LETTER TO DONALD T. REGAN FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704330038-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 18, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washint on.D C 20505
18 July 1985
The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff and Assistant to
the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Don,
This is something you will find interesting
and possibly useful on some of the questions
concerning us. Also, the President might find it
interesting weekend reading.
Yours,
William J. Casey
Enclosure:
NIC 03568-85, dtd 16 July 1985
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Tic Director of Central Intelli,ence
WJ; 1un km.1) C ?0505
18 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Soviet Opportunities in the Middle East (S)
1 . Our recent assessments of Gorbachev have focused on his energetic
and innovative approach to domestic affairs in the Soviet Union--particularly
the economy, where some of his actions and statements suggest potential for
some change. He has yet, in our view, to turn his attention in the same way
to foreign affairs, where he will confront both problems and opportunities.
(S/NF)
2. Many of the problems the Soviets have in foreign policy are of their
own making, often due simply to ideological blinders or ham-handed tactics.
One of the areas in which a more innovative approach could bring the Soviets
significant potential gains is the Middle East. In the attached paper, the
National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, using the technique of
creating a fictitious memorandum to Gorbachev, lays out some of the
opportunities that might await Moscow in that region from the perspective
of the new Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. While lacking foreign policy
experience, Shevardnadze, as a Georgian, is familiar with Islam and the
Middle East. While the purported Shevardnadze memo is long, it is uncommonly
well written and both interesting and intriguing. I suggest it for weekend
reading. It shows how troublesome a creative Soviet approach to the Middle East
could he. (S/NF)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC 03568-85
16 July 1985
MEMURANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: What Eduard Shevardnadze Might Tell Gorbachev about the
Middle East
"Dear Comrade General Secretary,
"You have asked me to review our policies in the Middle East with a
view towards being more imaginative, flexible, and activist. You may get
more than you bargained for. You know I am just a simple Georgian with
little foreign policy background. But I have been living down in Georgia
on the border with these rug merchants all my life. I know them. And
I've talked with our MFA specialists and KGB experts to get more input.
They are unhappy with things. Far be it from me to criticize the wise
leadership of my long-time predecessor--I leave that to you. But I would
like to suggest a number of new ways of thinking--perhaps less of the old
thunder and a little more lightning.
"I must frankly state that there are many major opportunities for the
USSR in this region which we have severely neglected over the past
decades. A bolder, more flexible and more imaginative policy could bring
us significant gains in the region vis-a-vis the US. Some of this calls
for greater confidence in our own society, our strengths, steadfastness,
and the role of our own minorities. It also calls for a greater
ideological flexibility to counter the buffeting winds of ideological
change around the world. Soviet power is the critical backdrop to all
that we do. But let's not be so muscle-bound that we can't play
effectively at the subtle and fast-moving Middle East game.
"We Marxists pride ourselves on sensitivities of the flow of history,
the convergence and correlation of historical forces. The Middle East is
currently undergoing a major shift of sociological, religious, and
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ideological forces in the resurgence of Islam. We must be alert to this
trend, roll with it and exploit it rather than passing ideological
judgment upon it.
"An old Georgian proverb says: "God created back and front positions
but either way makes the same baby." The road to Soviet success in the
Middle East can come from espousing both front and back ways to gaining
influence. Marxism-Leninism offers great potential as a guide to
establishing and securing power. Marxist-Leninist ruling parties
represent the ultimate political accomplishment--but we should not remain
bound to this ideology as the only vehicle for moving to influence and
power. Marxism will attract the progressive-minded--but the Middle East
is by and large hardly progressive-minded. As we say in Tbilisi, "If the
pig likes swill, don't waste time giving it peacock and brandy." If
Islam is what turns the rag-heads on, don't deny it to them. Let's
recognize the power of Islam--however much it falls short of the
perfection of Moscow society.
"We have lived with Islam, with Muslims, in our own Soviet Union and
Imperialist Russia for many centuries. We understand them and can use
them. We can always keep up support for progressive socialist and
Communist movements. But let's not limit ourselves to one approach.
Let's exploit Islam more effectively. Defeat of the Western position
comes before the ultimate triumph of Communism.
"I would summarize my major recommendations as follows. Don't reject
them out of hand but read what I have to say later in the paper.
-- Accept the reality that Islam is on the rise in the Muslim
world. Reorder our interpretation of it, stressing that it is
progressive, emphasizing its anti-Western, anti-libertarian,
anti-colonialist social revolutionary aspects. We were very
good at this in the early 1920's. Be confident that in most
cases radical Islam will pave the way to the destruction of
pro-Western bourgeois forces and provide ultimate opportunities
for organized Marxist parties to pick up the pieces. Have
confidence that our own Muslims will not be enticed away by the
dubious charms of life in the contemporary Islamic world.
-- Provide covert Soviet support for Islamic fundamentalism in
selected pro-Western moderate Islamic countries, especially
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.
-- Drop our current ideological hostility to the Iranian Revolution
and attempt to align ourselves with it, positioning ourselves
for its ultimate collapse.
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Reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel.
Work for reunification of the PLO overriding Syrian objections.
Induce a change in the leadership of the PDRY to restore its
support to a variety of leftist national liberation movements in
the Gulf.
Breathe new life into the moribund Tripartite Alliance between
Libya, Ethiopia and PDRY.
Be prepared to face a new long-range strategic shift in the
subcontinent in which we gain Afghanistan and Pakistan, but lose
India. Over the longer run we may be compelled to weaken Indian
strength and stability.
Provide covert support to a Pan-Kurdish movement--with good ties
to Armenian ASALA--in order to weaken Turkey and Iran.
Put the USSR at the head of the Middle East peace process with
our own active plans designed to upstage and overshadow any US
peace initiative.
Enable Soviet Muslim scholars, scientists and technicians to
play a far more active role in Middle East contacts including
bilateral contacts between the Soviet Muslim Republics and the
Muslim World.
Use mutual concern for falling oil revenues as a basis to
establish a working relationship with OPEC and as a foot in the
door to regular contacts with Gulf oil states where we now lack
diplomatic ties. Reinforce the concept that the West is
orchestrating the collapse of Third World oil-producing states.
"Our hopes for major ideological influence in the 50's and 60's seem
to have diminished greatly as bourgeois nationalists, military, or
religious elements have taken charge in most countries. The monarchies
have been rather more enduring than we anticipted. In those few
countries where a revolutionary situation might be developing we see
small chance that these upheavals would move in pro-Soviet directions in
the foreseeable future.
-- Many of these revolutionary situations are in fact being
exploited by right wing reactionary Islamic fundamentalist
movements. While these fundamentalist movements can be
dangerous and are unquestionably hostile to Communism, at the
very least they stand a good chance of overthrowing entrenched
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Western--and especially US--interests in the region. As such
ey are objectively progressive anted will harm the US more than
they will harm us. Over the longer run these religious regimes
will have feet of clay and will ultimately spark a mass public
reaction against themselves. Such an overthrow of clerical
regimes will offer opportunities to leftist parties--especially
once the fundamentalists have already largely destroyed the
pro-Western elite.
Our single greatest opportunity continues to lie in exploiting
the near total US identification with Israel in the Muslim
world. We must move to preempt the US peace initiative with
initiatives of our own. We must exploit growing US
Congressional opposition to US arms sales to moderate Arab
states to enter those some markets ourselves.
-- The greatest opportunities for major improvements in our
position lie in Iran and Pakistan.
-- We must revitalize the ties among the radical states and attempt
to direct them in a more coordinated fashion against the US
without becoming involved in the more adventuristic policies
which could lead to unnecessary confrontation with the West.
"Iran. This country is our gut concern. We have been concerned for
decades with our southern underbelly of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. We
Georgians more than once have felt their sting--before being rescued by
our Russian elder brothers. With the neutralization of Afghanistan only
two northern tier countries remain unsympathetic to Soviet
positions--Iran and Turkey. Turkey will be a much harder nut to crack,
but Iran is moving toward a period of crisis. The clerical regime is
losing support and is becoming increasingly discredited. Bourgeois
pro-Western forces have been largely eliminated within the country,
leaving opportunities for both the Tudeh and the more native leftist
movement--the Mujahedin-e-Khalq--in a potential position to strike out
for power. We need to employ both public carrots and covert sticks with
Iran. Either way we must move swiftly to take advantage of the rare
window of opportunity we now have--where the US has no cards at all to
play there.
-- We must not sacrifice our major investment in Iraq until we are
fairly confident we are gaining significant ground in Iran. But
we should not worry about Iraq much. Iraq will still critically
need us for major military supplies even if we improve our
relations with Iran. In a sense Iraq has nowhere else to go.
And Iraq has been of decreasing value to us for a decade. I
would ask how it contributes to Soviet foreign policy goals now.
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-- There is reason to believe increasing military and economic
desperation in Iran will move it toward a position of greater
flexibility toward us. Let's not play too hard-ass if we can
make some major gains--especially in the area of major strategic
arms sales. We can always influence Iranian usage of these
weapons through military trainers and advisors--and state
publicly our goal is to work to wind down the war.
-- Let Iran also know clearly only we can turn off the major
military pipeline to Iraq and only we can rebuild a major
military force in Iran after the war.
-- We must remain alert to exploit opportunities in southern
(Iranian) Azerbaijan. This is the province we possess major
leverage over with our own northern'Azerbaijan cadres. (Between
myself and Gaidar Aliev there is considerable expertise within
the Politburo on Iranian-Caucasus links.) Work must be devoted
to our contacts with other Iranian minorities represented within
the USSR as well: Kurds, Turkmens, etc.
"Afghanistan. No real improvement in our situation can come about
until aid to the rebels is terminated. Pakistan is the key to the
problem. Right now Zia is strong and enjoys major political support from
the US. Recommended actions:
-- Maintain our strong military presence in Afghanistan.
-- Continue the negotiation process with Pakistan in the hopes of
gaining unilateral concessions.
-- Continue or increase border pressures against Pakistan to
maintain the level of tension.
-- Work among left wing, intellectual, and elite classes in
Pakistan--much of which are anti-US--to weaken Zia's pro-US
stance while suggesting that the risk to Pakistan in supporting
the rebels remains high.
-- Husband our major resources in Pakistan until such time as Zia
weakens internally. He is bound to face both economic problems,
due to dwindling foreign revenues, and political problems
stemming from demands for greater political party participation
in the system. Once he falters badly we can move hard
politically.
-- Continue to develop capabilities among Pakistan ethnic elements
especially in Baluchistan and the Sind.
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-- Play up the threat of Pakistan's nuclear developments. This
both upsets India and creates concern within the US Government
and Congress which could lead to a cutoff of US aid to
Pakistan. Play on potential lack of US staying power in
Pakistan.
Continue to encourage Indian fears about Pakistan. Developments
are in fact moving against us in India since the departure of
Indira, but we must work to convince Rajiv that Pakistan is the
biggest immediate danger to India and presents such a danger
because of US support. India could pull our chestnuts out of
the fire in Afghanistan by taking on Pakistan--if it is
willing. We need to foster Indian willingness to do so.
"India. A fundamental geopolitical change may be coming about in
this region following the liberation of Afghanistan--whether we like it
or not. In 30 years we may have ended up Sovietizing Afghanistan and
successfully neutralizing Pakistan. Pakistan w i l l have by necessity
swung out of the US orbit and into the sphere of Soviet influence,
pushing India closer to the US. If India gets too close to the US we may
need to completely revise our thinking about Indian power and stability.
A pro-Western India may need to be kept weak and internally divided. I
advocate no policy changes now--but let's think about the way this
geopolitical game is moving.
"As noted above, developments in India have not been encouraging in
the last six months.
Rajiv is likely to maintain his quest for Western hi-tech
support, but will be consumed with internal problems as well.
It may well be he will be a negative element for Soviet
interests over the long run. We may need to consider how he
might be removed.
The Sikh crisis in the Punjab is a major threat to his power and
could lead to his demise. While it is too dangerous for us to
support the Sikh movement, we should certainly focus Indian
attention on the external roots of the Sikh
problems--particularly in Pakistan, the US, the UK, and Canada.
We must encourage all elements in Indian society which look for
statist solutions to Indian problems to weaken free enterprise,
pro-Western elements. Chinese economic experiments must be
painted as failures. Any possible Sino-Indian rapprochement
based on more liberalized economies pose a major geostrategic
risk to us.
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"Syria. Syria still remains our most important card in the Arab
world since the loss of our position in Egypt in 1971. As long as we
supply Assad with major arms items we can count on the fact that he will
strongly oppose US and Israeli interests in the region. This investment
is a valuable one. A few cautionary notes, however.
We cannot control to any degree Assad's regional policies--and
he is sometimes inclined toward adventurism. We must
nonetheless strengthen him militarily wherever possible. We must
disabuse Washington of any notion that our commitment to Assad
is limited. While we can write no blank checks to Assad,
Washington and Tel Aviv must be given far more doubts about what
red lines we draw in permitting attacks on Syria.
We must be wary of allowing Assad to provide Israel with an
excuse to attack Syria once again. We cannot provide a blank
check for Syrian defense under those circumstances--especially
if Assad has provoked it.
We must not allow Syria to be our sole vehicle for Soviet
ambitions in the region. AssacThas already attempted to swallow
up the PLO--with whom we have had a long and close
association--and has virtually pushed Arafat into the US camp.
He has already preempted much of an independent Soviet role in
Lebanon.
Maintain arms supplies to Syria. Syrian regional steadfastness
is essential.
Support Syrian diplomatic efforts to wreck any US-sponsored
peace process.
Attempt to reunite the PLO under Arafat--over Syrian objections.
Establish an independent Soviet capability in Lebanon for the
future. Syria's game in Lebanon is the maintenance of Syrian
power. Our goal is to create an infrastructure of progressive
forces which can grow over the years and which will hopefully
come to dominate nationalist and bourgeois groups. Extremist
religious activities are of dwindling value once they have
succeeded in weakening the US and Israeli presence. We must now
be looking to the next and higher stage: strengthening of
progressive forces. Amal must remain a key Soviet target of
influence for the USSR--even if it displeases the
Syrians--because of its potential dominant role in Lebanon.
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-- Build long-term leftist influence within Syria. Right now there
are no significant progressive pro-Soviet elements within the
government. We face very few opportunities when Assad dies and
run the risk of a possible reversion to a more nationalist
group. We must base our position in Syria on a long-term
cooperation with nationalist and military elements until other
alternatives emerge.
"The Gulf. The Gulf war has been largely a disaster for Soviet
interests:
Our two major allies--Syria and Iraq--are now totally hostile,
rendering any cooperation on anti-Western goals nearly out of
the question.
Iraq has drifted toward the Western camp and no longer supports
any progressive pro-Soviet causes in the region. Saddam flirts
with Washington, Arafat, Hussein and Mubarak. This is an ally?
Iraqi revolutionary influence down the Gulf has been diminished.
The Gulf states have formed a defensive alliance in the GCC and
basically have turned to the US for support.
The war has distracted Arab state attention from the
Arab-Israeli issue--our strong card.
Yet I see no major opportunities for the USSR to bring the war to a
close. But I do know that if the US tactic is to choke off Iran, we
should not be party to that goal. There is almost no opportunity for
leftist revolution in the Gulf. Such revolutionary movements as exist
are primarily fundamentalist in nature. This nonetheless possesses some
positive elements for Soviet interests since these movements may yet be
able to dislodge pro-Western governments and monarchies--a major goal.
We cannot look for any other positive opportunities for the USSR in the
Gulf for sometime to come, however. Recommendations:
-- Encourage Iraq to expand its influence down the Gulf in the form
of Ba'th party cells--which will at least ensure some organized
alternative opposition to fundamentalist movements.
-- Stimulate PDRY support of leftist movement in the Gulf--which it
used to do in the 1970's.
-- Seek opportunities for the USSR to serve as broker in the Gulf
war--especially if we can gain a position of influence in Iran.
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Let Iran know that Soviet support to Iraq can effectively
prevent Iran from ever winning the war, but that it lies within
Soviet power to greatly strengthen the Iranian military after
the war.
Engage the USSR in support of OPEC price and production problems
as a means of entree into the conservative Gulf states--while
retaining some independence of action in the oil market. OPEC
has frequently sought our support--and we have been
unimaginative enough to turn them down.
Encourage the Gulf states to establish diplomatic relations with
the USSR. Stress that they are vulnerable to fundamentalist and
leftist radical groups as long as their foreign ties are
unbalanced and pro-US.
Devote major efforts to opening up arms relations with these
states. The US is likely to diminish its arms sales to the Gulf
in the near future due to Congressional opposition. This
provides major opportunity for Soviet arms ties. We would then
be competing primarily against Western Europe. The arms
relationship is the major key to establishing an important
Soviet presence and working ties with the elite and the military
of these countries.
The weak Gulf states must perceive that Soviet ties can serve to
legitimize and protect them--even from leftist Iraqi or Syrian
pressures--given Soviet influence in those states.
"The PORY. We have allowed this country to go from an important and
activist role among revolutionary progressive forces in the Gulf in the
1970's to a stinking backwater and showcase for nothing. We draw at
present precious little political benefit from the PDRY despite our
access to military facilities and PDRY lip service to broader Soviet
foreign policy goals. We must woek to remove the present President,
al-Hasani, and restore the old revolutionary leadership. PDRY must
reopen the prospects for radical leftist liberation movements in the
Gulf--which are now moribund: the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf, etc. PDRY
can turn up the heat against the YAR. PDRY must play a greater role in a
community of radical regional states which it has all but abandoned
during the last half decade. We must reinvigorate the Tripartite
Alliance between PDRY, Ethiopia and Libya--virtually a dead letter at
present.
"The Peace Process. The US peace initiative represents one of the
major threats to our overall position in the Middle East.
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A US-sponsored peaceful settlement would work to diminish the
single greatest liability the US faces in the region--the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Reduced military tensions will partially reduce the options for
arms sales to the region--our chief source of access.
Reduced tensions mean regional countries will turn more towards
developmental projects--in which Western countries are clearly
at a great advantage over us.
A Pax Americana will strengthen the moderate states and weaken
the position of the radical states.
A Pax Americana will reinforce the idea that the USSR is a
superfluous element in Middle East politics.
Support Syria fully in its efforts to defer the peace process.
Syria is the _single most effective means to combat it; we can be
confident Syria will pull out all the stops if necessary to
succeed.
The point must be crystal clear to all in the region that there
is no peace settlement without the USSR playing its rightful
role. The Arabs must understand that only the USSR can prevent
imposition of a humiliating and imposed peace settlement on
Israeli terms.
Reunite the PLO--against Syrian wishes if necessary--to insure
that all radical factions are included, thereby insuring it
cannot come to terms with US capitulationist peace tactics.
Continue to develop alternative Soviet peace plans. These peace
plans must hold appeal to the moderate Arab states and to
Western Europe--keeping alive in the moderate Arab state minds
the realization that reasonable alternative plans and processes
exist to the present American-Israeli diktat. Such Soviet peace
plans need remain only one step more forthcoming toward
Palestinian and Arab claims in order to make US plans less
attractive. w i l l also strengthen the idea of Soviet presence
at an international conference. And let's get our own peace
shuttle going out there. We can only play in the peace game by
playing in the peace game.
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-- If a US-sponsored peace plan really gains momentum and neither
we nor the Syrians can block it, we will need to consider
associating ourselves with it in some fashion as a
damage-limitation operation. Even if some settlement is reached
we can still exploit its shortcomings and regional tensions will
not in any case really evaporate.
"Israel. Let's reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel. We
possess a powerful bargaining chip with Israel in the presence of Soviet
Jews wishing to emigrate. Restored relations with Israel will enable us
to play this card better. We can maybe stimulate greater Israeli
sensitivities to our own Soviet positions. The existence of ties between
ourselves and Israel will also weaken US claims that it alone can
negotiate with Israel. Sure the initial Arab reaction will at first be
negative--what else? But we can remind the Arabs that normalization of
relatioths over the longer run places us in a position to play a red ater
role in the Arab-Israeli problem so that we cannot be excluded by
anyone. Why shouldn't a superpower have relations with everyone?
"Libya. Qadhafi is dangerous and unpredictable, but is valuable in
attacking Western positions around the world. We should strengthen our
arms ties to him enabling him to continue acting forcefully in the
region. As long as we are not identified with his more irresponsible
acts we have little to lose through his activities. Let's encourage
Qadhafi to work with PURY and Ethiopia where possible to resuscitate the
Tripartite Alliance. And let's quickly upgrade our formal ties with
Libya. Again, no blank checks, but we need to ensure the US worries a
lot more about what we will do if Qadhafi is threatened.
"Egypt. I see no major opportunities for us in Egypt in the
foreseeable future--by way of creating a pro-Soviet regime. The best we
can hope for is the collapse of the Egyptian-Israeli accord and the end
to pro-US leadership in Egypt--still major gains. Right wing
fundamentalist forces are the major threat to the US position in Egypt.
Successful overthrow of pro-Western elements will at least neutralize
Egypt--while not necessarily leading to strengthening Soviet ties. Let's
strengthen fundamentalism here where we can.
-- We must also work to strengthen Nasserist forces in Egypt. They
are latently anti-US, anti-Israeli and anti-imperialist.
Egyptian intellectuals love Nasser; let's use it. Call for a
more independent Egypt--harking back to the days when Egypt was
a power to bleared in the Arab world--with Soviet support.
Nasserist forces--combined with the fundamentalists--are in a
position to bring down a pro-US Egyptian policy. Any change in
Egypt would also strike a major blow to the moderate pro-US bloc
in the region. Iraqi-Egyptian and Algerian-Egyptian ties are
especially undesirable.
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"North Africa. Some opportunities here. The pro-Western leadership
in Morocco is under great pressure and in the next few years could
collapse. We should improve ties with Morocco as much as possible now to
work toward that day. They can use money and want arms. Like Egypt, a
revolution against the Moroccan government is likely to come from the
right--which will at least eliminate Morocco's strong pro-Western
sympathies.
"Our position in Algeria has been weakening for many years, and there
are few near term options for us there other than attempting to keep
Algeria from sliding too heavily toward the US. Few things seem more
depressing than once radical states working their way back toward
moderation.
"Turkey. "When the Turk farts, Tbilisi swoons." We Georgians know
them better than we like. Turkey represents the last pro-Western bastion
on our southern borders. Ankara can play a serious role in hindering our
future options in Iran. Turkey must be weakened and isolated until such
time as pro-Western elements there are on the wane.
The Kurdish issue is critical to weakening Turkey. We should
expand our covert and unattributable support for the Kurdish
movement. The strengthening of a pan-Kurdish movement will also
have effect on Iraq and Iran; but in the case of Iran, it can
only serve to help weaken the central government and strengthen
separatist forces alongside of Iranian Azerbaijan. Only in Iraq
will it hurt a government with whom we have good relations.
Iraq is already drifting westward and the price is affordable.
Let the Iraqis worry about it.
A growing Kurdish movement inside Turkey immediately affects US
airbases in Eastern Turkey--the heart of Kurdish territory.
Harsh repression by Turkey will only draw down criticism of
Turkey in Europe and the US on the human rights level and will
compromise Turkey's position in Europe and even the US.
Kuraish ties with Armenian ASALA will serve to propagandize the
Kurdish cause, strengthen its capacity to launch terrorist
attacks on Western targets on an international basis for the
first time, and publicize Turkey's repressive role.
Otherwise, Turkish violations of human rights within Turkey
should be publicized to lend moral international support to the
strong latent left-wing movements in Turkey and to create
friction between Turkey and the West.
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"Soviet Muslims. We must be more imaginative in our use of our own
minorities, especially Muslim minorities--in the Middle East. While some
elements of our respected Central Asian brothers might have passing
interest in Islam, one good look at Tehran might cure that.
"Our Muslims have an historic role even in Czarist days of leading
the Muslim world in nationalist anti-colonial thinking--especially among
Turks and Persians. They currently represent an impressive reservoir of
educated and trained cadre able to display Soviet industrial and
technological accomplishments to some Muslim countries. Remember that
California-educated engineers may not be what heavily Islamic-oriented
Middle East countries want in the future. A good Uzbek engineer won't
import free love and do-your-own-thing trash values when he goes to
Tehran or Saudi Arabia. They can demonstrate the superiority of their
own Islamic Soviet culture over the current economic, political and
social mess and mayhem that dominates the Muslim world today--and free of
corrupting Western values. They are ideally suited to serve as a
foot-in-the-door in many conservative Islamic societies where non-Muslims
are less trusted. This potential reservoir of influence has been largely
neglected until now. Imaginative use of these assets can be of great
value to Soviet foreign policy goals--especially in countries under
increasingly Islamic regimes.
"Although some of these proposals may fly counter to other policy
positions, most of them merit close consideration. Do not forget that
comrades such as myself and Gaydor Aliev have lived on the border of
these states for a long time, perhaps giving us a special feel for the
mentality.
"Not all of these ideas can be immediately implemented, but their
time will come. Please accept these ideas in the spirit of youthfulness,
imagination, brilliance, and boldness which you bring to your office.
Far be it from me to suggest any failings of our previous foreign policy
leadership. You know we Georgians are simple and direct people who just
like to speak the truth to our Russian elder brothers--with no ambitions
for power of our own.
Edua Shevardnadze"
(This Memo has been shown to NIO/USSR.)
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