LIBYAN-CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THIRD WORLD
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88B00443R001704340023-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 16, 2010
Sequence Number:
23
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 19, 1985
Content Type:
MEMO
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Several years ago, some mem-
bers of the Lebanese govern-
ment of more-or-less
President Amin Gemayel esti-
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
19 August 1985
mated the value of the shells and
of savage fighting there at to mu-
lion.
That kind of extraordinary outlay
of money and weaponry - a devel-
opment privately remarked upon
with a kind of awe among analysts
from Western Europe to the Middle
East - is leading to some startling
new speculation on what Lebanon
really is all about.
Some of them are saying that, far
from being an accidental or out-of-
control war, Lebanon, on many lev-
els, is a deliberate and . planned
chaos. As one analyst intimately con-
nected with the war put it to me:
"The story not told is that this is
an international war. It is the Span-
ish Civil War of our times. At stake
area number of things, from the fate
of the Palestinians to whether the
Soviets take over the whole area.
"One key area the Soviets did not
control was Lebanon. Now, there is
Georgie Anne Geyer is a nation-
ally syndicated columnist.
The Lebanon war
most definitely is
being used and
molded from outside,
in particular by the
Soviets.
Soviet control - but negatively Ile
paused for emphasis. "This is Viet-
nam II," he added.
What is important to watch in
Lebanon is the sheer a"11011111 oI
weaponry and money for weaponry
This tells both the anry and at the
same time why ih,- ;or\ is so dan
gerous that none "I !hese anal~,t:
Canted to he tluute
Basically. the'.: e: t
nl ent
l,ebarn
Cate balance between factions, could
have fallen apart into warring clans
and sectors But. without the little-
reported and unprecedented inter-
national supply of arms, it would
never have reached the stage of sav-
agery that goes on day after day even
now. -
There are missiles launched from
trucks. and they are shot off at the
rate of 36 every half-minute. For the
most common ,,un. the' 152mm,
every shell costs S1,000. Private
armies have D-72 tanks, which the
Soviets i.nve to some Warsaw Pact
countries: and some Palestinian
groups have helicopters.
The enormous preponderance of
comes across the Black Sea
fr en Soviet 'Union through the
lane at such ports as
l.atakia. Some come
iu ! . i !and :across Syria, again
.....: ,:..~ ? ..:.,r's:nos.
by the Foreign and
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Commonwealth Office in London say
that Syria, the Soviets' main foothold
in the Arab World,` heads. the list of
Soviet-arms recipients for the :last
five years. In 1983 alone,'supplies to
it were worth about $1.7 billion.
One. curiosity also little known is
that the -Soviets obtained about .20
percent of their hard currency earn-
ings, . again in 1983 alone, from
repayments of principle and interest
on arms sales in these countries.,
So while the attention of the lead-
ers of the world's traditionally
organized countries (the United
States and Western Europe) is
focused on the "big" issues of
nuclear arms and their control, it is
telling that virtually no one is
watching the supposedly "periph-
eral" area of Lebanon.
I called the prestigious Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies
in London and asked whether they
had any information on the amounts
of arms going into Lebanon.
'In a word, no:' a military
spokesman told me. "We watch the
big stuff:' Then he asked the key
question: "How do you cover stuff
from the Syrians to their proteges?
From Iran to the Hezbollah? Tb
Christians from Cyprus?
Knowledgeable sources can't,
because the data is too scarce:'
Because. the entire Lebanon war
is 'orchestraated in such an "irreg-.
ular" manner, the constituted
authority of the world .cannot get a
grip on it. And,. ndeed,'that is pre- ..
-cisely why it is orchestrated in such
a way.
One caveat: it would be far too
much to say that the entire
Lebanon war, which now has
gone on for 10 horrifying years, was
planned from afar - from Moscow
or Damascus. There are too many
fissiparous protagonists in Lebanon.
But what begins to become clear
when you separate some of the
strands of the Lebanon war is that it
most definitely is being used and i
molded from outside, in particular
by the Soviets, through their maca-
bre arms input and the control that
gives them.
The useful chaos of the moment!
can, then, in their eyes, lead to a quite
different future, as yet unforeseen,
one in which the Soviet Union plays
a major role. The analysts also say,
for instance, that the little-known
Lebanese Communist Party
increasingly is inserting itself into
important posts.
The Spanish Civil War of our
time? When one thinks about it, it:
doesn't seem as unlikely as it might
sound at first.
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13 AUG 1985
KMe for: DD I
ks
j
Attached is 0GI'? re4ponse to the
DCI's tasking to identify areas of
competition between Cuba and Libya in
the Third World. It reflects extensive
input' from NESA and ALA and was
coordinated with the DO.
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Libyan-Cuban Competition for Influence in the Third World
A Background Paper for the DCI
In recent years Cuba and Libya have assisted groups or
governments in some 43 Third World countries. For the most part
Cuban and Libyan activities are mutually supportive, and Havana
on occasion has even encouraged Third World governments and
political groups to seek out Libyan assistance. (S NF)
In Latin America, however, recent reports indicate Cuba is
concerned that Libyan advocacy of militant tactics will disrupt
its post-Grenada strategy of counseling moderation among regional
leftists. While Cuba and Libya continue to provide complementary
support to opposition groups in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, as well as to the Sandinista regime,
friction has surfaced in the Caribbean. (S NF)
Although Cuba in the past welcomed additional sources of
financial support, there are indications that Havana has recently
come to view Libyan activism in the Caribbean as meddling in its
own backyard. Havana probably fears that violent anti-US activi-
ty in the region could be seen in Washington as Cuban-inspired,
thus prompting a strong US response. Cuban annoyance with and
opposition to Libyan activities has already been reported in a
number of countries
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;ECRET NOFORN
We believe there is potential for Cuban-Libyan competition
or conflict in Latin American countries:
In Africa, Libyan and Cuban activities mostly complement
each other. Both countries, for example, are strong backers of
the Ethiopian government and the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. (S NF)
While there is little evidence that either side views the
other as a direct competitor in the region, we believe the
potential for competition exists in some countries:
o In Ethiopia, while Addis Ababa is confident of its
longstanding Cuban military and economic assistance, it
believes Libya may renew its support for Eritrean
separatists.
o In Sudan, Tripoli is attempting to establish a state-to-
state military assistance relationship
o While Cuba has made repeated attempts to establish better
relations, including an economic assistance program with
the Zairian government, Libya has been reported to be
increasing support to insurgent groups. (S NF)
Appendix A is a listing of the Third World countries where
Libya and Cuba have since 1982 promised or provided Official
Military Assistance, Official Economic Assistance (including
scholarships to students), or engaged in Political Penetration
activities (the promise or provision of arms, money or other
forms of support to political groups, political arties, dissi-
dents, or insurgents in that country).
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S ~I.KG l ~ L) UKiv
Cuba-Libya: Summary of Third World Aid Activities, 1983-Present*
Official official Political official official Political
Military Economic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra-
Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion
LATIN AMERICA
ANTIGUA X X
ARGENTINA X
BAHAMAS X x
BARBADOS X
BELIZE X
BOLIVIA X X
BRAZIL X
CHILE X X
COLOMBIA X x
COST, RICA x x
DOMINICA X X
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC X X
ECUADOR X X
EL SALVADOR X x
FRENCH GUIANA X X
GRENADA X X
GUADELOUPE X X
GUATEMALA X x
GUYANA X X X X X
HAITI X
HONDURAS X
JAMAICA X
MARTINIQUE X X
MEXICO X X
NETH. ANTILLES X X
NICARAGUA X X X X X X
PANAMA X X
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' ECRET NOFORN
Official Official Political. Official Official Political
Military Economic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra-
Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion
PERU
PUERTO RICO X
ST. LUCIA X
ST. VINCENT X..
SURINAME X X X x x
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO X
URUGUAY X
VENEZUELA X
NORTH AFRICA
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
WESTERN SAHARA
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ANGOLA X X
BENIN X X X X
BOTSWANA X
BURKINA X X X
BURUNDI X X X
CAMERON X
CAPE VERDE X x
C.A.R.
CHAD
CONGO X X x
EQUATORIAL GUINEA X X
ETHIOPIA X X X X
GHANA X X X X X
GUINEA X X
GUINEA-BISSAU X x x
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Official Official Political. Official official Political
Military Econanic Penetra- Military Economic Penetra-
Assistance Assistance tion Assistance Assistance tion
KENYA
LESOTHO
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITIUS
MOZAMBIQUE X
NAMIBIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
RWANDA
SAO TOME PRINCIPE X
SEYCHELLES X
SIERRA LEONE X
SOMALIA
SCIJTH AFRICA
SUDAN
TANZANIA X
UGANDA
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
EAST ASIA
MALAYSIA
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
X
X x
X x
X x x x
25X1
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CYPRUS
IRAQ
JORDAN
LEBANON
OMAN
NORTH YEMEN
SOUTH YEMEN
SYRIA
TURKEY
U.A.E.
SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN
BANGLADESH
NEPAL
PAKISTAN
Official Official Political.
Military Econanic Penetra-
Assistance Assistance tion
Official official Political
Military Econanic Prnetra-
Assistance Assistance tion
*Excludes countries in which Cuban and/or Libyan involvement is minimal.
25X1
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