SOVIET AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 26, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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; I)ireclorale of
t;\ Intelligence
Soviet Climate Change:
Implications for
Grain Production
*ipecrct
VW (PHA
Secret
G!85-10128
May 1985
A I
S
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Implications for
Grain Production
Soviet Climate Change:
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Strategic Resources Division, OG
This paper was prepared by
Secret
G185-10128
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Sccrel
.% Y ! OM A
Summary
Information available
as of ii..pril 1985
was used in this report.
below target. Thus, at this level of production. Moscow will remain
dependent on foreign sources for grains if the leadership intends to achieve
projected levels of livestock production and fulfill promises to improve the
diet of Soviet citizens. Given the uncertainties of climate prediction, the
grain-growing environment in the USSR could be somewhat better or
worse than this most likely estimate:
- If a more favorable climate prevails, one with precipitation -equal to the
average as low as 165 million tons annually.
1976-80 period---the best five-year average of the last 65 years-and if
fertilizer:dc ivcries,.reach=planned levels,- the Soviets could produce an
average of 221 million tons per year.
With bad weather similar to the 1961-65 period-the lowest five-year
average precipitation of the last 25 years-and fertilizer deliveries
increasing at only the average rate of the last 10 years, production could
Secret
G1 15-101 28
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Implications for
Grain Production
Soviet Climate Change:
During the past several decades, grain production in the USSR has
benefited from a general improvement in climate-increased precipitation
and slightly higher temperature-and massive investments in agrotech-
nology. Of these two factors, climate and agrotechnology, the former has
been the most important. Aside from its direct impact on crop growth,
climate indirectly determines in- large measure the effectiveness of technol-
ogy such as fertilizer applications. Other determinants of grain output such
as political decisions, the quality of management, and worker incentives,
while important, have had much less impact.
account for 20 percent of Soviet grain production.
While the long-term climate trend has been favorable, there has been a
slight drop in precipitation in the 1980s. However, it is too early to assume
a permanent change in the long-term pattern. Our analysis indicates that
precipitation probably will remain near its present level during the rest of
the decade. At the same time, we expect temperatures to continue their rise
in the grain area because of worldwide increases-in atmospheric carbon
dioxide. Temperature increases will lengthen the growing season in the
north-providing opportunities for increased production of hardier crops
such as rye. Increased temperatures, however, will exacerbate the dry
conditions in the southern Urals, lower Volga, and Kazakhstan-areas that
Long-term weather patterns and trends in fertilizer deliveries to agricul-
ture suggest that Soviet grain production during the 1986-90 period most
) likely will average 195 million metric tons annually-about 60 million tons
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Secrel
\Ol ( R
currency imports.
Given the scenarios, Moscow will not be able to make rapid progress on two
key goals of the Food Program-improving food supplies while reducing
dependence on Western farm products. Indeed, the Soviets would need to
import an average of 15 to 65 million tons of grain annually during the
1986-90 period to meet domestic requirements. Although imports at the
upper end of this range are logistically and financially feasible, they would
strain the transportation system and could force reduction in other hard
At least two options could enable the Soviets to boost grain output
substantially above our most likely estimate. For example, grain yields
could be raised significantly by importing more and better agrochemicals
and improving application techniques. We believe the Soviets could also
increase grain production by changing the crop mix. Specifically, we
estimate that a substitution of corn for wheat and other grains on irrigated
land could result in a net increase of as much as 12 to 14 million tons by
1990. Despite the benefits associated with such options, the Soviets have al-
ways been slow to change agricultural policy.
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Soviet Climate Change:
Implications for
Grain Production
Introduction
Soviet efforts to put more and better meat on the
table-a principal measure by which Soviet citizens
judge their standard of living-have resulted in mas-
sive investments in agriculture and in grain produc-
tion in particular. Over the past two decades, Moscow
has committed billions of rubles to land reclamation
and irrigation, the production of agrochemicals, farm
machinery and equipment, and to a wide variety of
construction. These measures, coupled with generally
favorable weather, have caused grain production to
increase impressively. Nonetheless, the demands of
the steadily increasing livestock herds for grain still
far exceed the amount farms have been reliably able
to produce. As a result, the Soviets have been forced
to expend sizable amounts of hard currency for grain
imports.
Numerous factors have prevented the Soviets from
achieving their grain production goals, including poor
management and lack of incentives for farm workers.
We believe that the moat important-factories the year-
o-year variation in Soviet grain production has been cathcr. Indeed, the cRunate i although gradually
getting warmer and wetter, is generally unfavorable
for grain cultivation-xBecause climate changes slowly
over many years, while weather varies widely from
year to year, a long weather record is necessary to
analyze climate trends properly. We developed a
climate data base, covering 1920-84, to analyze his-
torical weather records and project weather for the
next five years. Our research also indicated that
fertilizer deliveries to agriculture, an important factor
in Soviet attempts to increase grain yields, can serve
as a surrogate for other kinds of technological im-
provements in regression analysis. This study shows
that past changes in Soviet climate and technology-
particularly the precipitation component of climate
Secret
\!)H)K.Y
and the fertilizer component of technology
correspond well with historical variations in grain
production and should provide a key to future Soviet
performance..,
The Role of Climate
Grain is grown primarily in a zone extending from the
borders of Eastern Europe to western Siberia-nearly
4.500 kilometers (km) west to east-and from the dry
steppes of Central Asia to the tundra regions-some
1,800 km south to north. For the most part, soils in
the zone arc comparable or somewhat inferior to those
of the northern plains of the United States. Soil
deficiencies aside, our analysis indicates that the low
precipitation in the relatively more important south-
ern regions (Ukraine, Volga Valley, and the Caucasus)
has been the key limitation to grain production in the
USSR. Primarily because of yearly variation in pre-
cipitation. total grain production during the 197 1-80
period ranged from a low of 140 million metric tons in
1975 to an alltime high of about 237 million tons in
1978. Only about 2 percent of the grain area in the
USSR is irrigated, and it accounts for only about 6
percent of production.
The timing of rainfall can be as important as the
annual volume. In the Soviet l~nion, most grain crops
are grown with less reliable precipitation than in the
United States. Moreover, in most grain areas a
smaller percentage of annual precipitation is concen-
trated during the growing season than in the United
States. This is the case, for example, throughout most
Climate is weather over a longer period. For example, daily mean
temperature is used to describe weather, while mean temperature
for 10 years or longer is used to characterize climate. Both are
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of the Ukraine and northern Caucasus- the most
important Soviet grain-growing region---which is gen-
erally comparable in climate to eastern Nebraska and
southern Minnesota. The Nebraska/ Minnesota areas
generally receive over 610 millimeters (mm) of precip-
itation per year, of which 75 percent occurs during
April to September (when the grain is growing) and
thus can be used most effectively by the plants. In
contrast, the Ukraine/Caucasus region receives about
510 mm, with only 55 percent falling during the
growing season.
Although precipitation is the principal determinant of
grain yields in the most important grain regions of the
USSR, agricultural decisions by the Soviet leadership
can have a lesser but still important impact on
production. For example, the record-high five-year
average production of 205 million tons during 1976-
80 resulted not only from three consecutive years of
good weather (1976-78)-highly unusual-but also
from a decision to substantially increase planted area.
Total harvested area during the three-year period
averaged almost 129 million hectares (ha). In contrast.
during the 1981-84 period, the weather was relatively
poorer and the average harvested area dropped to an
estimated 122 million ha, mainly because of a deci-
sion to increase fallow, a technique used in the USSR
primarily to build up soil moisture and dampen year-
to-year fluctuations in production. Largely because of
these factors, production during 1981-84 declined to
an estimated average of 180 million tons.
Climate Change
Our analysis of the two most common measures of
climate, average annual precipitation and tempera-
ture, shows a slow change in the climate throughout
the Soviet grain-growing region. Both temperature
and precipitation are increasing. While precipitation
and temperature are related, our analysis indicates
that precipitation is normally the more important
factor in determining Soviet grain yields.
Long-Term Trend. Since-thc-1930s there has been a
'general trend of increasing precipitation- in the Soviet
grain-growing region e 2). AliLough pee tti-
tlon hu-v rigid greatly.rgw year-to lear, on average
it has increased 'about 20 mm per decade since the
The precipitation and temperature regimes of the
major grain-,growing regions of the Soviet Union were
compiled front data recorded at 66 Soviet clintatoloa,,-
ic?al .stations.- The stations are distributed nt?arlt?
evenly across the grain-growing regions of the USSR
(figure I ). OJ. the 66 stations. 21 provided data front
it 9 20 to / 949. all provided data from 1950 to 1974.
and 36 provided data from /975 to /984.
Because of the good correspondence between annual
averages obtained from the sets of 21, 36. and 66
stations for the period /950 to 1974, we were able to
use the data from only the 21 stations for 1920-49
and the 36 stations for 1975-84 with corthdence. The
grain region's annual temperature and precipitation
averages were obtained by weighting each station's
average hr the fraction of total grain area N ithin a
surrounding polvgon.b The annual precipitation aver-
ages of the 21 and 36 station sets were in most cases
within 2 to 3 percent of the annual averages of the 66
stations, and the five-year averages of the 21 and 36
station sets were within / to 1.5 percent of thefive-
year averages of the 66 stations (table 1). Even better
correspondence was obtained in the temperature com-
parisons.
? Sources of information for this data base are "World Weather
Records, -published by the old US Weather Bureau. and -
Month-/Y Climatic Data for the World. " published by the 'ational
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration t.V04A). (U)
.a standard technique called the Thiessen polygon ,arhod was
used. The technique assumes that the precipitation at and station
can he applied halfway to the next station in any direction. The
polygons are formed by the perpendicular bisectors of the line
joining nearby stations. The grain area in each polygon is used to
..eight the precipitation amount for temperature) of the station in
1940s. Precipitation averaged about 476 mm in the
1970s-25 mm more than the 1960s and 71 mm
(almost 3 inches) more than the dry 1930s. The latest
five-year average (1980-84) shows a slight decrease to
470 mm-still considerably above the long-term
(1920-84) average of 435 mm.
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Figure 2
Annual Precipitation in Major Grain Area, I920-84
0 1920 00 40 ~0
-Total is for October through Sertember
t' ..serages for 21 stations, 66 station.. and 36 ,taturn, respccn%els %crr
used for the periods 1920-49. 19511-V, and 197s.x4
Although precipitation in the grain-producing zone
has increased overall, analysis of the weather data
shows a significant change in the geographical distri-
bution of precipitation during the last 10 years (1975-
84) compared with the 1950-74 period (figure 3). Most
of the grain area experienced an increase in precipita-
tion-as much as 75 mm in parts of European
RSFSR and eastern Ukraine. Significant decreases
occurred, however, in some important grain-
producing areas of the southern Urals and western
and eastern Kazakhstan-in some cases a decline of
about 25 mm or more occurred in these regions.
As for temperature, our analysis also shows a gradual
increase overall in the grain-growing region, from a
10-year average of about 4.5?C in the 1940s to about
5.0?C for the 1975-84 period (table I and figure 4,
Part of this long-term temperature increase may
reflect urbanization (increased pollution and city
heat-island effects). The rest may represent an in-
crease in air temperature worldwide that US scientists
generally attribute to a rise in atmospheric carbon
dioxide.'
An analysis of changes in temperatures by geographic
area shows regional changes in annual temperature
during the last 10 years (1975-84) compared with the
1950-74 period (figure 5). Temperature increases of
about 0.5? to 1.0?C are evident over most of the
north, central, and eastern regions of the grain area.
A climatic increase in temperature usually causes a
lengthening of the growing period, which in the future
may permit additional areas in Siberia and northern
European RSFSR to come under cultivation, especial-
ly with the hardier rye varieties that are already
showing success. On the other hand, we believe future 25X1
temperature increases in the southern Urals, lower
Volga, and Kazakhstan would further exacerbate the
already dry climate there.
Future Trends. Our analysis of climate indicates that
temperature will continue to increase and precipita-
tion is likely to remain above the long-term average.
Although average annual precipitation during the
1980-84 period was slightly less than during the
1970s-470 mm compared with 476 mm-it is still
too early to conclude that a downward trend-or
leveling off-has set in. Indeed, recent precipitation
levels are still well above the pre-1970 averages.
Secret 6
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Figure 4
Average Annual Temperature for the Soviet Grain Area ,4 1920-84
Dcgrccs ~cnllvrJtlr
-w
? N,cragc ., Inr I Llrnrr Ihrnuch tirrtc ohcr
I' Avc rage. for -'I .tatwn,. nn .Iallon.. and 16 .Ld wn.. respci u+clc . me
used for the pern,d, Wit-44, anJ 147; 44
We postulate that, for the 1986-90 period, average
rainfall should not depart greatly from the 1980-84
average of 470 mm even though year-to-year precipi-
tation amounts will continue to vary widely. Statisti-
cal analysis of the change in precipitation between
sequential five-year intervals during the 1920-84 peri-
od showed about a 50-percent probability that precipi-
tation in the 1986-90 period will average 476 mm or
above, and about a I5-percent probability that it will
be above 500 mm or below 440 mm.
As for temperature, we expect an increase that will
generally follow the long-term_trend,,as a`tesulf of a
continued increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide.
The temperature increase, however, may not be as
great as that experienced from 1975-79 to 1980-84
(4.7? to 5.4?C), since the latter period was considera-
bly above trend. Continuation of the trend of five-year
averages from the 1940s to 1990 would place the
average 1985-90 temperature at about 5.0? to 5.2?C.
Climate and Technology
Climate directly affects crop growth and technology
inputs, namely fertilizer. Together climate and tech-
nology arc key determinants of grain yields. Further-
more, other technological improvements-such as
new seed varieties and the application of improved
herbicides and pesticides-are not totally Effective
without good weather. For example, should precipita-
tion in the USSR return to the low levels of the 1930s
and 1940s. the benefits of most of the new technology
would be greatly reduced.' If the climate continues to
improve for grain production or remains about the
same, more likely in our view, Soviet success in raising
production will increasingly rely on technology. Our
analysis indicates that chemical fertilizer has been an
' Under such circumstances, lack of moisture would be the key
Meld-limiting :actor. For example, fertilizer needs moisture to be
used ett-ectivci. by crops. Furthermore. additional technological
investments such as new iced varieties, herbicides, or farm tillage
and irrigation equipment would have little value without timely and
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imptrtant input in enhancutg grain yields We also ? I he lott,rahle. based on the 1`176-KO 1pcrntd. which
found that. in regression inalxsis. fertiliicr can sersc shows the highest Live year precipitation ;tser;age
as a surrogate for the other kind,., of' technological 1498 ntm) of our 65-year record.
improvements gradually introduccd during the last 25 ? The unfavorable and least likely, based on the live-
`carsyear period 1961-65, which averaged 438 mm. the
1--t if the last 25 vcars.l
Looking Ahead
To evaluate the impact of climate change on future
grain output in the Soviet Union, we selected three
alternative weather scenarios--favorable, most likely.
and unfavorable. Because of the important impact of
technology on grain production, we also developed
three corollary scenarios for fertilizer deliveries to
agriculture. The combinations of weather and fertiliz-
er scenarios were used in a newly developed regression
model to estimate future grain yields. We believe that
the nominal-or most likely -combination of weather
and fertilizer scenarios provides the best indication of
Soviet grain production for the rest of the 1980s.`E
Weather Scenarios. We estimate with confidence
from weather trends (figures 2 and 4 and table I1 that
during 1986-90 the average precipitation in the grain
area will most likely range between 450 and 490 mm
and that temperature will average between 5.00 to
5.2?C. The general upward trend in temperature and
precipitation is consistent with the findings of the
National Academy of Science; which projects that
mean global temperature and precipitation will in-
crease because of increases in atmospheric carbon
dioxide. Nevertheless, the Academy cannot predict
the magnitude or location of such increases. The
climate probably would not suddenly revert to the
lower precipitation levels of the 1940s and 1950s,
although sudden shifts in precipitation-as in the
1930s-are still possible
The three weather scenarios we selected to estimate
the range of Soviet production in the 1986-90 period
are:
? The most likely, derived from the precipitation and
temperature regimes of the 1970-84 period with
annual averages of 474 mm and 5.00C.
Average grain yields for the 1986-90 period were estimated using
a simple regression model (see the appendix). To derive these
estimates, we examined various factors which influence grain
production Statistical analysis showed that precipitation. tempera-
ture, and the level of fertilizer deliveries to agriculture adequately
? Chanein? (?Irmare. National Academy Press, 1983.
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Fertilizer Delivery Scenarios. Following a four-year
lull that began in the mid-1970s, fertilizer deliveries
to agriculture regained their upward momentum after
1979, growing at an average rate of 1.1 million tons
per year to a record 23.1 million tons in 1984. Such a
continued rate of growth (almost 6 percent per year)
in fertilizer deliveries during the next six years would
fulfill Soviet plans to deliver 30-32 million tons of
fertilizer for crops in 1990.'
We developed three fertilizer delivery scenarios:
J I The high or best case, which projects an annual 6
percent increase in fertilizer delivery, or an average
of about 1.5 million tons per year. Although the 6-
percent rate of growth approximates the 1979-84
average, we doubt that the Soviets will be able to
maintain this rate because of expected lags in the
commissioning of new facilities for the production of
fertilizers, poor management, and the underuse of
existing facilities. The 1984 rate of growth was in
fact less than 1 percent.
? The medium, or most likely case, which projects
that deliveries will increase by about 1.0 million
tons per year, or a 4-percent growth, yielding a total
delivery to agriculture of 29 million tons by 1990.
We judge this scenario the most likely because we
expect the Soviets to fall 1-2 million tons short of
plan in 1985 and be unable to produce enough
fertilizer in 1986-90 to make up the 198 1-85 short-
falls and meet 1986-90 goals as well.
A statistical analysis of the change in precipitation between hve-
year intervals during 1920-84 results in the following approximate
probabilities of occurrence for the three precipitation scenarios
chosen for the 1986-90 period:
15-20 percent probability that precipitation will be 498 mm or
above.
45-50 percent probability that precipitation will be 474 mm or
above.
5.10 percent probability that precipitation will be 438 mm or
below.___________
From Brez nev s s a ement at the CPSU Central Committee
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? the lute case. W11101 prince(. ,t 2-percent-per-.innum
growth rate. This rate tsas derived from a model
using the last It) years' deliveries of fcrtiliicr to
agriculture. The model results project a total deliv-
ery of 26 million tons by 1)90, for an increase of
only about 0.5 million tuns per year
the projected fertilizer deliveries to agriculture for
the entire USSR for the three scenarios described
above were translated into fertilizer delivery rates in
kilograms per hectare (kg/ha) for each republic by
dividing by agricultural area. In all cases, we assume
total harvested area will approximate 124 million ha,
roughly equal to the annual average hectaragc for
1979-83. This relatively lo%% hectaragc figure assumes
that the Soviets will maintain current levels of fallow.
Projected Yields and Production
Grain yields and production to 1990 were calculated
with the regression model using the three fertilizer
scenarios and the actual weather variables for 196I-
65. 1976-80. and 1970-84. periods typical of unfavor-
able, favorable, and most likely weather conditions
(table 2).
The model forecasts that, given what we consider the
most like/ weather and fertilizer scenario, the
USSR's average grain yield during 1986-90 will be
15.7 centners per hectare (ce. ha). Using a harvested
area of about 124 million ha. this equates to an
average annual production of 195 million tons. Given
this scenario, the model projects that there is a 95-
percent probability '? that Soviet grain production
during 1986-90 will average between 180 million tons
and 210 million tons.
With a favorable weather scenario similar to 1976-80
and the high fertilizer delivery levels that the Soviets
are striving to achieve, Moscow could average 17.8
cc/ha or 221 million tons, with a 95-percent probabil-
ity that the average will be more than 206 million tons
but less than 236 million tons.
calculations.
"The 95-percent probability range is approximately defined by the
model's estimate * two standard errors of estimate, or within 15
million tons of the projected average of 195 million tons. One
standard error of estimate was calculated to be 7.5 million tons
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\n Urjlat?r,rh1v Acathcr ccnar w I\ptc,tl of I'thl-h5
(ttic lcasl ltkels of the three scenarios) and low
fcrtiliicr delivery growth rates could plunge average 25X1
grain production to 165 million tons, with less than a
5-percent probability that it would be above 180
million tons.
Analysis of the regression model results, using the
three weather and three fertilizer scenarios and as-
suming a harvested area of 124 million ha, shows that,
of grain.'' 25X1
at a constant fertilizer level, every 10-mm increase in
average annual precipitation will result in a 7.5-
million-ton increase in average grain production. Cor-
respondingly, at a constant precipitation level, every
million-ton increase in fertilizer deliveries to agricul-
ture will produce about an additional 2.5 million tons
Implications
The three grain production scenarios for the 1986-90
period suggest that the USSR will not progress 25X1
rapidly on two key goals of the Food Program-
improving food supplies while reducing dependence on
Western farm products. Indeed, even if grain produc-
tion averages 221 million tons, Moscow would still
need to import at least 15 million tons of grain
annually to maintain current levels of seed, food, and
industrial use, as well as to achieve planned output
levels for meat, milk, and eggs.'2 Given the most likely
scenario of 195 million tons, grain imports would have
to exceed 35 million tons annually.
In the unlikely event that production falls to 165
million tons, the Soviets would require an average of
roughly 65 million tons of grain imports annually.
This would be an enormous amount, but probably not
one beyond the USSR's improved logistic capability.
It would be financially difficult, but possible, so long
as grain prices remain relatively low. 4f" osi w -
" Roughly 60 percent of the 75-million-ton Soviet grain production
increase from the 1961-65 period to the 1976-80 period (130 million
tons versus 205 million tons) was caused by an increase in average
precipitation .438 mm versus 498 mm). The remaining 40 percent
was caused b% improvements in agrotechnology. 25X1
This assumes that neither the mix of feed nor current levels of
animal productivity change.
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Table 2
USSR: Projections of All-Grain Average
Yields and Production, 1986-90
to Agriculture
Low
13.3
Average Production
(million metric tonal
165
95-Percent Probability
Range of Production
(million metric tons)
150-180
Medium
13.6
169
154-184
High
14.2
177
162.192
Favorable weather
Low
16.8
209
194.224
Medium
17.2
214
199-229
High
17.8
221
206-236
Most likely weather
Low
15.3
190
175-205
Medium
15.7
19$
180-210
High
16.2
187-217
., Low, medium, and high increases in fertilizer deliveries to
agriculture correspond to approximately 2-. 4-. and 6-percent
increase, per year.
^ Production is estimated by assuming an average grain area of 124
million hectares, similar to that of the 1979-83 period.
The 9$-percent probability range is approximately defined by the
average = 2 standard errors of estimate.
chooses not to test the transportation system and/or
not to reduce other hard currency imports, however,
the need for grain could be reduced in several ways.
Planners could save a few million tons by reducing the
quantity of grain used for food, industrial purposes,
and export, as they have done in the past. They could
cut grain demand by reducing livestock inventories-
a tactic strenuously avoided since 1975. This would
increase meat supplies temporarily but would proba-
bly slow subsequent growth in meat production. A
third alternative is to curtail quantities of grain fed
per animal. But the reduction would have to be offset
by other feeds or animal productivity, and thus meat,
milk, and egg production would suffer. Consumers
would be faced with diets of somewhat lesser variety
and quality, but the extensive special food distribution
systems put in place during 1979-81 to cope with the
widespread food shortages probably would help offset
the etrects
Soviet Policy Options
In our view, the Soviets have at least two policy
options that may enable them to boost output substan-
tially above the levels indicated in our most likely
weather and fertilizer scenario by 1990:
? Grain yields could be raised significantly if a deci-
sion were made to purchase more and better agro-
chemicals, that is, pesticides, herbicides, fungicides,
plant-disease protective agents, etc., from foreign
suppliers, and if steps were taken to improve appli-
cation at the farm level.
? We also believe the Soviets could increase overall
grain production by changing the crop mix." For
example, by substituting corn for wheat and other
grains on irrigated lands, Moscow could boost out-
put by as much as 12-14 million tons by 1990.
' The potential to increase grain production in the USSR by
changing crop mixes is the topic of a forthcoming CIA research
paper.
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Other options. such as the purchase of turnkey agro-
chemical plants. are possible but would not signifi-
cantly affect production by 1990
Despite the potential benefits associated with these
options, history has shown that the Soviets are slow to
change their agricultural policy, particularly for
wheat production. We judge the possibility of the
Soviets deciding to import larger amounts of agro-
chemicals and agrochemical technology to be some-
what greater than the likelihood of the crop mix being
changed. Recent information
indicates
that the Soviets will test several million hectares in
1985 with imported agrochemicals. Purchases of large
quantities of agrochemicals from the United States
and other Western nations could help boost grain
production above trend in the near term, but the time
required to install turnkey production facilities would
preclude domestic chemical output from reaching a
high enough level to significantly affect grain produc-
tion before 1990.
D I,
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Iq
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