movement. It is moving horizontally, grip-
ping one state after another and one town and county
after another; and is also moving vertically, gripping
various strata and classes of society.
Washington-based Izvestiia correspondent M. Sturua, in a May
29 dispatch, also testities to the strength of the movement,
describing it as "spreading here faster than a forest fire."
The driving force behind it is not any mythical Soviet threat,
according to Sturua; it represents "a defensive reaction
against the intensified playing with nuclear fire which
American imperialism is indulging in."
Writing in the May 16 edition of Pravda, Pavel Demchenko
reviewed the worldwide antiwar protests which took place on
May Day, and noted the "mass demonstrations [which] were held
the other day in Washington at the Pentagon's walls. . . ."
The demonstrations supposedly culminated peace marches from
Los Angeles and New Orleans which passed through many U.S.
cities and which were "everywhere greeted warmly by represen-
tatives of public and religious organizations."
Soviet observers see the effects of the antinuclear movement
perhaps not as forcing the U.S. Administration to change its
policies, but certainly as causing it to shift its propaganda
strategy. President Reagan's Eureka proposal for arms talks
falls into this category, as do alleged Administration attempts
to defuse protests against its policies by claiming that it
sympathizes with the basic principles of the movement. On
the May 9 edition of Radio Moscow's "International Observers'
Roundtable," Gennadii Shishkin commented:
Until quite recently, the Washington Administration was
not particularly concerned about propaganda ploys to
camouflage its militaristic course. . . . Clearly in
response to criticism, Washington is now making quite
(over)
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an effort to make certain adjustments to its-propaganda
activity and to try to instill in the public the idea of
the peace-lovingness of the Reagan Administration. . . .
The President even tried to pass himself off as a peace
campaigner, and very nearly as a participant in the anti-
war movement! He attempted to seduce the people who have
joined this movement with a promise to,remember peace.
Resumption of Geneva INF Talks
The resumption on May 20 of the INF talks in Geneva was met
by Soviet propaganda with strong assertions of the reason-
ableness of~the Soviet position and the absurdity of;that.of
the U.S. Commentaries drew heavily on President Brezhnev's.
May 18 Young Communist League speech which set.out the Soviet
attitude toward disarmament in terms."free from any selective
approach tol'the'problem" and--in-contrast to the attitude of
the U.S.--free from seeking "unilateral advantage-for itself."
A flurry of print and broadcast commentaries.,attempted. to
portray'the Soviet Union .as the ,long-suffering promoter of .
peace and compromise while painting the U.S. as unreasonable,
intransigent, and dishonest. Yurii Soltan, in a. May 20
Radio Moscow-.English program,. described U.S.:..behavior thus:
Unfortunately, during the first phase of the talks,
the American delegation mostly used the tactics of
procrastination. -It kept putting forward proposals
they knew were unacceptable to the other side, pro-
posals frankly aimed at ensuring for NATO as much
as double superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons.
Soltan. concluded by warning that the "reasonable approach"
which U.S. delegation leader. Paul Nitze said the U.S. had
drafted during the break in the talks was welcome, but
Nitze's statements to the,press "set analysts on their guard."
A very strong element. of Soviet propaganda, both with regard
to INF and strategic weapons,; is that tabling totally new
proposals-is not acceptable. Speaking of INF in a May 20
Radio Moscow domestic:service broadcast, Nikolai,Shishkin
noted:
Of course, it would be' important for both the United
States and the countries of NATO . . . to pay attention
to the Soviet approach--that we do not want to start
these talks with a clean sheet. We want these talks
to include everything of value which was gained by
efforts over a period of many-;years. within the frame-
work 'of ,Moscow-Washington talks on the.problems of arms.
limitations.
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The Falklands crisis occupied a major place in Soviet
reporting and commentary during May. The Soviets were care-
ful not to be seen as supporting the Argentine regime, but
rather to be seen as defenders of the principle of decolo-
nialism. While there may have been little overt pro-Argentine
slant in Soviet commentary, there was a vociferous anti-British
line which absolutely denied any legitimacy to British claims
and condemned the British as unreconstructed colonialists.
Early U.S. Neutrality Called Ruse
The British were not the main target of Soviet propaganda,
however; that honor was reserved for the U.S. Charging that
the U.S. had never really been neutral in the dispute, an
Anatolii Gan Radio Moscow English broadcast on May 3 typified
this line:
In reality the much-publicized shuttle diplomacy of
Secretary of State Alexander Haig was nothing but a
screen to cover up the Anglo-American compact against
Argentina. Haig moreover was winning time to enable
the British naval armada to reach the area of the
Falklands.
U.S. Said To Want Falklands As Military Base
The main U.S. motive in "giving Britain the green light" was
its desire for control of the South Atlantic, mainly by
establishing bases on the Falklands. Writing in Pravda on
May 9, Nikolai Prozhogin noted:
Indeed, there can hardly be any question of neutrality
when from the very start of the crisis Washington has
been trying to get its own hands on the subject of the
conflict--the Falkland Islands--and establish itself
there under the cover of the transfer of the islands
to rule by a "tripartite administration--that is, with
the participation of the United States itself."
U.S. Involvement Not Limited To Falklands
But Soviet commentators stress that the U.S. involvement goes
beyond the Falklands or even the South Atlantic. Yurii Korni-
lov, in a May 6 Radio Moscow domestic service broadcast, noted:
(over)
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U.S. actions in support of the British militarists fall
into the same category as Washington's attacks on Nicar-
agua, its threats against Cuba and its interference in
the affairs of El Salvador. These are all links in the
same chain and an integral part of the global imperial-
ist course of the United States, which is based on a
reliance on force and attempts to use the big stick to
reshape the map of the world, and to dictate its wishes
to sovereign countries and peoples.
Yurii Zubkov generalized this theme to the entire Third
World in a May 5 Moscow television commentary:
The aggressive actions in the South Atlantic show
that [the U.S. and Britain] have need of military
might primarily for blackmail and pressure against
those developing countries of the Third World which
conduct an independent course, and to strengthen
and expand the NATO sphere of activity.
Hypocrisy, treachery, brute force--anything will do
for the U.S. Administration's diplomacy and actions
in order to create yet another military base, in
order to consolidate in yet another part of the
world, in order to- take another step toward military
superiority.
Soviets See Possibility Of OAS Collapse
Soviet glee at the damage caused to U.S.-Latin American
relations by U.S. support of Britain was barely restrained.
Moreover, many commentaries speculated that the U.S. action
would lead to the complete collapse of the inter-American
alliance. Radio Peace and Progress, broadcasting in Spanish
to Latin America on May 11, quoted former Uruguayan Foreign
Minister Rovira to that effect, and pushed his idea for
replacing the OAS with a regional UN organization for Latin
America without the participation of the U.S. Novoe Vremia
on May 7 also published a long article entitled "Will Presi-
dent Monroe Spin In His Grave?" which purportedly proved the
need for a fundamental reorganization of the OAS.
Other broadcasts and articles pounded away at the theme of
the U.S.'s "betrayal" of its hemispheric allies and its
failure to live up to its obligations under the Rio Treaty.
Yurii Kornilov, in a May 3 TASS commentary, pointed out:
It was not long ago that Washington bristled on
every occasion . . . with highfalutin talk to the
effect that the United States was all but the most
"loyal friend" and "dependable ally" of the Latin
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American countries and that it was prepared, if
need be, to honor the commitments assumed and
take part in the "collective defense" of these
countries.
But now there has emerged a situation in which one
of the Latin American states, Argentina, is indeed
threatened with the British mailed fist. The Wash-
ington "friend" has not only "forgotten" the inter-
American assistance treaty, not only pointedly
refused to subscribe to the decision of the consul-
tative conference of the foreign ministers of the
OAS countries, . . . but openly stated its support
for London.
Moscow Spanish Takes The Low Road
Moscow's Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America were
definitely more strident and inflammatory than the Russian or
English. For example, a Radio Peace and Progress Spanish
broadcast on May 12 speculated on the presence of nuclear
weapons aboard British ships. Recalling that the Pentagon
had often advocated using nuclear weapons in limited wars,
the broadcast pointed out:
The United States in every way approves the aggres-
sive operations carried out by its NATO ally and it
may even suggest to England to prove that a nuclear
war is feasible.
Chemical and Biological Warfare
There were few noteworthy developments in Soviet themes on
chemical and biological warfare (CBW) in May. The usual
charges, countercharges, and denials resurfaced (see April
"Propaganda Alert"), and no new themes were developed.
Several articles and broadcasts discussed alleged U.S. (or
U.S.-sponsored) CBW use in Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Afghani-
stan.
TASS analyst Askold Biriukov charged that President Reagan's
Eureka College comments on U.S. policy regarding CBW had no
connection with U.S. deeds:
Neither nice words nor frauds will help Washington
cover up preparations for a large-scale chemical
warfare which are under way in the United States.
The peoples who have still fresh in their memory
(over)
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acts of genocide committed by the United States
toward the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampu-
chea, are not confident that the United States
will not commit new crimes against mankind.
Moscow Conference of Religious Workers
The Moscow conference of "Religious Workers for Saving the
Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe." came off
without a hitch and can-be considered a subtle propaganda
success for the Soviet Union. While no ringing endorsements
of Soviet policy were issued and the U.S. was never directly
taken to task, the Soviets accrued some credits by sponsoring
the conference. The conference was not given a great deal of
play in the media. The propaganda points will probably be
scored in the future as the final document is used.to support
attacks on U.S. weapons policy (among others, it called for a
ban on the use of enhanced radiation warheads).
NATO Council Spring Session
The NATO Council session was characterized as being devoted
attempts by the U.S. to bring its allies into line. TASS
of NATO military potential in all fields. According to the
Soviets, he "unleashed frantic activity" in an effort to whip
recalcitrant allies into line with the U.S.'s aggressive
course. The final communique--especially the passages on
economic sanctions--came in for special condemnation.
Secretary Haig is said to have demanded a further build-up
May 18 saw the session as:
opening against a background of U.S. and NATO
leaders' intensifying pressure on West European
countries aimed at forcing them to agree unreserv-
edly to a course of confrontation in the inter-
national sphere and the activation of military
preparations proclaimed by Washington.
The U.S. and NATO were accused of attempting to convert Cyprus
into a Middle East outpost. Norway was taken to task for
acceding to U.S. and NATO plans for making it a .jumping-off
place for conventional and nuclear attacks on the Soviet
Union. Secretary Haig's'trip to Greece was portrayed as an
attempt to bring the country to heel and return it to the
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NATO fold. The U.S. was accused of intolerable interference
in the internal affairs of France when the U.S. Ambassador
allegedly criticized the government for permitting communists
to become ministers. The machinations of the U.S. and its
NATO allies in Poland came in for the usual heavy treatment.
The Netherlands gave the excuse for perhaps the nastiest
anti-U.S. comment of the month. Speaking of the monument to
slain Dutch journalists in El Salvador placed in front of the
U.S. consulate in Amsterdam, Radio Moscow English commentator
Viktor Olin spoke of its appropriateness:
The Dutch journalists were killed with United States
bullets, fired from United States rifles. They were
killed by soldiers trained by United States instruc-
tors and led by officers trained at United States
schools. They were killed on orders from people fully
obedient to Washington.
Several commentaries on Cuba stressed the armed blackmail
represented by the Ocean Venture-82 exercises.
Asia
Vice President Bush's visit to China commanded heavy attention.
Commentaries stressed that, despite allegedly duplicitous U.S.
behavior with respect to the Taiwan issue, there was little
possibility of a U.S.-PRC split over Taiwan. Japan was
described as being turned into a dangerous "springboard for
U.S. expansion into the Far East" contrary to the wishes of
its people.
U.S. complicity in South Africa's raids on Angola was allegedly
proven by the fact that they took place shortly after a visit
by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker. The U.S. is
supposedly turning Kenya into one of its strongholds in the
Indian Ocean.
Israel's raids into Lebanon were tied to the arrival of U.S.
envoy Richard Fairbanks. The U.S. is purportedly exploiting
the Iran-Iraq war to widen the split among the Arab countries.
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Listed below are representative Soviet press and TASS items on
themes discussed in this report. Translations or summaries of
virtually all appeared in the FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)
in late April and May.
"For A Just 'Zero Option'" by Yurii Kornilov, TASS English,
May 3.
Pot Calling The Kettle Black" by S. Vishnevskii,
Pravda, April 29.
"Brezhnev-Reagan: When and What To Talk About?" by Spartak
Beglov, APN Daily Review, April 20.
"That The Light Will Not Dim Over The Earth" by Vladimir
Bogachev, TASS Russian, May 3.
"War Psychosis Thrives In U.S.," Izvestiia, May 6.
"NATO Forgery" by V. Drobkov, Pravda, May 7.
"U.S. Attempting To Prove USSR Arms Superiority," Pravda,
May 9.
"Moscow Responds To Reagan Disarmament Proposal" by Sergei
Losev, Moscow World Service English, May 10.
"Moscow Calls For Halt To Nuclear Tests" by Vladislav
Koziakov, Radio Moscow English, May 10.
"Moscow Criticizes Reagan Arms Initiative" by Yurii Soltan,
Radio Moscow World Service English, May 11.
"The Highest Duty" by Pavel Demchenko, Pravda, May 16.
"For A Constructive Approach to The Problem of Limitation
and Reduction of Nuclear Arms" by Nikolai Shislin, Moscow
Domestic Service, May 20.
"Zorin Sees Growing U.S. Antiwar Movement" by Valentin Zorin,
Moscow Television, April 29.
"America's Awakening Conscience" by Tomas Kolesnichenko,
Pravda, May 3.
"All America Protests" by A. Tolkunov, Pravda, April 28.
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"Anglo-American 'Compact'" by Anatolii Gan, Radio Moscow
World Service English, May 3.
"U.S.-British 'Collusion' Against Argentina" by Eduard
Mnatsakanov, Moscow Television, May 4.
"When The Masks Slip" by G. Vasiliev, Pravda, April 30.
"Imperialist Solidarity," Izvestiia, May 4.
"The USA Is An Accomplice in Britain's Crimes," Krasnaia
zvezda, May 9.
"Behind The Scenes of The South Atlantic Crisis," Pravda,
May 9.
"Justice Washington-Style" by Nikolai Chigir, TASS Russian,
May 11.
"U.S. 'Real' Attitude" by Vladimir Lapskii, Radio Moscow
Spanish, May 9.
"On The [OAS] System's Collapse," Radio Peace and Progress
Spanish, May 11.
"Nuclear Arms In The South Atlantic," Radio Peace and Progress
Spanish, May 12.
"Along The Lines of Colonial Piracy" by M. Ponomarev, Krasnaia
zvezda, May 9.
"U.S. Colonialist Ambitions," Radio Peace and Progress Spanish,
May 14.
"Falklands Conflict Reveals U.S., UK Imperialism" by Nikolai
Chigir, Radio Moscow Spanish, May 17.
"U.S. Loses Influence In Latin America" by Maksim Teplov,
Radio Moscow English, May 18.
"U.K. Alone Cannot Recover Falkland Islands" by Viachislav
Vladimirov, Radio Peace and Progress Spanish, May 20.
"United States-Latin America: A Broken Partnership" by
R. Tuchnin, Izvestiia, May 17.
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CBW
"Failed Provocation" by V. Kalinin, Pravda, May 7.
"The Anatomy of Lies" by Nikolai Antonov, Mezhdunarodnaia
zhizn, May issue.
"U.S. Chemical Weapons Appropriations," TASS English,
May 7.
OTHER REGIONS, OTHER THEMES
"Who Warms Hands on The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict," Pravda,
May 13.
"U.S., Netherlands At Odds Over Monument" by Viktor Olin,
Radio Moscow World Service English, May 12.
"An 'Anti-Diplomat' In Paris," Izvestiia, May 14.
"Norway Yielding to U.S. Nuclear Strategy" by Vladimir Serov,
TASS English, May 7.
"They Will Not Be Intimidated!" by Pavel Bogomolov, Pravda,
May 10, [On Cuba].
"One More Compromise?" by S. Agafonov, Izvestiia, May 6,
[On Bush trip to China].
"Missiles Near Fujiyama" by V. Kuchko, Sovetskaia Rossiia,
May 4.
"U.S, UK Military Use Kenyan Territory," Radio Moscow English
to Africa, May 4.
"U.S. Role in S. African Raids on Angola" by Maksim Kniazkov,
TASS English, May 17.
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No. 7
Summary
Soviet Propaganda Alert
April 30, 1982
This special edition of the alert contains some of the more
outrageous charges against the U.S. made by Soviet propagan-
dists in the past few months. The term "disinformation" best
describes this output, which is distinct from ordinary Soviet
propaganda. These accusations cover a variety of topics, but
the majority focus on chemical and biological warfare, as has
the overall Soviet propaganda effort in this period.
As a reminder to our readers, the Soviet Propaganda Alert is a
series of reports on current Soviet external propaganda. These
reports are based on cable reporting, primary source material,
and secondary sources such as Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) publications. The purpose of the alert is to
highlight and analyze major Soviet propaganda themes.
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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Soviet media often use propaganda techniques that are rather
refined and sophisticated. The Soviet propagandist generally
relies more on distortion, one-sided and slanted presentation
of information, insinuation and manipulation of facts, than on
outright, blatant falsehood. But the latter is by no means
overlooked.
A whole range of methods is brought to bear in disinformation
campaigns conducted by the Soviets using both their own and
non-Soviet media conduits. Described briefly below are several
of the more outrageous fabrications which the Soviets have
circulated recently. These items obviously fit in with broader
Soviet propaganda objectives--for example, the "CIA kidnappings
in Honduras" story is part of the campaign to fuel anti-U.S.
sentiment in Latin America, to strengthen the myth of the
powerful, evil, and omnipresent CIA, and to create an image of
Americans as inhumane exploiters. The first item below appears
to be part of Moscow's effort to divert public attention from
the evidence of Soviet use of toxins in Afghanistan and Soviet
complicity in their use in Southeast Asia.
Moscow Launches Disinformation Offensive against University of
Maryland Medical Research Center in Pakistan
The February 3 issue of the popular Soviet weekly Literaturnaia
azeta featured a two-page spread on alleged chemical and bio-
ogical weapons research and use by the U.S. In addition to a
fearsome science-fiction sketch of giant insects hovering over a
city skyline, an article appeared entitled "Incubator of Death"
which took up three-quarters of one page. This sensationalistic
narrative by veteran Soviet correspondent Iona Andronov deals
with the University of Maryland's Pakistan Medical Research
Center (PMRC) in Lahore. Here, charges Andronov, CIA-sponsored
scientists are conducting research on "poisonous mosquitoes" in
order to exploit them for "bacteriological warfare."
Andronov's article is fundamentally an account of his mission,
undertaken on the spot in Lahore, to investigate the PMRC.
Referring to such dubious publications as the Communist Party's
Daily World and Philip Agee's Covert Action, Andronov notes by
way of introduction that accusations against the Center surfaced
over a year ago. According to various sources, such as one
Abdul Aziz Danishyar, identified as the editor of the Kabul New
Times, the PMRC was actually doing research on "bacteriological
wwaarfare" under the guise of studying malaria and similar diseases.
One immediate goal of the research was alleged to be the staging
of "mosquito military ventures" against Afghanistan--that is,
starting epidemics in Afghanistan by infecting nomads and their
herds in Pakistan with deadly mosquito-borne viruses which the
nomads would transmit to Afghanistan during their seasonal
migration there.
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In the course of his story, Andronov hits all the requisite
targets--the CIA, imperialistic and racist American attitudes,
bloodthirsty and fanatical American researchers. His main
themes include the following :
o. The activities of the Medical Research Center are funded by
the Agency for International Development, which, Andronov
glibly declares, is "in essence, the CIA." Offering no.evi-
dence whatsoever, Andronov depicts the Center as being under
CIA control. The CIA is alleged to be applying PMRC's research
in "germ warfare" in Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. For
example, noting the high reproduction rates of female experi-
mental mosquitoes shown him during his tour of the PMRC.labora-
tory, Andronov concludes that only a fraction of the mosquitoes
produced can be processed. Therefore, "it's evident that the
rest are being sent from there to the CIA's Caribbean sabotage
bases near Cuba."
o The Center is harmful to the local Pakistani population.
Andronov repeats a story that a year ago, "dozens of Lahore
residents were attacked by swarms of mosquitoes belonging to a
species unusual in that region. People who were bitten by them
came down with yellow fever, hepatitis, and jaundice, and some
went insane." The Lahore doctors, Andronov claims, could do
nothing to help their doomed patients. But they did find. the
source of the disaster--"the African Aedes aegypti mosquitoes
[which] were being incubated by the thousands at the PMRC
'laboratory.," Citing more. groundless rumors as further evidence,
Andronov asserts that the PMRC researchers have exhibited a
careless disregard for the local population-and have exploited
them as human guinea pigs.
o The U.S. personnel running the center are immoral, conniving,
personally loathsome individuals totally lacking in respect
for human life. Andronov resorts to extremely derogatory and
crude descriptions of the two American scientists he dealt with
at the center, trying in his physical characterization of them
to underscore negative moral traits. They appear in his article
as unbelievable caricatures of evil "mad scientists."
This story's unsubstantiated charges have been widely replayed
by both Soviet and non-Soviet (especially South Asian) media.
To cite just a few examples: TASS (Feb. 11) summarized the
Literaturnaia gazeta story; Moscow Radio. in an English-language
broadcast (March 24) repeated and expanded upon it; a follow-up
story was published in Literaturnaia gazeta on March 24;. the
Austrian Communist Party organ Volksstimme carried on April 3
an APN (Novosti) article containing the allegations against PMRC;
the Pakistani mass-circulation daily Jang.(in.Urdu) printed an
article based on Andronov's original; and the Times of India and
the Patriot (India) carried on March 9 a,Pre.ssTrust o India
iteia quoti g a TASS version of the story. Much '.use has been
made of the radical Lahore weekly Viewpoint which has long been
involved in developing and spreading propaganda against the PMRC.
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The techniques used in "Incubator of Death" are not new or
unusual, but Andronov employs them with considerable skill.
Several of the most noteworthy are:
o Incorporating some facts and elements of truth into a disin-
formation effort. A prime example of this is the impressive-
sounding scientific background on malaria and disease-carrying
mosquitoes. Such material is designed to enhance the writer's
credibility and impart to the whole story, including the most
absurd aspects, an air of "scientific truthfulness."
o Playing on the sensitivities, tears, or prejudices of ;members
of one's audience. Many in third-world--and other--audiences
are conditioned to believe charges of "CIA involvement" and
respond in a predictable fashion to the cry of "CIA." Another
attempt in Andronov's story to play to third-world readers is a
description of how he pretends to be "a typical American" in
order to yet past the guards at the Medical Research Center:
"After all, the management here was American and the guards were
Pakistanis, which meant that they were probably used to subserv-
iently obeying fair-skinned Yankees. And I was right: The guards
stepped back when, thrusting out my chin Texas-style, I walked
with a swagger up to the forbidden door."
Short Takes: Samples of Soviet Disinformation
This section presents, in brief form, particularly offensive
and/or outrageous offerings from the Soviet media.
o Repeat play on CIA complicity in Dozier kidnapping. Moscow
Radio on February 24 reiterate a charge which originally sur-
faced immediately after the release of General Dozier by Red
Brigade terrorists. The broadcast alleged: ". . . (M]any people
in America wonder whether the Dozier case was not from start to
finish a provocation by the CIA. . . . Such an operation could
have been prepared to direct public attention away from the Penta-
gon's dangerous plans in Western Europe and to reduce the inten-
sity of the antiwar movement in NATO countries." Incidentally,
the Italian daily Corriere della Sera (March 26) noted that an-
other old Soviet line has reappeared in the journal Druzhba
narodov ("Friendship of the Peoples")--the absurd charge of CIA
complicity in the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.
o U.S. staging a "publicity show" around Pentecostal Lidia
Vashchenko. The case of the Soviet Pentecostals who sought and
obtaine refuge in the American Embassy Moscow years ago and are
still there, unable to receive visas to emigrate, is a complex
problem. U.S. authorities have long tried--and continue to
try--to resolve the situation satisfactorily. The recent hunger
strike, hospitalization, and eventual return home of one of the
Pentecostals, Lidia Vashchenko, was widely reported in the West.
The situation--and the publicity accorded it--was a great source
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of embarrassment to Moscow, particularly as it came at a time
when Soviet authorities are going to extremes to demonstrate
Soviet religious tolerance and win the support of international
religious leaders and groups for Moscow's May propaganda-test,
the "World Peace Conference" nominally sponsored by the?.Russian
Orthodox Patriarch. Thus Soviet propagandists, seeking to
counter Western coverage, provided their own sketchy report of
the Vashchenko episode, slanting it to portray the J.S. as
"staging" various actions as "anti-Soviet publicity stunts."
However--they noted reassuringly--this U.S. "anti-Soviet effort"
was doomed to failure, since thinking people would immediately
see through American behavior.
o "Children Kidnapped in Honduras" Reprinted from the FBIS
translation (USSR Dal y Report, February 23), here is a parti-
cularlyabsurd piece of Soviet disinformation.
Moscow Radio in Spanish to Latin America:
In Honduras, the CIA is kidnapping children of Salvadoran
refugees. These operations are being carried out behind the
facade of the religious organization, World Vision, whicn
officially performs charitable activities in refugee camps.
The shepherds of souls, who are.. in fact.CIA agents, promised
the mothers that their children will receive good nourishment
and education in the United States. The poor peasants can only
acquiesce since their children are threatened with death by
starvation. They give their children to World Vision iriission-
aries and thus hundreds of children of both sexes have been
taken to camps in unknown places.
Some information about the whereabouts-of those Salvadoran
children who were sent to the United States has surfaced
through delegates to the international encounter of. Christian
organizations in Cuernavaca, Mexico. One of those delegates,
Oscar Arnulfo Romero, reported that those Salvadoran children
have been taken to CIA special camps in the United States where
they are submitted to tests-before being separated in groups.
Thus some groups are sent to special brainwashing schools where
they are trained to spy and perform terrorist acts. Others who
do not qualify for the special training are sent to research
establishments of the CIA where the children are used as guinea
pigs to test .medicines and. chemicals capable of changing human
consciousness, to practice lobotomies and other experiments.
In the Cuernavaca encounter it was learned that World Vision
had performed the same kind of activities in Vietnam.
Prepared by: PGM/R Staff
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Soviet Propaganda Alert
No. 6
April 26, 1982
Summary
In March and April, Soviet external propaganda has stressed:
o Chemical and Biological Warfare. Soviets continued to
deny vehemently that they have any involvement whatever in
chemical/biological warfare (CBW). Attacks on the U.S.
for alleged past and present use of CB4I in many parts of
the world--including Vietnam, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cuba,
and even the USSR--have increased in frequency. As more
evidence emerges of Soviet use or support of CBW, the more
strident have become Soviet assaults on the U.S.
o Arms Control and Peace Movements. The Brezhnev moratorium
proposal of March 17 has formed the centerpiece of Soviet
propaganda. Peace movements in Europe and the U.S. have
been emphasized and played as if they completely support
Soviet positions. President Reagan's March 31st press con-
ference and Secretary of State Raig's Georgetown speech of
April 6 have been cited as duplicitous justifications for
U.S. attempts to gain military superiority and for the first
use of nuclear weapons.
o Falklands and Latin America. Soviets claim that the U.S.
plans to exploit the Argentine seizure of the Falkland (Mal-
vina) Islands in order to establish military bases in the
South Atlantic. Other charges include alleged American sub-
version of Nicaragua and Cuba, collusion in the Guatemalan
coup, and support of "bloody, repressive" regimes in Honduras
and El Salvador.
o Espionage, Plots, and Warmongering. In several other parts
of the world the CIA stands accused of spying (Greece) and
plotting coups (Iran, Zimbabwe), while American militarists
purportedly are bringing Korea and Japan ever closer to war.
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D.C.
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- 1 -
CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The two main foci of Soviet propaganda in March and April have
been chemical/biological warfare (CBW) and nuclear arms talks.
The primary purpose in the first theme remains to defend the
USSR from charges that it is guilty of using chemical weapons in
Afghanistan and of supporting chemical warfare in Southeast Asia.
The more persuasive the American case against the Soviet Union
has become, the more vituperative and hysterical has been the
Soviet assault against the U.S. on this issue.
"A Lie Remains a Lie"
In the face of growing evidence demonstrating Soviet supplying of
"Yellow Rain" in Southeast Asia and use of mycotoxins in Afghani-
stan, the only Soviet response has been a blanket denial of any
wrongdoing. TASS (March 22) gave the typical line:
The fables about "Yellow Rains" in Asia and about "mycotoxins"
of, allegedly, Soviet make--the fables meant for American
philistines--are nothing but dirty lies which cannot cast a
slur on the honest and consistent line of the Soviet Union,
which, distinct from the United States, was among the first
to join the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical
weapons. . . . [The USSR] never used warfare toxic agents
anywhere.
Summoning up his indignation, TASS political observer Iuri Kornilov
proclaimed: "As to all sorts of inventions of the CIA around
which Washington launches another propaganda hullaballoo, it can
be said that a lie remains a lie no matter how many times it is
repeated."
Attempted Refutation of U.S. Charges
TASS analyst Askold Biriukov (April 6) added to his denials the
following:
The groundlessness of the claims made by the leading figures of
the U.S. administration is obvious. International experts on
chemical weapons and skilled medical personnel from different
international organizations have more than once debunked the
allegations about Soviet chemical weapons cooked up in the
Washington kitchen of pyschological warfare.
According to Ririukov, a team of U.N. experts had visited Pakistan
and reported on their findings.
The experts investigated the claims of Western, primarily
American, propaganda about the "use" of these weapons in
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Afghanistan and unanimously concluded that they were not cor-
roborated by facts. Some time earlier the same conclusion
had been made by U.N. experts who had investigated the false
assertions about "the use of chemical weapons of Soviet make"
in Kampuchea.
The fact that no final report has been issued by the U.N. team
that visited Pakistan has not deterred Soviet media from claiming
exoneration by these outside observers.
Pointing the Finger
Soviet propagandists have felt that the best defense against U.S.
accusations on chemical warfare is to go over to the offense.
Soviet media are full of charges against the U.S. for its alleged
use of chemical or biological warfare in nearly every corner of
the world.
In particular, Soviets blast the American involvement in Vietnam.
"There are numerous facts and even the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Richard Schweiker, had to admit that over 45
million quarts of various chemical substances were aerosol-sprayed
over Vietnamese territory" (Radio Moscow, April 6).
In nearly every attack, Soviets cite statistics. For example,
Radio Moscow observer Igor Aleksandrov recounted (April 6):
According to conservative estimates, the United States armed'-'
forces used over 100,000 tons of chemical substances. American
bombers sprayed the defoliant Agent Orange known for its high-
toxicity. As a matter of fact, over 2 million Vietnamese civ-
ilians suffered. Tens of thousands of GIs also became the vic-
tims. Considerable damage was inflicted on the economy. Seventy
percent of the coconut groves in South Vietnam were wiped out,
together with 375,000 acres of tropical plants.
A Krasnaia zvezda publicist, A. Leontiev, was even more detailed
in an item entitled "Poisoners' Orgy" (March 24).
In Vietnam alone American aircraft sprayed over 100,000 tons,of
toxins, as a result of which 43 percent of cultivable land and
44 percent of the forests suffered and 70 percent of coconut
groves and 150,000 hectares of topical vegetation were destroyed.
But his clincher was a claim rarely repeated even in Soviet media:
"Tens of thousands of Vietnamese died and the health of almost 2
million was ruined" (emphasis added). Only TASS back in February
and, surprisingly, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his trip to
Yugoslavia in early April have made similar claims about massive
loss of life in Vietnam due to American chemical weapons.
Beyond Vietnam, claim Soviet propagandists, targets of American
CBW over the years include Cuba, Afghanistan, Korea, Namibia, and
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the USSR itself. Krasnaia zvezda's Leontiev, in his March 24
diatribe, wrote that "American intelligence agent R. Albertson,
who took part in the intervention in the north of Soviet Russia
in 1919, admitted [in a book]: 'We used chemical munitions
against the Bolsheviks."' Leontiev further stated that "in the
early fifties the United States used chemical weapons in Korea"
and that "American toxins are killing women and children in
A recent lengthy piece in Literaturnaia gazeta (March 24) by Iona
Andronov, a follow-up to his article on the same subject in Litera-
turnaia gazeta No. 5 for 1982, described in great detail purported
U.S. biological warfare activities. Andronov accused the U.S. of
searching the world for exotic poisons to use on various peoples
and individuals. Among these poisonous substances were the gall
bladder of a crocodile from Tanganyika (1962); "Chondo-dendron
Toxicoferum" from the Amazon jungle, curare, and Venezuelan encepho-
myelitis (all 1966); and "oyster toxin" from Alaska. This does not
even include the "killer mosquitoes" supposedly used by the U.S.
in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s (the focus of Andronov's
article) and the many plagues allegedly visited upon Cuba.
At Fort Detrick, Maryland, the CIA and U.S. Army have, according to
Andronov, invented and stored 37 types of bacteriological weapons.
On occasion these toxins are employed, as when "the Fort Detrick
poisoners killed dozens of prisoner guinea pigs" during the Korean
War. And in February 1982, stated Andronov, Salvadoran rebels
were subjected to aircraft bombings with American "hemorrhagic
conjunctivitis powder."
Still to come, in the view of Soviet propagandists, is use of Ameri-
can chemical weapons in Europe. Thus, Izvestiia (March 28) carries
four separate articles by correspondents in Bonn, Rome, London, and
Washington--all in a full-page feature entitled "The Pentagon's Gas
Chambers"--which imply or declare that there exist "U.S. plans to
use chemical weapons in Europe."
The most provocative charges along these lines came in a story by
Aleksandr Liutii for TASS English (April 6). He claimed that a high
Pentagon official "confirmed" that the U.S. has "launched active
preparations for chemical and germ warfare" and that
the U.S. administration could not and was not going to rely on
arms control, including that in the field of chemical weapons,
and emphasized that the United States should constantly threaten
the Soviet Union in that field, regarding chemical war as an in-
tegral part of any conflict.
According to Liutii, this Pentagon official stated that 14 percent of
the Pentagon's "chemical budget"--$705 million for the next fiscal
year--will go for production of 155mm artillery binary shells, which
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the U.S. military plans to site in the territories of its allies
in Western Europe, "thus turning the continent's nations into
[U.S.] chemical hostages."
The obvious intent of all these charges, besides diverting attention
away from Soviet use of chemical weapons, is to sway world public
opinion against the United States and to drive wedges between the
U.S. and its European partners.
See the next alert--on Soviet disinformation--for more on CBW.
The other most important theme of Soviet propaganda in this
period has involved'U.S.-Soviet negotiations on controlling
nuclear arms, especially in Europe, and the peace movements in'
America and Europe.
The Brezhnev Moratorium
Dominating Soviet discussions of this issue has been President
Brezhnev's speech at the 17th Congress of USSR Trade Unions
announcing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the deployment of
medium-range SS-20 nuclear missiles in the European USSR. In
return for this "freeze," Brezhnev called on the U.S. and NATO
to forego deployment of new Pershing II and.cruise'missiles in
West Europe.
Brezhnev's freeze offer was apparently a direct response to
President Reagan's zero option plan put forth November 18, 1981
and rejected out of hand by the Soviets. Saying that the "Soviet
leadership has once again shown an example of goodwill" (Radio
Moscow, March 16), Soviet propagandists have trumpeted this "new
initiative" as the best starting point for arms control talks on
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. Soviet com-:
mentators have carefully avoided noting that the USSR continues
to deploy SS-20s to the east of the Urals, whence they can easily
reach targets in West Europe.
Spokesmen like Georgii Arbatov of the USA Institute (Manchester
Guardian, March 22) have also taken pains to deny that Brezhnev
threatened to place nuclear weapons in Cuba when he said in his
speech that, if the U.S. and NATO governments went ahead with
deployment of their new European missiles, the USSR would be
compelled to take measures in reply which would put the other
side, including the U.S. and its territory, in an analogous'
position.
Much attention in Soviet propaganda has been devoted to the nega-
tive American reaction to Brezhnev's proposals. "Washington
fears the principle of equality and like security because it
stands in the way of its arms drive," was the way commentator
Igor Dmitriev put it on Radio Moscow's World Service in English
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Soviet propagandists have tried to use the freeze proposal to
bring pressure on the U.S. to begin strategic arms talks. Thus,
Vladimir Bogachev has written (TASS English, March 18):
Reagan's statement that the production of nuclear arms should
not simply be frozen, that the already existing huge levels
should be lowered can evoke only perplexity. For it was
Washington that rejected the SALT II treaty providing for a
substantial reduction of strategic arms. It is the present
U.S. administration that under various pretexts and referring
to the need of "finalizing the position" of the United States
is delaying the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the
limitation or reduction of strategic arms. . . .
In Soviet eyes, the aim to obtain leverage may be working. "It
should be noted," according to Bogachev, "that on encountering
the sharp opposition of the world public opinion, Washington was
forced to moderate its tone and make its assessments of the new
Soviet initiatives less categorical." Virtually every Soviet
commentary on arms control questions finds it necessary to refer
to the antiwar and antinuclear movements in Europe and the U.S.
as evidence of support for their own positions.
The Peace Movements and Western "Freeze" Initiatives
In fact, Moscow has tried to make much capital out of peace move-
ments in both Europe and America. Most of its propaganda on arms
control is addressed directly to those engaged in the movements.
Thus, wrote Vasilii Kharkov (TASS English, April 9):
In Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and other West European
countries, mass manifestations against the Pentagon's nuclear
madness, for talks, and not confrontation, with the Soviet
Union, are characterized by a variety of forms used, the mass
scale and coordination of action by different antiwar and
pacifist organizations.
That many participants in the marches direct their negative senti-
ments toward Soviet arms as well is, of course, passed over in
silence by Soviet analysts. They prefer to see all the demonstra-
tions as a show of the "determination of the West European peoples
to avoid being used as the Pentagon's nuclear hostages."
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Soviet chief of
staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, has recently called for a crack-
down on pacifism within the Soviet Union. In his booklet en-
titled Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland, published in late
February, Marshal Ogarkov criticized some of the younger genera-
tion of Soviets for a "false sense of peace, complacency and
pacifism" and urged Party propagandists to "struggle against
such elements."
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A source of some surprise and pleasure for Soviet propagandists
is the fact that the "current antiwar movement in the USA has a
broader basis than in the years of the war in Vietnam," involving
"not only the youth but also the 'average American,' moderate sec-
tions of the population, church circles, organizations of physi-
cians, lawyers, businessmen, and finds support in political circles
and the U.S. Congress" (Ivan Ablamov, TASS English, April 12).
Of particular interest to Soviet commentators has been the freeze
proposal advanced by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield. Although
this proposal has both "good and bad qualities," in the words of
radio commentator Oleg Anichkin (Moscow Domestic, April 9), it
is a good indication of the growing resistance to the arms race
in the U.S. What no Soviet propagandist will do, however, is
endorse such mutual freeze proposals, because that would also
mean an end to Moscow's massive arms buildup.
"The war opponents in the West," claimed TASS's Ablamov, "clearly
see that, while the Soviet Union advances numerous constructive
initiatives, Washington rejects them outright without even getting
around to studying them attentively."
"Strange Speech" on The Military Balance
Soviet propagandists were quick to pick up on President Reagan's
March 31st news conference statement that the USSR had a margin
of superiority in nuclear weapons. Valentin Zorin, a prominent
.television and radio analyst, called this "fresh proof that some
really high-ranking United States officials don't feel bound to
stick to the truth when they address their fellow countrymen.".-
He accused Reagan of making this statement "obviously to try and
keep in check the mounting public demand. in his own country for
freezing the existing levels of nuclear arms . . . ." (Moscow
Radio English, April 10).
Vladimir Bogachev (TASS English, April 9) claimed that "[in] the
past, when making similar statements, the President himself and
members of his administration got away with it. This time, however,
Ronald Reagan's statement has given rise to a stormy reaction in
the country." According to Zorin and Bogachev, Senators Moynihan
and Jackson have categorically rejected the President's charge,
and even earlier statements by Alexander Haig and Caspar Weinberger
refute Reagan.
"The President's closest staff members tried to come to Reagan's
aid," averred Bogachev, "hinting that the President in his strange
speech meant only individual types of Soviet armaments." But the
American public will not be fooled, in the view of this Soviet:
"broad masses of people in the United States [take the statement]
as evidence of the administration's refusal to heed the Soviet
Union's new.peace proposals and as the administration's refusal to
conduct constructive negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear
arms."
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Haig "Falsifications" and the Foreign Affairs Article
Secretary of State Alexander Haig's speech on arms control at
the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International
Studies on April 6 evoked strong response from Soviet propagan-
dists. Haig "resorted to the open falsification of commonly
known facts to cover up the aggressive character" of U.S. policy,
wrote TASS analyst Igor Orlov (April 7). This speech, in Orlov's
report, reaffirmed a U.S. program of nuclear arms buildup "which
in fact relies on the admissibility of nuclear war and includes
the possibility of delivering the first nuclear strike."
According to Soviet commentators, the Haig speech was an attempt
to deal a "pre-emptive strike" to a forthcoming article in the
journal Foreign Affairs by four former top U.S. officials (George
Kennan, McGeorge Bundy, Robert MacNamara, and Gerard Smith). This
article argues for, among other things, U.S. renunciation of first
use of nuclear weapons.
INF Talks at Geneva and MBFR at Vienna
Not surprisingly, Soviet propaganda has claimed all justice for
the Soviet side's positions at Geneva and none for the U.S.
stance. Thus, P. Viktorov wrote in Pravda (March 12):
Comparing the Soviet plan for nuclear disarmament in Europe
with President R. Reagan's so-called "zero option," interna-
tional commentators note that the USSR has displayed a desire
to make the Geneva talks purposive and constructive and has
taken a major step in the direction of solving one of today's
most acute problems.
The U.S. approach, however, presupposes talks which would lead
to a limitation of the other side's arms without affecting its
own armaments. Washington wants only those armaments whose
limitation or liquidation would benefit the United States and
NATO to come under scrutiny.
At Vienna, the socialist countries have tabled "an important in-
itiative," according to TASS (April 9), but the West has avoided
discussion of this document. The reason: NATO and "above all
the United States" want to push on with the arms race and establish
"military superiority over the USSR and its allies."
It is precisely this course which is stalling the Geneva talks
on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. It is precisely this
course which is raising obstructions on the way to agreement
in Vienna. . . . This course is shortsighted and unwise . . .
irresponsibility and fanning the nuclear and conventional arms
race could end in tragedy.
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U.S. "Madness"
The root cause for all problems in the arms control process are
to be found in Washington's policies, according to Soviet commen-
tators. These charges against the U.S. have become increasingly
bitter in recent weeks. Typical of the Soviet attacks is an art-
icle in the journal Selskaia zhizn (March 13) entitled "Madness
as a Policy." In this piece Nikolai Pastukhov wrote: "Real
awareness of the terrible danger which is hanging over the planet
through the fault of Washington's insane policy.is giving rise
to a growing protest movement among the broadest circles of the
international public against the militarist forces' criminal
course."
Pastukhov summed up the current situation as follows: "The threat
to peace and universal security emanates from the.present American
administration, that champion of the U.S. military-industrial
complex interests, which has elevated madness to the rank of its
official policy."
FALKLANDS CRISIS AND LATIN AMERICA
While for most of this period Soviet propaganda has concentrated
on charges of U.S. plots against Nicaragua, Cuba, and other Latin
American nations, the Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands
has provided it with a major new theme.
The U.S. Desires a Foothold in the Falklands
At first rather neutral on U.S. involvement in the crisis, more
recent commentary from the USSR now includes charges that the U.S.
is "trying to exploit the dispute" for its own aims (Krasnaia
zvezda, April 2). The U.S. goal, according to Radio Moscow (-in
Spanish, April 14), is to establish military bases on the Falk-
lands and to control the South Atlantic (TASS, April 13).
Soviet propaganda has also begun to claim a definite pro-British
slant to U.S. activity in the crisis (e.g., A. Maslennikov, Pravda,
April 12). The USSR, meanwhile, has shown a tendency to support
the Argentines in the dispute, largely by criticizing British
"threats" smacking of colonialism (TASS English, April 9). Soviets'
attempt at "evenhandedness" in the dispute is shown by their use
of both the Argentine (Malvinas) and the British (Falklands) names
for the islands in most stories.
Reagan's Caribbean Initiative
Overshadowed in April by the new crisis, President Reagan's Carib-
bean Basin Initiative (CRI) still continued to draw fire from Soviet
propagandists. TASS English (April 9) charged:
The "economic program" which is being imposed on the Caribbean
countries is nothing more than a cover-up for Washington's
aggressive aspirations and sinister designs against the pro-
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gressive countries of the region, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Grenada. It is also designed to assure the exploitation of
manpower and natural resources of the region by American mono-
polies.
And just what are these "aggressive aspirations and sinister de-
signs"? In order to solidify "its military and economic positions"
in the region, the U.S. will pour huge amounts of money into the
"bloody Salvadoran junta" and the "anti-people dictatorships of
Honduras and Haiti." These funds, according to TASS English (April
11), "will be used for armed suppression of democratic forces in-
side these countries and for staging from their territories sub-
versive operations against Nicaragua, Grenada, and other sovereign
states."
"Gunboat Diplomacy" and Other "Desperate Attempts"
Apropos of NATO naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Mexico in March,
Komsomolskaia pravda correspondent R. Gabdullin wrote that "in
an attempt to trample on centers of the revolutionary movement
in Latin America, Washington is again pursuing a 'gunboat
diplomacy' which runs contrary to common sense" (March 16).
Repeating a charge leveled by Guatemalan revolutionaries, TASS
English (March 26) stated: "The military coup in Guatemala is a
desperate attempt of the Washington administration and the reac-
tionary Guatemalan military to save the repressive pro-imperialist
regime against which the whole people is waging struggle."
The U.S., in the Soviet view, is most anxious to sustain the cur-
rent "repressive" regimes in Guatemala and Honduras in order to
have bases for launching subversion against revolutionary Nicaragua.
T ASS correspondent Sergei Gorbunov has written (April 1) of U.S.
plans to reconstruct air bases in Honduras to handle American
combat planes, "thus preparing conditions for armed intervention
against revolutionary Nicaragua."
TASS commentator Ruslan Kniazev alleged on March 26 that
behind the smokescreen of a vociferous slander campaign about
the Nicaraguans' 'intervention' in the Salvadoran conflict . . .
the United States is steadily building up its military muscle in
Central America and the Caribbean and escalating preparations
for extensive subversive activities against revolutionary
Nicaragua.
The other main target of the U.S. in Latin America, say Soviet ana-
lysts, is Cuba. When a group of U.S.-based Cuban exiles called
Alfa-66 was recently tried in Cuba, Literaturnaia gazeta correspond-
ent Vladimir Vesenskii wrote at length about Washington's alleged
"interest in Alfa," foreknowledge of Alfa-66's attempt to assassin-
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ate members of-the Cuban government,, and, thus, collusion in inter-
national terrorism. Vesenskii concluded that Washington intended
to "use gangs of this kind as the first. echelon, as cover for the
agents of the CIA and other American special services, who are al-
lotted the main role in preparing assassinations and major acts of
sabotage, such as a biological attack, for instance . . . .
The elections in El Salvador in March also provided grist for Soviet
propaganda mills. These were a "foul election farce," cried Novoe
vremia (April 2), "staged by the Salvadoran ruling junta to a
script prepared in the White House." The U.S. allegedly had much
riding on the Salvadoran elections:
It was hoped in Washington that the very fact of elections held
will help improve the reputation of this blood-stained regime
which has made murder an instrument of political struggle. It
was also hoped that elections will help end the growing inter-
national isolation of the Salvadoran regime and become an argu-
ment to persuade American congressmen . . . that there is nothing
reprehensible in this support because it is support to a "duly
elected government."
OTHER REGIONS, OTHER. COUNTRIES
No Soviet'catalog of American perfidy'in the world could be com-
plete without some mention of such additional areas as the Far East,
Mideast,..Africa, and Europe. In this period, Soviet accusations
of U.S. interference, pressure, and other malefactions centered on
Korea, Greece, Iran, and Zimbabwe.
"Aggressive Intrigues" in South Korea
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's trip through the Far. Fast
in March and April occasioned several Soviet attacks on U.S.,.policy
in the Pacific region. A North Korean foreign ministry statement
picked up by TASS English (April 7) "firmly condemns U.S. aggres-
sive intrigues in South Korea as a brazen challenge to the peace-
loving Korean people and as actions aimed at undermining peace in
Asia and throughout the world."
Describing U.S.-Korean plans for continued mutual assistance and
military aid, TASS English charged: "Thereby Washington fully re-
vealed its plans of perpetuating American military-political con-
trol" of Korea and of using that nation as a "springboard of the
United States to blackmail and pressure the independent states
of the Far East and Southeast Asia" (March 30).
The United States was also condemned more generally for its
"secret deals" with the People's Republic of China--threatening
the USSR, Afghanistan, and world peace; its past "genocide"
against the Vietnamese; and its pressure on Japan to increase
its military activities and spending.
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CIA Espionage in Greece
A strike of teachers employed at the U.S. cultural center in
Athens led to discovery of some U.S. documents allegedly re-
vealing the center as a hotbed of espionage. Documents of the
International Communication Agency, "under whose cover CIA of-
ficials actively operate," showed that "the main purpose of the
American 'Cultural Center' in Athens is 'penetration of military,
parliamentary, diplomatic and administrative circles' of Greece."
(TASS English, April 1).
The lesson to be learned in all this, according to Soviet com-
mentators, is that "U.S. intelligence services might push the
forces of the right into stepping up their activities, as hap-
pened in the past when the black colonels came to power in Greece
with the assistance of the United States in April 1967."
U.S. Policy Against Zimbabwe
Conspirators planning to overthrow the government of the republic
of Zimbabwe who were arrested by state security organs have been
shown to be "closely linked with Western special services, specif-
ically of the United States and Britain"--this according to TASS
English (March 27).
In addition, charged TASS commentator Sergei Kulik, "the U.S.-
dominated International Monetary Fund and transnational companies
are especially active in carrying out anti-Zimbabwe measures"
(April 7). In sum, said Kulik, "Zimbabwe has been added to the
list of independent African countries against which the Reagan
administration is pursuing a policy of an 'undeclared war'."
Conjoined with these charges concerning Zimbabwe have been other
Soviet accusations of U.S, plots against Chad, U.S. backing for
"new aggression planned by the racist Republic of South Africa
against People's Angola," and a CIA coup plan in Ghana.
U.S. Plots in Iran
Iranian security forces have, according to Soviet reports, discov-
ered an antiregime plot backed by the CIA. The plotters planned
to "stir up unrest among various strata of Iranian society, kidnap
state figures, plant bombs, and so forth."
Radio Moscow (Persian, March 23) commented on these events thus:
In September last year Alexander Haig explicitly said that
everything will be done to return Iran to the ranks of Western
society. Washington is substantiating these shameless remarks
by the U.S. Secretary of`State with its dirty and rude actions.
The new plot of the counterrevolutionaries discovered in Iran,
and which was directed by U.S. spy masters, is further con-
firmation of this.
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Listed below are representative Soviet press and TASS items on themes
discussed in this report. Translations or summaries of virtually all
appeared in the FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union) in late March and
early April.
"Shifting the Blame" by Iurii Kornilov, TASS English, Mar. 18.
"International Echoes" (including article by Iona Andronov: "The
Secrets of Germ Warfare--?y Does the CIA Need Mosquitoes and Croco-
diles?"), Literaturnaia gazeta, Mar. 24.
"Publicist's Notes": "Poisoners' Orgy" by A. Leontiev, Krasnaia zvezda,
"The Pentagon's Gas Chambers" (comprising four articles: "Deadly
Contents" by A. Grigoriants in Bonn; "'Humanitarians' in Gas Masks"
by A. Pailadin in Washington;."Eloquent Silence" by N. Paklin;.and:
"Open Secret" by V. Skosyrev in London), Izvestiia, Mar. 28.
"[Askold] Biriukov Assails Claims on Soviet CW Use," TASS English,
Apr. 6.
"Misinformers Caught Redhanded: The Forgery That Did Not Pay Off" by
A. Akhmedzianov, Izvestiia, Apr. 6.
"TABS Cites Pentagon Official on CW Plans" by Aleksandr Liutii, TABS
English, Apr. 6.
"Moscow Responds to Chemical Weapons Allegations" by Igor Aleksandrov,
Radio Moscow English, Apr..11.
"TABS Claims CW Evidence Fabricated" by Askold Ririukov, TABS English,
Apr. 13.
ARMS CONTROL & PEACE MOVEMENT
Commentary by Vladislav Koziakov, Radio Moscow English, Mar. 16.
"Two-Approaches to International Security" by Vladimir Bogachev,
TABS English,,.Mar. 16.
"TABS: Reagan Rejects Kennedy-Hatfield; Resolution,"_TASS English,
Mar. 16.
"International Diary" Program with Evgenii Kachanov and Gennadii
Arievich, Radio Moscow Domestic, Mar. 18.
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"Topical Problems of International Life" Program with Nikolai % ishlin,
Radio Moscow Domestic, Mar. 18.
Commentary by Leonid Ponanarev, TABS English, Mar. 18.
"Washington's Confused Reaction" by Vladimir Bogachev, TABS English,
Mar. 18.
Commentary by Sergei Losev, Radio Moscow English, Mar. 18.
Commentary by Igor Amitriev, Radio Moscow Hbrldwide English, Mar. 19.
"Pravda Comments on Soviet Peace Proposals," TABS in Pravda, Mar. 19.
"An Observer's Opinion: Enlightenment is Inevitable: More and More
Americans Agree with J. Peston that the President is Leading the
Country to Disaster Both at Hane'and Abroad" by Vitalii Kobysh,
Literaturnaia gazeta, Mar. 31.
Commentary by Iurii Kornilov, Sovetskaia Rossiia (TABS), Apr. 8.
"Slogans Which Unite Millions" by Vasilii Kharkov, TASS English, Apr. 9.
"International Situation: Questions and Answers" with Valerii Kosovan,
Oleg Anichkin, and Konstantin Semenov, Moscow Radio Domestic, Apr. 9.
"TABS Analyzes Lack of MBFR Talks Progress," TASS, Apr. 9.
"TASS Sees Growing Antiwar Movement in West" by Ivan Ablamov, TASS
English, April 12.
"Our Commentary: NATO 'Games' in the, Gulf of Mexico" by R. Gabdullin,
Kcrosomolskaia pravda, Mar. 16.
"The United States Against Cuba: 100 Meters from Via Blanca" by
Vladimir Vesenskii, Literaturnaia_gazeta, Mar. 24.
"Hands off Nicaragua!" by Ruslan Kniazev, TABS English, Mar. 26.
"Reportage of Guatemalan Military Coup," TABS English, Mar. 26.
"U.S. Draws Honduras Into Central American Plans" by Sergei Gorbunov,
TABS English, Apr. 1.
"El Salvador: Elections to the White House's Script," TABS English
report of Apr. 2 Novoe vremia item, Mar. 31.
"Not Averse to Warming Their Hands," Krasnaia zvezda (TABS), Apr. 2.
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- 14 -
"Aggravating Tension," TABS English, Apr. 6.
"The Washington Post's Fabrications," Izvestia, Apr. 6.
"Nicaraguan Interior Minister on U.S. Aggression," TASS English, Apr. 7.
Commentary by Vladimir Korotkov, Radio Moscow English, Apr. 7.
"Intent of Reagan's Caribbean Initiative Assessed," TASS English,
Apr. 9.
"Colonialist Threats," TASS English, Apr. 9.
"A Relapse of Gunboat Diplomacy," TASS English, Apr. 11 (based on
story by Boris Kotov in Pravda, Apr. 11).
Commentary by Aleksandr Liutii, TASS English, Apr. 11.
"A Dangerous Frenzy" by A. Maslennikov, Pravda, Apr. 12.
"U.S. Activity, Motives in Falklands Area Viewed," TASS, Apr. 13.
Commentary by Vladimir Korotkov, Radio Moscow English, Apr. 13.
OTHER.RDGIONS, OTHER COUt'RIES
"Who is Inflaming,the Conflict in Chad" by Vladimir Korochantsev,
Selskaia--zhizn, Mar. 2.
TASS on CIA Coup Plans," TASS English, Mar. 15.
"The Pentagon's Helpers"'by Iu. Vdovin, Pravda, Mar. 25.
"The Far East: The Limits of Common Sense,"'TASS English, Mar. 26.
"CIA's 'Phoenix' Program in Vietnam Termed Genocide," TASS English,
Mar. 26.
"Weinberger Visit to South Korea Assessed," TASS English, Mar. 30.
Commentary by Boris Andriianov,,Radio Moscow Domestic, Mar. 30.,
"U.S..'Cultural Center' in Athens Espionage Site," TASS.English, Apr. 1.
"Zigzags of U.S. Policy in the Pacific" by A. Vlasov, Pravda, Apr. 2
(also, similar story with same title in TASS English, Apr. 2).
Commentary by Viktor Sivakov, Radio Moscow English, Apr. 5.
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"Diametrically Opposite Approaches" by Vasill Kharkov, TASS English,
Apr. 5.
"With Background of Planned Aggression" by Sergei Kulik, TASS English,
Apr. 6.
"Zimbabwe--A New Target of U.S. Provocation" by Sergei Kulik, TASS
English, Apr. 7.
"U.S. Linked With Plan to oust Zimbabwe Government," TASS English, Mar. 27.
"Documents Confirm CIA Activities in Greece" by Vladimir Kapov, Radio
Moscow Greek, Apr. 7.
"DPRK Condemns U.S. 'Intrigues' in South Korea," TASS English, Apr. 7.
Prepared by: PGM/P Staff
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Soviet Propaganda Alert
No. 5 March 26,1982
Summary
During February, Soviet international propaganda emphasized:
o U.S. arms control negotiating behavior. Soviet media contended
that the U.S. lacks sincere intent to negotiate at Geneva on IUF
and is using the talks as a "smokescreen" for a massive U.S.
military buildup. Conflict between the U.S. and its NATO allies
on INF--as well as a myriad of other issues--was played up.
o Chemical weapons. The Soviets intensified their attacks on
U.S. chemical weapons policy. Soviet propaganda alleged that the
U.S. intends to store chemical weapons in Europe despite objec-
tions by NATO allies; is ready to use chemical munitions in a
"limited war" in Europe; and has used and is providing chemical
weapons for use in the Third World. The Soviets also accused the
U.S. of refusing to take part in negotiations to ban chemical
weapons, and of "concocting lies" about Soviet use of chemical
warfare to divert attention from U.S. activities.
o Poland. Soviet propaganda stressed the familiar theme that
Washington is trying to disrupt "normalization" in Poland through
subversion and hostile propaganda. The "Let Poland Be Poland"
telecast was repeatedly denounced, as were foreign radio broad-
casts alleged to be sending "coded instructions" to counter-
revolutionaries in Poland. The U.S. was condemned for "shedding
crocodile tears" over Poland while enacting sanctions that hurt
the Polish people. The Soviet media also criticized the U.S.
for allegedly seeking to turn the Madrid CSCE meeting into an
"arena of confrontation" over Poland.
o Latin America. To protect American imperialist interests,
argued the Soviets, the U.S. resorts to subversion, military
adventurism, and "assistance to bloody, repressive regimes." The
U.S. was charged with trying to halt the revolutionary process in
Nicaragua and Cuba by preparing terrorist groups of exiles for
subversive actions and eventual invasions. Direct U.S. complicity
in atrocities in El Salvador was also alleged. Soviet news com-
mentators dismissed President Reagan's OAS speech as a "rehash of
the Monroe Doctrine." They also claimed that Washington is exag-
gerating problems in Poland to divert attention from El Salvador.
o Middle East. Soviet media suggested that Egyptian President
Mubarak, uncomfortable with close ties to the U.S., is seeking
to distance himself from Washington. Soviet commentaries
treated rlubarak favorably and expressed a cautious optimism
regarding developments in Soviet-Egyptian relations. The U.S.
and Israel were blamed, as is customary, for tensions in the
Middle East.
Office of Research
international Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Soviet Line on Geneva Talks
Soviet media focused directly on the Geneva INF talks or tied
most general discussions of international security and strategic
matters to Geneva. Some attention was also paid to the Vienna
MBFR talks. While no fundamentally new themes emerged, familiar
ones were adapted for application to Geneva:
o The U.S. went to Geneva reluctantly only under pressure of
international (especially European) public opinion and is not
making a serious negotiating effort.
o The U.S. is using the Geneva talks to create the impression
that it strives for peace, favors arms control and reduction,
and tries to deal with the Soviet Union. To develop this image,
U.S. tactics are to make clearly unreasonable proposals, counting
on their rejection, then blame the Soviet side for obstructionism.
At the same time the U.S. ignores reasonable Soviet proposals.
o Using Geneva as a "smokescreen," the U.S. is carrying out an
immense military buildup--increasing the defense budget, develop-
ing new types of weapons, and expanding its resources abroad.
According to the Soviets, U.S. "stalling" at Geneva fits into the
overall strategy of Washington's drive for political-military
superiority: "the U.S. opposes any concrete results which might
hinder the siting of new U.S. missiles [in Europe] and spoil the
Pentagon's plans for the United States to achieve military super-
iority" (TASS, Feb. 11). American "obstructionism" at Geneva was
related to increases in the military budget, to interventions
throughout the world aimed at shoring up or expanding U.S. power,
to confrontation with the Soviet Union, and to the "doctrine of
the acceptability of 'limited nuclear war'."
The Soviets maintained that the USSR, in contrast to the U.S.,
adheres to a "peace-loving" policy and consistently supports arms
control and reduction. But, in the interests of security and
progress, the USSR cannot and will not permit the U.S. to achieve
the world domination it seeks. Thus if the U.S. is determined to
escalate the arms race, Moscow has no choice but to keep pace.
Greater Media Attention to Geneva
Soviet media coverage of Geneva in December was sparse and avoided
direct comment on U.S. negotiating behavior. Treatment of the
subject increased in January, but a decision to "go public" on the
issue of negotiating positions was clearly indicated only on
February 9 with the release of an authoritative '`ASS commentary on
the Soviet stance, repeated the following day in the central press.
Subsequently, remarks on INF made by Leonid Brezhnev were widely
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reported as indications of Moscow's offering of new "concrete"
proposals.
Soviet media handling of Geneva was intended partly to counter
the impact of President Reagan's February 4 announcement of the
U.S. draft of an INF treaty. Western analysts suggested that
Moscow felt it was necessary to generate pressure from public
opinion to moderate the U.S. position at the negotiations.
They also speculated that Moscow's decision was influenced by
East-West tensions over the Polish situation and Soviet anxious-
ness to discredit the U.S. policy of linkage.
Soviet propaganda on chemical weapons increased and became more
strident in February. In addition to a barrage of domestic and
international press and radio items devoted to the subject,
criticisms of U.S. chemical munitions policy frequently appeared
in treatments of other subjects, such as American foreign policy
in general, CSCE, and the U.N. To some extent, the intensifica-
tion of Soviet propaganda appeared to be a response to Western
coverage of Soviet complicity in lethal chemical weapons use in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. The Soviets also charged the
U.S. with developing lethal biological weapons--a form of warfare
which the U.S. has repudiated.
Techniques in Treating the Chemical Weapons Theme
Soviet propaganda strove for effect with dramatic descriptions of
the chemical weapons allegedly being produced or planned for
production by the U.S. Nothing was said about Soviet possession
of lethal chemical and biological agents. Soviet.reports criti-
cized the U.S. for already having the "world's greatest arsenal of
'silent death'" yet preparing to spend "billions of dollars more"
on chemical weaponry.
The Soviets also relied on a one-sided piling up of facts and
figures--some accurate, some not, many attributed to Western
sources--on chemical weapons: what types of munitions the U.S.
has, how much of various types, budget allocations for binary chem-
ical weapons, "case studies" of American use of chemical agents,
and so forth. Soviet propaganda continued to deny charges leveled
against the USSR regarding chemical and biological weapons use.
Chemical Weapons in Europe
The Soviets stressed that the U.S. is "proceeding with plans to
turn Europe into a storehouse of binary chemical weapons" despite
objections of the European NATO allies. Just as with "limited
nuclear war," contended Soviet commentators, the U.S. envisions
Europe as a potential theater for chemical war and has little
regard for European fears of this: "The United States' new
binary munitions are first-strike weapons meant for use on the
European territory." (TASS, Feb. 9)
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Parallels were drawn with other cases of the U.S. "forcing"
Europe to accept certain weaponry, e.g., new American medium-
range nuclear missiles and the ERW.
Chemical Weapons in Third World Trouble Spots
Soviet media alleged that in addition to the European theater,
the U.S. plans to deploy chemical weapons in Asia and the Middle
East. Soviet regional radio broadcasts emphasized U.S. inten-
tions to bring chemical weapons to those regions. Propaganda for
Middle Eastern audiences, for example, stressed that eventually
chemical weapons are to be placed in Israel for use in "localized
conflicts." (Moscow Radio's Hebrew as well as Arabic broadcasts
warned of potential ruin of the area by chemical war.)
Sharply denying American charges that the USSR is responsible for
chemical and biological weapon use in Afghanistan and Southeast
Asia, the Soviets countered with accusations of American use of
such agents in those and other areas. According to the Soviet
line, the U.S. is trying to justify and/or divert attention from
its own chemical weapons policy by fabricating groundless charges
against the Soviet Union--"irresponsible claims [which] were
shown to be false following enquiries" (Radio Moscow in English,
Feb. 3). Soviet commentators vehemently attacked and ridiculed
Sterling Seagrave's book Yellow Rain and U.S. State Department
evidence of Soviet complicity in chemical/biological weapon use
in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
Soviet media accused the U.S. of waging biological as well as
chemical warfare against Cuba. They listed diseases supposedly
caused by the U.S., ranging from swine fever in 1971 and a fungus
affecting sugar cane in 1972 to dengue fever in 1981.
A particularly bizarre story spread by the Soviet media claimed
that the U.S. is testing virus-carrying mosquitoes on innocent
citizens in Lahore, Pakistan, planning to export the "killer
mosquitoes" to Afghanistan and elsewhere.
International Controls on Chemical Warfare
Soviet commentators criticized the U.S. for "invariably refusing"
to hold talks aimed at banning chemical arms. At Geneva, com-
plained the Soviets, the U.S. has refused since last summer to pro-
ceed with negotiations on chemical weapons. The Soviet explanation of
this was the "U.S. drive for military superiority" and rejection
of any constraints on this drive. There was no mention of the
U.S. and Western European position on the necessity for verifica-
tion and compliance safeguards in any chemical weapons agreement.
Soviet propaganda accused the U.S. of violating the spirit of the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and alluded to the U.S. abstention from a
U.N. resolution noting the need to activate talks on chemical
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weapons in the Disarmament Committee as indicative of the U.S.
position. For their part, the Soviets professed willingness to
take part in any negotiations aimed at reaching international
agreements on chemical weapons.
Propaganda on Poland continued in the same vein as in prior months.
According to the Soviet line, Washington is still disturbed that
the attempt to overthrow socialism in Poland was thwarted and
the situation there is normalizing. The Soviets alleged that
the U.S. continues to interfere in Polish internal affairs, trying
to disrupt improving conditions there and to exacerbate interna-
tional tensions. Some Soviet commentators charged that the U.S.
is seeking to "break down the postwar system" established at Yalta
by challenging the principle of "the inviolability of borders."
Soviet examples of the U.S. disruptive effort include:
o Economic sanctions. Washington's hypocrisy is evidenced by its
imposition of sanctions that will make life more difficult for
Poles at the very time U.S. leaders are professing "solidarity"
with the Polish people. Soviet media characterized the sanctions
as "inhumane" and also "naive" (historically proven to be a,
futile method of exerting pressure).
o Polish issue at Madrid. The U.S. and certain other delegations
were accused of trying to use the Polish issue to stir up anti-
detente feeling and to transform the CSCE Madrid meeting into an
arena of East-West confrontation. Western intent, argued the
Soviets, was to divert attention from the real problems at hand--
such as ensuring military security--by raising a fuss over Poland,
a subject which has no place at Madrid.
o Showing of "Let Poland Be Poland." By mid-month the propaganda
blitz aimed at discrediting the program had somewhat abated, but
references to it as a "provocation" which turned out to be "a
total failure" persisted. Soviet media condemned efforts by the
U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to hold a "provocative screening" of the
program at the Embassy. As an indication of extreme Soviet
sensitivity on "Let Poland Be Poland," the Soviets denounced the
singing group ABBA (hugely popular and until now officially
approved in the USSR) because ABBA taped a segment for the
program--even though the segment was never shown.
o Western radio broadcasts. Allegations that RFE is broadcasting
coded instructions to counterrevolutionaries inside Poland were
repeated. VOA and foreign radio in general were condemned for
interfering in Polish internal affairs.
o CIA. Quoting heavily from official Polish sources, Soviet
media charged that the CIA is linked with Polish subversive
groups. The Soviets lost no time in working up stories of the
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CIA in Poland and tying these in with the favorite Soviet theme
of the CIA as the sinister, ruthless and ubiquitous U.S. "special
service" involved in virtually everything evil in the world.
Another Soviet theme related to the so-called "U.S. anti-Polish
campaign" was U.S. pressuring of reluctant European allies to follow
American initiatives. The Soviets dwelt in particular on allega-
tions of "desperate but fruitless" U.S. efforts to stop the Soviet-
West European gas pipeline.
A particularly virulent article entitled "White Scorpions" appeared
in Pravda on February 15. Essentially, the article blamed Polish
problems on the influence of Western decadence (nihilistic atti-
tudes, consumerism, etc.) which had grown dangerously in Poland
over the past two decades. The "white scorpion" of American
propaganda was attacked, as was a sweeping range of U.S. foreign
and domestic policies.
Soviet propagandists argued that Washington's actions in Latin
America are but one part of a worldwide U.S. policy of using
"lies, threats and sanctions" to pressure and weaken revolutionary
movements. Pravda on February 4, in a piece on Nicaragua, charged
that "almost every day Washington cabinet members make announce-
ments containing threats to take 'sanctions' or 'measures' against
one or another state."
El Salvador
Soviet media relied almost exclusively on selective use of material
from Western sources which they adapted to fit their own needs.
Soviet propaganda stressed that the U.S. has entered what is
essentially a civil war in El Salvador in order to protect U.S.
imperialist interests in the area; the U.S. naturally sides with
the oppressors of the common people. The Soviets charged the U.S.
with direct complicity in the murders of innocent civilians by
Salvadoran "cutthroat" squads on "punitive missions."
Soviet media repeated and added to connections drawn by Western
journalists between El Salvador and Vietnam. One Soviet com-
mentary on the attitude of the U.S. military toward El Salvador
asserted that "the Pentagon generals have long been straining to
take revenge for Vietnam" (Moscow domestic radio, Feb. 12). Other
commentators noted that, as in Vietnam, U.S. involvement is esca-
lating despite strong protest from U.S. citizens, and the U.S.
role is growing gradually and "sneakily" under the "pretext of
resisting foreign intervention." Drawing another analogy to
Vietnam, the Soviets criticized El Salvador's upcoming elections
(over)
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as a dubious exercise staged solely to legitimize the present
government.
Cuba and Nicaragua
Soviet propagandists complained of a stepped-up U.S. campaign to
reverse the process of revolutionary transformation in "progressive"
Latin American states. They accused the U.S. of training "terrorist
groups" of Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles for subversive actions and
eventual invasions.
President Reagan was charged with making "an avalanche of insinua-
tions" about Cuban participation in Caribbean drug and arms
smuggling designed to create pretexts for aggressive acts against
Cuba. Soviet media asserted that the U.S. has shown no proof of
Cuban smuggling or "export of violent revolution."
The Soviet media also accused the U.S. of CIA-directed chemical
and biological warfare against Cuba (see page 3) and in El Salvador.
President Reagan's OAS Speech
Labeling President Reagan's speech a "rehash of the Monroe Doctrine
Soviet propagandists described his Caribbean basin initiative as
"a package of military-political and economic measures, directed
at suppressing the mounting struggle of the Latin American peoples
for freedom and independence [and] at consolidating pro-Washington
regimes and military dictatorships which have given a free hand to
American corporations in plundering their national wealth...."
(TASS English, Feb. 24).
Miscellaneous Charges
Much of Soviet propaganda on Latin America--especially but not
exclusively that intended for Latin American audiences--contained
various details and elaborations on the major themes. Among these
were:
o Washington organized the Central American Democratic Community
to further its plans for creation of a regional military bloc
composed of reactionary regimes.
o U.S. has plans to use Chilean military forces to intervene in
Central America.
o Expansion of the Peace Corps in Latin America means more CIA
agents will be sent out under that cover.
o Senior U.S. military officials have made "provocative visits"
to Guatemala to emphasize USG concern over the situation there.
o U.S. military exercises in Panama were staged to say "Do
not forget who is the real master of the Panama Canal Zone"
(Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Spanish, Feb. 15).
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MIDDLE EAST
Soviets View U.S.-Egyptian Relations
A spate of media items dealt approvingly with Egyptian President
Mubarak, pointing to Egyptian internal reforms, an evident
inclination to seek better relations with other Arab states, and
a decline in the amount of "anti-Soviet propaganda" in Egypt.
Soviet commentators expressed a vague cautious optimism regarding
prospects for improved Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Soviet media treated U.S.-Egyptian relations cautiously but at
some length. They emphasized that President Mubarak is uncom-
fortable with a close relationship with the U.S. and is seeking
to distance himself from Washington. As one Soviet commentator
stated, "tiubarak's visits to the West European capitals are...
viewed as a desire to attribute a more balanced character to
Egypt's foreign policy and eliminate the far too strong tilt
toward Washington. Already a word like 'desadatization' is
being used." (Moscow Domestic Television, "International
Panorama," Feb. 6). The U.S. was depicted as pressuring Egypt
to stay in line on Camp David and to serve as a base for U.S.
"aggressive military designs."
U.S. and Israel Blamed for Mideast Tension
Predictably, U.S. policy was denounced as the "real reason" for
tension in the Mideast. The U.S. was taken to task for "black-
mailing" the U.N. on the Golan Heights vote. Soviet media
claimed that U.S. behavior on this issue is an indication that
the "U.S. wants to maintain tension in the Middle East" and
"essentially instigates Israel to new aggressive actions
against Arab states" (TASS, Feb. 4).
The Soviets asserted that Secretary Weinberger's trip to the
Middle East was a disappointment for Washington. They reported
that he did not want to hear what he was told by Arab leaders--
which was that Israel is the real threat in the region--and
he was unhappy to find his interlocutors did not want to talk
about strategic cooperation with the U.S. or about a "mythical
Soviet threat."
Prepared by: PGM/R Staff
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Listed below are representative Soviet press and TASS items
on themes discussed in this report. Translations or summary
reports of almost all appeared in the FBIS Daily Report
during February and early March.
Arms Control/Strategic Issues
"Does the United States Have a Stand at the Geneva Negotiations?"
(V. Bogachev), TASS English, Feb. 2.
"The United States: A Strategy of Confrontation." (Col. M. Pono-
marev), Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 7.
"Redhanded; Going for Broke" (E. Genri), Sovetskaia Rossiia,
Feb. 7.
"The Budget of Preparation for War," Izvestiia, Feb. 9.
"Is There or Is There Not to be Another Spiral in the Arms
Race?," TASS, Feb. 9; Pravda and Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 10.
"Leonid Ilichev: The Soviet Delegation is Ready to Display
Goodwill" (speech at Madrid), TASS, Feb. 10.
"International Review: Who is Blocking Disarmament?" (G.
Shishkin), Sovetskaia Rossiia, Feb. 11.
"For a Fair 'Zero Option'" (V. Kuznetsov), Pravda, Feb. 20.
"Geneva: Do Not Undermine the Foundations of the Talks" (V'.
Matveev), Izvestiia, Feb. 20.
"Against Common Sense" (A. Palladin), Izvestiia, Feb. 23.
"The Most Important Question of Peace," Pravda, Feb. 24.
"In the Blind Alley of Linkages," TASS in New Times, Feb. 26.
Chemical Weapons
"The Pentagon's Chemical Weapon Arsenals," Izvestiia, Feb. 2.
"USA: Bacilli and Gases against Mankind" (2-page feature incor-
porating "Biological Attack: Secret Invasion of Cuba," "Incu-
bator of Death," and "Big-Eye Bomb"), Literaturnaia gazeta,
Feb. 3.
"The Pentagon's Chemical Arsenals" (M. Ilinskiy), Izvestii'a,
Feb. 3.
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"Attention: Gases" (T. Kolesnichenko), Pravda, Feb. 14.
"American Gas-Chamber for the Europeans" (V. Biriukov), TASS
English, Feb. 15.
"Binary Chemical Ammunition -- Weapon of the Aggressor"
(V. Bogachev), TASS, Feb. 18.
"Chemistry in the Pentagon's Plans" (T. Emelianov), Izvestiia,
Feb. 23.
"In the Incubators of Fort Detrick" (A. Manakov), Literaturnaia
gazeta, Feb. 24.
"Rejoinder: Fabrications on the Production Line" (A. Zagorskiy),
Pravda, Feb. 25.
"The Guilty Accusing the Innocent," Pravda, Feb. 25.
"Chemical Threat to Europe" (Col. Gen. N. Chervov), TASS English
Feb. 26.
Poland
"Inadmissible Actions: TASS Roundup" (international press
criticism of U.S. policy on Poland), Pravda, Feb. 4.
"In Their Hour of Trials" (Col. V. Moroz; on martial law),
Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 6.
"International Commentary: Poisoners of the Airwaves" (11.
Mikhailov; on Western radio broadcasting to Poland), Izvestiia,
Feb. 6.
"International Review: The Suppressors of Freedom," TASS
and Izvestiia, Feb. 7.
"At the Madrid Meeting" (L. Kamynin; on "trashy anti-Polish
show at Madrid"), Izvestiia, Feb. 12.
"Plot Against Poland" (Col. V. Semin), Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 16.
"Washington and NATO--Inspirers and Patrons of Internal
Counterrevolution In Poland," Za rubezhom #8, Feb. 19-25.
"Loyal to Lofty Ideals" (TASS), Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 24.
"Vain Attempts of Socialism's Enemies" (A. Lebedev), Krasnaia
zvezda, Feb. 27.
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Latin America
"They Are Threatening Cuba Again," Izvestiia, Feb. 4.
"Nicaragua: Guarding Freedom" (V. Korionov), Pravda, Feb. 4.
"Washington's Genocide in El Salvador" (V. Kobysh), Litera-
turnaia gazeta, Feb. 10.
"USA Escalates Military Interference" (V. Kharkov), TASS
English, Feb. 14.
"The Culprit is Imperialism," Pravda, Feb. 16.
"Salvador: The People's Rage" (I. Golembiovskiy), Izvestiia,
Feb. 16.
"The Same Old Course" (N. Chigir), TASS English, Feb. 25..
"Major Adventures in Preparation" (TASS), Krasnaia zvezda,
Feb. 26.
Middle East
"Storm Clouds Gathering Over Lebanon," Izvestiia, Feb. 5.
"On Mubarak's Tour" (A. Bovin), Izvestiia, Feb. 16.
"Egypt: Why They Are Taking Down Sakhara City" (V. Mikhin),
Sovetskaia Rossiia, Feb. 16.
"Who Is Obstructing a Settlement?" (Ye. Primakov), Pravda,
Feb. 19.
East-West Relations; Global Issues
"Reaction Right Down the Line" (criticizes U.S. domestic policy,
tying it to "aggressive, imperialistic" foreign policy),
Pravda, Feb. 2.
"Questions of Theory; The Soviet Union and the Liberated.
Countries" (Karen Brutents; on Soviet and U.S. relations with
developing countries), Pravda, Feb.2.
"Unseemly Intrigues Around the Madrid Meeting," Pravda, Feb. 4.
"Atlantic Discord" (A. Grigoriants), Izvestiia, Feb. 6.
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"Unseemly NATO Stand at Madrid," Izvestiia, Feb. 10.
"Poisoners" (A. Palladin), Izvestiia, Feb. 11.
"Who Stands Behind the Separatists?" (A. Ter-Grigorian; alle-
gations of CIA involvement with "Sikh separatists" in India),
Izvestiia, Feb. 19.
"International Review: Mighty Potential" (on INF, detente,
the World Federation of Trade Unions congress), Pravda,
Feb. 21.
"Tartuffes and Human Rights," Pravda, Feb. 22
"International Observer"; USA: 'Big Stick' Policy" (V.
Kudriavtsev), Izvestiia, Feb. 22.
Attacks on "U.S. Anti-Soviet Propaganda"
"Failure of a Provocative Undertaking" (roundup of inter-
national press items critical of "Let Poland Be Poland),
Izvestiia, Feb. 2.
"A Smokescreen of Lies: Reporting from the Ideological Front"
(G. Oganov), Pravda, Feb. 8.
"Anti-Sovietism: How It's Done"; "Stupidity or Baseness?:
Russian Monsters Stride U.S. Television Screens" (G. Borovik;
on NBC television movie World War III), Literaturnaia
gazeta, Feb. 10.
"White Scorpions" (A. Krivitskiy), Pravda, Feb. 15.
"The Ice of Cold War" (M. Sturua), Izvestiia, Feb. 19.
"Trud: Futile Efforts of Falsifiers" (report on article in
Tru don "imperialist propaganda"), TASS, Feb. 21.
"Since that Memorable Day" (A. Leontiev; on U.S. "hysteria"
over Soviet threat and American lack of gratitude to Red
Army for World War II effort), Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 23.
"Truth Against Truth"; "A Gamesman? No -- A Murderer"'(i.
Andronov), Literaturnaia gazeta, Feb. 24.
"Barrels of Tar" (Vladimir Baidashin), Sovetskaia Rossiia,
Feb. 24.
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PROJECT TRUTH
Soviet Propaganda Alert
No. 4 February 17, 1982
Re: Project Truth
Summary
Soviet propaganda in January continued to accuse the U.S. of inter-
fering in the internal affairs of other countries, notably Poland,
and of seeking military and geopolitical superiority.
o Poland. Soviet media charged that the U.S. is interfering in
Polis internal affairs by, among other things, provocative radio
broadcasts (VOA and RFE), "inhumane" economic sanctions, "slander-
ous" declarations, and CIA plotting. The television program Let
Poland Be Poland was derided and denounced. According to the
Soviets, the U.S. goal is to undermine "normalization" and subvert
socialism in Poland.
o U.S. Strategic Policy. A glossy Soviet publication called
Whence the rea to Peace sought to counter the Pentagon's Soviet
Military Power (which it imitated in appearance) by mustering
"facts and figures" on U.S. military capabilities. The publica-
tion's theme is that the U.S., maintaining its tradition of an
offensive strategic policy, is escalating the arms race and
striving for military superiority and eventual world domination.
o The Reagan Administration. Assessing President Reagan's first
year, Soviet commentators d welt on the gloomy state of U.S.-Soviet
relations. They criticized the Administration for allegedly "re-
viving the Cold War" and conducting a campaign of "fabrications and
slander" to discredit the USSR and socialism. The "myth of the
Soviet threat," they contended, has been used to justify Western
aggressiveness worldwide and escalation of U.S. "preparations for
war." President Reagan's handling of domestic economic problems,
especially unemployment and the budget, also came in for criticism.
Soviet propaganda on other issues involving U.S. policy in various
parts of the world included the following:
o "Wedge-driving" efforts to emphasize differences and conflicts
between the U.S. and its West European allies, especially the FRG.
o Allegations of CIA links with the Italian Red Brigade terrorists
and complicity in the kidnapping of U.S. NATO General Dozier.
o Other disinformation campaigns implicated the U.S. in the failed
coup attempt in the Seychelles, and suggested that the U.S. is con-
spiring to overthrow the governments of Ghana and Nicaragua.
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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POLAND
Poland was one of the most important subjects in Soviet propa-
ganda during January. Dominating Soviet treatment of the
Polish situation were themes of alleged U.S. interference in
Poland and condemnations of U.S. policy toward the martial law
regime. The amount of actual reportage on internal develop-
ments in Poland was limited and had a rather pessimistic tone.
Much effort was devoted to refuting Western statements on
Poland and denouncing Western actions. Soviet commentators
drew heavily on Polish media and government pronouncements to
support the Soviet line. By this they evidently sought to im-
part a sense of authenticity to the Soviet version of what is
going on in Poland, and to project the impression that the
Poles and Soviets share the same viewpoint.
On Poland, as on other subjects, the Soviet media made exten-
sive use of Western (usually noncommunist) media items to
buttress their claims.
Continuing U.S. Interference Alleged
The general Soviet line on U.S. conduct vis-a-vis Poland was
the following: The U.S. is disappointed over the increasing
stabilization and normalization inside Poland. Strife and
chaos were required by the U.S. scenario for counterrevolution
and the overthrow of socialism there. Now, not yet resigned
to failure, the U.S. is continuing to mount various futile,
last-gasp attempts to disrupt Polish affairs. These include
economic sanctions, subversive radio broadcasts, projects such
as "A Day of Solidarity with Poland," etc.
Some of the other major Soviet themes elaborating this basic
line were:
o U.S. hypocrisy. The U.S. is hypocritical to condemn and
enact sanctions against Poland on the pretext that the declar-
ation of martial law entails human rights violations, while
the U.S. maintains excellent relations with states that are
truly oppressive and that violate human rights. (South Africa,
Turkey, Chile, and El Salvador, among others, are commonly
cited.) Some Soviet commentaries argue that the U.S. is-unjust-
ified in condemning martial law in Poland since martial law is
recognized under American law as a legitimate measure to restore
order under threatening circumstances, and it has been put into
effect in parts of the U.S. on various occasions in recent
decades. A further point made is that the U.S. is hypocritical
to declare its desire to help the Poles while at the same time
cutting off economic aid to them.
o CIA involvement. The CIA and U.S. Government in general
have been deeply involved in supporting and inciting "Solidar-
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ity extremists" and other groups bent on civil war and the
overthrow of socialism in Poland. Subversive broadcasts by
RFE and RL (the "CIA mouthpieces"), VOA and other stations also
try to provoke counterrevolution--for example, by broadcasting
"instructions" to Polish "extremists."
o Anti-Polish slander. The U.S. and NATO are running an
"anti-Polish campaign," slandering Poland and giving a false
and outrageous version of developments in Poland. The Soviet
Union and Soviet-Polish friendship are also targets of this
campaign. The January 11 NATO ministers' statement on Poland
is one of the most offensive products of this campaign in the
Soviet view.
o U.S. pressure on allies. The U.S. is pressuring other coun-
tries, particularly its West European allies, to go along with
American policy but is encountering considerable resistance.
Soviet media reported and criticized Western European state-
ments condemning martial law (January 5 EC statement, January 11
NATO statement) but Soviet commentary implied that the Western
Europeans are "long on words, but short on deeds." In other
words, regardless of what they say (perhaps as an effort to
appease the U.S.), they are unlikely to take any measures--such
as trade sanctions--which would seriously harm their economies or
endanger the prospects for European security.
Soviet Media React to U.S. Sanctions
The Soviets denounced U.S. economic sanctions against Poland as
inhumane actions which will affect the Poles adversely but not
influence the course of events in the directions desired by the
U.S.
As to measures taken against the USSR, Soviet commentators
claimed these would not hurt the Soviet Union in the slightest.
They contended that history has shown such actions are doomed
to failure--and furthermore, they tend to backfire and harm the
state enacting economic sanctions more than its intended target.
Gloating over West European failure to follow the U.S. lead on
sanctions, Soviet propagandists stressed that Western European
countries are far more dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc
than is the U.S., that they understand the importance of vital
East-West economic links, and that they are unlikely to take the
severely self-damaging step of cutting off these ties.
Soviets Blast "A Day of Solidarity with Poland"
The Soviet line on "Let Poland Be Poland" was established imme-
diately after the President's January 20 announcement of the
program:
o The program constituted interference in internal Polish
affairs. Such interference is contrary to international
agreements such as the CSCE Final Act and the UN Charter.
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o The program was subversive in its intent, designed to incite
the Polish people against the government. In the long run, it
is part of a general plan to undermine socialism in Eastern
Europe and to destroy the Warsaw Pact.
o The program and other Solidarity Day activities underscore U.S.
hypocrisy. No such "solidarity" has been shown for the victims
of the massacre of Indonesian communists, the persecution of
left-wing activists in Chile, or the subjects of repression in
El Salvador and other countries. The hypocrisy is compounded
by U.S. claims of wanting to help Poland while simultaneously
cutting off food aid.
o The U.S. is putting on the program not out of friendship for
Poland, but because its imperialist and hegemonist plans for
the country were frustrated. The program is only part of the
large-scale anticommunist effort of the U.S.
o The U.S. forced its West European allies to take part in the
program. Many of these countries would prefer not to because
of the damage it will do to peaceful coexistence, but the U.S.
wants to regain its dominant position in the alliance.
o The program was part of a massive U.S.-West European propaganda
campaign. This campaign is unprecedented in scale and recalls
1950s Cold War activities.
o Mr. Reagan supervised preparation of the program. USICA was
responsible for producing it.
o The program and U.S. propaganda plans are doomed to fail.
With minor variations on these basic themes, the Soviets
attempted at once to diminish the impact of the program and to
exploit it as an example of U.S. anticommunism. Predictably,
initial reaction to the program was that it was a fiasco and
had perhaps even damaged the U.S. position by showing how little
support there was among the West European allies.
Adopting tones ranging from righteous indignation to sarcasm
and heavy irony, Soviet media put out a barrage of articles and
broadcasts. On the program itself, commentary tended to stress
its "Hollywood" aspect and the low level of usage by even close
U.S. allies. Some commentaries claimed to detect disagreement
with the U.S. position in the statements of Messrs. Trudeau and
Schmidt.
In what has become a propaganda pattern, the Soviets rushed out
a program on Radio Moscow's English world service which was
clearly a direct response to the planned U.S. show. Hosted by
the well-known propagandist Vladimir Pozner and entitled "The
Friends and Foes of Poland," the program was introduced as
follows:
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This is not a show. Hollywood stars past and present
are not involved in it, nor does it offer you such
entertainment as heads of state sharing a rostrum with
traitors. This is a documentary. It offers you the
views of ordinary people and furnishes documented and
verifiable facts. Those views and those facts will help
you decide who are the friends and who are the foes of
Poland
Somewhat less temperate were the remarks of TASS news analyst
Yuriy Kornilov:
What is of interest is that the "independence" of states
and "noninterference" in the internal affairs of other
states are being persistently invoked in Washington by
those who not so long ago tried to "bomb back to the
stone age" the revolutionary Vietnam, who have unleashed
and continue their undeclared war against the sovereign
Afghanistan, who try--wherever it is possible, be that in
Chile or in El Salvador--overtly or covertly to strangle
any attempt by the peoples to decide their own future.
Appeals "to pray for freedom" are launched by those who
encourage and aid the most reactionary, dictatorial, and
hated regimes, who are arming the Israeli aggressor
which'in the eyes of the whole world is occupying the
native Arab territories and wants to drown in blood the
struggle of the Palestinian people for its own national
existence.
Human rights are being invoked by those who created in
their own country a state system of institutionalized
arbitrariness, who shoot to kill the "disobedient" in
Miami, send the national guards and police armed to the
teeth to "pacify" the fighters against racism,.and
handcuff the. leaders of the flight controllers' trade
union which was brave enough to try to protect its
basic rights. Truly there is no limit to Washington's
dissemblance.
Pessimistic Reportage on Life in Poland
Soviet media coverage of actual developments in Poland was sparse,
particularly early in the month. Most stories had a distinctly
pessimistic character, pervaded with cautions that the internal
situation is still "difficult," Polish attitudes are "extremely
complicated," economic problems will not be easily solved, and
other "threats to normalization" (CIA plotting, antisocialist
extremists) still remain. Such stories were presumably designed
both to prepare the Soviet people for a protracted period of
troubles in--and because of--Poland, and to justify martial law
as a means of coping with such a serious situation.
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The pessimistic tone of such Soviet features was somewhat tem-
pered, if not offset, by optimistic notes. These were at least
partly intended to reassure worried citizens of socialist bloc
countries. Soviet commentators rarely failed to mention the
constant progress in "normalization" of life in Poland under
martial law. Uplifting stories about Polish servicemen stead-
fastly doing their duty--with many of them rushing to join the
Party--and interviews with Polish workers relieved that "work
rhythms" had returned to normal in their factory were intended
to foster the impression that things are calm and, overall, are
developing along positive lines (from the Soviet viewpoint).
Another common type of optimistic media feature focused on the
"fraternal bonds" between Soviet Russia and socialist Poland.
The 37th anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw by the Soviets
was amply publicized. Polish gratitude for this was under-
scored, perhaps with the implication that Poles have lasting
obligations to the Soviet Union which had better be honored.
Some Soviet commentaries also seemed to suggest a parallel
between Poland's rescue from fascism in 1945 and its more recent
"rescue from counterrevolution." For Soviet audiences, it was
no doubt reassuring to be told that Poles were now honoring
Soviet war memorials rather than desecrating them.
Coverage of Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek's visit to Moscow
also served to put Soviet-Polish relations in a positive light.
The phrases chosen byrthe Soviets to characterize Czyrek's visit
indicated that relations had considerably improve,] since the
declaration of martial law.
PROPAGANDA PUBLICATION: Whence the Threat to Peace
Soviet propaganda booklets lauding the "peaceful nature" of
socialist policy and condemning the "aggressive imperialist
militarism" of the West are nothing new. The most recent pam-
phlet of this sort, however, titled Whence the Threat to Peace,
gained unusually great attention. Published by the USSR Minis-
try of Defense in six languages and released in mid-January, the
78-page booklet was a reaffirmation of public Soviet strategic
policy and, more specifically, the major Soviet rebuttal to the
1981 Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power.
Whence the Threat to Peace was accorded an exceptionally large
promotion in the Soviet domestic and foreign-targeted mass
media. It was previewed, excerpted, and discussed by news
commentators, and a rare Soviet military press conference was
held. Interestingly, however, the print run was reportedly not
large, and there were no reports--as of late January--of efforts
to distribute it widely.
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The booklet's fundamental thesis is that U.S. strategic policy
has traditionally been offensive, and the Reagan Administration
is carrying on that tradition with a vengeance. The ultimate
goal of the U.S., contend the publication's authors, is world
domination achieved through development of military superiority
(first-strike capability) over the Soviet Union.
Whence the Threat to Peace attacks Soviet Military Power for
allegedly presenting a distorted and exaggerated picture of
Soviet military strength (for example, by excluding comparative
data on the U.S. and NATO). According to the Soviets, the "myth
of the Soviet threat" has been concocted in order to "frighten"
the public, and justify and mobilize support for a Western arms
race for superiority.
To summarize briefly some of the other central points of the
Soviet argument:
o The U.S. bears the blame for obstructing arms negotiations,
hindering peace and international cooperation, pressuring other
countries, and trying to destabilize sensitive situations. It
is driven by a desire to destroy socialism, which is growing in
strength and thus becoming increasingly frightening to the capi-
talist world.
o By mounting its noisy campaign against socialism, the U.S. is
also striving to distract attention from domestic difficulties
(deep social and economic problems). Furthermore, an active
arms industry, fed by international tensions and antisocialist
feeling at home, means huge profits for Western capitalist-
imperialist circles.
o The USSR is and has always been dedicated to peace. Its
military establishment is for the purpose of defense. Soviet
military developments have been responses to Western actions;
the U.S. always initiates every new phase of the arms race.
o The U.S. must accept the realities of the world situation
and stop its confrontational foreign policy and futile drive
for military and geopolitical superiority.
o There is currently a rough parity between Soviet bloc and
Western forces in Europe. U.S. and NATO military power is more
than adequate for defense needs. Thus the present balanced
situation should be acceptable to both sides.
o The USSR favors arms control and reductions, but they must be
carried out fairly. Providing the West considers the legitimate
defense needs of the Soviet Union, agreements can be reached.
0
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Techniques
While "ideological" material is integrated. into Whence the
Threat to Peace, the authors rely mainly on a massive mustering
of facts and figures (real and imaginary) to support their
arguments. Adding to the persuasive appeal of this approach is
the booklet's relatively sophisticated, smooth, "Western" style
of presentation--which attempts to "mirror-image" that of its
American-produced target, Soviet Military Power.
A favorite Soviet propaganda technique is liberal use of
Western--especially reputable and noncommunist--sources to
support the Soviet position on issues. Material is very care-
fully selected, of course, and often taken out of context or
manipulated in a misleading fashion. This method is taken to
an extreme in Whence the Threat to Peace, where a tremendous
amount of data and analyses comes lro,n Western newspapers, jour-
nals, and government documents. Most of the photographs are
Western. The primary purpose is to establish credibility for
the Soviet argument--the Americans' claims are "disproved" with
their own data.
ASSESSMENTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST YEAR
Soviet media commentators provided an unrelentingly negative
appraisal of President Reagan's first year on the anniversary
of the Administration. As is their habit, they focused primar-
ily on foreign policy and especially U.S.-Soviet relations,
with secondary attention to U.S. domestic economic and social
problems. There was much ado about the revival of a "Cold War
mentality" in Washington--charges that the Reagan Administration
is "fanning the flames of anti-Soviet hysteria" and "seeing the
'hand of Moscow"' wherever a problem for the U.S. exists. Lack
of "realism" on the part of U.S. leaders was bemoaned, and there
was no expression of hope for improved relations in the near term.
Soviet critics of the Reagan Administration tended to adopt a
mocking, ironic tone when discussing Washington's current views
on the Soviet Union, as if seeking to underscore the sheer
absurdity--from the Soviet perspective--of such views.
One of the favorite themes of Soviet propagandists was the
alleged "moral posturing and hypocrisy" of the Reagan Adminis-
tration. They cited as a prime example of this the "harsh
treatment" of striking American air traffic controllers as op-
posed to the "pious" stance taken on Polish Solidarity.
Regarding the U.S. domestic scene, Soviet commentators focused
on economic ills. The emphasis was on unemployment--the num-
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bers of unemployed, their suffering, and the alleged indiffer-
ence and callousness of U.S. Government leaders, who have
"failed to take steps to remedy the situation." The Soviets
inevitably contrasLed unemployment in the West with the "guaran-
teed full employment" of the socialist-bloc countries.
President Reagan's State of the Union message to Congress was
also used as a peg for criticism of the Administration's domes-
tic economic policy. Soviet commentators stressed that the
President "had to admit that the economic situation is very
bad...it was impossible not to admit this." Noting that
Reagan had promised to reduce the enormous U.S. budget deficit,
they declared that he had "failed to produce results" and was
now warning the American people not to expect speedy improve-
ment. Nonetheless, "President Reagan expressed his determina-
tion to continue the present course of reducing appropriations
or social needs combined with colossal military spending"
(Moscow World Service [English], 27 Jan. [FBIS, 27 Jan.]).
Soviet journalists asserted that in seeking to balance the
budget by cutting funds for social programs without controlling
military spending, the Reagan Administration was moving to
"take away from the U.S. working people much of what they had
achieved during long years of hard and stubborn struggle"
(Moscow Television, Jan. 30, [FBIS, Feb. 1]).
WESTERN EUROPE
Major issues directly concerning Western Europe, the U.S., and
the USSR are covered in the preceding sections on Poland and
Whence the Threat to Peace. Other Soviet propaganda themes on
Western Europe included:
o Continued "wedge-driving" between U.S. and Western Europe.
The Soviet media continued to stress the differences between
American and Western European geopolitical concerns, while at
the same time emphasizing the unity of interests among all those
sharing the European continent--including the Soviet Union.
Among the Soviet allegations repeated again this month were U.S.
indifference to European security concerns, failure to consult
adequately with European allies before making decisions, and
willingness to sacrifice Europe in a war if necessary for U.S.
"victory."
o Alleged CIA link with Red Brigades. Charges of CIA-Red Bri-
gades complicity, already made during the 1978 kidnapping and
murder of Aldo Moro, were revived in connection with the kid-
napping of U.S. NATO General Dozier. Referring to non-Soviet
sources of information, the Soviet media reported that the Red
Brigades, as other terrorist groups, are known to work with, and
sometimes on instructions from, the CIA. The CIA would welcome
a terrorist action such as the Dozier kidnapping, argued the
Soviets, because it would hurt the image of the anti-NATO peace
movement while creating sympathy for NATO at a time when opposi-
tion to it is strong and growing.
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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD
Soviet propaganda output in January was routine as far as the
Middle East, Latin America, southern Africa, and other regions
are concerned. American policy in the Middle East came in for
most attention.
Middle East
The U.S. was strongly criticized for vetoing the proposed U.N.
declaration on sanctions against Israel. Trips by Secretaries
Haig and Weinberger to the Middle East were characterized as
U.S. "interference" in the internal affairs of sovereign
nations and efforts to impose American imperialist will on that
part of the world. U.S. support for "the Israeli aggressors"
was bias'r_e1, and commentaries on this and related themes--for
example, on the strength of "pro-Zionist" elements in influen-
tial U.S. circles--were designed to portray the U.S. as hostile
to Arab interests in the Middle East and always on Israel's
side.
In contrast to this picture of U.S. anti-Arab bias, the Soviet
Union's sympathy and support for Arab peoples were emphasized.
This, in addition to being explicitly stated, was conveyed in
glowing reports on Arab delegations in Moscow, Soviet technical
aid projects in Arab countries, friendly meetings of Arab and
Soviet citizens, etc. Propaganda attacks against Israel, parti-
cularly in connection with the Golan annexation, also served to
reinforce the image of the-USSR as friend and ally of the Arab
peoples.
Latin America
The harshest Soviet propaganda on Latin American issues was
heard on Radio Peace and Progress (RPP) to Latin America. These
broadcasts described alleged CIA operations in Nicaragua as "a
conspiracy of large proportions... aimed at assassinating the
Sandinist leaders and sabotaging the economy." A typical re-
port concluded:
All this U.S. underground work in Nicaragua is part of
the U.S. aggressive political strategy against this
country. Washington is exerting direct pressure on the
Nicaragua Government by telling it how the Nicaraguans
should live and manage their internal affairs, whom they
E should or [should] not befriend. If they do not obey such
dictates, Washington threatens an armed invasion, dragging
along in its aggressive plans other states of the continent.
[Present U.S. activity] is...the prelude of a collective
intervention that is being prepared. (Moscow RPP in
Spanish [to Latin America], Jan. 18 [FBIS Daily Report,
Jan. 26] )
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Commentaries similar in substance but generally less inflamma-
tory in tone than the RPP broadcasts appeared elsewhere in the
Soviet mass media.
Africa
Toward the end of January, the Soviet media began a disinforma-
tion effort on U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ghana. A familiar pattern
of operation became evident: Soviet media, vaguely citing
Ghanaian media sources, ran a story that Washington was involved
in planning a coup in Ghana because of U.S. displeasure over the
change of leadership there. One Soviet report, for example,
charged that, because a "secret agreement" Washington had with
the previous Ghanaian government was terminated by the fall of
that government, the U.S. decided to provide "planes and mer-
cenaries for an invasion" (Izvestiia, Jan. 24 ). Citing Radio
Accra as its information source, TASS reported that the U.S.
hoped to destabilize Ghana "through economic boycott, slander,
[and] ethnic strife." Once Soviet media gave worldwide circu-
lation to such vaguely-sourced stories, they were picked up by
communist and noncommunist news media outside the r1SSR. Fre-
quency of repetition alone was relied upon to infuse them with
a degree of credibility, at least for some audiences.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
Several prominent and numerous minor Soviet media items dealt
with the subject of chemical-biological warfare (CBW). Much of
the material appeared to draw upon recent publicity in the
Western mass media of the issues surrounding the development
and proposed production of binary weapons. Soviet sensitivity
to Western charges of Soviet use of CBW in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan was evident in outraged Soviet denials of such
activity and the intense campaign of countercharges, which show
little sign of abating.
The Soviets raised standard accusations against the U.S.:
o The U.S. is stalling bilateral CW (chemical warfare) talks
because it is "on the way to preparations for large-scale chem-
ical war."
o Ample evidence, some available from Western sources (articles
in The Washington Post and Armed Forces Journal are cited),
shows that the U.S. has appropriated huge sums for CW develop-
ment. The Reagan Administration, especially Secretary Haig,
advocates binary munitions production and has "pressured" the
Congress into earmarking funds for it. (As in other situations,
the Soviets used--selectively--Western-sourced figures and other
"facts" to enhance the credibility of their claims.)
J
J
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o The U.S. is trying to picture the Soviet Union as the
aggressor in this area; it has used "slander and lies in
order to justify its own dangerous course of increasing the
arsenals of such weapons and to ascribe to others its own
militarist plans."
A CASE STUDY: Continuing Soviet Campaign to Link the U.S.
with Seychelles Coup Attempt
On November 25, 1981, an attempt to overthrow the government of
the Seychelles failed. Michael Hoare, an individual with a long
history of mercenary activity in Africa, led the group of armed
men, most of whom returned in a hijacked airliner to South Africa
from where they had mounted the attempt.
On December 1, President Rene of the Seychelles issued an offi-
cial statement on the attempted. coup, in which he noted that it
was organized in South Africa but that the South African govern-
ment disclaimed any responsibility. He accused two Seychellois
exiles of involvement. No accusations were made against the
U.S. or other Western governments, and the U.S. was implicitly
thanked for its message of support to President Rene.
Notwithstanding their inability to produce any evidence of U.S.
involvement in the event, the Soviets launched a campaign to
lay the blame on the CIA. To outline briefly the key elements
of their efforts to date:
o Immediately after the coup attempt failed, Moscow domestic
radio reported unnamed African radio commentators as noting
the "undoubted participation of Washington." The Soviets were
unfazed when the official Seychelles account of the failed coup
made no suggestion of U.S. involvement and clearly placed the
blame elsewhere.
o During the first week of December, in TASS and in radio
broadcasts to Africa, Moscow continued to blame the U.S. for
conspiring with South Africa to "mastermind" and fund the
attempted coup. TASS referred to nameless "news analysts" as
the source of statements that CIA agents were involved.
o Subsequently, articles appeared in various African newspapers
(Nairobi Nation, Lagos Daily Times, Ethiopian Herald, and
others) speculating on U.S. involvement and repeating variations
of the Soviet themes. In January, the Times of India picked up
the story, stating that "it is widely believed in southern
Africa]" that the attempt "had the backing of several intelli-
gence organizations of Western governments...."
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o A January 12 Izvestiia article on alleged CIA activity in
Africa cited an article in the Paris journal Afrique-Asie as
saying that the attempted coup was staged by the CIA in cooper-
ation with the intelligence services of South Africa, Israel,
and Morocco.
Typical characteristics of Soviet disinformation campaigns are
evident in this case:
o The first appearance of the theme is in'Soviet domestic
media.
o False information is attributed to foreign sources (often
vaguely identified) to, give spurious authority to the
fabrications. (Foreign sources cited by the Soviets in these
situations may often be nonexistent.)
o Repetition is relied upon to establish the charges and endow
them with an aura of credibility (at least for some audiences).
There is often no attempt to establish even the appearance of a
factual basis for the charges.
o The Soviets take advantage of the willingness of some non-
communist media to accept undocumented accusations. Once these
media carry the material, Moscow can replay it, treating it as
if it were further confirmation of the original (Soviet) line.
Prepared by: PGM/R Staff
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PROJECT TRUTH
Soviet Propaganda Alert
No. 3 January 11, 1982
Re: Project Truth
summary
Soviet external propaganda in December continued to emphasize
that the Soviet Union steadfastly maintains a humane, peaceful
and defense-oriented foreign policy, while U.S. policy is
bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations.
In connection with specific international events and develop-
ments, Soviet propaganda efforts:
o depicted the U.S. approach to negotiations on nuclear arms
reduction in Europe as conniving and, insincere (in contrast
to the sincere and longstanding Soviet commitment to arms
negotiations).
o dwelled on issues of U.S. and NATO military policy in Europe,
playing up alleged differences between the U.S. and some of its
European allies on that subject. At the same time, the Soviets
stressed their ties with Western Europe and their stake in com-
mon "European" concerns, implying unsubtly that the U.S. is an
outside power stirring up trouble and seeking to further its own
ends against the interests of all Europeans.
o denounced Solidarity "extremists" and other elements in Poland
for counterrevolutionary, antisocialist activities against the
interests of the Polish people. Soviet media conveyed approval
of the imposition of martial law. Since the crackdown, they have
emphasized that conditions are generally calm and "returning to
normal." Soviet propaganda harshly accused the U.S. of inter-
fering in internal Polish affairs, charging, among other things,
that the CIA was behind Solidarity.
o attempted to weaken the impact of U.S. official statements
and news media items critical of the Soviet Union by ridiculing
them as "cynical fabrications" or "shopworn anti-Soviet cliches"
designed to distract attention from the real evils perpetrated
by the U.S. Media attacks were targeted on American officials
and journalists associated with the alleged anti-Soviet propa-
ganda campaign.
o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in
the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, Indian ocean
region and Latin America.
End Summary
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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A. Arms Reduction Talks in Europe
Soviet media commentaries repeatedly chided the U.S. for
behavior and statements by American leaders which allegedly
revealed a cynical and unserious attitude toward arms limita-
tion negotiations. Soviet propagandists claimed that the U.S.
embarked on negotiations only under pressure (mainly from
public opinion in Western Europe and the U.S. itself). While
expressing their hope that the U.S. would negotiate in a
"businesslike" and sincere fashion, Soviet commentators noted
somberly that the U.S. had thus far not manifested its inten-
tions to do so.
The U.S. was consistently portrayed as a reluctant and untrust-
worthy participant in arms negotiations, more interested in
attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and
mutually acceptable solutions. Nonetheless, much of the Soviet
reportage dealing directly with the newly begun Geneva arms
talks was rather restrained in tone and played down the usual
harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric. Soviet commentators rarely failed
to inject a note of optimism alongside the usual cautions that
reaching agreements at Geneva would not be easy. Soviet media
appeared to be attempting to prepare the ground for negotiations
without discouraging the development of popular opposition to
U.S. arms policy in Europe.
Despite its relatively cautious treatment of the Geneva talks,
Soviet propaganda throughout December did not ease efforts to
depict the U.S. administration overall, and certain officials
in particular (e.g., Secretaries Haig and Weinberger), as "war-
mongering" and "saber-rattling." Frequent media items on such
topics as the U.S. military budget, NATO talks, and measures
to enhance U.S. and NATO military preparedness were intended
to contribute to the image of U.S. militarism.
Constant references were made to Leonid Brezhnev's recent Bonn
visit--termed his "peace mission"--and to the Soviet position
on arms in Europe which Brezhnev set forth, once again, during
that visit. Continuing the line of previous months, Soviet
propaganda characterized Soviet arms reduction proposals as
ideal, but proclaimed Moscow's willingness to seek compromise
and consider other "serious" approaches. Brezhnev's Bonn state-
ments were described as indicating the most fruitful direction
for negotiations to take.
President Reagan's "zero option" proposal, on the other hand,
was criticized as a blatantly unreasonable suggestion disin-
genuously put forth for sheer propaganda value--a "phony
proposal" designed to deflect criticism from the Reagan Admin-
istration. Soviet propaganda charged that the West's selective
method of counting weapons in Europe presented a false picture
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of Soviet strength. In reality, the Soviets contended, there
currently exists a rough parity in Europe. In the Soviet
view, the U.S. proposal sought to reestablish Western military
superiority in Europe and ignored legitimate Soviet defense
concerns.
Alleged U.S. willingness to sacrifice Europe in a "limited
nuclear war" was, as in previous months, another major point
of Soviet propaganda. A December 9 article in Literaturnaia
gazeta, for example, described. Europe as America's "nuclear
football field"--"no matter which goalpost the 'goals' are
kicked through, the Americans remain on the other side of the
ocean ready to sacrifice the Europeans." Numerous media fea-
tures seeking to portray the U.S. as the real threat to Euro-
pean security drew on the Soviet propaganda pamphlet Threat
to Europe released in November.
Soviet coverage of the Polish situation before the declaration
of martial law consisted largely of fierce attacks on
Solidarity--accused of "providing cover for counterrevolution"--
and on other elements of Polish society characterized as anti-
socialist. After the crackdown, Soviet media, in addition to
continuing their denunciations of Solidarity and the "anti-
socialist threat" to Poland, endorsed the measures taken and
began to stress that conditions in Poland were beginning to
"return to normal."
The Soviet media have reported selectively on developments in
Poland, exercising particular care in the choice of material for
domestic Soviet audiences. Relatively little concrete infor-
mation on what is going on in Poland has been offered by Soviet
media. Instead, they have sought to pound away on several ideas
which they would like to have the world believe. These include:
o The vast majority of Poles did not support the Solidarity
"extremists" and are relieved that Party and military leaders
have reasserted control to return the country to normal. Soviet
reportage is laced with quotes attributed to Polish citizens
which criticize Solidarity and express support for the measures
taken by the Military Council. Although "isolated" hot spots
have been noted in Soviet reportage on Poland, a heavy emphasis
has been placed on depicting the situation as generally peaceful
with constant improvements in popular morale and progress in the
efforts to resolve. Polish economic problems.
o While the Polish armed forces are playing a significant role
in saving Poland from counterrevolution and helping it "return
to normal," it is the leadership of the Polish Party which is
of key importance. (Some Soviet defensiveness on this issue
was indicated in commentaries which took pains to underplay
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the Polish Army's role and even managed to credit "the Party
leadership" with the crackdown.)
o The Polish situation is an internal Polish matter and should
be resolved by the Poles. Western speculations that Moscow is
orchestrating events there and may intervene militarily are
"slanderous lies" and merely part of the general U.S.-inspired
anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that sees the Kremlin behind
everything from international terrorism to peace marches in
Europe. However, while repeating that there should not be
outside interference in internal Polish affairs, Soviet media
have asserted the USSR's special position in regard to Poland,
noting that a threat to Poland "directly affects the security
interests" of all the Warsaw Treaty nations.
o It is actually the U.S. and NATO that are interfering in
domestic Polish affairs by holding meetings and issuing
statements designed to support and incite counterrevolutionary
activity, and to pressure the Polish government into taking
actions--such as making concessions to Solidarity--deemed
desirable by the West. According to the Soviets, Western
"crude interference in the affairs of sovereign Poland" is
taking other forms as well: economic blackmail; escalated
"subversive propaganda" broadcasts into Poland by the Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe; and provocative media sensation-
alization and distortion of events in Poland.
Such allegations of Western (especially American) interference
and provocation in Poland have been a daily staple of Soviet
media since mid-December. President Reagan's announcements of
sanctions to be taken against Poland and the USSR triggered
intensified attacks on the President personally and on American
policy vis-a-vis Poland. The sanctions were denounced and the
the President accused of resorting to "lies" and "blackmail."
During the last week of December, Soviet propagandists sought
to elaborate on their charges of "U.S. interference." They
claimed to have "documentary proof" that the U.S.--and in
particular the CIA--was deeply involved in trying to wrest
Poland from the "socialist community" by supporting and inciting
"coup-plotters." Soviet media also contended that the U.S. has
been displeased with the course of "normalization" in Poland
since the imposition of martial law, and is continuing efforts
to destabilize the Polish situation and use it to exacerbate
international tensions and provide a pretext for continued
Western military buildup and antisocialist activity.
Other Soviet media themes which have become significant since
U.S. sanctions against Poland and the USSR were announced are:
o The U.S. is attempting to force its NATO allies to join in
the American "campaign of pressure" against Poland and the USSR,
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but this is meeting with. little success. U.S. "official cir-
cles" disregard European interest in and need for cooperation
and detente in Europe.
o Washington continues to "magnify" and "distort" events in
Poland in a deliberate attempt to build tensions. This.attempt,
however, is doomed to failure.
o The U.S. decision on economic sanctions is "extremely in-
hum.an"--withholding of food as a means of exerting political
pressure is particularly reprehensible. However, these sanctions
will have no real effect. (Western sources are extensively cited
by Soviet commentators. making this point.)
o U.S. policy toward Poland since the imposition of martial
.law fits perfectly into the overall pattern of U.S. foreign
policy--seeking to hinder detente, and discriminating against
socialist countries on various pretexts while supporting
truly repressive regimes simply because they are antisocialist.
To summarize, the overall effort of Soviet propaganda on Poland
in the closing days of 1981 was to emphasize charges of con-
tinuing U.S. pressure against Poland and the socialist bloc
while at the same time downplaying the actual international
significance of Polish events. By taking this approach, Soviet
propagandists hoped to: show a real need for martial law to
repel outside threats to Poland; muster public opinion against
the U.S.; divert attention from Soviet involvement in Poland;
and demonstrate that declared Soviet foreign policy goals
(detente, arms control, etc.) should and would not be.jeopard-
ized by developments in Poland.
C. Attacks on U.S. "Propaganda" Against the USSR
A longstanding common complaint in Soviet media has been that
the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the
Soviet Union and socialism. In December there was an unre-
lenting flow of prominently featured media items on this
theme, zeroing in on the Department of Defense publication
Soviet Military Power, the State Department's Soviet Active
Measures report, USICA and VOA in general, "Project Truth,"
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and network television
news programming. Articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia
gazeta and other publications attacked "American anti-Soviet
propaganda" for allegedly seeking to invent a mythical Soviet
threat and to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria in order to divert
American--and worldwide--anxieties over U.S. policy, in parti-
cular increased defense spending and deployment of new weapons.
Soviet media sought to discredit U.S. information efforts by,
among other things, personal attacks on the integrity of the
individuals and institutions involved. Protesting that
"aggressive and provocative radio propaganda" from the West had
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escalated, the Soviets reiterated familiar charges that RFE-RL
is staffed with "traitors and renegades" who formerly served the
Nazis, and that the CIA is overseeing U.S. international broad-
casting operations. A long article in the Izvestiia weekly
supplement Nedelia (December 10) described ICA Director Charles
Wick in disdainful tones as a millionaire who made his money in
"real estate, show business and brothels," and a "cold warrior"
who wants to return to the Truman era.
D. U.S. Policy and the Third World
While not introducing any new themes, Soviet propaganda keyed
its repetition of the standard ones to current international
situations. Major emphasis was on the Middle East and Latin
America. Specific themes included the following:
o Libya. The Soviets charged the U.S. with trying "to imple-
ment a plot against an independent and sovereign Arab state"
and, in addition, with "reanimating the propaganda falsehood of
the 'support' by the Soviet Union-for international terrorism,
which had failed [to convince people] on all counts." The
Soviets contended that the U.S. had no support worldwide for
its accusations against Libya.
o Middle East. Soviet propaganda called it "ridiculous" to think
that the U.S. did not know in advance about and approve Israeli
plans to annex the Golan Heights. By its consistent support of
Israeli aggression in the Middle East, claimed Soviet media, the
U.S. shared responsibility for the latest Israeli actions.
o Latin America. The Soviets gave heavy coverage to the Moscow
visit of Nicaragua's foreign minister, making use of the occasion
to condemn the U.S. for a "flagrant campaign of threats" against
Nicaragua aimed at forcing that country to cooperate with alleged
U.S. imperialist policy in Latin America. Soviet media also crit-
icized U.S. plans to increase "provocative" broadcasts to Cuba.
o Indian Ocean. Propaganda attacks focused on the presence of
the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (referred to as evidence of
escalating imperialist military power), and alleged U.S. failure
to join efforts to secure peace in the region.
o Afghanistan. Complementing glowing accounts of beneficent
Soviet activity in Afghanistan were condemnations of the Western
media for "creating lies" about the Afghanistan situation. The
U.S., China and Pakistan were accused of continuing to incite and
support "bandit activity," thus blocking complete normalization
of conditions in Afghanistan. Stories portrayed Soviet soliders
serving in Afghanistan as conscientious young citizens fulfilling
their "internationalist duty" under trying conditions. Babrak
Karmal's praise for Soviet assistance was also reported at length.
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E. Human Rights
On the occasion of UN Human Rights Day (December 10), Soviet
media self-righteously described the socialist states as the
true defenders of the most important of all human rights--the
right to live in a peaceful world--inasmuch as "socialism and
peace are indivisible." Replaying familiar themes, Soviet
commentaries contrasted the rights enjoyed by citizens of
socialist countries--right to a job, to free universal educa-
tion, free health care, etc.--with the lack of rights in
Western capitalist societies, as evidenced, they noted, by
high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and expensive medical
care,
Some of the Soviet propaganda on human rights may have been
designed especially as a counterweight to Western media
coverage of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner's hunger strike
in defense of Liza Alexeeva's right to emigrate to join her
husband (Bonner' s son, Sakharov's stepson). But the Soviet
media-regularly feature such material and rarely let suitable
opportunities such as Human Rights Day pass without comment.
Soviet media treatment of the Sakharov hunger strike itself
consisted, predictably, of extremely cryptic reporting of
events themselves along with generalized articles criticizing
Sakharov, Alexeeva and others involved. The hunger strike
was characterized in some Soviet sources as a "provocation"
intended to promote Western opposition to detente.
F. Brezhnev's Birthday
The Soviet news media were packed with material dedicated to
Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his 75th birthday, cele-
brated on December 19. Birthday-related items included
congratulations and praise from numerous Soviet Party and
government organizations; congratulatory messages from foreign
communist parties and foreign government leaders; excerpts from
Brezhnev's books; biographical features; speeches by Politburo
members; reports on exhibits, plays, and other events devoted
to Leonid Ilich; poems and songs; and much, much more--all
highly laudatory.
Western observers noted several characteristics of the birth-
day adulation. Brezhnev was praised for his lifelong dedica-
tion to the cause of peace. At the same time, relatively great
attention was focused on his military experience and ties to
the military, perhaps underscoring the prestige and significance
of that institution. Controversial international issues were
totally avoided in the many official speeches; there was no
mention of Poland. There were, however, references to serious
Soviet economic problems and the need to solve them.
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No. 2
PROJECT TRUTH
Soviet Propaganda Alert
November 27, 1981
Re: Project Truth
Summary
Overall themes and techniques of Soviet propaganda remain vir-
tually unchanged from those reported in the first number of this
series. However, specific incidents have triggered major Soviet
efforts to take advantage of transitory themes which fit into
ongoing propaganda patterns.
The theine of war and peace has been the main focus of Soviet media.
In addition, many American officials and government agencies have
come under frequent attack in recent Soviet propaganda.
Recent Soviet efforts are designed:
o to picture President Reagan's disarmament proposals as a
propaganda ploy.
o to convince Europeans that the U.S. would, in the event of
war, abandon them to the Soviet Union if by doing so the
United States itself could avoid nuclear attack.
o to turn public opinion in Europe and elsewhere against the
NATO plan to modernize its theater nuclear forces (TNF) and
thus to achieve Soviet aims at minimum cost.
o to undermine the credibility of the Reagan Administration's
foreign policy, and especially its recent offensive against
Soviet active measures.
o to divert attention from Soviet wrongdoing in Afghanistan and
Poland.
End Summary
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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I. THEMES
A. The President's Speech on Arms Reduction Talks
Initial Soviet media response to President Reagan's November
19
speech criticized the U.S. "zero option" as unrealistic and
un-
fair, an attempt to regain U.S. military superiority in Europe.
Soviet media characterized the Reagan proposal as a "propaganda
ruse" intended simultaneously to soften opposition--particularly
in Western Europe--to U.S. and NATO military plans for Europe,
and to block the upcoming Geneva negotiations, while trying to
cast blame for the deadlock on the Soviets.
A flood of Soviet media commentary on the Reagan speech seemed
primarily designed to blunt its positive impact upon worldwide
audiences by discrediting it as a serious arms control initiative.
Perhaps out of concern that Reagan might be upstaging Brezhnev
on the eve of the latter's trip to Bonn, Soviet media commentators
reemphasized the seriousness and steadfastness of Brezhnev's
peace policy, contrasting that to alleged U.S. "posturing" and
suspiciously "sudden" interest in peace.
Soviet media commentary stressed the following points:
o "Rough parity" between the military power of both sides now
exists in Europe. Figures cited by President Reagan to show
alleged Soviet superiority are "fantastic." (Soviet media
provided a counter set of figures.)
o Acceptance of the American proposal would mean a return to the
imbalance which formerly prevailed. The present Soviet defense
potential in Europe would be eliminated while U.S. forward-
based systems and British and French submarine-based missiles
and nuclear bombers would remain untouched. Thus for this and
other reasons, the "zero option" does not take Soviet security
needs into account.
o By deliberately offering a proposal they themselves realize
is unacceptable, U.S. leaders are trying to create the impres-
sion "among the uninformed" that they are seriously interested
in arms reduction in Europe. Actually, this maneuver is yet
another indication that the U.S. is approaching the Geneva
talks with an unconstructive attitude: the U.S. side would
like to see a breakdown of the talks "that could be used as an
excuse for the continuation of the arms race."
The Soviet media quoted extensively from Western media analyses
to support their arguments. They also continued to give prominent
play to material treated as evidence of a "warmongering attitude"
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on the part of the U.S., such as information on U.S. military
appropriations and recent statements by U.S. officials on "limited
nuclear war" and "nuclear warning shots."
The recent focus of Soviet propaganda has been, overwhelmingly,
war and peace. Soviet media have painted the U.S. as the enemy
of peace, the instigator of a new arms race, an opponent of arms
limitations talks, and a proponent of nuclear war.
While alleging America's "trigger-happy" attitude toward war and
nuclear weapons, Soviet propaganda emphasizes the "peaceloving"
nature of Soviet policies. The centerpiece of this campaign has
been the so-called interview Leonid Brezhnev granted to the West
German journal Der Spiegel in November. In this lengthy exposi-
tion, the CPSU General Secretary denies that his country seeks
military superiority over the U.S. and disclaims any Soviet
belief in the "winnability" of a nuclear war. Brezhnev insists
that the USSR desires serious arms negotiations and that the
U.S. is obstructing such talks.
Soviet media have given. much play to the antiwar movements in .
Western Europe and pictured them as exclusively anti-American in-
stead of antinuclear (i.e., against both U.S. and Soviet arms).
This propaganda tries to turn the concern of many Europeans over
nuclear conflict into a Soviet weapon to obtain the unilateral
cessation of NATO's TNF modernization program while permitting
continued Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.
Because Soviet propagandists know that their own and other
publics tend to discount official Soviet statements, they quote
liberally from.American and Western leaders--generally out of
context or with distorted interpretation added--to bolster their
points. Thus, statements by President Reagan on the possibility
of a "limited nuclear war," by General Schweitzer on current
Soviet designs, and by Secretary of State Haig on certain NATO
contingency plans have all figured prominently in recent Soviet
propaganda. (See also following section.)
In pushing the image of the U.S. as a warmonger and the greatest
threat to world peace, the Soviet Union has made a number of
claims and charges, such as:
o the U.S. is plotting. an invasion of Libya under the pretext of
its Bright Star joint military exercises in the Mideast.
o the U.S. plans to deploy, neutron weapons in the People's
Republic of China.
o the U.S. plans to invade the Caribbean nation of Grenada.
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o the U.S. refuses to support the Soviet-backed U.N. treaty on
weapons in space, an obvious sign of American intention to
put "weapons of mass destruction" into space.
o the U.S. is waging war against Cuba with chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons and is training forces for an invasion of Cuba.
o the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia presages a vast expansion of
the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and indicates
an American intention to use its military forces in areas
where it claims (unjustifiably) a U.S. national interest.
Thus, for example, the Soviet military newspaper Red Star on
October 18 claimed that "Washington regards the upcoming series
of U.S. Armed Forces maneuvers . . as a 'dress rehearsal' for
an invasion of Libya and as a means of forcible pressure on
other Arab countries." And a TASS broadcast on November 1
charged that
the United States is trying to secure for itself the long-
awaited possibility to deploy its armed forces in the Middle
East on a long-term basis, which fully meets the aspirations of
U.S. imperialism to establish dominance over that strategically
sensitive part of the world.
Soviet organs also continue to reiterate elements of the Soviet
"peace offensive" first sketched at the 26th Party Congress in
February-March 1981: e.g., the call for nuclear-free zones in
Europe, and a new Mideast multinational peace conference to
supplant the Camp David accords.
C. Vilification of U.S. Officials and Agencies
Soviet media have devoted much time and space to attacks on and
citation of certain American officials. Among those most fre-
quently and most sharply attacked in the past month have been:
President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of the
Navy John Lehman, ICA Director Charles Wick, ACDA head Eugene
Rostow, former NSC staffer General Robert Schweitzer, and two
U.S. diplomats. Most often attacked has been Secretary Wein-
berger, with Secretary Haig a close second.
Two apparent motives lie behind these attacks. First, many of
these officials have been on the offensive against the Soviet
Union in recent weeks. Second, as noted above, Soviet propa-
gandists think that quoting and misquoting Western officials
lends more authority to their work.
The President's comment that he could, in certain circumstances,
envision a nuclear engagement confined to Europe alone, has drawn
much fire from Soviet media. In keeping with public Soviet mili-
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tary doctrine, Brezhnev (in Der Spiegel) and Defense Minister
Ustinov (at the November 7 anniversary celebration)--as well as
many other Soviet commentators--have insisted that the USSR does
not agree with the concept of "limited nuclear war." They claim
that any nuclear exchange between NATO and Warsaw Pact members
would inevitably lead to a major nuclear conflagration.
Such efforts seem geared to fan anti-American and anti-NATO
feelings in Western Europe. Thus, Soviets apparently hope to
spread doubt and disaffection among the NATO allies.
Notable examples of personal attacks are:
o After publication of the Department of Defense report Soviet
Military Power, Secretary Weinberger became a lightning rod for
Soviet abuse,, including many personal attacks. In a Pravda
piece entitled "In a Propagandistic Hysteria" (October 1), a
Soviet commentator implied that the Defense Secretary's "anti-
Sovietism" amounted to a kind of mental imbalance. Noting that
"anti-Soviet hallucinations" had brought former Defense Secre-
tary James Forrestal to a "bad end" (suicide), he expressed
fear that the present Pentagon chief might succumb to "the same
illness." At bottom, this and other articles portray Weinberger
and the U.S. as seeking military superiority over the USSR.
o Secretary of State Haig has been the object of Soviet assault
for a variety of public statements, e.g., that the U.S.- would
like to see a more moderate, pro-U.S. regime in Iran, that NATO
might consider use of a nuclear weapon as a "demonstration," and
that the U.S. intends to ensure its leadership in the Middle
East with an American military presence in the region. Most of
these remarks have been interpreted by Soviet commentators as
evidence of American desire to dominate various areas of the
globe and to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations.
o Statements of officials such as Bush, Rostow, and Lehman have
all been used by-Soviet propagandists to bolster their claims
that the the U.S. pursues a policy of singleminded self-inter-
est, primarily by military means, to the detriment of other
countries. Soviet media portray U.S. policy as seeking Ameri-
can dominance over its allies, neighbors, and others--especially
less developed countries.
o Particularly intense have been Soviet-inspired attacks against
two American diplomats, Ambassador Barnes to India and Ambas-
sador Ortiz to Peru. Non-Soviet media with close ties to the
USSR originally accused both men of being CIA agents. In a
classic pattern, the-Soviet media then picked up and spread the
stories. Such unfounded charges'are designed to embarrass
American public servants and to complicate bilateral relations
with the nations involved. But they endanger the lives of U.S.
diplomats because alleged CIA agents often become "fair game"
for terrorists worldwide.
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Some individuals and agencies in the U.S. engaged in international
information and cultural exchange activities have been prime tar-
gets for Soviet media attacks.
The International Communication Agency (ICA) has been depicted by
Soviet media as a powerful and "far-flung" propaganda apparatus
leading U.S. "anti-Soviet and antisocialist" propaganda operations.
ICA is charged with having close ties to the CIA; some Soviet com-
mentaries, such as a November 5 TASS item, characterize ICA as
"nothing more than a branch of the CIA." The Voice of America
(VOA) is the ICA component most often singled out for attack, and
the recently inaugurated "Project Truth" has also drawn specific
criticism. Soviet media have accused ICA/VOA of, among other
things, spreading fabrications which glorify the West and "blacken"
socialism," and interfering in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries (most importantly, Poland) with the purpose of encouraging
instability and subversion.
The Central Intelligence Agency itself has also come under regular
fire from Soviet media, both for its alleged foreign involvements
and for current attempts to change its mandate. Charges of CIA
"crimes" against Panama's Torrijos, Cuba, etc. are noted below.
But Soviet propaganda has been especially attentive to the pro-
posed changes in laws which would enable the CIA to operate at
home against enemies of the U.S. The Soviets accuse the Reagan
administration of trying to turn the CIA into a domestic spying
operation which would endanger the civil liberties of all Ameri-
cans, particularly those who do not agree with administration
policies.
D. The U.S. as Moral Monster Abroad and at Home
Soviet propagandists' ongoing efforts to portray the United
States in the worst possible light can be seen in their charges
of "amoral" and "immoral" U.S. activities, such as:
o The U.S. constantly interferes in the internal affairs of
other nations: in Poland, where the U.S. allegedly fans the
flames of antisocialism in the Solidarity union; in Spain,
where the U.S. is supposedly pressuring that nation to join
NATO; in El Salvador, where--it is claimed--a legitimate
national liberation movement is being blocked with U.S. sup-
port; and in Afghanistan, where the U.S. (and China) are ac-
cused of fomenting and abetting resistance to the Soviet
puppet regime.
o The United States uses military, political, and economic
means to exploit Third World nations for the benefit of its
multinational companies, monopoly capital, and the military-
industrial complex.
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-6-
o The U.S. uses its leverage unfairly against its own allies--
forcing the Japanese to increase their military spending, the
Europeans to acquiesce to U.S.-inspired NATO plans that only
threaten war, and Egypt to. submit to an expansion of the
American military presence in the Mideast.
o The United States in general and the CIA in particular have en-
gaged in heinous crimes against individuals and nations. The
U.S. was behind the death of Panama's General Torrijos, was
somehow involved in the assassination of President Sadat of
Egypt, and is currently using outlawed chemical and biological
weapons against Cuba.
o The Reagan administration's domestic economic program squeezes
the poor and weak while helping the rich and powerful. The
American worker is either ignored or consciously overburdened
so that those in the so-called ruling elite may increase their
own wealth. Most harmed-by current policies are minority
groups.
Diversion of Attention from Soviet Wrongs
One of the most widely practiced Soviet propaganda techniques,
diversion, has been frequently used in the past month. The most
recent example occurred when a Soviet nuclear-equipped submarine
ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. The incident, with
the submarine obviously on an intelligence-gathering mission,
garnered the Soviets much hostile publicity and considerable ad-
verse reaction among European publics. Yet within a few days of
the sub's release, Soviet rgedia were again hyping the Soviet plan
for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.. And shortly thereafter TASS, the
official Soviet press agency, accused the Swedes, albeit indi-
rectly, of spying on.Soviet communications systems for NATO.
They continue to utilize the diversionary technique to distract
attention from their own huge military buildup, Soviet wrongdoing
in Afghanistan and the Third World, and Soviet use of chemical
and biological warfare (CBW). For example, as the United States
began to demonstrate with hard evidence that the USSR uses and
supplies lethal agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the
Soviet Union unleashed a massive attack on the U.S. for use of
chemical weapons in Vietnam and of bacteriological warfare
against Cuba (an allegation made by Fidel Castro).
As the Cancun summit was unfolding, the Soviet media tried to
paper over the-Soviet absence at the conference and the USSR's
meager aid program to nonsocialist developing nations by vili-
fying the U.S. and.the West as colonial exploiters of the Third
World. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is almost ignored in
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Soviet media, which blame instability there on Western inter-
ference. Continuing Soviet difficulties in subduing the indi-
genous Afghan resistance are blamed on the U.S. and China--
supposedly the instigators and direct supporters of the freedom
fighters in Afghanistan.
When the Pentagon released its report on Soviet Military Power,
the immediate Soviet response was to step up attacks on U.S.
military power and the planned Reagan administration enhancement
of American military capabilities. By falsifying efforts, they
have tried to show that one photograph of a Soviet computer is
not what it purports to be and by this device to call into
question the entire text. (See Kornilov item in Izvestiia for
October 20.)
In short, Soviet propaganda not only indulges in coverups and
omissions, it often is reduced to name-calling. The theory
behind this technique seems to be that Soviet policies,
behavior, and even intentions are always irreproachable.
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PROJECT TRUTH
Soviet Propaganda Alert
No. 1 October 15, 1981
Re: Project Truth
In addition to the efforts underway of a complementary nature,
this is the first in a monthly series of reports on Soviet
external propaganda. The reports will be based on evaluations
of cable reporting, primary source material, and secondary
sources such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
publications. Because this report is the first, it contains
more general and introductory material than will be included
in updates.
Presented in this report are:
o An overview of Soviet propaganda principles and
techniques.
o A list of major political-military propaganda themes
and societal comparisons drawn between the U.S. and
the USSR. Selected regional and country propaganda
themes are also provided.
o A case study of a Soviet propaganda campaign currently
in progress: the anti-neutron weapon (ERW) campaign.
While the focus is on Soviet external propaganda, most of the.
themes are echoed in the domestic media. Thus, Soviet citi-
zens do not in general get different messages than do foreign
audiences.
Office of Research
International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.
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I. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA
A. Soviet External Propaganda*
Soviet external propaganda has two main purposes:
o To represent the Soviet Union as dedicated to peace and
detente, and
o To show the Soviet Union as a just, fair, progressive
society, worthy of admiration if not emulation.
For these purposes, Soviet propagandists follow several basic
principles. The first of these is a systematic denigration of
the U.S., its culture, political system, and belief structures.
By showing that the U.S.--the acknowledged representative of all
things Western--is a doomed, decadent, inherently evil society
which opposes all progressive change, Soviet propagandists hope
to persuade target audiences that it is not a fit model for their
own countries.
The Soviet Union presents itself as the only alternative to the
U.S. as a system of social organization. It portrays itself as
the near-perfect society. Armed with an ideology that maintains
that the Soviet form of society is the inevitable next step in
human development, Soviet propagandists draw invidious comparisons
between almost every aspect of American and Soviet life.
Another key feature of Soviet propaganda is the argument that
while the U.S. and the West are doomed in historical terms, the
U.S. is all the more dangerous because it will defend its way of
life to the end, taking the rest of the world with it to destruc-
tion if need be.
By contrast, the Soviet Union arms only to defend itself and its
allies. It does this reluctantly because its main goal is to
perfect the social, cultural, and economic lives of its citizens;
and armaments are a drain on that process.
From these basic principles flow the whole litany of Soviet
propaganda and, for that matter, foreign policy:
o Support for "national liberation" movements is justified
in terms of putting them. on the road to the higher plane
of existence enjoyed by the Soviet Union.
o The foreign and domestic policies of Western countries are
criticized because they are dedicated to the preservation
of the status quo and are opposed to progressive change.
* In the Soviet lexicon, the word "propaganda" does not carry
the negative connotation that it does in the West.
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o Western military measures are portrayed as inherently
aggressive because they are directed against the Soviet
Union and the progressive principles for which it stands.
o Anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism) is claimed to be good
because it represents a movement against the ancien
regime and toward historical progress. The methods used
in the anti-imperialist struggle are sometimes harsh but
are justified by the ends.
o The Soviet Union is the natural ally of Third World
countries and all others who have freed themselves from
imperialism (i.e., Eastern Europe).
B. Soviet Propaganda Techniques
Soviet propagandists employ a vast array of techniques, crude
and sophisticated. As well as simply being very good at what
they do, Soviet propagandists are not restrained by truth,
honesty, and morality; rather, they are guided by a new morality,
defined by Lenin as that which serves the good of the Party.
Their ideology rationalizes the use of falsehood and deception
by promising that the end--the perfect society--justifies all
means and that shrinking from the use of all available means
constitutes betrayal of the cause.
Soviet propagandists use selective information, half-truths,
distortions, and innuendo, as well as outright lies. Many
Soviet propagandists (such as Radio Moscow's Vladimir Pozner)
have an excellent understanding of the American psyche and
take advantage of American feelings about fair play to justify
their own actions or call those of the West into question.
A favorite Soviet propaganda technique is indirection: an item
from a Western or other non-Soviet source is cited in support
of the Soviet position on an issue, the item sometimes having
been planted by the Soviets. Ironically, the Soviets tend
to think sources from the bourgeois West will have the greatest
credibility, even among their own population. An alternative
form of indirection is the inaccurate citation of a foreign
source or the portrayal of the source as broadly representative
of the larger society when it is not (i.e., frequent citations
from the U.S. Communist Party newspaper, Daily Worker).
Disinformation is another technique. It is impossible to tell
how widespread the practice is because good disinformation is
usually not detected. One form of disinformation is the
"revelation" of false information (such as a forged U.S. docu-
ment), preferably in a foreign source that cannot be directly
associated with the Soviet Union. Another disinformation
technique is to draw attention to past covert actions by U.S.
intelligence agencies and then to imply that the attempted
assassination of the Pope or the bombings in Iran are similar
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types of activities. From here it is a short step to the
suggestion that the U.S. could have been involved.
A most effective technique is imputing false motives to U.S.
policy. The Soviets are quick to exploit any opening offered
by a U.S. action by pointing out adverse consequences or
offensive features to the countries affected. Thus, any U.S.
action which can be interpreted to support Israel is portrayed
as being anti-Arab in nature. U.S. attempts to achieve
"balance" in situations such as the recent South African
incursion into Angola are dismissed as hypocrisy.
Another technique is to debase the meaning of words. Soviet
propaganda has succeeded in appropriating the word "socialist"
as a synonym for the word "communist," and propagandists sel-
dom refer to themselves or their East European allies as
communist countries. In so doing, they acquire at least
semantic legitimacy with groups and countries that consider
themselves to be socialist but not communist. Perhaps the
term most debased is "anti-Soviet": virtually every develop-
ment in the world is seen as either pro- or anti-Soviet and
whatever is not clearly "pro" is immediately labeled "anti."
There is also the example of the application of "national
liberation movement" to groups which seek the violent over-
throw of governments unfriendly or neutral toward the Soviet
Union.
Diversion is a technique used to blunt attacks on the USSR.
When the USSR is criticized, Soviet propaganda responds
with a barrage of countercharges, trying to turn the accusa-
tion made against the USSR against the accusers themselves.
For example, Western charges of Soviet experimentation with
biological warfare, arising in connection with the Sverdlovsk
anthrax incident, were answered by a Soviet propaganda blitz
on Western development of biological weapons. Soviet propa-
gandists often concoct even the most absurd accusations in
the belief that even these will help distract attention from
the charges against the USSR.
This is not to say that everything that Soviet propagandists
create is untrue or that Soviets necessarily disbelieve their
own arguments even if they appear to be untrue in Western eyes.
Because their ideology dictates the "correct" interpretation
of most facts, Soviets may often read a vastly different
meaning into a situation or action than would their western
counterparts. Over the years, Soviet ideologists have
developed an array of philosophical rationalizations that
make all Western actions appear to be threatening or malev-
olent regardless of their objective intent, while all Soviet
actions are laudable, no matter how they might appear to the
outside observer.
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II. CURRENT SOVIET EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA THEMES
This list of current propaganda themes and variations is not
exhaustive. Soviet propagandists adjust quickly to changing
situations, developing variations on general and constant
themes in the Soviet repertoire to suit the needs of the
moment. Thus, a general theme (e.g.: "The U.S. is a threat
to peace") can be refined to apply to an unlimited range of
geographic and situational requirements.
The themes are organized according to their geographic con-
cerns--global, regional, or country-specific--and within
these categories according to whether they involve military-
strategic matters or seek to contrast the Soviet Union with
the United States.
A. Global Themes: Military-Strategic
The aggressiveness of the U.S. as contrasted with the peace-
loving nature of the USSR is one of the dominant themes of
Soviet propaganda. It encompasses many sub-themes, some of
which are discussed below.
According to Soviet propaganda, the U.S. is escalating the
arms race, provoking conflict, and trying to counter every
aspect of Soviet influence in the world in its efforts to
regain the military-strategic superiority it once possessed.
Aggressive behavior by the U.S. stems largely from its ina-
bility and/or unwillingness to adjust to the new "correlation
of forces" in the world (the decline of the Western capitalism
and the rise of socialism). U.S. frustration at no longer
being "number one" is expressed in violence, directed primar-
ily at its chief rival, the Soviet Union.
The USSR, on the other hand, has always been and continues to
be dedicated to the struggle for peace. Its military might
is intended only to defend itself and other peoples who want
and deserve help in defending themselves. In recent months, the
so-called Brezhnev "peace offensive" has been cited repeatedly
as testimony to the peace-loving nature of Soviet policy.
While Soviet propaganda always presents U.S. military-strategic
aggressiveness as a real and dangerous threat, it also indicates
that U.S. actions will ultimately prove futile. For as Marxism-
Leninism teaches, the capitalist/imperialist world is doomed,
despite its desperate efforts to survive, and socialism--with
the USSR its leading representative--is the future. Nonetheless,
the forces of socialism cannot wait passively for the collapse
of the capitalist world; they must actively counter its "last
gasps" of harmful activity.
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Sub-Themes
1. The U.S. seeks military superiority over the Soviet Union.
The U.S. has lost the military preeminence in the world it
enjoyed after World War II when only it possessed nuclear
weapons. The U.S. wishes to regain its former position in
order to blackmail the Soviet Union and its allies, to force
its will upon other countries, and to resist forces of change
and progress, especially in the Third World.
2. The U.S. is not seriously interested in arms control
negotiations. The U.S. strives to create an international
atmosphere which is counterproductive to arms talks, it has
failed to respond to any of the sincere Soviet initiatives in
the sphere of arms control, and it has blocked ongoing efforts
such as the MBFR talks. Although the American failure to
ratify SALT II is no longer a major emphasis, it is still regu-
larly referred to in the context of more general criticisms
of U.S. arms control behavior.
3. The U.S. is introducing sinister new weapons such as the
neutron weapon, the Pershing II, the MX, chemical and biologi-
cal weapons. In its drive to regain superiority, the U.S. is
developing and deploying new weapons systems which endanger the
alleged parity that Soviet propagandists maintain now exists
between the two countries. The U.S. is willing to use any
weapon, including chemical and biological devices which most
other countries have outlawed. The U.S. is also developing
the space shuttle mainly for military use and is working on
killer satellites, particle-beam weapons, and laser applications.
4. The U.S. is forcing its allies to accept its weapons and
to increase their own arms expenditures. The U.S. blackmails
its allies into accepting the placement of weapons (e.g.
Pershing II's). Its allies resist because they recognize that
the U.S. is trying to export a future war, that is, to ensure
that it is not fought on U.S. soil. There is a growing split
between the U.S. and its allies.
5. The U.S. seeks to forge an anti-Soviet alliance with such
countries as China, Japan, Pakistan, and Turkey. The U.S.
wants bases for its troops or the right to stockpile military
supplies on the soil of other countries. The U.S. uses econ-
omic aid, military assistance,. weapons sales, or simple black-
mail to gain concessions.
6. The U.S. engages in psychological warfare against the Soviet
Union. It spreads untruths about the USSR through its propaganda
activities--especially radio: VOA, RFE, and RL--and foments
anti-Soviet hysteria and war mentality. These activities are
in violation of basic international agreements such as CSCE.
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7. The U.S. wages economic warfare against the USSR. The
U.S. is trying to provoke a costly new round of the arms
race that will strain, exhaust and ultimately destroy the
Soviet economy. It also uses economic weapons such as the
grain embargo to force the Soviet Union to accede to its
will. Soviet propagandists always strongly emphasize that
the Soviet economy will never be ruined by a forced arms
race. Although the Soviet leadership would much prefer to
use Soviet resources for improving the people's living
conditions, the USSR is certainly capable of keeping pace
with U.S. military strength and is determined to do this,
even-if sacrifices are necessary in other sectors of the
economy.
8. The U.S. grossly interferes in the internal affairs of
other countries. The U.S. seeks to manipulate the domestic
political process of other countries, including its allies.
It attempts to guarantee that these countries' domestic and
foreign policies will be subordinate or at least complemen-
tary to its own. The U.S. is willing to use all methods to
this end, including propaganda, blackmail, bribery, and
assassination. In the case of countries that seek to free
themselves of U.S. or colonial domination, the U.S. assists
repressive regimes in putting these movements down or spon-
sors counterrevolutionary activities which will restore the
status quo.
9. The U.S. faces vast resistance to its aggressive plans.
The world public opposes the aggressive plans of the U.S. and
its allies. Large-scale resistance is seen in almost all
countries. Pacifism and neutralism are growing, especially
in those countries most threatened by U.S. plans. Even within
the U.S., there is a major split between the Government and
the people over defense policy.
10. The U.S. and allies are responsible for international
terrorism. The U.S., Israel and some of the NATO allies are
behind terrorist activity in the world. There is a tradition
of terrorism associated with right-wing extremists in the
West and the U.S. is a violent, unstable society which spawns
terrorist activity.
11. The CIA is behind much of the unrest in the world. In
its efforts to carry out its policies, the U.S. resorts to
all available means. Along with military, economic, and
psychological weapons, the U.S. employs the CIA to subvert
other countries and to bring their policies in line with its
own. It attempts to control other governments through its
agents or to destabilize those countries it cannot control.
The CIA has unlimited funds and will employ any means to
achieve its ends.
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12. The Soviet Union seeks only peace and detente. Soviet
policy is peace-loving and defensive. The USSR has often
sought to reach agreement with the U.S. and its allies to
reduce tensions, disarm, and engage in peaceful economic and
social intercourse. The Soviet Union respects the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of other countries and does not inter-
fere in their internal affairs. The world public recognizes
and appreciates this policy, and regards the Soviet Union as
the greatest force for peace on the planet.
13. The Soviet Union arms only to defend itself and its
allies. The USSR is forced to respond to U.S. and Western
threats by building its own forces. These forces are purely
defensive, but can be used to defend the gains of socialism
and national liberation movements such as in Afghanistan.
14. The U.S. cannot succeed in gaining military superiority.
The Soviet people are willing to make whatever sacrifices
are necessary to provide adequate defenses. In spite of the
U.S.'s superior resources, it will never be allowed to regain
military superiority.
B. Global Themes: U.S. and USSR As Competing Social Models
The propaganda themes listed in this section are meant by the
Soviets to show that the U.S. is an unattractive, vicious,
exploitative society which has outlived its time. The Soviet
Union is portrayed as the society which has found the answers
to the challenges of modern society. While the Soviet Union
is acknowledged to have some problems, these are of a tempo-
rary nature and will fade as the society develops.
The Soviets are especially defensive about social and economic
comparisons with the U.S. and other Western countries. They
react immediately to charges from Western officials which call
into question the quality of life in the Soviet Union or chal-
lenge the idea that the USSR constitutes a model for future
society.
Sub-Themes
1. The U.S. slanders the Soviet Union. U.S. policy is per-
vasively anti-Soviet. "Bourgeois falsifiers" in the West
carry on a relentless campaign of anti-Soviet slander. They
slur the Soviet way of life, Soviet reality, nationality
relations, foreign policy, economic system, etc. Western
"secret services" and their "mouthpieces" and "voices" are in
the forefront of this campaign of anti-Sovietism.
2. The neocolonialist U.S. and its allies are not friends of
the Third World. The U.S. holds up the American system as
a model for Third World countries but in fact it is not a fit
model. Imitating it means continuing in a mode of colonial-
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style oppression and injustice. The U.S. supports tyrannical
regimes (e.g Chile, South Africa) if they are pro-West and
anti-Soviet, and it opposes national liberation movements.
It has no genuine concern for the welfare of the Third World
peoples; its main concern is access to resources. American
exploitation of Third World takes many forms--economic, cul-
tural, political. For example, U.S. corporations extract
profit from the Third World while exploiting their resources;
the CIA manipulates foreign regimes by "dirty tricks"; U.S.
museums and private collectors steal Latin American artifacts.
3. The Soviet Union is the natural ally of Third World
countries. Its dedication to the interests of the common
people is manifested in its support of national liberation
movements. The USSR generously extends opportunities to
Third World students to study in the USSR. It unstintingly
gives economic assistance for peaceful purposes and sends
Soviet technicians and specialists of all kinds to Third
World countries to work jointly with the indigenous population
on construction and other projects.
4. The U.S. is an insecure, unstable, inhumane society in a
a permanent state of crisis. Its most striking features are:
o High unemployment (especially among blacks).
o Racial discrimination.
o Abject poverty juxtaposed with excessive wealth con-
centrated in the topmost elite.
o Widespread demoralization as well as material depriva-
tion among the poor, the unemployed, and the otherwise
disadvantaged.
o High cost of education, medical care, etc.
(access and quality depend upon ability to pay).
o Rampant crime and antisocial behavior (decadence,
drugs, and pornography).
o Neglect of and lack of respect for the elderly.
o Widespread worker dissatisfaction (as evidenced by
strikes).
o Political prisoners.
o Lack of genuine democracy.
Note: While usually less prominent and extensive than propaganda
on international issues, propaganda on U.S. internal affairs is
nonetheless a staple feature of the Soviet media. Themes are
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longstanding and change little over time, although treatment
and tone vary. Commentary is usually tied to some news event
or development in the U.S. which illustrates negative aspects
of American society. Soviets do not need to make up stories or
"disinformation" although they are not above it. All they must
do is give one-sided coverage of issues, drawing from Western
press articles and data that show American society in an
unfavorable light.
By contrast, Soviet propagandists portray the USSR as having
solved or nearly solved most of-its problems. Because econ-
omic rights (jobs, wages, pensions) are considered to be basic
human rights in the Soviet Union, the system is shown to be
more humane and dedicated to the welfare of the masses. Social
relations are based on equality, antisocial behavior is an
aberration, and the people regard the system as fair and just.
5. The U.S. violates fundamental human rights while accusing
others of doing so. The U.S. hypocritically attacks the
Soviet Union for alleged human rights violations, while it is
the U.S. that is violating fundamental human rights. The U.S.
is interested in human rights only as an issue with which to
attack the Soviet Union.
6. Soviets who fall prey to Western propaganda tend to be
unsuccessful and miserable when they emigrate. Soviet emigres
miss their homeland intolerably, regret their decision to
emigrate, and are desperate to return to USSR. Their reasons
for being disenchanted with life in the West tend to be both
economic and "spiritual": difficulty of getting a job commen-
surate with one's education and experience; unsatisfactory
living conditions; feeling out of place in a cold, uncaring,
dog-eat-dog, every-man-for-himself capitalist society.
C. Regional and Country Themes
Many of the global themes previously described appear in Soviet
propaganda directed at or concerning specific regions and
countries. This section sets out the main lines of propaganda
about a few countries and areas.
1. Poland. Soviet propaganda accuses outsiders--especially the
West and particularly the U.S.--of interfering in internal
Polish affairs, stirring up trouble though its radio propaganda
(VOA and RFE), and supporting antisocialist elements. Various
Polish organizations and individuals have been criticized, but
favorite targets are Solidarity, the Committee for the Defense
of the Workers (KOR), and groups which allegedly seek to separ-
ate Poland from the socialist community or restore capitalism.
FRG interference and revanchism is also a recurrent theme.
2. Afghanistan. Major emphasis is on the humanitarian, econ-
omic, and otherwise peaceful aid rendered by the Soviet Union
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to Afghanistan. Outsiders, especially the U.S. together with the
PRC and Pakistan, are charged with interfering in Afghan affairs
and in the Persian Gulf, supporting and encouraging the "bandits"
(insurgents) and generally provoking discord and chaos. The CIA
is accused of being behind "bandit" activity.
3. Iran. The Iranian people are said to have overthrown the
oppressive, U.S.-backed regime of the Shah. The U.S. is still
trying to regain its previous dominance and is behind attempts to
overthrow the revolutionary regime. The U.S. (through the CIA)
is responsible for the rash of assassinations of Iranian leaders.
4. China. China is accused of taking an uncooperative and hostile
stance toward the Soviet Union. It is depicted as conspiring with
the U.S. on military and political adventures which threaten the
USSR and its allies and endanger peace--for example, in Afghanistan.
The point is made, however, that the USSR remains ready to have
normal relations with the PRC.
5. Japan. Japan is ganging up with China and the U.S. against the
Soviet Union. It is making outrageous claims on Soviet territory
(the disputed Northern Territories).
6. Cuba. Cuba and the USSR are loyal allies. Cuba is the bastion
of progressivism and freedom in Latin America. Latin Americans
elsewhere seek to follow its example, but are often discouraged or
prevented from this by the U.S. (through the CIA) together with
its allies. Since Castro took power, the U.S. "special services"
have been plotting and conniving against him. The U.S. constantly
threatens and provokes Cuba.
7. El Salvador. The U.S. is propping up an oppressive, unpopular
regime. It has promoted falsehoods about the situation there,
bolstered with forged and falsified (by the CIA) documents. The
U.S. has made false claims about Soviet clandestine involvement in
El Salvador in order to distract attention from its own activities.
8. South Africa. South Africa is a racist renegade state which
suppresses its national liberation movement with the support if
not the assistance of the U.S. Its recent attack on Angola is
evidence of its lawless, aggressive nature, and the UN veto is
evidence of U.S. support.
9. Middle East. The main propaganda target is Israel, which is
depicted as the prime military and political threat in the region.
Zionism is condemned as a pernicious force and is equated with
-imperialism. Egypt is another favorite target of Soviet
propaganda, with personal attacks often made on President Sadat.
The U.S. is criticized for efforts to reach a "separate deal"
with Israel and Egypt which is doomed to fail. The U.S. is also
charged with general aggressiveness in this area. This is con-
trasted to the "peace, friendship and cooperation" offered by
Soviet Middle East policy. Steadfast Soviet support for the PLO's
cause is reiterated.
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10. Western Europe. NATO countries are often lumped in with
the U.S. in propaganda on military/strategic themes. On TNF,
the U.S. and "some NATO leaders" are the villains, while the
European people are generally described as peace-loving. All
manifestations of opposition to neutron weapon and other weapons
receive heavy play. Disagreements or conflicts between the
U.S. and its European allies receive heavy and unbalanced atten-
tion from Soviet propagandists. A constant theme is that the
U.S. exploits Europe in its (U.S.) anti-Soviet policies and
uses heavy pressure in countering_European resistance to U.S.
domination. Another theme, used mostly in connection with the
FRG is the "resurgent neo-Fascism, neo-Nazism" in the West.
III. A CASE STUDY: THE ANTI-NEUTRON WEAPON CAMPAIGN
This section describes a Soviet propaganda campaign on a
specific issue to show how propaganda themes and techniques
fit together in a concrete situation. The anti-neutron weapon
campaign is a major effort, is current, and is typical of
Soviet propaganda activity.
The Soviets have mounted an intensive worldwide propaganda
offensive against the neutron weapon (ERW) in response to the
recent U.S. announcement of plans to put ERW into production.
The campaign began immediately after the U.S. announcement on
August 6, and it has quickly grown into one of the biggest
Soviet propaganda efforts in recent memory
The Soviets' current themes and techniques are largely reminis-
cent of those used in their 1977-78 anti-neutron weapon campaign.
Some themes, however, are given new or different emphasis, in
line with present circumstances.
ERW in the Context of General Propaganda Themes
In addition to targeting the ERW issue directly, Soviet propa-
ganda frequently treats it as one of many elements constituting
the most important "general trends" in U.S. nuclear-strategic
policy. ERW is almost always brought up in the context of
discussions of these broader themes, several of which are listed
below (see pp. 6-9 for general discussion of these themes):
o The U.S. is initiating a costly new spiral of the arms race.
The neutron weapon decision is an obvious component of this.
The U.S. hopes to achieve military superiority over the USSR
but this is a futile effort. Escalating the arms race can
only lead to an ever more dangerous world situation and the
peoples of both countries will suffer because the resources
needed for butter will go for guns.
o The U.S. is seeking to destabilize the world situation and
to take advantage of that instability to intervene in other
countries in order to further its own interests. The
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neutron weapon is linked to other U.S. military programs and
plans geared to this goal. The neutron weapon decision, for
example, is tied to U.S. preparations for nuclear aggression
in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area; the creation of the
"Rapid Deployment Force," in combination with ERW and other
things, assumes a "particularly sinister character."
Major Themes on ERW
Most of the Soviet propaganda on ERW interweaves a variety of
general (e.g., "The U.S. is not serious about arms control nego-
tiations") and specific themes. The specific themes include:
o The neutron weapon is a new type of weapon, distinct from
other weapons; its introduction will significantly disturb
the present military parity between the USSR and the U.S.
o By blurring the line between conventional and nuclear-
strategic weaponry, the neutron weapon lowers the threshold
for nuclear war and makes nuclear war more "thinkable."
o The neutron weapon is a particularly "monstrous" and "bar-
baric" weapon. That it is designed expressly to destroy
living things while leaving inanimate objects and property
intact is a clear and horrifying reflection of capitalist/
imperialist priorities.
o The U.S. is making "nuclear hostages" of the Western Euro-
peans In the event of nuclear war, Europeans would become
the first victims and many countries would cease to exist.
o It is common knowledge that despite the present U.S. deci-
sion to store the weapons on American territory, the neu-
tron weapon is intended primarily for use in Western Europe
and deployment of the weapon on European soil can be ex-
pected before too long. The U.S. failed to consult with its
allies on this decision--although it affects them directly
and it continues to "trample callously" on their concerns.
The U.S. thus seeks to impose its will on Western Europe
regardless of strong opposition at a popular--and even to
some extent official--level.
o Worldwide opposition to U.S. introduction of the neutron
weapon has been and continues to be fierce. Manifestation
of anti-neutron weapon sentiment has been greatest in Europe,
but is occurring elsewhere, too, including in the United
States. Popular demonstrations have taken place, prominent
figures have spoken out, letter-writing campaigns have been
conducted, committees have been formed, and other activities
against the neutron weapon have been undertaken.
o The neutron weapon decision "complicates" and "puts off" the
question of LRTNF talks, thus intensifying the overall
problem of European security.
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o The U.S. argument that the neutron weapon is a defensive,
anti-tank weapon, intended to offset Soviet tank strength
in Europe, is nonsense. The weapon can be used offen-
sively, for example, to clear the way for invading troops.
o Although the USSR opposes the production of any new types of
weapons, it will respond with a "proper counterbalance" to
the neutron weapon if the U.S. does not reconsider its decision
to produce the weapon. The USSR is prepared to acquire a
neutron weapon or whatever is necessary to defend against the
American threat.
Trends in Soviet ERW Propaganda
Slight shifts in emphases on several themes have been noted
recently. Thus far, Soviet propagandists have been concen-
trating heavily on what the neutron weapon means for Europe.
While anti-neutron weapon propaganda is not directed exclusively
to a European audience, this is nonetheless the group on which
it has a primary and immediate impact.
Now in mid-September it appears that the Soviets are increasingly
stressing the possible opportunities for use of neutron weapons
in the Third World--opportunities, they suggest, which the
Pentagon is pondering. According to Soviet propagandists, the
neutron weapon can be used wherever the U.S. perceives a "sphere
of vital interest"--which, it is noted, appears to be anywhere
and everywhere. The Persian Gulf is mentioned as one of the
most likely locations for U.S. use of the neutron weapon.
Anti-ERW propaganda dealing with the European context has not
been decreased, but perhaps an attempt is being made to broaden
the appeal of the Soviet campaign and make everyone feel more
threatened by ERW and thus inclined to protest against it.
There has also been a shift of emphasis away from the theme of
"the neutron weapon as an offensive weapon for clearing the way
for invading troops." Stress is increasingly being placed on
the argument that radiation contamination hazard from the weapon
is much longer lasting and more intense than U.S. officials
contend. If the Soviets want to play up the latter theme (as
they evidently do), they cannot simultaneously charge that the
weapon could be used to quickly clear the way for troops to move
into or through an area.
There is no indication of a perceptible reduction in the intensity
or quantity of anti-ERW propaganda generated by the mass media of
the USSR and Soviet bloc countries. Their rhetoric also continues
to be harsh.
Techniques
The techniques used in the anti-ERW campaign are no different
from those commonly used in any Soviet external propaganda
activity (summarized in pp. 3-5 of this report). Different
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
themes are played up for different audiences, or one theme is
treated in a sophisticated or simple manner. Thus a Radio
Moscow English broadcast targetted to North America is likely to
emphasize the cost of ERW and other weapons to the American
public, commenting that it would be better for ordinary American
citizens if arms expenditures rather than social programs were
cut. Broadcasts to Western Europe, on the other hand, stress
U.S. "victimization" of Western Europe and European opposition
to ERW.
Various approaches used in the anti-neutron weapon campaign
include the following:
o TASS statements and official statements issued by top Soviet
officials giving the Soviet position on ERW. As these
constitute "news," they are generally reported widely in
foreign media.
o Statements issued by prominent Soviet figures in fields such
as medicine, science, religion (e.g. the Patriarch of Moscow,
the head of the USSR Academy of Sciences). These usually
condemn ERW on "humanitarian" grounds.
o Testimony by military experts (Soviet or non-Soviet) on the
military characteristics of ERW. This material is often
intended to refute American information on the subject. For
example, an expert may discuss (in fairly technical terms)
how the longterm ERW radiation hazard is much greater than
U.S. specialists have disclosed.
o Citation or reproduction of articles, speeches, reports, etc.,
appearing in non-Soviet, especially Western, mass media which
support Soviet anti-ERW themes. References to Western sources
to support Soviet positions is very common in Soviet external
and internal propaganda. The Soviets may use foreign-
originated material to suggest things they prefer not to state
directly themselves or consider more credible to audiences if
presented in non-Soviet sources. To give one example of Soviet
use of foreign media items: Publicity was given to a secret
ACDA study supposedly unearthed by Jack Anderson that "re-
vealed attempts to reassure the U.S. leadership by emphasizing
what would remain intact after the use of nuclear weapons."
This, according to the Soviets, provided "further convincing
evidence" that the U.S. is preparing for nuclear war.
o Personal attacks on U.S. officials considered responsible
for the ERW decision--Secretary Weinberger and Counselor
Meese, for example. Their worldview in general and their
motives for promoting particular policies are impugned.
Prepared by:
PGM/REU Staff
724-9265
M-9/17/81
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
Countering
Soviet Mis-statements
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8 1J U l1 U L 1 U li Li U LJ L ! !Jli LJ
O U T G O I N G
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAM
COMMUNICATION AGENCY.
063537 HIA636
16/0526Z
063537 HIA636
OF SOME TYPES OF SOVIET (OR SOVIET-INSPIRED) CBW ACCUSATIONS
WHICH HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY.
REFS A-F CONTAIN VARIETY OF SOVIET CHARGES REGARDING US
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP/USE. CHARGES SURFACED IN REFERENCED
COUNTRIES, AND ACCUSE US OF CBW ACTIVITIES IN NUMBER OF
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PAKISTAN AND CUBA. IN ADDITION, LARCE
NUMBERS OF OTHER SOVIET ACCUSATIONS (SIMILAR IN CONTENT)
ABOUT US CBW ACTIVITIES APPEAR IN RECENT FEIS REPORTS.
REFS G AND H PROVIDE FACTS ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC CHARGES AND
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR POSTS DEALING WITH CHARGES OF US CBW
ACTIVITIES.
2. REFS B, C AND D RELATE ABSURD CHARGES ("TASS,
LITERATURNAYUA GAZETA," AND "JANG," AN URDU DAILY) CONCERNING
CBW RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND'S PAKISTAN MEDICAL
RESEARCH CENTER AT LAHORE. POSTS SHOULD CONSULT REF G FOR
DISCUSSION OF CHARGES, FACTS ABOUT RESEARCH CENTER AND POLICY
GUIDANCE.
3. USICA MOSCOW (REF C) RELATES RIDICULOUS "TASS" CHARGE
THAT US-MADE AMMUNITION "STUFFED WITH TOXINS" IS BEING USED
BY SALVADORAN JUNTA. ALLEGATIONS THAT US HAS BEEN INVOLVED
IN CBW ACTIVITIEG IN LATIN AMERICAN HAVE SURFACED FREQUENTLY
IN RECENT MONTHS. GUIDANCE AND FACTS ARE PROVIDED IN REFS G
AND H.
4. REFS A, E, AND F POINT UP SOVIET CHARGES OF US CBW
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. ON THIS SUBJECT, MAX KAMPELMAN'S (HEAD
OF US DELEGATION MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING) FEBRUARY 16
SPEECH (CARRIED WORLDWIDE ON WIRELSS FILE 1/16 AND 17)
PROVIDES AUTHORITATIVE OVERVIEW OF CURRENT CBW DEVELOPMENTS.
GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF G, PARA 5 REMAINS CURRENT, WHICH IS
THAT: WHILE SPECIFIC CHARGES OF US CBW ACTIVITY MAY BE
LUDICROUS, SOVIET EFFORT TO UNDERMINE WORLD CONFIDENCE IN US
COMMITMENT TO 1972 CONVENT 1011 ON CBW IS SERIOUS AND APPEARS
TO REPRESENT PATTERN OF DISINFORMATION AGAINST U.S. POSTS
SHOULD BE ALERT TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE.
5. USICA COPENHAGEN (REF A) DISCUSSES ARTICLE APPEARING IN
"AKTUELT" (APRIL 2) HEADLINED "THE US REJECTS BAN ON CHEMICAL
BT
x9382
ORIGIN OFFICE PGMG-06
INFO TCO-01 OSO-02 MGTI-01 MTCM-05 PGME-02 PGMF-01 PFN-01
D15-01 AID-10 NSA-03 NSC-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02
PGMA-01 PGMD-01 PDC-04 PDE-03 PDF-03 PDP-03' MGT-01
PGM-01 PL-01 EU-03 GC-02 PGMR-01 PRL-03 PGMP-04 ECA-08
MGTP-04 PPM-03 PGMT-08 VOA-01 VBCA-01 VBCX-01 USUN-01
DOS-15 CIA-05 WH-02 OSD-01 SECD-02 J3-02 SSO-01
/132 A4 2
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------------------
DRAFTED BY PGM/G
APPROVED BY PGM
PGM/G JTHURBER
R 160523Z APR 82
FM USICA WASHDC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUFHMR/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIEIINA/RPO
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL FLORENCE
RUFHAM/AMCONSUL HAMBURG
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL PALERMO
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAN
RUOMZA/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TRIESTE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TURIN
RUDKRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUEHVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBA(I
RUFHMRC/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USICA 19382
WEAPONS BUILDUP/USE
REFERENCES: A) COPENHAGEN 2432 - U
HELSINKI 1349 - U (NOTAL)
MOSCOW 3508 - L (NOTAL)
LAHORE 0220 - C (NOTAL)
MOSCOW 4081 - U (NOTAL)
VIENNA 3901 - C (NOTAL)
USICA.7048 - U
USICA-81 $5891 - U
USICA 08658 - U
COPENHAGEN (REF A) REPORTS
UNGILASSI FI ED
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
OUTGO I P!G
f
ICI 1.-(?,\!,^;TIGl' /\I. ELEGPAIM
C01I'.JIk-1UNIC;1TION AGENC' S~"~
LIMITED OFFI CIAI USE
PAGE 01 930982 HIA569
17/1928Z
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PGM/PAXCOM; C
R 171924Z MAR 62
FM USICA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0343
BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USICA 13299
SUBJECT: PROJECT TRUTH: AS-SABAH AND MOTHER JONES
REFERENCE: TUNIS 1693-J`'__..__..__ I. AS-SABAH IS ROMANTICIZING MOTHER JONES WHEN IT SAYS THE
MAGAZINE "HAS MADE AMERICA DIZZY" WITH ITS REPORTING AND HAS
MADE All ADVENTURE OF THE PRESS." THE CALIFORNIA PUBLICATION
IS A SELF-STYLED MUCK-RACKING JOURNAL OF THE ALTERNATIVE
PRESS. PUBLISHED IN SAN FRANCISCO. ITS CIRCULATION BEYOND
CALIFORNIA IS LIMITED TO A FEW URBAN CENTERS OII THE EAST
COAST AND CHICAGO. IT IS ADDRESSED MAINLY TO A YOUNG,
EDUCATED AUDIENCE WITH All ANTI -ESTABLISHMENT POINT OF VIEW.
IT IS HARD-HITTING AND WIDE-SWINGING.
2. AGENCY WOULD SUGGEST LO'J-KEY RESPONSE. PAO MAY WISH TO
POINT OUT THAT NDTRER JONES AS WELL AS COUNTLESS OTHER
PUBLICATIONS III THE UNITED STATES PUBLISH WHAT THEY WANT AND
TAKE STRONG POSITIONS ON ISSUES. ACCESS TO CHANNELS OF
EXPRESSICH ARE NOT LIMITED. AND A WIDE DISPARITY OF VIEWS CAN
FIOD A MARKET.
FURTHERMORE. IN THE TRADITION OF MUCKRACKING JOURNALISM IN
THE U.S.. THE PUBLICATION BRINGS TO THE ATTENTION OF ITS
READERS SHORTCOMINGS AND/OR ISSUES THAT THEY FEEL REQUIRE
ATTENTION. U.S. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY PAY CLOSE ATTENTION
TO THEM AND ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THEIR CONCERNS. THUS A
FREE SOCIETY MONITORS AND CORRECTS ITSELF.
3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHARGES IN REFTEL. POST COULD
MEOTIOII THAT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS IN 1981 FULLY ABSOLVED
NASA OF ANY RESPCNSIBILITY IN DEATH OF THE CHILD DWAINE (SIC)
SEXTON. THE CHILD AND OTHERS WERE PARTICIPATING IN A MEDICAL
RPT MEDICAL PROGRAM DESIGNED TO. USE RADIATION AS A MEDICAL
APPROACH IN TREATMENT OF CERTAIN FATAL DISEASES. IT WAS NOT
RPT NOT A PROGRAM RELATED TO SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS AS
MOTHER JO'IES ALLEGES. NASA HOWEVER MADE USE OF THE AVAILABLE
DATA FROM THIS MEDICAL PROGRAM IN LTS OWN RESEARCH.
ALLEGATION THAT HUMANS WERE USED INSTEAD OF ANIMALS IS PURE
FANTASY.
4. CHARGE THAT THE THIRD WORD IS THE U.S. DUMPING GROUND
FOR ILLEGAL OR DANGEROUS MATETIALS IS OFTEN MADE AND REQUIRES
DELICACY IN RESPONSE. ACCORDNG TO V.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, THE CCNTROLLING FACTOR ON USETHFR OR NOT A
SUBSTANCE MAY BE EXPCRTED IS THE LAWS CF THE IMPORTING
COUNTRY. IF A FOOD. DRUG. DEVICE. OF COSMETIC ACCORDS WITH
THE SPECS OF A FOREIGN PURCHA':ER AND DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH
LAWS OF IMPORTING COUNTRY. EXPORT LICENSE MAY BE GIVEN.
INFORMATION ON PRCDUCTS IS READILY AVAILABLE BUT OFTEN NOT
OBTAINED BY IMPORTER. U.S. RESPG!1SIBILITY IS TO MAKE FULL
INFO?AVAILA6LE ON ALL PRCDUCTS. BUT CARELESS IMPORTERS OR
UNSCRUPULOUS EXFCRTERS CAN AND SOMETIMES 00 RESULT IN
SUBSTANCES SUCH AS THE DALCCN SHIELD BEING EXPORTED EVEN
THOUGH IT HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN =ROM THE U.S. MnckFT. POST MAY
LIMITED OFFICIAL
030902 HIASGT
WISH TO NOTE THAT GENEROUS PUBLIC ATTENTION Ili U.S. MEDIA IS
GIVEN TO WITHDRAWAL OF ANY PRODUCT AND THIS INFORMATION
USUALLY IS WELL DISSEMINATED ABROAD.
S. LASTLY. RATHER THAN SHOWING THE "HORRIBLE SECRET AS'ECTS
OF AMERICAN SOCIETY" AS ARTICLE ALLEGES. MOTHER JCNES
ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATES THE SELF-CORRECTING NATURE OF THE U.S.
SYSTEM. IT ISN'T PERFECT. AND NO CNE WOULD CLAIM IT !S; BUT
WHEN SHORTCOMINGS CR PROBLEMS ARE BROUGHT TO PUBLIC
ATTENTION. STEPS ARE USUALLY TAKEN TO CCRRECT THEM. TH: FORD
PINTO ISSUE IS All EXAMPLE. BECAUSE OF MANY ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST THE PINTO AND THE ATTENTION TO THE PRC2L:M GENEATED
BY CONGRESSIONAL HEARI?lGS AND THE MEDIA. THE NECESSARY
CHANGES III THE VEHICLE. IN FACT, WERE MADE.
6. THIS MESSAGE SENT LOU BECAUSE-THE DISCUSSION IS OBV;OUSLY
SOMEWHAT DELICATE AND OPEN TO SOME INTERPCETATIO7 AND
ARGUMENTATION. THEREFORE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IF POST
WISHES TO REBUT THE CHARGES IN AS-SADAH. IT DO SO WITH 1
VISIT TO THE PAPER AND DISCUSSION WITH THE EDITOR CH
BACKGROUND RATHER THAN A. LETTER TO THE EDITOR. THUS. TIE
EDITOR MIGHT BE PREPARED TC PUBLISH A USEFUL COM'IENTAPY ON
THE MOTHER JONES PIECE WITHOUT INVOLVING THE EMBASSY JII
PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE ISSUES.
WICK
BT
#3299
USE
11 -
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
Lv U LA U U L1 L.' LJ M II u 6~ U U
UNCLASSIFIED OUTGOING
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAM
COMMUNICATION AGENCY.
063533 HIA637
16/05292
----------------------------------------------------------------
ORIGIN OFFICE PGMG-06
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 MGTI-01 MTCM-05 PGME-02 PGMF-01 PFN-01
DIS-01 AID-10 14SA-03 NSC-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02
PGMA-01 PGMD-01 PDC-04 PDE-03 PDF-03 PDP-03 MGT-01
PGM-01 PL-01 EU-03 GC-02 PGMR-01 PRL-03 PGMP-04 ECA-08
MGTP-04 PPM-03 PGMT-08 VOA-01 VBCA-01 VBCX-01 USUN-01
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------------------
R 160523Z APR 82
FM USICA WASHDC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUFHOR/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/RPO
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL FLORENCE
RUFHAM/AMCONSUL HAMBURG
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL PALERMO
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAN
RUOMZA/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TRIESTE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TURIN
RUDKRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUEHVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
RUEHBG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN
RUFHMRC/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USICA'19382
063533 HIA637
ARTICLE MAINTAINED THAT "DOCUMENTS" WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO
BRITISH JOURNALISTS IN 1980 BY KGB, AND THAT PLAID HAD ALSO
BEEN MENTIONED BY "STERN" MAGAZINE III 1969. POSTS SHOULD NOT
ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THIS TYPE STORY, SINCE IT WOULD ONLY CALL
ADDITIONAL ATTENTION TO, AND DIGNIFY, THE REPORT.8.
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ON SOVIET CBW USE AND SOVIET ALLEGATIONS
OF US CBW ACTIVITY WHICH POSTS MAY FIND INSTRUCTIVE ARE
LISTED IN USICA 08658 - U, CBW BASIC DOCUMENTS (REF I).
WICK
BT
#9382
WEAPONS." ARTICLE CONTINUES WITH USUAL ACCUSATIONS THAT US
ALONE OPPOSES BAN ON CBW, IS CONTINUING LARGE-SCALE
PRODUCTION CBW MATERIALS, AND IS DEPLOYING THEM IN EUROPE.
FINALLY, ARTICLE ALLEGES THAT USSR HAS NEVER USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ANYWHERE, STRICTLY OBSERVES GENEVA PROTOCOL, ETC.
6. USICA MOSCOW (REF E) REPORTS ON "IZVESTIYA" ARTICLE
(MARCH 27) CHARGING THAT US IS DEPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
ITALY, AND ACCUSES US OF FABRICATING STORIES ABOUT SOVIET CBW
ACTIVITIES TO COVER UP OUR ALLEGED EFFORTS IN THIS AREA.
7. USICA VIENNA (REF F) DISCUSSES ARTICLE APPEARING IN
"VOLKSSTIME" (AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY) ON MARCH 27
CONTAINING PORTIONS (STAMPED TOP SECRET) OF WHAT IS PURPORTED
TO BE 1960'S US PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT OF CBW IN AUSTRIA.
PORTIONS OF SAME PLAN APPEARED IN "VOLKSSTIME" AND "PROFIL"
(INDEPENDENT NEWS WEEKLY( IN SEPTEMBER 1981. "PROFILUNCLASSIFIED
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
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R !308512 FEE 82
FM USICA WASHDC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEH.JL/AMM64SSY BANJUL
RUEH3Z/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHWII/AI!EMB.ASSY ORIDGETOI/II
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/A11EM3ASSY NASSAU
RUF.HPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUFHMR/AMF.IIBASSY RABAT
RUEHVI/P!IEMEASSY VIENNA/RPO
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFHOM!ANNCONSUL FLORENCE
RUFHAM/AMCONSUL HAMBURG
RUDKRW/A!ICOtISUL KRAKOW
RUFIIOIIL/A.MCO!ISUL MILAN
kUF,1U1/HMCJN:.UL PALiRnu
RUOGRW/MMCONSUL POZNALI
RUGMZA/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
RUEHON/AMCONSU! TORONTO
RUFHOMlAMCONSUL TRIESTE
RUFHO'i: AMCO!ISUL TUR 1:4
RVDKRB/AMCOUSUL ZAGREB
RUEUVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCOUSUL GENOA
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DUP.RAU
RUEHBG/AMCOIIS'JL JOHANNESBURG
RUEIIPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
BT
UNCLAS SECTION C1 OF 02 USICA 07048
~rnew rana~?^'~xa+n
USICA
01p`Y}FE"RLT i t nF G tl S T 0
COME FROM THE SOVIET O SIEFORMATION MILL IN RECENT WEEKS IS
THE STORY OF THE "KILLER MOSGUITOES". A LEADING SOVIET
CULTURAL MAGAZINE, THE WEEKLY LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, PUBLISHED
STORY FEBRUARY 3 ALLEGING THAT CIA-FINANCED RESEARCH BEING
CONDUCTED AT THE MALARIA RESEARCH CENTER IN LAHORE, PAKISTAN,
WAS AIMED AT "BREEDING PARTICULARLY POISONOUS MOSOUITOES
WHICH INFECT THEIR VICTIMS WITH DEADLY VIRUSES." THE
CEJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO INFECT AFGHAN NOMADS WHEN
THEY CROSS INTO PAKISTAN AND THROUGH THEM UNLEASH PN EPIDEMIC
0;' ENCEPHALITIS IN AFGHANISTAN. RADIO BROADCASTS HAVE BEEN
HEARD ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA, AND
THEY MAY BEGIN TO CROP UP ELSEWHERE.
2. FACTS: THE PAKISTAN MEDICAN. RESEARCH CENTER AT LAHORE IS
A UJ'IVERSiTY 0; MARYLAND FACILITY WHICH, FOR 21 YPARS, HAS
CONDUCTED RESEARCH ON MALARIA AND LED AN EFFORT TO HELP
ERADICATE THE DISEASE. IT IS FUNIDFD PARTIALLY BY THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH =LID RECEIVES SOME COUNTERPART
FUNDS FROM AID TO COVER LOCAL COSTS. NO USG DOLLAR FUNDING
t' I 1
1N WC r' 1' 1 1if`
ti J i LA U I I. ii
r: I
L .L a0.11it
C53'['?S HIAIa5
I:AS L'EEIi G"ANITED TO THF. CEKTFR III RESENT YEAS. CU L TKE
PAST FOUR YEARS THERE HAVE SEEM AT LEAST FOUR ATTEMPTS 10
LINK THE RESEARCH CENTER WITH CIA ANIC LADEL ITS FESEARCH A
FORM CF BIOLOGICAL. WARFARE.
GUIDANCE: THE CHARGE IS UTIERLY RIDICULOUS. THE
RESEARCH CENTER IS AN ESTABLISHED AND RESPECTED IUIST!TUT IC;
ENGAGED IN SEPIOUS SCIENTIFIC 90 II OIC;L WORN SET!EKED TO
FIND SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, IT IS NOT ENGAGED III
PLOTTING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHEII`_S. THE CHARGE DENOIISIRATES
THE DEPTH TO WHICH SOVIET DISITIFOR!ISTIONI WILL SINK. MOST
SIGNIFICANTLY, IT F"PEARS TO GE AN EFFORT TO DEFLECT PUBLIC
CONCERN OVER THE EVIDENCE OF SO:'IET US: CF TOJI!CS is
AFGHANISTAN ITSELF AND THE SOVIET CONPLICJTV (V..5ID PROBACLE
PARTICIPATION) IN THEIR USE IN SOUTHEAST USIA ;I. E., THE
"YELLOW FAIN" ISSUE). IF THE KILLER MOSQUITO STORY APPEARS,
PADS SHOULD REBUT WITII RIDICULE, BEING SURE TO REFER TO THE
SOVIET USE OF CCW IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN ANY
RESPONSE.
4. FOR AR POSTS: SAME ARTICLE RETURNS TO THEME OF U.S.
BIOLOGICAL WAFFARE AGAINST CUBA, DREO LNG UP T+IE OLD CHARGES
THAT U. S. WAS RESPONSIBLE'FCR RECENT EPIDEMICS OF SWINE
FEVER, TOBACCO ROT, AND DENGUE FEVER III CUBA. STATE
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN LAST YEAR CALLED THESE CHARGES LUDICROUS
AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. POSTS SHOULD CO!ITIt;UE TO
RIDICULE THEM IF THEY APPEAR, NOTING THAT MOST OF CUBA'S
PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE RECENT EPIDEMICS, CAN BE TRACED TO Ali
ECONOMIC SYSTEM THAT OCESII'T WORK.
5. WHILE LUDICROUS IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO PIN! SPECIFIC CHARGES
ON U. S., THE SOVIET EFFORT TO UNDERMINE WORLD CONFIDENCE IN
U.S. COMMITMENT TO 1972 CONVENTION 01 BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IS
SERIOUS AND POSTS SHOULD BE ALERT TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE.
Bi
#7048
IU!i'I AC'^I ri rn
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----------------------------------------------------------------
ORIGIN OFFICE PGMG-01
INFO TCO-01 NSA-03 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02 PG11-01 EU-03
PGMP-04 VOA-05 DOS-15 CIA-05 /045 A2 2
----------------------------------------------------------------
DRAFTED EY PGM/G DMATHES
APPROVED BY PGM 601101OCE
PG11/G JTHURUER
EA SJL'E
AF RDAKER
AR DEECOM
NEA SMON81AT T
EU CH ENZ E
R 13CES12 FEB 82
FM USICA WASHDC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY RAIIJUL
RUEHBZ/AIIEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHWII/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/AMEMB.ASSY NASSAU
RUEHPM/AIIEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUFHMR/AIIEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/RPO
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFKOM/AMCOIISUL FLORENCE
RUFHAM/AMCOIISUL HAMBURG
RUDKRW/AINTONSUL KRAKOW
RUFHOIIL/AMCOIISUL MILAN
KUFKOM/Ar1GO11SUL PAL[Kn0
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAN
RUOMZA/AMCOIISUL THESSALONIKI
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO
RUFHOM/AMCOCSUL TRIESTE
RUFHOII/AI:TONSUL TURIN
RUDKRB/AMCOIISUL ZAGREB
RUEHVA/AIIEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AIICOIISUL GENOA
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN
RUEHEG/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USICA 07048
LI` i.'l_.tiSc I FI LD
.A !r I,
A IIHHk Y
0114111' I'll rill r iU
in TEL [C.N ;kit
AT1TI-11'.LARIAL LAOORATOiVY IS A UNIVERSITY OF Ili,RYLA.ND
IlISTITUTICII W4IICUI HAS BEEN FUIIUED OVER TILE YEAR, CY III H.
DURING THE LAST FISCAL YEAR, AID PROVIDED LOCAL CURRENCY FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE CENTER.
-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DECISICN NOT TO RENEW DR. HALIN'S
VISA STEMMED FROM CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INTERNAL
OPERATIONS OF THE CENTER. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU ASH THE
PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT FOR ANY DETAILS.
-- WE HAVE EEEII AWARE OF TOTALLY BASELESS SOVIET PROPAGANDA
CHARGES CONCERNING THE CENTER, BUT THESE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE
RELATED TO THE DECISI011 OF TH.; GOP NOT TO RENEW DR. NALIN'S
VISA
ROBINSON, ACTING
BT
#7048
053200 1110160
13/0302Z
WE 00 NOT WISH TO DIGNIFY RIDICULOUS ALLEGATIONS; HOWEVER,
PADS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THESE`CBW CHARGES AGAINST THE U.S.
SEEM TO REPRESENT A PATTERN OF DISINFORMATION AGAINST US.
6. AS THIS CABLE WAS BEING PREPARED, REPORTS APPEARED IN
U.S. PRESS THAT DR. DAVID NALIN, DIRECTOR OF THE MALARIA
RESEARCH CENTER, WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED BY PAKISTAN
GOVERNMENT TO RETURN TO PAKISTAN. LABOR DISPUTES WITHIN THE
CENTER WERE CITED BY PRESS. DR. NALIN, INTERVIEWED BY THE NY
TIMES III NEW DELHI, HAS DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH ANY
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SAYING THAT ALL OF THE CENTER'S WORK WAS
PUBLIC SCRUTINY. IIALIII'S OPINION, ACCORDING TO NYT, WAS THAT
ATTACK On THE MALARIA CENTER WAS SOVIET INSPIRED AND INTENDED
AS RESPONSE TO U.S. DISCLOSURES OF USE OF MYCOTOXINS ("YELLOW
RAIN") IN S.E. ASIA.
7. DEPARTIIENT SPOKESMAN GAVE FOLLOWING RESPONSE FEBRUARY 9
TO QUESTION WHETHER THIS ACTION WAS III ANY WAY RELATED TO
SOVIET ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE RESEARCH CENTER AND CITED
IN PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE:
-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT
DECLINED TO RENEW DR. IIALIN'S VISA IN DECEMBER. THE
IIF!r.1 Il1~1 cl rI rn
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
OUTGOING -~---
TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION AGENCY
136386 HIA671
27/0553Z
CAMPAIGN.
-------------------------------------------- -------------------
ORIGIN OFFICE PGMG-01
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02 PGM-01 EU-03
PGMR-01 PGMP-04 VOA-07 C-02 DOS-15 /048 A6
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DRAFTED BY PGM/G DONALD MATHES
APPROVED BY PGM MORN HUGHES
PGM/G JAMES THURBER
PGM GIFFORD MALONE
C COHN W. SHIRLEY
PGM/P RICHARD BORDEN
PGM/R G. HURSH-CESAR
EU . RICHARD GILBERT
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
AF, AR, NEA, VOA/P, STATE/INR, EA
------------------
R 2705432 NOV 81
FM USICA WASHOC
.TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL
RUFHPBI/AMEMBASSY BISSAU
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/RPO
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL FLORENCE
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL PALERMO
RUDKRW/AMCONSUL POZNAII
RUQMZA/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TRIESTE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TURIN
RUDKRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUEHVA/AMEMBASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN
RUEHBG/AMCOIISUL JOHANNESBURG
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
BT
UNCLAS USICA 53128
USICA
TO PAO FROM DIRECTOR WICK
ED 12065 N/A
SUBJECT: DISINFORMATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S.
REFERENCE: USICA 55891
1. EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF DISINFORMATION EFFORT THAT COULD
BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN ALMOST ANY COUNTRY--
AND WHICH WE ARE GOING TO COUNTER WITH FACTUAL RESPONSE--IS
THE FOLLOWING FROM MADRID.
2. ON NOVEMBER 18-11 A FORGED LETTER DATED OCTOBER 23
ALLEGEDLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING JUAN CARLOS I WAS
PLACED IN THE MA?. FOXES OF THE DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) MEETING IN
MADRID. THE LETTER DISCUSSED THE SPAIN-NATO ISSUE AND QUOTED
THE PRESIDENT AS SAYNG THAT SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO WITHOUT
DELAY WAS 'VITALLY IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES." THE
FORGERY ALSO HELD OUT HOPE THAT 'AMERICA MIGHT CONSIDER THE
FINAL SOLUTION TO GIBRALTAR IN FAVOR OF SPAIN' IF THE KING
WOULD 'ACT WITH DISPATCH' TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO.
3. STORY WAS PICKED UP BY THE MADRID PRESS ON NOVEMBER 12-13
AND PLAYED AS A FALSIFICATION. SPANISH NEWS AGENCY EFE ALSO
RAN THOROUGH REPORT CALLING FORGED LETTER A DISINFORMATION
4. ALTHOUGH ISSUE SEEMS SETTLED IN SPAIN, FOLLOWING IS
GUIDANCE IN EVENT STORY RUNS OR REAPPEARS IN YOUR COUNTRY.
S. THE ALLEGED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN IS A CLUMSY AND
TOTALLY PREPOSTEROUS FORGERY. IT BEARS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A
HEAVY-HANDED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN WHOSE OBVIOUS PURPOSE
IS TO PREVENT SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.' U.S. EMBASSY
SPOKESMAN, MADRID. NOVEMBER 12.
6. THE LETTER IS A BLATANT FORGERY. IT IS A PRIME EXAMPLE
OF DISINFORMATION AND IS A CRUDE AND CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO
DISRUPT U.S.-SPANISH RELATIONS. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS. AND
RESPECTS THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND WE CONDEMN
ANY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN THAT PROCESS. THE DECISION TO
ENTER NATO IS ONE FOR SPAIN ALONE TO MAKE." PREPARED FOR,
BUT NOT USED BY, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, NOVEMBER 12.
7. "THE FORGERY AND ITS CRUDENESS IS, OF COURSE, OBVIOUS.
IT REMINDS US AGAIN OF THE DIFFICULTY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE
IN THE FACE OF ACTIVE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS BY THOSE
INTERESTED IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL DESTABILIZATIONI."
AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN, CHIEF U.S. DELEGATE TO CSCE, IN
LETTER TO DELEGATES,.IIOVEMBER 13.
WICK
BT
#9128
UNCLASSIFIED
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I E L E it i.'i
((~~ ,rt[~ I l)1_1'7I
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PAGE 01 C'SHENS HIA655
12/05192
G.IGIN OEF:CE FG" _71
ISFO TCC-11 FF-lU Ak-03 EP.-23 NEA-02 PGM-Cl EU-03
/C17 A3 12
-----------------------------------------------------
O'ATTED BY P=1':!G D!'ATTNES
AFPROVFD 6Y PC!i GMFLCVIE
Puri/G MBCRNEIDER
DEESOM
A.F. RBAVER
EU CHENZE
EA SJL'E
IHEA DROEIN3-I!OIRY
------------------
R. 1220132 JUN E2
FM USICA W~SHDC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL PORTS
RUEHCR; A.YEMEASSY RA.'IJUL
RUEHCRIiCASGY C.;9ZZAVILLE
RUE?CR/A. EYSl0EY GYCCOEV=
RL'E.CE/ V'SEVEASSY FA? V.!!AR I BO
RUEHCR/AI:E"ZASSY FORT MORESBY
RU2: T/V.!1EI:EASSY RAEAT
RUEAI/ ii 4224 VIEI'1A/RPO
P.UEHRCA/Ai'':C'iSUL FLC::ENCE
EUF'r.0! C/V'iCD'IS!'L hAhEURG
RL'C?;R'drA.Y.CCSSUL VRVAO'4
P,L'EEROD/Y'I E'ISVL PALERMO
RUCKF A',00 1. POZI,.N
RUEHTH/AMCO'ISUL THECCALC!IIHI
R':'FLSHA/A"CC'!SUL TRIESTE
RUEH30S/P.!SCO"SUL TURIN
FUOKFE/0CC5SUL ZAGREB
RUEh!CR/AMEMFASSY SUVA
RIlEHRCR/A .2CO3UL GE!.OA
"FCEHCR/AIiCCSOLIL JC'!i....:EB9 .,
RUEHCR/A!'COTOUL QUIiHA5
RUFHEA/AMCCSEUL CASAELANCA
ET
C 0 N F I DE MT I AL USICA32011
SUBJECT: COUNTER TO SOVIET DIEIMFORMATIO!1: VSEVOLOD 11.
SCFINSKY
REFERENCE:- STATE 141C44 - C
1. REFTEL DIRECTED ATTEOTIC'1 TO CON'S POD PAD'S TO AGENCY l.'F
STORY CN SOVIET AGEMT.SOFIHSKY. SUBSEQUENTLY, 0511)32 Otl
GENEVA CALLED DEPARTMENT'S ATTEIIT1011 TO ADDITIONAL SOFIIISKY
ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE USED IN TREATING THIS ISSUE. WHILE
ADDITIONAL WE STORY OR SOFIRSH'Y SEEMS INAPPRCPRIATE AT THIS
TIME. WE REPEAT THE GENEVA CYCLE (GENEVA C545S-C) EELOW WITH
SUSGESTICN THAT PAO OR OTHER EMECFFS COULD UTILIZE THE INFO
IN ANY DISCUSSIONS ON SCTINSKY WITH LOCA! MEDIA OR OFFICIALS.
2. REPEAT OF 501110A 0545S- (C-ENTIRE TEXT):
VISH CALL DEPAETMEIIT'S ATTENTION TO ADDITIONAL ECCSOC ACTIVI-
TIES OF VSEVCLCO N. SOFISOK'Y WHICH COULD BE EXPANCEC UP011 IN
REFTEL'S EFFORTS TO 55SFOND FORCEFULLY TO THE SOVIET DISII:FOR-
MATIO'i E FFCRT AG AIUST U.S. OFFICIALS. SOFITISKY' IN ADDITION
TO SERVINA AS A SERIOR EEMEER CF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE
UN HUMAN RIGHTS C0.LIISSIC1. IS ALSO A METIER OF THE COVYIS -
SION'S S,'SCOMMISSICN CN FREVENT10:1 OF DiSCR IIIINAT ION AND
FROTECTIC" OF MINORITIES. THE SUECCMMISSIC'I CONSISTS OF 26
"IhCEPEIIDE!ST EXFESTS" IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AAHO SERVE
IN THEIR "INDIVIDUAL" CAPACITIES. NOT SUBJECT CT INSTRUCTIONS
FROM (HEIR GOVERNMENTS. IN THE CASE CF AMBASSAUC3 SOFINSKY.
HIS ATTEMPTS TO. PORTRAY HIMSELF III THIS LIGHT OFTEN DRAW
C0!'F ! CU11'`T I AIL
059555 HI4 55
SUPPRESSED BUT .LDIELE LAUGHTER. itO ':EST SESSIC!i O' THE SUE-
CC1i.`!ISSIC': T',`;ES PLACE ...GUST 12-SEPTE!'EER 10 IN Gc'.G''.A'.
3. lE ALSO RECALL 1961 E22 Ti' "F'.C3=11 Pn.O S Yi L',iIC COII-
TAINFD A. LENGTHY SEG!'ENT EX?0;1'IV ELFI!:SI;Y'S 02521IG'~A6LE
ACTIVITIES IN ,EA' ZEAL402. SNORES IIiCLLTED :.CTU;',! FILM TCCT-
AGE CF HIS LEAVING A ^,OTE1 IN AUC'.LA!:O ICPE HE HAD C!ASD-I:S-
TINELY MAT WITH A ThiVDE UNIONIST. SLAEEE
VICK
ET
"D?11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
UiIGILA SSI i+! D
INTERNA T ICMA1~,\ ~
COMMUNICATION AGENC"
----------------------------------------------------------------
ORIGIN OFFICE Si
Pr,INFO TCD-D1 DSO-03 JCS-03 AF-E3 AR-03 NEA-02 PGM-E1 EU-03
EA-01 DOS-03 /026 A4
--------------------------------------------------------------
DRAFTED BY PSM/G DONALD MATHES
APPROVED EY PGM GIFFORD MALONE
PGM/G RICHARD ROTH
EU CHRIS HENZE
AR DONALD RESOM
AF ROBERT BAYER
NEA JOHN HARROD
EA STANTON JUE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
STATE-EUR. DOD/JCS/J-3/SOD, PGM/G-3r FORMULA 'FG'
------------------
0 222134Z. OCT Al
FM US1CA WASHOC
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHJL/Ar.EMEASSY BANJUL
RUFHPBI/P.MEMBASSY BISSAU
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY DRAZZAVILLE
RUENIYI/AMEMBASSY BRICGETCWII
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PCRT MORESBY
RUEIIVI/A'IEi;EASSY VIENNA/RPO
RUEIIVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA/REX
RUFHCM/AI'CO'ISUL FLORENCE
RUbKRW/AMCC.'iSUL KRAKOW
RUFNOM/A"CONSUL PALERMO
RUDKRW/AMCC'ISUL POZ'tAN
RUQMZP./AMCO'ISUL TAESSALCIIIKI
RUFHOM/AMCOMSUL TRIESTE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL TURIN
RUDKRB/AMCONSUL ZAGREB
RUFNPS/US MISSION CECD
RUEHVA/P.'TEG6ASSY SUVA
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA
CT
UNCLAS USICA $3912
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: GUIDANCE FOR FAGS
1. THE WHITE HOUSE ISSUED A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON
WEDNESDAY. CCT0EER 21. ON RECENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS
TO DIVIDE EUROPEAN ALLIES FROM THE UNITED STATES OVER THE
ISSUE OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. STATEMENT WAS CARRIED BY
USINFO AND BY WF OCTOBER 21 IN ENGLISH AND LANGUAGE VERSIONS.
IT IS AN IMPORTANT POLICY DECLARATION AND DESERVES WIDE
DISSEMINATION BY POSTS.
2. THE SOVIET UNICTI HAS SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT OUT OF CONTEXT A
RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO A QUESTION AT A MEETING OF
.NEWSPAPER EUIICRS OCTOBER 16. IN SO DOING. SOVIET
CHAIRMAN BREZH'IEV. IN PRAVDA OCTOBER 20. IMPLIED U.S.
IS THREATENING LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR III EUROPE. THIS
CONTENTION IS A SELF-SERVING OISTCRTION OF U.S. POLICY AIMED
AT FEEDING THE FEARS AND CONCERNS CF EUROPEANS AEOUT A
NUCLEAR EXCHANGE OH THE EUROPEAN CCNfINENT. THESE CONCERNS
ARE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED III THE PRESICENTIAL STATEMENT. TO
WIT: 'THE ESSENCE OF U.S. NLCLE..R STRATEGY IS THAT NO
AGGRESSOR SHOULD BELIEVE THAI THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
EUROPE COULD REASONABLY BE LIMITED TO EUROPE.' WHILE RECOG-
NIZING THAT EUROPEANS HAVE, LECITIMATE AND REAL INTERESTS
HERE, PADS SHCVLD NOTE THAT HEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF
SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND THAI lit BFEZHNEV STATEMENT 13 AN EXAM-
[INTI ASSI Fl ED
t/
0HT GO111
T ELEGRi M
PLE OF IT. U.S. C^?VTIHULS TO REASSURE EUROPEANS TART IT VILL
NOT ACT If:R:S:':~SII Y. THAT IT IS NOT LOWERING THE NUCLEAR
THRESHOLD. ANO THAT ITS STRATEGY CF THE PAST TW'EYTY YEARS
FOR DETERRING C.';-L4CT IN EUROPE HAS NOT CHATIGED.
3. PADS S4CUL'S ZE r_LERT TO OPPCRIUNITIES TO BRING
PRESIDENTIAL STATE'E NTS TO THE ATTENTION CF TARGET AUDIEPCES
AND BE PREPARE: FGT. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES SUCH AS
BACKGRODUDCRS .':3/ ZA ADDITIONAL HIGH LEVEL COMMENTS ON THIS
ISSUE.
WICK
CT
63912
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Soviet Distortions
and Fabrications
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
June 28, 1982
Soviets Attack President Reagan's U.N. Disarmament Speech
SUMMARY - Soviet media attacks on President Reagan's speech to the U.N.
Special Session on Disarmament accused the President of resorting to "crudely
worded anti-Soviet rhetoric" and charged that, in fact, it was the Soviet
Union who led the movement for arms control. Of course, "contrary to known
facts. . . .he asserted that the USA allegedly 'exercised unilateral
restraint'." The contents of the President's speech refute these charges
completely, urging the Soviets to join in disarmament measures.
ALLEGATION - Radio 'Moscow's English Service (to Great Britain and Ireland)
alleged on June 17 that "Addressing the special United Nations General
Assembly session, President Reagan ignored the Soviet appeal for the
nuclear powers to take a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms.
He resorted to crudely worded anti-Soviet rhetoric and grossly distorted
Soviet policy. His speech is seen as an attempt to direct the attention
of the international community away from the fact that it is the United
States that is pushing the arms race ahead.".
ALLEGATION - TASS English charged (June 17) that "the President's speech came
to rhetorical justification of the U.S. policy aimed at undermining
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
detente and at sharpening international tension. . . . Contrary to the
generally known facts, he tried to portray the Soviet Union as the main
culprit of the arms race, grossly distorted the Soviet Union's policy."
ALLEGATION - A June 18 TASS English commentary stated that "We have
never been aggressors, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said on Thursday. A
strange statement, to say the least. . . .The statement was made before
people of whom many not only know the history of the USA from textbooks,
theoretically, but also know it well practically, so to say, from their
own bitter experience. And history refutes a hundred percent the
assertions of the American President."
RESPONSE - In his June 17 speech to the United Nations' Special Session on
Disarmament, President Reagan made the following statements, which are the
basis for responses to questions about U.S. Arms control policy.
-- "The record of history is clear: citizens of the United
States resort 'to force reluctantly and only when they must.
. . .To those who challenge the truth of those words let me
point out, that at the end of World War II, we were the only
undafhaged industrial power in the world. Our military
supremacy was unquestioned. We had harnessed the atom and
had the ability to unleash its destructive force anywhere
in the world. In short, we could have achieved world
domination, but that was contrary to the character of our
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people."
-- "Instead, we wrote a new chapter in the history of
mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the
war-ravaged economies of the world, both East and West,
including those nations who had been our enemies. We took
the initiative in creating such international institutions
as this United Nations, where leaders of good will could
come together to build bridges for peace and prosperity."
-- "While we exercised unilateral restraint they [the Soviets]
forged ahead and today possess nuclear and conventional
forces far in excess of an adequate deterrent capability.
. Since the end of World War II, the United States has
been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control
proposals."
President Reagan's U.N. speech, the culmination of seven months of
preparation, demonstrated genuine U.S. commitment to arms control, despite
Soviet charges to the contrary. Reagan outlined to the Special Session an
integrated approach to'arms control, which covered all major categories of
weapons of concern to the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance. As the
President pointed out (without undue rhetoric), this is in sharp contrast to
Soviet arms cbntrol claims and actions. (The full text of the U.N. speech was
carried by the Wireless File June 17, 1982.)
CO?INENT - The extent of Soviet propaganda surrounding President Reagan's U.N.
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speech, as with his speeches to the West German Bundestag and the British
Parliament, reveals unusual Soviet sensitivities to several aspects of their
own standing in the world community. The subjects of these speeches, U.S.
efforts for peace and the Soviet response, attest Eo Soviet vulnerabilities.
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SCVINT DISTORTIONS AND FABRICAII011S
JINI 24, 1902
i,'; .A1`.,: - The Soviet media has continued its propaganda halraq agiinnt 1s..ae1
and United Sut2s support: of Israeli actions in Lebanon. ihi ma..)-1 rh= . W.
Soviet nctachs in the last two weeks has been that the U.S., in lull and tr sa
support of isrsel, is planning to move U.S. troops i co Lebanon in C::.. , :L.
of a p encdl ci force, interfering in Lebanon's it L:,rno I .__ r 1.. . 'HK.,.
ciie_aLions are unfounded and groundless. Accounts hav:? U ape:irad t;. !:i._
fiddle East2rn press stating that American soldiers had been 0 110
Lighting .;iLK rue Israeli forces in Lebanon.
Examples of . :?viet media charges follow, ai.ou with ?uidanaa uro'?:1.def ud LC_
State Denar! ',;ant and a senior administration official.
ALLEGATION - On Jun. 14 T SSA 0'1i:h charged that "The .,..c SLCtos is
hatchiry plans for a military penetration into Lebencn. 1:. ?)uu;- _ by reports it is planning to ensure s constant p ese^.. _ Ai'i_':'lcna tri?otS
there hy establishing a so-called 'new' multinational :)i:vcc-iinopin:, force
in Lebanon, consisting chiefly of army units from too US:,. . . .iL,.c~?r1CL?
military pretence in Lebanou will mean a Consider;hie e..,?.O ,itut (c:_ ",
. ,rea of U.S. gendarme operations in the oil-rich rcaico ad tha i.: 1 I
n
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This allegation has appeared in a number of other 'PASS English item:, in
co:i: NL' ?T - It, is a usual Soviet propaganda tactic to attribute !. .. .. . ' i ..
to
organ stateirents which cannot easily be checked for 'accuracy iil1:. 'J'.Od L:;
valuable because the ,Testern press is known to be indep.)erident of governments, and thus more r_r: Bible than the Soviet media.
i.LEG.\TIr) - A June 15 Radio i)os_ow:' 7nel1Sh broadcast (to h; rth , `T-I'ri C:i) ;undo
ti!e 3CCLisL"LOn that "T7 Shi1:^ton is planning to dl-plov in ttl _
controlled J:' Israel in Lebanon the SO-Cal Led TLiltinaltione LCL-Cus,
backbone Ui unich is to be made up of American troops. ihi 1.'; file C'hl_
objective of United States envoy Habib's shuttl?:_ in
L,
LLi:CATi0: - ,mule 14 s 'ravda alleged that "'I.-Le Reagan adia*ni.St:r:'t!':, 11CL
has given .very assistance to the preparation.
barbarous ~,,~ iell aggression, in now tryi1'. to pose as pea ....
but in _act It 1> ee.in? fla'~ira.)Zt interfere._n..e in . . . . In this connection one i-s struck by 0f 7L:4.1 1
.>ta~er:c nts tile..
sotD:? ;find of 'international forces' ~?1t Il l).5. '
'D,.' ('%t
intb the huge area of Lebanese territory 110!'. ocCUi iC::. is i Israei__
milita
1.,L 's.:\TION - An .rti cle in the .Tune 14 edition o._ i ^%'e
is no coi.ncide:nce that reports have appeared in ti,.
States i:1 not adverse to de, lo3,ing its coutlntiants 71'. 1 :: i lo,l UI)dc cover
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of the same figleaf of a 'multinational force' supposedly designed to
serve the aims of maintaining 'peace' and 'order'. The United States has
long vio:?;od Lebanon, as a strategic objective which can used in the
struggle _uinst the national liberation processes occurrin^ H the Arai,
,..:iSt.
ALLIGATI N - A June IS TASS English item stated that "Secretary of State Uni
has actually admitted today that the USA intends to send its troops into
Lebanon in the guise of a so-called 'multi-national' fcrc?'. According to
WnshiOgton's and Tel. Aviv's design the troops are to ba .J;) Li)v ' in
southern Lebanon, Mich is now occupied by the Israeli 5for. Laic
said that President Reagan will be ready to send Amcricn i troop.
fulfil lmaint of what he described as 'peace-making' _ua L. ,:l' Lebanon.
This will octnally result in the occupation of a Hart OL so'verei.^,i'!
L_.)anoii, this tiwu by, U.S. troops.
RESPONSE - Soviet allegations that the U.S. is eager to intarvane in thr
Lebanon crisis are groundless and infla -una Cory. Current S tsz. ., par::mon :
guidance stresses that the U.S. seeks "a rapid end to the t:;? ;is !?`,'?en.tn i
Lebanon," and is making a major effort to find a solutinn to the Sri s ...
"both through the tireless efforts of Ambassador ..,.bib On t,,._
'Dot ..ad L..ro'igiI our own efforts here and in Citee.
capitils. The main elements of our ppcoa . .... ........I .?
consistent with a realistic and durable
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Security Council Resolutions 503 and 509, are as follows:
-- ieseuiato humanitarian relief
-- tne earliest possible termination of hositiliti-,:;
-- :1 str anathenin, of the central governient to perr.:i_L r':._
rostora`_ion or Lebanese sovereignty, unity, an ter: i tc viol
integrity
-- the creation of a buffer zone patrolled by a pnaccl:eepin...
force to prevent further attacks on Israel across the
Lebanese border
-- the withdrawal of all foreign forces, includ i n.' then,'
isi a>i and Syria, and the deinilit:,rization t5
eeiestimans in Lebanon."
As for the c,iF:i:,os that the U.S. is planning to send A;sericon t?-ecp- to
perticioste in a peaceh^_eping Force, a senior adminstrotion J i are ,si'.
on June 21 toe,_:
arc remaining open-minded on the subject. U a nu
enehusi.ostic, in pact we are less than enthusiastic '
p_.,.:nr_c-, but then in the final snaly: . the Pros: .. will
do .n: t he consijen: best to g>es peace and stability in ti::
re;ion."
WNW '.i-r - The Soviet mWia ._..: \'._ been ?'n.^_- their "C _,_.. I7..._ ., .n
J.S. policy toward Isree_J.'s actions in Lebanon. These at
Ui: Cl:1%i'_s of their usual "o;usual n; g1311Q:: on iJ.:i-I$t:=C 11 rl'.lat].oil:, ...." D._ C:i:;Oi: tr)U
to
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continUE. throughout the crisis.
In what may be in offshoot of Soviet propaganda, press accounts have appeared
in Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates repeating the charges that
mer Lan r;oldlers :hnd offica_s had J_en killed "taking, part in i:he Isrue1i
invasion OL' T:_b3ri0i1.n
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JUNE 22, 1982
Soviets Attack President kearan's 'Role at NATO Conternce
The Soviet media has continued its attack on President Reagan's European
"Pompous speeches about Washington's 'devotion to peace' sound really
race is not only not contra-indicated to Eurcpe but is al:-,most nee
it."
ALLEGATION - On June 9 Literaturnava Gazeta discussed President Keztan'.s spcoca
at the Bonn NATO conference. According to article, at lac:t veer's
session, President Reagan "spoke only of firmness, confrontation and the
need to achieve military superiority. His vocabularly now includes such
words as 'peace' and 'talks'. . . Having begun to talk about 'peace' and
'talks', Washington has nevertheless not only shown no restraint in the
implementation of its military programs but, quite the reverse, has begun,
to step them up in every way."
ALLEGATION - On June 12, TASS English charged that "In the FNG, too, the U.S.
President held forth on the theme of the 'crusade' ac'ainst socialism. taut
there he did not limit himself to this: He showered slanderous attacks on
the USSR and its peace-loving foreign policy trying to prove that th^ arms
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blasphemous considering that they are being made at a time when the
Israeli military, armed with American weapons, are engaging in a veritable
genocide against the Arabs in sovereign Lebanon, while London, with the
active participation of the United States, is pursuing a policy of
escalatin2 the bloodshed in the South Atlantic."
ALLLGA'lION - Or. June 13 lavestiva charged that "From the first day it was
evident that R. Reagan's trip to the FRG was primarily propagandist in
nature. . . . . The quest made a point of mentioning peace and disarmament
in every speech. . .However, it is not hard to perceive the real U.S.
line behind the propaganda tog: Meagan came to the Rhine ;:pith a
manifestly destructive program whose essence boiled down to intensi v.ng
the bloc's war preparations, particularly in the sphere of conv;en: io al
armaments, undermining the detente process in Europe and curt .ilia;;
East-West ties, including in the economic sphere, and tried to toist it on
the other members of the alliance."
ALLhGATlON' - TASS Enelish on June 14 quoted that day's Pravda as chc_ i:: that
"Spearing in Bonn before the deputies of the Bundestag and putting on a
show to pass for a peace-maker, he [President Raaganj said that it he had
believea in the possibility of achieving pace through mass demonstrations
he would have personally led them. He wanted, apparently, to stress one
point but what he really stressed was another -- contempt towards the
feelings and sentiments of others. This happens when one's words are in
disagreement with one's inner thinking. lie who wants to unleaGh ~. nuclear
war. . .cannot march among demonstrators demaninn peac,'. the',' l: u chuck
him out of their ranks as a hypocrite and a chaat."
',LL CATION - On June 17, TASS Ene fish charged that "Rhetoric about ro,.L!iness
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to develop 'constructive relations' between East and West, about
disarmament and even about the need to avert war changes but little. '11bis
rhetoric is a tribute to the demands at the peoples to check the -,;:_dness
of the arms race, an attempt to dampen the wave of anti-war protests and
to dupe the population of their own countries."
RESPONSE - In his June 9 nundestag speech President Reagan made the tollo'?;ing
remarks, which are the basis for answers to Soviet charges about U.S. arms
control policy.
The Search tor Peace:
"I believe this partnership at the Atlantic Alliai c
nations is motivated primarily by the search tor peace."
Strengthening Alliance Security:
Without a strengthened Atlantic security, the possibility
of military coercion will be very great."
The Threat of Nuclear War:
In recent months. . .there has been renewed public concern
about the threat of nuclear war and the arms buildup. . .
land-base'
It is, the United States that has proposed to ban
intermediate-range nuclear missiles -- the missile., i,:ost
threatening Europe. It is the United States that no
proposed and will pursue deep cuts in strategic
It is the West that has long sought the detailed
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of information on forces an.d effective verification
procedures. And it is dictatorships, not democracies, that
need militarism to control their own people and impose
their system on others."
?western Commitment to Ar: s Control:
"cie in,the West. . .are deeply committed to continuing
efforts to restrict the arms competition. Common sense
demands that we persevere."
The Need for Unity:
"In each of these areas our policies are based on the
conviction that a stable military balance at the lc:;est
possible level will help further the cause of peace. L-oe
other side will respond in good faith to these initiatives
only if it believes we are resolved to provide for our own
defense. Unless convinced that we will unite and st:,?;
united behind these arms control initiatives and
modernization programs, our adversaries will seek to divide
us from one another and our peoples from their leader
President 1,eag,in's speech was is no way an attempt to pressure our N\'iO
allies, bit rather a convincing statement in support of the conce;~t cf tc
dual approach of-modernization of Western defenses and arms reduction efforts,
ap^.roveu by NATO. (The' full text of the Bundestag speech wa ; carried
iirel -_ss rile June 10, 1902 )
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CO 1EidT - The extent of propaganda surrounding President P:eagan's i;undesta ;
speech, as with the address to the British Parliament, reveals unusual Soviet
sensibilities to several aspects in their own standing in the world
community. The subjects of both speeches, U.S. efforts for peace and the
Soviet response, and democracy contrasted with communism, attest to Soviet
vulner45ilities. Thus, the Soviets have mounted broad general attacks on the
U.S., and our arms control policy, and alleged that the U.S. is pressuring its
allies.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
June 18, 1982
Soviets Attack President Reagan's Parliament Speech
Soviet media have assaulted President Reagan's June 8 speech to the British
Parliament. Several examples of Soviet media attacks on the speech and the
President's visit to England follow.
-- On May 31, TASS English attacked the alleged contents of the June 8
speech, citing the New York Times and The Guardian on the contents of the
speech and adding the Soviets' interpretation of its contents. According
to TASS' assessment the "'political aid' which the United States intends
to render to developing countries envisages undisguised financing of some
political parties, trade unions, newspapers and politicians there. In
other words, it envisages outright bribery, though it is camouflaged by
the demagogic slogan of assisting the development of democracy." TASS
also states that the prosposed assistance is "bound to finance
infiltration of American agents in the socio-political life of those
countries? creation of an atmosphere of political instability. This is a
doctrine of political gangsterism which still discloses Washington's
imperial ambition, its hegemonistic designs."
On June 2, TASS English carried a similar article on this subject.
-- TASS English reacting on June 8 to the President's speech, stated that "In
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his speech he declared for the buildup of the a ,red might of the North
Atlantic bloc and for conducting talks with the Soviet Union from a
position of strength. The President also supported the British
Conservative Government which is spreading the bloody conflict in the
South Atlantic. Meanwhile, he did not advance any proposals for stopping
Israel's aggression against Lebanon.
-- TASS English on June 9 attacked the President's speech, saying that in his
"broadly publicized speech . . . the American President slandered the
Soviet Union and called for a crusade against communism. . . . The American
President is by no means concerned over- racism and mass unemployment, the
arms race, the suppression of human rights and freedoms in the West,
including the USA. He takes under his defence fascist regimes and
justifies the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and other Arab countries.
. . Ronald Reagan also justifies the British invasion of the Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands."
-- On June 10 TASS English carried excerpts from Izvestiva's analysis of
President Reagan's speech. "Perhaps in all its century-old history, the
article runs, old Westminster 'has never heard such unbridled insults
towards whole peoples. Mounting his hobby-horse, the U.S. President
extolled the false virtues of the world of exploitation and capital and,
without mincing words, he smeared the socio-economic system which- for the
first time ever opened to mankind the way to a world without humiliation,
oppression and without wars.' The boss of the White House 'undertook all
of a sudden to instruct peoples of socialist countries ho,.: they should
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live and work in the future. If one is to listen to Reagan, the whole
world should fall into line with the United States and even think as it
does.'"
-- Radio Havana's International Spanish Service charged on June 15 that
"During his appearance at the British Parliament, the U.S. President
called for a crusade against communism and repeated the arguments he has
used to step up the arms race and to heighten tension in various areas of
the world."
"Conspiring against the dovish image Reagan tried to convey in Europe were
the open support he gave to Great Britain 'in its conflict with Argentina
while in London and his conniving silence when the Israeli troops
unleashed their genocidal invasion of Lebanon. . . .Reagan's efuorts to
seem a messenger of peace to the Europeans were undermined by the star[:
reality that U.S. weapons and supplies, as well as U.S.-made planes, were
used to murder thousands of innocent people in the Niddle East, with
Washington's complacency and blessing."
President Reagan actually said in his June 8 speech to Parliament:
"The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster
the infrastructure of democracy -- the system of a free press,
unions, political parties, universities -- which allows a people
to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to
reconcile their own differences through peaceful means."
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The President continued to state that:
"This is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means
for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity.
Democracy already flourishes in countries. with very different
cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural
condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer
dictatorship to democracy.
In examining Soviet propaganda on the speech, it is impossible to miss the
fact that the bulk of Soviet charges about President Reagan's speech do not
`deal with the content of the speech itself.--Rather, the attacks center on
charges about U.S. support of the British in the Falklands and Israel in
Lebanon. As stated previously, the United States has counseled restraint on
all parties involved in both these crises, and has corked unceasingly to sce
peace restored in both areas.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
JUNE 17, 1982
Soviets Continue to Attack U.S. Policy on the Falkland Islands Crisis
Since the British landing on the Falkland Islands, the Soviet media has
intensified its propaganda barrage against U.S. and British policy-in the
South Atlantic. While the primary Soviet propaganda theme remains the
`allegation that the U.S. is. exploiting the crisis to gain a military base in
area, several other themes have been introduced or expanded. Examples of
these follow.
-- Literaturnaya Gazeta's May 19 edition charges that "What has happened in
the icy waters of the South Atlantic is not a clash as such between
British colonialism and the Argentine Armed Forces. Imperialism, whose
shock detachment is the NATO military bloc headed by the United States, is
giving battle there against the entire so-called Third World, against all
the developing countries. In effect they are being warned: Today
Argentina, anyone may be next."
-- On June 9, Radio Moscow's World English Service made the accusation that
Britain and the United States are united by their intention to punish
Argentina and at the same time teach the other developing nations a
lesson."
-- A June 10 broadcast of Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin
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America) said that "The conflict in the South Atlantic has created
problems of principles in relations between the West and the Third World.
This conflict is not just a question of an Anglo-U.S. desire to forcibly
snatch the Malvinas away from the Argentines in order to set up a military
base there. It is also a question of punishing Argentina for its
independent foreign policy, for its refusal to submit to the desire of the
United States which seeks to bring this sovereign country under the yoke
of its voracious objectives within its global strategy. With this
example, the West intends to threaten other emerging countries., to
demolish any liberation movement in Latin America and on the other
continents as well."
The conflict in the Falkland Islands is of no benefit to the U.S., since it
has imperiled our recently-improved relationship with Argentina, and adversely
affected our relations with other Latin American nations. Once it was clear
that the U.S. effort at mediation between the two sides would not succeed,
the U.S. Government felt compelled to support the British in order to
demonstrate our position against the unlawful use of force. Secretary of
State Haig stated that:
"We must take concrete steps to underscore that the United
States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force
to resolve disputes." We are not trying to threaten other
'developing countries'. . . The United States remains ready
to assist the parties in finding the settlement."
While we have opposed Argentina's use of force in this crisis, we have been
careful not to take a position on sovereignty over the islands. We believe
that the issue should be resolved through peaceful negotiations. This is not
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"punishing Argentina" or "threatening other emerging countries".
-- TASS English on June 3 carried excerpts from that day's Izvestiya
comparing the crisis in the Falklands with that in Lebanon. "One should
recall another region and another country with which Washington maintains
'particular relations' -- Israel. When Israel annexes captured Arab
lands, Washington, even rebuking Begin for the sake of appearances, acts
above all as defender of Tel Aviv and its expansionist policy. But not as
champion of international law and order.. Why? One of the main causes is
that Israel is 'a strategic ally' of American imperialism. Britain is
also an ally. That is the gist of the matter. Exactly this self-interest
which determines the American line on the Falkland conflict, and if the
question is taken on a broader plane -- the U.S. attitude to non-aligned
countries in general, be those Arab or Latin American countries."
The United States has counseled restraint on all parties involved in both
these crises, and has worked unceasingly to see peace restored in both areas.
In recent weeks, State Department officials have travelled to both areas in
attempts to end the fighting. This can hardly be construed as unconditional
support of Great Britain and Israel in the quest of "American imperialism".
The following charges that the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires is "preparing
coup d'etat in Argentina" and that U.S. has approved British use of "nuclear
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and biological weapons, and implosion bombs" are vicious and demonstrate that
the Soviets are trying to poison U.S./Argentine relations.
-- Radio Moscow's Domestic Russian Service alleged on June 2 that an unnamed
newspaper carried a report charging that "The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires
in preparing a coup d'etat in Argentina. This was stated by the Argentine
Communist Party Central Committee. We are experiencing a difficult time,
the statement says, which our country's enemies would like to take
advantage of. The U.S. Embassy in the Argentine capital is openly
carrying out preparations for a coup with the objective of preventing a
deepening of Argentina's anti-imperialist course."
--.On June 13, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin America)
charged that "It is even known from reports that the United States has
approved the use of nuclear and biological weapons, and implosion bombs by
the British strike force.
The Soviet media is continuing its attacks on U.S. policy in the South
Atlantic in an attempt not only to damage U.S. relations with Argentina but
with all Latin America while trying to improve its own ties with the countries
of the region. With the surrender of Argentine troops on the Islands and the
massive demonstrations in Argentina, the Soviet propaganda may begin
castigating the U.S. for its role (real or imagined) in the evolution of the
government of both the Islands and Argentina itself.
urpin
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June 15, 1982
Soviet media commentary on the Versailles Economic Summit has accused the U.S.
of pressuring our allies to follow hard line economic policies against the
Soviet Union. Examples of Soviet propaganda which appeared during and after
the summit follow.
-- TASS English on June 4 charged that "Contrary to the provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act the United States is pressing for restrictions and
undermining of the commercial and economic contacts of its partners with
the socialist countries and for subordination of these relations to the
global anti-Soviet strategy of the United States."
-- On June 5 TASS English carried an Izvestiya account of the Versailles
summit. According to TASS, Izvestiya said that "what is referred to as
'settling economic differences' in the parlance of U.S. diplomats means in
the language of the remaining 'six' an 'attempt to impose on them the
diktat of American monopolies', while 'to put an end to discord' inside
NATO means in other languages the Pentagon's desire to make Western Europe
march to its miltaristic commands."
Izvestiya continues to state that "There is no doubt that the economic
difficulties experienced by the Western world, specifically by Western
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Europe, cannot be resolved or even alleviated if the burden of military
spending continues to press heavily on the shoulders of NATO countries,
if, instead of fruitful cooperation and trade between countries with
different social systems, diverse embargoes, sanctions and other
accessories of policy of diktat gain the upper hand."
-- On June 6, TASS English quoted that day's edition of Pravda. "The U.S.
stand at the Versailles meeting shows that the 'leader' wants to be full
master. This is indicated by U.S. attempts to make its partners limit the
granting of export credits to socialist countries and by the proposal to
reconsider altogether trade-and-economic contacts between West and East
with a view to toughening them."
-- TASS English on June 7 leveled the accusation that "The Versailles summit
meeting of the 'big seven' has borne out that the USA does not intend to
stand on ceremony with its allies, in pursuing a policy which serves first
and foremost the selfish aims of the United States, the monopolies of that
country, which strive to find a way out of their economic troubles at the
expense of the interests of other countries, in the first place of the
European partners."
"American representatives subjected their partners at Versailles to the
crudest pressure, wishing to force on them agreements that would undermine
the natural and mutually beneficial East-West economic relations."
"The meeting is'over, but there is every indication that Washington
further intends to bring pressure on its allies to the detriment of their
interests."
-- Radio Moscow World English Service broadcast a commentary on Jun" 7 which
said that "President Reagan and his advisors did all they could to make
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the other countries accept the American approach to international affairs
from positions of strength, and the American policy of diktat and sanction
in world trade."
American officials stressed in public statements before and during the summit
that President Reagan was not proposing economic warfare against the Soviet
Union. U.S. proposals would not interfere with trade as long as the Soviet
Union was willing to pay cash for or finance imports at market rates of
interest. Basically the U.S. had two goals in this area at Versailles:
-- The administration wanted an already negotiated OECD agreement on
tightening guidelines on subsidized credits from the governments of
industrial nations ratified and put into effect. Part of this agreement
would move the Soviet Union from one category to another for the purposes
of the guidelines and would have the effect of increasing interest rates
on export credits provided the USSR.
-- The U.S. also wanted a further mechanism put in place among the seven
summit nations to exercise some sort of restraint over the amounts of
credit supplied to the European communist nations. The administration
wanted a real commitment from the other summit participants to restrain
government-subsidized and government-guaranteed credits to the Soviet
Union, and some kind of effective followup to those commitments.
The Summit leaders agreed at Versailles to "pursue a prudent. . economic
approach" to the USSR and Eastern Europe and "to limit their government export
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credits to these countries." The leaders agreed "to handle cautiously
financial relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries, in
such a way as to insure that they are conducted on a sound economic basis,
including also the need.for commercial prudence in limiting export credits."
This agreement did not go as far as the U.S. wanted, but it did establish the
principle that the Western economic approach to the East should be consistent
with its political and security interests.
The U.S. did not "attempt to impose on them [the allies] the diktat of
American monopolies." We did, of course, have positions on the issues to be
discussed, as did all of the participants. These were discussed and debated
freely. The fact that the U.S. plans were not totally agreed to certainly
should lay to rest the idea that the U.S. can impose its own wishes on its
allies.
Soviet media "previews" of the summit attacked the U.S. along the same lines
as those appearing later. The Soviet propagandists were ready with their
accounts of the results of the summit before it took place and without worry
about its actual course. These themes will almost certainly appear in future
Soviet propaganda on U.S. economic policies.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
June 11, 1982
Soviets Charge U.S. Is Responsible for Israeli Attack on Lebanon
Soviet media attacks on Israel and the U.S. have intensified following
Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. The current Soviet media blitz repeats
the Soviets' routine allegations that Israel is a puppet of the United States
and that the U.S. is behind every move Israel makes. Several examples of
these charges follow.
-- TASS English Service charged on June 6 that "The start of the aggression
followed military consultations between Tel Aviv and Washington. . . .The
invasion of Lebanon. . confirms in all obviousness that deals similar to
the Camp David one only encourage the Israeli aggressors to further use of
force against Arab states and peoples and enable imperialist forces to
gain a spring-board.for direct interference in the affairs of local
countries. The way of separate deals has nothing in common with the task
of ?2stablishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East and is
threatening new aggravations of the conflict."
Secretary of State Haig in his May 26 speech on the Middle East discussed the
Camp David peace process. "The Camp David process, which is based firmly on
United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, remains the only practical route
toward a more comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and all of its
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neighbors, including Jordan and Syria. No other plan provides for movement
despite the conflicting interests and fears of the parties. No other plan
embodies so well the necessity for progress despite the inherent imperfections
of a transitional arrangement."
-- On June 7 TASS English repeated the accusation that "The new Israeli
aggression was undoubtedly undertaken with consent and support from
Washington which armed Israel to the teeth and is pushing it by its policy
to carry out criminal anti-Arab actions. The attack on Lebanon is a
direct consequence of the Camp David deal and American-Israeli 'strategic
cooperation'."
State Department spokesman Alan Romberg said on June 4 and 8 that Israel did
not notify the U.S. before moving into Lebanon. "This clearly was an Israeli
decision. It was not a U.S. decision."
-- Another June 7 TASS English item accused the U.S. of "encouraging Israeli
'hawks' poisoned with chauvinist sentiments to pursue an increasingly
adventurist and bellicose policy with regard to Arab countries," and of
attempting "to assure a Middle East 'settlement' American-Israeli style,
to perpetuate the occupation of the lands captured from the Arabs and to
threaten directly not only the Middle East but also the adjacent regions."
Secretary Haig's May 26 speech reaffirms the U.S.'s committment to a peace
settlement which will benefit all the Middle Eastern parties involved..
-- On June 7 Radio Moscow Peace and Progress broadcast in Hebrew that "The
Americans, after all, view this region as a region which should include
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props for the United States aimed against the national liberation movement
of the Arabs and African agents. It is not secret to anyone that the
United States is mainly gambling on tightening its military-strategic
alliance with Israel. . . .One of the basic tasks. . is to destroy --
while relying on the Israeli and U.S. military power -- the
anti-Imperialist forces in the Middle East and turn the region into a base
for war against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the national
liberation movement."
The U.S. has consistently volunteered its services to the parties involved to
ensure peace in the Middle East. We are not interested in using the area to
"war" on other nations. This allegation that we are turning the region into a
"base for war" is typical of the Soviet Union's tactic of accusing the U.S. of
acting as they do.
-- On June 8, TASS English continued its allegations saying that "As regards
the Middle East, Israel remains the U.S. principal military ally, is the
United States trump card there and a tool it is going to use to recarve
the map of the Middle East as it sees fit. . . .It becomes clear,
therefore, why at a time when the world has been swept by a storm of anger
at Israel's fresh aggression against Lebanon, Washington is driving a
feverish effort in a bid to whitewash the aggressor and justify his crimes
before the world public."
Secretary Haig in his ?June 7 briefing said that the U.S. has "joined fervently
in the United Nations Resolution yesterday to urge an immediate ceasefire. . . .
The initial efforts of this government are to take every step possible to
bring the bloodshed to a conclusion." Responding to a question, Secretary
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Haig said that "Clearly we have sought that [Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon]. We didn't want them to go in the first place. We've been very
clear about that for an extended period."
-- Several articles attributed to TASS items appeared in Moroccan newspapers
on June 7 and 9. A piece charging U.S. collusion in the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon appeared in a page one "Wire Service Round-up" of the Arabic
language newspaper Al Alam on June 7. A similar item appeared June 9 in
that paper's French language sister daily L'Opinion.
-- On June 8, the North Koreans added their attack. A Pyongyang KCNA English
broadcast charged that "It is entirely due to the active patronage and
instigation of the U.S. imperialists that the Israeli Zionists are now
running wild at will to realize their expansionist ambition, defying
publicly recognized international law and the unanimous denunciation of
fair world opinion."
The Soviet Union has been a major critic of Israel and its relationship with
the U.S.- for years. The Soviets have used the Arab-Israeli conflict to
engratiate themselves with the Arab states of the region and gain influence in
this strategically important area at the expense of the United States. They
will almost certainly continue their media attacks on the U.S. and its friends
in the Middle East in pursuit of this goal.
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EXPOSING SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
June 9, 1982
Soviets Continue to Accuse U.S. of Interfering in Poland
In recent weeks, the Soviet and Polish media have continued their attacks on
U.S. policy toward Poland, accusing us of interfering in the dQmestic affairs
of Poland. The accounts have continued to single out Radio Free Europe for
particularly vituperative abuse, although they are also attacking other
Western press organs. Several examples follow.
-- Literaturnaya Gazeta carried in its May 19 edition an attack on Radio Free
Europe and its staff, which stated that "Last week Poles watched on
television, a four-part documentary on the activity of Radio Free Europe
and its ties with the CIA. They were able to'see for themselves the worth
of that demagoguery and what true criminal schemes the 'baboons', as the
political degenerates and traitors to People's Poland who work for that
station are contemptuously called, were instructed to implement. Poles
also'saw for themselves that the wave of political hooliganism that swept
through their cities in early May was by no means a 'spontaneous display
of the masses' anger'."
-- On May 20 TASS English Service made the accusation that Radio Free Europe,
"the main mouthpiece and offspring of the cold war that is supervised by
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the CIA, plays an important role in these sinister pLar.s of llushington,
which is trying to exploit the difficulties faced by Poland to weaken the
socialist community and to whip up international tension. Mai:-twining
continuous contacts with the Polish underground and using the services of
mercenary henchmen from among renegades and traitors to the Polish people,
this American subversive radio center operating from the trr.ritory of
another country has drastically expanded its subversive anti-Polish
propaganda during the past few months."
TASS 'is not content with attacking Radio Free Europe. The item continues
to charge that "The Washington administration is increasingly involving in
these unseemly activities the American press and its correspondents
working in Poland with other radio centers." Michael Dobbs of the
Washington Post is singled out in a long segment of the item.
Routine allegations were repeated that the Western media like the Soviets'is
run by the U.S. Government (usually the CIA).
-- Novoye Vremya on May 21 continued the accusations that Radio Free Europe
is interfering in the domestic affairs of Poland, with the connivance of
the CIA and the Reagan administration. It alleged that ICA Director Wick
requested $15-20 million for "modernization" of Radio Free Europe's
studios in Munich and $200 million for improving the transmitters of Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. This constitutes
interference according to the article because the request for funds was
justified by the argument that "it would cost less than a B-1 bomber, but
could accomplish more than all B-1's."
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are funded and overseen by the Board for
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International Broadcasting, not by USICA or the Central Intelligence Agency.
USICA has requested appropriations for modernizing VOA transmitters because
the current equipment is antiquated and non-standard. This modernization was
planned long betore the events in Poland. Radio Free-Europe broadcasts news
accounts of Eastern Europe into those countries where the media are government
controlled, and does not incite violence, disseminate "subversive" propaganda,
serve as a-center for subversive elements in Poland, or slander Poland and the
Soviet Union.
-- TASS English Service on May 22 charged that "As for the allegations of the
Department of State that the United States has never encouraged Solidarity
to perpetrate illegal actions, this claim, to put it mildly, is even
farther from the truth than Washington is from Warsaw. . . How else can
we view the patently provocative and.inciting statements of the official
U.S. radio station Voice of America and the subversive radio centre 'Free
Europe which takes its orders from the U.S. Government and which,
broadcasting to Poland, conveys round-the-clock what actually amounts to
instructions to the counterrevolutionary underground, slanders socialism
and incites people to''resist' the authorities.?"
The TASS item also discussed the Polish TV series which "supplies
irrefutable proof of close contacts" between "counterrevolutionary
organizations", including Solidarity, and the CIA and "its actual
affiliate, Radio Free Europe".
The United States' position remains that the Polish people should settle their
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current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise, without
outside interference. The accusation that the U.S. has intervened in Poland's
affairs is baseless. The United States is not seeking to impose any political
formula in Poland. It is simply trying to make clear that the way out of
Poland's crisis is to end repression, release political prisoners, and
establish a genuine internal dialogue.
This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union's efforts to turn back the
reform process through its support of the imposition of martial law and the
stationing of large numbers of Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet Union
seems uninterested in negotiation and compromise. Rather its interest is in
imposing its own solution on Poland.
Continued Soviet and Polish media attacks on the Western media can be expected
as long as objective news is printed and broadcast on the situation in
Poland. RFE will be the recipient of the harshest criticism because it is the
one media organization which provides the Polish people with uncensored news
of events in their own country.
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Jure 4, l9U2
Soviets charge 't'hat U.S. LW Accusations are Slander
Recent revelations of evidence of lethal chemical and toxin weapons tLW) use
by the Soviet Union and its proxies in southeast Asia and Atghanistan have led
to additional Soviet attacks on alleged U.S. LW activities. Several examples
`ot Soviet and-Soviet-sponsored media charges that the U.S. is 'slandering' the
Phnom Pekin Domestic Radio Service on May 5 charged that the U.S. "present
campaign of vicious propaganda is aimed at misleading world public opinion
in an attempt to cover up the savage and ugly crimes they have perpetrated
and at diverting opinion trom the tact that they are continuing to produce
toxic chemical weapons in preparation tor an assault against world peace.
.U.S. imperialism itselt is the one who uses toxic chemical weapons
against mankind while blaming our triends the Soviet Union and Vietnam."
The U.S. reported incidents of lethal chemical and toxin use which have been
brought to our attention since the mid 19/U's by retugees trom southeast Asia
and Atghanistan. 'these reports have been corroborated by scientitic analysis
of samples of "yellow rain" and by medical examination of victims of chemical
and toxin attacks.. There has been no tabrication of stories about Soviet use
of lethal chemicals and toxins intended to cover up our own use, since the
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U.S. has never used these lethal agents. It arrythirig, the reverse is true,
with the Soviets accusing us to divert attention trom their own activities.
- On Play '/ 'TES5 t;nglish charged that "The slander campaign against Vietnam
and the USSR that has been inspired by the U.S. administration looks
sacrilegious against the background of the facts related to the
consequences of the Pentagon's chemical wartare an Vietnam."
At no time during the Vietnam War did the U.S. use toxins or lethal chemical
weapons. U.S. use of riot control or irritants against enemy combatants and
the use of the defoliant Agent Orange during the Vietnam War is a matter of
extensive public record. We have neither-denied these activities nor
endeavored to keep them trom the public. Moreover, the U.S. never
deliberately used the defoliant Agent orange against people. The U.S. used
more of the defoliant (tor agricultural purposes) in the U.S. than in Vietnam;
and discontinued its use both in Vietnam and the U.S. at the same time in 19/U
when a Department of Agriculture report indicated that there could be possible
long-term harmtul ettects trcm exposure to Agent Orange.
-- Pravda's May '/ edition in ettect charges the U.S. with disintormation
activities in Thailand. "The Thai press must retrain trom publishing
articles which accuse Vietnam of receiving 'yellow rain' chemical weapons
allegedly manutactured in the Soviet Union. The point is that in recent
months the editorial ottices of the 13angkok newspapers and magazines have
been receiving a continuous tlow of such tabricated reports trom U.S.
agencies."
The U.S. has provided the U.N., all member-states and the public.- through the
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media with material including comprehensive reports of U.S. eviclcncL or c_:,
in Southeast Asian and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its proxies. '? is
the 'Thal or any other press does with these materials is up to the
publications' editors.
The article continued with the charge that the U.S. was planting C.l?1
evidence in Indochina. "One of the goals. . .was to supply and circulate
the countries of Indochina with 'yellow rain' cnemicals, in order to
create 'material evidence' of the use or toxins by the Soviet Union and
Vietnam."
This accusation is patently ridiculous. The U.S. has no need to fabricate or
plant any evidence of LW use. The evidence is voluminous. We rave merely
reported the eye witness accounts of retugees, the tindings of medical
examination of victims, and scientitic analysis of a variety of samples,
including blood samples tram victims.
A lengthy may lb Pravda article repeated the now tamlllar litany of Soviet
charges about the U.S. CWV activitly. The article described the State
Department's March 1982 LW report as "a whole collection of tabrications
about the USSR" which was "based on ludicrous tantasies, the bribery oi:
bogus eyewitnesses and other machinations, and. . .tabricated trom the
so-called 'testimony' that 'eyewitnesses'. . .gave to CiA agents, atter
appropriate treatment. It contains not a single tact, not a single piece
of proot that can with any seriousness bear out the accusations that have
been leveled. .
According to the article, "Washington decided to resort to a trankly
underhand method and to take the path of creating 'proot', systematically
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introducing its bogus eyewitnesses in Southeast Asia and planting
Similar charges about the State Department Report and the usual list of
charges about U.S. C11 develcpment and deployment appeared in a May 1U
lzvestiya article.
The Department of State's PPeport to the Corxgress "Chemical Wartare in
Southeast Asia arcs Afghanistan" is based on a massive amount or intormation,
trom a variety of sources, which has been caretully compiled and analyzed over
the years. The paper is accompanied by annexes and tables that provide
details of the medical evidence, sample analyses, and other supporting data.
The report thus provides a compilation of all the U.S. evidence which can be
made public without compromising sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
it presents incontrovertible prott of lethal LW use.
- A May 26 Thai broadcast by EEanoi's International Service made the
accusation that "the U.S. State Department's samples were all provided by
the Pol Pot clique and no one lur.ows where they were collected or under
what conditions. . . The United States has spent no small amount or money
to tabricate evidence to substantiate its allegation. In the end, its
ettorts have exposed its attempt to deceive public opinion. . . ..Lt is
clear that the U.S. propaganda about the toxic chemicals issues was a
dirty slander right trom the beginning."
The variety or U.S. samples come trcm a number of ditterent sources, trom
three ditterent countries -- Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. So tar,
positive results showing tricothecene toxins nave been reported in samples
trom both Laos and Kampuchea. In addition to the toxins t"yellow rain") there
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is strong evidence that other lethal -,jeitt:,, including nerve gas and phosgene
With these charges the Soviet media ccntin'es to accuse the U.S. of doing what
the Soviet Union is doing with the dev-1.07;;ent and use of lethal chemicals and
toxins. The problem tor the Soviets is i-Tat their arguments break down under
the sheer weight of tact. They can prove no evidence whatsoever of American
use of lethal chemicals arid the U.S. loncl ago admitted use of non-lethal riot
control gas and Agent orange in Vietnam. The Soviets will, of course,
continue their slanders of the U.S. in tti hope of diverting world attention.
from their own C1V activities and their violations of the 1925 Geneva protocol
and the 19/2 Biological an toxin weapons convention.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
June 2, 1982
Soviets Charge U.S. With Profiting from Iran-Iraq War
Soviet media coverage of the Iran-Iraq War has included frequent charges that
the U.S. is profiting from that conflict and has a vested interest in seeing
it continue. Several examples follow.
-- On April 10 TASS English carried an account of a Krasnaya Zvezda (Red
Star) article which asserted that "Washington's behind-the-scenes
instigatory role in whipping up the Iranian-Iraqi military conflict is
well-known." According to the article, "America needs the conflict also
to split countries of the Near and Middle East and to divert their
.attention from Israel's.aggressive policies.
-- Izvestiya's May 14 edition charged that "The United States is seeking to
draw considerable dividends from the conflict on the shores of the Persian
Gulf. . . The United States is trying to deepen the split among the Arabs
and distract their attention from the consequences of the Camp David deal
and from the struggle against the brazen Zionist agressor; it is
insinuating into the minds of the Arab peoples the idea of the 'Iranian
threat' in the hope of accelerating the formation of a pro-Western
alliance in the Near East on the basis of so-called 'strategic consensus'."
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-- On .fay 25 Radio tloscou's Arabic S'?r iice alleged that the Iran-Iraq War is
"exploited by the United States. . .for stirrin;; up differences and
feelings of emnity anion; the Arab countries 6_, as to weaken them."
The broadcast continued to cite th2 Kuwait Times article which supposedly
"pointed out that it is futile to expect the United States to play a
positive role in halting the Iraq-Iran war. Being a major protector of
Israel, the United States is happy to see that the two militarily strong
Muslim countries weakening each other to such a degree."
Radio Moscow continues to charge that "It is common knowledge that the
United States and Israel want the conflict to continue. . . Imperialism
and the reactionary circles in the Arab countries are trying to use the
Iranian-Iraqi conflict so as to drive a wedge in relations between the
Soviet Union on the one hand and the parties involved in the conflict on
the other."
This Radio Moscow broadcast combines two Soviet propaganda techniques. First,
it cites a non-Soviet media source, but without a complete citation so it is
difficult to verify whether the quote was accurate. Secondly, the broadcast
follows the citation with its own text, which to the casual reader appears to
be that of the Kuwait Times rather than Radio Moscow.
Current Department of State guidance on the Iran-Iraq War states that:
We have always maintained that the Iran-Iraq War poses a danger to
the peace and security of all nations in the Gulf region. As
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Secretary of State Haig said in his 'Nay 26 Chicago speech, "There is
great risk that the conflict may spill over into neighboring
states. . . ," and may "lead to unforseen and far reaching changes
in the regional balance of power offering-the Soviet Union an
opportunity to enlarge its influence".
Clearly the interest of all will be served by an immediate ceasefire
and a negotiated settlement based upon the territorial integrity and
independence of both Iran and Iraq. In this context we have
consistently welcomed constructive international efforts to bring an
end to the war on the basis of each state's respect for the
territorial integrity of its neighbors and each state's freedom from
external coercion.
We have made our views on the war known to other countries and will
continue to do so in the hope that hostilities can be brought to an
end as soon as possible.
With their propaganda on the Iran-Iraq role and U.S. policy towards it, the
Soviet Union is pursuing its usual strategy of imputing to the U.S. the
policies and actions they are pursuing themselves. As Secretary Haig points
out, the U.S. is anxious to end, not continue, this conflict which has the
potential of destabilizing the entire region. It is the Soviet Union which
has an interest in the conflict, demonstrated by the. fact that it fueled the
conflict by supplying arms to both Iran and Iraq.
Post should expect that as long as this conflict lasts, the Soviet Union will
almost certainly continue its propaganda barrage against the U.S.
1
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 27, 1982
Soviets Continue to Assail U.S. Policy in the South Atlantic
The Soviet media has continued its verbal assault on British and
U.S. policy regarding the Falkland Islands. Their charges have
centered on two major themes: that the U.S. was never really
neutral, even during Secretary Haig''s shuttle diplomacy in April;
and that the United Kingdom and the U.S. were interested in the
Falklands for imperialist reasons. Several examples follow:
Radio Moscow's Peace and Progress to Latin America (Spanish) on
May 14 carried a commentary discussing a letter Fidel Castro
sent to all heads of nonaligned countries "urging them to adopt
measures to put an end to the Anglo-U.S. aggression against the
Argentine people." The message states that the United States
and Great Britain intend to impose punitive actions against
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Argentina as a sure lesson of imperialist powers to all
developing countries that hope for their sovereignty and
territorial integrity...It is thus a criminal attack on the
right of each people to be free and independent to decide their
own future.
TASS English on May 17 alleged that Secretary Haig's 'shuttle
diplomacy' was designed "to mislead the international public as
to the Washington administration's real plans, and at the same
time to stall until the British squadron drew near to the
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands."
TASS English on May 24 continued on the same themes. "Touching
on the so-called mediation effort by the United States in the
British-Argentine. conflict, the-news analyst stresses that it
lasted for as long as it took Britain's admiralty to lead its
task force to the archipelago...After that Washington cast off
the guise of med'iator...The conflict in the South Atlantic has
once again demonstrated the sinister role of NATO which uses it
not only as,a test range of modern sea warfare but also as an
additional pretext for intensifying the arms race."
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Earlier USINFO's in L1iis series (May 5 and May 14), which also
discussed the Falkland Islands crisis and the U.S. role in it,
answered many of these charges directly. Elowever, it bears
repeating that: the U.S. was scrupulously impartial in its
mediation efforts prior to April 30; the U.S. announcement of
support for the United Kingdom came only after the breakdown in
negotiations and was not timed to coincide with the arrival of the
British fleet in the South Atlantic; The United States did not
precipitate the crisis in the Falklands;-we are not trying to gain
control of the Falkland Islands for military or any other purposes;
the United Kingdom and the EEC members did not ask the U.S. for
permission to act or for approval of their actions and were not
pressured by U.S.; the U.S. began its mediation effort at the
request of both Argentina and the United Kingdom.
In contrast, none of the Soviet attacks on U.S. and British Falkland
Islands' policies mention the facts that: the Argentines first
occupied the islands, which are outside their territorial waters,
without warning; the people of the islands have expressed a
preference to remain British subjects; while the Soviets vehemently
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attacked our efforts at solving the crisis peacefully, they
themselves' have done nothing to halp bring puce,, contenting
themselves with calumnies against the U.S. acid the British.
These Soviet attacks will-undoubtedly continue throughout the crisis
and after, for as long as there is a chance that the Soviet Union's
relations with Latin American countries will benefit from attacks on
the U.S.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 24, 1982
Soviets Assail President Reagan's Speech at Eureka College
The Soviet media carried a number of distorted accounts of President Reagan's
May 9 Eureka College speech shortly after it was given. Examples of their
charges about the speech and U.S. Arms Control policy follow.
-- Moscow Domestic Service on May 12 charged that "The only new thing about
his speech was that it gathered together the various fabrications and
insinuations against the Soviet Union which have been customary with the
.current U.S. leaders. Admittedly,-on this occasion, the standard-
anti-Soviet attacks were mixed up in the President's speech with
peacemaking phraseology. . . He has never concealed the fact that he
wants to foist an endless and very expensive arms race on the Soviet
Union. Only someone who has lost all sense of reality would hope that the
Soviet Union would succumb to blackmail and disarm unilaterally.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly continue its efforts to
achieve a genuine reduction of strategic armaments based on the ptinciples
of equality and identical security of the sides."
-- A May 14 Radio Moscow English Service-commentary charged that, "Try as you
will, you will find no sign in the President's Eureka speech of a serious
desire to reduce strategic arms in a way suitable for both sides. . . .The
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proposals he made suggest that Washington qeeKs not an agreement that
would end the danger of a nuclear arms race, but military advantages for
the United States. . . .The administratior is app.o enzly obsessed with the
idea of gaining advantages for the United States. a= the expense of the
Soviet Union's security. . . What all this means is that President Reagan
expects the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally."
Since taking office, the President has been seeking arms reduction agreements
which would be verifiable, equitable and militarily significant. In his
Eureka College speech, President Reagan proposed drastic reductions in the
nuclear arms arsenals deployed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He
proposed that nuclear arms levels be reduced by one-third as soon as possible,
that the ceilings for nuclear warheads be equal, and that no more than
one-half the remaining forces be land-based. These are certainly quite new
and specific proposals for ending the nuclear arms race, which would benefit
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at the expense of neither country's
security and for the benefit of all. There is no suggestion that the Soviet
Union should disarm unilaterally.
While a number of Soviet media items on the President's speech attacked its
contents directly, a far greater number used one of the Soviets' favorite
propaganda techniques -- assailing the President's speech through the
criticisms of the speech by Democratic Party members of Congress, former
members of Democratic administrations, and the Western media. Several
examples follow.
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-- On May 10, liar+c ow Don:::sci_c Radio Service brovdcast all. ;ed criticisms of
the President's speech by former Secretary of S_nr.e lluskie and Senator
Nunn with the lead that "The latest speech of Pr_,-:sider.t_ Fr,agan. . .has
evoked quite a skeptical reaction among leading circles of the opposition
Democratic Party in tha United States."
-- Moscow-Domestic Service on May 12 carried a litany of Western press
accounts which appear to be critical of the administration. For example,
it alleges that NBC "stressed that Reagan certainly does not wish to set
off on his planned meeting with his West European partners with the
reputation of a warmonger."
Immediately after the NBC quotation, Radio Moscow continues with the
charge that, "If Reagan's speech is stripped of its cost-ctic rhetoric,
which is a sop to world and U.S. public opinion, it shows him in his
customary role of inspiring and organizing futile attempts by the U.S.
reaction to undermine the positions-of world socialism and to seek
military superiority over the Soviet Union."
Here the Soviets quote directly from an inoccuous Western media statement and
follow it with a Soviet accusation. NBC was speculating about the reason for
and tone of the President's speech, not condemning its content, yet the first
impression is that it is NBC, rather than Radio Moscow who is attacking the
President.
-- Numerous other Soviet media accounts appeared in the days after the
speech, all of which attacked the President's speech through the use of
U.S. domestic political and press disagreements with the President's
policy.
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Freedom of speech ::yid freedom of the press are fundamental rights of citizens
in democracies. The Soviet citations of public domestic criticisms of'the
Presiden!_'s policies merely point up this major strength of our country.
Whenever.the President, Vice-President or a cabinet member delivers a major
foreign policy speech, the Soviet media react strongly and critically. They
often use the technique desribed above of quoting Western sources in their
O
accounts to give their attacks at least a veneer of credibility. They will
almost certainly continue to use these techniques whenever there is a major
foreign policy speech.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 21, 1982
Soviet and Cuban Media Continue Assaults on Ocean Venture '82
The U.S. Navy's recently completed training exercises in the
Caribbean, Ocean Venture 1982, were the target of a number of
attacks by the Soviet and.Cuban media. Several of the most recent
examples of these charges follow.
Pravda on May 5 charged that "Washington is continuing to worsen
relations with the Western Hemisphere's first socialist country
and is whipping up tension throughout the Caribbean. . . .While
this whole armada is 'practicing' firings and landings, U.S.
propaganda is inventing all kinds of pretexts to justify the
latest outburst of militarist fever."
-- On May 10 Pravda accused the Pentagon of "indulging in saber
rattling off the Cuban coast. . . .The maneuvers are an alarming
symptom of the escalation of Washington's policy of threats
against the island of freedom."
-- Havanna's Domestic Radio Service broadcast on May 13 accusations
that the goal of Ocean Venture '82 is "to frighten countries in
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the area that are hostile to U.S. imperialism and liberation
movements struggling in the region to overthrow corrupt and
bloodstained governments supported by Washington."
Ocean Venture 182 was a regularly scheduled yearly Atlantic command
naval and amphibious exercise, which is traditionally held in the
Spring in international waters in the same area as this year's
exercise. The objective of Ocean Venture was to insure that U.S.
Naval forces are in a high state of readiness to defend the sea
lines of communication in the region and to demonstrate U.S.
capability to project power into the region when necessary to
support friendly nations or to oppose a potential threat. According
to Admiral Robert McKenzie, the commander of the exercise, "That's
what this exercise was meant for -- to improve our readiness and to
let our friends know we are here to support them." Ocean Venture
was a training exercise, not preparation for aggressive action
against anybody or anything, and there is no need for "pretexts to
justify" its activities.
These media attacks. continued the propaganda campaign which the
Soviet and Soviet-influenced media launched just prior to the
beginning of Ocean Venture '82 in late April. Similar attacks were
leveled against Operation Team Spirit in South Korea and seem to be
beginning on NATO's North Sea exercises "Bright Horizon". Posts
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should expect similar propaganda campaigns whenever and wherever
U.S. military forces conduct routine training exercises.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 1Q, 1982
Soviets Assail USICA and Director Wick
In the last several weeks, Soviet and Soviet-influenced media have intensified
the vicious propaganda campaign against Director Wick and USICA. Several
examples of these slanders follow.
-- Izvestiya on May 5 charged that recently the "bourgeois" press has given
up its role in disseminating "anti-Soviet",propaganda, and that the U.S.
Government and USICA in particular have taken over this task, which is
"first and foremost 'psychological war' against the USSR and other
socialist states". The Soviets charge that Project Truth, the name of
this alleged "campaign of psychological war," has "not even been touched
by the truth. It has other contents: unscrupulous deception and blatant
lies."
-- On May 7, Pravda continued, in an article written by the paper's senior
political observer Yuri Zhukov, Izvestiya's "psychological war"
accusations, charging that USICA conducts "U.S. foreign policy propaganda
worldwide" and that Washington does not intend to renounce "psychological
war". The article places the U.S. in the league of Nazi Germany with its
charge that the U.S. "borrowed.from Goebbels," the "tactic of the 'big
lie'," which is "being used increasingly actively by the present U.S. and
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NATO leaders for subversive purposes, as wa:i done durin_ the 'cold war'
years."
TASS English carried an item on the Pravda article on flay 7, which
repeated the article's main points.
USICA's goal, and that of Project Truth, is to tell the truth about the U.S.
and about the U.S. Government's policies, in an attempt to lessen
international tensions. We do not disseminate propaganda and are not
conducting "a campaign of psychological war" against the Soviet Union and its
allies. The attempt to link USICA's activities with Coebbels' 'big lie' is
despicable.
-- May 11's issue of the Polish Government daily Rzeczpospolita attacked
Director Wick's May 3 speech in Chicago, linking it to the "unprecedented
anti-Communist and anti-Polish propaganda campaign" allegedly being waged
by the Reagan administration. "In the United States it is no secret that
the psychological war being conducted against our country is intended to
force the authorities to restore the pre-December 13 state. To the
contrary, it has been forecast that it is the goal of the propaganda
activities to interfere in Polish internal affairs. Moreover, one of the
bosses of American propaganda, Charles Wick, went so far as to put forward
serious threats."
The article charges that the Director, while "pretending to be''a friend
of Poland'. . simultaneously is responsible for activities in [the]
Spring unrest, disturbances, and street rows. [And] in various propaganda
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activities, playing on nationalist feelings is linked with anti-Socialist
phraseology followed by calls and instructions to organize a resistance
movement, break the regulations of martial law, and set Poles in
opposition to Poles, even as far as civil war."
As stated above, USICA's goal is to tell other countries about the U.S. and
its policies. We do not disseminate propaganda, interfere in the affairs of
other nations (including Poland), and certainly do not incite domestic
violence abroad. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, involves itself in all
these activities in many areas of the world.
These Soviet scurrilous attacks on USICA and Director Wick come after a
month-long period of reduced Soviet propaganda on the Agency. Several of the
new attacks appear to be a result of the Director's April trip to Europe,
which is mentioned in several of the above items. The Polish item, while
ostensibly an-account of Director Wick's Chicago speech, was probably
published as part of the propaganda barrage over the expulsion of the two
American diplomats. Both also fit well with the continuing Soviet
(Soviet-inspired) propaganda campaign against Western media and journalists.
The extent and vehemence of these continuing attacks against USICA may be an.
indication that current Agency efforts to point out Soviet propaganda and
disinformation are discomforting to the Soviet Union. It is unlikely the
Soviet media would bring such attention to USICA unless our
anti-disinformation efforts hurt the Soviets.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 17, 1982
Soviets Attack Vice President Bush's Visit to East Asia
Vice President Bush's trip to East Asia in April and May has been the subject
of numerous unfounded attacks by the Soviet media and by Soviet-sponsored
media in the region. Examples of the type of propaganda appearing on the Vice
President's trip appear below.
-- A .Radio Moscow English commentary (to South and Southeast Asia) charged on
April 27 that "Political analysts link Bush's current trip with the
implementation of the United States administration's militaristic plans
regarding the Pacific area. Washington is banking on its local allies in
its effort to regain the role it played in the region and lost as a result
of its defeat in the agressive war in Vietnam."
The purpose of Vice President Bush's trip to East Asia was to demonstrate to
our Asian allies that the United States remains a strong and reliable force in
the region. Before leaving Washington, the Vice President told reporters that
the U.S. has a full, legitimate, useful role to play in the Pacific. Another
reason for the trip was for the Vice President to represent the U.S. at
various commemorations in the region, and much of the trip was devoted to
those ceremonial functions.
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-- On April 27, the purportedly clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary' Party
for Reunification (VKPR) broadcast to South Korea about the Vice
President's visit to Korea, that "the visit by U.S. Vice President Bush
was, in a nutshell, a trip to inspect the preparations by the U.S. forces
stationed in South Korea and the Chon Tu-hwan ring for a war of northward
invasion. It was a criminal trip to inspire the Chon Tu-hwan ring's
policy of fascism, treachery and division. It was also an agressive trip
to fabricate the military.alliance of South Korea, the United States and
Japan. . . .Bush's visit to South Korea was a dangerous and criminal visit
to hinder peace in the Korean Pen'n sula and its peaceful reunification and
to accelerate war and division."
-- VKPR (April 27), Pyongyang Domestic Radio (April 29), and Nodong Sinmun,
the official newpaper of the North Korean Communist Party, (April 30)
contained similar attacks on the Vice President's visit to South Korea,
and a May 2 Pravda article repeated Nodong Sinmun's accusations about the.
trip.
In fact, Vice President Bush's prime reason for visiting South Korea was to
participate in ceremonies marking the Centenial of the establishment of
relations bgtween Korea and the United States.
-- On April 28 TASS English attacked the Singapore leg of the Vice
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President's trip, charging that the trip was an attempt to further extend
American influence in the region. "Washington's real approach to ASEAN
countries is based not on the principles of respect for their national
interests, but on the striving to subjugate them to the United States
military and political aims."
Since there are no pressing issues between the United States and Singapore,
the Vice President's discussions with Singapore's leaders were wide-ranging,
including international trade issues and security in the Asia-Pacific region.
To accurately reflect American relations with ASEAN, the "not" in the above
TASS quotation should be moved from the first to the second phrase of the
sentence. To characterize Soviet intentions toward ASEAN, it would be
necessary to replace 'Washington' and ;the United States' with 'Moscow' and
'the Soviet Union' in the quote.
Since a large part of Vice-President Bush's trip to East Asia was occupied
with ceremonial duties, Soviet and North Korean media were hard pressed to
find material on which to base their normal output of scurrilous propaganda on
the trip's activities. Most of the accounts of the trip quickly moved from
attacking the trip itself to castigating U.S. policy in the area in general
and relations with the countries visited in particular. These accusations
followed the usual'Soviet technique of accusing the U.S. of attempting to
dominate an entire region, that is, of doing exactly what the Soviets
themselves have been doing, unfortunately with some success, for years. Posts
can expect the Soviet media to mount similar propaganda campaigns whenever and
wherever senior American officials travel.
K~K
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 14, 1982
Soviets Attack U.S. Policy and Intentions During the Falkland Islands Crisis
The April 30 announcement by Secretary Haig that the United States would
support the United Kingdom in its conflict with Argentina has resulted in the
continuance of the Soviet Union's spate of anti-U.S. propaganda regarding our
role in the Falkland Islands crisis. The major charges leveled by the Soviet
media are that Secretary Haig's effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities-
was a sham, and that the U.S. donned the "mask" of mediator only to gain
control of the islands for the U.S. Several examples follow.
-- Moscow's World English Service-charged on May 3 that British air raids-
"completely exposed the myth of America's role as a self-styled mediator
in the conflict. In reality the much-publicized shuttle diplomacy of the
Secretary of State Alexander Haig was nothing but a screen to cover up the
Anglo-American compact against' Argentina. Haig moreover was winning time
to enable the British naval armada to reach the area of the Falklands."
-- A May 4 Izvestiya article charged that the conflict in the Falklands was
the responsibility of the U.S. as well as Britain. "The United States is
by no means an 'honest broker' in the British-Argentine conflict. . . .The
main thing is that this conflict is in fact a conflict between the United
States and Argentina to the same if not larger extent as it is a
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British-Argentine conflict."
-- Radio Moscow's English to North America Service (May 6) accused the U.S.
of "playing a double-crossing game. The 11-day-long mediation mission of
the United States secretary of state was geared to enable Britain to take
its fleet to the Falklands and make ready for landing troops there and
starting hostilities."
-- Pravda charged on May 9 that "there can hardly be any question of
neutrality when from the very start of the crisis Washington has been
trying to get its own hands on the subject of the conflict -- the Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands." (Segments of this article and its accusations
appeared in by TASS English on the day the article appeared in Pravda.)
-- TASS English on May 10 contained accusations against the U.S. which
appeared in Kommunist, the journal of the Soviet Communist Party. "It is
not astonishing that in this case too they preferred to side actually with
one of its NATO allies in demanding the withdrawal of Argentine troops
from the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, disregarded the interests of a
member-state of the Organization of American States, which they simply
discounted as soon as it comes to the strategy of imperialism."
-- TASS language services have repeated, throughout the crisis, the same
litany of accusations and charges in programming dealing with the
Falklands. In addition, similar propaganda has appeared in the media of
other Communist or leftist governments.
A response to Soviet attacks that.the U.S. was not impartial in its mediation
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attempts is contained in Secretary of State Haig's April 30 statement on the
"We have made a determined effort to restore peace through
implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 502.
.From the outset, the United States has been guided by the
basic principle of the rule of law and the peaceful settlement
of disputes. . . .We took no position on the merits of either
the British or Argentine claims to the Islands."
The announcement that the United States would support the United Kingdom in
the crisis was made only when it became apparent that the Argentinians would
not accept the compromise agreed to by the United Kingdom. The announcement'
was not timed to coincide with the arrival of the British fleet in the
vicinity of the Falklands, despite Soviet charges to the contrary. Secretary
Haig stated that:
"In light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we
must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States
cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to
resolve disputes. . . .The United States remains ready to
assist the parties in finding the settlement. . . .In the end,
there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the
interested parties."
Finally, in answer to Soviet charges that the conflict in the South Atlantic
is a conflict between the U.S. and Argentina, it must be pointed out that,
since we have recently developed a better relationship with Argentina, the
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conflict in the South Atlantic, with its concomitant deterioration of that
relationship, is of no benefit to the U.S. The accusation that the U.S.
precipitated the crisis to gain control of the Falkland Islands is patent
nonsense. The United States became involved in the crisis only after both
Argentina and the United Kingdom requested our assistance in mediating the
conflict.
The Soviet media continues to use the Falkland Islands crisis to attempt,
through its propaganda, to damage U.S. relations with Latin America while
trying to improve its own ties with the countries of the. region.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 12,1982
Soviets Charge U.S; Is Interfering in Poland
The expulsion of two American Embassy officers by Poland this week comes
during continuing Soviet attacks on U.S. policy on Poland and on American
diplomats and journalists covering Poland. Several examples of these attacks
follow. - -
-- On April 20, the Polish Army newspaper Zolnierz Wolnosci carried the text
of a Warsaw speech given. by the Soviet ambassador to Poland, accusing the
U.S. and NATO of interfering in the internal affairs of Poland. The
ambassador charged that "American imperialism and its NATO assistants, who
have petted the Polish counterrevolution and pushed it toward the seizure
of power, are continuing to brutally interfere in internal Polish affairs."
Ambassador Aristov also characterized the Soviet Union's role in Poland,
alleging that "Notwithstanding the slanderous bourgeois propaganda, the
Soviet Union does not impose its will on anyone."
-- Pravda's-May 6 edition carried a TASS item which contained a number of
accusations that the May 3-4 demonstrations were the result of foreign
subversion. Among the charges were: 1) that the incidents took place
according to a "unified scenario" and were directed by a "single hand";
2) that external support, especially that of Radio Free Europe has now
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gone beyond "scurrilous propaganda" and broadcasts not only instructions, but
"entire scenarios"; and 3) that the "offensive" against Poland is motivated
by the fears of Poland's enemies that tension is lessening and that the
"shameful Falkland's conflict" has pushed Poland off the front pages of
Western Europe.
It is the position of the United States that the Polish people should settle
their current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise,
without outside interference. The accusation that the U.S. has intervened in
Poland's affairs is baseless. The United States and the West in general are
not seeking to impose any political formula in Poland. The West is simply
trying to make clear that the way out of Poland's crisis is an end to
repression, the release of politicial prisioners, and the establishment of a
genuine internal dialogue.
This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union's efforts to turn back the
reform process through its support of the imposition of martial law and the
stationing of large numbers of Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet Union
seems uninterested in negotiation and compromise, rather its interest is in
imposing its own solution on Poland.
-- According to Reuters,a May 3 Zolnierz Wolnoscsci article charged that
"intelligence agents were masquerading in Poland as Western journalists"
and that "certain publications owned or inspired by the CIA are involved
in espionage and subversive activities." The publications attacked by the
article as "past or present instruments" of the CIA were The Christian
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Science Monitor, Time-Life Incorporated, the Rome Daily American, and U.S.
Armed Forces Radio in West Berlin. The article also included another of
its regular attacks on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Reuters said
that the article attempted to link U.S. intelligence circles to the
current unrest in Poland by implying that Newsweek's correspondent in
Gdansk had something to do with that city becomming the center of the 1980
strikes. On May 6, Pravda printed a TASS dispatch summarizing this
article.
-- On May 3 Radio Moscow's Polish Service also attacked the Western media,
saying that in Western accounts of events in Poland "events and facts are
twisted and falsified beyond measure."
-- A Radio Moscow Polish Service commentary on May 4 charged that "In the
text of anti-Polish psychological war unleased over the waves by the NATO
ideological subversion staffs, one of the main roles is played by Radio
Free Europe. . . .Gross provocations and subversive moves are the most
characteristic methods of Radio Free Europe. . . .In implementing the
guidelines of its CIA bosses, Radio Free Europe is literally jumping out
of its skin, striving to torpedo the process of normalization of life in
Poland."
Allegations that the Western press is run by the CIA frequently appear in the
Soviet media. All media in the Soviet Union are government owned and
.controlled.' Their staffs routinely are saturated with intelligence agents,
and the Soviets charge that our media operates the same way. In fact none of
the media cited above is "owned or inspired by the CIA". Most are independent
privately-owned organizations: one exists for the entertainment of U.S. troops
in Germany, and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are funded and run by the
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semi-governmental Board for International Broadcasting.
In the May 6 Pravda article cited above, the Soviets charge the Unite-l?states
and the West with exacerbating the situation in Poland to deflect
international attention from our role in the Falkland Islands. The fact that
Poland has reappeared on the front pages of Western newspapers does not please
the Soviet Union and they have lashed out at the journals carrying the news
with the usual accusations that they are tools of the CIA and carry inaccurate
% stories. This is in sharp-contrast to their-own use of Western sources when
it suits Soviet interests. Of course, Soviet attacks on Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty are constant, since they broadcast objective news accounts of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet. Union into those countries where the media are
government contolled.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 10, 1982
Soviets Accuse U.S. Of Militarizing Outer Space
Recently the Soviet media has rehashed and expanded its charges about U.S.
militarization of space. Examples of these accusations follow.
- Sovetskaya Rossiya on March 20 attacked American television networks (ABC
and NBC) for claiming that the Soviet Union has a 'killer satellite' in
orbit designed to destroy U.S. satellites, and that next year the Soviets
will "'be putting laser weapons into space'." According to Sovetskaya
Rossiya, "These fantasies are a far cry from reality. It is the United
States, not the USSR, which is starting an arms race in space." While the
Pentagon is primarily responsible for this "sordid propaganda ploy",
according to the article, the Heritage Foundation and Joseph Coors are
also involved.
The article continued by charging that the "flight program of the reusable
shuttles is geared to militarist plans." Finally, the article accused the
U.S. of "doing its utmost to block any measures being taken to prevent the
militarization of space."
In fact, the Soviet Union is the primary villain in the militarization of
space. As stated in October 1981 by Kenneth Adelman (U.S. Deputy
Representative to the United Nations), the Soviets launched the propaganda
campaign, not the U.S. Ambassador Adelman said (in a United Nations First
Committee meeting) that the Soviet accusations about U.S. militarization of
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space were untrue, and regreted that the Soviet Union continued its
"rhetorical claims" that the U.S. was militarizing outer space, particularly
since they were made by "the only country
to engage in such practices."
Soviet implications that the space shuttle is primarily a military vehicle are
patently untrue. The bulk of the shuttles' flights will carry civilian
payloads, including those of foreign nations. As Secretary of Defense
Weinberger said in April 1981 on NBC's Today, "it has some military
applications but these are really secondary to the civilian aspects. . ."
- Pravda on April 18 charged that "The delirious ideas of the 'Pentagon's
Thinkers' outdo the most unrestrained play of science fiction writers'
imagination. According to Pravda's correspondent, an article in the Naval
War College Review, written by two Air Force officers said that, "'the
United States must start creating new units in its armed forces -- space
troops. Their mission is to restore the era of American nuclear
superiourity of the fifties'."
This quotation, if accurate, is only the recommendation of two mid-level
officers, and certainly not U.S. Government policy.
The Pravda article also alleged that Aviation Week and Space Technology
writes that, in?preparation for a "future space war", "The Pentagon. . .is
now developing a 'new weapon' which will alter 'the balance of power' in
the world. . . .According to the journal, it is a question of a
multimillion dollar program to set up space stations circling the eart
equipped with laser weapons."
The Soviet Union has been engaging in the development*(admittedly) and
possible deployment of space weapons, and so the Department of Defense is
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studying the practicality of many types of systems to be used for defensive
purr'ses. The use of space by the U.S. to support defense programs is fully
consistent with our obligations to the 1967 U.N. Treaty.
As usual,. the Soviets accuse the U.S. of doing what they themselves are
engaged in, and then self-righteously castigate us for falsely accusing them
of these same activities.
Several of these articles employed a favorite, and frequently used, Soviet
propaganda tactic; that is, using quotations from respected Western sources
to bolster their position on any subject. One characteristic of this method
(the Naval War College Review citation) is to infer that the views of
individuals are in fact government policy. Another characteristic (Aviation
Week and Space Technology) is to omit the full bibliographic citation of the
piece quoted from, so that it is almost impossible to go to the original
sources and check their actual content.
Soviet media attacks on the militarization of space can be expected any time
there is activity in the U.S. space program. The examples discussed above
almost certainly result of the third flight of the shuttle "Columbia" in
March. Posts can expect to see more such charges with the next flight of the
space shuttle.
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 7, 1982
Soviets Charge That U.S. Naval Exercises Are Prelude to Intervention
The U.S. Navy's current training exercises in the Caribbean, Ocean Venture
1982, have been the target of a number of recent attacks in the Soviet and
Soviet-influenced media. Examples of these charges follow.
- Moscow Domestic Radio service (April 29) attacked Ocean Venture '82 as a
demonstration that the U.S.- is "continuing a course of escalating
hostility toward Cuba, of intimidating the peoples of Nicaragua, Grenada,
El'Salvador, Guatemala and other Central American and Caribbean states
with the threat of a possible invasion." The article continued to charge
that the U.S. "under the cover of talk about a Soviet-Cuban threat . .
is whipping up a militarist psychosis in the region, seeking to create
more favorable conditions to conduct military actions, including
intervention against Central American States." Finally, the broadcast
alleged that the U.S. was holding the maneuvers in order to somehow
?distrupt negotiations between Cuba and Nicaragua aimed at "normalizing the
situation in Central America." Similar accusations were carried the same
i:.., day by Havanna Domestic Radio and Radio Hanoi's English service.
- TASS English on May 4 charged that "U.S. militarists have committed a
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Is
Hungary's Nepszabadsag (May 4) repeated Cuban accusations about Ocean
Venture '82, charging that "the real goal of the present military exercise
is to threaten the Cuban people as well as other progressive movements in
the area."
- Pravda's May 5 edition accused the U.S. of using Ocean Venture '82 "to
exacerbate relations with the first socialist state in the Western
Hemisphere, heightening tension throughout the Caribbean Basin."
- Izvestiya (May 5) charged that Ocean Venture '82's maneuvers ("among the
largest the Pentagon has ever carried out in the Caribbean") "have an
overall aggressive character," and that "their goal is to intimidate the
countries of the Caribbean with military might."
fresh blatant provocation against socialist Cuba," and that "Washington's
fresh attempt to intimidate Cuba with a demonstration of force has caused
indignation among Cuban people."
Ocean Venture '82 is a regularly scheduled yearly Atlantic command naval and
amphibious exercise, which is traditionally held in the Spring in
international waters in same area as this year's exercise. The objective of
Ocean Venture 'is to insure that U.S. Naval forces are in a high state of
readiness to defend U.S. interests in the region. It is a training exercise,
not preparation for aggressive action against anybody or anything, certainly
not for invasion of either Cuba or Nicaragua.
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- Prior to the commencement of Ocean Venture '82 (but after its April 5
announcement), a number of accusations about U.S. intentions in Central
America appeared in Pravda, TASS, Managua Domestic Radio, and Havanna
Domestic Radio.
These attacks, charging that the U.S. was preparing to invade various leftist
countries in the area, seem designed to prepare their Central American
audiences for later accusations about Ocean Venture '82.
It is obvious that Soviet and Soviet-influenced madia have launched one of
their usual propaganda campaigns aimed at maligning military exercises in
which the U.S. participates. The current attack on Ocean Venture '82 in
Central America is simliar to that aimed*at Operation Team Spirit in South
Korea. Posts should expect to see similar propaganda campaigns whenever and
wherever U.S. military forces conduct routine training exercises.
1A. -ev"
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SOVIETS CHARGE TFAT U.S. IS USING FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS
'10 "ST
OUR POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA
May 5, 1982
As the intensity of the Falkland Islands crisis heightened, the Soviet media
moved from moderately balanced reporting of the crisis to criticism of British
actions in the region, and finally expanded their reporting to concentrate on
attacking the role and motives of the U.S. during the crisis. Examples of
Soviet charges against the U.S. follow.
- TASS English on April 5 charged that the British forcibly took the
Falklands from Argentina in 1833. The article also alleged that'the Daily
Mail said that the U.S. "gave Britain the green light for a military
action against Argentina." The charge that the U.S. gave Britain a"green
light" was repeated on April 6 in Pravda and on April 15 by Radio Moscow's
Spanish to Latin America service.
The United Kingdom is a soverign nation and does not ask the U.S. for
permission to act or for approval of it actions.
- TASS International Russian reported April 18 that "Although Washington is
trying to present its Secretary of State in the role of 'peacemaker', in
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actual fact his so-called 'efforts to settle the conflict' amount to
attempts to foist on the Argentinian side the British variation of
settling the conflict. At the same time he is trying to frighten Buenos
Aires with the threat that otherwise Washington will openly side with
Britain."
In fact, the U.S. offered its good offices to both parties, and Secretary Haig
visited both London and Buenos Aires several times in an attempt to resolve
the dispute peacefully. In addition, the United States "strongly supports"
United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 (adopted April 3), which calls
for the immediate cessation of hostilities, immediate withdrawal of Argentine
forces from the Falklands, and an effort by both parties to seek a diplomatic
solution to resolve their difficulties.
Moscow Radio Peace and Progress (Spanish to Latin America) asserted (April
16) that the "final objective of Washington's mediation mission" is the
plan to establish a U.S. military base on the islands in order to "have
the Latin American Southern Cone and especially Argentina within its
scope."
- TASS English April 20 charged that "the true purpose of the U.S.
diplomatic efforts is to use those islands in the southern Atlantic for
the advance deployment of the U.S. and NATO forces in the region."
- According the TASS (English, April 27), the reason the U.S. is so
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interested in the crisis is the strategic importance of the islands, since
the Falklands are "the major link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
the Panama Canal, . . . a region that becomes increasingly troublesome to
the major. NAM power, the United States."
Obviously these charges are fabrications. Secretary Flaig's mediation efforts
were prompted solely by the desire to avoid armed confrontation between two
governments which are friendly to the United States. -The charge that we are
interested in establishing a military base on the Falklands is ridiculous.
Soviet media attacks (prior to May 1) focused primarily on these major themes,
which charge that our peace keeping efforts are.merely a cover for attempts to
establish a military presence in the South Atlantic, and accuse the U.S. of
giving the British "the green light" to attack the Argentinians. In fact, the
Soviet media are accusing the United States of employing the Soviets' own
strategy, which is to use the crisis to improve the Soviet Union's position in
the area. By siding with the Argentines, the Soviets may hope to improve
their image in, and relations with, rightist Latin American countries, and
thus alleviate sane of these countries' suspicion of the Soviets, now suspect
as the supporter of. leftist revolutionaries in the region.
%4 1&,~W
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SOVIET DISTORTIONS AND FABRICATIONS
May 3, 1982
Soviets and North Koreans Attack U.S. Policy Toward Korea and Japan
In recent weeks, Soviet and North Korean media have carried a number of
vituperative attacks on U.S. relations with South Korea and Japan. These were
sparked by Secretary Weinberger's trip to the Far East to lead the U.S.
'delegation to the 14th Annual U.S.-R.O.K. Security Consultative Meeting,
(March 30 and 31) and by the joint military exercise "Team Spirit 1982," held
in Korea February through April 1982. A few examples of these attacks are
listed below.
- On March 31 the purportedly clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party
for Reunification (actually based in North Korea) broadcast to South Korea
the abominable charge that the U.S. "will not hesitate to annihilate our
.people by triggering a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula."
- On April 1 a Nodong Sinmun (official North Korean Communist Party
newspaper) article attacked "Team Spirit 1982" as "not a mere exercise but
an exercise for a war of aggression." The article continued to charge
that the U.S. "imperialists" are scheming to maintain our "last Asian
colony" and "using it'-ad a 'base, expand its sphere of influence" in the
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- Nodong Sinmun on April 8 charged that the "extremely provocative war
exercise called 'Team Spirit 1982"' (which turned "South Korea into a war
zone closely resembling a real war") and the concurrent attendence of
Secretary Weinberger and other. top U.S. military leaders ("those who plan
and execute U.S. war policy") at the 14th Annual Security Consultative
Meeting showed that the "U.S. imperialists" regarded the meetings as very
important in implementing our "policy for invading Korea."
Pravda in Russian on April 8 charged that the Meeting's Communique
contained statements which "attest. that Washington intends to perpetuate -
.the occupation of South Korea, to turn it into its military-strategic
bridgehead in the region and to prevent the'country's unification."
These joint military exercises and the Consultative Meetings are regularly
scheduled annual occurances. Both are-regularly the focus of concerted and
coordiated Soviet and North Korean media attacks.
"Team Spirt 1982" was the latest in this series'of joint (U.S.-R.O.K.)
military exercises. The only extraordinary thing about these particular
exercises was that the North Koreans were invited, but declined, to send
The Communique of the Security Consultative Meeting reaffirmed the U.S.'
commitment-'to aid South Korea in its defense, while stressing that "it is
essential for the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula to
ease tension and create an atmosphere for national reconciliation through
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dialogue between the South-and the North of Korea. This is a long way from
the "policy for invading Korea" as charged by the Soviets.
Prior to his attendence at the meetings in Seoul, Secretary Weinberger visited
Japan., Soviet media used his visit to harp on their recurring allegations
that the U.S. is exterting unrelenting pressure on the Japanese in a variety
of spheres. A few examples follow.
TASS English on April 5 alleged that Secretary Weinberger warned Japan
that "it would not avoid U.S. retaliation if it did not assume a heavier
burden of war preparation in the region." The item continued to charge
that this was yet another example of "the pressure constantly exterted by
Washington on Tokyo in the political, economic and military fields."
- Moscow Domestic Radio on April 9 charged that the U.S. uses its military
presence in South Korea as "a forward post in continental Asia--a possible
bridgehead." (Pravda used very similar language in its April 8 edition.)
According to the program, this presence in Korea allows us to keep tension
in the area at a very high level and gives us "a pretext for exerting
pressure on Japan.... to force the Japanese" to increase their military
spending, an increase "persistently asked for" by Secretary Weinberger
during his visit to Japan.
Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge, in his prepared statement for the
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House Foreign Affairs Committee (March 1, 1982), said that the U.S. and Japan
have moved toward what has been termed "a productive partnership" and that our
relationship is "now approaching equilibrium" and that "the patron-client
relationship of the post-war period has largely faded away."
In the same statement Assistant Secretary Holdridge said that:
"In the defense area, our objective is an equitable sharing of roles
and missions, taking into account Japan's unique constitutional and
political constraints. Within this framework, we are agreed that
Japan should assume primary responsibility for its local defense,"
"require increased outlays in the years ahead....We recognize that
the ultimate decision will be made by Japan in its own national
While. these examples of Soviet and North Korean attacks on U.S. policy in
Korea and Japan are quite localized (only one is in English), they are good
examples of the types of propaganda assaults leveled against any kind of
military exercises in which U.S. military forces participate, and of the
visicious media attacks which accompany and follow foreign visits by senior
U.S. officials.
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APRIL 30, 1982
Soviet Media Attacks USICA Officers
Scurrilous personal attacks on USICA officers, including the Director, are
showing up with increasing frequency in the Soviets' disinformation campaign.
A close look at some recent Soviet statements shows how vicious this slander
campaign has become.
- On April 19 an Izvestiya article attacked the Agency, the VOA and John
Hughes. (TASS English carried excerpts of the unsigned article.) The
article ostensibly discussed the Director's National Press Club address;
however, it expanded its scope to assail Agency, and particularly VOA,
operations. Among the article's charges are: that the Agency's FY83
budget is thirty percent higher than that of FY82 of which a sizable
amount will go to "the heavy artillery of ICA--the Voice of America;"
that the Agency's "new broom" (Director Wick) is attempting to "sweep
out," conducting in the editorial offices of VOA, "a campaign to
'strengthen the?cadreswith the resulting vacancies being filled by
"specialists, like the rabid anti-communist and master of disinformation
J. Hughes;" that the Agency will not achieve, its goal of changing the
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Izvestiya (March 26) accused Vienna 10 Michael Bennett of "crude pressure"
on the government and people of Austria. Bennett sent a letter (in
English) to the editor of Neue Zeit (Graz Socialist Party Daily), in which
he protested an article on U.S. policy regarding Poland. Bennett's letter
was published by Neue Zeit, followed by an editorial comment expressing
exacerbate) international tensions. We do not disseminate propaganda, and no
VOA or Agency staffer has been replaced for the reasons cited by the Soviets.
USICA's FY 82 budget request was $561.4 million and the request for FY83.is
$640 million, a 14 percent not 30 percent increase. James Conkling resigned
his position as Director of the VOA for personal. reasons, so that he could
spend more time with his family in California. ,He was replaced by John
Hughes, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and formed editor of the Christian
Science Monitor. As mentioned-above USICA and VOA are concerned with
providing foreign audiences with the truth, an activity which cannot possibly
be construed as interference in the affairs of other countries.
the belief that "foreign representatives should use the language of their
host country," but making no comments on the letter's content. Izvestiya
sumarized and criticized Bennett's letter and printed the editorial note,
'?n an attempt to depict it as a blatant example of a U.S. attempt to
pressure" the Austrians.
- Pravda (March 27) attacked Barcelona BPAO John Barton for a letter he
wrote to the director of a local film society, protesting its sponsorship
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attitude of Western Europeans by increasing the number of "worthless
farces sent over the airways. The article concludes its assault on the
Agency with this statement: "nevertheless, the 'new broom' continues to
sweep in the direction of further exacerbation of tension, not its
- On April 8, Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow city newspaper) attacked Director
Wick, USICA and Project Truth in a lengthy article, which presented a
review of old calumnies against the Director and the Agency. The article
charges: that the Reagan.administration came to power determined to make
U.S. propaganda "extremely aggressive;" that Director Wick'.s first task
was to make USICA the "spearhead" of this effort; that VOA staffers not
sufficiently aggressive were replaced by those capable of."intensifying
malicious anti-Soviet propaganda;" and that-Project Truth culminates the
reorientation of the VOA and USICA, whose arsenal consists of "lies,
slander, disinformation and political provocation."
TASS international Russian Service (March 24) charged that the change in
leadership at VOA "is a victory for ultra rightwing political circles" who
have succeeded in their goal of securing the replacement of James Conkling
("a spineless liberal") for not carrying out the propaganda directives of
the Reagan administration. The 'change means that the VOA will continue
its alleged "course of sharply stepping up the psychological warfare," as
well is, its interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
USICA's goal, and that of Project Truth, is to tell the truth about the U.S.
and about the U.S. Government's policies, in an attempt to lessen (not
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of a Soviet film festival. The article quotes from Barton's letter, which
refers to Soviet human rights violations in Poland (and elsewhere) and
from the response of the Mayor of Barcelona. The Mayor's response was.a
published tirade accusing the U.S. of human rights violations in'a number
of countries, including support of Franco in Spain. The response also
attacked Barton for interference in the affairs of "countries and cities
which are not part of America, at least formally."
Both Mr. Bennett and Mr. Barton did what any citizen of democratic countries
(such as Austria and Spain) can do, which is to write a letter disagreeing
with an action taken by a local institution. Writing letters certainly cannot
be construed as "crude pressure" or interference in the affairs of other
t countries.
While the Soviets have in the past ridiculed USICZA officers, the number of
such charges against USICA have increased significantly recently. The
virulance of the attacks seems to reflect increasing Soviet apprehension over
the potential effectiveness of US public information activities.
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t}
SOVIET DISTORTIOtdS AND FABRICATIONS .
APRIL 28, 1982
Soviets Charge That the U.S. Is Using Chemical/'Biological Warfare (CBW)
Soviet canards about U.S. chemicdl weapons buildup/use have proliferated
recently. These accusations have surfaced in a number of countries and accuse
the U.S. of CBW activities throughout the world. Listed below are some recent
examples.
TASS (March 23) charges that U.S.-made ammunition "stuffed with toxins" is
being used by the Salvadoran junta.
This accusation is nonsense and should be treated as. such.
- Literaturnaya Gazeta (March 24) continues and expands its scurrilous
attack on the University of Maryland's Lahore Malaria Research Center.
The article adds to previous accusations more references to the CIA
including one to an'alleged CIA memorandum on ways of maintaining CBW
arsenals despite Presidential directives. USICA 7048-U completely refutes
this accusation.
The Research Center, an established and respected institution, has for 21
years conducted serious scientific and medical research pn malaria and has
been a leader in?efforts to eradicate the disease. The Center has no
connection with the CIA and is not engaged in CBW activities.
y.,.a v . .. ..J. . ..... r.. ..?..r y.w.. .... ~..~ v .. N.: .,..r.. +...w.~~?i.... ??t ... ~,ql-.~... fr.a ~....N . ..r Y.,~r'~l.n .?.fY.Y.Mf..r r.MAr?'w...i w..... -
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tz."c sr.i'.?a's Rome correspondent, in a March 27 article, accuses the U.S. of
pi. pac ng for chemical warfare in Europe, focusing on the deployment of
An-erican chemical warheads in Europe, particularly in. Italy. The article
al?~o rites 3 January 16 report in the Turin paper La Stampa (center/left
orientation) allegedly discussing increased CBW activity in the U.S.
The U.S., as a signatory of the 1972 Convention on'CBW, has not deployed or
ever used lethal CBW weapons anywhere in the world, whereas it is clear from
evidence made public that the Soviet Union has made offensive use of these
weapons in Aghanistan and Southeast Asia. This attack is obviously an attempt
to divert attention from the Soviets' own CBW activities in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan and from their extensive training of their own troops in the art
of chemical warfare. The Soviet Union has a chemical warfare force of 60,000-
troops which can use various types of chemical agents, and every Soviet
division in Central Europe is equiped with elaborate anti-CBW equipment. The
U.S. will resume chemical weapons production in the U.S., focusing on better
and safer packaging of established weapons and on replacement of obsolescent
chemical weapons stores. The U.S. has decided that it must begin this
replacement production only because the.Soviet Union refused to match our 1969.
unilateral decision to stop such research, and to serve as a deterrent to
Soviet use of their own CBW supplies, which have greatly increased since 1969.
Soviets Claim That U.S. Accusations of Soviet Use of CBW Are Lies
Soviet and other Communist Bloc accusations that the U.S. is lying when we
present evidence of Soviet CBW use have greatly intensified recently. The
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increased level of these attacks against the U.S. are clearly d(:s;.g'ed to
deflect public concern over mounting evidence that the Soviets'rre involved-in
CBW in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Below-is a recent exam.-ie. .
- The March 27 Izvestiva article mentioned above charges the U.S. of
fabricating stories about Soviet CBW to cover up our own efforts in this
area. However, as the article itself states, "The thief's custom of
covering his guilt by crying 'stop, thief' can apply to others as well."
The U.S. has reported incidents of suspected CBW use which have been brought
to our attention by refugees in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and those which
have been verified by scientific analysis. There has been no fabrication of
stories about Soviet CBW use to cover up our own, since, as mentioned above,
the U.S. has not used CBW. If anything the situation is the reverse, with the
Soviets accusing us to divert attention from their own CBW activities.
While most of the specific charges of U.S. CBW activity are patently
'ludicrous, they can nevertheless have a cumulative effect. They are part of a
pattern of disinformation against the U.S., aimed at undermining world
confidence in the U.S.' commitment to the 1972 Convention on CBW and at
distracting attention from Soviet CBW activities. This effort is serious and
posts should be alert to respond to-all charges as appropriate. 'It is likely
that this Soviet campaign will be sustained and vicious.
Drafted by:PGM/G:KRTurpin
F~
Clearance:PG~i/urber
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Dateline America
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No. 13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
American Families Host Foreign Students
U.S. Dairy Exports Show Substantial Increase
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Americans Show Volunteer Spirit
U.S. Schools Focus on Microelectronics
Focus on the Individual
(U.S. Agency for International Development)
2. U.S. JOB-PLACEMENT PROGRAM A SUCCESS .............................. 300 words
By J. Frank Diggs, from U.S. News & World Report
3. OIL IMPORTS DROP AS U.S. CUTS ENERGY USE .......................... 300 words
By Robert Ortner and David C. Lund
(From U.S. Department of Commerce)
4. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY ..................................... 500 words
By Ian M. Ross, from New Jersey Bell
5. LAND IS RETURNED To INDIANS IN U.S ................................ 650 words
By Al Pessin (USICA)
(Photo 82-777)
6. NEW YORK: THE 'EMPIRE STATE' ...................................... 350 words
(Photos 82-1233c, 77-1795, 78-3802)
7. CALIFORNIA'S LIFE-SAVING SKYWAY PATROLS ........................... 400 words
By Hal Klopper, from Helistop
(Photo 82-159)
8. USING NATURE TO FIGHT INSECTS ... ........ 350 words
By Wayne Hyde (USICA)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Foreign-Born Americans: Trend Reversed
(U.S. Bureau of the Census)
U.S. Farmers Focus on Exports
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
More Working Mothers
(U.S. Department of Commerce)
U.S. Firm Funds Cancer Research
Bicentennial of U.S. Constitution
(U.S. Supreme Court)
Work Habits Seen Likely to Change
2. IN OHIO-BASED FIRM, IT'S VOLUNTEERS BY THE HUNDREDS .......... 55O words
(From NAB Clearinghouse Showcase)
(Photo 82-903)
3. WASHINGTON: AMERICA'S 'EVERGREEN STATE' ......................250 words
(Photos 77-3202c, 72-4965c, 77-3171c)
4. EXXON CELEBRATES 100 YEARS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION ..............400 words
By C.C. Garvin, Jr., from The Lamp
5. GOODBYE BLACKBOARDS, HELLO COMPUTERS .........................450 words
By Donn Barrett (USICA)
(Photo 82-826)
6. PREFAB HOUSING EXPANDS IN U.S ................................300 words
(From U.S. Department of Commerce)
7. AMERICA'S LAKE TAHOE; HIGH COUNTRY WINTER ....................600 words
By Mark Miller, from Vista/USA
'(Photo 81-2911c)
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A news and feature service of the international Communication Agency
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
New Early Warning Forecasting System
(U.S. Department of Commerce)
U.S. Winning War on Childhood Diseases
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
Space Shuttle Uses 'Off-the-Shelf' Films
U.S. Firm Gives Land to Public
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Florida Reports Foreign Trade Record
2. LEADING ENERGY RESEARCH ......................................350 words
By Jim Bapis, from University of Utah Review ,
PRIVATE SUPPORT EYED FOR STATUE OF LIBERTY .................. 250 words
(From U.S. Department of the Interior)
(Photo 67-2654)
4. FACTORY FARMING ..............................................650 words
(From The Economist)
5.
ALASKA: 'THE LAST FRONTIER' ..................................300 words
(Photos 75-2439, 81-2929c)
6. CALIFORNIA'S LIGHTHOUSE HOSTELS ..............................500 words
tiers
By Larry Wood, from Sea Frontiers
(Photo 81-3553)
7. FRANCHISING'S NEW DIRECTIONS .................................250 words
(From U.S. Department-of Commerce)
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No. 10
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
American Giving Sets Record
U.S. Energy Achievements
(U.S. Department of Energy)
U.S. to Host World Theater Festival
New Honor for Bob Hope
U.S. Gains Farms
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
2. U.S. PROJECT ORBIS BATTLES EYE DISEASE OVERSEAS .............450 words
(Photo 82-1583c)
3.
U.S. CITIES, BUSINESS JOIN TO PROVIDE SUMMER JOBS ........... 650 words
(From NAB Clearinghouse Showcase)
(Photo 82- 21
4. MAINE: THE STATE WHERE INDUSTRY AND WILDERNESS COEXIST...... 300 words
(Photos 73-2099c, 75-1802c)
5. COMPUTERS PINPOINT BAD WEATHER .. ...........................300 words
By Laurent Belsie, from The Christian Science Monitor
6. GENE TRANSFER ADVANCE: A STEP CLOSER TO GENE THERAPY? ....... 350 words
(From U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
7. TEEN-AGE UNITED NATIONS........................ ..............550 words
By Jonathan Kern (USICA)
8. THE LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN CHOCOLATE KING .................. 600 words
(From Grit)
(Photo-82-176)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Americans Are Living Longer
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
Gift to Boost Energy Research
Housing Assistance for Elderly and Handicapped Americans
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development)
Everyday Life in American Art
(The Smithsonian News Service)
(Photos 82-151, 82-152)
U.S. Workforce Up 30.6% Since 1970
2. PETER GRACE: 'ONE STEP AHEAD' .................................. 450 words
By Donn Barrett (USICA)
(Photos 82-1803, 82-1804)
3. 3-D IMAGES OF HUMAN ANATOMY .................................... 550 words
From University of Utah Review
(Photo -9-2-871)
4. LOUIS LYONS: AMERICAN JOURNALIST ............................... 250 words
By Van Seropian (USICA)
(Photo 82-227)
5. OVERSEAS MARKETS EYED FOR VERMONT MAPLE SUGAR .................. 300 words
(Photo 82-902)
6. COACH: LEARN FIRST, THEN RUN ................................... 400 words
By Mickey Cioffi, from Grit
(Photo 82-156)
7. VOLUNTEERS MAINTAIN AMERICA'S FORESTS .......................... 220 words
From U.S. Department of Agriculture
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No. 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
The American Immigration Record
(U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service)
Mississippi City to Host International Ballet Competition
AID Official on Key to Growth
(U.S. Agency for International Development)
Practical Home Electronics
Progress in Cancer Control
2. THOSE DETERMINED ENTREPRENEURS ......................................900 words
By Judith B. Gardner, from U.S. News & World Report
(Photos 82-803, 82-804, 82- 05)
3. GUIDELINES FOR GIVING ...............................................800 words
By C.C. Garvin, Jr., from The Lamp
4. WASHINGTON'S TOUCH-AND-FEEL MUSEUM ..................................850 words
By Wesley Ann Godard (USICA)
(Photo 82-319)
NEW TOOTHLESS GEAR HELD ENERGY SAVER ................................400 words
By Ripley Watson, from The Journal of Commerce
(Photos 82-1094, 82-109
6. U.S. SCIENTIST CREATES 'CLEANUP' MICROBE .............................300 words
(Photo 82-147)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Deaf Attorney Argues Case Before U.S. Supreme Court
(with Photo 82-1160)
U.S. Progress Against Inflation
Weeds Forecast Crop Survival
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Levitating Trains
A Better Artificial Knee
The Story of the Mississippi
2. VIVA FOSTER GRANDPARENTS! ....................... .............. ...1,100 words
By Nancy Reagan, from The Saturday Evening Post
(Photo 82-278)
3. DISNEY EXPOSITION GIVES $800-MILLION PEEK AT TOMORROW ............. 300 words
By Ron Scherer, from The Christian Science Monitor
(Photos 82-1192, 82-1-1-947
4. AMERICAN INDIAN ART TODAY............. ............................ 900 words
By Erica Benis (USICA)
(Photos 82-899, 82-900)
5. AMERICAN FARM WOMEN TAKE ON NEW ROLES ............................. 300 words
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture)
6. SKYLIGHTS BRIGHTEN AMERICA'S URBAN LANDSCAPE....... ............... 900 words
(From Rohm and Haas Reporter)
(Photos 81-15 2, 81-1543)
7. FILM DIRECTOR GIVEN TOP AWARD AT HOLLYWOOD GALA ................... 400 words
By Ray Kabaker (USICA)
(Photo 82-153)
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No. 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
FEATURE BRIM
U.S. Is Critical Trading Partner
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Americans Cut Energy Use
(U.S. Department of Energy)
U.S. Space Orbiters Get Better Protection
(U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
The Talking Encyclopedia
2.
CABLE TV NEWS AROUND THE CLOCK .......................................
400 words
(Photo 82-1098)
3.
NEW LASER ADVANCES BRAIN SURGERY IN U.S ..............................
400 words
4.
MASTER OF NEW ENGLAND AMERICANA .................. ....................1,000 words
By Susan E. Meyer, from Modern Maturity (Photos 82-1100
and 82-1101)
5.
CHICKS VACCINATED THROUGH EGGSHELLS ..................................
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture) (Photos 82-1141 and 82-1142)
550 words
6.
TEACHING STUDENTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ..................... ............:
(From Honeywell Information Systems) (Photo 82-189)
650 words
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No. 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Researchers Designing Solar Powered Greenhouse
Washington Exhibition to Spotlight the Cowboy
America Attracted 49 Million Immigrants
(U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service)
U.S. Schedules Major Study of Diabetes
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
Major Arts Festival Set in Miami
Trade and the U.S. Economy
(U.S. Department of the Treasury)
2.
'THE MOST UNSORDID ACT IN HISTORY' -- (Picture Story)
(Photos 49-1259, 50-11399, 67-1393, 67-1394)
3.
U.S. ATTRACTS RECORD NUMBER OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS ....................
By Jim Bencivenga, from The Christian Science Monitor (Photo 82-364)
4OO.words
4.
KODAK CLAIMS MAJOR ADVANCE IN PICTURE-TAKING ........................
250 words
(Photos 82-275, 82-276)
5.
BRINGING AMERICANS TOGETHER .........................................
By Marvin Stone, from U.S. News & World Report
600 words
6.
A NEW JOB MARKET ....................................................
By Linda Cashdan (USICA) -- (Photo 82-807)
DISABLED TACKLE THE 'IMPOSSIBLE' ....................................
By Caroline Smith, from The President's Committee on
Employment of the Handicapped)
600 words
700 words
8.
BUILDING ON THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION ............................. 1,000 words
By Landrum R. Bolling, from The Saturday Evening Post (Photo 82-183)
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No. 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Bell Laboratories: At the Cutting Edge (with photo 82-808c)
Talking Encyclopedia Aids Blind Youngsters
(U.S. Department of Education)
U.S. Key Food Producer
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Prisoner Rehabilitation Program
2. 21 NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN 1982 WORLD'S FAIR IN U.S ................. 400 words
By Michael J. Bandler (USICA) (Photo 82-277)
3. WILLIAMSBURG'S REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE ................................ 1,000 words
By Peggy Stanton, from The Saturday Evening Post
(Photos 69-2006, 81-466, 81- 7
4. HONORING VOLUNTEERS .................................................. 450 words
By Sandra Arnoult, from The Montgomery Journal
(Photos 82-184, 82-185)
5. U.S. SCIENTISTS SEEK CUT IN FOOD MARKETING COSTS .................... 600 words
(From U.S. Department of Agriculture)
6. THE LEIGACY OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY ....................................... 750 words
By Alan Silverman (USICA) (Photo 52-?614)
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amerli
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
Electric Autos in World's Fair City
Native American Center for the Living Arts
Country Vacations for City Youngsters
More Food Per Acre
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
2. SPACE SHUTTLE LABORATORY ATTRACTS UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ...... 800 words
By Kim McDonald, from The Chronicle of Higher Education (Photo: 82-605)
3. I.M. PEI, AN ARCHITECTURAL REVOLUTIONARY ...................500 words
From Grit (Photos: 76-316, 78-1486)
4. REDUCING HEART ATTACK DAMAGE ...............................400 words
By Laszlo Dosa, USICA
5. U.S. OFFICIAL TESTIFIES ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES ..............250 words
Fran U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
6. SODA ASH GALORE! ...........................................320 words
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photo: 82-320)
7. CULTURE IS-GOOD BUSINESS (picture story)
By Sandy Greenberg, USICA (Photos: 81--1642c, 81-1645c, 81-1668c)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
World's Fair Display Highlights Technology
U.S. Farm Exports Go To 40 Countries
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Fish Farmers: Latest American Entrepreneurs
The Spirit of American Heroism (Photos: 82-279c, 82-280c)
2. SATELLITES REPAIRED IN SPACE ........... .. .. .. ...................... 500 words
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photos: 79-252, 81-2381c)
3. VOLUNTEERISM BOOSTS NIAGARA FALLS' SPIRIT .......................... 400 words
By Jim Merkel, from Grit (Photos: 82-89, 82-90)
4. OLDER ARTISTS CREATE AN 'AGELESS' BEAUTY.... o.--o-o ... - ... .1,250 words
By Margery Byers, The Smithsonian Institution
5.
(Photos: 82-202, 82-203, 82-802)
NEW TECHNOLOGY TESTED FOR DEEP-SEA RESEARCH ........................ 600 words
By Bob English, University of California News Office
6. RAGS TO RICHES ..................................................... 600 words
From Cincinnati Horizons
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No. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FEATURE BRIEFS
2. HELPING TO FEED THE WORLD........ .. .............? .......... 300 words
From U.S. Department of Agriculture (photo81-3885)
3. COLUMBIA'S TRIUMPH -- SPACE AGENCY GAINS NEW CONFIDENCE ............. 1,000 words
By Robert C. Cowen, from The Christian Science Monitor
4. AMERICA EMBRACES WINDPOWER......................................... 500 words
From U.S. Department of Commerce (Photo 78-1466)
5. BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN FINDS U.S. VISIT 'A REVELATION' .................1,100 words
By Khaba Mkhize, from Frontline Magazine
6. RELIGION IN AMERICA ..... ... .. ....................................1,400 words
By Frank P.L. Somerville, from The Baltimore Sun
7. U.S. INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM IN 25TH YEAR ........ ................1,350 words
From U.S. Department of Transportation (Photo 76-1716)
8. JAZZ: STAYIN' ALIVE .................................................1,500 words
By Michael Rozek, from American Way
9. PROJECT HOPE PROVIDES GLOBAL MEDICAL AID ............................ 950 words
By John Holway, USICA Staff Correspondent (Photo 68-577)
10. FARMING FOR THE FUTURE -- PGM/P "Mini" Picture Story #1447/DA
By Sandy Greenberg (4 color photographs)
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Films and Videotapes
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UPDATED 16 JUL 82
PGM/TD - EWALT
WANG FILE 0259d
MASTER TITLE FILE OF AGENCY VTR, FILM
PRODUCTION AND ACQUISITIONS (OCTOBER 1, 1981 THROUGH JULY 16, 1982)
AMERICAN FOLK FESTIVAL PROMOS
AMERICAN POETS
BENEFITS OF DATA PROCESSING AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS (Other Agency)
CBI-II, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
EMERSON CENTENNIAL
FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
GRADUATE STUDY IN THE U.S. (EDIT)
LET POLAND BE POLAND - U.S. NETWORK COVERAGE (Staff Use)
MSTISLAV ROSTROPOVICH
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF U.S.-KOREAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
POLAND 1981
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND ACTIVE MEASURES
THE FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIAN SECURITY
U.S. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICIES (FRANCOPHONE AFRICA)
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
U.S. PEACE INITIATIVES
U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA - PART II
AFGHANISTAN 1982: THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM CONTINUES
AFRICAN HERITAGE IN THE SMITHSONIAN
AMERICAN CINEMA: FILMS OF SOCIAL COMMENT - WITH E.G. MARSHALL
AMERICAN LABOR TODAY
CANCUN: A REPORT FROM THE SUMMIT
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
COLUMBIA - FLIGHT II
COLUMBIA FLIGHT III: PATHFINDER MISSION
COLUMBIA RETURNS TO SPACE
DISARMAMENT EXHIBITS: PART I - PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH
DISARMAMENT EXHIBITS: PART II - ERIC SEVAREID
DISARMAMENT EXHIBIT: PART III
DUMAS MALONE: A JOURNEY WITH MR. JEFFERSON
FOCUS: FOUR AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHERS
IMPACT: ECONOMIC REPORT - FOREIGN INVESTMENT, THE PRIVATE INTITIATIVE
JUMP
UP
LET
POLAND
BE POLAND
LET
POLAND
BE POLAND (Abbreviated version)
MORE
THAN
SURVIVAL
NEW
TRENDS
IN AFRO-AMERICAN MUSIC
PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE: JUNE 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON FOREIGN POLICY - 18 NOV 81 (NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
EUROPE)
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PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE VISITS WASHINGTON
PRESS CONFERENCE USA: DR. HOWARD PENNIMAN - APRIL 2, 1982
PRESS CONFERENCE USA: NICHOLAS VELIOTES
PROJECT TRUTH: USICA TELEVISION RESPONDS (Staff Use)
RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE
REAGAN WHITE HOUSE, THE
SOVIET MILITARY POWER
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: A CONVERSATION WITH DR. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
THEATRICAL SERIES ##38: ARTS AMERICA - JAKE GARDNER
THEATRICAL SERIES #39: ARTS AMERICA - PAT BIRCH
TOWARD THE CANCUN SUMMIT
U.S. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY - MARCH 1982
USICA - A YEAR OF NEW DIRECTIONS
VOYAGER II - RENDEZVOUS WITH SATURN
YELLOW RAIN
REQUESTED CURRENT EVENTS NEWSCLIPS INITIATED:
BALTIC DAY
COLOMBIAN TV CO-OP VTR TRANSFER
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS - SECY. OF STATE-DESIGNATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT MONGE'S OFFICIAL VISIT
PANEL DISCUSSION: "ARE WE LOSING THE THIRD WORLD" (Staff Use)
PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE, 3-11 JUN 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TV ADDRESS TO THE NATION - 29 APR 82
RETRIEVAL PROCESSING OF FOOTAGE - PRESIDENT & MRS. REAGAN'S VISIT TO FRANCE
SLIDE KIT UPDATE - SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ
STATEMENT FOR JORDAN TV
SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ'
U.S. VISIT OF PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE OF GUINEA
USICA DIRECTOR AND USUN AMBASSADORS AT SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH
VISIT OF HONDURAN PRESIDENT SUAZO
WRAP-UP ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO EUROPE 3-11 JUN 82
CURRENT EVENTS NEWSCLIPS COMPLETED:
A CONVERSATION WITH DATO SERI DR. MAHATHIR MOHAMAD, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA
A CONVERSATION WITH EDWARD SEAGA, PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA
A CONVERSATION WITH HERMAN NICKEL - U.S. AMB. TO SOUTH AFRICA
AN INTERVIEW WITH EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR ACDA FOR WELLINGTON
ATATURK CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION
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BETWEEN CONTINENTS/BETWEEN SEAS - EXHIBIT OF THE PRECOLUMBIAN ART OF COSTA RICA
BROCK AND BALDRIGE TESTIMONY AT TRADE RECIPROCITY HEARINGS
CHARLES WICK VISITS WITH PRESIDENT AND MRS MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES
CLEVELAND ORCHESTRA PROMO - PHILIPPINES
CONVERSATION WITH JOSEPH LUNS, SECRETARY GENERAL NATO
DILLERY INTERVIEW FOR TURKISH TV
GREECE'S DEPUTY SECY. OF DEFENSE MEETS WITH DEPUTY SECY. OF STATE STOESSEL
HERITAGE OF ISLAM EXHIBIT - HOUSTAN TEXAS
HERITAGE OF ISLAM EXHIBIT - SPECIAL VERSION FOR JORDAN
ICA - FIRST YEAR REVIEW (Staff Use)
INAUGURATION OF THE INDIAN CULTURE CENTER AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK
CITY
INTERVIEW WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESSEL, JR. ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD POLAND - 30 DEC 81
KONGO ART IN AMERICA
LOY KRATHONG CELEBRATION
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM'S MICHAEL ROCKEFELLER WING OF AFRICAN ART
NATIONAL BALLET OF ZAIRE, THE
1981 SLIDE KIT UPDATE
ORIENTAL INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN POETRY
PEACE CORPS RECRUITMENT STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR LORET RUPPE (Staff Use)
PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA - SATELLITE FEED
PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA - VISIT TO THE U.S.
PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSES THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND MEETING IN
WASHINGTON - 29 SEP 81
PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
PRESIDENT REAGAN PROCLAIMS AFGHANISTAN DAY MARCH 21, 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON CARIBBEAN BASIN POLICY
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (PRE-CANCUN
SUMMIT SPEECH - 15 OCT 81)
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO UN ON DISARMAMENT - 17 JUN 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EUREKA COLLEGE ADDRESS
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEMORIAL DAY ADDRESS - 31 MAY 82
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - MAY 13, 1982
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - 30 JUN 82
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE - MARCH 31, 1982
PRESIDENT'S NEW INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE INITIATIVE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE TO PERU AID ADMINISTRATOR MCPHERSON
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH EXCERPTS FOR BRAZILIAN ADVANCE TEAM
PROMINENT INDONESIAN RECEIVES HONORARY DEGREE IN OHIO
REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO BRITISH PARLIAMENT - 8 JUN 82
REPORT TO CONGRESS: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN
ROLAND MASSA - OPEN AND CLOSE STATEMENTS FOR COLUMBIAN TV
SECRETARY HAIG AND UNDERSECRETARY STOESSEL REPORT ON SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SECRETARY HAIG INTERVIEWED BY EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT
SECRETARY HAIG PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING VISIT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK - 5 FEB 82
SECRETARY HAIG STATEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION - 30 NOV 81 (SATELLITE FEED)
SECRETARY HAIG'S ADDRESS ON PEACE AND DETERRENCE - 6 APR 82
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SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON DEATH OF ANWAR SADAT
- 7 OCT 81
SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG INTERVIEW FOR BELGIUM TV
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA - FLIGHT IV (NASA SPACE REPORT)
SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #1: ASTRONAUT TRULY PROFILE
SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #2: ASTRONAUT ENGLE PROFILE
SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #3: REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM
SPACE SHUTTLE-2 ADVANCE CLIP #4: CREW TRAINING
SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #1 - PROFILE: ASTRONAUT JACK LOUSMA
SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #2 - PROFILE: ASTRONAUT CHARLES FULLERTON
SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #3 - ASTRONAUT TRAINING
SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #4 - PAYLOAD
SPACE SHUTTLE III - ADVANCE CLIP #5 - FLIGHT OVERVIEW
STOCK FOOTAGE TO SANTIAGO FOR SPECIAL ON U.S.
SWEARING IN OF HARRY G. BARNES, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO.INDIA
SWEARING-IN OF JOSEPH VERNER REED - AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO
SWEARING-IN OF MR. JOHN HUGHES AS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR -PGM (Staff Use)
THE LANDING OF COLUMBIA - IV
UN DAY CELEBRATION - MEXICAN PHILHARMONIC AT THE KENNEDY CENTER - 31 OCT 81
UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT MISSION TO AFRICA
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH PROMO FOR LATIN AMERICA
VIDEO DIALOGUE: UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER FOR ZDF-TV
VISIT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO THE U.S. - FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEEDS
VOA - 40TH ANNIVERSARY (Staff Use)
ZAMBIAN UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY DELEGATION VISITS WASHINGTON
FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN TV, INITIATED:
FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, D.O.S.
(Other Agency)
FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEEDS - VISIT OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO
FACILITATIVE SUPPORT FOR PEACE CORPS (Other Agency)
OFFICIAL VISIT OF TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER MOHAMED MZALI
FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN TV, COMPLETED:
"ACTION" FACILITATIVE - RSVP PROGRTAM PROMOS (Other Agency)
AUSTRIAN TV - ESCORTED FACILITATIVE: SPACE SPIN-OFFS
BBC FACILITATIVE SATELLITE: INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR WICK - 21 JAN 82
FACILITATIVE RAI INTERVIEW WITH ASST. SECY OF STATE ELLIOT ABRAMS
HUNGARIAN FACILITATIVE SATELLITE FEED - JANOS AVAR
OFFICIAL VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MZALI OF TUNISIA - FACILITATIVE SATELLITE
FEEDS
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S D-DAY MESSAGE FOR FR3 TV
REAGAN PRE-SUMMIT INTERVIEW FOR EUROPEAN TV NETWORKS - 1 JUN 82
SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG INTERVIEWED BY RAI-TV - 24 liar 82
SWEDISH TV FACILITATIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY
VISIT OF KING HASSAN II - FACILITATIVE COVERAGES AND SATELLITE FEEDS
Transmitted 18-21 MAY 82
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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN - FACILITATIVE ASSISTANCE/SATELLITE FEEDS -
1-9 NOV 81
YUGOSLAV FACILITATIVE: BORIS BERGANT OF TV LUBLJANA - REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR
CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTIONS WITH FOREIGN TV, COMPLETED:
AUSTRIA TV CO-OP: "FOOTPRINTS IN THE THIRD MILLENIUM"
FINLAND TV CO-OP: THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R.: ARMS RACE OR DETENTE?
HUNGARY TV CO-OP: "PANORAMA"
ACQUIRED FILMS AND VTRS OFFERED POSTS:
A DREAM COME TRUE
A PLACE IN THE SUN
ABC-BARBARA WALTER'S SPECIAL 20/20: RONALD REAGAN ON THE RANCH
ABC CLOSE-UP...RAIN OF TERROR
ABC'S VIEWPOINT - 28 APRIL 82: TELEVISION REPORTING OF FOREIGN NEWS
AFGHAN EXODUS
AMERICAN INTERESTS: JEANNE KIRKPATRICK - 13 APR 82
ANNIE HALL
AS THE EARTH QUAKES
BEN WATTENBERG: RONALD REAGAN - 25 DEC 81
BEN WATTENBERG: THE U.N. AND THE U.S.
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: SRI LANKA
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: THE DEFENSE STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES
BEN WATTENBERG AT LARGE: THE SITUATION IN POLAND - 2 NOV 81
BEST BOY
BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA: FROM THEN TO NOW
BODY HUMAN: THE BIONIC BREAKTHROUGH
BORROWED FACES
BUFFALO SOLDIER
BUKOWSKI READS BUKOWSKI
CAMERA THREE: CARL RUGGLES, AMERICAN MYSTIC
CAMERA THREE: THE DIRECTOR IN EXILE
COAL MINER
COLUMBIA, A FOUNTAIN OF LIFE
COME CLOSER
CONVERSATION WITH RALPH LOWENSTEIN
COUNTRY CORNERS
DAY AFTER TRINITY, THE
DAYS OF HEAVEN
DEAF LIKE ME
DICK SMITH - ACADEMY AWARD WINNING MAKE-UP ARTIST
DIVE TO THE EDGE OF CREATION
FACE THE NATION: RICHARD ALLEN - 11 OCT 81
FACE THE NATION: SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG - 20 DEC 81
FACE THE NATION: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPER WINEBERGER - 4 OCT 81
FACES OF A UNION
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FAREWELL ETAOIN SHRDLU
FESTIVAL OF HANDS - THE SILKEN TENT
FIELDS OF FUEL: THE ETHANOL DEBATE
FROM HOPEFUL GREENSTUFF WOVEN
FULL OF LIFE A-DANCIN'
GETTING OFF WELFARE
GOVERNMENT AS IT IS
GREAT DECISIONS: EL SALVADOR - 26 FEB 82
HEAVEN CAN WAIT
HERE COME THE PUPPETS
HERMAN MELVILLE: CONSIDER THE SEA
IN
PERFORMANCE
AT
THE WHITE
HOUSE
- GENE KELLY
IN
PERFORMANCE
AT
THE WHITE
HOUSE
- MERLE HAGGARD
IN
PERFORMANCE
AT
THE WHITE
HOUSE
- NEW YORK CITY OPERA SINGERS
IN
PERFORMANCE
AT
THE WHITE
HOUSE
- RUDOLF SERKIN AND IDA LEVIN
IN
THE WOODS...A LIGHT
JULIA
KGB CONNECTIONS - AN INVESTIGATION INTO SOVIET OPERATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA
KINFOLKS: THE BLACK FAMILY IN NEW HAVEN CONN.
LANGUAGE OF THE DEAF
L.A. SUGGESTED BY THE ART OF EDWARD RUSCHA
LEGACY OF A SMALL PLANET
LOUIS ZUKOFSKY
LOVE OF LIFE
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: A VICTORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: AFGHANISTAN UPDATE - 16 OCT 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN POLAND - 10 MAR 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE - 24 SEP 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: DOES THE PRESIDENCY WORK?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
USSR
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: FIRST USE ISSUE - 7 APR 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST - ALLY OR BROKER?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: HEART DISEASE TREATMENT
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: HOW WILL SADAT ASSASSINATION AFFECT SALE OF AWACS TO
SAUDI ARABIA?
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: IS THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN GOING TO REPLACE THE CAMP DAVID
ACCORDS
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: OPERATION BRIGHT STAR - 9 NOV 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: PRESIDENT JOSE MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: RECESSION -
21 Oct 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CARIBBEAN BASIN PROPOSALS - 24 Feb 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: SECRETARY HAIG - 16 FEB 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: START NEGOTIATIONS - 24 JUN 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: THE DEFICIT DILEMMA - 17 DEC 81
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF FEEDING POLAND -
12 JAN 82
MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT: U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR
MAKING DANCES
MANHATTAN
MARK TWAIN: THE PRIVATE HISTORY OF A CAMPAIGN THAT FAILED
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MEET THE PRESS ALAN GREENSPAN
MEET
THE
PRESS
EUGENE ROSTOW - 20 JUN 82
MEET
THE
PRESS:
GUILLERMO UNGO - 28 FEB 82
MEET
THE
PRESS:
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER - 22 NOV 81
MEET
THE
PRESS:
SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG - 28 MAR 82
MIDNIGHT
COWBOY
MIDWIFE
MILDRED
PIERCE
MODERN TIMES
MY CHILDHOOD: JAMES BALDWIN
NAPOLEON DUARTE - 21 SEP 81
NBC WHITE PAPER: AMERICA WORKS WHEN AMERICA WORKS
NEW VISION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENTAL FILM
NEWS: WHAT IS IT?
NORMA RAE
NORTHWEST VISIONARIES
NOT JUST ANYWHERE
NOVA: ANATOMY OF A VOLCANO
NOVA: MESSAGE IN THE ROCKS
NOVA: TERMITES AND TELESCOPES
NOVA: THE ASTEROID AND THE DINOSAUR
NOVA: THE GENE ENGINEERS
NOVA: THE SCIENCE OF MURDER
NIGHTLINE - SOVIET USE OF PSYCHIATRY - 27 JAN 82
NORMAN AND THE KILLER
ODYSSEY: THE CHACO LEGEND
OUR TOWN
PORTRAIT OF A COAST
PUBLIC POLICY FORUM: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY - WHAT ARE OUR VITAL INTERESTS?
PUEBLO OF LAGUNA
PUERTO RICO
PUTTING UP THE PICKLES!
QUILTS IN WOMEN'S LIVES
ROCKY
SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS SEARIES
SILENT MOVIE
SIXTY MINUTES: LOOKING AT SIXTY MINUTES
SIXTY MINUTES: SOVIET EMIGRE POET - JOSEPH BRODSKY
SLEEPER
SPECIAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT DUARTE
STALAG 17
SUGAR RAY LEONARD/HEARNS CHAMPIONSHIP BOUT
SUMMER SOUNDS OF NEW YORK CITY
SUPREME COURT
THE BAD NEW BEARS
THE CHICAGO SYMPHONY
THE FLIGHT OF THE GOSSAMER CONDOR
THE GODFATHER, PART I
THE GODFATHER, PART II
THE GREATEST ADVENTURE: THE STORY OF MAN'S VOYAGE TO THE MOON (Q5528) (T/6)
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THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
THE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW
THE LIVING PLANET
THE LOOK OF AMERICA, 1750-1800
THE NIGHT OF THE HUNTER
THE SCARLET LETTER
THE SHOOTIST
THE VANISHING MOMMY
THE WRITER IN AMERICA: MURIEL RUKEYSER
THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER 20 JUN 82
TO HAVE A VOICE
TRIBUTE TO JOHN CAGE, A
WHEN NIGHT COMES TO KANDAHAR
WHITE HERON, THE
WIND POWER
WOMEN IN BUSINESS
XIV WORLD GAMES FOR THE DEAF
YANKEE DOODLE DANDY
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Wireless File
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
Recent examples of VOA editorials
carried worldwide on the Wireless
File:
-"Peace in Lebanon?" (7/7/82)
-"Soviet Peace Movements" (7/12/81);
and
-"The Shultz Hearings" (7/14/82)
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(xx105,x,
.WF-105 (7/12/82)
?
(VOA EDITORIAL) SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENTS (500)
(A VOA EDITORIAL REFLECTING U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON
NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEACE
MOVEMENTS SUPPORTING THEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES)
THE SOVIET COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER PRAVDA SAYS THAT MILLIONS
OF SOVIET CITIZENS ALL OVER THE USSR HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING
THEIR UNSWERVING DESIRE FOR PEACE. THEY HAVE BEEN MEETING
AT THEIR FACTORIES AND WORKPLACES, PRAVDA SAYS, DONATING
SOME OF THEIR WAGES TO AN OFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE FUND. AND,
IT ADDS, THIS AMOUNTS TO AN ANGRY, MASSIVE PROTEST AGAINST
THE ARMS RACE, WHICH PRAVDA SAYS IS ALL THE FAULT OF NATO
AND U.S. MILITARISTS.
EVEN SO, THERE ARE A FEW JARRING, CONTRADICTORY NOTES TO
THIS PICTURE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET PRESS. TASS, FOR
INSTANCE, QUOTES DEFENSE MINISTER DMITRIY USTINOV AS STATING
THAT SOVIET DEFENSES MUST BE KEPT AT THE PROPER LEVEL.":
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INDICATES THAT IT IS. THE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT OF OUR ARMED
FORCES," HE SAYS "IS BEING STEADILY PERFECTED. THE LEVEL OF
COMBAT EFFICIENCY IS RISING."
WHAT IS MORE, DISPATCHES FROM WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS IN
MOSCOW REVEAL THAT NOT EVERY SOVIET PEACE MARCHER IS
WELCOMED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES. ONE SMALL CITIZENS GROUP --
WHICH CALLS ITSELF THE "GROUP FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR" -- IS REPORTED IN
TROUBLE.
TWO MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN UNDER
HOUSE ARREST BY THE KGB, THE STATE SECURITY POLICE, FOR
LENGTHY PERIODS. OTHERS HAVE BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
ON SHORT NOTICE; ANOTHER HAS BEEN WARNED HE COULD LOSE HIS
JOB AND BE PROSECUTED FOR TREASON.
A MONTH AGO WHEN A PARIS-BASED GROUP OF PEACE CAMPAIGNERS
SAILED INTO LENINGRAD IN A NETHERLANDS SHIP, THERE WERE
MEETINGS, THEN CLASHES WITH THE OFFICIAL SOVIET PEACE
COMMITTEE.
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WITH SIGNS SAYING "USSR, STOP NUCLEAR TESTING NOW." SOVIET
TUGS TOWED THE PEACE VESSEL OUT INTO INTERNATIONAL WATERS --
AWAY FROM ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATING THE SOVIET
PUBLIC.
MOSCOW'S PEACE COMMITTEES ARE READY TO SUPPORT CRITICISM
OF WESTERN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND WESTERN DEFENSE
EFFORTS -- BUT NOT OF THOSE OF TEE KREMLIN.
THIS PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR CONTRASTS WITH THE FREE PUBLIC
DEBATE WHICH IS PART OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
AND IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES.
A MONTH AGO, DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR, PRESIDENT REAGAN
INVITED SOVIET LEADERS TO CONSIDER HOW COMPETITION IN IDEAS
AND VALUES CAN BE CONDUCTED IN A PEACEFUL AND RECIPROCAL
BASIS. IT IS REAGAN'S FIRM CONVICTION THAT DEMOCRATIC
DISCUSSION, COMPLEMENTED BY A GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM.,
WILL STRENGTHEN THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND A WORLD
AT PEACE.
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PPO/ES/SG 11:14 7/12/82 RTG (JU-11:40)
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(xx304,x,
*WF-304 (7/7/82)
(VOA EDITORIAL) PEACE IN LEBANON?- (500)
THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IN LEBANON CAN BE EXPRESSED SIMPLY
AND DIRECTLY: THE FIGHTING MUST STOP.
WHAT WAS TRUE WHEN THE WAR BEGAN REMAINS TRUE. PEACE IN
LEBANON REQUIRES THREE CONDITIONS. THE LEBANESE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT MUST BE STRENGTHENED TO THE POINT WHERE IT CAN
TRULY CONTROL ALL OF LEBANON'S TERRITORY. ISRAEL MUST BE
ASSURED, ONCE AND FOR ALL, THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE SUBJECT
TO ATTACKS FROM ACROSS ITS NORTHERN BORDER WITH LEBANON.
AND, THIRD, ALL FOREIGN ELEMENTS MUST REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM
LEBANON.
WITHOUT THESE THREE CRUCIAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION,
LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE UNWILLING SITE OF MILITARY
STRUGGLES IMPOSED ON IT BY OUTSIDE CONTENDING FORCES.
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING THE TIRELESS EFFORTS BY
U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY PHILIP HABIB ON THE SCENE, HAS BEEN, AND
WILL CONTINUE TO BE, DEDICATED TO HELPING BRING ABOUT A
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LASTING SETTLEMENT.
BUT THE SITUATION REMAINS EXTRAORDINARILY TENSE AND
DELICATE. KEY, AND INTERRELATED, QUESTIONS PERSIST. WILL
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S LEADERSHIP, BESIEGED
IN WEST BEIRUT BY ISRAELI FORCES, DECIDE TO WITHDRAW ITS
FORCES FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON? AND WILL ISRAEL RESTRAIN
ITSELF FROM A DIRECT ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT?
FORTUNATELY, THERE ARE OPTIONS WHICH PRESENT AT LEAST
SOME MEASURE OF HOPE THAT FURTHER HEAVY BLOODSHED CAN BE
PREVENTED. ONE IDEA, LINKED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PLO
WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, IS A TEMPORARY MULTINATIONAL FORCE
WHOSE MISSION WOULD BE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IN
THEIR SUPERVISION OF SUCH A PLO PULLOUT.
PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID THAT, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, HE
WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING AMERICAN TROOPS
TO SUCH A FORCE -- IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ASKS FOR SUCH
ASSISTANCE. OBVIOUSLY, ALL PARTIES CONCERNED IN LEBANON
WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO COOPERAT.E WITH SUCH A FORCE.
IN THE MEANTIME, NO MATTER HOW AGONIZING AND FRUSTRATING
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THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MAY BE, IT MUST CONTINUE.
ON THAT SCORE, THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.
PPO/VOA/SG/DJM 10:43 7/7/82 RTG GP
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(xx308,x,
*WF-308 (7/14/82)
*
(VOA EDITORIAL) THE SHULTZ HEARING (500)
(A VOA EDITORIAL ON THE SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARING OF
SECRETARY OF STATE-DESIGNATE GEORGE SHULTZ, WHICH REFLECTS
THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT)
A CABINET MEMBER IS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, AND
SO GEORGE SHULTZ -- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHOICE TO REPLACE
ALEXANDER HAIG AS SECRETARY OF STATE -- WENT TO CAPITOL HILL
THIS WEEK FOR THE NECESSARY HEARINGS.
AS SHULTZ APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE, THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT ABOUT HIS SPEEDY
SHULTZ IS NO STRANGER TO WASHINGTON, HAVING SERVED IN
CABINET POSTS IN THE PAST. HIS PERFORMANCE AS A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL IS HIGHLY REGARDED IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD.
STILL, THERE WAS NOTHING RITUALISTIC ABOUT THE QUESTIONS
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PUT TO THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINEE BY SENATORS FROM BOTH
POLITICAL PARTIES. AT ISSUE WAS TAE STATUS OF REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY FOLLOWING THE SUDDEN HAIG
RESIGNATION TWO AND A HALF WEEKS AGO, AND WHETHER SHULTZ WAS
COMFORTABLE WITH THAT POLICY. HIS ANSWERS, AT A TIME OF
PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, WERE REASSURING.
THE GOAL IN LEBANON, ACCORDING TO SECRETARY OF STATE
DESIGNATE SHULTZ, REMAINS THE SAME: A CHANCE FOR THE
LEBANESE TO GOVERN THEMSELVES FREE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE.
THERE IS A NECESSITY FOR AN URGENT RESOLUTION OF THE
LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE UNITED
STATES MUST BUILD RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WHILE AT
THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
ISRAEL. AMERICAN POLICY, SAID SHULTZ, MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO
ISRAELIS AND ARABS ALIKE.
SHULTZ SAID THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK A
BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- FROM A POSITION
OF STRENGTH AND ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. AND WHILE
ADMITTING HIS GENERAL DISLIKE OF THE USE OF TRADE SANCTIONS
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AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL, SHULTZ SAID HE FULLY SUPPORTS AMERICAN
ECONOMIC MOVES AGAINST MOSCOW BROUGHT ON BY THE SERIOUS
SITUATION IN POLAND.
THERE WERE QUESTIONS ON ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND OTHER
REGIONS -- ALL OF THEM HANDLED WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF A MAN
WHO HAS APPEARED AT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS BEFORE, AND WHO
SEEMS AT EASE WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES HIS PROPOSED CABINET
POSITION WOULD BRING.
ACCORDING TO GEORGE SHULTZ, THE PAST 18 MONTHS HAVE SEEN
THE EVOLUTION AND EMERGENCE OF A VERY CLEAR AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY. HIS JOB AS SECRETARY OF STATE, SAYS SHULTZ, WILL BE
TO BRING CONTINUITY TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES BY HELPING THE
PRESIDENT FORMULATE AND EXECUTE HIS FOREIGN POLICIES.
GEORGE SHULTZ, IT SEEMS, IS READY TO PICK UP THE BATON
(TAKE CHARGE) AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITHOUT MISSING A BEAT
(WITH EASE),.
*
PPO/VOA/SG AW-1:45 (YB-2:22)
*item*
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Special Publications
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41,
- USICA special publication
English - 12,600 copies in 80 countries
French - 3,000 copies in 25 countries
Spanish - 8,500 copies in 14 countries
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U1,
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 pproved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
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Below, the ever-present
Solidarity slogan.
The world
witnesses a struggle
for liberation
that is as old as
Poland itself
Solidarnosc. Solidarity. A sturdy
workers' word that traditionally has
signified the unity of working men and
women throughout the world. Today,
Solidarity has a new meaning: Poland's
quest for individual freedom.
Poland is a nation that has been
forged in generations of struggle for
freedom and self-determination. But
if history taught Poles to cherish
freedom, geography exposed them to
repeated invasions by Germans from
the west and Russians from the east.
Black Madonna at
cherished religious
Poles reach out for
inside the Gdansk
In the 18th century they suffered
three successive partitions that
eliminated Poland from the map of
Europe until 1918.
Poles were sustained through
these decades of strife by their
religious faith. Throughout Poland's
history, the Roman Catholic Church
has served as a protector of its culture,
tradition, even language. And the
Church continued to be a defen-
der of human rights and Polish identity
in the postwar era. Today, 75 to 80
percent of Poland's 36 million people
are practicing Catholics.
Patriotism, religious faith, a
tradition of resistance to oppression,
these are values that have united
Poles for centuries. Today, they are
the values embodied in Solidarity.
Solidarity is, first and foremost, a
labor movement: It arose from the
accumulated grievances of workers
exploited by a state that ruled in the
name of the working class. Its
demands-the right to strike, better
wages and working conditions-were
the demands of any free labor union
throughout the world.
Because Solidarity reflected the
aspirations of the Polish people for
self-determination, the Communist
Party perceived it as a threat to the
continuation of single-party rule. In
short, it was a genuine working-class
movement that threatened Commu-
nist leadership-the self-appointed,
self-perpetuating representatives of
the working class. In the end, the Polish
regime, pressured by the Soviet Union,
refused to accept limitations on its
power or a tolerance of pluralism.
Instead, the regime resorted to
force, playing the role of Poland's
historic foreign oppressors by
instituting martial law, banning
Solidarity and imprisoning its leaders.
And once again, it was the Church
which spoke for the Polish people:
"Our suffering," said Poland's
bishops, "is that of the entire nation,
terrorized by military force."
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? ??? . 1? ?? ? ? . ?~
1 jrrf r. o
/1 1? ?? ? r O01 ?r/
? ' I r I
1 ? . ? .1
r? ?r
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 Two events set the stage for the dra-
matic emergence of Solidarity: one
unprecedented, the other familiar.
The unprecedented occurrence was
the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II to
his homeland, a moment of immense
national pride for the Polish people.
The other event was a 1980 de-
cree raising meat prices. Polish workers
rose in protest, but instead of marching
in the streets, they remained in the fac-
tories and conducted peaceful sit-in
demonstrations. The strikes spread,
and shipyard workers in Gdansk were
Gdansk shipyard workers (top) eye passing members of Poland's
security forces. Above, workers carry an exuberant Walesa on their shoulders
following negotiations that produced the Gdansk Accords.
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joined by striking miners in Silesia.
An electrician named Lech Walesa
climbed over a fence to join the
Gdansk strikers, and soon found him-
self negotiating with the government
as the representative for more than
one-half million workers. With pa-
tience, determination, and a refusal to
be intimidated, Walesa and his negoti-
ating team won virtually all their de-
mands. Among the most significant:
the right to an independent union, the
right to strike, a relaxation of censor-
ship and more freedom for the Church.
The historic Gdansk agreements
of August 1980 signaled an extraordi-
nary, long-awaited flowering of free-
dom in Poland. Solidarity gained
rights taken for granted elsewhere: It
published its own newspaper; the
state television network carried Sun-
day church services for the first time;
new passport regulations enabled
Poles to travel more freely; writers,
scholars, artists and filmmakers began
exploring a world whose boundaries
had suddenly broadened.
Solidarity grew to a membership
of 10 million: Together, union mem-
bers and their families comprised a
majority of Poland's population.
Farmers organized and won approval
for a rural counterpart to Solidarity. At
the same time, some 900,000 Poles
quit the Communist Party, and doz-
ens of corrupt officials were forced
from positions of authority.
Poland was a nation where free-
dom was no longer an abstraction, but
a daily reality in the lives of millions.
Above, crowd gathers to read leaflets offering best
wishes to Solidarity. At right, Poles assemble at the
gates of the Gdansk shipyard to show support for
striking workers massed inside the yard. Negotiations
conducted there led to the historic Gdansk Accords
that recognized Solidarity as an independent union.
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'~ ~. it ,? '1 II? ? .?
?~ it 1? ...?? 1 ..
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NEMMUSLIMEMOM
ME
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e ?~ ?.r ee e e .e? .
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 Life under martial
law: dissidence and
privation
Despite the estimated 2,000 dissi-
dents and Solidarity members still im-
prisoned, Poles continue to demon-
strate their opposition to the martial
law regime in hundreds of daily indi-
vidual acts. Church leaders speak out
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for a dialogue between the govern-
ment and Solidarity, and many work-
ers follow the suggestions of the anti-
regime Social Resistance Circle
(KOS): "Work like a snail. Behave in
a passive way.... Break all the idiotic
rules made by the military council."
Solidarity has gone under-
ground, trying to operate much as it
did before August 1980. Couriers de-
liver messages, and thousands help
print and distribute leaflets and other
publications rallying support for Soli-
darity and reporting incidents of
repression. Some are single typewrit-
ten sheets, but several, such as News
of the Day in Warsaw, appear regu-
larly enough to be called newspapers.
State holidays and commemora-
tions of historic dates serve to illumi-
nate the hostility of the Polish people to-
ward the regime. May Day 1982 pro-
duced a large, pro-Solidarity march in
Warsaw; two days later, on the anni-
versary of Poland's first liberal constitu-
tion in 1791, angry demonstrations
broke out in a number of cities, result-
ing in more than 1,000 arrests.
Solidarity members have even
succeeded in making clandestine radio
broadcasts calling for continued resis-
tance to martial law and reporting on
conditions in the internment camps.
Radio Solidarity's theme music: a pop-
ular song of anti-Nazi resistance fighters
during World War 11.
The response of the Jaruzelski
government follows a familiar pattern:
At left, one of the many internment
''. camps where Solidarity members and
other protesters are still imprisoned
months after the imposition of martial law,
all without having any formal charges
brought against them. Below, food line
stretches along a Warsaw street.
vt' _aM
It floats tentative plans for restoration
of a "reformed" Solidarity while hand-
ing out harsh sentences to anyone
caught distributing anti-government
publications. It talks of reconciliation,
but announces a compulsory-labor
provision for all males aged 18 to 45
that is reminiscent of the Stalinist era.
The martial-law regime continues
to offer promises of economic reform,
but it has only succeeded in providing
scarcity at higher prices. In March
1982, the regime announced the
greatest price increases in postwar Pol-
ish history; the cost of basic foods such
as sausage, potatoes and bread dou-
bled or even tripled. Despite such mea-
sures, shortages, food lines and ration-
ing remain a way of life.
~ VA
has added political oppression to the unrelenting
burdens imposed by the regime's economic failures.
,Ir
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WIMAWW4 M_
Polish refugees in the Traiskirchen transit camp in Austria:
Their grim choices are uncertain futures in foreign lands, or a
return to the bleak repression of Poland under martial law.
In pain and disillusion, thousands of
people, as in the Czarist past, have left
Poland for the uncertainties and
wrenching adjustments to life apart
from their homeland. Many were
outside the country when martial law
was declared and decided not to re-
turn. Since martial law, Poland's bor-
ders have been sealed, and few have
been able to leave the country. Many
Polish refugees hold temporary visas
and are housed in Austrian transit
camps; hundreds have applied for
permanent residence abroad.
In Washington, the Polish
ambassador to the United States,
Romuald Spasowski, resigned and
asked for political asylum. "I cannot
be silent," he stated. "I shall not have
any association... with the authorities
responsible for this brutality and in-
human't~ ." The ambassador to
Japan, Zdzislaw Rurarz, sought asy-
lum as well: "Poland today is not my
Poland. The Polish people are being
punished for the crimes committed by
the Polish government." And writer
Czeslaw Milosz, winner of the 1980
Nobel Prize for Literature, stated:
"Last summer, after 30 years of exile,
I returned to Poland. But after what
happened in December, I am again a
poet in exile."
New arrival at Traiskirchen: Many Poles seek political
asylum in Austria or West Germany; some have
obtained visas for other West European countries,
Australia, Canada or the United States.
Exiles new and old: Former Polish ambassador
to the United States, Aomuald Spasowski (top);
Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz.
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 The world
is watching
Tokyo. London. New York. Paris.
Washington. Madrid. Stockholm.
Chicago. Sydney. Bonn. Brussels.
Lisbon. Rome.
In cities such as these throughout
Europe and other parts of the world,
thousands of ordinary citizens-
many of them union members them-
selves-have rallied to show their
own solidarity with the 10 million
members of Poland's Solidarity
Union, and with the thousands who
have been imprisoned under martial
law. Such rallies, many of which were
sponsored by member unions of the
International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, serve as a massive in-
dictment of a regime, claiming to rep-
resent workers, that has repressed
an authentic workers' movement-
and then turned to the Soviet Un-
ion for support. These worldwide
demonstrations also insure that nei-
ther silence nor censorship will allow
the repression of the Polish people
to go unchallenged.
li I I ~ ~! I
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Below, rallies for Solidarity in Tokyo and London...
.77 -29 4
~CF
~[~~(~ll ~ S(1PPpT ~ ~~
oky 3an~ary 1982 r"teIS ~Ri
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 "The age-old lesson of history is
that the human spirit will not live
in chains. In Poland today, the
flame of freedom may seem to
burn less brightly, but it has not
been extinguished, nor can it be."
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
United Kingdom
"Now and always the Portuguese
people will stand beside the Polish
people and all those whose
freedom has been destroyed."
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"On the 13th of December last
year, we once again witnessed the
failure of the Communist system to
accept a process of national
renewal and reform."
"Men of goodwill throughout
the world deplore the present
situation in Poland and.. .search
for an avenue which leads to
genuine stability and prosperity
in Poland."
'I would like to add my voice to
those leaders of other countries to
ask the military authorities...
to abolish the state of martial
law which currently suppresses
the most profound aspirations of
the Polish people."
"Solidarity symbolizes thestruggle
of real workers in a so-called
workers' state for fundamental
human and economic rights...
the right to assemble, the right to
strike, and the right to freedom
of expression."
"The days go by and the basic
conditions of freedom of which the
labor movement has been
deprived are not being restored to
that great nation."
Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, Italy
farmers these past few years."
President Frangois Mitterrand, France
--------- -- -_ ,_
"The Polish people have often,
through ages, suffered from
despotism, but never has the soul
surrendered. Their hope for
freedom will give them strength to
endure and survive."
"In the name of all Canadians,
I fervently call upon the
government of Poland to bring an
end to martial law and to
open the way to national renewal
and reconciliation."
"Poland recalls to us the value,
and also the fragility, of what we
have to represent and defend."
Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, Belgium
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"1 am convinced that all " ThePolish people...need to know
democratic nations must show that the political and moral pres-
an attitude of unity and firmness sure of international public opin-
in the face of the Polish crisis and, ion will not cease until they have re-
the Soviet responsibilities I gained the use of the labor union
related to it." rights wrested by the workers and
"The repression in Poland
concerns us all. The,Poles must
be allowed to build their own
way of life without interference
or coercion."
Prime Minister John Malcolm Fraser, Australia
"We had hoped that the Polish
people would be able to progress
on the path of renewal and reform,
which had started in the summer
of 1980, without foreign
interference. "
"The suppression of freedom in
Poland is a grave moral challenge
to all those in the world who
stand for humanity and freedom."
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt,
Federal Republic of Germany
 t 1 1 1
111 / '1 -'1
1 1 1 1
? 1 I11 11 1? 1
? t ? 11 . 1' 1 1
r 1 1
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ENDURING
THE DARKNESS OF
MARTIAL LAW
The present Government of the people in
Poland rests on the alliance of workers and
working peasants. In this alliance the
leading role belongs to the workers, who
are the leading class of society....
These are the words of the preamble
to the Constitution of the Polish People's
Republic.
Poland today is a country oppressed
by a regime responsible for an economic
fiasco, divided internally, fearful of its
citizens, and accountable only to the Soviet
Union. Its lone success has been the
forcible repression of Poland's first postwar
mass workers' movement.
The Soviet Union attempts to rational-
ize its constant meddling in Polish affairs by
endlessly stressing Poland's "fraternal ties'
to Moscow. As part of this effort, Polish and
Soviet authorities have tried to exploit four
myths about recent events.
First, that Solidarity, through its
"excesses," was responsible for its own
downfall. The facts are otherwise. The
claim that strikes by Solidarity created
Poland's economic turmoil ignores the
simple truth that much of the labor unrest
arose as a result of the economic chaos
caused by decades of government
ineptitude and corruption.
Lech Walesa and other Solidarity
leaders worked continuously to halt strikes
and encourage a return to work following
the August 1980 accords. Strikes affected
only a small proportion of workers after
March 1981, and the government's own
statistics showed a steady increase in
overall production. By contrast, the
Jaruzelski regime never accepted Solidarity
as a legitimate union, and it heightened
tensions when it attempted to repudiate the
heart of the Gdansk agreement by
introducing a law to forbid strikes.
A second myth is that the Soviet
Union did not intervene in Poland. Any
impartial review of the record reveal a
continuous Soviet campaign of threatening
military maneuvers, verbal intimidation,
and fabricated accusations directed at
Solidarity. Western observers agree that
secret preparations for martial law began as
early as March 1981; the martial law
decree itself was printed in the Soviet
Union in September; and the Warsaw Pact
Commander-in-Chief, Viktor Kulikov, and
other senior Soviet military officers, were in
Warsaw when martial law was declared.
As one Soviet speaker admitted
publicly: Martial law had been "brilliantly
conspired."
A third myth is that Poland's rulers
acted out of patriotism, to pre-empt a
Soviet invasion. This particular example of
double-think requires one to laud the
Jaruzelski regime's high-mindedness in
doing the Soviets' dirty work for them in
returning the Polish people to the
oppression that they had struggled so
valiantly to escape.
Fourth, the myth that events in Po-
land are purely an internal matter. This as-
sertion ignores an inconvenient fact: Po-
land and the Soviet Union are signatories
to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which
obligates all parties to respect each nation's
right to develop its own political and eco-
nomic system without interference. The es-
tablishment of martial law, the imprison-
ment of thousands, and the deprivation of
freedoms for all is the clearest possible ex-
ample of a deliberate and conscious viola-
tion of the Helsinki Final Act.
Poland is a challenge to the principles
of civilized international conduct, and to the
political will of independent nations
everywhere. In meeting this challenge, the
United States has joined with the nations
of the Atlantic Community, and many
others around the world, to demand the
lifting of martial law, the release of all
political prisoners, and the reestablishment
of dialogue and reconciliation among all
sectors of Polish society, including
Solidarity and the Church. In short, the
Polish people must be allowed to
determine their own future, free from fear
and outside coercion. To underline its con-
demnation of martial law and Soviet inter-
ference in Poland, the United States, along
with other nations, has imposed a series of
economic sanctions-including trade and
credit restrictions-on both countries.
If the Polish regime undertakes a
program of genuine reconciliation, the
United States, together with Western
Europe and other nations, stands ready to
aid Poland in eliminating agricultural
shortages and reducing its foreign debt.
And the American people, as in the past,
will continue to provide food and
humanitarian aid directly to the people
through private agencies. But the United
States will not supply credits or other forms
of assistance that serve only to prop up a
regime imposed on the Polish people
against their will.
The restoration of an independent,
strong Poland is a matter which concerns
not only the Poles but all of us.... For the
workers of all the rest of Europe need the
independence of Poland just as much as
the Polish workers themselves.
Friedrich Engels wrote those words in the
introduction to the Polish edition of The
Communist Manifesto. Those outside
Poland can cite such passages, acknowl-
edging the heavy irony of a nation that
oppresses its workers in the name of a
workers' state. But Poles cannot afford the
luxury of irony. They live the tragedy of
Communist failure every day. ^
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Editor: Howard Clncolla
Deputy Editor: Adrienne Price
Art Director: Robert Banks
Editorial Assistant: Diane Lewis
Photos:
Front cover, Liaison/ Bulka
Inside Front cover-1,
Gamma-Liaison/Czarnecki
2, Sygma/Rancinan
3, Photoreporters
4, top left Contact Press
Images / Fishman
top right-Contract Press
Images/ Burne It,
bottom-Sygma / Keler
5, Gamma-Liaison/Hires
6-7 top left-Liaison/Bulka
top right-Sygrna/Philippot,
bottom-Contact Press
Images/Fishman
8, top-Contact Press
Images/Fishman.
bottom left-Sygma/Dejean,
bottom right- Visions/Damien
9, SygmaIAtlan
10 Contact Press Images/Burnett
11 Photoreporlters.
12, Liaisonl Czarnecki
13, top-Sygma. bottom-Sygma
14-15, left-Phiotoreporters
right Sygma
16 Photoreporlters
17, top left-Contact Press
Images/Fishm~an,
top right-Visioms/Riboud
bottom right-Black Star/lbedenthal
bottom-Liaisorn/ Czarnecki/ Hires
18, top-Visioms/LeScour/Ana
middle-Visions/Bisson
bottom-Gamnna-Liaison /Wildenberg
19, left-Vision.:s/Bisson
top right-Liaison/Halstead,
bottom right-Dygma/Zimberof1
20, bottom left-Sygma/Franker,
top right-Eiji 6Niyazawa/Black Star
bottom right-Liaison/Jordan
21, left-Visions/Jacobson
top right-Sygrna/Franker
bottom fight-Visions / Baughman
22-23 Carol Hightower
24, Photoreporlters (2)
Back cover, poisters by Jan Savvka
photographs b!y Krawczyk
International
Communication Agency,
United States of America
 Ir it
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304730001-5
- USICA specipl publication
English - 37,100 copie
s i
n 110 countri
French - 7,800 copies
in
49 countries
Spanish
- 8,100 copies
in
21 countries
Arabic
- 4,100 copies
in
24 countries
es
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 "We would like to
hope that everybody
will understand the
fruitlessness of attempts
to interfere in
Afghanistan's internal
affairs and to dictate
to its people how
they should live and
what government
they should have....
Leonid Brezhnev,
October 1980
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he would-be conquerors have come for
centuries to this rugged, haunting land. Alexander the Great, Tamerlane,
Babur, Genghis Khan... later, the soldiers of Czarist Russia
and Great Britain. All failed. Now another power has come to Afghanistan. Since
launching its invasion in December 1979, the Soviet Union has
installed its own government, occupied the major cities, and attempted
to suppress a resistance movement that encompasses
elements from every regional, ethnic and social group in the country.
But it has neither conquered the nation nor
vanquished the spirit of its citizens. As one freedom fighter declared:
"The foreigners never learn. They still keep trying to conquer us. This time, it
is the Russians, and they will soon learn the lesson we teach anyone
who tries to own us."
In these photographs we see the face of Afghanistan today, the face
of a people struggling to regain freedom.
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 By invading and occupying its smaller neighbor,
the Soviet Union has transformed an internal conflict into an
example of international aggression. Soviet troops-and the remnants of the
Afghan army which they still control-have killed and
imprisoned thousands, and so far have forced almost three million
persons into exile in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. They have
reduced villages to rubble with helicopter gunships, destroyed food supplies,
seeded roads and trails with antipersonnel mines designed to kill
and maim indiscriminately, and, according to reliable refugee and other
eyewitness accounts, employed chemical warfare against
civilian populations.
Beyond the international political debate
concerning Soviet actions, beyond the implications for regional and global
stability, there lies the human tragedy of a nation
whose people are forced to choose between subjugation,
resistance or exile.
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n the '70s Afghanistan was a country in
political turmoil. Forces led by Mohammad Daoud,
formeir Prime Minister and cousin to the nation's
constitutional monarch, King Zahir, took power in a
bloodless coup in 1973. Daoud had committed
himself to a radical political and social program; but
once in office, he grew increasingly conservative,
purging leaders of the Parcham faction of the
Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) which had helped engineer the coup that
brouglht him to power.
In 1978 another faction of the PDPA, the
Khalq,, led by the party's founder, Nur
Mohammad Taraki, staged a coup in which Daoud
was killlled. The Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty
signed that year was the signal for an influx of Soviet
militant' and civilian administrators and advisors.
Taraki himself was executed a year later following a
clash with supporters of a rival Marxist leader,
Hafizulllah Amin.
While these Marxist factions contested for
power in Kabul, anti-communist dissidence flared
in the cities and military resistance mounted in the
countryside. Faced with a deteriorating political
and military situation, the Soviet Union launched
an invasion by land and air in December 1979;
Amin was killed and replaced with Babrak
Karmall, a member of the Parcham faction who had
been in exile under Moscow's protection.
In a propaganda exercise that deceived no
one, the Soviets attempted to claim that they had
been invited into Afghanistan by the very
government they overthrew. They then congrat-
ulated Karmal upon his "election" as President,
and broadcast a speech he already had recorded
before being flown into Kabul from the Soviet
Union. Moscow added to the deception by
sending the speech over transmitters claiming to be
Radio Kabul but located inside the Soviet Union.
"The trouble is the
uncertainty. Kabul loot
calm, but you never
know where or
when it will blow up."
Indian traveler
Signs of the Soviet presence: food vendor
(above) stands in front of poster advertising the
Soviet airline, Aeroflot; at right, group of
Soviet bureaucrats congregate in Kabul street.
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Signs of unrest
(above): the February
1980 strike by shop-
keepers in Kabul,
protesting the Soviet
invasion. The strike
triggered subsequent
demonstrations
throughout the city.
Violent anti-Soviet protests
have broken out in
other towns throughout
Afghanistan, and
resistance forces have
had partial control of
cities such as Jalalabad
and Herat for weeks
at a time.
 I
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fter approximately two years and a
Soviet troop-carrying
helicopter (above) lifts off
from Kabul airport;
because roads are cut so
frequently by the
resistance, supplies and
reinforcements to
Soviet and Afghan army
outposts move largely
by air. Below, Soviet
division, with support
vehicles, encamped near
the airport.
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commitment of more than 85,000 troops, after a major
expenditure of resources and political prestige,
Moscow has achieved little more than a tenuous
military grip over Afghanistan's larger cities.
In its fundamental political objective-to
establish a client state recognized as legitimate
internally and internationally-the Soviet Union
has failed.
According to observers, feuds and even armed
conflict continue between the ruling Parcham and
rival Khalq factions of the party; the Afghan army
has suffered massive desertions; Soviet civilians and
soldiers walk the streets at their peril; the economy
has been damaged severely; and food production
and distribution have been badly disrupted.
Despite efforts by the Soviets and their Afghan
collaborators, the regime of Babrak Karmal has
been unable to attract supporters from any significant
segment of Afghan society: the regime's political
base today is narrower than when the Soviets
installed it in 1979. The Karmal faction remains a
minority within a Communist Party that is itself a tiny
minority as well. Without the protection of Soviet
forces, it would not last a day.
Apart from a few states aligned with the Soviet
Union, almost the entire international community has
censured the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The
United Nations General Assembly, for example, has
called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by votes
of 104 to 18 in January 1980 and 111 to 22 in
November 1980; similar resolutions have been
passed by the UN Human Rights Commission, the
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations), the European Economic
Community and, perhaps most significantly, by the
Islamic Conference. (In the UN Security Council, the
Soviet Union twice has vetoed resolutions deploring
armed intervention in Afghanistan.)
The Soviets have continued to reject all
reasonable proposals for the withdrawal of their
troops and the restoration of Afghanistan as a
genuinely nonaligned nation free from outside
interference. Instead, they have offered a succession
of diplomatic initiatives that are designed to
accomplish what two years of occupation have not:
internal control of the country and international
recognition of the legitimacy of the regime. s
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 L I1
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"The government is
totally unnerved. Its only
objective is to survive."
Asian diplomat in Kabul
y day the Soviet presence in Kabul
is most visible at the airport, where entrenched
antiaircraft weapons, rockets and tanks guard rows
of MiG fighters, air force transports, helicopter
gunships, armored personnel carriers and
thousands of Soviet troops. At nightfall,
journalists and other observers report, tanks and
armored vehicles move through the city and take
up positions on main thoroughfares and street
corners. Yet even this military presence doesn't
insure peace or halt resistance, and the sound of
gunfire and streak of tracer bullets regularly
punctuate the night.
When city-wide, anti-Soviet strikes and
demonstrations erupted in 1980, according to
eyewitness accounts reported in the Western
press, the Soviets and Soviet-directed Afghan
troops suppressed them with armored vehicles
and helicopters, gunning down hundreds of
massed demonstrators who were trapped in
narrow streets. Violent demonstrations also have
occurred in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and
other towns. In response to such widespread
opposition, the regime has imprisoned tens of
thousands of Afghans, many of them in Kabul's
Pul-i-Charki prison.
Faced with hostility in the cities and guerrilla
opposition in the countryside, the Soviets have
made little effort to protect civilian populations
from the conflict. The destruction of food supplies,
some experts have asserted, for example, appears
to be part of a deliberate policy to destroy
Stark contrasts between the new regime and
traditional Afghanistan: veiled women in Kabul
(above) beneath banners of the faction-torn
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan;
houses thousands of political prisoners and,
according to news reports, has been the
scene of countless instances of torture and
execution without trial; opposite page, one of
the country's many mosques, symbol of
Afghanistan's enduring Islamic faith.
q~ t.Yfif
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agricultural production in areas of nationalist
resistance. In addition to indiscriminate bombings,
the Western press also has reported numerous
instances of mass killings and torture, as well as the
alleged use of lethal chemicals and other
poisonous substances that are illegal under
international law.
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"The Karmal
government would not
survive 24 hours
without the Soviets there."
has lost as many as
50,000 troops through
defections and
desertions, has required
massive Soviet support
to maintain its facade as a
cohesive force. At
right, the Afghan army on
parade in the 1960's;
below, Afghan soldiers
today outside an office
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1 1 t
The ubiquitous Soviets: from top,
airborne troops patrol a road on the
outskirts of Kabul shortly after
the invasion; auto with curtains drawn
carrying high-ranking officials is
followed by second car with security
agents; soldiers guard facilities
of Radio Kabul.
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? 'r '1 r r11 1 I r l 1 I l r 1 1
1 ? r 1 ?'r r ' ? ?
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 i L H
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Opposite page, villagers warily
examine an unexploded antipersonnel
bomb containing thousands of pieces
of shrapnel. Bombs such as this ravage
farm lands as well as destroy
buildings. Above, this child stepped on
a small plastic-covered mine which
the Soviets, according to eyewitness
accounts, have dropped by the
hundreds of thousands along roads and
trails throughout the country. Many are
disguised as toys, pens or other
objects which attract children. Villager
(far left) displays another type of Soviet
antipersonnel mine; at left, Afghans
endure with prayer and patience.
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"The Soviets see nothing wrong in
killing civilians, When you ask
them about it, they say, 'This is a
revolution, and in a class struggle
you eliminate the enemy. `"
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1 - 11 1 ,
1 11 , ??, 11 ,
1 ?,1/
1 1 M ? 1 1 ?
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Villagers near Herat (above) begin clearing away
rubble following a Soviet air attack. At right,
another group of villagers surveys the devastation
after an attack by eight MiG jets and four
helicopter gunships.
"The Russians are trying to annihilate us...
There is not a single day when they do not
bomb villages full of civilians. But they do not
control the countryside. Despite their
overwhelming firepower, they cannot win,"
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Left, rocket pod from a downed
Soviet Mi-24 gunship. Resistance
forces often remove the
explosives from such Soviet
ordnance and reuse them in their
own bombs and mines. Below,
volunteer French doctors, here
operating a makeshift underground
hospital inside Afghanistan, are
able to treat only a small number of
the casualties among Afghan
civilians and resistance fighters.
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 While women and children
remain in the refugee camps,
mujahidin such as these return to
their devastated villages and
continue the resistance against
Soviet attacks.
Iild I 1
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Crossing a river using a hand-held cable (top),
trekking through a mountain pass with their
belongings on the backs of donkeys (above), two
groups of refugees escape the fighting for the
sanctuary of camps in Pakistan.
"Over there Russian planes destroyed
everything with their bombs.
Our homes. Our fields. We came here to seek
shelter with our women and children.
We came with nothing. Just the clothes we are
wearing. Now we must live like nomads."
Afghan refugee
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 Below, one of the war's many
casualties receives treatment in a
refugee hospital in Pakistan.
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"With no end of the
conflict in sight, it is
difficult to determine
how long these influxes
will continue.
Whenever reports of
navy ngnnng come
through, we get new
streams of refugees."
At right, refugee camp in Pakistan with tents
supplied by the United Nations and
other international relief organizations;
below, family whose few possessions
include several goats. "It takes something
incredible to force a man to leave his
home or country," says an international
volunteer organization official. "In this
case, the Afghans have left because of fear."
ost arrive destitute. After long treks
over mountainous terrain, they are weary, hungry, their
feet often bloodied and unshod. Many have witnessed
homes bombed, crops destroyed, family members killed
or wounded.
Tens of thousands of homeless Afghans cross over
into Pakistan each month. The largest and fastest-growing
refugee group in the world, their numbers swelled to more
than two million just 19 months after Soviet troops invaded
and occupied their homeland. Together with those in Iran,
they total nearly three million, or approximately 20 percent
of Afghanistan's pre-invasion population.
More than 70 percent of the refugees are
V-1
women or children under the age of 12. Many of the rest
are old men.
Most of the refugees inhabit sprawling tent villages
located near the Afghan border. In certain regions,
authorities have supplied refugees with the necessary
materials to build themselves traditional dwellings, the flat-
topped mud huts seen throughout Afghanistan.
The Afghan refugees must rely on the Govern-
ment of Pakistan and international assistance for the
essentials of food, clothing, shelter and medicine. They also
must depend on outside help to finance the primary
schools, vocational training and other programs in the
refugee villages.
Estimates are that the Government of Pakistan
itself bears about half the direct cost of the total
Afghan relief effort. Pakistan also absorbs all the indirect
costs for land and water resources caused by the
growing concentration of refugees.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
oversees the international Afghan relief program, which is
administered by the Pakistanis. The World Food Programme,
United Nations Children's Fund, and the World Health
Organization are among the contributors to this effort.
But no relief program can answer the over-
riding question: when will the Afghan refugees be able to
return home?
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W* a
M
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"Why should our homeland be like this?
Why should we be homeless vagrants?
Aren't we human beings?
Don't we have the right to freedom?"
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"Words cannot stop bullets-but bullets cannot stop words."
This Afghan proverb easily could be the battle cry for millions of Afghans
resisting Soviet occupation. Through strikes, demonstrations and
guerrilla warfare, the Afghans are sending a signal to the Soviet Union, and to the
rest of the world that they will not submit. One Western
journalist, returning from a trip to the strategic Panjshir Valley, a stronghold
of the resistance, has described the conflict as "one of the most
popularly supported anti-communist revolts of this century."
RESI
Freedom fighters at prayer (above): their most powerful bond is their faith.
Left, after a three-day battle in the Hassan Keel Valley, mujahidin forces destroyed this Soviet-Afghan convoy and
captured more than 700 AK-47 rifles.
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Freedom fight&rs;
displ ono oI the green
Is1amj flags that have tt,
becptn a widespread
syrnb `~of resist n e to
Soviet occupation.
Jp cnptEon is fror the
"Nobody incited us to fight
against the enemy, We ourselves started
fighting for the glory of Islam. We are believers-
In uoa, ana these people wanted
us to leave our faith, Tell me, how can I-
renounce my religion?"
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esistance to the Soviet invaders is
not limited to the freedom fighters. In one form or
another it has been embraced by Afghans living
throughout the world as well as within the country.
Citizens demonstrate their defiance by distributing,
during curfew hours, hand-written or mimeo-
graphed "night letters"; closing down shops;
boycotting classes; and offering aid to tired and
hungry mujahidin. Seven Afghan wrestlers hiked
across the mountains for three days to Pakistan
rather than participate in the Moscow Olympic
Games, and more than 200 employees of the
Afghan airline Ariana, many of them pilots, fled to
Western countries to avoid flying Soviet military
personnel and materiel into Afghanistan's
war zones.
The Afghan army has virtually disintegrated
because of defections. Since the Soviet invasion,
their numbers have dwindled, in the estimates of
journalists and government experts, by 50,000 or
more; many of the former army men have joined
the mujahidin, often providing much needed
arms and expertise to the freedom fighters.
The Muslim mujahidin are bearing the brunt
of the fighting. What the freedom fighters lack in
sophisticated weaponry and modern military
training, they make up in courage, commitment
and religious faith. The mujahidin have learned to
make the best use of their limited resources,
including the rugged terrain. The craggy
mountains provide excellent places from which to
attack, and give the mujahidin effective shelter
from helicopter and rocket fire.
A West European doctor helping to treat the
Afghans witnessed a tactic of the freedom fighters
which has been documented frequently by other
eyewitness accounts: "They dig deep trenches
across narrow mountain dirt roads and cover
them. The lead tank falls in, blocking the road. The
mujahidin run to the other tanks and smear mud
over the slits so the crews are blinded. Then they
destroy the tanks with gasoline."
Engaged in a battle many analysts initially said
they could not win, the freedom fighters have
refused to acknowledge defeat. Although their
spirits are high, so are casualties. Lack of prompt
medical attention sentences many of the wounded
to die. And when food is scarce, the mujahidin
sometimes must subsist on little more than black tea
and a flat bread called non. Yet their degree of suc-
cess has been remarkable. One Western journal-
ist, after a month inside Afghanistan, wrote: "It is
no exaggeration to say that the Afghan resistance
commands almost the entire countryside."
Right, Soviet
helicopter gunship
climbs after bombing
attack on a village
in Nangarhar Province.
Afghanistan's rugged
terrain and numerous
caves (far right)
help offset the Soviet
monopoly in air power.
Above, resistance forces
atop a Soviet T-54 tank:
despite few anti-tank
weapons,the mujahidin
have developed
effective, increasingly
sophisticated techniques
for intercepting and
destroying tanks
and other armored
vehicles.
I
!
-.
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Freedom fighters (right) care for a wounded soldier far
from doctors and with few medical supplies.
"0f course it is difficult. But we can
get food on donkeys along mountain
tracks.... The worst shortage is of medical
supplies and doctors. Many of the
wounded have died because we have
no medicine to stop their bleeding."
Freedom fighter
Resistance forces are largely self-sufficient and independent. Cooks (above left) prepare the flat wheat bread
that is a staple of the Afghan diet; other resistance members assemble a homemade land mine
(center), and a blacksmith fashions a part for a rifle.
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 i II
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 he Soviets have followed their
strategic error of occupying Afghanistan with a
series of tactical miscalculations. Their military
campaigns consist largely of unwieldy forays by
tanks and armored vehicles, preceded by air
strikes from MiG fighters and helicopter
gunships. Such assaults tend to be enormously
destructive, but in the long term they
accomplish little: as soon as the Soviet and
Afghan forces return to their bases, the
mujahidin reoccupy the area. As one Western
military analyst has observed: the Soviets do not
"win any territory, and they continue to expose
their troops to Afghan mines, booby traps and
sniping." As a result, they find themselves fighting
an essentially defensive struggle from inside
armored vehicles, aircraft or occupied cities, able
only to conduct punitive raids that do little to
change the military status quo.
The Soviets also have been unable to pit one
ethnic or regional group against another
successfully; quite the opposite, the common
effort against the Soviet invader has proven to be a
greater unifying force than any other factor in
recent Afghan history. At the same time, the
decentralized, even disunited, character of the
resistance has prevented the Soviets from
mounting a single decisive military blow, oir even
responding quickly to successive attacks ins
scattered parts of the country.
While the resistance forces have few
antiaircraft and other advanced weapons, they
have grown stronger and more sophisticated in the
last year. They have become adept at springing
ambushes, setting mines, avoiding armored[ and air
attacks, and reducing their own casualties.
And even in areas which the Soviets control by day,
the nights, in classic guerrilla style, belong
to the mujahidin.
The regime's Afghan army, in the
estimation of journalists who have observed the
war, remains ineffectual in offensive operations,
prone to desertions and politically unreliable.
Soviet troops, also according to experts, suffer
from low morale and frustration, and from a
casualty rate estimated at between 8,000 to
12,000 killed and wounded.
The war is a tragedy as well for the young
Soviet soldier fighting an enemy he rarely sees, in a
conflict he does not understand.
Mujahidin gunner (left), wearing a captured Soviet tanker's helmet, holds a flag in one hand
and a Soviet RPG-7 anti-tank weapon in the other. Above, mujahidin gather in a circle
and listen intently as the gunner, kneeling, demonstrates how to aim and fire the RPG-7. The man
standing beside him is holding a model of a Soviet helicopter.
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l ~i ~ I I
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 adapted to their mountainous homeland,
the mujahidin have proven to be a
formidable foe. At top, two soldiers
descend a steep hillside; right, surrender of
a crewman from a captured armored
personnel carrier.
a
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I
Resistance unit on the
march (above) stops for a water
break. Mujahidin in the field carry
little equipment except for
their weapons and ammunition,
subsisting for long periods
on water, sugared tea
and bread.
"The Afghans have
always been the best resistance
fighters in the world."
Pakistani government official
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Much of the Soviet military equipment introduced into
Afghanistan, such as heavy tanks and large rocket launchers
(bottom), have proven unwieldy and virtually useless against
the guerrilla tactics of the Afghan resistance. The critical
difference may not be hardware, but the endurance and
determination of the freedom fighters as they train their sons,
whether with toy guns and sticks (below left) or AK-47s
(right), in the event that they must continue the fight against
Soviet occupation.
"They are a superpower
and we are among the
poorest of peoples. . .. But the
Russians have never before
fought a people who were
fighting for their faith."
Freedom fighter
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Editors: Howard Cincotta, Adrienne Price
Contributing Writer: Dian McDonald
Editorial Assistant: Diane Lewis
Art Director: Robert Banks
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Photos: Front Cover, Contact Press Imagess/Jim
Sheldon. 1,LiaisonfMcCurry/Stockbower. 2, Black
Star. 6, Black Star. 7, top-Ariane; Gamma/IFrancois
Lochon. 8-9, Gamma/Lochon (2). 10, top lefft-
Contact Press Images/Sheldon; bottom-Wide
World. 11, Liaison/McCurry/Stockbower. 12;, Black
Star. 13, Gamma/Lochon (2). 14-15, Black Sitar;
top left- Wicart. 23, bottom right-Black Sitar. 26-27,
left-Contact Press Images/Sheldon; top-[Liaison/
McCurrylStockbower; Gamma-Liaison/Nagaakura
28.29, Contact Press Images (3). 30-31, Comtact
Press Images. 32, Pascal PuginNisions. 33, Black
Star. 34.35, Gamma-Liaison/Honorin. 36-37,,
top-Omega Group Limited/Galen Geer. 40,, top-
LiaisonlMcCurrylStockbower. 41, bottom-
Wildenberg Sipa. 44-45, left-Contact Press; Images/
Sheldon; right-Liaison(McCurry/Stockbowrer;
bottom left-Black Star. 46, bottom-UPI' 447, Contact
Press Images/Sheldon. Additional photographs
provided by U.S. Government.
International Communication Agency
United States of America
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- Department of Defense publications in English
- USICA acquired 12,000 copies and distributed to
all overseas posts
- Significant segments ran on the Wireless
File-in English, Arabic, French & Spanish
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SOV ET
MILITARY
POWER
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"The more constructive East-West relation-
ship which the Allies seek requires tangible
signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to
abandon the -disturbing buildup, of its mili-
tary strength, to desist from resorting to
force and intimidation and-to cease creat-
ing or exploiting situations of crisis and
instability in the Third World."
From the Communique of the
NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting
May 1981
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
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\\1
CONTENTS
I SOVIET MILITARY POWER ................................... 5
II MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION ........................... 9
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES .................. 15
IV SOVIET THEATER FORCES .................................. 25
V SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES ................................. 53
VI QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY ................. 71
VII SOVIET' GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION ....................... 83
VIII THE CHALLENGE ............................................ 95
The illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing
each chapter are derived from various U.S. sources; while not
precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.
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r
PREFACE
The Soviet Armed Forces today number more than 4.8 million men. For the past
quarter century, we have witnessed the continuing growth of Soviet military power at a
pace that shows no signs of slackening in the future.
All elements of the Soviet Armed Forces -the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground
Forces of the Army, the Air Forces, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces-continue to
modernize with an unending flow of new weapons systems, tanks, missiles, ships, ar-
tillery and aircraft. The Soviet defense budget continues to grow to fund this force
buildup, to fund the projection of Soviet power far from Soviet shores and to fund
Soviet use of proxy forces to support revolutionary factions and conflict in an increas-
ing threat to international stability.
To comprehend the threat to Western strategic interests posed by the growth and
power projection of the Soviet Armed Forces it is useful to consider in detail the com-
position, organization and doctrine of these forces, their ideological underpinning,
and their steady acquisition of new, increasingly capable conventional, theater
nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons systems. It is equally important to examine the
USSR's industrial base, military resource allocations, and continuing quest for
military/ technological superiority which contribute to the effectiveness of its armed
forces and proxy forces, and which support the Soviets' position as a world leader in
arms exports.
The facts are stark:
? The Soviet Ground Forces have grown to more than 180 divisions - motorized rifle
divisions, tank divisions and airborne divisions - stationed in Eastern Europe, in the
USSR, in Mongolia, and in combat in Afghanistan. Soviet Ground Forces have achiev-
ed the capacity for extended intensive combat in the Central Region of Europe.
? The Soviets have fielded 50,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery pieces. The Soviet divi-
sions are being equipped with the newer, faster, better armored T-64 and T-72 tanks.
Some artillery units, organic to each division, include new, heavy mobile artillery,
multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled, armored 122-mm and 152-mm guns.
? More than 5,200 helicopters are available to the Soviet Armed Forces, including
increasing numbers of Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopter gunships used in direct support of
ground forces on the battlefield.
? More than 3,500 Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical bombers and fighter aircraft
are located in Eastern Europe alone. In each of the last eight years, the Soviets have
produced more than 1,000 fighter aircraft.
? Against Western Europe, China and Japan, the Soviets are adding constantly to
deliverable nuclear warheads, with the number of launchers growing, with some 250
mobile, SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile launchers in the field, and with
three nuclear warheads on each SS-20 missile.
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? The Soviets continue to give high priority to the modernization of their Intercon-
tinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force and their Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
(SLBM) force stressing increased accuracy and greater warhead throwweight. The
Soviet intercontinental strategic arsenal includes 7,000 nuclear warheads, with 1,398
ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 long-range bombers. This does not in-
clude some 150 nuclear-capable BACKFIRE bombers.
? The Soviets have eight classes of submarines and eight classes of major surface
warships, including nuclear-powered cruisers and new aircraft carriers, presently
under construction. This growing naval force emerging from large, modern shipyards
is designed to support sustained operations in remote areas in order to project Soviet
power around the world.
? The Soviet Air Defense Forces man 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at
1,000 fixed missile sites across the Soviet Union.
? The growth of the Soviet Armed Forces is made possible by the USSR's military
production base which continues to grow at the expense of all other components of the
Soviet economy. There are 135 major military industrial plants now operating in the
Soviet Union with over 40 million square meters in floor space, a 34 percent increase
since 1970. In 1980, these plants produced more than 150 different types of weapons
systems for Soviet forces and for export to client states and developing countries.
? Today, the Soviets have more than 85,000 men fighting in Afghanistan. Soviet
naval forces are deployed in the major oceans of the world. The USSR is gaining in-
creased access to military facilities and is supporting proxy conflicts in Africa,
Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and the Western hemisphere.
There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion,
modernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are
obvious.
A clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities,
their strengths and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of ef-
fective U.S. and Allied Armed Forces.
The greatest defense forces in the world are those of free people in free nations well
informed as to the challenge they face, firmly united in their resolve to provide fully
for the common defense, thereby deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of
the world's democracies.
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
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I SOVIET MILITARY PO
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This document, which is a distillation of briefings
provided to the NATO Ministers of Defense,
describes the totality of the Soviet military buildup
in some detail. Free people can better determine the
challenges they face and the decisions required if
armed with adequate factual knowledge of the
threat. For this reason, the Secretary of Defense has
had this document prepared and published.
Soviet Military Power presents a factual portrayal
of the Soviet Armed Forces, a review intended to be
as informative as possible on an issue of the utmost
importance to the United States and its Allies.
The chart "Soviet Military Forces," on pages six
and seven of Chapter I, depicts the size, composition
and deployment of the USSR's Strategic Nuclear
Forces, Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense
Forces and Naval Forces.
Chapter II, Military Resource Allocation, ex-
amines the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
military industrial base, the world's largest in
facilities and physical size. .
Chapter III, Organization of Soviet Armed
Forces, describes the USSR's strategic command
structure, command and control, logistic support
and combat doctrine.
Chapter IV reviews those Soviet Armed Forces
designated for theater operations, nuclear and con-
ventional land, sea and air forces- forces geared to
fast-paced offensive operations, forces arrayed
against the nations of Western Europe.
Chapter V describes the increasing capabilities of
the Soviet Strategic Forces, including the SS-17, SS-
18, and SS-19 missiles of the ICBM forces, and the
continuing modernization of the submarine launch-
ed ballistic missile forces.
Chapter VI reports on the Research and Develop-
ment effort behind the USSR's drive for modern
military technology.
Chapter VII reviews the application of Soviet
military power today, and Chapter VIII summarizes
the challenge posed by the Soviet Armed Forces.
The Tupolev BACKFIRE, swing-wing, turbofan powered
bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or air-to-
surface missiles entered service in the mid-1970s. Thirty
new BACKFIRES are being built each year in the contin-
uing expansion and modernization of Soviet military
power..
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PACT DIVISIONS
CATEGORY 1 - 62%
CATEGORY 2 - 21%
CATEGORY 3 - 17%
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 547
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 380
ICBMs
IRBMs/MRBMs
SS-11
580
SS-13
60
SS-17
150
SS-4
320
SS-18
308
SS-5
35
SS-19
300
SS-20
250+
I SS-N-6
SS-N-8
SS-N-18
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 545
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 260
80 DIVISIONS
CATEGORY 1 = 5%
CATEGORY 2- 20%
CATEGORY 3 - 75%
CATEGORY 2 - REDUCED STRENGTH, 50-75% AUTHORIZED WARTIME STRENGTH
CATEGORY 3 - CADRE STRENGTH, BELOW 50% AUTHORIZED WARTIME STRENGTH
SOVIET
NORTHERN FL
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEE
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATIO
1
25 DIVISIONS
CATEG 20%
CATE RY 2 o
LATE ORY 3 - 60%
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4ILITARY FORCES
PACIFIC FLEET
TOTAL NUMBER IN FLEET 720
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 420
IATION
880
SURFACE COMBATANTS
1,297
4DGER
ISON
SUBMARINES
377
ATION
4,800
SAM
AABM
AUXILIARIES
755
LAUNCHERS 10,000
LAUNCHERS 32
SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION
1,440
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II MILITARY RESOURCE
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ALLOCATION
In 1980, the first of the Soviets' TYPHOON-
Class 25,000-ton strategic ballistic missile sub-
marines was launched from a newly completed
construction hall at the Severodvinsk Shipyard
on the White Sea. Earlier in the year the same
shipyard launched the first of the extremely
large OSCAR-Class guided missile nuclear sub-
marines, a submarine capable of firing 24 long-
range, antiship cruise missiles while remaining
submerged.
In 1980, some 2,400 kilometers southeast of
Severodvinsk, the mammoth Nizhniy Tagil
Railroad Car and Tank Plant, an industrial fa-
cility covering 827,000 square meters of floor-
space, manufactured 2,500 T-72 tanks.
To support the continuing growth and mod-
ernization of the armed forces, the Soviet Union
over the past quarter century has increased
military expenditures in real terms, devoting an
average of 12-to-14 percent of its Gross Na-
tional Product each year to the Soviet military.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military in-
vestment exceeded comparable US spending
by 70 percent in 1979. The defense sector is the
first priority of Soviet industrial production.
The Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact mili-
tary industrial base is by far the world's largest
in number of facilities and physical size. The
Soviet Union alone produces more weapons sys-
tems in greater quantities than any other country.
The Soviet military industry has grown stead-
ily and consistently over the past 20-to-25 years.
Its physical growth -and the commitment of
large quantities of financial and human re-
sources is its most dynamic aspect, but its
The TYPHOON 25,000-ton strategic ballistic missile
submarine was launched from the Severodvinsk
Naval Shipyard in 1980. Severodvinsk, one of five
Soviet yards building submarines, has produced
seven different classes in the last decade.
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cyclical production is its most important. Pro-
duction plants remain at work. As old weapons
programs are phased out, new ones are begun,
leaving no down times or long periods of layoffs
and inactivity. The cyclical process, the conti-
nuing facility growth and the high rates of pro-
duction keep the arms industry in a high state of
readiness to meet any contingency and any de-
mand for new weapons. The military produc-
tion industry includes 135 major final assembly
plants involved in producing weapons as end
products. Over 3,500 individual factories and
related installations provide support to these
final assembly plants.
Major Soviet
Manufacturing Areas
1. Strategic and Defensive Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors
Major Surface Combatants
2. Strategic Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Major Surface Combatants
3. Armored Vehicles
Tanks
4. Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Strategic and Defensive Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors
5. Major Surface Combatants
Submarines
Tanks
Aircraft Engines
Missile Engines and Motors
Defensive Missiles
6. Submarines
Tactical Aircraft
Armored Vehicles
7. Major Surface Combatants
Strategic and Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Strategic Missiles
Missile Engines and Motors
Armored Vehicles
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers
8. Tactical Aircraft
Missile Engines and Motors
9. Tactical Aircraft
10. Strategic Aircraft
11. Aircraft Engines
Strategic Missiles
Defensive Missiles
Armored Vehicles
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers
Tanks
12. Tactical Aircraft
Aircraft Engines
Missile Engines and Motors
Armored Vehicles
Tanks
Artillery, SP Guns and
Multiple Rocket Launchers
13. Strategic Missiles
Tactical Aircraft
14. Major Surface Combatants
Submarines
Strategic Missiles
Tactical Aircraft
Construction at the Severodvinsk Naval Ship-
yard illustrates the growth of Soviet facilities
over time. Over the past decade seven classes of
submarines have been produced, and during
this time, floor space has increased by several
hundred thousand square meters, or approxi-
mately three-quarters again the yard's size ten
years earlier. The new large construction hall
used to assemble the TYPHOON and OSCAR
submarines accounted for about 25 percent of
this increase. Moreover, Severodvinsk is only
one of five Soviet yards producing submarines.
In the aerospace industry, even though there
has been significant construction in recent years
including a number of new large final assembly
buildings at established plants, the Soviets have
revealed that they are constructing a wholly
new, large aircraft plant at Ulyanovsk. This
plant, when completed, will be well-suited for
the fabrication and assembly of large air-
craft- transports or bombers - underscoring
the Soviets' continuing drive to improve further
their industrial base. Qualitative improvements
in production technology, which typically ac-
company new and more sophisticated aircraft,
have paralleled the physical growth of the
industry.
The Army's sector of Soviet military industry
is traditionally large to support the growing
Ground Forces. Army industrial floorspace has
expanded by over ten percent in the late 1970s.
All segments of the Army's industrial base have
been expanded despite their already massive
size. For instance, a major Soviet tank producer
which was already nearly five times as large as
the US manufacturers, has again been expanded.
The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact need all
of these facilities for the large number of major
weapons and support systems currently in pro-
duction -more than 150 in all.
The following tables show estimates of pro-
duction by weapon systems type over the past
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AREA OF NIZHNIY TAGIL TANK PLANT
(Superimposed on Washington, D.C.)
,F
111.500 SQUARE' TER
IICHI AN
S! s
. TANK PLANT'-
LINCOLN
MEMO
II MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION
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Production of Ground Forces Materiel
USSR and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
USSR
NSWP
Tanks
2500
800
2500
800
2500
800
3000
800
3000
750
T-55
500
800
500
T-64
500
-
500
500
-
500
-
500
-
T-72
1500
1500
-
2000
-
2500
-
-
-
Trial
-
Trial
-
Output
Output
Other Armored Fighting
Vehicles
4500
1800
4500
1900
5500
1700
5500
1600
5500
1200
Towed Field Artillery
900
50
1300
50
1500
100
1500
100
1300
100
Self-Propelled Field Artillery
900
-
950
-
650
-
250
50
150
50
Multiple Rocket Launchers
500
250
550
200
550
150
450
150
300
150
Self-Propelled AA Artillery
500
100
500
100
100
50
100
50
100
50
Towed-AA Artillery
500
300
250
250
100
200
-
200
-
150
Infantry Weapons
250,000
140,000
350,000
120,000
450,000
200,000
450,000
115,000
400,000
100,000
five years. A five year period was selected to
demonstrate the Soviet ability to sustain high
rates of production.
Aircraft Production
USSR
Bombers
Fighters/
Fighter-Bombers
1,200
1,200
1,300
1,300
1,300
Transports
450
400
400
400
350
Trainers
50
50
50
25
225
ASW
5
10
10
10
10
Helicopters
1,400
900
600
700
750
Utility
125
100
100
100
100
Total
3,255
2,690
2,490
2,565
2,765
The most important aspect of aircraft pro-
duction is the sustained high rates of fighter air-
craft production. Helicopter production shows
a decline at midpoint, but then a gradual build-
up probably indicating a phase-out/phase-in of
a new system, or increased orders for
helicopters.
Missile Production
USSR
Missile Type 1976 1977 197 81979 1980
ICBMs 300 300 200 200 200
I R B M s 50 100 100 100 100
S R B M s 100 200 250 300 300
S LC M s 600 600 600 700 700
SLBMs 150 175 225 175 175
ASMs 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
SAMs 40,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Missile production shows the wide range of
missiles in production. Every class of missiles,
from Surface-to-Air to ICBMs, is produced in
significant quantities.
Naval ship construction demonstrates the
USSR's capability to sustain high rates through-
out. Moreover, the number of auxiliary ships
produced in Eastern Europe has freed Soviet
building ways for other projects.
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Naval Ship Construction
USSR
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Major
Combatants
12
12
12
11
11
Minor
Combatants
58
56
52
48
52
Ground Forces Materiel Production
USSR
1976
1977
19 1978
1979
Tanks
2,500
2,500
2,500
3,000
3,000
T-55
500
500
500
500
-
1-64
500
500
500
500
500
T-72
1,500
1,500
1,500
2,000
2,500
T-80
Trial
Output
Trial
Output
Other Armored
Vehicles
4,500
4,500
5,500
5,500
5,500
Self-Propelled
Field Artillery
900
950
650
250
150
Soviet Army materiel production shows a
jump in the output of tanks and other armored
vehicles in 1979 and 1980. The production of
self-propelled artillery, however, exhibits a
steady decline since 1977. This probably rep-
resents the phasing out of production of an old
weapon and the introduction of a new one.
Such transition is fairly common in Soviet pro-
duction practices. The evolutionary introduc-
tion of new systems continues. Overall, Soviet
Ground Forces materiel production has increas-
ed over the past five years.
An even greater increase is evident when
Soviet Ground Forces materiel production is
combined with that of the Warsaw Pact allies.
These weapons systems are produced to equip
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and for export.
In recent years, in addition to being the world's
largest producer, the USSR has become the
world's largest exporter of major items of mili-
tary equipment to the Third World.
To provide nuclear weapons for their Armed
Forces, the Soviets have an adequate number of
plutonium and uranium production facilities to
ensure a sufficient quantity of necessary materi-
al for those forces, and to ensure the provision
of material for other high priority needs as well.
What impact does this massive dedication of
resources to military products have on the
USSR? The Soviet Union and the countries of
the Warsaw Pact have, over the past decade,
faced deteriorating economies while at the same
time sustaining high levels of military equip-
ment production for an across-the-board force
modernization. The Soviets' own economy is in
difficulty and facing competing priorities for
scarce resources as it begins the 11th Five Year
Plan. The problems include food shortages, low
labor productivity, transportation disruptions
and energy constraints which have all combined
to bring industrial growth to a post-1945 low.
Externally, the high costs of supporting other
communist regimes, also in difficulty, such as
Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Poland have
created an additional burden. These difficulties
have grown at the end of a decade during which
Moscow's policy has been to stress guns over
butter. Throughout the 1970s the Soviets have
consistently allocated from 12-to-14 percent of
Gross National Product to military programs in
spite of a marked downward trend in the rate of
economic growth. If this trend continues, the
percentage allocated to the military will in-
crease. There are no signs of a deemphasis of
military programs.
The economic burden of defense spending, as
viewed in the West, is viewed differently in the
Soviet Union. To the Soviets, defense spending
is a necessity and a priority above all else. Pro-
ductivity might continue to decline and the
Soviets might have to face a negative growth
rate, but the system of fostering massive
military industrial production will continue.
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III ORGANIZATION OF
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)VIET ARMED FORCES
Marshal of the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact Commander-in-Chief Kulikov has written
that the traumatic experience of World War II
has taught the Soviets the necessity of having a
fully operational strategic command structure
in being prior to the onset of hostilities. To this
end, the Soviets have created a wartime man-
agement structure which provides a unified sys-
tem of command capable of exerting centraliz-
ed direction, but designed to permit decentral-
ization of functions to lower levels as necessary.
Immediate control of the Soviet land, sea and
air forces is exercised by the Minister of De-
fense. Within the Soviet Government, the Min-
ister of Defense is a member of the Council of
Ministers, appointed by and technically answer-
able to the Supreme Soviet or to its Presidium.
In practice he is responsible to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Politburo. The
current Minister of Defense, Marshal of the
Soviet Union Ustinov, is a member of the Polit-
buro, as was his predecessor. The Defense
Council, a subset of the Politburo chaired by
the General Secretary of the CPSU, in effect
functions as the controlling authority. In 1976,
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was award-
ed the highest military rank, that of Marshal of
the Soviet Union, possibly indicating that ulti-
mate operational-as well as policymaking -
control of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces was
being vested in the Defense Council.
The combined arms army, the basic Soviet field ar-
my, includes four motorized rifle divisions, a tank
division, an artillery brigade, missile units, frontal
air support, and intelligence, chemical, engineer
and signal units. There are more than 180 divisions
in the Soviet Armed Forces today.
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/l/
The key point to understand about the Soviet
military control structure is that the reins of the
instruments of state policy and power-not just
the purely military - are in the hands of a tested
political leadership supported by very experi-
enced and long-established staffs. President
Brezhnev and his key colleagues have been at
the center of power for decades. Ustinov has
guided the Soviet armaments industry since the
early 1940s and has proven to be an able and
decisive leader. These men, aided by such
others as KGB Chief Andropov, Premier Tik-
honov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, the ageless
ideologue Suslov, Chief of General Staff Ogar-
kov, Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov and
lesser but equally experienced subchiefs of the
military and industry, know how the Soviet
military machine runs and what they want to
achieve. They are able to marshal all available
Soviet resources toward their strategic objective.
They exercise absolute control of all instru-
ments of Soviet power.
At the apex of the Soviet wartime strategic
command structure is the State Defense Com-
mittee or GKO. The Defense Committee serves
to unify the highest military and civilian leader-
ship to insure centralized political direction of
the entire war effort. This committee appears to
consist of the permanent members of the peace-
time Defense Council. Just as in World War II,
the Defense Committee and its subordinate
managerial entities would play a critical role in
wartime economic mobilization and in oversee-
ing sustained wartime production. Beneath the
Defense Committee and its component elements
is the vast ministerial structure of the Soviet
government.
Under the guidance of the Defense Commit-
tee, a Supreme High Command (VGK) would
serve as the highest organization of strategic
military leadership. The Supreme High Com-
mand apparently includes the CPSU General
Secretary, the Minister of Defense, the first De-
puty Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main
Political Directorate, and the Commanders in
Chief of each of the five services. The contribu-
tion of the General Staff, serving as an executive
agent for the VGK, would be to insure the de-
velopment and execution of a unified military
strategy for the operational commands.
In order to simplify the planning for war, the
Soviets have divided the world into 13 Theaters
of Military Operations, or TVDs. The Theater
of Military Operations is a geographical con-
cept used to denote an area within which their
armed forces would function in wartime. There
appear to be possibly five continental TVDs,
four maritime or naval TVDs, and four inter-
continental TVDs.
Recognizing that the Soviet Supreme High
Command would find it difficult to exercise the
direction of multi-theater operations without an
intermediate command echelon, the Soviets
have apparently established intermediate-level
high commands. This Soviet conceptual frame-
Soviet Military Districts
and Groups of Forces
1.
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
11. Carpathian
2.
Central Group of Forces
12. Belorussian
3.
Northern Group of Forces
13. Moscow
4.
Southern Group of Forces
14. Odessa
5.
Baltic
15. Kiev
6.
Leningrad
16. Volga
7.
Ural
17. North Caucasus
8.
Siberian
18. Transcaucasus
9.
Transbaykal
19. Central Asia
10.
Far East
20. Turkestan
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C-IN-C SOVIET
ARMED FORCES
GENERAL SECRETARY
CPSU
FIRST DEPUTY
MINISTERS OF DEFENSE
CHIEF,
MAIN POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE
C-IN-C'S OF
SOVIET FORCES
FIRST DEPUTY
MINISTER OF
DEFENSE
DEPUTY MINISTER
OF DEFENSE
V. I. Petrov
(C-in-C Ground Forces)
DEPUTY MINISTER
OF DEFENSE
S. G. Gorshkov
(C-in-C Naval Forces)
FIRST DEPUTY
MINISTER OF
DEFENSE
N. V. Ogarkov
(Chief of the
General Staff)
DEPUTY MINISTER
OF DEFENSE
P. S. Kutakhov
(C-in-C An Forces)
MINISTER
OF DEFENSE
CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF
OTHER PARTY
AND STATE
FIGURES AS REQUIRED
GENERAL STAFF
(EXECUTIVE AGENT OF VGK)
QFW
CHIEF OF
MAIN POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE
A. A. Yepishev
V. F. Tolubko
(C-in-C Strategic
Rocket Forces)
FIRST DEPUTY
MINISTER OF
DEFENSE
V. G. Kulikov
(C-in-C Warsaw
Pact Forces)
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED
FORCES
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work for intermediate-level strategic leadership
is intended to accommodate centralized strategic
planning with decentralized battle management.
The Theaters of Military Operations not only
include the terrain upon which the Fronts
would conduct their operations, but include
those Military Districts that would support such
operations. Thus, while forces may depart a
Military District as battlefield operations pro-
gress, the Military District structure would be
retained to serve as a principal wartime ad-
ministrative entity.
The Soviets have carefully thought out and
continue to develop the details of the system of
strategic leadership. The system required for
war fighting and war survival is now in place.
Central to this system is the establishment of the
means to ensure the survival of state control.
The Soviets have, for years, been building an
infrastructure of facilities and procedures which
is geared to the survival of the means of con-
trol for the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union during even the worst of conflict situa-
tions - a nuclear war. Alternative locations
have been established for virtually the entire
structure of the Soviet leadership - political,
military, security and industrial-from the
highest to the lowest levels. Many of these are
bunkered facilities and certain levels of leader-
ship are provided with mobile equipment as
well.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Utilizing the General Staff of the Ministry of
Defense as its agent, the Soviet Defense Com-
mittee controls its military commands. To
achieve this goal the Soviets have developed ex-
tensive and modern command, control and
communications (C3) systems. Soviet doctrine
emphasizes centralized control, survivability,
redundancy and flexibility within the system.
Survivability is achieved through dispersal,
redundancy, hardness, concealment and mobil-
ity. Survivability is also enhanced by airborne
command posts, which can be deployed to dif-
ferent locations to serve as alternate communi-
cations hubs in the event of war, hedging
against the destruction of groundbase facilities.
Redundancy includes multiple command
centers to assure continuity of the control of
armed forces, and a wide variety of communi-
cations means and modes. Redundancy of
Soviet C3 facilities is also achieved through the
establishment of main and alternate command
posts.
In the Soviet Union, the strategic command
and control system maintains contact with
widespread civil and military authorities. The
system includes extensive networks of cable and
open-wire lines, radio-relay links, radio-com-
munications stations, and communications
satellites. Modern Soviet telecommunications
engineering concepts stress the flexibility, sur-
vivability and reliability of the system to meet
national military command and control re-
quirements for continuous telecommunications
operations. The major national telecommuni-
cations complex is known as the unified com-
munications system. In the event of war, the en-
tire system could be readily converted into a na-
tionwide military communications network.
Automation of Soviet command and control
is evolving. The Soviet Air Defense Forces and
the Moscow antiballistic missile system employ
automation most extensively. The major
strength of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact automation
program is that systems are being developed
specifically for military requirements rather
than adapting other systems to military use.
Soviet satellites provide communications sup-
port to military, diplomatic, intelligence, and
civilian organizations. The predominant com-
munications satellite used in support of military
command and control has been the MOLNIYA
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I system. Since the mid-1960s, when the first
MOLNIYA I was launched, the Soviet Union
has continued to improve its communications
satellite program. The Soviet Union has launch-
ed the improved MOLNIYA II and MOLNIYA
III systems which can be used for military com-
mand and control. The MOLNIYA I and II
military ground sites are deployed at major
headquarters throughout the Soviet Union, and
stations are beginning to be deployed in Eastern
Europe.
The Soviets are maintaining vigorous re-
search and development programs to upgrade
their C3 systems emphasizing the use of cable as
the primary means of communication when
practicable, and increasing use of satellite and
point-to-point systems operating in a number of
frequency ranges.
The Soviets can be expected to increase their
use of automated systems which will increase
their data handling capabilities as well as in-
crease reaction times. As in the past, Soviet
command and control systems will continue to
employ redundancy, hardness and mobility to
enhance survivability.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE
SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The Deputy Defense Minister who is Chief of
the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces (NTVS)
has management responsibility for the overall
system of rear service support to the armed forces.
The Deputy Minister and his staff are located
at Ministry of Defense Headquarters in Mos-
cow. The first deputy to the NTVS serves as
Chief of the Main Staff of the Rear, which plays
a key role in the logistic establishment. From
the Ministry headquarters, the Staff administers
the fuel, food, clothing, military trade and
technical supply organizations, the military
medical and veterinary organizations, and
other directorates and departments. This cen-
tralized system also includes a large number of
Rear Services brigades, regiments and battal-
ions as well as installations, bases, depots, ar-
senals, repair plants and other support assets for
all armed forces components. All aspects of the
movement of military supplies received from
the national economy are managed by the Rear
Services staff. In this management capacity, the
Rear Services staff coordinates the activities of
the deputy commanders for Rear Services of
each of the branches as well as at the Military
District, groups of forces and tactical levels.
Soviet wartime logistic planning is carried on
at three general levels: strategic, operational
and tactical. The NTVS is the principal con-
troller of the numerous and diverse logistic
organizations and assets comprising what Soviet
planners call the "central Rear Services." There
is a Rear Services counterpart at each subor-
dinate echelon down to regiment. This officer,
who is designated a deputy commander as well
as the Chief of the Rear, is directly subordinate
to his unit or formation commander, and in
addition carries out the policies and guidelines
of Rear Service representatives at higher levels.
The entire Rear Services establishment is
designed to support military operations of all
the Armed Forces with consumable supplies,
weapon system stocks, maintenance assets,
transportation resources, local security and a
variety of logistic services deemed integral to the
successful conduct of combat operations. In
wartime, central logistic units, resources and
command/control entities, in addition to serv-
ing as a USSR-based resource pool, may be
moved into Theaters of Military Operations
directly to support operational formations and
organize the use of theater resources. Military
command post complexes are present at all tac-
tical and operational echelons.
The Soviets, and their Warsaw Pact military
allies, conceived a system for automating Pact
~0
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED
FORCES
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ll
Rear Service command and control in the early
1960s. Variations of this system have been field
tested over the last decade. The system is de-
signed principally to enable the Chief of the
Rear at operational/ strategic levels rapidly to
evaluate his resources and assets in light of an
envisioned operation; to formulate a Rear Ser-
vice plan which optimally supports the com-
mander's concept of operations; and to respond
to the support requirements generated by
rapidly changing battlefield situations.
Today, in the European Theater, for exam-
ple, the Rear Services of the Soviet Armed
Forces already have in place vast stocks of all
the logistic supplies-from fuel, to ammuni-
tion, to weapon systems stocks-required 'for
sustained combat.
COMBINED ARMS WARFARE
At the heart of Soviet combat doctrine is the
concept of combined arms operations. To the
Soviets, combined arms operations are more
than the joint use of weapon systems and forces.
The concept involves the bringing to bear of all
systems and forces as needed in a unified and
effective manner.
The Soviet Union's concept of combined
arms operations, particularly at Front or
theater levels, is much broader and more struc-
tured organizationally than the Western com-
bined arms concept envisioning the joint and
cooperative employment of ground, air and, if
applicable, naval forces to achieve an objective.
The operational definitions as provided by the
Soviets in their combat doctrine permit a fuller
understanding of the combined arms warfare
concept.
? The Combined Arms Battle is a bat-
tle fought by a combined arms formation
or unit together with attached formations
or units of other service branches and
aviation; and in maritime sectors, with
naval forces as well. The use of nuclear
weapons and the participation of the
various service branches or forces, in con-
junction with the great mobility of the
troops, impart an especially decisive and
maneuver-oriented character to combined
arms battle.
? The Combined Arms Commander is
the sole commander of a combined arms
formation, unit, or subunit. He organizes
the combined arms combat of the forces
subordinated to him, and leads them in
battle. He makes the decision to engage
the enemy, assigns combat missions to
subunits, coordinates the actions of his
own combined armed troops with those
of neighboring troops, and directs his
staff, and the commanders of the service
branches and Services.
? The Combined Arms Staff is the staff
of a major field force or of a formation
or unit which includes formations, units
or subunits of various service branches.
The combined arms staff ensures coordi-
nation between the staffs of the subor-
dinated and cooperating troops, and
those of the service branches, special
troops, services and rear. The combined
arms staff takes all measures necessary to
ensure the comprehensive preparation of
the troops for their combat missions, and
to ensure constant command and control
of the troops during the course of battle
(or operation).
At the Front level the Soviets are organized
to control and employ coordinated ground, air,
missile, air defense and, if appropriate, naval
formations. The combined military power of all
weapon systems is applied in a fully integrated
plan. To insure the control of activities, the
Front has a combined arms commander who is
responsible for carrying out missions approved
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Combined Arms Warfare, at the heart of Soviet
combat doctrine, brings units from the different
services, such as the tank, infantry, self-
propelled artillery and missile units shown here,
under one Combined Arms Commander.
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED
FORCES
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by the General Staff Plan. It is his responsibility
to oversee and coordinate the operations of his
subordinate units and the commanders of the
other services subordinated under his com-
mand. If the Front is operating near or in a
maritime sector, naval forces will be under his
command. As stated in the definition, he must
also coordinate his activities with neighboring
troops, most probably another Front.
The Front is the largest field formation in
wartime. It is a tactical and administrative unit
with size and composition subject to consider-
able variation depending upon the situation. A
Front could be composed of three-to-five com-
bined arms armies, one or two tank armies, plus
aviation, air assault, diversionary, artillery,
missile, air defense, engineer, signal, intel-
ligence, reconnaissance and rear service units.
A combined arms army might include three
or four motorized rifle divisions and a tank divi-
sion, plus artillery, missile, air defense,
engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence,
reconnaissance and rear service units.
The role of the tank army, a heavily armored
force of tanks and motorized rifle troops, is to
rupture and penetrate enemy defenses and to
exploit breakthroughs deep into the enemy's
rear areas. This army is a tactical and ad-
ministrative unit capable of independent opera-
tions, although its normal employment, like
that of the combined arms army, is as a compo-
nent of a Front. The size of the army and its
force composition are dependent upon the mis-
sion, the situation and the area of operations.
There are three different types of maneuver
divisions in the field forces: motorized rifle,
tank, and airborne. The motorized rifle and
tank divisions are the major combat and ma-
neuver elements of the ground combat forces.
Divisions are organized on a triangular basis.
The motorized rifle division has three motorized
rifle regiments, one tank regiment, one artillery
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regiment, one air defense regiment and other
support elements. The tank division forms
around three tank regiments, one motorized ri-
fle regiment, one artillery regiment, one air
defense regiment and other support elements.
Three airborne rifle regiments are the nucleus
of the airborne division.
As few as one Front and as many as five may
exist in a Theater of Military Operations
(TVD). A High Command of Forces in a TVD
is commanded by at least a three star general
who is directly responsible to the Soviet General
Staff. The commander is supported by a com-
bined arms staff with the responsibility for over-
seeing and coordinating the activities of the
various strategic formations. At the theater
level the commander insures that the plans of
the General Staff for his forces in the theater are
carried out.
The General Staff controls the operations of
the five services, while individual service chiefs
are responsible for the training and support of
troops, the development of tactics and the ac-
quisition of weapons systems for their respective
services. The services function under the Gen-
eral Staff to assure the mutual supportiveness of
their training, tactics, and weapons acquisi-
tions. In a wartime situation, the same system
would apply, but the General Staff would
operate as the executive agent of the national
leadership and would adopt plans for control of
the forces. The Soviets have organizationally
structured their forces to form a unified com-
mand structure under the General Staff. This
provides the Soviets with the command struc-
ture to apply the totality of their military power
in warfare so that the whole of the operation is
greater than the sum of its parts.
III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED
FORCES
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IV SOVIET THEATER F(
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ACES
Over the past 15 years the Soviets have stead-
ily expanded and upgraded their military forces
designated for theater operations with partic-
ular attention directed toward the European
theater. During this period, the Soviet objective
for this modernization has been the conversion
of the Red Army from a balanced offensive-
defensive force to one geared to fast-paced of-
fensive operations. A key aim appears to have
been the provision in peacetime of a standing
Army at the leading edge of the potential
battlefield such that it could begin operations
with minimal mobilization and, thereby, with
little warning.
The forces are highly mobile, and they are
organized and supplied for a rapid initial push
from a peacetime posture. At the outset of a
war, the Soviets plan to move quickly slicing
through NATO forces in the Central Region
and driving to the English Channel, while con-
currently securing the northern and southern
flanks. During the initial operations, necessary
additional forces would be mobilized and mov-
ed to the battlefield. All of this the Soviets aim
to accomplish before the full weight of NATO
reinforcements could be brought to bear. The
Soviets have given priority attention to all
elements of their Armed Forces with a role to
play in the sweep across Europe. Modernization
and upgrading is underway in each of the
following elements of Soviet Theater Forces:
Long Range Missile and Air Forces
Ground Forces
Frontal Aviation
Military Transport Aviation
Special Purpose Forces
Navy
Soviet theater nuclear forces are being deployed
in increasing numbers against Western Europe
and Asia. Some 250 SS-20 mobile, MIRVed nuclear
warhead, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
have been deployed. Three warheads per missile
greatly increase Soviet firepower; mobility in-
creases survivability.
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LONG-RANGE THEATER
MISSILES
Since the advent of the nuclear-tipped bal-
listic missile, the Soviets have dedicated signifi-
cant numbers of nuclear, land-based missiles to
theater warfare missions. No theater has been
neglected, but the European theater has always
commanded the greatest attention. The first
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs-
1,000-to-3,000 kilometers) were fielded in the
late 1950s, followed by improved MRBMs and
new intermediate -range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs-3,000-to-5,000 kilometers) in the, ear-
ly 1960s.
Soviet MRBM/IRBM Characteristics
Warhead Range Propellant Mobility
MRBM
SS-4 SANDAL 1 Z000 Liquid Fixed
IRBM
SS-5 SKEAN 1
As the number of SS-20
missile launch sites in
the western USSR con-
tinues to grow, the Sovi-
ets intensify their tacti-
cal nuclear strike capa-
bility specifically tar-
geted against Western
Europe - SS-20 range and
coverage extend beyond
the shaded area.
More than 700 fixed launchers for these
systems-the SS-3 and SS-4 MRBMs and the SS-
5 IRBM -were operational at peak deployment
in the mid-1960s. All but approximately 100
were directed at targets in or related to the
European theater. The remainder were direct-
ed against the Middle East, South Asia and the
Western Pacific littoral. China was not then a
target. In the late 1960s, the Soviets began to
draw down these, by then, obsolescent missiles,
replacing them with ICBMs and adding cover-
age of the new enemy-China.
This situation remained unchanged until
1977 when the SS-20 IRBM first reached opera-
tional status. Previously, the theater-dedicated
strategic nuclear missiles were based at fixed,
vulnerable sites, and each missile carried only
one warhead - although provisions for force
reconstitution and refire were made. The SS-20
eliminated most of these weaknesses. Its launch-
ers are highly mobile, and each SS-20 is fitted
with three, very accurate and independently
targetable (MIRVed) warheads. Moreover,
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Soviet Medium and Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles
each SS-20 unit is equipped with refire
missiles-one per launcher-and each refire
missile is fitted with three warheads. Thus the
firepower of the theater strategic nuclear missile
forces is being greatly multiplied, even though
the Soviets are withdrawing older SS-4s and SS-
5s from the forces as the SS-20s are deployed.
As of July 1981, some 250 SS-20 launcher/
missile sets equipped with a total of 750 nuclear
warheads had been deployed. Of these, 175
with 525 warheads are deployed opposite the
NATO countries. There is no sign that the de-
ployment is slackening. Since January 1981, the
PERSHING
1A
LU
w
5
INTRODUCED
1969
1977
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES
1
3
RANGE
160-740 KM
5000 KM
MODE
MOBILE
MOBILE
PROPELLANT
SOLID
SOLID
GUIDANCE
GYRO-AUTO-REFERENCE
INERTIAL
REACTION TIME (MAX.)
LESS THAN 1 HOUR
1 HOUR +
Characteristics of Primary
US Et Soviet Theater Missiles
pace of SS-20 base construction has increased,
particularly opposite the NATO nations. At
bases known to be under construction, another
65 launchers with some 195 warheads will be
deployed. Perhaps as many as 100-to-150 addi-
tional launchers - 300-to-450 warheads-could
be fielded before the deployment program
reaches its conclusion. While this modern
nuclear force will continue to exhibit the full
coverage of theater targets around the Soviet
Union's periphery, it will be concentrated
primarily against the European theater.
THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES
The Ground Forces, with a strength of
1,825,000, constitute the largest of the five ma-
jor components of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Traditionally, Imperial Russian and Soviet ar-
mies have been characterized by great numbers.
Today, the Ground Forces are highly moderniz-
ed and well equipped, possessing great fire-
power and mobility. Manpower and materiel
combine to make the present Soviet Ground
Forces the most powerful land army in the world.
Soviet leaders view an upgrading of the Soviet
Ground Forces, in concert with an expanded
Navy and improved strategic air transport
capabilities, as adding a desirable flexibility to
the exercise of Soviet military power on a global
basis. The addition of some 30 divisions since
about 1967 also reflects the Soviet view that war
without resort to nuclear weapons, or at least
without resort to strategic nuclear exchange,
may be possible. To achieve these aims Soviet
doctrine calls for clear-cut superiority at the
outset of a conflict. Increased availability of
helicopters, armored vehicles, amphibious
vehicles, self-propelled artillery weapons and
surface-launched guided missiles has provided
the Ground Forces with unprecedented flexi-
bility, mobility and firepower.
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Strength and Disposition: The Soviet Ground
Forces currently contain more, than 180, divi-
sions at various stages of combat readiness. Of
this total, 71 percent are motorized rifle divi-
sions, 25 percent are tank divisions and four
percent are airborne divisions.
These divisions are disposed as follows:
79 percent of the total are stationed in-
side the Soviet Union.
16 percent are stationed in Eastern
Europe (East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary).
percent are stationed in Mongolia.
percent are engaged in combat oper-
ations in Afghanistan.
There are four basic deployment groupings:
against NATO, against China, against the Mid-
dle East, and a strategic reserve. The largest,
best-equipped and most combat ready of these
is the Ground Forces group deployed against
NATO.
Modernization Program: The' following
graphs show the changes in manpower by type
of division and the changes in the,number of
deployed tanks and artillery since 1966. In-
creases in personnel to 11,000 men in a tank
division and almost 13,000 men in a motorized
rifle division have resulted in an increase in the
number of tanks- and mobile combat vehicles
per division.
Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have engag-
ed in a program of modernizing and upgrading
ground forces to ensure a capability for carrying
out offensive doctrine. Comprehensive in scope,
this program has involved large-scale improve-
ments in mobility, fire power, shock action,
command and control, obstacle crossing capa-
bility, air defense, electronic warfare and
logistical support. New and advanced equip-
ment has been introduced. Highlights of this
program, which has resulted in formidable and,
increasingly capable ground forces that now
Soviet.Manpower
by Type of Division
1966-1980
13,000 13.000
Soviet Tanks
and Artillery
. 1966-1980
1980
face NATO Europe and other areas contiguous
to the USSR, include:
? Deployment of T-64 tanks. in the
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
(GSFG); fielding of T-72 tanks into Soviet
units in the Western Military Districts;
introduction of small numbers of T-72s
in most non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies;
and continued development of a new
tank, designated the T-80.
? Expansion of both division and non-
division artillery units and some replace-
ment of older, towed guns by self-
propelled 122- and 152-mm weapons.
? Upgrading tactical capabilities by
deployment of nuclear-capable heavy
artillery brigades equipped with 203-mm
howitzers and 240-mm mortars, and the
introduction of the more accurate,
longer-range and more mobile SS-21 and
SS-X-23 tactical surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs) in ground forces as,re-
placements for older FROGs and SCUDs.
? Replacement of the 900 kilometer.
SS-12/SCALEBOARD tactical missile
with the more accurate SS-22.,
? Replacement of older air defense gun
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OK
systems by a new family of surface-to-air
missiles, some of which could have capa-
bilities against enemy tactical ballistic
missiles.
? Introduction of advanced radio sys-
tems and communications satellite equip-
ment, airborne command posts and the
gradual development of automated sys-
tems to enhance command, control and
communications.
?Introduction of infantry combat vehi-
cles into Soviet motorized rifle units, and
the use of airborne assault vehicles and
newly identified variants in airborne
units.
? Introduction of Air Assault Brigades
at the Front level.
Each of these deployments increases the
Ground Forces' capability to launch a rapid
thrust through Europe, the central theme of
Soviet military thought.
T-72 Main Battle Tank
The evolution of Soviet tanks illustrates the
extent of Soviet Ground Forces modernization.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Soviets fielded
the first and most sophisticated of their modern
family of main battle tanks, the T-64A incor-
porating a number of unique and innovative
features including:
? A 125-mm smoothbore gun and an auto-
matic loader which allows reduction in crew size
from four to three.
? Unconventional frontal armor and the in-
clusion of movable armored plates along the
side of the hull.
? A compact, turbocharged diesel engine
with a high horsepower-to-ton ratio.
The T-64A began deployment to the Group
of Soviet Forces, Germany in 1976, and, since
1980, has been deployed to the Southern Group
of Forces in Hungary.
The T-72, a high production tank comple-
mentary to the T-64A, entered operation in the
0
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WEIGHT (TONS)
SPEED (KM/HR)
MAIN ARMAMENT
36
50
100mm
TANK GUN
115mm 125mm 125mm
SMOOTHBORE SMOOTHBORE SMOOTHBORE
mid 1970s. This tank incorporates many of the
features of the T-64A such as the 125-mm
smoothbore gun and automatic loader and un-
conventional armor in the form of layered or
laminate armor in the upper hull.
The direct fire range for the 125-mm gun is
2,000 meters firing the kinetic energy round.
This means that at all ranges out to 2,000
meters, the gunner merely places a crosshair on
the target and fires. In the 125-mm gun the
automatic loader allows a rate of fire up to eight
rounds per minute. For mobility, the 41 metric
ton T-72 is powered by a 780 horsepower diesel
which allows a top road speed of 60 kilometers
per hour, and a cross country trail speed of up
to 45 kilometers per hour.
While the T-64A and T-72 are formidable
systems, the Soviets are nearing production of
an even newer tank, the T-80.
Simultaneously with modernization activities,
Soviet ground divisions also are undergoing a
personnel and equipment expansion program.
Major aspects involve the addition of an artil-
lery battalion to the tank regiments of tank and
motorized rifle divisions; expansion of the
motorized rifle company to a battalion within
tank regiments of tank divisions; and the addi-
tion of medium tanks to the reconnaissance bat-
talions of both types of divisions. The expansion
program has included the Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany.
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Soviets have deployed large numbers of
tactical nuclear delivery systems, and we believe
they have stockpiled reloads for these systems.
The Soviets rely on dual-capable systems for
most of their shorter-range theater nuclear de-
livery capability and have adapted some of their
203-mm and 240-mm artillery pieces deployed
in the USSR to fire nuclear projectiles. Towed
203-mm and 240-mm weapons are being re-
FROG Tactical Nuclear Surface-to-Surface
Missile
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placed with self-propelled models. Their
.medium-range launchers are capable of firing
nuclear, conventional, or chemical munitions,
and consist of the FROG (and its SS-21 replace-
ment), the SCUD B (and its SS-X-23 replace-
ment), and the SS-12/SCALEBOARD (and its
SS-22 replacement). An increase in the number
of nuclear-capable systems combined with mod-
ernization of these systems give the Warsaw
Pact improved nuclear options. A Front nor-
mally has tactical rockets, such as the free-
rocket-over-ground (FROG), and operational-
tactical missiles (SCUDs) to complement
nuclear-capable artillery, aviation and other
longer-range missiles.
Long-Range Theater Nuclear Weapons
24
The follow-on to the FROG, the SS-21, has
improved accuracy and range. Initial opera-
tional capability for the SS-21 was attained in
1976; however, only a few have been deployed.
Until recently, the West relied extensively
upon the qualitative superiority of its forces to
offset the numerical superiority of the USSR
and its allies. That margin of quality is rapidly
diminishing in the face of a massive Soviet effort
to modernize its forces and those of its Warsaw
Pact allies. Modern tanks, armored fighting
vehicles, artillery, rocket launchers, antiaircraft
artillery, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface
missiles, and other weapons now being fielded
in large quantities are the direct result of an in-
tensive, multi-year Soviet investment program.
This program is expected to continue in spite of
predicted Soviet economic problems. The
Soviet advantage in tanks, presently about three
to one in the European theater alone, will grow
throughout the decade.
THEATER BOMBERS
BADGER, BLINDER and BACKFIRE air-
craft assigned to both Soviet Long Range Avia-
tion and Soviet Naval Aviation could be used to
carry out missions covering all of NATO
Europe. While the BEAR and BISON bombers
also could perform theater roles, they are re-
served primarily for intercontinental strike mis-
sions. The most notable feature of the theater
bomber force is its age: fully three quarters of
the aircraft are over ten years old, and only the
BACKFIRE remains in production.
These medium bombers have a primary land
attack role, intended for either a nuclear or a
conventional war scenario. In their nuclear use,
the bombers would complement strikes by the
Soviets' medium and intermediate range ballis-
tic missiles. The primary objective in either case
would be to free the Strategic Rocket Forces to
concentrate on highest priority, time-urgent
NATO targets.
FRONTAL AVIATION
The Soviet Air Force is separated into three
distinct air arms to include: Long Range Avia-
tion, Frontal or Tactical Aviation and Military
Transport Aviation.
Frontal Aviation is the largest component of
the Soviet Air Force and is organized into Tac-
tical Air Armies consisting generally of fighter,
fighter-bombers, transports, helicopters and
reconnaissance units as well as miscellaneous
support units. Tactical Air Armies are located
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in 12 Soviet Military Districts and with the
Groups of Soviet Forces in East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These
tactical air armies account for some 4,800 fixed
wing combat aircraft, 250 transports and 3,500
helicopters.
Since the early 1970s, the introduction of
modern aircraft such as the FENCER, FITTER
C&D, FOXBAT and FLOGGER has steadily
improved the offensive capabilities of Frontal
Aviation, turning the Soviets' Tactical Air
Forces from a force basically defensively-
oriented to one now with significantly enhanced
offensive capabilities for theater warfare. These
aircraft carry loads of bombs, rockets and guid-
ed munitions, 2,000-to-8,000 kilograms in
weight, to radii between 350 and 1,500 kilo-
meters. The counterair fighters carry improved
air-to-air missiles to ranges in excess of 900
kilometers. These aircraft also incorporate
upgraded avionics. The entire counterair and
about 75 percent of the ground attack force are
comprised of aircraft introduced in the past
decade.
Frontal Aviation possesses five basic aircraft
in support of ground force operations.
FLOGGER
Currently 1,400 FLOGGER B/D/G/J are
operational in Frontal Aviation.
FLOGGER B/G - all-weather counterair fighter
FLOGGER D/J - all-weather ground attack air-
craft
FLOGGER E - export version of FLOGGER B
FLOGGER F - export version of FLOGGER D
FLOGGER H - export version of FLOGGER D
Flogger
FLOGGER B/G FLOGGER D/J
Max Payload (kg) 6xAAMs 3,500
Combat Radius (km) 900-1,200 550-800
Service Ceiling (m) 18,000 16,000
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FISHBED
Some 1,300 FISHBED can be found in Soviet
units, although the FLOGGER is replacing the
FISHBED as the standard combat fighter in the
Soviet Air Force.
FISHBED E - short-range, clear-air fighter
FISHBED D through N - (except H and
M - all-weather counterair fighters
FISHBED H - reconnaissance platform
Fishbed
FISHBED E FISHBED L/N
Max Payload (kg) 2xAAMs 4xAAMs
Combat Radius (km) 350-650 550-900
Service Ceiling (m)
Fitter
FITTER A
FITTER C/D/H
Max Payload (kg)
2,000
3,500-4,000
Combat Radius (km)
250-350
550-900
Service Ceiling (m)
15,000
18,000
Su-17/FITTER C Swing-Wing Ground Support
Fighter
FOX BAT
Two variants of the FOXBAT are deployed
in operational service with Soviet frontal avia-
tion; both are reconnaissance platforms.
MiG-21/FISHBED N All-Weather Interceptor
FITTER
There are four ground attack and one recon-
naissance variants of the FITTER operationally
deployed with Warsaw Pact Forces, with only
FITTER A and C in the national air arms thus
far.
FITTER A - swept wing clear-air ground at-
tack aircraft (200 operational with Soviet units)
FITTER, C/D/H - swing-wing all-weather
ground attack aircraft (650 operational in
Soviet units)
Max Payload: Reconnaissance
package only
MiG-251FOXBAT High Altitude Supersonic
Interceptor
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FENCER
The FENCER, operational since 1974, was
the first modern Soviet aircraft designed
specifically for a ground attack role and the first
to carry a weapons system officer. There are 400
FENCERS operational.
Max Payload (kg)
Combat Radius (km)
Service Ceiling (m)
8,000
1,800
17,500
Su-24/FENCER Ground Support Aircraft
Replacing the old Yak-28/BREWER tactical
bomber with the FENCER gives Frontal Avia-
tion the ability to strike targets throughout most
of NATO Europe from home bases in the
USSR. The addition of this aircraft along with
the latest ground attack variants of FLOGGER
and FITTER greatly increases the tonnage
which can be delivered over a far greater range.
To complement the growing inventory of
modern aircraft, the Soviets are developing new
types of armament which should greatly in-
crease the effectiveness of sorties against
hardened ground targets.
HELICOPTERS
The majority of the Soviet helicopter forces
are assigned to Frontal Aviation units to be em-
ployed near the forward edge of a battle area.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet
helicopter design and production was limited to
medium and heavy lift aircraft intended for use
as transports only. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the Soviets began to experiment
with the use of the helicopter in the assault and
attack roles. The Soviets installed 128x57 mm
rockets on the Mi-8/HIP C to be employed as
an assault helicopter. Later, the Mi-8/HIP E
was identified. It remains the world's most
heavily armed helicopter. The HIP E helicopter
has 192x57-mm rockets, four AT-2/SWATTER
Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM), and a 12.7-
mm nose gun. The Mi-8/HIP F is an export ver-
sion of the HIP E with the major change that six
AT-3/SAGGER ATGMs replace the four
SWATTERs.
While the Mi-8/HIP was undergoing modifi-
cation to improve its assault capabilities, the
METERS Su-24
SPEED (KTS)
540
1,350
540
540
1,625
1,205
RADIUS (KM)
1,800
1,300
1,200
700
900
900
ARMAMENT
2,500 KG
Bombs
10.2 (swept)
6AAMs
8.1 (swept)
3,000 KG
Bombs
8.1 (swept)
3,000 KG
Bombs
9.9 (swept)
4 AAMs
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MiG-23 MiG-27
FLOGGER B/G FLOGGER D/J
Su-17
FITTER D/H
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Mi-24/HIND E with Tube-Launched Anti-Tank
Guided Missiles
Soviets were developing the Mi-24/HIND, an
attack helicopter and the first Soviet helicopter
to be produced that has an integral weapon sys-
tem and retractable landing gear. The HIND A
is armed with 128x57-mm rockets, four AT-2/
SWATTER ATGMs, and a 12.7-mm machine
gun in the nose. The helicopter also has a small
cargo bay that is used to transport up to eight
troops. The Mi-24/HIND D is a streamlined
variant of HIND A with the pilot seated above
and behind the co-pilot gunner. The 12.7 mm
nose gun has been replaced with a turreted Gat-
ling-type gun, but other armament remains un-
changed from the HIND A. The latest version
METERS
60
MAX PAYLOAD (MT)
80
40
20
TROOP/PARATROOP CAPACITY
175/175
140/140
90/60
RANGE (MAX PAYLOAD) (KM)
4,200
5,300
1,400
of the HIND E is similar to the HIND D except
that it has the tube-launched AT-6/SPIRAL.
TRANSPORT AVIATION
Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) is
charged with the primary responsibility for pro-
viding airlift services for the Soviet Airborne
Troops and air assault brigades.
VTA also operates an air logistics system to
supply other deployed Soviet and allied armed
forces and to support other Soviet political and
economic interests.
Over 600 medium and long-range cargo
transports are currently assigned to VTA airlift
units. I1-76/CANDID long-range jet transports,
which are replacing CUBs, now number over
Transport Aircraft
An-72 COCK
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60
11-76/CANDID Long Range Jet Transport
130. Over 50 An-22/COCK long-range turbo-
prop transports are in the VTA inventory. The
COCK and CANDID units are based in the
western USSR, as are most of the remaining
CUB units, although some VTA CUB units are
stationed along the southern and far eastern
periphery of the Soviet Union. This concentra-
tion in the western USSR places the main VTA
assets near the airborne divisions they would
support, as well as positioning the force op-
posite NATO. Nevertheless, VTA is capable of
quickly concentrating its aircraft to support an
operation anywhere along the Soviet periphery,
as demonstrated in the December 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
An-22/COCK Long Range Turboprop Transport
The CUB continues to be the mainstay of
VTA. It is a four-engine turboprop which can
carry up to 90-to-100 troops or cargo up to a
maximum payload of 20 metric .tons. It first
entered VTA in the late 1950s.
In the mid-1970s, CANDID transports were
introduced to meet VTA's increasing worldwide
airlift requirements. The CANDID is compar-
able to the U.S. C-141, and can airlift up to 140
troops or 40 metric tons of cargo. Its main asset,
however, is its greatly improved radius/ range
over that of the CUB it is replacing. A CANDID
can thus theoretically lift twice the payload
weight to five times the radius/ range of the CUB.
During times of military emergency, VTA
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J
can call upon the considerable reserve offered
by Soviet civil aviation, Aeroflot. The civil fleet
is equipped with about 200 CUBs and CAN-
DIDs, about 1,100 medium- and long-range
passenger transports and several thousand
short-range transports and helicopters.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
The Soviets continue to improve their capa-
bility to conduct Electronic Warfare (EW) and
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Technical ad-
vancements in both Electronic Counter Mea-
sures (ECM) and Electronic Warfare Support
Measures are noted in all Soviet forces. The air
forces have numerous aircraft devoted to EW as
escort and standoff jammer platforms. Addi-
tionally, since 1979, there has been increased
emphasis on Soviet offensive, penetrating air
forces equipped with ECM and accompanied by
dedicated EW aircraft. The USSR has made a
major investment in Electronic Counter
Countermeasures (ECCM), as well as lethal and
nonlethal countermeasures. Ground forces con-
tinue to introduce new jammers, as well as a
new series of improved SIGINT vehicles. Stra-
tegic fixed jammers are located throughout the
Soviet Union.
The Soviets have developed their EW capa-
bilities into an integrated system called Radio-
electronic Combat, combining all forms of in-
telligence, direction finding, intensive jam-
ming, deception and suppressive fires from
ground, air and seabased platforms to attack
enemy organization and systems through their
electronic means of control. Its purpose is to
limit, delay or nullify the enemy's use of his
command and control systems while protecting
Soviet systems by ECCM. An estimated goal of
the system is to destroy or disrupt a significant
proportion of the enemy's command, control
and weapon system communications, either by
jamming or by destructive fire.
The Soviet ECCM objective is the satisfactory
operation of USSR electronic equipment in the
face of enemy disruption. Thus, physical pro-
tection of the equipment is included as well as
other practices beyond the scope of western
ECCM. Modern ECCM features have been de-
signed into the newer air defense equipment.
The greatest emphasis, however, has been on
individual and organizational techniques that
can be applied in the field.
To cite one example, the Soviets use anti-
radar camouflage to conceal military equip-
ment against detection by ground, airborne and.
shipborne radars. Depending on the radar visi-
bility of the objects to be camouflaged, anti-
radar camouflaging is achieved by the creation
of false targets or by blending into the terrain
background those objects that might serve for
orientation. Equipment may be concealed be-
hind local features or by making use of the
camouflaging properties of the ground relief.
In addition to natural cover, timber, brush
wood, metallic nets and angle reflectors are
used by Soviet forces for radar camouflage.
Mockups of military equipment can also be
used as antiradar reflectors.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
The armed forces of the Soviet Union in par-
ticular and the Warsaw Pact forces in general
are better equipped, structured and trained
than any other military force in the world to
conduct offensive and defensive chemical war-
fare operations. Their capabilities are steadily
improving.
The Soviets have deployed a variety of
modern agents and multiple delivery systems,
and have the tactical doctrine for large-scale
employment of chemical weapons. A significant
portion of all Soviet delivery systems -including
missile and rocket systems, aerial bombs and
artillery-are chemical-weapon capable. War-
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saw Pact forces are well-trained, organized and
equipped for offensive CW operations.
In Soviet military doctrine, toxic chemicals
are associated primarily with theater warfare.
The basic principle is to achieve surprise by us-
ing massive quantities of chemical agents
against unprotected troops or against equip-
ment or on terrain to deny its use.
A large chemical warfare organization is
organic to the Soviet service structure.
Throughout the Warsaw Pact each combat unit
down to regimental level has a sizable contin-
gent for chemical defense. Chemical specialists
are also assigned at the company level. All War-
saw Pact combat and combat support forces are
well equipped and realistically trained to insure
their survivability and to increase their opera-
tional effectiveness in toxic environments.
SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES AND
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
In the context of Special Purpose Forces,
Soviet unconventional warfare is defined as a
variety of military and paramilitary operations
including partisan warfare, subversion, and
sabotage, conducted during periods of peace
and war, and including other operations of a
covert or clandestine nature.
The Soviets have used unconventional forces
and methods in the past:
? Bolsheviks employed partisan guer-
rilla units against the Czarists and other
opponents during the Russian Civil War
of 1917 to 1920.
? Soviet partisan forces were extensively
used against the Germans during World
War II.
? Special purpose troops were used to
crush resistance to Soviet domination over
Eastern Europe.
? Soviet special purpose forces were
used in the Soviet invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in 1968 to arrest Czech leader-
ship and secure key objectives in Prague.
? Soviet special purpose forces played
an important role in the invasion of Af -
ghanistan and the elimination of Presi-
dent' Amin.
Soviet unconventional warfare activities are
managed at the highest level of government au-
thority. The Committee for State Security
(KGB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate
(GRU) of the General Staff can be assumed to
plan and execute Soviet unconventional warfare
operations. These activities are protected by
stringent security measures.
The Soviet leadership has a variety of elite
forces for conducting unconventional warfare
missions: special units of the KGB, GRU, Air-
borne and Ground and Naval Forces. The KGB
special purpose units have a sabotage mission,
and are thought to be targeted primarily
against the civilian sector. Their tasks would be
to create general panic among the civilian pop-
ulation, to disrupt civil government and public
utilities, and to damage or destroy key produc-
tion facilities.
The regular Soviet Armed Forces maintain
elite airborne units, special sabotage/recon-
naissance units and special long-range recon-
naissance units for missions. The most powerful
and numerous are the airborne troops under
the direct control of the General Staff in Mos-
cow. Some of these airborne units are des-
ignated as "special purpose" troops and are in-
tended to operate in small groups against key
political, military, command and control,
transportation and industrial targets in the
enemy rear area.
Soviet unconventional warfare units receive
very intensive training. Small groups of men are
trained as teams. Each team has an officer in
charge who speaks the language of the target
country fluently; a senior sergeant serves as sec-
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and in command. Other members of the group
are trained as radio operators, weapons and
demolition experts. In addition to the normal
military training, the following special skills are
emphasized:
? tactics of infiltrating and exfiltrating
the target area
? night operational linkups
? sabotage methods using explosives, in-
cendiaries, acids and abrasives
? parachute training
? clandestine communications
? hand to hand combat and silent killing
techniques
? language/customs of target country
? survival behind enemy lines
? identifying and locating targets.
To make training as realistic as possible, the
Soviet training centers are equipped with
realistic models of key targets such as enemy
facilities and weapon systems.
Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of
UW units and record the accomplishments in
World War II:
"During the war the partisans killed, wound-
ed or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of
German troops, collaborators and officials of
the occupation administration. They derailed
more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or
damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of
thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The par-
tisan war affected the morale of the German
Army, keeping the German troops in a constant
state of fear."
Use of unconventional warfare is a basic ele-
ment of Soviet doctrine, and Soviet capabilities
in this respect constitute a formidable threat.
THE SOVIET NAVY
Over the last two decades the Soviet Navy has
been transformed from a basically coastal de-
fense force into an ocean-going force designed
Major Surface Ships
- 270 Meters -
Displacement 37,000 Tons
- 245 Meters -
Displacement 23,000 Tons
- 190 Meters
160 Meters
- 155 Meters -
Displacement 7,500 Tons
to extend the military capability of the USSR
well out to sea and to perform the functions of
tactical, theater and strategic naval power in
waters distant from the Soviet Union. The
Soviets have a larger array of general purpose
submarines, surface warships and combat naval
aircraft than any other nation. The subma-
rines, about 70 of which carry antiship cruise
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/z/
missiles, constitute the most serious threat to US
and Allied naval forces and the worldwide sea
lines of communication upon which we and our
Allies depend. In the mid-1960s the Soviets had
260 major surface warships and amphibious
ships. Today they have 362.
In the European theater, Soviet naval forces
would have a variety of key missions. These
would include securing vital areas of the sea and
strategic passages such as the waters north of
the Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom Gap,
the Gap itself, the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of
Finland, the passages on either side of Den-
mark, the Bosporus and Dardenelles and the
Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Soviet
Navy would seek to interdict the sea lanes to
Europe, and would mount operations on the
high seas against NATO carrier task forces,
other surface warships and submarines.
The largest Soviet surface warship is the
KIEV-Class aircraft carrier. At present, two
KIEVs are deployed and two more are under
construction. The KIEVs are armed with anti-
ship cruise missiles, antisubmarine and over-
Soviet Navy Order of Battle
*SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarines
(YANKEE, DELTA classes) .............. 62
SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarines
(HOTEL class) .......................... 7
*SSGN Cruise Missile Submarines ............. 50
"SSN Torpedo-Attack Submarines............ 60
*DDG Guided Missile Destroyers
(SAM/SSM) .......................... 38
DD Destroyers ............................ 30
*FFG Guided Missile Frigates
(KRIVAK class) ........................ 28
*FF/FFL Frigates /small frigates ................. 140
SSB Ballistic Missile Submarines ............ 18
SSG Cruise Missile Submarines ............. 20
*SS Torpedo-Attack Submarines ............ 160
CVHG VSTOL Carriers
(KIEV class) ........................... 2
CHG Aviation Cruisers
(MOSKVA class) ....................... 2
*CGN Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear)
(KIROV class) .......................... 1
*CG Guided Missile Cruisers
(SAM/SSM) .......................... 26
CL Light Cruisers
(SVERDLOV class) ..................... 9
*Missile Craft .............t........................ 145
*Patrol /ASW/ Torpedo Craft ....................... 395
*Minesweepers ................................... 395
*LPD Amphibious Assault Transport
Dock (IVAN ROGOV class) .............
LST Amphibious Vehicle Landing
Ships (ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA
classes) ...............................
LSM Medium Landing Ships
*Mobile Logistics Ships ............................ 150
*Other Auxiliaries .................................. 605
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the-horizon target acquisition helicopters, anti-
aircraft missiles, anti-submarine rockets and
missiles, believed to be nuclear-capable, and
the FORGER vertical- and short-takeoff and
landing (VSTOL) jet aircraft.
The principal surface warships which the
Soviets are building today have greater range,
firepower and electronics capabilities than in
the past. The modern ships of the Soviet Navy
are among the fastest and most heavily armed
in the world.
Present surface warship building programs
include about 12 hulls under construction in
four new classes of large warships, including a
23,000-ton nuclear-powered cruiser as well as
the continued construction of KIEVClass car-
riers and destroyer and frigate classes. The
Soviet Navy has led the world in the use of
cruise missiles in naval warfare. Since the in-
stallation of the SS-N-1 cruise missile on the
KILDIN and KRUPNYY classes of destroyers in
the late 1950s, the Soviets have extensively
developed and deployed this type of weapon.
Today the Soviet Navy has some 20 cruisers,
carriers, and destroyers, about 70 submarines
and 300 land-based aircraft armed with anti-
ship cruise missiles.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
The widely publicized KIEV-Class aircraft
carriers are the largest warships ever completed
by the Soviet Union.
With the commissioning of KIEV in 1976,
the Soviets, for the first time, have seabased,
fixed-wing aircraft in operation. The second
KIEV-Class ship, MINSK, is now in the Pacific
Ocean Fleet, a third carrier is fitting out, and a
fourth is under construction. A logical advance
on the KIEV design could be a nuclear-powered
carrier of about 60,000 tons with catapults and
an air wing of some 60 aircraft. Such a ship
could join the fleet late in this decade.
The KIEVs have an unusual design. They
have a full load displacement of about 37,000
tons, are 270 meters long, have an angled flight
deck some 185 meters long and an island super-
0
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In this view from astern, the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser KIROV reveals a superstructure
massed with radars and electronic sensors, a stern door for ASW sonar, helicopter deck bordered by
Gatling guns and 100mm dual purpose gun mounts.
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structure to starboard in the tradition of
Western carriers. However, the forward part of
these ships is similar to Soviet missile cruisers,
with antiship, antisubmarine and antiaircraft
missile launchers. They also have a profusion of
more traditional weapons, electronic warfare
systems, and a number of advanced communi-
cations devices.
The lack of aircraft arresting wires and cata-
pults on the fight deck limits the ships to heli-
copters and VSTOL aircraft. A mix of about 20
Ka-25/HORMONE helicopters and 15 Yak-
36/FORGER VSTOL aircraft is a nominal air
group, although this mix could be changed to
meet varied mission requirements.
Yak-36/FORGERs on KIEV-Class Carrier
Although the primary mission of the KIEV
Class is stated by the Soviets as antisubmarine
warfare, the ships also have powerful antiship
capability in their cruise missile battery. They
have eight large launching tubes with reloads
for SS-N-12 missiles, which are an improvement
over the older SS-N-3 antiship missiles. The
HORMONE B helicopter, capable of providing
over-the-horizon targeting information for the
SS-N-12/SANDBOX missiles which have a
maximum range of some 550 kilometers, has
been seen aboard the KIEV Class.
KIEV is a second generation class of Soviet
"aviation ship," following the helicopter
carrier missile cruisers MOSKVA and LEN-
INGRAD, which were completed in 1967 and
1968, respectively. These earlier ships also were
of innovative design, being essentially missile
cruisers forward with a clear flight deck aft for
the operation of up to 18 HORMONE antisub-
marine helicopters. The latter ships are rated as
"antisubmarine cruisers" by the Soviet Navy
and have been used primarily in that role as
well as serving as flagships.
SURFACE COMBATANTS
In May 1980 the Soviets began sea trials of
their first nuclear-powered surface combatant,
the guided missile cruiser KIROV. This is a ship
of 23,000 tons, larger than any surface comba-
tant other than an aircraft carrier built since
World War II. Its primary armament is heavy,
new generation, highly sophisticated surface-to-
air and long-range antiship cruise missiles. The
Soviets have also fitted her with ASW missiles,
two 100-mm dual purpose guns, short-range sur-
face-to-air missiles, Gatling guns for close-in de-
fense, and Ka-25/HORMONE ASW helicopters.
KIROV is designed to provide improved fleet
air defense against attack from Western aircraft
carriers or from long-range cruise missiles. Con-
versely, the KIROV's new long-range, antiship
cruise missiles will significantly enhance Soviet
abilities to strike opposing surface action
groups. KIROV marks an important develop-
mental step in the technical evolution of Soviet
sea power. A second unit is well along in
construction.
In July 1980, the Soviets began sea trials of
their second new class of major surface comba-
tant in 1980, the 7,000-to-8,000-ton, steam-
powered, guided missile destroyer (DDG)
SOVREMENNYY. While KIROV is clearly a
multipurpose ship, SOVREMENNYY appears
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UDALOY, Guided Missile Destroyer
primarily designed for antisurface warfare with
four 30-mm Gatling guns, surface-to-surface
antiship cruise missiles, and new, medium
range, surface-to-air missile systems. The
SOVREMENNYY has a secondary ASW mis-
sion and can carry HORMONE variant
helicopters in its telescoping hangar. This new
DDG is the first gun ship constructed by the
Soviets since the late 50s and is their first major
combatant since 1970 to deploy without signifi-
cant ASW capability. It is now in series produc-
tion with additional units expected through the
mid-1980s. Ships of the SOVREMENNYY Class
can be expected to support amphibious assault
forces, provide naval gunfire, and oppose
Western air, surface and submarine forces in all
ocean areas.
In November 1980, the Soviets began sea
trials of still another new class of mission-
specific guided missile destroyer, the UDALOY.
This unit is designed primarily for antisub-
marine warfare, displaces about 8,000-to-9,000
tons, is armed with eight ASW missiles, two
100-mm guns, four Gatling guns for close-in
defense and two hangars for ASW helicopters.
The UDALOY appears to be a follow-on class
to previous Soviet large antisubmarine ship pro
grams and probably will be employed as the
main ASW platform within an integrated Soviet
task force. All available evidence suggests that
the UDALOY program will be a large-scale ef-
fort with a number of units to be deployed
through the 1980s.
Finally in 1980, a fourth major surface com-
batant program was identified in the Soviet
Union. This new class of large, conventionally
powered, multipurpose guided missile cruiser is
being constructed in the Black Sea and has been
temporarily designated "BLACK-COM-1."
This new cruiser has supplanted KARA-class
cruiser construction and will probably carry
long-range cruise missiles. The new ship dis-
places approximately 11,000-to-13,000 tons
and is further evidence of the Soviet trend
toward larger, more technically sophisticated
combatants. Although BLACK-COM-1 is con-
ventionally powered, it is expected to function
like KIROV as a multipurpose command ship
capable of providing a Soviet battle group with
enhanced air defense and surface strike capa-
bilities. Series production of this new class is
already underway.
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SOVREMENNYY, Guided Missile Destroyer
SUBMARINES
The Soviet Navy currently operates some 377
submarines, including 180 nuclear-powered
submarines compared to some 115 in the U.S.
Navy.
Attack Submarines: The Soviet Navy
operates about 220 attack submarines. Most are
diesel-electric powered and many are of recent
construction. About 60 of the torpedo attack
submarines are nuclear powered, being of the
NOVEMBER, ECHO, VICTOR, and ALFA
Classes. The last is believed to be the fastest sub-
marine in service today in any Navy. An im-
proved VICTOR Class is now in production and
the small, ALFA Class, which combines deep-
diving capabilities with its high speed, may well
be in series production. The Soviet Navy con-
tinues to build diesel-powered submarines, the
FOXTROT Class, for overseas sales, i.e., India,
Libya and Cuba, and the new TANGO Class
for use by the Soviet Navy. The prime weapons
of these attack submarines are antisubmarine
0
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i1
and antiship torpedoes; however, mines also
can be carried. The newer submarines have
rocket-delivered ASW weapons as well.
Cruise Missile Submarines: Even while am-
bitious surface combatant construction pro-
grams were underway, the Soviets continued to
turn out submarines at virtually the same pace
they have maintained through the 1970s. One
new class introduced in 1980, the OSCAR, is an
extremely large SSGN capable of launching up
to 24 long-range, antiship cruise missiles while
remaining submerged. The missile fired by the
OSCAR is probably a submarine variant of the
same new antiship cruise missile first deployed
aboard KIROV. This missile has an estimated
range of over 450 kilometers. The Soviets began
their submarine cruise missile programs in the
1950s converting existing submarines to fire the
long-range SS-N-3 missile. Then, newer sub-
marines designed to carry the SS-N-3 joined the
Soviet fleet, the diesel-powered JULIETT Class
and the nuclear-powered ECHO I and II
Classes.
After producing about 50 submarines of the
JULIETT and ECHO Classes, the Soviets com-
pleted the first CHARLIE I Class SSGN in 1968
with the improved CHARLIE II following sev-
eral years later. These nuclear-powered sub-
marines can fire eight antiship cruise missiles
while remaining submerged at a range of up to
100 kilometers from the intended target. Soviet
cruise missile submarines also carry ASW and
antiship torpedoes.
The Soviet Navy's cruise missile submarines
and their missile-armed bombers form the
greatest threat to Allied naval surface forces
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operating on the high seas. This is especially so
when within range of Soviet air bases where the
Soviets can launch coordinated attacks using
not only reconnaissance aircraft to provide
target data for submarine-launched missiles,
but also their extensive force of naval and air
force missile-equipped bombers.
Soviet Navy Aircraft
Strike/Bombers ............................ 390
BACKFIRE
BADGER
BLINDER
NAVAL AVIATION
Soviet Naval Aviation is subordinate to the
Soviet Navy, with regiments being assigned to
each of the four fleets under an aviation officer
reporting directly to the fleet commander.
Soviet Naval Aviation consists of some 1,440 air-
craft, most of which are based ashore except for
helicopters assigned to various cruisers and the
helicopters and VSTOL aircraft that fly from
the KIEV-Class aircraft carriers.
Soviet Naval Aviation has four basic missions:
reconnaissance and surveillance, antiship
strike, antisubmarine and aviation support.
Naval aircraft are employed in long-range
reconnaissance and ocean surveillance, with
some aircraft equipped to provide midcourse
target data for antiship missiles launched "over
the horizon" from surface ships, submarines,
and other aircraft. Reconnaissance aircraft now
in use include about 50 of the larger Tu-95/
BEAR D turbo-prop planes; about 100 twin-jet
Tu-16/BADGER aircraft, and Tu-22/
BLINDER jet aircraft that have a supersonic
dash speed. Additionally, the 11-38/MAY
maritime patrol aircraft are used for sur-
veillance and reconnaissance missions.
The prime strike force of Soviet Naval Avia-
tion consists of over 300 twin-jet BADGER and
BLINDER aircraft which are fitted to carry one
or two of several types of antiship cruise missiles
with "standoff" ranges varying from 90 to over
300 kilometers. Some missiles have variable
flight paths and various homing techniques to
Fighter/Fighter Bombers .................... 70
FITTER
FORGER
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare
Aircraft .................................. 180
BADGER
BEAR D
BLINDER
Antisubmarine Aircraft ...................... 400
BEAR F HOUND
HAZE A MAIL
HORMONE A MAY
Tanker ..................................... 70
BADGER
Transport/Training Aircraft .................. 330
help penetrate ship defenses. All these missiles
are assessed to carry either a nuclear or a high
explosive warhead of about 1,000 to 2,000
pounds (450 to 900 kilograms).
Soviet Naval Aviation also flies the twin-jet
BACKFIRE, a supersonic aircraft with vari-
able-sweep wings. This plane carries stand-off
missiles and is slowly replacing the BADGER in
strike squadrons. The Navy is receiving this air-
craft at about the same rate as the Soviet Long
Range Aviation strategic bombing force and
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Su-171FITTER Fighter-Bomber
the inventory has climbed to more than 70 air-
craft. The BACKFIRE greatly increases the
capability and extends the range at which strike
aircraft can attack Western surface forces such
as aircraft carrier or amphibious battle groups.
The introduction of aircraft carriers and
FORGER aircraft gives Soviet Naval Aviation
another dimension of antiship strike. The
FORGER can be fitted with short-range air-to-
surface missiles, rockets, or bombs for use
against ship or shore targets.
The FITTER fighter-bomber has been intro-
duced into Soviet Naval Aviation over the last
several years. These aircraft are assigned to the
Baltic Fleet primarily to provide antiship strike
and support to amphibious operations in the
Baltic.
In addition to naval aircraft armed with an-
tiship missiles, certain BEAR and BADGER
bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation can be
used for attacks against ships, and these aircraft
regularly participate in naval exercises. Most of
these strike aircraft can be refueled in-flight by
naval BADGERs fitted as tankers as well as by
Long Range Aviation tankers.
For antisubmarine warfare the Soviet Navy
has a force of about 400 fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters configured for submarine detection
and attack. This force currently includes BEAR
F aircraft, MAY turbo-prop aircraft and MAIL
twin-engine flying boat aircraft. Only the
BEAR F appears to be still in production. These
aircraft operate from Soviet land bases to search
out seaward areas for foreign submarines.
An increasing number of antisubmarine
helicopters are being flown by the Soviet Navy.
The HORMONE A, a twin turboshaft heli-
copter, is flown from the newer Soviet cruisers,
as well as from the helicopter carriers MOSKVA
and LENINGRAD and the KIEV-Class aircraft
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01-7
carriers. Additionally, an ASW version of the
Mi-14/HAZE helicopter flies from land bases.
Soviet Naval Aviation also operates some 125
transport and utility aircraft of various types.
Although basic and advanced training are pro-
vided by the Soviet Air Forces, maritime opera-
tional training is accomplished within the Navy.
Soviet Naval Aviation retains a number of
transports to provide a logistics capability better
to meet the Navy's priority needs.
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
Another area of continuing development in
the Soviet Navy has been the amphibious as-
sault forces. In April 1980, the recently con-
structed IVAN ROGOV, the Soviets' newest
amphibious warfare ship, deployed to the In-
dian Ocean. At about 13,000 tons, the IVAN
ROGOV is nearly three times the size of previ-
ous Soviet amphibious ships and is designed to
operate both helicopters and high-speed air-cush-
ioned landing craft. The ROGOV can embark
about 550 naval infantry troops and significantly
enhances Soviet amphibious warfare projection to
distant areas, especially the Third World.
Amphibious lift for the naval infantry is pro-
vided primarily by IVAN ROGOV-Class LPDs,
ALLIGATOR-Class' and ROPUCHA-Class
LSTs, and POLNOCNY-Class LSMs. The
Soviet amphibious forces exercise regularly in
their respective fleet areas and regularly deploy
to the Mediterranean, off West Africa and the
Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy has about 25
LSTs and some 60 LSMs, plus numerous lesser
landing craft and air-cushion vehicles for am-
phibious operations.
The Soviet Navy is now the world's largest
operator of military air-cushion vehicles for
which development continues. There are three
classes currently in use: the GUS, LEBED and,
large AIST Class.
Although small by comparison to the U.S.
Marine Corps, the Soviet Naval Infantry is the
second largest marine force in the world. The
potential power of even a few hundred Soviet
marines afloat during a crisis provides the
Soviet Union with a valuable political-military
instrument.
The Soviets have in hand, or are developing,
the elements necessary to provide a formidable
IVAN ROGOV, Lead Ship of a New Amphibious Assault Class
~0
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The 13,000-ton amphibious assault transport dock IVAN ROGOV entered service in 1978, the largest
amphibious ship in the Soviet Navy. IVAN ROGOV has two helicopter decks and helicopter hangers,
and a floodable welideck, behind the large stern gate, which can carry three air-cushion landing craft.
Judging by IVAN ROGOV's characteristics, the amphibious ship can carry a Soviet Naval Infantry Bat-
talion-550 men-30 armored personnel carriers and ten tanks, enhancing the USSR's capability to pro-
ject naval and military power at great distances. from the Soviet homeland.
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MINSK, Second of the KIEV-Class VSTOL Aircraft Carriers
projection into distant waters. These include
the improvement in assault lift capability, the
expansion of a large administrative lift ability
designed into certain ships of the Merchant
Marine, the retention of a substantial gunfire
support strength in cruisers and destroyers,
development of sea-based, tactical air power,
and an improving underway replenishment
capability. The Soviet Navy's ability to project
tactical power ashore at some distance from the
Soviet littoral may be part of Admiral Gorsh-
kov's grand plan of achieving a "balanced
fleet."
Soviet naval policy and programs for the
1980s can be expected to be directed toward
broadening the range of military and political
options available to the leadership across the
entire spectrum of conflict-from competition
in peacetime to hostilities in the event of a
nuclear war. Having achieved rough parity in
general war capabilities, the Soviets can be ex-
pected to increase their emphasis on making
general purpose naval forces more capable in
distant waters, of performing a variety of mis-
sions and of challenging the West's traditional
dominance of the open oceans. We believe that
Soviet naval policies also intend gradually to
achieve greatly improved capabilities for sus-
tained, long-range naval operations, even
against substantial opposition.
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V SOVIET STRATEGIC
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!FORCES
Over the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has
devoted substantial resources to the develop-
ment and deployment of intercontinental ballis-
tic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) forces. Fewer resources
have been allocated to bomber forces, although
new weapons systems-primarily the BACK-
FIRE bomber-have been deployed.
Under Brezhnev, the Soviet missile forces
have moved from a position of clear inferiority
in the early-to-middle 1960s to one in which
they are generally recognized as equal or su-
perior in certain measures to those of the West.
In 1964, the Soviets had only a few operational
SLBMs, many of which had to be launched
from surfaced submarines. While the USSR had
more ICBMs than SLBMs, the number was sig-
nificantly fewer than US ICBMs. Moreover, the
majority of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate sys-
tems housed in launchers that were clustered to-
gether and unhardened, making them vulner-
able to attack. The USSR then embarked on
high-priority development and deployment pro-
grams first focused on increasing single-silo
ICBM deployment to a level greater than that
of the United States. A similar buildup of
SLBM launchers on modern, nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) was under-
way by the late 1960s. These massive 1960s
ICBM and SLBM deployment programs, large-
ly centered on the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs and
the SS-N-6/YANKEE SLBM/SSBN weapons
systems, provided the foundation from which
subsequent strategic nuclear modernization
programs were tb grow.
Since the mid-1970s the Soviet Union has com-
pletely upgraded its strategic Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile force with the introduction of the
SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, equipped with multiple, in-
dependently targetable reentry vehicles-missiles
with improved reliability, range, payload accuracy
and survivability.
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The 1970s modernizations, which only now
are reaching a conclusion, were largely tech-
nological in nature. More than half of the 1,398
Soviet ICBM launchers have been rebuilt to
house the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs in
vastly more survivable, hardened silos. These
ICBMs, all of which are MIRVed, are in the
forefront of ICBM technology. Certain versions
of the SS-18 and SS-19 are among the most ac-
curate ICBMs operational anywhere. Together,
these systems have the capability to destroy a
large percentage of the more than 1,000 US
ICBM launchers, using only part of their total
numbers.
The Soviet SLBM/SSBN modernizations be-
gan in the early 1970s with the introduction of
the long-range SS-N-8 SLBM deployed on
DELTA-Class SSBNs. By the late 1970s, the
Soviets were producing the MIRVed SS-N-18
and deploying it in a modified version of the
DELTA-Class submarines. In 1979, a new
SLBM, the MIRVed SS-NX-20, was first tested.
This SLBM will probably reach operational
status by the mid-1980s, deployed in the new
TYPHOON-Class SSBN submarine.
These technological advances in ICBM and
SLBM weapons systems have been accompanied
by major improvements in communications sys-
tems and in the organization of the forces as
well.
Soviet intercontinental bomber forces retain
most of the BEAR and BISON bombers and re-
fueling tankers which were initially produced in
the 1950s and 1960s. Improvements to their
avionics and weapons systems have been made,
however. Since the early 1970s, the USSR has
also deployed over 70 BACKFIRE bombers to
operational LRA units and is producing about
30 more of these supersonic bombers each year.
While BACKFIRE appears to have been given
primarily theater and maritime missions, it has
a strategic capability and cannot be ignored as
a potential intercontinental bomber threat.
Current force levels of Soviet intercontinental
strategic nuclear forces include 1,398 ICBM
launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 long-
range bombers, excluding BACKFIRE. These
delivery systems are loaded with some 7,000 nu-
clear warheads. Deployment programs now
underway indicate that the number of warheads
will increase over the next few years.
STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE
The Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), the largest
missile force in the world, controls all Soviet
military units in the Soviet Union equipped with
ICBMs, IRBMs and MRBMs. The mission of
the SRF is to destroy an enemy's means of
nuclear attack, military- industrial production
facilities, civil and military command and con-
trol capabilities and logistics and transport fa-
cilities. The SRF's secondary mission is to sup-
port tactical joint forces and naval fleets.
Soviet strategic operational employment
plans, based on Soviet writings, point to seizing
the initiative through preemptive attack. Such
an attack would effectively reduce the impact of
a retaliatory strike, limiting damage to the
USSR. While this is the preferred Soviet scenar-
io, the Soviets also have the capability to launch
on tactical warning if necessary. Regardless of
how a war started, the Soviets view the nuclear
forces and command and control of an enemy
as their first priority targeting objectives. This
would include such targets as ICBM launch
silos, launch control facilities, support and
maintenance facilities, strategic bomber bases,
submarine berths and loading facilities and nu-
clear storage and production facilities. Priority
two targets would be those that would negate
the ability to project military power abroad.
Such targets would include depots, transporta-
tion centers, military stockpiles, conventional
force bases and training centers. Other targets
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would be those that limit the capacity of the en-
emy to conduct a protracted war such as mili-
tary industries, refineries and electrical power
plants.
The SRF is under the command of General of
the Army Tolubko. He is responsible for the ad-
ministrative and technical control of the forces
and equipment under his command. The Gen-
eral Staff of the Ministry of Defense has the re-
sponsibility for executing operational decisions
of the Supreme High Command which affect
the SRF. In addition, the General Staff can by-
pass the SRF headquarters and exercise direct
operational control of the missile forces. Organ-
ization within the SRF is based on army, divi-
sion, regiment, battalion, and battery. A bat-
tery consists of single ICBM, IRBM, and
MRBM launchers.
The ICBM force of the SRF is deployed in
missile complexes generally located along, and
within access of, the Trans-Siberian Railway. A
typical ICBM complex includes a main base
support area, a facility for transferring missiles
and equipment from rail to roads, and launch
control centers, each with a group of launch
silos it controls. Each complex is comprised of a
number of launch groups. Each launch group is
comprised of either six or ten launch silos.
ICBM DEPLOYMENT
The Soviet ICBM force currently consists of
580 SS-lls, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s,
and about 300 SS-19s. The great majority of the
17s, 18s and 19s are equipped with MIRVs. The
Soviets are expected to complete their current
ICBM modernization program (SS-17, SS-18
and SS-19) in the early 1980s.
Soviet ICBM Deployment
A A A
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SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs
SS-17: Since it first became operational in
1975, the SS-17 has been deployed in 150 con-
verted SS-11 silos. Both single and multiple re-
entry vehicle (RV) versions of the SS-17 have
been developed, but few if any of the single RV
versions are deployed. The maximum range of
At present, there are 1,398 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launchers in the Strategic Rocket Force. An
SS-13 ICBM is seen here during public display in Moscow.
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MOD MOD
1 2 3 1 2
MAX RANGE (KM) 10000 11,:00012,'00V,11,000 16,000 9,600 10,000
LAUNCHMODE Cold . Cold Cold Cold Cold Hot Hot I
the SS-17 is believed to be about 10,000 kilo-
meters. Although much more accurate than its
predecessor, the SS-11, the SS-17 is not as ac-
curate as the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs.
The SS-17 employs a cold-launch technique
which delays main engine ignition until the mis-
sile has exited its hardened silo. This technique
minimizes launch damage to the silo and is con-
sistent with the notion of building in the capa-
bility to reload and refire missiles during a pro-
tracted nuclear conflict.
SS-18: The SS-18, the largest of the current
Soviet ICBMs, is similar in dimensions to the
SS-9, which it replaced, and is about twice the
size of the proposed US MX missile. Like the
SS-17, the SS-18 also uses a cold-launch tech-
nique. Both single and MIRVed versions of the
SS-18 have been tested. The MIRVed versions
carry eight or ten reentry vehicles. Each
warhead of the ten RV variants has a better
than 50 percent chance of destroying a
MINUTEMAN silo. When used in pairs against
a single target, the warheads are even more
destructive. The single RV versions of the
SS-18, with their large destructive power and
accuracy, are capable of destroying any known
fixed target with high probability.
SS-19: The SS-19 ICBM became operational
in 1974. It uses a hot-launch technique with en-
gine ignition occuring while the missile is in its
silo. The SS-19 is estimated to have three-to-
four times the payload carrying capacity of the
SS-11, and the missile is much larger in volume,
comparable in size to the proposed US MX.
There are both single and multiple RV versions
of the SS-19. The MIRVed version, which
makes up most of the SS-19 force, is believed
capable of delivering -six RVs to a range of
about 9,000 kilometers.
ICBM RELOAD CAPABILITY
The Soviets could have contingency plans for
reloading and refiring missiles from ICBM
launchers which already have fired an initial
round. The cold-launch technique employed by
the SS-17 and SS-18 lends itself to such a
capability in a protracted nuclear conflict. Ad-
ditionally the Soviets may be able to recon-
stitute a portion of their hot-launched missile
force-SS-11, SS-13 and SS-19-as well. The
Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload
silo launchers in a period less than several
days- thereby avoiding violation of the SALT
II Agreement which precludes a rapid reload
capability for ICBM launchers.
ICBM PRODUCTION
Four major Soviet design bureaus specialize
in strategic missiles development. These bu-
reaus are supported by activities at main assem-
bly plants, at hundreds of component production
plants, at test ranges, and at launch complexes.
The Soviet missile development program shows
no signs of slackening. We expect improve-
ments leading to new missiles and to the modifi-
cation of existing missile systems. These im-
provements are expected to continue the trend
towards greater capabilities against such hard-
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1\\
ened military structures as ICBM silos. As the
accuracy of future Soviet missiles increases, it
will be feasible for the Soviets to reduce the size
of individual RVs and thereby to increase the
number of MIRVs carried on each missile, as-
suming no external constraint such as that im-
posed by arms limitations. It is anticipated that
the Soviets will develop solid-propellant ICBMs
to supplement or replace some of the current li-
quid propellant systems. The SS-16, a small
ICBM about the same size as the MINUTE-
MAN, is a solid-propellant ICBM which was
developed by the Soviets in the early 1970s for
mobile deployment. The system was never de-
ployed. Future solid-propellant ICBM develop-
ment and deployment could give the Soviets ad-
ditional flexibility in handling and in basing
their missile forces. Future missiles are expected
to include upgraded versions of the present sys-
tems as well as new missiles.
SLBM FORCE
The Soviets continue to expand and modern-
ize their SLBM force, now consisting of some 62
submarines carrying 950 modern SLBMs with a
total of almost 2,000 nuclear warhead reentry
vehicles. In the past seven years, the USSR has
produced 30 SSBNs, and the new 20-tube, very
Length of TYPHOON Compared to
Height of Washington Monument
large TYPHOON SSBN was launched in 1980.
This new SSBN/SLBM system will be opera-
tional in the mid 1980s and is expected to in-
clude the SS-NX-20 missile. The SS-N-8 and
SS-N-18 on DELTA-Class SSBNs permit the
Soviets to hit targets in the United States from
their home ports, and it is possible that the Sovi-
ets will develop follow-on SLBMs for these as
well as the SS-N-6 on the YANKEE SSBNs.
The Soviet effort leading to this current capa-
bility began with the conversion of existing die-
sel-powered submarines in the mid-1950s to fire
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HOTEL'CLASS
Nuclear Ballistic Miss-le Submarines and Missiles'
METERS
x s
1 . HOTEL II 115m 3 Tubes SS N 5 =-+ I"
HOTEL 111,130m`,6 Tubes .SS=N?8
YANKEE+I 130m-16 Tubes SS?N 6
k YANKEE II,130m 12 Tubes SS NX 1T
DELTA L 140m 12 Tubes SS N 8 --I
DELTA II 155m 16 Tubes SS N 8 --' +
r t
yp
DELTA III155m 16 TubesSS N 18
s$ RVs ggg
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TYPHOON' CLASS.,.., .
.,;,.,. }ceNrciku~
?^i'enn';
2
TYPHOON 170m 20 Tubes SS NX 20
short-range ballistic missiles. In the early 1960s,
the GOLF-Class diesel and HOTEL-Class
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
were completed.
By the end of 1974, the Soviet Navy had 34
YANKEE-Class SSBNs in service, each carrying
16 nuclear-tipped missiles. During 1973, follow-
ing the signing of SALT I, the first of the larger
DELTA-Class submarines was completed. The
early DELTAs displace some 11,000 tons sub-
merged and have an overall length of about 140
DELTA I-Class SSBN
SS-N
SSNX17:
MOD MODu MOD>
2,.. .3.*r. 9.1
ASS"NX20
I's 9,12 e 1' 2MIRVs 1'M+ * 1' 1 3MIRVs~ l5 r7MIRVs + N12k
400f 3 000 3 000 7 800 9100 3 900 6 500 8 000E 6 500j 4 8 300 ,'
meters. The modern deployed strategic Soviet
SLBM/SSBN force includes the SS-N-18/
DELTA III weapon system.
SS-N-6/YANKEE I: The SS-N-6/YANKEE I
weapon system is composed of the liquid-
propellant SS-N-6 missile and the 16-missile
tube YANKEE I-Class SSBN submarine. The
SS-N-6/YANKEE I weapon system became op-
erational in 1968. There are different versions
of the SS-N-6'SLBM.-One version carries a sin-
gle RV and has a maximum operational range
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of about 2,400 to 3,000 kilometers. Another
version carries two RVs and was the first Soviet
SLBM to carry multiple RVs. This SS-N-6 has a
maximum operational range of about 3,000
kilometers.
SS-N-8/DELTA I and II: The SS-N-8/
DELTA weapon system includes the long-
range, two-stage, liquid-propellant SS-N-8
SLBM and the 12-missile tube DELTA I and
16-missile tube DELTA II-Class SSBN sub-
marines. The SS-N-8 was a significant change
from previous Soviet SLBMs, even though
liquid-propulsion technology was employed,
because this was the first two-stage SLBM. The
DELTA Ill-Class SSBN
SS-N-8 has a maximum operational range of
about 9,000 kilometers and carries one RV.
SS-N-18/DELTA III: The SS-N-18/DELTA
III weapon system is composed of the SS-N-18
two-stage, liquid-propellant SLBM and the 16-
missile tube DELTA III-Class SSBN.
The SS-N-18 is the first Soviet SLBM to dem-
onstrate a MIRV capability. Its maximum op-
erational booster range is about 6,500 to 8,000
kilometers depending on the payload configura-
tion. Greater range is possible if the SS-N-18
post-boost vehicle, or small third stage, is used
to push the payload further along its trajectory,
in addition to maneuvering to place reentry
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