POSSIBLE SOVIET SABOTAGE OF OUR SPACE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
EXECUTIVE SECR ARIAT jy
ROUTING SLIP
17 1 )/QS
SUSPENSE 7 A--=V-t- 86
Date
To 8: Please prepare response as
requested.
STAT
xe tive Secretary
1986
Date
3637 "0-8j
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 2
28 July 1986
NOTE FOR: DDS&T
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Sabotage
of Our Space Program
Please take the lead in drafting
a response from me to General Graham.
William J. Casey
Attachment:
Ltr dtd 23 July 86 to DCI
from General Daniel 0. Graham
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6 ~3$
HIGH FRONTIER
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W. ? Suite 1000 ? Washington, D.C. 20005 ? [phone]
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham
USA (Ret.)
Director
July 23, 1986
En-tine Re ist
Lr- 3428X
The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear B ill :
I hate to bug a busy mars, but this is in my view a critical
matter.
tease for Soviet sabotage= our spaced is too std-
eda
b~ee i~c ored or soft-plled. When the likes of Tad Szulc, a perennial
apologist for Soviet actions, writes a column like the one attached,
you can be sure that suspicions in the general public are running high.
I know that my pro-SDI army out there is highly suspicious of IIB
involvement. They are not yet voicing the suspicion of a "cover-up,
but that idea will surely surface if they perceive inaction to promote
arms-control deals.
The basic fact is that the West has had a series of catastrophes
with space vehicles beginning in August 1985 - two Titans, the Shuttle,
the Delta, the Nike-Orion and the Ariane.
My experts calculate the odds against this being coincidence, given
the reliability records of the systems involved, are 250 million to
one.
The notion that this is due to a rash of ineptitude might hold up
if only NASA was involved, but the fact is that there were four launch
organizations involved. It defies logic to assume they all went sour
together.
None of the explanations for these "accidents" are fully satisfying
and some downright mysterious.
These sidebars add to the suspicion of foul play:
1. The absence of normal Soviet surveillance of the Challenger
flight (and perhaps one of the Titan shots).
2. The extraordinarily quick response with "condolences" by the
Soviets.
3. The Canaveral blow-ups occurring at nearly the same time after
launch (around 73 seconds).
4. The 1983 disappearance of an Air Force officer expert in
destruct systems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
5. French suspicions of sabotage of Ariane.
6. The assassination of an FRG scientist for collaboration
with SDI.
7. The conviction and imprisonment of a man in 1966 for sabotage
of Gemini 9.
Bill, none of this adds up to proof of Soviet sabotage, but to me
it demands an answer to these questions:
Did the Soviets, after the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy's
annoumoement of the Moon Landing Mission, decide to put in place the
means to ground the American space program should the need arise?
Did the Soviets, as part of their frenetic effort to destroy the
SDI Program, activate those means?
I strongly urge you and Ed Meese to leave no stone unturned in
getting answers to these questions, based on a hard-nosed investigation.
Daid'el 0. Graham
Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
nos etes Mutes
Sunday, July 6. 1986 Part V 5
Sabotaged Missile Launches?
Explosions, Key Air Force Officer's Disappearance Probed
By TAD SZULC
In a departure from its public position,
the French government has concluded that
the explosion of its Arcane rocket at the
Kourou launch site in French Guinea on
May 30 may have been due to sabotage.
According to French intelligence officials,
the investigation into the Arcane accident
has been secretly reopened because, "Ini-
tially we had no reason to raise the
question of sabotage, but now we have
reason to ask that question."
France has shared its concerns and
suspicions about Arcane with the highest
levels of U.S. intelligence-French De-
fense Minister Andre Giraud is believed to
have touched on this topic when he visited
Washington last Tuesday and Wednes -
day-because of the series of catastrophes
involving American space launches this
year. The French and American accidents
are adding up to a bizarre pattern, sur-
rounded by strange coincidences and un-
explained events, deeply preoccupying
Western intelligence. These include the
apparent defection to the Soviet Union in
1983 of the U.S. Air Force's leading expert
on rocket self-destruct procedures.
With the lose of the space shuttle
Challenger on Jan. 28, a Than 34-D rocket
on April 18, a Delta rocket on May 3 and the
French Ariane, all of which carried Ameri-
can reconnaissance satellites, the United
States no longer has the capability of
putting satellites into orbit to monitor
Soviet nuclear deployments and serve as
early-warning systems against a ballistic-
missile attack. The Challenger and the
Delta rocket were launched from Cape
Canaveral in Florida, the Titan from
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
Before the string of 1986 losses, a Titan
blew up at Vandenberg last August and an
Ariane rocket exploded at Kourou in
September.
Although specific causes of all these
accidents varied in each case, according to
technical inquiry reports, . the common
denominator was that most of the rock-
ets-including the Challenger's solid-fuel
boosters-had to be destroyed by radio
command from the ground to prevent
debris from falling into inhabited areas.
In the can of Arcane, the technical
report on the causes of the May 30 accident
concluded that it was the failure of the
rocket's third-stage engine to ignite prop-
erly and propel the rocket into orbit that
forced a loss of power and triggered the
destruct order four minutes and 36 seconds
after launch. The full text of this report is
available only to Ariane's potential payload
customers. For example, it was presented
on Wednesday to the Commerce Depart-
ment and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration by Frederic d'Allest,
the general manager of France's National
Center of Space Studies. But French
intelligence officials say that while the
report is technically correct (the 1985
Arian accident had the same cause), "it is
very easy to perform sabotage in this
context by one very well -placed person."
French intelligence officials declined to
provide details concerning their new suspi-
cions, but experts in this realm are fasci-
nated and intrigued by a series of extran-
eous events that may have a bearing on the
destruction of the West's satellite launch
capability.
By far the most interesting is the
mysterious disappearance three years ago
of a U.S. Air Force officer who specialized
in space-launch command, control and
communications for satellite surveillance
systems. Capt. William Howard Hughes
Jr., then 34 years old, was the "lead
analyst" of the Command Control and
Communication Surveillance Systems at
the Air Force Operational Test and Evalu-
ation Center at Kirkland Air Force Base in
Albuquerque, N.M., which 'tests new
space-related weapons systems. Among his
responsibilities was the training of range
officers in charge of destroying rockets
malfunctioning after launch
Hughes, who was single. was dispatched
to the Netherlands on July 18, 1983. to
work with North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation officers on the operations of AWACs
electronic surveillance aircraft. He was due
back in Albuquerque that Aug. 1. But after
leaving for ? rope, he was never seen
again. On Dec. 9. 1983, the Air Force
formally declared him a deserter.
Intelligence officers believe that Hughes
was either captured by Soviet agents or
voluntarily defected to the Soviet Union.
At the time of his disappearance, the Air
Force said that he had no classified
materials with him. But these intelligence
officers point out that Hughes' knowledge
of all the top-secret rocket launch proce-
dures was invaluable to the Soviets, per-
haps more so than the secrets delivered by
recently captured spies. "He is worth his
weight in gold to the Russians in terms of
future 'Star Wars; if we have them." one
said. They see a clear link between Hughes
and possible sabotage of the American and
French launches.
Another bizarre occurrence, neither ex-
plainable nor evidence of anything, was the
sudden disappearance of Soviet trawlers
from the Cape Canaveral area four hours
before the scheduled launch of the Chal-
lenger on Jam 28. The trawlers, which are
electronic spy vessels, had been on station.
off the cape from the start of the U.S. space
program. On that January morning. how-
ever. three or four trawlers steamed at
flank speed in a northeastern direction
away from the coast- Normally, these.
trawlers seek to monitor telemetric signals
from the rockets before, during and after-
launch because they provide crucial data
on the space vehicles' performance-
among the most avidly sought information-
by both the United States and the Soviet
Union on each other's ballistic arsenals. It
is an absolute mystery why the trawlers. as
observed by the U.S. Navy, went off station
in this manner.
Tad Szuk is a Washington journalist who
has long covered inteiigence mattm.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
Terrorist Group
Kills Executive
Near Munich
By Robert J. McCartney
W?h:r.i in Post Foreign Servile
MUNICH, July 9-A powerful,
remote-controlled bomb killed a top
business executive and his driver
this morning in an attack that gov-
ernment officials and police said
may signal the- beginning of an up-
surge of left-wing extremist vio-
lence in West Germany.
A note found under the battery
used to detonate the 22-pound
bomb asserted that the leftist Red
Army Faction, West Germany's
self-styled urban guerrilla group,
had staged the attack, officials said.
Karl Heinz Beckurts, 56, a nucle-
ar physicist and chief of research
and development of the giant Sie-
mens corporation, and his chauf-
feur, Eckhard Groppler, 44, were
killed half a mile from the execu-
tive's house en route to his office
this morning. The explosion shot
flames three stories high and hurled
the armor-plated BMW in which
they were riding more than 10 feet
across the road, according to two
witnesses. -
The terrorists apparently chose
their target to seek to exploit op-
position to nuclear power and to
West German cooperation in re-
search on the U.S. Strategic De-
fense Initiative, or "Star Wars."
A seven-page letter, signed by
the Red Army Faction and dis-
played at a news conference at the
federal prosecutor's office in Karls-
ruhe, cited "secret negotiations" in-
volving Siemens in a possible roie in
the SDI research program.
Kurt Rebmann, chief fe'?erai
prosecutor. said the "negotiations"
were a reference to a June 1955
10 July 1986
meeting about SDI between West German cor-
porate and government officials.
Rebmann said Beckurts' name was on a list of
participating business executives that police
found in a raid on a suspected Red Army hideout,
The Associated Press reported.
The letter also referred to the company's role
in a planned nuclear waste reprocessing plant at
Wackersdorf.
"Attack the current strategic projects of the
political, economic and military formation of the
imperialist systems in Western Europe!" the Red
Army note began.
It identified Beckurts as the Siemens corpor-
ate director in charge of nuclear projects, but
company spokesman Werner Osel said that Be-
ckurts did not directly supervise nuclear re-
search.
Osel said the Munich-based company has no
formal contracts or proposals for participation in
the SDI program.
Siemens, a multinational electronics and elec-
trical company, is a leading builder of nuclear
power plants. Before joining Siemens in 1980,
Beckurts had been chief of West Germany's nu-
clear research center.
Antinuclear feeling here has drawn renewed
strength following the Chernobyl nuclear acci-
dent in the Soviet Union, officials said. Protests
aimed at blocking construction the Wackersdorf
plant in the southern state of Bavaria have
grown increasingly violent this summer.
Rebmann said that the terrorists were seeking
to gain favor with the militant wing of the anti-
nuclear movement, and that he believed that the
Red Army Faction would stage further attacks.
Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann
"the government is
determined to use
constitutional means to
combat such murderers and
men of violence."
"This type of terrorist attack is yet another
challenge to our democracy," Chancellor Helmut
Kohl said today. "The government is determined
to use constitutional means to combat such mur-
derers and men of violence.*
The terrorists blew up Beckurts' car as it
passed between a thick forest and a field of low
shrubs just outside the well-to-do suburb of
Strasslach where he lived, eight miles south of
Munich. The bomb was located next to a solitary
tree, whose branches were singed by the blast,
on the right-hand side of the roadway.
The terrorists apparently waited in the
woods on the opposite side of the road and
watched for Beckurts' car to pass. Beckurts'
bodyguard, riding in a car immediately behind
the executive, was unable to react in time to
prevent the attack. The blast crumpled Beck-
urts' car but only smashed the windshield of the
second vehicle.
Government officials said that the attack was
carried out with great efficiency, noting that
such remote-controlled devices have not been
used before by the Red Army Faction. Interior
Minister Zimmermann suggested that the ter-
rorists may have had help from other extremist
groups in other countries.
The Red Army Faction's note identified the
unit that carried out the attack as the "Mara
Cagol Commando," named for the wife of Renato
Curcio, founder of Italy's Red Brigades. Cagol
was killed in 1975 in a police raid in northern
Italy.
Witnesses saw a white van leaving the area of
the explosion shortly after the blast, police said.
Late this afternoon police investigators still were
searching the road for clues and had sealed off
two miles of roadway connecting Strasslach to
Munich.
warned last month that the group was likely to
escalate its activities because it had rebuilt its
strength following a series of arrests and shoot-
ings of its members.
The last senior business figure killed by the
Red Army Faction was Ernst Zimmermann, who
was shot to death at his home near Munich in
February 1985. The group also asserted that it
planted the bomb that killed two Americans and
injured 20 other persons at the U.S. Rhein-Main
Air Base near Frankfurt last August.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JULY 10, I986
High-Tech Research Director and Driver Slain by Bomb in Bavaria
By JOHN TAGLIABUE
Special to The New York Tinm
MUNICH, West Germany, July 9 -
Terrorists using a remote-control.
bomb killed the research director of
West Germany's largest electronics
company and his driver today.
A seven-page letter found near the
site of the bombing and signed by the
Red Army Faction terrorist group said
Karl-Heinz Beckurts, the 56-year-old
director of research and technology at
Siemens A.G., was killed because he
was a proponent of nuclear energy and
a collaborator in the Strategic Defense
initiative, the space-based missile de-
fense system proposed by the Reagan
Administration.
The authorities attributed the killing
to members of the Red Army Faction,
the name given itself by the so-called
Baader-Meinhof Gang, which gained
notoriety for terrorism in the 1970's.
The explosion occurred at about 7:30
A.M. in Strasslach, a town about 15
miles south of Munich, while Mr. Beck-
urts was on his way to work at a Sie-
mens research center in Perlach, a
suburb of this southern West German
city.
of turbines and motors, and shot him
fatally in the head.
The two security agents who followed
Mr. Beckurts Ina second car were tin
hurt, and their light blue BMW stoxxt on
the roadside this afternoon with its
windshield smashed and its trunk
sprung open by the blast.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, through a
spokesman, condemned the attack as
"cold-blooded murder."
The Red Army Faction, which took
responsibility for the killing, built its
reputation in the 1970's in a series of
brutal bombings and other attack;
against German businessmen and
United States Army bases. Since flit
group began its activities in 1971, it has
claimed 30 victims.
The group has loosely defined its gist I
as the overthrow of the West Gennati
political system, but it has hover
clearly defined the type of system it
sought jo install in its place.
Mr. erkurts studied nuclear plivs
ics at the Max Planck Institute for
Physics in G6(thipcn. and was named
in 1963 director (if the Institute fur Ap-
pllctd Nu''leai Physic,; at flit, noclenr
research ccoter in Karlsruhe.
In htril, Sielnvirs hrouf!hl Mr. Iteck.
Loud Explosion Heard tilts into its nrn,tgement hoard as di-
"A
l
?
d t
h
i
f
er
reseatc
1 an
no
ot!; arn
Witnesses said they heard a loud ex- A.1,c -, ,Pn? . rector o
plosion, and a schoolboy said he saw a hind of lice cowpony's huge rcsevc I+
90-foot flame burst from underneath German police officers inspecting the car which eiday iei-t near >' MunichBeckurts and facility at Perlach, where he directed
lift, work of more than :t8,txxr scientists
Mr. Beckurts's car. his driver were killed in a bomb explosion ion ye yesterday Munich.
The authorities said a powerful bomb S - and other workers.
of about 22 pounds of explosives had 1 and the driver, Eckart Groppler, were of the bombing said the automobile ap- The letter taking responsibility bore
h t al st tr +nd machine f tin of the
u
evidently been attached to an oak tree
along the country road that Mr. Beck-
urts usually took home.
Later in the day, the dark blue four-
door BMW that Mr. Beckurts used lay
In a ditch opposite the site of the explo-
sion, its doors, trunk and hood torn
open, twisted and shredded, and its in-
terioi smeared with blood and glass.
The authorities said Mr. Beckurts
.
apparently killed instantly by the force peared to be a standard BMW with no t e yp
of the explosion. special heavy plating. Red Army Fa''t ion and was signed by a
Witnesses said they saw a white The bombing was he latest in a group tailing itself the Mara Cagnl
Volkswagen bus flee the site of the ex- string of attacks on West German in- Command.
plosion, and the police mounted a na- do+stry leaders, and the first such as- The letter also referred to what rt
tiuuwide waununt fur the attackers. snult since f ebrnary 19k,5, when it man said was Mr. tls'ckwts's involvement
Although some news agencies re- aad won)ati hioke into th^ house tit in the Ifni'.. t Statt,~ ' rt ctrl cc 11of,,t+se
ported that Mr. Beckurts was riding in Frost Zimmermann. the 'hc'irman of Initiative, cun'tn'Htio .?all"d "Sty
an armor-plated car, polrt.e at the site Moor-n Und IUrbinen Union. a oink ~r Wars."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
IS THE KGB SABOTAGING SDI?
Daniel 0. Graham
Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)
Director, High Frontier
The Challenger tragedy occurred on January 28, just 10
minutes before I was to address an influential audience of
Germans at Heidelberg University on the need for Allied
involvement in the President's space defense program. You can
imagine the chilling effect that catastrophe had on the audience.
Returning to Washington, I contemplated both the political
and physical setbacks this tragedy would create for the
President's SDI program. Critical tests would be delayed, and
the anti-SDI politicians and media would have a field day crying:
"You see, U.S. space engineering is not what it's cracked up to
be. We told you SDI would never work."
It was also evident to me that there would be great
happiness in the Kremlin at the setback to SDI and U.S. space
programs in general. When it was reported that the Soviet spy
ships which had always before monitored every shuttle launch were
curiously absent at this launch, my intelligence background began
to assert itself. Could it also be that KGB officers were
celebrating a spectacular "victory"? Could foul play have
destroyed the Challenger and its crew?
As evidence came in, my suspicions of dirty work became
restrained. Still, with some trepidation that it might be
considered paranoid, I wrote to former Secretary of State William
Rogers (who was chairing the Presidential Commission
investigating the shuttle accident) and urged a thorough
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
investigation of the possibility of sabotage. I told him that
sabotage was low on my list of probable causes, but argued that
lack of attention to the foul play possibility could encourage
speculations at some later date--a la the Kennedy assassination.
If it had been possible to know what was to follow, I would
not have been so tentative in my letter to Mr. Rogers. Since
then, all other attempts by the United States to enter space have
resulted in catastrophic failures. First, the old workhorse of
space transportation, the Titan II, blew up shortly after launch
by the Air Force from Vandenberg Air Force Base, destroying a
critical reconnaissance satellite.
Then, a NASA launch of a Nike-Orion rocket, carrying a
scientific probe, misfired after liftoff from the New Mexico
desert on April 25. It was the first failure for this booster
after 55 successful launches.
Finally, another system, the Delta rocket, had to be
destroyed by ground controllers after a mechanical malfunction
sent it spinning out of control shortly after launch. The
rocket's payload--a $57 million weather satellite--was also
destroyed.
The fiery demise of four of our space transportation systems
in a row cannot be logically ascribed to "coincidence." Two
government agencies are involved--NASA and the Department of
Defense. All four systems had high reliability histories, the
Shuttle 100%, the others around 95%. The chances of four in a
row failing are mathematically astronomical. The case for foul
play is undeniably strong.
Three elements must be considered in examining the sabotage
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
possibility: motivation, capability, and vulnerability.
With regard to motivation, there can be little doubt that
the Soviet Union would have much to gain by denying, even
temporarily, U.S. access to space. They are frantically trying
to scuttle SDI and have pulled out all propaganda and political
stops to accomplish this end. To assume that they would refrain
from pulling out a "dirty tricks" stop doesn't make sense. If
the KGB thought that U.S. access to space could be denied for a
critical year or better, NASA discredited, and SDI set back
severely, they would certainly consider sabotage.
The Soviets know, just as domestic critics of SDI know, that
the best bet for preventing U.S. defenses against their missile
force is to make certain no deployment decision is made during
Ronald Reagan's Presidency. In this context, even a year's delay
of SDI is critical to their strategic plans.
Does the KGB have the capability to sabotage our space
program? While motivation is clear, capability is less so, and
should be the focus of investigation. The record over the past
few years of uncovering Soviet agents in highly sensitive
positions in both government and high-tech industry suggests that
placement of agents in positions to sabotage our space vehicles
cannot be brushed aside lightly. In fact, the level of subverted
personnel required to sabotage space shots is far lower than that
required to steal the plans for our spy satellites or to deliver
our top-secret Navy codes to the KGB.
And this leads to the third point: vulnerability. The
vulnerability of our space transportation systems is inherently
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
great. These are highly complex machines, serviced by thousands
of technicians. Minor tampering with key components can cause
major disasters. For instance, a half-dollar inserted between
the much-maligned 0-ring seals of the solid rocket boosters on
the Challenger could have created that spectacular tragedy.
Unexplained engine cut-offs, short circuits, etc. could all be
caused deliberately by a technician anywhere between the factory
and the launch pad.
All this does not constitute proof of foul play, but it does
demand the most thorough investigation of that possibility.
Before we lambaste NASA for mismanagement or industry for shoddy
work, we'd better find out if they, along with all the rest of
us, are not victims of deliberate action by the KGB.
There is in all this one very ironic aspect. Those of us
who have been strong supporters of strategic defense have been
frequently confronted by opponents who soberly warn that SDI is
so upsetting to the Kremlin that the Soviets would start World
War III Nuclear to prevent us from defending ourselves with space
systems. These same spokesmen call us paranoids for wondering
whether the Soviets are sufficiently upset with SDI to sabotage
our space systems. Odd, isn't it?
To me, there is no question that the KGB has considered
sabotaging our Shuttle and three other space access systems. The
question is: Did they do it?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 n_~un rriviri icri
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W. ? Suite 1000 ? Washington, D.C. 20005 ? [phone]
Lt. Gen. Daniel o. Graham
USA (Ret.)
Director
February 11, 1986
Ambassador William P. Rogers
Chairman, The Presidential Corurdssion
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
1737 H Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Arbassador Rogers:
I note that among the distinguished members of your commission
there are no intelligence types. Let me serve for a moment as a repre-
sentative of that suspicious breed in the hope that a bit of suspicion
may forestall some future problems.
It is not reasonable to assume that the tragic loss of the Shuttle
Challenger and its crew of fine young Americans was the result of foul
play. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to diniss peremptorily the
possibility that foul play was involved.
One thing is certain. If the Presidential Corrarssion does not look
carefully at the possibility of sabotage, we can expect a rash of
speculative articles, even books, making the case for foul play. One
can readily i--agine ti }l es such as: "were our Astro,.u:ants Assassinated?"
There will probably be such speculation no ratter haw carefully the
possibility of sabotage is examined, but a less-than-thorough probe of
this issue will guarantee a flood of both serious and sensationalized
argument.
A serious probe of the sabotage possibility would be called for no
matter what the circumstances, but certain aspects of this tragedy make
such a probe iizerative. The US Space Program is the pride and joy of
Anerica, coupled closely to the new wave of confidence in the West, and
central to the Stratecic Defense Initiative. As such, the centerpiece
of the program, the Shuttle, is as hated by America's enemnies as it is
admired by America and it's friends.
In :.articular, a~I has become a bane to the Soviet Union because
space defenses uculd sharcl-; reduce the military and political value of
their huge arse :a_ of balliszic nuclear ,tissiles, restore confidence in
the ncn-ccr:a:r:istt World, and move the West onto a new, higher plane of
technology where the USSR wi`l be hard pressed to compete. On the
fanatic fringe of domestic Left politics there is also reason to deplore
progress in SDI. The shift of strategy frog, reliance on nuclear
vengeance to reliance on non-nuclear space defenses has gutted the
Nuclear Freeze :'_cve::ent which many cn the Le--,':: had believed was their
ticket to political power. Both the Kr in and the radical Left would
have reason to re;Ioice at the loss of Challencer, and both are prone to
violence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
Of course, establishing a motive proves nothing except a need to
look further. But there are other reasons supporting a serious
investigation.
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Challenger tradegy is the
absence of Soviet spy ships off the coast of Florida and along the
flight path. As one might expect, the Soviets have consistently
stationed their signals collection ships as close as the Coast Guard
would allow to gather as march data as possible on Shuttle flights. Only
in the case of the ill-fated Challenger flight did they fail to show.
Coincidence? Perhaps. But could it be that they wished to be absent
from the scene of a crime?
Another peculiarity was the speed with which the Soviet Embassy
offered condolences. It may sound churlish to question a gesture of
co m . n decency. But those who know the Soviet system well know that
reacticn to an event of great political and military impact is never off
the cuff, that is without serious consultaticn among the leadership.
That Soviet condolences arrived in a ratter of minutes is unusual at
least.
Another aspect that raises questions is the fact that it appears
now that the proximate cause of the explosion was a weakening and
rupture of the steel casing around the starboard solid booster. This
kind of malfunction was considered so remote a possibility that the
engineers, whose attention to safety is excruciatingly refined, didn't
even bother to install a sensor to detect such a problem. Was that a
case of failure of seals or could that sturdy steel casing have been
weakened or punctured by a deliberate act carried out too late in the
launch procedure to be detected visually? Wculd at have been possible
for a "Walker" to have provided ground-to-shuttle con .rid links and
codes to interfere with the system?
If someone had wanted to sabotage the Shuttle could it be done?
One thing is certain, security around Cape Canaveral is not overly
strict. For those who have attended launches, it seens pretty obvious
that much of the security is designed to prevent danger from the launch
to the spectators, not the reverse. Tens of thousands of people gather
within sight of the huge space vehicle. People in vans and campers
arrive far ahead of time to jockey for geed position. It would be hard
to make the case that a determined sniper could not cet in position for
a shot to be drowned in the awesome roar of the launch.
If the President's Cc..,issicn elects to investigate thoroughly the
sabotace possibility, it is in the security area where they will meet
dogged resistance. As a former intelligence chief, I knew that the
natural inclination of all security institutions in situations such as
this is to exclude foul r a if at ail posse: .e. Ga_-s in the security
ay stems (and they wav= ex:`t) are bound to ce uncovered. Further,
security organizations in Such investigations are consistently faced
with tr/ing to prove negatives, "Can you rule cut the possibilty that
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
--?" So those charged with physical security of the Shuttle, safeguar-
ding the ground-to-Shuttle control codes, and plant security in industry
will not welcome a probe of possible sabotage.
Whether such a probe led to anything else, it would tighten up lax
security. Your Commission should overcome the objections of bureaucracy and
probe the foul play possibility thoroughly. If you do not, there will
be incessant speculation. If you do, you will probably not be able to
settle the question in every citizen's mind, but you will provide
credible answers for the great majority. And, while sabotage is not
high on most observers' lists of possible explanations of the Challenger
tradegy (including mine), it should not now be excluded entirely from
anyone's list of possibilities.
Sincerely,
Daniel 0. Graham
Lt. Gen., USA (Ret. )
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
Presidential Commission
on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
March 28, 1986
Mr. Daniel 0. Graham
Director
High Frontier
1010 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20005
Mr. Rogers has received your letter of March 28, 1985. We
appreciate your support and offer of assistance. At the present
time, the Commission staffing is complete. If, however, a need
arises for your expertise, one of the members of the staff will
contact you.
On behalf of Mr. Roge-s,I want to thank you for your interest in
work i rig with us on what we al l agree is an immensely important
task.
Sincerely,
Thomas T. Reinhardt
Executive Secretarj
6(X) Marylddnd :\venur. 5 \\'. \Vdshmgtnn. DC. _N x)24 (2o2453-14(0.5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
WASHINGTON TIMES
22 May 1986
Shuttle explosion probers
warned to suspect sabotage
By Walter Andrews
and Warren Strobel
THE .NASHINGTON TIMES
A former director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency yesterday
called on the presidential commis-
sion investigating the January space
shuttle catastrophe to look into the
possibility of sabotage.
"The case for foul play is undeni-
ably strong:' retired Army Lt. Gen-
eral Daniel O. Graham said in a
statement. The general is currently
head of the High Frontier, a non-
profit group organized to gain sup-
port for a space defense against nu-
clear missiles.
Mike Weinberg, a spokesman for
the presidential commission. de-
clined commment other than to say
"the commission will consider all as-
pects of the matter."
A spokesman for the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. Lane Bonner.
said FBI agents were present at
Cape Kennedy for the January 28
liftoff as they routinely are for all
space launches.
He said "I'm not aware that
there's any sabotage investigation
underway." Asked if any evidence
pointed to sabotage. the spokesman
replied "I can't comment on that"
In a telephone interview, Gen.
Graham - who was director of the
DIA from 1974 to 1976 - said he
doubted that sabotage was being in-
vestigated "because I know what
kind of reaction one gets ?,chen you
bring up such a possibility. The secu-
rity people get very nervous
In the interview, Gen. Graham
said he was not making a case for
sabotage in the shuttle launch and
,he failure since then of three NASA
rocket boosters. "I'm just saving
that you ought to look awfuli'. close
at !t:
He said "the only choices,. ou have
are; coincidence. a gross drop in
efficiency or a third possibility -
sabotage:'
The general noted that in recent
weeks there had been three failures
of normally very reliable space
boosters - an Air Force Titan II
rocket, which destroyed an impor-
tant spy satellite; an April 25 misfire
of NASA's Nike-Orion, the rocket's
first in 55 launches and a more re-
cent failure of the highly reliable
NASA Delta rocket.
"The fiery demise of four [includ-
ing the space shuttle] of our space
transportation systems in a row can-
not be logically ascribed to 'coinci-
dence:' Gen. Graham said. Concern-
ing possible mismanagement, he
noted both NASA and the Pentagon
were involved.
He also noted all four space
launch systems had histories of high
reliability: the shuttle 100 percent
and ,he others 95 percent.
"The chances of four in a row fail-
in, are mathematically astronomi-
cal. The case for foul play is undeni-
ably strong:' the general said.
Three elements - motivation,
capability and vulnerability -
should be considered in examining
the possibility of sabotage, Gen.
Graham said.
On motivation, he said the Soviet
KGB would certainly consider sab-
otage if it thought it would set back
the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative space defense program by
denying American access to space
for a year or more. He did not
elaborate on how this denial would
set back the SDI.
On the space program's vulner-
ability. the general said it is "inher-
. ently great " because of the highly
complex machinery and thousands
of technicians involved.
"Minor tampering with key com-
ponents can cause major disasters,"
he said.
On capability, he said "while mo-
tivation is clear, capability is less so,
and should be the focus of the inves-
tigation."
It would take lower ranking per-
sonnel to sabotage space shots than
those accused in recent years of
stealing spy satellite plans or Navy
communications codes, he said.
His suspicions of sabotage were
first raised when it was reported
that Soviet spy ships, which usually
monitor shuttle launches, "were cur-
iously absent at this launch:'the gen-
eral said.
He then ?.vrote the chairman of the
presidential commission. former
Secretary of State William Rogers.
and asked him to look into what he
then considered the low possibility
of sabotage in order to forestall later
speculation such as occurred after
the 1963 assassination of President
Kennedy.
"If it had been possible to know
what was to follow. ' would not have
been so tentative :n my letter to Mr.
Rogers:'the general said in his state-
ment.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
A Monthly Review of News, Books, and Public Affairs
June, 1986
OUR SPACE FAILURES
Was that extraordinary string of launch failures in America's space program due to
technological mistakes, coincidence or just plain bad luck? Or could sabotage have
been involved?
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for
one, has urged the presidential commission investigating the explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger to look into the possibility of sabotage. Graham, who now heads
High Frontier, a private space-defense research group, says, "The Soviets have been
pulling out all the stops in their propaganda machine to prevent us from using space
for SDI (President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative). I wouldn't be surprised
if they were also pulling out all the stops in their dirty tricks machine, too. You
cannot ignore the possibility." Graham acknowledges that no hard evidence of sabotage
has yet been presented, but says some "curious things" occurred in connection with the
January shuttle tragedy. "The Soviets withdrew all their (reconnaissance).ships from
the launch area off Cape Canaveral during the launch. That was a first. Also, the
condolence message from the Soviet Embassy here came very fast, uncharacteristically so."
The successive unmanned rocket failures that followed Challenger also have aroused
intense curiosity in security circles. These involved the April 18th explosion five sec-
onds after liftoff of an Air Force Titan rocket carrying a badly needed spy satellite.
Previously, the Titan had been regarded as one of our most dependable military launchers.
This was followed on April 25th with the explosion of a Nike Orion rocket with a scien-
tific probe. Before that, the Orion had a record of 120 consecutive NASA successes. And
just over a week later, a Delta rocket carrying a weather satellite misfired and was
destroyed by flight safety officers. The Delta had recorded 43 straight successes for
NASA dating back over several years. Commenting on the Delta failure, one NASA official
said the engine shutdown "almost seemed like something flipped the switch."
Whatever the cause of the successive launch failures, there's no question but that
the U.S. space program has suffered a damaging setback. Our three remaining shuttles,
which had been counted on to carry vital SDI and other defense satellites into space,
are not expected to fly again until mid-1987 at the earliest. And the Air Force's
Titan explosion in April left the Pentagon with only one spy-in-the-sky satellite, a
thin margin in today's dangerous world when Soviet military moves must be constantly
monitored.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
HUMAN EVENTS 17 !y 1986
Was the Space
Program Sabotaged?
In trying to explain the recent malfunction of a
Delta rocket, the type scheduled to launch SDI
experiments into space later this year, one NASA
official said the engine shutdown "almost seemed
like something flipped the switch."
While investigators have suggested an electrical
circuit on the engine may have failed, there is also
the distinct possibility of sabotage. Lt. Gen. Daniel
0. Graham (Ret.), former director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, says that sabotage could have
been accomplished through "transmission fre-
quencies" by sending the wrong information to the
space vehicle.
Graham, who now directs High Frontier, a pro-
SDI research organization, says, "The Soviets
have been pulling out all the stops in their propa-
ganda machine to prevent us from using space for
SDI. I wouldn't be surprised if they were also pull-
ing out all the stops in their dirty tricks machine,
too. You can't ignore the possibility."
Graham says that he has sent a letter to William
Rogers, the head of the presidential commission
investigating the destruction of the space shuttle
Challenger, urging him to look at the possibility of
sabotage in that disaster.
Graham acknowledges that no hard evidence of
sabotage has yet been presented, but that some
"curious things" took place in connection with the
shuttle tragedy. "The Soviets pulled out all their
ships from the area near the cape during the Chal-
lenger launch," he says. "That was a first. Also,
the condolence message from the Soviet embassy
here came eery fast, uncharacteristically so."
On the question of how the Soviets could have
pulled it off, Graham says the Soviets have been
trying for years to get "sleepers" into the U.S.
space industry. He points out that the movie, "The
Falcon and the Snowman," was about a real life
story of a Soviet operative working at the defense
firm TRW.
"If the Soviets have the right access," he says,
"they could do it. It's not an impossible feat."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6
Electrical Surge Caused Delta to Fail
Accident Finding Leads NASA Probers to Urge Delaying Atlas Centaur Launch
By Michael IaikofT
... _ _ M,.MwR,ew Imo, V..N Mr"n
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla., May 5-
NASA Investigators said today that the fail-
ure of a Delta rocket over the Atlantic Sat-
i-day night apparently was caused by two
powerful surges of electricity that drained
power from the battery in the first-stage
engine, choking off the rocket's fuel supply
I1 seconds after liftoff.
''Although investigators said they cannot
yet pinpoint the cause of the electrical mal-
function, they are sufficiently concerned
about the Delta's engine system to advise
postponing the upcoming launch of an Atlas
Centaur rocket, the nation's only large
launch vehicle not grounded by a recent
failure. The Atlas Centaur has a similar en-
gine system made by the same company,
Rockwell International's Rocketdyne divi-
sion in Canoga Park, Cal.
Lawrence J. Ross, chairman of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's eight-member board investigating the
Delta accident, said there are "strong re-
semblances" between the two engines and
he has spoken to the Air Force about delay-
ing the Atlas Centaur launch of a Navy com-
munications satellite.
'-'"There's a fair probability it will be de-
layed, unless we stumble on an answer
very, very quickly," said Ross at a news
briefing here.
The discovery of the electrical failure,
and its potential relationship to the Atlas
Centaur, was described by aerospace ex-
perts as virtually the crowning blow to it
national space program devastated by the
Jan. 28 Challenger shuttle disaster and the
April 18 explosion of an Air Force Titan
34D rocket.
Even temporarily grounding the Atlas
Centaur will leave the country with no
means of orbiting heavy military and com-
mercial satellites since the shuttle. the
Titan and the Delta rockets are officially
grounded pending accident investigations.
"This puts us right out of the space busi-
ness," said Gary Flandro, a prominent rock-
et expert at Georgia Tech University. "It's
a terrible disaster .... We can't do any
military payloads, we can't do any SDI ex-
periments, we can't do anything."
Flandro also noted that the Delta aod
Atlas Centaur engines were "really tried
and proven, and tremendously reliable."
"This is just not a mode of failure that's
been observed before," he said. "1'm amazed
they (NASA) would be caught by this sort of
difficulty .... It's a very peculiar situa-
tion."
The latest crisis was triggered Saturday
when the normally reliable Delta, carrying a
$57.5 million weather satellite, suddenly
veered out of control and broke apart short-
ly after launch. forcing Air Force range of-
ficers to destroy it from the ground with
onboard explosives.
William Russell, NASA's Delta project
manager, said investigators reviewing te-
lemetry data discovered that there had
been two "spikes," or sharp electrical
surges, through the engine's main power I
lines starting at 70 seconds into the flight,
just before the engine lost power.
The first surge lasted 6 or 8 milliseconds
and pulled power from the engine's main
battery down to an abnormally low 10 or 11
volts, he said. The surge quickly abated, but
nine-tenths of a second later there was an.
other electrical surge, lasting 14 or 15 nnil-
liseconds, that measured about 150 am-
peres-at least 12 times higher than the
normal current, Russell said.
This second surge again drained the bat-
tery, cutting power to the valves that hold William Russell, NASA's 1'4 Ita prnirct inana[:er, describe: the shutdown e
open the first-stage engine's fuel lines. The I
abrupt cutoff of fuel to the rocket's first "We're still going hack and looking at 10 Rocketdyne is the r
stage appears to have caused the sharp the prelaunch processing of the vehicle to slurtlle orbiter's nnau, ,
break in engine power that Russell said Sat- make sure we didn't do sonuvthuog that n,ac ir,rt soon e of difficult
urday resembled "a commanded shutdown." have caused it," lie said. But while Russell called the telemetry s program.
Y The Delta engine, l:noecn as a RS'l7 en-
showing the two electrical surges "quite a give, has been used throughout flit ^6 the speycculaannotiont ofu
significant find" investigators remain years of the Delta project without any his- out.
rpleositsioublet
stumped as to what caused the malfunction. tory of problems, said Joyce Lincoln, a likely" that ant; ground
Russell said that faulty wiring, mishandling spokeswoman for the Rocketdyne division. rocket engine's shutdov
or improper construction of the engine are "I don't think there's any question about '?,I'here ii absolutely n
possibilities. this not being a design flaw," she said. the iuce,nigators said.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6