AID TO THE CONTRAS: DEALING WITH THE MISCONCEPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001904440083-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: May 6, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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6 May 1986
SUBJECT: Aid to the Contras: Dealing with the Misconceptions
The debate on the renewal of aid to the contras has demonstrated vast
misperceptions on the role and effectiveness of armed resistance to oppressive
government. We hear it said that there is no way the United States could ever
match the many hundreds of millions the Soviets have provided the Sandinista
regime or the billions of support they have provided the Angolan government.
The truth is that "matching" assistance totally misses the point. It
can cost as much as ten times more to counter an insurgency than to support
one. Recruiting, training and equipping an adequate security force becomes
a monumental task in situations where the government faces an insurgent
force. For example, the Angolan regime, with about 150,000 regular troops
and with massive aid from the Soviets and Soviet surrogates, is beleaguered
by a 50,000-60,000 insurgency. Because the government cannot choose the
battlefield in an insurgency, it must provide security throughout the country.
Because extensive fortification networks--maintained by troops that patrol
the countryside--are needed to provide such protection, large numbers of
troops are tied down. A country's economic infrastructure--transporation
networks, electrical power systems, major industries--is comprised of a
number of facilities and ancillary support structures that are difficult to
secure. By their very nature, powerlines, oil pipelines, or railroads cannot
be well guarded unless a government expends large numbers of troops. Countering
an effective insurgency force with airpower (helicopter gunships or transports),
heavy weapons and tactical communications equipment is very expensive. Large
quantities of ammunitions are needed when fighting an "invisible" enemy.
Far fewer people are required to destabilize a government than are
needed to protect it. An insurgent force does not really need sophisticated
and expensive weapons except to defend against air and tank attacks by an
oppressive government. The insurgents can pick their opportunities to
strike at vulnerable strategic targets. This can inflict physical and
psychological damage at a low cost. Much of the insurgents' appeal to the
populace comes from their efforts to improve living conditions within the
country. Programs to provide education and improve sanitation and health
facilities are cheaper to fund than programs to upgrade the military
capabilities of the government.
We also hear that the insurgents will never have the military power
to defeat the government's superior military might. This ignores history
and misrepresents the way revolutions work. Because insurgency is a protracted
conflict, involves a number of stages and is pursued through a variety of
tactics, progress is made through small, numerous achievements. A full-blown
offensive is not required to gain momentum in the insurgency, for small-scale
tactics can gradually erode the stability of the government. Most insurgent
conflicts are not decided on the battlefield. Insurgencies force the collapse
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of regimes that, either through an erosion of popular support or international
pressure, are already weakened. A decisive insurgent military victory is
not required. In Uganda, for example, the recent success of Musaveni--who
led a small resistance movement against a government force six times its
size and succeeded without fighting a major engagement--shows the vulnerability
of brutal, corrupt governments.
In the case of Algeria in the late 1950s and South Yemen in the 1960s,
neither Paris nor London had the perseverence or domestic support to continue
their counterinsurgency efforts and a stalemated situation ensued, resulting
in eventual withdrawal by the foreign forces and victory for the insurgents.
We also hear that the Nicaraguan resistance should be totally self-reliant;
that external support somehow will undermine the legitimacy of the moment
and its long-term chance of success. The truth is that external material
support and international recognition of a shadow government are key factors
in most successful insurgencies.
-- External support played a key role in the successful rise to
power of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Without massive
support from the Cubans and Soviets, the Popular Movement would not have
been able to defeat the other groups vying for power.
-- Moreover, the Sandinistas' victory was achieved in large measure
through Cuban assistance in the form of advice, training, arms and funds.
-- International pressure was a key factor in bringing about the
negotiations between the white regime and the insurgents in Rhodesia which
ultimately led to a peaceful insurgent victory. An insurgency gains support
and international recognition of the shadow government.
Withdrawal of external support can destroy or greatly diminish an
insurgency's capabilities, at least initially. This occurred in:
The Philippines, where the communist Chinese withdrew support
from the Huks during 1946-1954.
-- Venezuela, where Cuba, after becoming disillusioned with the
insurgents in the mid-1960s, withdrew support.
-- Greece, where Tito terminated support for the Greek insurgents
and closed the Yugoslav borders in the late 1940s.
-- Angola, where the US stopped its support of the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola following the Clark Amendment in in 1975 and
the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola gained power.
We also near that there is no significant popular support for the
resistance inside Nicaragua and that, by contrast, the Sandinista regime
enjoys broad international backing. Simply not so.
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History shows that progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government and gradual erosion of international support for the government
is what brings down or alters oppressive governments. This process is
under way in Nicaragua. The insurgents have made gains among rural peasants
who resent agricultural collectivization and resettlement programs as well
as the government's mandatory military draft and anti-church policies. The
heavy financial burden of the counterinsurgency effort--about half of the
Nicaraguan budget last year--combined with poor economic management has
created mounting discontent with the Sandinista regime.
Until recently, Western nations viewed the Sandinista revolution as a
reaction to socioeconomic problems endemic to dictatorial regimes; Latin
American nations saw it as a triumph over US political and economic dominance.
But as evidence of government abuses and internal unrest have surfaced, other
nations have become more critical of the Sandinistas and official and multilateral
financial aid to Nicaragua has been decreasing. The general rule in Latin
America is that the closer the country is to Nicaragua, the greater the fear
and dislike of the Sandinista regime becomes. This is evidenced by recent
USIA public opinion surveys. These surveys, conducted between June and
November 1985, found:
-- Nicaragua is seen as a military threat by 9 out of 10 in
Costa Rica and Honduras and by about half in Guatemala.
-- Sixty percent of the people polled in these countries say
that the United States interferes in Central America, but that the net result
is good. Cuba, the USSR, and Nicaragua are together named as interfering
more often than the United States with their interference being unanimously
described as negative.
-- Public opinions of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the USSR are overwhelmingly
negative, with most regarding Nicaragua as a tool of Cuba and the USSR.
A large percentage of those who responded in Costa Rica and
cnduras approve of US aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents, with an approval
rating of two to one in the other two countries.
We hear it said that the Nicaraguan resistance simply has had no real
impact--has achieved nothing! This is certainly not the way the Sandinistas
see it. On the contrary, they undoubtedly see the insurgency as a major
obstacle to their consolidation of a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state.
Marxist regimes try to move quickly to consolidate power to thwart
internal opposition and to develop close ties with the Soviet bloc to
discourage external intervention.
-- Castro was able to eliminate virtually all internal opposition
in Cuba within the first two years.
-- Within two and one-half years of Selassie's overthrow in Ethiopia,
Mengistu had consolidated power, severed relations with the United States,
and begun receiving Soviet military support.
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On the other hand, where the West has provided at least a degree of
support to opposition forces--such as in Nicaragua--consolidation of the
Marxist regime has been much slower. After almost seven years in power,
the Sandinistas--faced with a continuing insurgency that enjoys only very
modest US support--have not been able to complete the consolidation process
and eliminate the internal political opposition. In addition, both the
Soviets and Cubans are cautious about provoking a confrontation with the
United States over Nicaragua. Unlike the Angola and Ethiopia cases, the
USSR has not signed a friendship treaty or made other formal commitments to
Nicaragua, and the Cubans have refrained from sending in large numbers of
combat troops.
Finally, skeptics question whether US support for the Nicaraguan
resistance makes sense in a geopolitical sense. The answer is that US support
of insurgent movements fighting Marxist-Leninist regimes has to be seen in
the context of countering greater Soviet subversive involvement in the Third
World. Moscow and Havana currently support high cost, long-term efforts to
the regimes they installed in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua. In each case, the Soviets now find themselves supporting a
Marxist-Leninist government that is combatting an insurgency--a clear reversal
of the roles experienced by the United States and the Communists in Vietnam.
Given the nature of insurgent conflicts, the cost to Moscow and its
allies of countering an insurgency is considerably greater than the cost to
the West of aiding the insurgents. Yet, at present Moscow appears committed
to holding these gains and is likely to exploit any low cost opportunities
to further consolidate power. Part of this resolve may reflect Soviet belief
that America's post-Vietnam reluctance to become embroiled in Third World
conflicts will eventually force the United States to withdraw because the
results of any US commitment are not immediate enough to sustain public
support. The United States can block this form of Soviet aggression even
while maintaining relatively low levels of support to insurgent groups. In
El Salvador, for example, a low-level US commitment in support of the government
has been a major factor in reversing the fortunes of Nicaraguan and Cuban-backed
insurgents. By requiring Moscow to counter multiple insurgencies, the risks
and costs to Moscow are increaser substantially, alternatives to Soviet
domination are kept alive in several Third World arenas, and Marxist-Leninist
regimes in countries such as Nicaragua are prevented from quickly consolidating
their revolution.
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