(SANITIZED) PROPOSED DCI OPED/SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001904420057-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
14 March 1986
DCI:
FYI. Herewith a tidied up copy of the Op-Ed
piece or speech you cabled in. I have also
attached copies of my notes to Buchanan, Dolan and
Poindexter.
Bob Gates contributed to and approved the
final version.
STAT .
George V. Lauder
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Control Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
13 March 1986
Dear Admiral Poindexter:
Director Casey asked me to send you this copy
of a possible Op-Ed piece or part of speech he may
give. He would be pleased if you find it useful
to quote from or whatever in support of the
President's program.
Also at the DCI's request I have sent copies
to Pat Buchanan and Tony Dolan for possible use in
the President's speech.
Sincerely
George V. Lauder
Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
Pat,
13 March 1986
Herewith a copy of Director Case es
Op-Ed piece or speech. Please use ityin any Posswible
that would be helpful. Tony Dolan and y
Adm. Poindexter also have copies.
George uder
Patrick J. Buchanan
Special Assistant to the President and
Director of Communications
The White House
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
13 March 1986
Tony:
Herewith a copy of Director Casey's remarks.
Feel free to use them any way you wish.
Anthony Dolan
Special Assistant to the President and
Chief Speechwriter
The White House
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THE ERODING BALANCE
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Over the last decade, the strategic balance between the Soviet Bloc and the
Western Alliance has been taking on new dimensions.
From the beginning, the Soviets had dominance in land warfare. This was
countered by U.S. superiority in strategic forces. From 1965-1980, the
Soviet strategic offensive forces caught up and, in many key areas,
surpassed ours. Even as the United States in recent years has acted to
modernize its strategic forces, the Soviets have been doing more. For
example, the Soviets are-now protecting their land missile force by making
much of it mobile, whereas the U.S. mobile ICBM will not be deployed until
the 1990s.
This current situation, representing a net decline in relative U.S.
strategic power, is being potentially compounded as the Soviets complete a
missile defense around Moscow and develop the components and the production
line capable of building a much larger, widespread missile defense system.
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If President Reagan's military modernization program and Strategic Defense
Initiative are sustained, we may be able to catch up and stay abreast of
rapidly expanding Soviet military power.
But there are two other dimensions of the strategic balance where we are
still falling behind. Soviet strategic military power may never be used.
It may be merely the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out
worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the
vicinity of critical sea lanes.
Over the past twenty years, the Soviets have acquired bridgeheads in Cuba
and Vietnam, and client states in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Kampuchea,
Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Since coming to power in early 1985, Soviet
party leader Gorbachev has made strong efforts to strengthen the Soviet hold
on these bridgeheads. Many are being linked, moreover, in a growing
logistic and mutual support network that depends on expanding Soviet naval
and air power.
Take, for example, the Soviet position in the Caribbean. The Soviets have
created in Cuba the strongest military force in the Western Hemisphere, with
the exception of our own. Over the last few years they have given Cuba
massive infusions of MiG-23 aircraft, T-62 tanks, artillery pieces and
multiple rocket launch systems, infantry combat vehicles, anti-aircraft
guns, helicopter gunships, SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, fast
torpedo and missile attack boats and Foxtrot-class submarines. The Soviets
themselves have at their own military bases in Cuba 4,500 Soviet troops and
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advisors and the largest intelligence collection and electronic monitoring
capability outside the Soviet Union.
Cuba, however, is merely a Soviet stepping-stone in the Caribbean.
Even now, Cuban construction crews are completing, outside Managua, the
largest military airbase in Central America. When finished, it will be
capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters, heavy transport aircraft, and
Tu-95 bombers. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft now routinely fly from the
Kola Peninsula in the Soviet arctic to Cuban airfields and on to Angola.
When the new field is operational, the Soviets will be able to fly from the
Soviet homeland to Nicaragua, refuel there, and continue by way of the
Pacific to air bases in the Soviet Far East.
In addition, the already short, direct sea connection between Cuba and
Nicaragua will be made even shorter when the Bulgarians complete a major
port facility on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. Now if this were used
only for Nicaraguan exports, that would be fine. Unfortunately, the
existing port is used for wholesale importation of Soviet weapons. The new
port will simply make their transshipment from Cuba all the more efficient.
Similar links and components of this network have been established around
the globe. From Angola, Soviet naval and air forces now routinely operate
astride western shipping lanes in the Atlantic. These forces depend on a
growing West African Marxist base manned and protected by nearly 2,000
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Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban troops, and a local Angolan Government
army of 100,000.
The Mediterranean segment of this Soviet global network is anchored at Libya
and Syria. Some 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors aid these countries. Their
presence makes achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East less
likely, and they also provide the "ground crews" for rapid expansion of
Soviet military power in the region should that be directed by the Politburo.
Similarly, this network threatens western sea lanes in the Red Sea, Arabian
Sea, and Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Base rights
in these and some other countries play no small part in the Soviet ability
to operate its naval forces over extended periods in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da
Nang in Vietnam command .the vital sea lanes linking Japan, Taiwan and South
Korea with Middle East oil supplies and Southeast Asian customers.
Moreover, the bases permit the Soviets to operate routinely from naval and
air bases in the Soviet Far East down the China coast. It is clear that
these bases, acquired from the Vietnamese since about 1980, pose a threat to
Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines, which are critical to the
defense of our friends and allies throughout the Pacific.
Now, the West could cope if the Soviets were merely interested in acquiring
overseas military bases and colonies. But the Soviets have no intention of
stopping there.
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A more valuable role for their bridgeheads on the various continents is for
the spread of subversion, terror, and destabilization. From Nicaragua,
terrorism and subversion have been exported throughout Central America and
into Chile, Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America. Nicaragua has also
served as a transfer point for drug traffic enroute to the U.S. From Libya,
there is invasion of Chad, attempts at destabilizing governments in Egypt,
Tunisia, and Sudan, and subversion throughout West Africa. From Angola,
there are intrusions into Zaire. From Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, there
have been armed intrusions into Pakistan and occasionally even Iran.
The Soviets are spending many billions of dollars to consolidate their
holdings and make additional gains in the Third World. This will further
tilt the balance against the West. To accomplish this, they are now
spending $4 billion a year in Cuba, $1 billion a year in Angola, several
hundred million in Nicaragua, $3 or 4 billion a year in Afghanistan, and
another billion in Vietnam. This aid to its many clients does not, by the
way, include funding of Soviet forces or bases such as those installed and
operated at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet effort is further supported by a flood
of weapons that pours out of the great arms depot at Nikolayev on the Black
Sea to pro-Soviet regimes and insurgent groups all over the world.
To give an additional push to its efforts at destabilizing pro-Western
governments around the world, the Soviets have also aided terrorist groups
in Western Europe and the Middle East. It is true that the Eastern European
hand is more obvious than the Soviet hand in supporting terrorists.
Nonetheless, hard evidence exists of their combined support. And that
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support takes many forms. The Soviets and their satraps provide training,
weapons, communications, documentation, safehaven and other assistance to
terrorist groups.
What does it take to prevent this Soviet ten billion dollar annual
investment from producing even more hostile bases and eroding the strategic
balance even more rapidly?
There is a priceless asset available to the West for this purpose.
During the 1960s and 1970s, people in many parts of the world were flocking
to join Communist insurgencies. In the 1980s, this trend has reversed.
Today, some half million people around the world are fighting in resistance
movements against Communist regimes or Communist occupation. Afghanistan is
virtually a nation-in-arms fighting against 120,000 Soviet occupation
troops. In Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000 fighters in all parts of the
country battling the Cubans, Marxist Angolans, and Soviet advisors. In
Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels fight the Marxist Mengistu government
and the largest army in Africa with its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In
Kampuchea, 50,000 insurgents struggle bitterly with 170,000 occupying
Vietnamese soldiers. In Marxist Nicaragua, 20,000 resistance fighters--most
of whom are campesinos driven from their homes by the regime--are holding
their own against 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia armed with the
latest Soviet assault helicopters and tanks.
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Despite these valiant efforts to shake off the Soviet yoke, the outcome of
many liberation struggles is far from certain. The Soviets can be expected
to react violently to insurgency, popular rebellion, or even attempts by
lesser Marxist governments to liberalize their regimes.
During the Brezhnev Era, the Soviets announced the so-called Brezhnev
Doctrine which says, in effect, "once Communist, always Communist." There
is every indication that--despite his smiles and smooth manner--Gorbachev
will apply that doctrine with renewed vigor. Now this is not new. During
the 1950s and 60s the Soviets installed whomever they pleased as leaders in
Eastern Europe. You may recall their violent removal of Alexander Dubcek
and installment of the puppet Husak regime in 1968. The Soviets also ?
removed--and murdered--two puppets in Afghanistan in 1979.
Most recently, hardline pro-Soviet elements in the South Yemen government
initiated a coup against-President All Nasser. The coup soon escalated into
a bloody civil war between military and tribal elements loyal to All Nasser
and those of the hardline pro-Soviet camp. After watching the blood flow
for a few days, the Soviets threw their unreserved support to the pro-Soviet
Yemeni Vice President, then in Moscow, who was speedily confirmed by the
Yemeni Politburo as the new president. The message in all these cases is
clear: leaders of governments installed by Moscow who seek improved
relations with the West do so at their peril. The message is also clear
that the Soviets will brook no challenges in any part of their empire.
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The brutality of the Communist regimes' against which many peoples have risen
has already driven millions of their fellow countrymen into exile. Our
failure to support their struggles will send millions more our way. We seem
to have already forgotten the tragic experience of the "boat people" from
Vietnam and Kampuchea.
Communist-initiated violence around the world has resulted in thousands of
deaths attributable directly to attacks or to plain murder by occupation
forces. Thousands more have died of starvation, disease, or exposure. And
millions have been made refugees. In Afghanistan, for example, fully one
quarter of the prewar population--nearly four million people--has fled from
the terrors of Soviet occupation. In Central America, the story is the
same. Thousands have been killed or executed by the Sandinistas and the
Salvadoran Communists, and fully a quarter of a million people made
refugees. In Ethiopia, the Marxist government has squandered its meager
financial resources on buying Soviet weapons while virtually ignoring the
agonizing famine that has killed thousands of its people. Ethiopia's only
response has been to force-march other thousands from their homes in the
drought-stricken north to ill-prepared camps in the south. The plight of
Kampuchea is nearly,unbelieveable. In five years, it is estimated that yet
another million Kampucheans have been killed, died of malnutrition, or fled
from the rapacious Vietnamese occupation.
The sums needed by these brave men and women to fight for their freedom and,
incidentally, to protect our own security and freedom, are paltry. If we
deny them our help now, what does that say of us as a people? Indeed, what
verdict can history bring against a great people that refuses to help others
and thus cannot help itself?
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